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BRITISH FOREIGN POLICY
AND INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS DURING
SIR WILLIAM TRUMBULL'S CAREER
JEREMY BLACK
SIR William Trumbull served as envoy, and subsequently as Secretary of State, during
a period of major change in Britain's international position. He was Ambassador
Extraordinary to Louis XIV of France from 2 September 1685 to 12 October 1686, and
then Resident Ambassador at Constantinople from November 1686 to October 1691.^
Although appointed to Constantinople in November 1686, Trumbull did not embark
until 16 April 1687 and only arrived on 17 August 1687. He left on 31 July 1691.
Trumbull was Secretary of State for the Northern Department from 3 May 1695 until
I December 1697.^
When Trumbull left for Constantinople, England was ruled by the Cathohc James II
and was at peace. When he returned, James had been removed as a result of the invasion
in 1688 by his nephew and son-in-law, William III of Orange, and England was at war
with Louis XIV, the Nine Years' War, otherwise known as the War of the League of
Augsburg or King William's War. This shift has generally been seen as according with
Britain's national interests: in a somewhat teleological account of foreign policy, conflict
with France, a struggle for oceanic, colonial and commercial supremacy, have been seen
as Britain's destiny. This interpretation was for long axiomatic. Indeed, it is necessary
to turn back to the major works of the past in order to appreciate just how revolutionary
modern 'revisionism' has been. Thus, Captain Montagu Burrows, R.N., Chichele
Professor of Modern History at Oxford, wrote in The History of the Foreign Policy of
Creat Britain (London, 1895):
Happily for the world... the Revolution of 1688 once more opened up the way to the resumption
of the Tudor Foreign Policy... Not one vv^ord too much has been said in praise of the benefit
conferred upon England and the world by the Revolution. From the 5th of November 1688 dates
the return of England to her old place... The nation had long been aware of the evils of a departure
from the principles entwined with its whole earlier history, and exemplified in chief by the great
Elizabeth.
Sir Adolphus Ward was less florid in his language, but, to him, the later Stuarts had
depressed 'the English monarchy to the position of vassal state', while William III was
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'one of the most far-sighted of great statesmen'.^ In such statements, historians were not
only reflecting and sustaining the national historical myth, but also adopting a clear
position on domestic history: the Glorious Revolution was seen as seminally good and
necessary and thus the foreign policy changes that stemmed from it were likewise.
On 17 November 1722 a leading newspaper, the London Journal, offered an assessment
of the consequences of the Glorious Revolution. Designed to elicit support for the
Protestant Succession, this account linked directly the international results of 1688,
namely war with France, to the supposed domestic consequences had the Stuarts and
France not been rejected in 1688:
Without the Revolution there would have been no war with France, but then it is for this unhappy
reason, because there could not have been one. But instead of it, there must have been a much
greater evil; and that is, slavery to France, or to a government modeled and supported by it. I
acknowledge that, without the Revolution, the expense of wars abroad, the lives of men fighting
in defense of their country, and the effusion of much blood, had been saved. But instead of these,
the writer argued, there would have been a bleak domestic prospect:
arbitrary demands of taxes... Black Darkness - Deep Silence, never interrupted, unless by the
groans of those who dare not any farther disturb it - the terrors of an Inquisition, or a HighCommission Court - one voice of bigots blaspheming, and of hypocrites affronting God - the
profound quiet of slavery, in which all arts and sciences are by degrees sunk.
The striking feature of this classic statement of Whig behefs was that in 1722 Britain was
in alliance with France, an alliance negotiated in 1716 by George Fs Whig ministers and
which had recently borne fruit in the French disclosure of Jacobite plans, the Atterbury
Plot. Such a contrast poses a question mark against the attempt to present foreign policy
as dominated by ideological considerations. In replacing socio-economic determinism
with notions of cultural, ideological and linguistic hegemony, scholars have often failed
to appreciate the limitations of the latter, both in describing what was generally a more
diverse and divided situation, and as a means of explanation. This can be an acute
problem in studies of foreign pohcy, where politicians can be presented as trapped by a
set of ideas of their own, or, more generally, by the dominant notions of the political
society of the period. Any close reading of Anglo-French relations in the lateseventeenth and early-eighteenth centuries suggests that the staple foreign policy item of
the Whig creed - political, religious, cultural and economic hostility to France - was not
matched by any consistent government policy. This creed, however, had considerable
weight in terms of domestic political debate, and has subsequently been important in
influencing historical judgements. In terms of the former, the seizure and development
of the anti-French case by particular groups of politicians was of growing significance in
the last forty years of the seventeenth century as hostility to Spain and the United
Provinces became less valid as a basis of foreign policy and less significant as a domestic
political issue. In terms of historical judgement, hostility to France and the argument
that the pre-Revolution monarchy had slavishly followed French interests were used to
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brilliant effect by Whig propagandists in the half-century after the Revolution. The
argument had, of course, also been used before the Revolution, most notably in much
of the polemical Whig literature of the Exclusion period.
It was William III who negotiated the two Partition Treaties with Louis XIV (1698,
1700) by which the French monarchy was promised substantial territorial gains, and it
was William who sought to gain European support for this new settlement. In it,
everything really depended on Louis's good faith. Between 1716 and 1731 Britain and
France were allies, and together they fought Spain in 1719-20 and confronted Spain and
Austria in 1725-9. During the War of the Polish Succession (1733-5) the Walpole
ministry did not oppose Bourbon successes at the expense of Austria.* And yet, at the
same time. Whig propagandists stressed the pro-French policies of Charles II and James
II, using them, as much as Stuart Catholicism, to argue that the Jacobites were unBritish. Religion and international policy could thus serve as definers of nationhood. On
2 September 1749 the Remembrancer, a London newspaper, claimed, 'on the ruins of
King James the Second's government a new one was established which undertook not
only to perpetuate the liberty of this country, but to restore the liberty of Europe.'
One might ask what Whig propagandists would have said of Charles II and James II,
had they signed treaties for the partition of the Spanish empire comparable to those of
William III, or in the 1680s enjoyed an alliance with France as close as that of 1716-31.
Indeed subsequent Tory writers were to point out that, having savaged the attempts of
the Tory ministry of 1710-14 to improve relations with France, the Whigs were to do
likewise. Thus, Smollett, in the Briton of 9 October 1762, defended the Peace of Utrecht
of 1713 and wrote of the Tories,
as soon as their adversaries had overwhelmed them with ruin, and established their own influence
about the throne, beyond all possibility of reverse, the treaty of Utrecht, which they had branded
as infamous and pernicious, they left unaltered and undisturbed; and instead of producing a fresh
rupture in less than one year, it remained in full force very near thirty, a period of tranquillity
almost unexampled in the annals of England, during which, she enjoyed, without interruption,
every blessing which opulence and security could bestow.
Smollett was correct to argue that the Whigs had stolen the Tories' 'Utrecht clothes'.
