Survey
* Your assessment is very important for improving the work of artificial intelligence, which forms the content of this project
* Your assessment is very important for improving the work of artificial intelligence, which forms the content of this project
THE YEN: EYE ON INTERVENTION REUTERS/Yuriko Nakao The yen rally represents a major re-pricing of Japanese assets – debt and equity – as well as a significant deepening of Japan’s economic crisis. Currency market intervention is an ever present risk. .• MARKET SIGNALS .• Q+A .• FX COLUMN .• POLLS .• SCENARIOS .• THE POLICIES SEPTEMBER 2010 EYE ON INTERVENTION SEPTEMBER 2010 MARKET SIGNALS Yen looks likely to stay strong By Masayuki Kitano and Eric Burroughs TOKYO/HONG KONG, Sept 9 T he yen may hold near 15-year highs against the dollar around the 80-85 zone in the coming months as a confluence of factors play in favour of the Japanese currency despite the country’s weak economy. Japan’s focus on hedging any purchases of U.S. Treasuries, the downward dollar pressure from falling U.S. yields, the prospect of more Federal Reserve easing and the Bank of Japan’s inaction on deflation all suggest the yen can remain strong. Here are some graphics explaining why the yen could remain strong against the dollar and euro. TREASURIES AND FALLING YIELDS Japanese investors, especially banks, have been huge buyers of U.S. Treasuries, especially in recent months. CLICK FOR CHART SUITE The latest Ministry of Finance data shows Japanese investor buying of U.S. sovereign bonds accelerated in July to 3.55 trillion yen ($42.3 billion), easily a one-month record on the data and taking year-to-date purchases to $109 billion. Total foreign bond buying accelerated to $60 billion last month. All things equal, such purchases would weaken the yen against the U.S. currency. But Japanese banks tend to fund their Treasury buying with dollars via the U.S. repo market. Institutional investors such as life insurers are taking advantage of lower U.S. interest rates to currency hedge their purchases by selling dollars in FX forwards -- thus neutralising the currency impact. 2 EYE ON INTERVENTION SEPTEMBER 2010 Still, the U.S. bond buying has been big enough to play a role in yields falling to 16-month lows, eroding the traditional U.S. yield advantage over Japanese bonds whose yields are also falling, though not at the same pace. The spread between five-year Treasury yields and JGB yields has shrunk as much as a percentage point in the past four months, while the 90day correlation between that yield spread and dollar/yen has climbed to a very strong 0.96 and held near that level in the past month -- showing the role that yield spreads are playing. The same is true for German Bund yields and euro/yen. The deleveraging of banks has meant that many in major countries are increasing their holdings as a share of total assets, just as inflation slows and could turn into deflation -- keeping G3 yields under pressure relative to JGB yields. YEN NOT THAT STRONG, REALLY The yen’s climb to a 15-year peak against the dollar and a nine-year high against the euro has spurred a barrage of warnings from Japanese officials about the dangers to the country’s exporters and fragile economy. The rise against those currencies has resulted in the yen’s trade-weighted index -- or nominal effective exchange rate (NEER) -- hitting an alltime high. The yen’s inflation-adjusted index (REER) is at an 18-month high, but is still 32 percent below its 1995 peak because of falling prices in Japan for the better part of 15 years. Of course, the relatively weak yen REER matters little for big Japanese firms that had planned for a dollar/yen rate closer to 90 this year and are scrambling to limit the hit to their earnings from its strength, on top of a slowing global economy. YEARNING FOR YEN One surprise this year has been foreign central banks finding a new place for the yen in their foreign reserves. 3 EYE ON INTERVENTION SEPTEMBER 2010 The bulk of overseas buying of Japanese assets this year has been in short-term money market instruments, as seen most clearly in China’s record buying spree of Japanese debt totalling 2.3 trillion yen ($27.4 billion). Such demand for Japanese debt, either as part of foreign reserve diversification or due to investors seeking a temporary parking place for their money, has likely helped support the yen. YEARNING FOR HIGHER YIELDS While the yen has climbed broadly, it has not risen as much as higher-yielding currencies such as the Brazilian real and South African rand, thanks mainly to sizable Japanese investment abroad. Japanese investors shovelled $190 billion into overseas equities, bonds and money market instruments in January-July. Such overseas investments by Japanese investment trusts, or “toushin” funds, are heading towards higheryielding currencies and emerging market assets rather than the dollar. BOJ STANDS PAT, FED SEEN ACTING The Bank of Japan has showed no inclination to fight the deflationary forces gripping the Japanese economy, even as the Fed looks poised to increase quantitative easing, and many market watchers believe it has little power to turn the tide anyway. So far, increases in its special funding operations – including at last week’s emergency meeting – have done little to stem the yen’s rise or spur bank lending. The BOJ’s total balance sheet size remains well below its quantitative easing peak in 2006, while the Fed’s has nearly tripled since the collapse of Lehman Brothers. The perception that the Fed may be more aggressive than the BOJ has been one factor undermining the greenback. So in many ways, the yen’s rise simply reflects that it is the anti-dollar and anti-euro among G3 currencies in a world where the developed world is struggling after the financial crisis but emerging markets are still thriving. 4 EYE ON INTERVENTION SEPTEMBER 2010 Q+A Will Japan intervene on crosses? Sterilise action? By Hideyuki Sano and Tetsushi Kajimoto TOKYO, Sept 8 J apanese authorities may consider buying currencies other than the dollar for any yen-selling currency intervention, but many traders think they would stick to the traditional approach of buying the greenback. Caution over possible Japanese intervention is rising in currency markets as the yen struck a 15-year high of 83.34 against the dollar, also raising questions on whether Japan would sterilise any intervention or leave the yen in the market. While Japanese officials have stepped up their warnings that they may take action, most analysts think the Ministry of Finance will likely hold fire until the yen rises to around a record high of 79.75 yen per dollar. WHAT’S THE PROBLEM WITH BUYING DOLLARS? Buying the dollar could cause a headache for Japan. Japan would probably increase its holding of U.S. Treasuries with dollars it buys. But that could hurt the dollar further as a fall in U.S. Treasury yields would further shrink their spread over Japanese yields -- one of the main contributors to the dollar’s slide against the yen. SO WOULD JAPAN BUY DOLLARS? Probably. Japanese authorities would likely stick to its traditional approach of buying the dollar for the yen, the most traded yen currency pair with a daily average of $568 billion -- 14 percent of the entire FX market. Before ceasing its last bout of currency intervention in March 2004, Japan often stepped into the currency markets to stem yen strength by making sizable dollar purchases, except for a few occasions where it picked up euros. A small opposition party has floated the idea of buying Asian currencies, such as Korean won, against the yen. But traders write off the idea as unrealistic because Asian currencies are far less liquid than the dollar. There is also a risk that such steps could be seen by Asian countries as beggar-thy-neighbour policies -- especially with China seen as holding down the yuan’s value. The MOF does not disclose the currency makeup of its $1 trillion reserves, but a large chunk is believed to be in dollars because that is where intervention has been concentrated in the past. WOULD JAPAN CONTINUE TO BUY TREASURIES? Yes, traders think a large part of any dollars bought by Japan would be invested in Treasuries. As of 2008, the only time when the MOF made a partial disclosure on its foreign reserves, nearly 70 percent of its securities holding were in sovereign bonds. Some market players say that could undermine Japan’s own efforts to weaken the yen because dollar/yen has had a strong correlation with U.S. bond yields in recent months and Japan’s buying of Treasuries could push down U.S. yields, and hence dollar/yen. But market players say Japan would regard any such fallout as a necessary cost to achieve a wider good. HOW MUCH WOULD JAPAN SPEND ON INTERVENTION? Japan spent 35 trillion yen ($416 billion), roughly seven percent of Japan’s GDP, in the 15 months from January 2003 to March 2004, its last spell of intervention. Many market players expect smaller operations now given doubts over whether Japan, or any government, could control the currency market where $4 trillion changes hands every day. An apparent failure by the Swiss National Bank, which spent money worth 19 percent of its economy in franc-selling intervention, to stem the franc’s gains is likely to be making Tokyo think better of large-scale intervention. Despite its efforts, the franc has soared to a record high versus the euro. Still, Japan increased the borrowing limit for its currency intervention by 5 trillion yen in the budget for this fiscal year 5 EYE ON INTERVENTION