Download The War of 1812 - Ashland Independent Schools

The War of 1812
Two hundred years ago Britain and the United States went to war. The conflict was a relatively
minor affair, but its consequences were great, says Jeremy Black.
The War of 1812
A
nglo-American relations, though extolled
since the 1940s, have often been difficult and
never more so than when the two powers
went to war in 1812. Sometimes referred to
as a forgotten conflict, the War of 1812 played a major
role in defining relations between the two states.
Episodes ofthe conflict are celebrated in American
public myth, notably the defence of Fort McHenry in
1814, the origin of 'The Star-Spangled Banner', and
Andrew Jackson's victory outside New Orleans in 1815.
The Americans went to war in 1812 in order to end
Britain's blockade of trade with Napoleon's France and in
the hope of conquering Canada, ending real or potential
British backing for Native Americans. In the event
Canada heldfirm,whue the US was unable to force
Britain to accept its interpretation of maritime rights.
The American challenge was held off by the superior strength ofthe Royal Navy, combined with skilful
defence ofthe Canadian border. Some episodes were
to be celebrated in Canada as key moments in
securing its identity as a loyal but autonomous territory under the Crown. On October 13th, 1812 the
American invaders who crossed the River Niagara
were driven back. With echoes of James Wolfe outside
Quebec in 1759, Isaac Brock, the British commander.
George Munger's drawing
of the unfinished Capitol
building in ruins after the
British set fire to it in retaliation for destruction at
York (now Toronto) the
previous year.
was killed attacking the Americans (see 'The Saviour
of Canada', p. 13).
American hopes were also disappointed in the
distant, snowy wastes of Russia. America had chosen to
go to war with Britain in June 1812 at a moment when
Britain appeared vulnerable. Napoleon's invasion of
Russia, which followed a week later, represented, in its
constituent army, an alliance of most of Europe. Anticipating French success. President Madison hoped that
Britain would be forced to concede the loss of Canada.
Yetfi^omlate 1812 Britain's position strengthened
dramatically. Napoleon's failure in Russia put France's
unwilling ally Prussia in thefi'ontline. In January 1813
Napoleon rejected Prussian terms for continued support
and, Ü1 March, Prussia declared war on Napoleon.
Any hope that the US would benefitfi-omsome sort
of balance in Europe collapsed. In 1813 Austria, an ally
of which the British Government was correctly dubious,
offered Napoleon terms that would have enabled France
to concentrate on Britain, thereby greatly affecting the
war with the US. Napoleon, however, failed to accept or
offer terms that would divide his assailants. This left
Britain able both to decide what military effort to make
in America and also to insist that any negotiations with
the US government should be direct.
www.historytoday.com
The War of 1812
The economic burden of the war was rising in
America, similar to the situation during the War of
Independence. This time, however, France could not act
as an opponent or even diversion to the Royal Navy and
so the British blockade was more effective: US exports
fell from $45 million in 1811 to $7 million in 1814, with
grain exports hit especially hard, falling from 972,000
barrels in 1813 to a little over 41,000 barrels in 1814.
MAINE
T
his dimension of the war tends to be disguised in
American public memory as a result of the
emphasis on American success in ship-to-ship clashes.
The latter were impressive and had consequences, but
the key naval outcomes at the strategic level reflected
British naval strength and matched the situation in the
European world in the 1810s, where France could not
effectively challenge Britain at sea. 7\inerican warships
were unable to make any material difference to trade, let
alone security, in British home waters, nor to prevent
British projection into US waters. Nor could American
ships break the blockade. By late 1814 the severe
economic problems faced by the Americans limited
their ability to deploy ships. When warships did go to
sea, the British were more effective at engaging them. A
small American force of twofrigatesand two sloops that
did set sail in winter 1814 could not compensate for the
extent to which the remainder of the navy remained
blockaded, some to the point that they were not even
manned for active operations.
Napoleon's unconditional abdication on April 11th,
1814 enabled the British to send more warships and far
more troops to North America than in 1812 and 1813.