More important, however, is the extent to which the Whig critique of Charles II and
James II has been generally accepted by subsequent historians. Part of the problem lies
in the notion of national interest. The idea that this lay in hostihty to France was one
that was read backwards into the pre-Revolution period by those who witnessed and
considered the wars between the two powers in the period 1689-1815. Thus, the
apparent hostility to France represented by the Triple Alliance of 1668 with Sweden and
the Dutch was seen as the natural path to follow, and Charles II was criticized for taking
the opposite course. The notion of national interest as defined by hostility to France was
also read forward from the Hundred Years War. Furthermore, nineteenth-century
historians found it difficult to accept that England had acted as a second-rank power in
the period 1660-88, had indeed received French subsidies for part of the period. This
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was explained by reference to the wishes of Charles H and James H, wishes that were
held to lie behind their policies. The actions of many of the German rulers of the period
towards Louis XIV were similarly explained and condemned by nationalist German
historians. Pusillanimity, treason to national interests and Catholic convictions were the
only possible explanations.
The very notion of national interests, however, is one that faces considerable
difficulties. Thus, in the Lords debate on 14 July 1986 concerning the forthcoming
tercentenary celebrations, Lord Grimond thought them provocative to the Irish and,
possibly, to Catholics, adding 'that the so-called revolution of 1688 was in fact a coup
d'etat^ carried out largely by appealing to religious bigotry, and by treachery'. The
Catholic peer Lord Mowbray and Stourton complained because of the subsequent
treatment of Catholics, the Earl of Lauderdale because of that of Scotland, and Lord
Glenamara, as Ted Short a headmaster and later Secretary of State for Education,
declared, ' It was a pretty squalid affair. It amounted to nothing more than the ousting
of the lawful, rightful King by religious prejudice... this squalid coup d'etaf} Members
of the House of Commons, for example Tony Benn, were also critical of the Glorious
Revolution. Other views were naturally voiced, but the variety of the opinions expressed
are both a reminder of the complexity and controversial nature of assessing national
identity and interests, and the danger of accepting the current scholarly preference for
notions of cultural hegemony: attention to the celebration of the tercentenary can well
lead to a neglect of conflicting voices.
Nineteenth-century confidence in definitions of national interest relating to territorial
consolidation and expansion, domestic order and stabihty and national strength, are of
little help in the appreciation of the later Stuart period. Domestically, there was no
constitutional, political or confessional consensus. This of course lay behind the
contentious politics of the 1680s, and also affected the diplomatic corps. TrumbuU's
robust Protestantism ensured that his career survived the Revolution of 1688, and that
he had reason to regard the replacement of James II with some equanimity but that was
not true of most of James's diplomats. In international terms it was far from clear whence
the greatest opportunities for and threats to England came in the late seventeenth
century. The close involvement of foreign powers in domestic English politics^ lent
further complexity to the situation as the political significance of individual positions on
domestic and international issues was far from consistent. Louis XIV's willingness to
support both Charles II and his domestic rivals in the 1670s revealed the extent to which
the external parameters of English politics were far from fixed. The intertwining of
domestic politics and diplomatic developments was a characteristic feature of
seventeenth-century international relations, not least those between England and France.
In an age of kaleidoscopic unpredictability in the international sphere, the policies of
rulers were far from consistent, and this was true of allies and rivals alike. Intervention
in domestic politics therefore seemed prudent, and it was further encouraged by the
knowledge or suspicion that rival rulers were acting similarly, as William of Orange was
in England in the 1670s.
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Foreign intervention in English domestic politics was encouraged and facilitated by
the nature of the political system and, in particular, by the ability of opposition
politicians to inconvenience the government in Parliament. More significant, in the case
of England, was foreign concern about her international position. The period 1620-85
had underlined the volatility of English foreign policy, as well as witnessing several
dramatic interventions in the affairs of her neighbours. She had gone to war with France
once, Spain twice and the Dutch thrice. Cromwell's decision to support Mazarin against
Philip IV of Spain had helped to tilt the balance of the Franco-Spanish confiict of
1635-59. In 1658 English Ironsides and French troops defeated the Army of Flanders
at the Battle of the Dunes and captured nearby Dunkirk. The attitude of monarchs and
ministers to the events of 1688 was affected not only by those events and by James II's
policies, diplomatic and domestic, but also by their experiences over a number of
decades. Most of the rulers and politicians alive in 1688, for example Louis XIV,
Leopold I, William III and Frederick William of Brandenburg, could look back to
decades of past hopes and concerns over English policy. It was clear that England could
take a major role in international affairs, but also that she could be handicapped by
domestic problems. Volatility in English foreign policy was a product of the volatility of
English domestic politics, and hence encouraged foreign interventions in the latter: the
Scots during the 1640s; Spanish intrigues with republicans in the early 1660s; William
III and the opposition in 1672-4; and Louis XIV and the opposition in 1678. Louis's
basic attitude to England was not very different from that to the German princes,
Denmark and Sweden; only the techniques of intervention had to be varied especially
because of the formation of parties and their infiuence on foreign policy decisions.
Though foreign policy was constitutionally a matter exclusively for the royal prerogative,
the exercise of this prerogative was very much mediated through, and affected by, the
political system.
The difiiculty, indeed artificiality, of assessing English national interests ensures that
there is no secure base from which to judge the shifting relationship between Charles II
and James II, and Louis XIV, a situation further exacerbated by the nature of the
surviving evidence with its lacunae and ambiguities. Thus, for example, Charles II's
intentions at the time of the Treaty of Dover (1670) and the outbreak of the Third
Anglo-Dutch War (1672) have always been especially controversial, and there is still a
lack of agreement. For K. H. D. Haley in 1986, Charles's policies in 1670-2 refiected a
'decision' in favour of a Europe dominated by Louis XIV, but for Ronald Hutton in the
same year they were the products of a 'search for double insurance against isolation',
removing 'the chance that the French would come to terms with the Dutch or Spanish'.^
Prerogative control over foreign policy ensured, however, that this relationship between
monarchs was crucial.
If the assessment of English policy towards France is embroiled in controversy and
fraught with difficulties, the situation is a little clearer on the French side, a consequence
of the greater stability and consistency of French decision making. The principal
question has always been whether Louis XIV's failure to assist James II against the
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threat of Dutch invasion in 1688 was a serious mistake that delivered the British Isles
to William and the anti-French cause. This is best approached by appreciating that
James was not a French client, that he did not wish to identify himself, or be identified,
with Louis too closely. James appears to have realized that any attack on him by William
would probably depend on the connivance of the Emperor, Leopold I, and his foreign
policy was characterized by an attempt to maintain good relations with both Louis and
his Catholic rivals, Leopold, Charles II of Spain and Pope Innocent XI. James wished
to prevent war between Louis and his Catholic opponents, a war that he feared would
drive them to support William, as they had done during the Dutch War of 1672-8, and
were indeed to do, as war resumed from 1688 on.
James's attitude hardly commended him to Louis, but, in truth, Louis's policy
represented a continuation of that towards Charles II of England. He had sought to use
England for French ends and to manipulate Charles and English politics accordingly.
Thus, in 1672-3, when the two Kings were allied against the Dutch, Louis was opposed
to Charles's objective of acquiring fortified Dutch coastal towns, and in the Cologne
peace conference of 1673 he offered little support for English objectives. In the same year
the absence of promised French naval assistance helped to defeat Charles's plan for a
landing on the Dutch coast, and there was bitter public criticism of the French.^ Charles,
however, also seems to have believed in 1672 that he was to a degree manipulating Louis.