SEPTEMBER 2010 Light is cast on a Japanese 10,000 yen note placed on top of U.S. One-hundred dollar bills at Interbank Inc. money exchange in Tokyo, in this September 9, 2010 picture illustration. REUTERS/Yuriko Nakao to March 2011, making room to borrow about 35 trillion yen at maximum for intervention. The decision to lift the intervention borrowing ceiling was the first in six years this year, showing the concern about persistent gains in the yen. Some market players suspect the BOJ, under pressure from the government and markets for more measures to ease the pain from a higher yen, might take additional easing steps in tandem with MOF intervention. WILL JAPAN STERILISE INTERVENTION? This could effectively be considered a form of non-sterilised intervention. Technically, it will. The MOF, which decides on currency intervention and uses the Bank of Japan as its agent, must borrow the yen from markets -- thus soaking up yen cash from the market, to finance its yen selling. However, many market players think part of Japan’s massive intervention in 2003-2004 was effectively unsterilised as the BOJ offset such sterilisation by pumping yen cash into the banking system via its previous quantitative easing policy. But the BOJ never made it clear during its previous experiment with quantitative easing whether its policy was intended to offset MOF sterilisation. Thus there is a chance that BOJ Governor Masaaki Shirakawa might inherit that ambiguous approach. (Editing by Eric Burroughs and Joseph Radford) 6 EYE ON INTERVENTION SEPTEMBER 2010 FX COLUMN Yen option plays alluring as intervention risks rise By Rick Lloyd and John Noonan SINGAPORE/SYDNEY, Sept 8 I F you think Japan will be forced to intervene to weaken the surging yen, it is worth looking now at plays in dollar/yen options and spot that will benefit from resulting volatility. Japanese authorities can only be disappointed by the slide in USD/JPY ever since last week’s encouraging U.S. employment data helped give a brief boost to USD/JPY and U.S. Treasury yields, a move that has since reversed as worries about the euro zone have resurfaced. Since the start of the week the break to a 15-year low below 83.50 appeared all but inevitable, with the coming Japanese fiscal half-year end seen bringing heavy repatriation by big companies and institutional investors. Any intervention is unlikely to be coordinated with other G7 members, and past episodes of unilateral intervention have taught us to expect volatility. One way to take advantage of that volatility is to buy options as protection with a view to trading the bigger spot swings if intervention occurs. Traders can consider buying a dollar/yen option with a low delta, such as 25 delta (at current market an 86.75 strike), with a tenor of two months. Such an option with a $1 million face value would cost roughly $8,000, based on the Reuters FX options pricing calculator. The dollar/yen call gives a trader protection to go short dollar/yen after an intervention-related spike and trade the likely big swings in spot as authorities step in to buy dollars and then back away. This is done by overhedging the options position -- shorting dollar/yen for the full face amount of the option, rather than the amount typically sold to delta hedge the option. What makes this strategy attractive is that dollar/yen implied vols are still at relatively inexpensive levels and a long way below the spike levels seen in May this year, reducing the cost of the option. Two-month implied vols are quoted at 13.15 percent, well off the peaks seen in May near 17.5 percent, mainly because the day-to-day swings in spot dollar/yen have also been subdued during the drop to 15-year lows.Also reflecting that investors are not yet paying a premium in options for protection Foreign exchange traders work at trading room in Tokyo September 8, 2010. REUTERS/Yuriko Nakao against big market swings, implied vols are trading close to realised vol in dollar/yen and one-month risk reversals are not showing big positioning in favour of yen calls. If Japan intervenes, any initial jump in USD/JPY will inevitably be met with good selling from the many market players looking for better levels to get out. These include the exporters who have fallen behind on their hedging schedules, as a result of yen staying much stronger than their business plans for levels near 90. Life insurers and other big investors are expected to repatriate money from overseas investments back into yen to cover losses suffered on the Nikkei at home, as well as the many speculative accounts that are long from having tried to pick a bottom in dollar/yen and yen crosses. The conundrum for Japanese authorities is that any dollar purchases will likely be invested in U.S. Treasuries, potentially