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This Persion-slyle pointing depicts the Ottomon Turks os they ottock the
Hungorions with troops ond connons in o bottle in 1526. '
e The Decline
of
the Old Order
c The Rise
of the West
@
VISUALIZING TIIE
Pasz; Population
Trends
*
D)CUMENT:
Italian
Renaissance
Culture
e Western
Expansion: The
Experirnental
Phase
a IN Dnrrut:The
Problem of
Ethnocentrism
e Outside the
World Network
E
CONCLUSION:
Adding Up
the Changes
in 1400 was in fundamental transition. This chapter highlights the main features of this transition. The principal focus is on
shifts in the balance of power betrveen civilizations in Asia, Africa,
and Europe and related changes in the nature of international contact.
This period of transition in dre l4th and early lSth centuries begarr with
the decline of Arab strength-symbolized by the fall of the last Arab
caliphate in 1258-and the disruptions that Mongol incursions caused elsehe world
where in Asia and eastern Europe . These developments created new opPor-
tunities in the international network that had been established in the
postclassical centuries, initially under Arab sponsorship. Various candidates
emerged to take a new international role, including for a short time China
in its new Ming dynasty.
The most dynamic new contender for international power ultimately
proved to be western Europe, and the conditions that propelled Western
civilization toward a new position around 1400 are the second key theme
of this chapter. The West was not yet the world's major power; it did not
replace the Arabs as international leaders quickly or easily. The first stages
of the rise of the West were accompanie d by important changes in Western
civilization itself, also taking shape by about 1400. At this point, Italy, Spain,
and Portugal took a new leadership role in west European outreach, which
they would hold for about two centuries.
It is also vital to note changes in the societies outside the international
network, in the Americas and Polynesia. New difficulties in the great American empires, in particular, inadvertently reduced the ability to respond to a
European challenge that was about to arrive.
Focusing on new frameworks for international contacts) this chapter
inevitably d.eals with the question ofwhy individual civilizations reacted differently to key forces. This was a vital period of redefinition) comparable to
the centuries that led from the classical to postclassical periods but with
developments that had even wider sweep.
339
340
PART
Irr The Poslclosirollro
1250 c.r.
1258
Mongol conquest of Bogh
1300 c.r.
I
dod; foll of Abbosid coliphote
t.1266-1337
1275-1292
Giotto
Petrorch; develop'
menf of ltolion Renoissonce
1320s
1320r
route fo lndies
I
begin
First luropeon use
I
I
Plogue reoches Sicily
348
Peok
I 453 0tiomons copture Constontinople, foll of Byzonline Empire
I
433
End of Chinese expeditions
439
Portugol tokes over Azores;
469
Union of Arogon ond
[o$ile;
rise of Sponish monorchy
inoeosing expeditions into Atl0ntic,
reoches Chino
347
1450 c.t.
migrotions
I 405 Chinese troding expediiions
I
1330s Block Deoth
Fint ltolion expedition seeks
Chho; Ming dynosty
1400 c.r.
1400 tnd of Polynesion
Spreod of bubonic plogue
of ronnon in worfore
New fomines in
Europe
I 368 Mongols expelled from
in 6obi Desert
Morco Polo
in Chino
1290-1317
l29l
304-l 374
1350 c.s.
olong northwest Africon roo$
of Block Deoth
in Middle Eost
1348-1375
Plogue spreods in
Europe, including Rusio
TH E DECLIN E OF TH
E
CLD ORDER
)1,
The first steps in the new worltl. ord.er that
was beg'inruing t0 enoeyge by 1400 inyohred.
rnajor reshwfJli.ng in the Middle East and
vtoYtb
Afi.ica.
In 1200, this region was still dominated by two
powerful empires, the Byzantine in the northwest
and the Islamic caliphate through much of the Middle Eastern heardand. By 1400, rhis srructure was in
disarray. The Byzantine Empire still existed, but it
was in decline, pressed by invading Ortoman Turks.
The imperial capital, Constantinople, fell to the Turks
in 1453, efTectively ending the empire. Two cenruries
earlier, the caliphate, long sapped by increasing
reliance on foreign troops and advisors, including the
Turks, had fhllen to Mongol invasion. Arabs have
never since been able to unite all of their region
under their own rule.