The clash between English and French objectives and policies was not limited to the
waters of the North Sea. For Louis, the state and future of English politics were
important primarily only if they served his foreign policy, and the wishes and interests
of his English ally in this sphere could be sacrificed accordingly. In 1673 he pressed
Charles II to yield to Parliament on religious issues and to revoke the Declaration of
Indulgence, in order to obtain parliamentary support for the war. This angered James,®
but Louis, as ever and understandably so, preferred to heed the immediacy of short-term
considerations, rather than to consider the more problematic long-term perspective.
Louis followed a similar policy in 1678 when the prospect of English support for his
opponents led him to help overthrow the Danby ministry.
In 1688 Louis adopted a similar short-term and manipulative approach, arising
essentially from the international context of the Rhenish crisis of that year; though his
policy seems also to have been affected by his attitude towards James. James, a sovereign
ruler, understandably preferred to follow an independent line in foreign policy and not
to subordinate his domestic views to the convenience of Louis. James was seen as a
monarch who foolishly ignored the practicalities of his domestic situation,^^ and the
French were unimpressed by his conduct in the crisis of 1688.^^
In addition, James's determination to follow his own line in international relations led
to differences with Louis, as did specific problems in Anglo-French relations. D'Avaux,
the French envoy at The Hague, reported on 24 July 1687 that he had been told that the
English fleet had been ordered to make French ships in the Channel strike their flag to
that of England and to attack if this mark of respect was refused. D'Avaux added, 'thus
at the very time that the King of England was so cautious in every thing, not to affront
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the States General who abused him, he took every opportunity of quarrelhng with the
King my master, who was so strenuous in his interest'.^^
A Dutch invasion of England might well cause a lengthy conflict, possibly also an
English civil war, that would exhaust both William and England, so that, whoever won,
the result would benefit Louis. The French government certainly wanted to see civil war
in England. ^^ There had been three Anglo-Dutch wars in the last forty years, and there
was no reason why there should not be a fourth: a cause also of William's concern about
James's intentions. Just as Louis welcomed the diversion of Austrian resources to fight
the Turks, and viewed with disquiet any suggestion of a Balkan peace, so the prospect
of an Anglo-Dutch conflict was pregnant with possibilities. The speedy collapse of
James's position in England in late 1688 was not anticipated.
This can be seen as a failure on the French part. Barrillon, their envoy, underestimated
the extent and determination of English opposition to James, and, in his correspondence
with Louis, the possibility of a total collapse of James's position was not raised. It is,
however, worth pointing out that William's military and subsequent political victories
were unpredictable. The idea of a successful landing of any sort was unlikely, given the
possibilities of interventions by the weather and by Dartmouth's fleet. William perishing
in a storm would not have been an unattractive prospect for Louis. Had William landed
and James fought in the West Country or stayed subsequently in London, the crisis
might well have been more protracted or had a different result. In addition, the Stuart
position did not collapse in Ireland, and in 1690-1 William had to devote considerable
effort to its conquest, a task that should not be treated as marginal and that has recently
received more attention.^'*
Even less than in 1672,^^ Louis did not seek a lengthy conflict in 1688 when he began
hostilities in the Rhineland. He hoped that a military demonstration would obtain his
objectives, and he did his best to win the neutrality of Spain, whose territories in the Low
Countries had proved so vulnerable in the last war. Possibly an attack on Maastricht, the
Dutch fortress most vulnerable to French forces, would have helped James, but this was
unclear, and Louis did not wish to unite the Dutch around William. In addition, James
feared the close association with France that naval assistance would have entailed.
On 4 October 1688, however, D'Avaux complained about the effect of the French
moving east, into the upper Rhineland, rather than threatening the Dutch: 'the siege of
Philipsbourg made the stocks rise and rendered the States General very insolent, from an
assurance that the king would neither attack them nor the Spanish Netherlands'. He
added his view that measures should be taken to frighten the Dutch. Four days later,
D'Avaux reported that Wilham might defer his invasion as long as it was possible that
Louis would invade the Spanish Netherlands.^^ Thus, Louis can be criticized for failing
to assist James until after he had fallen. To do so, however, is possibly to underrate the
unpredictability of international relations at a time when the opening of the Spanish
Succession and the collapse of the Ottoman Empire in Europe appeared imminent, to
endow Louis with a prescient awareness of England's future role against France, and to
neglect the extent to which the purpose of allies and clients was to assist the furtherance
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of policy, not dictate its course. There was no reason for Louis to suppose that England
(still less with its Scottish and Irish complications) would be a major asset for William.
Leopold Fs conquest of Hungary from the Turks threatened to upset the balance of
Franco-Habsburg power.^^ It introduced a worrying note of volatility, without making
it clear to Louis how best to respond. Furthermore, the attack on Maastricht, when
suggested by D'Avaux, could not be mounted: the armies were already directed against
Philippsburg. Military objectives could not be switched at short notice and at that time
of the year, certainly not without logistical preparations.
Arguably more serious for France in the long term than Louis's failure to back
James II in 1688 was his support for James and his line after 1688, for that made it more
difficult to develop better Anglo-French relations. Louis did not offer James consistent
support, but he did send a contingent to Ireland in 1689-91 and lost part of his fleet in
the 1692 project for an invasion on behalf of the Jacobite cause. Louis returned to the
scheme in 1696 when, unable to defeat William in the Spanish Netherlands and
promised Jacobite support in England, he concentrated troops near the coast, only to be
dissuaded from acting by English naval moves. The extent to which French recognition
of the male line of the Stuarts harmed relations is open to debate. Louis was willing to
recognize William as King as part of the Ryswick settlement (1697), and acknowledgement of the Hanoverian succession was a central feature of the Anglo-French alliance of
1716-31. Louis's support for James IFs claims during the Nine Years' War, however,
hindered negotiations with William, while his recognition of James III in 1701 made any
last-minute attempt to prevent Anglo-French hostilities as part of the War of the
Spanish Succession appear redundant. The English Ambassador at Paris, the Duke of
Manchester, observed, 'It shows at least this court does not intend to keep any measures
with His Majesty.'^^
If Anglo-French conflict is regarded as inevitable, then dissension over the succession
might not appear important, but any stress on the play of contingency in the absence of
defined and generally-accepted national interests, suggests that, on the contrary, Louis's
policy towards the Jacobites was of great consequence. It helped to give Anglo-French
rivalry an added degree of tension and made it recognizably different in type from that
between France and the United Provinces. Pride, personal commitment and a sense of
royal dignity were reflected in Louis's recognition of the Jacobite claim and, in turn,
helped to make it difficult, though not impossible, to negotiate. On the English part, the
recognition was a direct challenge to the domestic political situation.
An issue that could dramatically change the nature of Enghsh politics and rehgion was
placed at or near the forefront of Anglo-French relations, and it was not surprising that
anxiety about France and Louis XIV increased. The rise in hostility to France has been
dated to the later Stuart period, more especially to the Third Anglo-Dutch War
(1672-4), the Franco-Dutch war (1672-8) or to the Revocation of the Edict of Nantes
(1685). French success in 1672, the replacement of the De Witt regime in the United
Provinces, and the conduct of French naval operations, led to a major shift in opinion
against France in 1672-3.^^ Parliamentary debates in the Commons in the mid-i67os
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revealed concern and fury, because of feelings of insecurity, especially in 1677-8, anger
about Colbert's tariffs and concern about the possible threat posed by the French fleet.