pushing down U.S. yields versus Japanese yields -- contributing to one of the main factors that has driven USD/JPY lower. For that reason, the idea the BOJ could become bolder on their intervention and reinvest these dollars into other Asian currencies that compete with Japan for Asian markets has been mooted. But Japanese authorities have never been known for being bold, and unilateral intervention in dollar/ yen remains the most likely scenario this time around as well. Rick Lloyd is a Reuters FX analyst and John Noonan is head of Asia FX at IFR Markets. The views expressed are their own. (Editing by Eric Burroughs) 7 EYE ON INTERVENTION SEPTEMBER 2010 POLL Yen to gradually weaken over next 12 months By Anooja Debnath BANGALORE, Sept 2 • Dollar seen below 90 yen for next six months • Weakness in the yen seen as overall trend T he Japanese yen is set to gradually weaken against the U.S. dollar over the year, although at a markedly slower pace than was forecast last month even as the Bank of Japan attempts to tame its stubborn rise. Consensus forecasts for the yen in the latest Reuters poll of more than 60 strategists taken recently were scaled back considerably from a similar survey a month ago. The dollar is expected to end September at 85.0 yen, before inching to 86.0 yen in three months, 89.5 in six and 95.0 in 12 months. These are the strongest yen forecasts since at least January 2008 and some analysts believe the currency is set to touch 8 EYE ON INTERVENTION SEPTEMBER 2010 An employee at a foreign exchange trading company walks past a wall displaying the Japanese Yen’s exchange rate against the U.S. dollar in Tokyo September 8, 2010. REUTERS/Yuriko Nakao new highs in the near term unless the Bank of Japan steps in with bolder intervention measures. “Price action over the past few days has demonstrated that BoJ policy has become ineffective in slowing yen appreciation,” said Kenneth Broux at Lloyds TSB Corporate Markets. “In the context of a weakening U.S. economy and the clouded outlook for risk assets, I suspect the yen will stay supported in the short term.” August proved to be a crucial month for the safe-haven currency, as it soared to levels not seen in 15 years, with a barrage of gloomy U.S. economic data cutting risk appetite and quelling any hopes of an immediate recovery. The yen’s rise last month, which threatens to hurt exportreliant Japan’s fragile economic recovery, caught strategists off guard in last month’s survey, with only six of 52 seeing the USD/JPY at levels below 85 by end-August. The BoJ decided this month to expand its fixed-rate fund supply scheme to 30 trillion yen from 20 trillion yen, and to launch a new six-month loan operation in addition to an existing three-month scheme. The move, which did little to curb the yen’s rise, disappointed markets and drove Japan’s Nikkei stock index down 16 percent -- making it one of the worst-performing markets in the world this year next to China and Greece. Only three of 63 strategists in the latest poll see the dollar at below 80 yen over the period forecasted. While many hope currency intervention by the Japanese authorities is on the cards, some believe the BoJ and the Ministry of Finance will hold fire unless the dollar slips to the record low of 79.75 seen in April 1995. “People have that view that 85 (yen) was going to be some kind of line in the sand that would bring forward the Ministry of Finance to order the Bank of Japan in,” said Ray Attrill at 4Cast. “But we were never really thinking as high as that and the Japanese were still fundamentally quite reluctant to go back down the route of intervention.” Calculated cross rates saw the EUR/JPY at 107.6 in one month, 108.0 in three months, 109.3 in six and 114.5 in 12 months. (Polling by Bangalore Polling Unit; Editing by Susan Fenton) CLICK TO VIEW IN FULL 9 EYE ON INTERVENTION SEPTEMBER 2010 POLL Japan economy to show moderate growth By Kaori Kaneko TOKYO, Sept 8 J apan’s economy is set to stay on a moderate recovery trend and the chance of a double-dip recession is fairly slim despite recent sharp gains in the yen that are likely to hurt exports, a monthly Reuters poll shows. Growth, however, is expected to slow in the final quarter of this year and into January-March next year as the effects of government stimulus, such as tax benefits for energy-efficient cars, fade. The poll forecasts Japan’s economy will grow 0.5 percent in the third quarter from the previous quarter, and then increase 0.2 percent in the fourth quarter. • Japanese GDP growth seen slowing towards year-end • Deflation to continue at least until middle of next year • BOJ seen keeping rates at 0.1 pct at least until end 2011 • Double-dip recession probability 30 pct, unchanged vs Aug In last month’s