Whereas earlier British initiatives had been relatively
limited and had in part depended on the co-operation
of Native Americans (as in the advance in early 1813
into the Ohio country), in 1814 the British were able to
launch a wide-ranging campaign. It included operations in the Chesapeake, as well as a focus on the
conquest of American territory, especially in the Lake
Champlain corridor and in Maine. The Chesapeake
campaign was a diversion intended to reduce pressure
on Canada, both by diverting American forces and by
making the Americans aware of the dangers of fighting
on. Furthermore, American territory was to be
conquered in order to improve Britain's negotiating
position in the eventual peace talks.
The Americans still attacked Canada in 1814, but
they fañed to make gains. The US did have some success
that year against the Creek, or Muskogee, in the American south-east, but this did not affect British policy. In
the Chesapeake campaign they took the offensive; on
August 24th at Bladensburg, Maryland they easily
defeated the American force protecting Washington,
which was occupied without resistance. Public buildings
were destroyed by British troops in retaliation for American destructiveness at York (now Toronto) in 1813, an
attempt at equivalence not often mentioned in US
public history. Private property was respected, with the
exception of the few buildings from which resistance
was offered. Some buildings were destroyed by the
Americans themselves, determined in particular to
prevent the navy yard and its stores from being seized
by the British.
www.historytoday.com
TERRITORY
OF
ILLANOIS
The War of 1812.
TERRITORY
OF
INDIANA
In the crisis caused by this defeat, American leadership was poor and marked by division. John
Armstrong, the secretary of war, a convenient scapegoat who had insisted there was no threat to Washington, was dismissed.
Having re-embarked, the British struck frirther up
the Chesapeake at Baltimore, one of America's leading
ports and the commercial centre of the region.
However its fortifications had been enhanced since
the summer of 1813, a refiection of the wealth and
determination of the city, as the federal government
was not up to the task of ensuring adequate defences.
Moreover the British force was seriously outnumbered. Having landed ten miles away, it advanced on
Baltimore, but was blocked by the American defences.
Supporting warships moved up the Patapsco River
and, with Congreve rockets and mortar Ijombs,
bombarded Fort McHenry, which blocked the access
to Baltimore harbour. British forces failed to destroy
the fort, in part because they fired from beyond the
range of the defending guns. An attempt by night to
capture the fort through an amphibious attack failed
when the boats lost their way in the fog and so the
expedition was abandoned. The troops sailed to
Jamaica from where they would be available for operations in the Gulf of Mexico.
The advance on New Orleans in the winter of
1814-15 was less successful than the operations in the
Chesapeake. New Orleans' distance from the sea was
an important factor, but so also were the poor tactics
adopted when the American lines were attacked on
January 8th, 1815. Failure at New Orleans denied the
British a base but scarcely stopped their operations in
the Gulf of Mexico, for there was no powerful American fieet that could be based at New Orleans, or
anywhere else in the Gulf. Indeed the British moved
on to Mobile and were conducting operations against
Georgia at the end of the war and considering action
against South Carolina.
What if the war had continued? With Napoleon's
return to power in France in 1815 there was a need for
October 2012 | HistoryToíítiy
11
The War of 1812
JlIEROGLYPlnCS of Jclm Bults oixrihxm : m View of the Northern Expedition in Miniature.
DOLL,
Split-Foot.
Bonapait.
John Bull.
ames War.. Tom PatrioL John Adams. John Rogers;
Er:
ON GOVERNMENTS.
'
•ñ^íM £^£?£Í ^ 2 ^ J I
British warships to blockade France and support action
against ports there and in the French West Indies. Even
though British naval forces were deployed globally in
early 1815, they had enough strength in European
waters to deal with Napoleon's threat. The key weakness
was a shortage of British ships ofthe line, but it was
quicker to re-commission warships than to withdraw
others on active service from America.
In any event, the global crisis was brought to a close at
Waterloo, after which the British moved rapidly on the
French possessions of Martinique and Guadeloupe. The
latter surrendered two days after the British had landed.
n p h e War of 1812 had proved an unexpectedly arduous
±. conflict, difficult, divisive and expensive for all
involved. Fortunately for the US, Britain was war-weary
and sought a peace dividend at the end ofthe Napoleonic
Wars. Moreover, none ofthe British commanders in
North America enjoyed much political clout and
Wellington was doubtful that the Americans could be
attacked in a way that would compel them to capitulate.