The last has recently been seen as of major concern also to Charles and James, leading
to the conclusion that Charles was prepared for war with Louis in 1678. Danby warned
Charles in April 1677
that when mens feares are growne both so generall and so great as now they are by the successes
of France, neither his Majestie nor any of his ministers shall have any longer creditt if acts do
not speedily appeare some way or other to theire satisfaction. ^°
This shift in Anglo-French relations can be related to a more general breakdown in the
'classical' French alignment with various northern European Protestant powers in the
1670S. This also led to the French attack on the Dutch in 1672, to the breakdown in
relations with Brandenburg-Prussia and to a deterioration in those with Sweden. The
previously important Huguenot component in French society and in the French army
and navy was placed increasingly at risk. This shift ensured that Stuart patronage of the
non-Anglican English population became more contentious politically, as the reception
of successive Declarations of Indulgence showed. Furthermore, the Revocation of
the Edict of Nantes in 1685 seriously weakened James II, because of the association of
his policies with those of Louis XIV, and also harmed the Dutch francophiles.
A case, however, can also be made for suggesting that much of the rise in
Anglo-French hostihty derived from the events of 1688-9: the Glorious Revolution,
French support for James and the outbreak of war between the two powers. Louis's
military support for the Jacobite cause in Ireland was significant, as Ireland was the focus
and source of a number of English phobias. There is a sense in which English national
consciousness and patriotism were given a tremendous boost and fresh definition by the
Glorious Revolution. This consciousness was politically defined and partisan, directed
against Jacobites and those held likely to support the exiled Stuarts, especially Catholics
in England and, though to a lesser extent, Episcopahans in Scotland, as much as against
the principal patron of the Stuarts, Louis XIV. Indeed, it could be argued that Louis
established himself as the national enemy more by his real and apparent backing for the
Stuarts and their British supporters, than by his activities on the Continent.
English, still more British, patriotism was thus after 1688 necessarily divisive, and
derived much of its drive from this partisan character. The Glorious Revolution led to
the development of two competing theses of patriotism, one of which triumphed, and
thus was able to define patriotism accordingly. Such a process was not new. It could be
seen on every occasion in which domestic divisions and foreign policy had interacted, for
example during the Henrician Reformation and the English Civil War, and had medieval
roots, as with French intervention in English domestic politics in 1216-17 at the end of
the reign of John and at the beginning of Henry Ill's minority. The expansion of the
dimension of public politics in the early 1690s, thanks to the move to annual Parliaments
and an active press free of pre-publication censorship, as well as the lengthy conflict with
France for most of the period 1689-1713, ensured that the particular patriotic discourse
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associated with the winning side in the British civil conflict of 1688-91 became well
entrenched. It has also influenced scholarship on the subject. The Whig interpretation
of domestic history may have been supplanted; but this is not true of work on foreign
policy.^^ The problematic nature of national unity has received too little attention. Thus,
Brinkmann argued that James * was in the impossible position of any government which
has its support outside its proper national basis'. This problem can be seen in the
eighteenth-century use of 1688. Thus, in 1787, Count Charles Bentinck pressed for
British military intervention in the Dutch crisis on behalf of William V of Orange, 'I
hope to hear soon of an English fleet on the coast: remember 1688. There is a sea port
town ready to receive you.' Yet British activity was not only directed against a Dutch
political movement, the Patriots, who could claim to be as representative of national
interests as the house of Orange, but was also criticized by one prominent minister,
the Lord Chancellor, Lord Thurlow, then the most obvious representative in the
Cabinet of what can be referred to as the Tory strain in late-eighteenth-century
politics.^^
That there was always a public debate over foreign policy, over goals as well as means,
was amply demonstrated both during the wars of 1689-1713 and subsequently. The
events of the period and the debates they gave rise to shaped the notions of national
interests and thus patriotism that were to be so influential in public discourse and
subsequent scholarship.
It is therefore possible to focus attention on the specific events in international
relations and British foreign policy during Trumbull's career, and to emphasize their
importance. By directing attention to those years, greater stress is placed on the role of
choice, for Louis had to decide how far he was to support James. His policies ensured
that France clearly emerged as the leading challenger to the Protestant succession. Far
from such a development being inevitable, it was actually at variance with one of the
central themes of French foreign policy since the 1530s. France had been classically,
though not invariably, associated with the Protestant cause against the Habsburgs, both
in the Empire (Germany) and in the Low Countries. Louis's moves against the
Huguenots did not make such a strategy redundant, as his co-operation with William III
in negotiating the Partition Treaties (1698, 1700) was to demonstrate. His support for the
Jacobites, however, made co-operation with Britain more diflicult. Dynastic claims were
not by their nature subject to compromise and Louis restricted his freedom of
manoeuvre by sheltering James. The more distant and manipulative French policy
towards the Jacobites that followed the death of Louis XIV in 1715 was more successful
in respecting British sensitivity on the subject of the succession. On the other hand, an
England under a suitably grateful and subservient James II or James III would have
been the best possible scenario for Louis, albeit a risky and long term one which
restricted his freedom of manoeuvre in the short term. Had Tourville been permitted by
Louis to wait for the Toulon fleet in 1692, the battle of Barfleur might have been a
French success, and had William been killed during the war, it is possible that the
policies of reinsurance on the part of politicians who continued links with the exiled
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James might have weakened the English response to a French invasion or a Jacobite
rising.
French support for the Jacobites proved to be a central feature of the Whig myth of
the Glorious Revolution, helping to locate both France and Jacobitism, and making clear
their guilt by association. Largely because French policy towards the Jacobites has not
been placed in the context of Louis's wider relations with William and England, this
myth has proved singularly durable. By directing attention, however, to the state of flux
in relations, a more realistic appraisal of Louis's policies can be made. Given his
ideological views and his concern in his later years with aflirming his role as a Catholic
monarch, it is unreasonable to criticize him harshly for his recognition of the Stuarts,
though it is appropriate to stress the serious consequences that it had.^^
In turning to consider the i68os it is necessary first to stress the unpredictability of
international relations in this period. International relations were extremely volatile, to
the extent that it was difficult, and even dangerous, for a government to seek to apply
consistent principles, as was to be demonstrated by the heavy price paid by Louis XIV
for the continuing support he gave to the Jacobites. In practice, in their foreign policies,
governments usually were reacting to the pressure of events at home and abroad, rather
than executing long-term, carefully calculated plans; and, when they chose a course of
action it was usually in the light of patchy information and without being able to predict
or control the consequences of their actions. It is possible to stress 'the beginning of a
new era in European pohtics',^^ with French, and far more obviously, Turkish power
ebbing, and Austria becoming more prominent. It can be argued that * there was no real
danger of France being able to achieve the sort of successes feared' by those, such as Sir
William Temple, who warned about a French threat. ^^ However, the success of the
reunions policy and the paralyzing of William's attempts to aid Spain, by D'Avaux and
the Louvestein party, indicate why contemporaries were impressed by French power,
and they had reason to be so intimidated or frightened. It is scarcely surprising that the
changes of the period were imperfectly understood and that, when they were grasped,
it was unclear how best to respond. This was a particular problem for rulers who were
not in the first rank, such as the Kings of Denmark and Norway, the Electors of Bavaria
and Brandenburg, and the Dukes of Lorraine.^^ Charles II and James II could clearly
be included in this list, and that is a measure of their problem, both in terms of their
international position and with reference to the later reputation of their foreign policy.