poll, economists forecast a 0.4 percent expansion for both the third and fourth quarters of this year. Japan will be mired in deflation at least until the middle of next year, forcing the central bank to keep interest rates on hold at 0.1 percent during that period, the poll of more than 50 economists showed. “The impact of the strong yen is a bit worrying. It’s a risk factor but as long as the dollar stays above 80 yen, it won’t cause the recovery to derail,” said Kyohei Morita, chief economist at Barclays Capital. The yen has appreciated further since the August poll was issued and Japanese policymakers have tried to talk it down, threatening to intervene. It surged to a 15-year high against the dollar earlier on Wednesday. Of those polled, economists gave a 30 percent chance that Japan would enter a double-dip recession, in line with the previous month’s poll. “An expected increase in public works projects in China will likely support Japan’s economy. Capital spending and job conditions in Japan are therefore expected to improve next year,” said Yasuo Yamamoto, senior economist at Mizuho Research Institute. “We don’t deny that a double-dip recession is possible but it is not our main scenario.” Japan will release revised second-quarter GDP data on Friday and the growth figure is expected to be revised up to 0.4 percent on the quarter, or an annual clip of 1.5 percent after improvements in capital spending. That compares with initial readings of a meagre 0.1 percent quarter-on-quarter gain and a 0.4 percent expansion. The monthly poll also showed the core consumer price index (CPI) is expected to fall 1.0 percent in the third quarter from a year earlier, before declining 0.7 percent in the fourth quarter, broadly in line with the previous month’s survey. (Polling by Bangalore Polling Unit; Editing by Susan Fenton) CLICK TO VIEW IN FULL 10 EYE ON INTERVENTION SEPTEMBER 2010 SCENARIOS Japan leadership race WILL AFFECT YEN, FISCAL POLICY By Linda Sieg TOKYO, Sept 8 J apanese Prime Minister Naoto Kan and powerbroker Ichiro Ozawa appear neck-and-neck in a leadership race that could spell a shift in fiscal policy priorities as the country struggles with a strong yen, weak economy and divided parliament. The Democratic Party of Japan (DPJ), which swept to power last year, is already floundering after the DPJ and a tiny partner lost their upper house majority in a July election. Below are scenarios for the outcome of the Sept. 14 leadership race and their policy impact. KAN WINS PARTY VOTE, REMAINS PM Kan, 63, has a shot at victory even though Ozawa heads the biggest DPJ group, because his opponent faces possible indictment in a funding scandal and is plagued by an image as an old-style wheeler-dealer that undercuts his ratings among ordinary voters. The key question is whether Kan can defeat Ozawa decisively enough to bolster his clout and unify the party. • In the best scenario for Kan, Ozawa loses by a hefty margin and bolts the DPJ with only 20-30 of the party’s 411 lawmakers, spelling the potential end of his four-decade career. That would allow Kan to consolidate control over the party and concentrate on his efforts to engineer growth while cutting public debt now twice the size of Japan’s $5 trillion economy. The Japanese government bond yield curve might flatten a bit. • A key aide to Kan, however, told Reuters that any victory would likely be by a small margin. Ozawa would then have the option of remaining in the DPJ to exercise clout over personnel and policies, or bolting the party with followers. • Ozawa would have to persuade almost 70 DPJ lower house lawmakers to leave the party to deprive the Democrats of their majority in the powerful chamber and put at risk Kan’s grip on power. Analysts doubt whether that many would be willing to join the opposition ranks. But if Ozawa took a large bloc of members with him, that could trigger moves towards a realignment of party allegiances, spelling prolonged political and policy chaos. • If Ozawa remains inside the party after a robust showing in the party vote, the result looks likely to be more bickering, a possible weakening of any drive to curb the public debt by reducing spending, and delay in debating a rise in the 5 percent sales tax. Kan would likely reshuffle his cabinet and might give posts to Ozawa backers, further complicating policy decisions. He would still face the problem of how to win opposition support to enact laws, including bills to implement the 2010/11 budget. OZAWA WINS • Ozawa, 68, would probably become prime minister because Kan, as the defeated party chief, would resign and a vote would be held in parliament to pick a new leader. Ozawa has rejected the notion of splitting the party post from the premiership because of the scandal hanging over