The political and governmental system ofthe US
did not match its military ambitions. There was strong
opposition to the war from the New England Federalists, which led to an emphasis in the region on states'
rights as well as to some wüd talk of autonomy. The
opposition to the war expressed by the secret meetings
of New England delegates in the Hartford Convention, which met from December 15th, 1814 to January
5th, 1815, encouraged British hopes about American
divisions and war-weariness and undermined American operations against Montreal. The Federalists had
been delighted by Napoleon's fall, which they hoped
would lead to an end to war in North America.
American finances were in an increasingly parlous
state. In September 1814 Alexander Dallas, the newly
appointed secretary ofthe treasury, was unable to meet
the interest payments on the national debt. Contractors
rejected treasury notes. The following month, the
Senate was told by James Monroe, secretary of war as
12
History Today I October 2012
Hieroglyphics of John Bull's
overthrow, a broadside of
1812, includes the battie of
Queenston Heights.
well as for state, that New York City was at risk. He
pressed for an expansion ofthe regular army to 100,000
men, though there were just 49,000 at the close ofthe
war. Also in 1814, there was an attempt to address the
growing problem of desertion; most ofthe 205 US
soldiers executed during the war were killed that year.
As in the War of Independence, high rates of desertion
were overlooked in the public myth. The impression of
success left by a selective account ofthe campaigning in
1814-15 played a major role in the creation of a sense of
national identity, when the reality of war, as so often, had
been very different. Richard Rush, the comptroller ofthe
treasury, observed ofthe peace: 'It comes indeed, at a
most happy point of time for our interests and our fame',
while Madison informed Congress that the war had been
'signalised by the most brilliant successes' and also
declared that God had 'reared' the USA 'into the strength
and endowed them with the resources which have
enabled them to assert their national rights and to
enhance their national character'. There was emphasis on
the need for unity and a degree of optimism about the
fliture: France had fallen but not America.
The war, however, was also followed by anxiety
about another potential conflict, most likely with
Britain. The peacetime size of America's army and navy
rose, while the war led to the launching of a systematic
programme of coastal fortification, which long
remained the centrepiece of American defence policy.
The territorial expansion following the war was
obtained at the expense not of Canada but ofthe
Native Americans and of Spain in Florida. Under the
Peace of Ghent, ending the War of 1812, Britain had
obliged the US to restore Native Americans to their
pre-war situation and to negotiate treaties with the
tribes, but there was no British guarantee that their
position would be maintained and they did nothing to
support the Native Americans. The War of 1812 was
followed by American operations in Florida, culminating with Andrew Jackson's invasion of 1818. The
following year, in the Transcontinental Treaty, Spain
relinquished claims to Florida. Ratified in 1820, the
American coastline now ran uninterrupted from
Maine to Louisiana. Thus, although unsuccessful, the
War of 1812 helped affirm US gains under the Treaty
of Versailles of 1783 and the Louisiana Purchase of
1803 and looked forward to significant further expansion. It was a minor conflict of mixed success for the
US, but was of major long-term consequence.
Jeremy Blacic, Professor of Modern History at Exeter, is autinor of
7he War of1812 (Okiahoma, 2009).
Further Reading
Brian Arthur, How ßr/ro/n Won the War of T 812: The Royal Navy's
BlockadesoftheUnitedState5,1812-1815{Boyde\\,20•l^).
Troy Bickham, TheWeightofVengeance:The United States,
the British Empire, and the War of 1812 (Oxford, 2012).
John Latimer, 1812: War with America (Harvard University
Press, 2007).
Kevin McCranie, Utmost Gallantry:The US and Royal Navies
at Sea in the War of 1812 (Naval Institute Press, 2011).
ixFor more articles on this subject visit
www.historytoday.com
www.historytoday.com
Copyright of History Today is the property of History Today Ltd. and its content may not be copied or emailed
to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However,
users may print, download, or email articles for individual use.