There was of course no rigid divide between first rank and other powers, but England
seemed clearly absent from the first for two reasons. First, after the demobilization of the
substantial army and navy of the Commonwealth and Protectorate, the forces that had
given substance to Cromwellian foreign policy, England was not a leading military
power. Her navy was still important, as was shown in the Second and Third
Anglo-Dutch Wars, though its relative strength was diminished by the growth of French
naval power under Louis XIV, a growth that challenged English assumptions about the
naval situation in the Channel. This lay behind the disputes about the precedence of the
English flag that involved so much diplomatic effort. The English army became far
209
weaker after demobilization.^^ There was less prospect under Charles II of Continental
intervention on the scale of 1658 when English troops had played a major role in the
Spanish defeat at the Battle of the Dunes, though in 1678 the army of nearly 30,000 men
raised by Danby was as large as the Cromwellian force in Flanders. The English were
well aware of French military strength. It was mentioned in both Parliament and the
press. The English Intelligencer of 16 August 1679 reported that the French army
contained more than 140,000 men. In January 1686 Trumbull wrote from France, *Here
is a considerable augmentation of the King's forces, but to what number I cannot yet
positively know; and there are 6 millions added to the Marine.'^^
Instead of English military power, it was the memory of past strength, the Elizabeth
and Drake, Cromwell and Blake myth, and the prospect that her potential strength might
increase that were of importance to English politicians and foreign diplomats. Foreign
powers sought to foster or prevent the latter by intervening in English domestic politics.
The second reason why England did not seem a flrst-rank power was the state of these
politics. England seemed unstable, due to and demonstrated by, both the problems
successive governments faced in parliamentary management, and those caused by
ministerial division. As a result, the politics of Charles IPs reign appeared repeatedly
to demonstrate that royal and ministerial wishes could be thwarted and were unlikely to
remain constant. ^^ Indeed, in seeking foreign support or in excusing particular steps,
both Charles and his ministers made reference to the domestic problems they faced,^^
and thus contributed to the foreign impression of their weakness. In 1676 the French
envoy Honore de Courtin observed, 'il arrive si souvent ici des changemens',^^ and later
that year he added that fear of Parliament, rather than, to him, rational considerations
based on diplomatic calculations, determined ministerial policy.^^ As a consequence, this
policy could be driven towards aggressive positions at the expense of France,^^ while in
order to lessen his domestic problems Charles could also seem to want peace.^^ Indeed,
the confusion between the two possible responses to these problems, bellicosity and
inaction, helped to make English policy seem especially volatile in the late 1670s and
early i68os.^^ Charles II was well aware of this problem. In May 1677 he replied to a
Commons address by stating that,
should I suffer this fundamental power of making peace and war to be so far invaded (though but
once) as to have the manner and circumstances of leagues prescribed to me by Parliament, it is
plain, that no prince or state would any long believe, that the sovereignty of England rests in the
crown; nor could I think myself to signify any more to foreign princes than the empty sound of
Far, however, from seeing the domestic situation as a simple explanatory device to
account for foreign policy, it is important to note its ambiguity and the variety of political
uses to which it could be put. Thus, in the spring of 1678 James told Barrillon that war
with France would diminish domestic hostility to him and enable the crown to raise an
army that could, if necessary, be used to suppress revolt. Barrillon replied that war would
force the government to accept parliamentary limitations on the King's choice of
210
ministers and restrictions on Catholicism.^^ The army raised in 1678 represented an
extension of ministerial patronage: a foreign policy development was thus turned to
political advantage, indicating the primacy, or at least pervasive role, of domestic affairs.
The varied use of the argument from the weakness of the English government underlines
the need for a cautious use of statements about the relationship between domestic and
international affairs. It is, however, clear that the Popish Plot and Exclusion Crisis
(1678-81) led, at the time, to the expectation that James would either be excluded from
the succession or only gain the throne if he accepted limitations on his authority.
In fact, as a result of the failure of Exclusion and the subsequent 'Tory reaction',
James came to the throne in 1685 with more power and authority than could have been
anticipated as recently as 1681. Furthermore, the international situation was more
propitious than in recent years. The Truce of Ratisbon (Regensburg) of 1684 marked not
a full settlement of differences, but at least a relaxation of the tensions created by Louis's
reunions policy and by his determination that his gains should be recognized.^® As with
domestic British affairs, so with those abroad: it is necessary to put aside the awareness
of crisis, rupture and conflict from 1688 on and, instead, to pay attention to the particular
conjuncture. The 1680s can be seen in terms of a general crisis,^^ but it is also worth noting
that in Western Europe the period from the Truce of Regensburg to the outbreak of the
Nine Years' War was peaceful. This contrasted with the situation for most of the previous
thirteen years. It can, however, be suggested that, although the contexts were very
different, the detente brought about by the Truce of Ratisbon resembled WilUam Ill's
Partition Treaties, in that they all broke down after a short interval. Granted thus that
there was flux and various possibilities, it can, nevertheless, be argued that in the period
before 1688 developments were taking place which made the course of events from 1688
onwards more than the product of contingencies at the time.
Clearly, not least in 1688, there were disputes, as well as intimations of a forthcoming
war, as there had earlier been in the period before the outbreak of the Dutch War in 1672.
It was, however, far from clear whether war would break out and, if so, between whom.
Thus, at the beginning of January 1685, the Spanish envoy in London thought war
inevitable over the French intimidation of Genoa, and Charles II wanted the dispute
settled, as he feared that if war broke out, it would become general. And yet the issue
did not lead to war. The same was true of the Baltic crisis of 1683, and again in 1686-9
as war between Denmark and its neighbours was averted.*^ War was also feared when
the English and the Dutch clashed over trade in the East Indies, the English being driven
out of Bantam in r682, but it was avoided. Thus, it is necessary not to regard war as
inevitable and, indeed, to appreciate the extent to which opportunities for continued
peace existed. In March 1687 Sir George Etherege, Ambassador to the Imperial Diet,
who the previous month had been displeased to hear James II called a 'bon fran9ois',
felt able to write,
I hope (now there is no danger of the public peace's being broke) the Ministers will no longer
live in a state of war and that I may play quietly at cards with the Countess of Crecy, without
giving the Austrian jealousy.'*^
211
The opportunity for continued peace seemed particularly true of Britain, given
Charles II's reluctance in his last years to adopt any interventionist role in Continental
diplomacy.'*'^ This set the situation for James II's foreign policy and thus for Trumbull's
Paris embassy. The Paris embassy would seem to be the key diplomatic post. It was,
however, held by distinctly secondary figures. Trumbull, and his successor, Bevil
Skelton, were neither important nor influential in their own right. This practice made
it difficult for James to maintain the independent uncommitted stance which he wanted.