his head. A judicial panel of ordinary citizens is to decide in coming months whether he must be indicted over a funding scandal. Still, Ozawa could in theory choose to let the leader of another political party become premier in order to forge a coalition to break the impasse in the upper house. • Ozawa’s backers say he can use his contacts with opposition parties and skills honed over 40 years in politics to do 11 EYE ON INTERVENTION deals with the opposition and smooth policy implementation, including spending to boost the economy. An Ozawa win might cause the yen to ease against the dollar, since he has spoken of intervening to stem its rise. It could also make the JGB yield curve steepen in response to his propensity to spend while putting off debate on raising sales tax to fund rising social welfare costs of a fast-ageing population. • Both Ozawa and Kan have stressed the party won’t implode whatever the outcome of the vote. But lawmakers put off by what critics see as Ozawa’s authoritarian style and his reluctance to address Japan’s fiscal woes might refuse to back him in the parliamentary vote, setting off a battle that splits the party. There may also be moves towards political realignment, seen by some analysts as Ozawa’s real goal. Whether SEPTEMBER 2010 this would lead to policy consistency within the two major parties, the DPJ and the business-friendly Liberal Democrats, is questionable. • Even if the DPJ hangs together, opposition parties could boycott parliamentary debate or hammer Ozawa with questions related to his funding scandal, with no progress made on the budget for the fiscal year from next April. Ozawa might have to step down as PM, or even call a snap lower house election that neither main party could win, setting the stage for more political confusion. (Editing by Nick Macfie) THE POLICIES candidate Ozawa, A SPENDER Japan PM, A FISCAL HAWK NAOTO KAN ICHIRO OZAWA ECONOMY • Boost jobs to increase incomes, stimulate consumption and revitalise the economy. Implement already announced growth strategy and create jobs in areas such as medicine, nursing care and the environment. ECONOMY • Take all possible measures, including currency market intervention, to protect the economy from the impact of rapid yen rises, since room for further monetary policy steps by the Bank of Japan is limited. • Try to implement policies from the party’s 2009 campaign manifesto, such as child allowances, as much as possible after doing utmost to cut waste, but frankly explain to get public understanding if there are not enough resources to fund them. • Use 2 trillion yen ($24 billion) of reserve funds in the budget for the fiscal year to March for economic stimulus steps. • Reach a decision on corporate tax cuts by December when the budget for the fiscal year from next April is compiled. • Take strong steps in tandem with the Bank of Japan to beat deflation. • Take decisive measures to stem yen’s rise as needed, his finance minister has said currency market intervention is one option. FISCAL REFORM/SOCIAL SECURITY • Consider drastic tax reform including the sales tax, along with holding a debate on how to fund the social welfare system. • Consider debt issuance to fund stimulus if economic conditions worsen, though budget reserve funds should be used first. • Consider issuing non-interest bearing bonds, on which investors pay no inheritance tax, to help fund public works and other projects. FISCAL REFORM/SOCIAL SECURITY • Cut wasteful spending and use the funds to implement campaign pledges. • Avoid raising the sales tax from 5% before the next general election, due by late 2013. • Seek a public mandate when implementing tax reform. • Consider major cuts in income and residential taxes, although he has given no details. • Seek a virtuous cycle of reforms on economic growth, fiscal consolidation and the social security system. • Consider securitising government assets as a way to find funds. • Cut waste to promote fiscal reform, including seeking to cut personnel costs for public employees by 20 percent. • Debate social security reform and present an outline by the end of the year. 12 EYE ON INTERVENTION Click for the Aug. 26 PDF SEPTEMBER 2010 Click for the Sept. 3 PDF Click for the Aug. 20 PDF © Thomson Reuters 2010. All rights reserved. For comments, queries or tips: Eric Burroughs Vidya Ranganathan Editor, Asia Financial Markets Economics Editor, Asia Phone: +852 2843 1652 Phone: +65-68703090 [email protected] [email protected] Republication or redistribution of Thomson Reuters content, including by framing or similar means, is prohibited without the prior written consent of Thomson Reuters. ‘Reuters’ and the Reuters logo are registered trademarks and trademarks of Thomson Reuters and its affiliated companies.