All the important business was transacted by the French envoy in London. This
approach had suited Charles with his secret set of policies, but handicapped James.
Trumbull's embassy has been the subject of detailed study. Ruth Clark's monograph*^
was based on extensive work in English and French archives and has stood the test of
time well. It is clear that the Anglican Trumbull, who was chosen as a result of the
influence of the Earl of Rochester, was not in the confidence of his catholicizing monarch.
Rochester, a prominent Tory and Anglican, was created Lord Treasurer soon after the
accession of his former brother-in-law, James. Rochester supported good relations with
William and reliance on the Tories, but, from the prorogation of Parliament in
November 1685, Rochester's influence was increasingly supplanted by Sunderland who
advocated closer ties with France and was willing to support James's pro-Catholic
policies. Though James did not decide to dismiss Rochester until December 1686,
Trumbull's position was weakened from the outset by the change in the domestic
situation. With Barrillon and Sunderland working together, any English diplomat in
Paris had no influence and little real role. Nevertheless, James was firm on his royal
dignity. Despite his conviction that Huguenot refugees had played a role in the
Monmouth rising,^^ and French complaints,*^ Trumbull's pressure on behalf of the
Huguenot wives of James's subjects and Trumbull's Huguenot servants was supported.
The Monmouth rising did not necessarily commit James to Louis. Leopold I
congratulated James heartily on his victory of Sedgemoor.*^
^
Trumbull's manner was not conducive to easy negotiations, though, given the
grandiloquent French tone of these years, it is clear that any robust defence of the
English position was likely to cause offence. Trumbull himself reported in April 1686,
The Emperor's envoy was yesterday at Versailles to press Monsr. de Croissy [French foreign
minister] for some favourable answer to the memorial he gave in of several damages done by the
French troops in the domains of the Emperor, signifying the ill consequences that might happen,
if the Emperor should be obliged to take satisfaction upon the new conquests of the French
adjoining: Adding that the Emperor was not in the condition of a slave with his hands tied in
chains, otherwise than in the fancy of Monsr. de la Feuillade. (This he thought fit to take notice
of, upon occasion of one of thefiguresunder the new statue, representing a slave in chains, with
the arms of the Empire, the spread-eagle, by him.)*'
It is scarcely surprising that diplomats found the triumphalist atmosphere at the French
court unwelcome, though, in the case of Trumbull, Louis XIV suggested that given the
current circumstances, in the aftermath of the revocation of the Edict of Nantes, it would
212
be better to have a Catholic than a Protestant envoy. He was also certain that Trumbull
would serve James better at Constantinople than at Paris.*^ Trumbull had certainly had
to cope with intrinsically difllicult, or even intractable, problems in Paris, both the effects
of the Revocation in human detail, and the continuing resentment caused by French
tariffs and restrictions on trade. These issues were far from inconsequential: they
completely cut the ground from under the feet of D'Avaux at The Hague. In addition,
Trumbull had to confront the delicate matter of Orange, on which it was scarcely
surprising that he should antagonize Louis, James and William.
Trumbull's move of embassy took him far from the centre of diplomatic activity in
Western Europe and from the sensitive subject of Anglo-French relations, a move that
was to ease his transfer of allegiance from James to William. The move had other
advantages. Trumbull had found Paris cripplingly expensive,*^ but Constantinople,
where the envoy's salary was paid by the Levant Company, was less costly. The
Company paid more regularly than the crown. This, however, posed problems as the
Company essentially sought a commercial representative and was unwilling to pay for
political services.^^ Trumbull was therefore the envoy furthest from England at the time
of the Glorious Revolution. The particular international and domestic conjuncture has
received exhaustive treatment as a consequence of the recent tercentenary.^^ Though
certain topics have had inadequate attention, for example Anglo-Spanish relations, there
is little to add to the account of how William was able to negotiate a diplomatic cover
and establish a military backing for his invasion and of how James miscalculated his
response, both militarily and pohtically. When Bonrepaus urged him on 11 September
to move troops from Ireland, James rephed that there was no hurry.^^
Trumbull was absent from the scene of crisis. He would scarcely have been an
appropriate messenger for discussion about the dispatch of French warships to the
Channel. By the end of his reign, James had been pushed, by the crisis in his relations
with William, far closer to Louis than he would have sought at its outset. On 6
September he told Bonrepaus and Barrillon at Windsor that he had such confidence in
Louis that he would never be jealous of his grandeur, but would be happy to see Louis
conquer all Germany. Bonrepaus thought that it would be easy to persuade James to join
Louis in a war with William.^^
Thus, already before William's invasion, James had been pushed towards the
subservience to Louis that was to characterize his position after he left England. James
had lost his earlier independent position when, in the aftermath of the suppression of the
Monmouth rebellion, he had been both strong domestically and willing and able to
negotiate with a number of Continental rulers, including William. Unpopular domestic
policies had made intervention by William appear an option at the same time as James's
closer relations with Louis seemed to make such intervention for William a desirable,
even necessary, prelude to the resumption of Franco-Dutch hostilities. Trumbull played
no real role in this crisis or in the deterioration of James's position. His rebarbative
legalism and Anglicanism, the former a reflection of his legal career, had scarcely
improved Anglo-French relations in 1686, but that had not then caused James serious
213
problems. However, as a diplomat at a turning point in British and Continental history,
Trumbull's correspondence is of great value to scholars.
At Constantinople, Trumbull was of most importance when serving William, for it
was then that he sought to promote an Austro-Turkish peace in order that Leopold I
and his German allies should concentrate their forces against Louis XIV. This involved
Trumbull in opposition to French diplomacy, a position he found more conducive than
his Paris embassy. However, the unwillingness of the two powers to compromise
thwarted Trumbull and he was recalled at his own request in 1691.^* In some respects,
Trumbull's pre-Revolutionary diplomatic career prefigured the new international order
created in 1688-9. I^ Paris, in early 1686, he tried to act in conjunction with the Dutch
envoy over Louis XIV's occupation of William's principality of Orange: in miniature
this raised issues which were from 1689 to join England and the United Provinces in
opposition to France, but in 1686 Louis would not admit the acceptability of joint
representations in a matter in which he claimed that his sovereign rights were involved.
Furthermore, although they were so dissimilar in personality, Trumbull was the mentor
of Henry St John, later first Viscount Bolingbroke,^^ the most influential Tory Secretary
of State of the early eighteenth century.
Cruickshanks (ed.). By Force or by Default? The
Revolution of 1688 (Edinburgh, 1989), pp.
135-58. Recent guides to international relations
and to British foreign policy in this period are
provided by Black, The Rise of the European
Powers i(i79-i793 (London, 1990) and A System
of Ambition? British Foreign Policy 1660-1793
(Harlow, 1991).
5 The Parliamentary Debates (Hansard), 5th ser.,
vol. 478, cols. 676-8.
^
6 Paris, Archives du Ministere des Affaires
Etrangeres, Correspondance Politique, Angleterre (hereafter AE. CP. Ang.) 129, ff. 20, 3&-1:
Louis XIV to Paul de Barrillon, envoy in
London, 2 May, Barrillon to Louis, 2 May 1678;
K. H. D. Haley, William of Orange and the
English Opposition 1672-4 (Oxford, 1953), and
' English Policy at the Peace Congress of
Nijmegen', in J. A. H. Bots (ed.), The Peace of
Nijmegen (Amsterdam, 1979), p. 146; J-RJones, 'French Intervention in English and
Dutch Pohtics, 1677-88', in Black (ed.). Knights
Errant and True Englishmen: British Foreign
Policy 1660-1800 (Edinburgh, 1989), pp. i -
I would like to thank David Aldridge, David Davies,
Richard Harding, J. R. Jones, John Stoye and David
Sturdy for commenting on an earlier draft, and the
British Academy and the Staff Travel and Research
Fund of Durham University for their support.
1 G. M. Bell, A Handlist of British Diptomatic
Representatives isog-1688 (London, 1990), pp.
125, 287.
2 J. C. Sainty, Officials of the Secretaries of State
i66o-iy82 (London, 1973), p. m .
3 Burrows, History., pp. 32, 34-5; Ward and G. P.
Gooch (eds.), The Cambridge History of British
Foreign Policy 1783-igig^ vol. i (Cambridge,
1922), pp. 38-9. For recent work on eighteenthcentury views of the Glorious Revolution, see K.
Wilson, 'Inventing Revolution: 1688 and
Eighteenth-Century Popular Vo\it\cs\ Journal of
British Studies, xxviii (1989), pp. 349-86, and 'A
Dissident Legacy: Eighteenth Century Popular
Politics and the Glorious Revolution', in J. R.
Jones (ed.). Liberty Secured? Britain before and
after 1688 (Stanford, 1992), pp. 299-334; R. B.
Sher, '1688 and 1788: William Robertson on
Revolution in Britain and France', in P. Dukes
and J. Dunkley (eds.). Culture and Revolution
(London, 1990), pp. 98-109.
4 J . M . Black, 'The Revolution and the Development of English Foreign Pohcy', in E.
214
237 Haley, An English Diplomat in the Low Countries:
Sir William Temple and John de Witt 1665-1672
(Oxford, 1986), p. 318; R. Hutton, 'The making
of the Secret Treaty of Dover, 1668-1670',
Historical Journal, xxix (1986), pp. 297-318.
8 C. J. Ekberg, The Failure of Louis XIVs Dutch
War (Chapel Hill, 1979), pp. 23-4, 88, 90, 154,
158-62; J. D. Davies, Gentlemen and Tarpaulins: The Officers and Men of the Restoration
Navy (Oxford, 1991), pp. 172-4.
9 Ekberg, Failure, p. 155.
10 Marquis de Chamlay, 'Memoire historique de ce
qui s'est passe depuis la paix de Nimeque...
jusqu'en 1688', Vincennes, Archives de la
Guerre, Ai 1183.
11 Paris, Archives Nationales, Archives de la
Marine (hereafter AM), AE.B^ 758: Correspondance Consulaire Londres, Usson de Bonrepaus
to French minister of the marine, Seignelay, 10,
II Sept. 1688.
12 The Negotiations of Count D'Avaux, 4 vols.
(London, 1754-5), vol. iv, p. 129.
13 C. Rousset, Histoire de Louvois, 4 vols. (Paris,
1861-3), vol. iv, pp. 152-3; R. D. Martin, The
Marquis de Chamlay. Friend and Confidential
Advisor to Louis XIV:
The Early Years,
1650-1691 (D.Phil., Santa Barbara, 1972), p!
207.
14 W. A. Maguire (ed.). Kings in Conflict. The
Revolutionary War in Ireland and its Aftermath
1689-1750 (Belfast, 1990); P. Wauchope, Patrick Sarsfield and the Williamite War (Blackrock,
1992).
15 P. Sonnino, Louis XIV and the Origins of the
Dutch War (Cambridge, 1988).
16 D'Avaux, vol. iv, p. 238; AE. CP. Hollande 156,
f- 236.
17 Martin, Chamlay, p. 184.
18 New Haven, Beinecke Library, Manchester Box,
Manchester to William Blathwayt, 16 Sept.
1701; M.Thomson, 'Louis XIV and William
III, 1689-1697', and 'The Safeguarding of the
Protestant Succession, 1702-18', in R. Hatton
and J. S. Bromley (eds.), William III and Louis
XIV. Essays 1680-1720 by and for Mark A.
Thomson (Liverpool, 1968), pp. 24-48, 237-51.
19 S. C. A. Pincus, 'From Butterboxes to Wooden
Shoes: The Shift in English Popular Sentiment
from Hollandophobic to Francophobic in the
1670s', Historical Journal {ionhcomm%). I would
like to thank Dr Pincus for letting me see a copy
of this piece.
20 Davies, 'The Birth of the Imperial Navy?
Aspects of Maritime Strategy, c. 1650-90', in
M. Duffy (ed.), Parameters of British Naval
Power 1650-1850 (Exeter, 1992), pp. 24-30, 32;
A. Browning, Thomas Osborne Earl of Danby. II.
Letters (Glasgow, 1944), p- 67.
21 This is demonstrated most recently by H. M.
Scott, 'The Second "Hundred Years War",
1689-1815', Historical Journal, xxxv (1992), pp.
443-69; on p. 450 he emphasizes the need 'for
re-asserting the whig approach' and defends
'interventionist' ministers. For a criticism of the
'British-Whig view', albeit of the early nineteenth century, P. W. Schroeder, 'Old Wine in
Old Bottles; Recent Contributions to British
Foreign Policy and European International
Politics, i-]Sg-iS4S\ Journal of British Studies,
xxvi (1987), pp. 20-3.
22 C. Brinkmann, 'The Relations between England
and Germany, 1660-1688', English Historical
Review, xxiv (1909), p. 469. Bentinck to William
Grenville, 31 Aug. 1787, BL, Add. MS. 59364,
f. 71; Thurlow to Marquess of Stafford, 29 Sept.
1787, and undated. Public Record Office (hereafter P.R.O.), 30/29/1/15, nos. 60, 69. On the
use of the term Tory, J. J. Sack, From Jacobite to
Conservative. Reaction and Orthodoxy in Britain,
c. 1760-1832 (Cambridge, 1993). On the contentious nature of national interests, see Black,
British Foreign Policy in an Age of Revolutions
WS3-93 (Cambridge, 1994). A failure to probe
this is a problem with L. J. Colley, Britons (New
Haven, 1992) and with Steven Pincus's account
of 1688 in his unpublished paper, ' T o Prevent a
Universal Monarchy'.
23 Black,' Louis XIV's Foreign Policy Reassessed',
Seventeenth-Century French Studies, x (1988),
pp. 199-212. An excellent, lengthy and wideranging recent account of international relations
is provided by C. Boutant, L'Europe au grand
tournant des annees 1680: La Succession Palatine
(Paris, 1985).
24 J. T. O'Connor, Negotiator out of Season. The
Career of Wilhelm Egon von FUrstenberg 1629 to
1704 (Athens, Georgia, 1978), p. 200; Black, The
Rise of the European Powers 1679-17^3, pp. 3-6.
25 J. L. Price, 'Restoration England and Europe',
in J. R. Jones (ed.). The Restored Monarchy
1660-1688 (London, 1979), p. 135.
26 G. Pages, Le Grand Electeur et Louis XIV,
1660-1688(Pzris, 1905); G. Livet, 'La Lorraine
et les relations internationales au X V I I P siecle',
in La Lorraine dans PEurope des Lumieres (Nancy,
1968), pp. 15-48; L. Huttl, 'Die Beziehungen
zwischen Wien, Miinchen und Versailles wahr-
215
end des Grossen Turkenkrieges 1684 bis 1688',
Mitteilungen des Osterreichischen Staatsarchivs^
xxxviii(i985), pp. 81-122; S. P. Oakley, William
III and the Northern Crowns during the Nine
Years War 1689-97 (New York, 1987); J. Voss,
*La Lorraine et sa situation politique entre la
France et J'Empire vues par le Due de SaintSimon', in J. P. Bled, E. Faucher and R.
Taveneaux (eds.), Les Habshourg et la Lorraine
(Nancy, 1988), pp. 91-9; Black, European
Powers, pp. 198-203.
27 J. Childs, The Army of Charles II (London,
1976).
28 P.R.O., 78/150, f. 4: Trumbull to Robert, 2nd
Earl of Sunderland, 16 Jan. 1686.
29 J. J. Jusserand, A French Ambassador at the
Court of Charles the Second (London, 1892), p.
150.
30 AE. CP. Ang. 118, ff. 156-7; 119, f. 70; 127, ff.
21-2; 128, f. 40: Courtin, French envoy, to
Louis XIV, 4 June, Courtin to Pomponne,
foreign minister, 27 July 1676, Barrillon to
Louis, 3 Jan., 9 Mar., 5 May 1678; Courtin to
Pomponne, 20 Aug., Courtin to Louis XIV, 12
Oct. 1676, Barrillon to Louis XIV, 11 Apr. 1678,
Marquise Campana de Cavelli, Les Derniers
Stuarts a Saint-Germain-en-Laye, 2 vols. (Paris,
1871), vol. i, pp. 176-7, 180, 214.
31 AE. CP. Ang. 119, f. 23: Courtin to Pomponne,
9 July 1676.
32 AE. CP. Ang. 120, f. 26: Courtin to Louis XIV,
I Oct. 1676.
33 Courtin to Louis XIV, 3 Dec. 1676; Cavelli,
Derniers Stuarts, vol. i, p. 185.
34 AE. CP. Ang. 120, f. 37: Courtin to Pomponne,
5 Oct. 1676.
35 AE. CP. Ang. 128, ff. 26, 28: Barrillon to
Pomponne, 3 Mar., Barrillon to Louis, 7 Mar.
1678; AN. AE. B^ 755: Barrillon to the minister
of the marine, Colbert, 14 Mar. 1678.
36 Journals of the House of Commons, vol. ix, p. 426.
37 Cavelli, Derniers Stuarts, vol. i, pp. 213-14.
38 W. Platzhoff, 'Ludwig XIV, das Kaisertum und
die Europaische Krisis von 1683', Htstorische
Zeitschrift, cxxi (1920), pp. 377-412.
39 A. Lossky, 'The General European Crisis of the
1680s', European Studies Review, x (1980), pp.
177-98.
40 AE. CP. Ang. 154, ff. 17-19: Barrillon to Louis,
4Jan. ibS$;Lossky, Louis XIV, William III and
the Baltic Crisis of 1683 (Berkeley, 1954); J.
Stoye, 'Europe and the Revolution of 1688', in
R. Beddard (ed.). The Revolutions of 1688
(Oxford, 1991), pp. 197-8.
41 Etherege to Nicholas Taafe, 12 Feb., Etherege to
Charles, 2nd Earl of Middleton, Secretary of
State for the Northern Department, 20 Mar.
1687, BL, Add. MS 11513, ff. 50, 64. On the
general issue of the causes of war in this period,
see Black (ed.). The Origins of War in Early
Modern Europe (Edinburgh, 1987).
42 AE. CP. Ang. 149, ff. 12-13, 31; 154. f- 24:
Barrillon to Louis, 4, 7 Jan. 1683, 8 Jan. 1685;
Jones, Charles II (London, 1987), p. 180;
Hutton, Charles II (Oxford, 1991), p. 427.
43 R. Clark, Sir William Trumbull in Paris 16851686 (Cambridge, 1938).
44 AE. CP. Ang. 156, ff. 40-1, 46: Barrillon to
Louis, 10, 13 Sept. 1685.
45 AE. CP. Ang. 158, ff. 37, 40: Barrillon to
Croissy, foreign minister, 10 Jan., Croissy to
Barrillon, 17 Jan. 1686.
46 AE. CP. Ang. 159, ff. 42-3: Barrillon to Louis,
15 July 1686; Clark, Trumbull, pp. 57-9, 63-5,
67-70; J. Miller, James II (London, 1989),
p. 145; Brinkmann, 'England and Germany',
p. 467.
47 P.R.O., 78/150, f. 62: Trumbull to Sunderland,
3 Apr. 1686. The reference is to the statue of
Louis on the Place des Victoires commissioned
by Marshal Feuillade and recently erected; see
illustrations in P. Burke, The Fabrication of Louis
XIV (New Haven, 1992), pp. 94-5.
48 AE. CP. Ang. 159, f. 52: Louis to Barrillon, 2
Aug. 1686.
49 Clark, Trumbull, p. 103.
^
50 P. S. Lachs, The Diplomatic Corps under Charles
II and James II (New Brunswick, 1965), pp. 36,
62; Etherege, who had served at Constantinople,
to Trumbull, 10 Sept. 1686, BL, Add. MS.
11513, f. 26.
51 The most important works are Childs, The
Army, James II, and the Glorious Revolution
(Manchester, 1980); W. A. Speck, Reluctant
Revolutionaries. Englishmen and the Revolution of
1688 (Oxford, 1988); Cruickshanks (ed.), By
Force or by Default?; C. Wilson and D. Proctor
(eds.), 1688. The Seaborne Alliance and Diplomatic Revolution (London, 1989); G. H.Jones,
Convergent Forces. Immediate Causes of the
Revolution of 1688 in England (Ames, Iowa,
1990); Beddard (ed.). Revolutions; J. I. Israel
(ed.). The Anglo-Dutch Moment. Essays on the
Glorious Revolution and its World Impact
216
(Cambridge, 1991); L. Hobelt, 'Imperial Diplomacy and the " Glorious Revolution " ' , Parliaments. Estates and Representation, xi (1991), pp.
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52 AN.AE.B^ 758: Bonrepaus to Seignelay, 11
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53 AN.AE.B^ 758: Bonrepaus to Seignelay, 7 Sept.
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54 Trumbull, 'Memorials of My Embassy in Constantinople', BL, Add. MS. 34799; A. C. Wood,
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xmi d&n Osm^ntn \()^\ Mitteilungen des Instituts fur Osterreichische Geschichtsforschung, xcvii
(1989), pp. 329-80.
55 H. T. Dickinson, Bolingbroke (1970), pp. 4, 7.
217