S*cial *ud eanitural tr}*cli*e
t*ae &€iddi* Easc
ix
By about I300, religious leaders in the Islamic Middle East gained the r"rpper hand over poets, philoso-
phers, and scientists. An earlier tension between
diverse cr-rltural elements yielded to rhe predominance of the faith. The ,r.la, pietl associated with the
rising Sufi movement, discussed in Chapter Z, was
both the cause and the result of this development. In
literature, emphasis on secular themes, such as the
joys of feasting and hunting, gave wav to more
strictly religious ideas. Persian poets, writing in their
own language instead ofArabic, led the way, and reli-
gious poetry-not poetry in general-became part
of the education of upper-class children. In philosophy, the rationalistic current encountered new attack.
In Muslim Spain, philosopher Ibn-Rushd (Averro€s)
espoused Greek rationalism, but his efforts were
largely ignored in the Middle East. In fact, European
scholars were more heavily influenced by his work.
In the Middle East proper, a more typical philosopher now claimed to use Aristotle,s logic to show
that it was impossible to discover religious truth by
in a book revealingly titled The
Destrwct'iotc of Philosopby. Many Sufi scholars wrote
human reason,
excitedly of their mystical contacts with God and the
stages of their religious passion, which led to dramatic new statements of Islam.
Changes in society and the economy were as
as the shifts in politics and intellectual life. As
the authority of the caliphate declined, landlords
seized power over the peasantry. As a result, fi-om
about 1100 onward, Middle Eastern peasants increasingly lost their fieedom, becoming serfs on large
estates, providing the [abor and produce landlords
now sought. This loss was not the peasants, alone, for
agricultural productivity suffered as a result. Landlords turned to sucking what they could from their
estates rathcr than trying to develop a more vital agriculture. Tax revenues declined, and Arab and other
Middle Eastern rraders began to lose ground. Few
Arab coins have been found in Europe dating from
later than I100. European merchants began to control their own turf and challenge the A.r-abs in other
parts of the Mediterranean; initiative in this vital trading area was passing to their hands. Arab and persian
commerce remained active in the Indian Ocean, but
the time was not too distant when it would face new
competition there as well.
telling
CIIAPTER 15
The decline of the Islamic caliphate and its economy was gradual and incomplete. It cannot be compared with the dramatic fall of the Roman Empire in
the West many centuries befbre. A more subde model
is needed. The reduced dynamism in trade did not take
the Arabs or.rt of major world markets, for example'
Finally, the political fragmentation of the Arab
world did not produce prolonged confusion in the
Middle East. The emerging Ottoman Turkish state
soon mastered most of the lands of the old caliphate
as well as the Byzantine corner) expanding into
southeastern Europe. (See Chapter 20 in Volume II
for the development of the new Ottoman Empire.)
It is important to realize that the empire was far more
por'verful, politically and militarily, than the caliphate
had been for many centuries and thus more frightening to observers in neighboring civilizations such
as
western Europe
.
A P*war Vacuum in Internatioxrai
Leadership
Nevertheless, even the rise of the Ottoman Empire
did not restore the full international vigor that the
Islamic caliphate had at the height of its powers.
Turkish rulers-scornful of their Arab subjects,
although they shared their religion-did not promote
trade, particularly maritime trade, as vigorously as in
the past. The expansionist power of the Ottoman
Empire was very real and persisted into the ITth century, but the fbcus on conquest and administration
overshadowed wider commercial ambitions. The
empire was not the sole hub of an international netu,ork, as the Arab caliphate rvas a few centuries
before. The result was a Power vacuum beyond the
borders of the emerging Ottoman Empire. A single
replacement for the Arabs as hub of the loose international network was not necessarily inevitable, and
no other civilization set out to advance itself, but a
sorting-out process was well under way by 1400.
The Mongols developed the first alternative irternational framework, with their interlocking holdings
that included central Asia, China, and Russia, with
thrusts into the Middle East and south Asia. l{ere was
that actively encouraged international travelers and provided unprecedented opportunities for
exchanges of technology and ideas-exchanges that
particularly benefited Western Europe through contacts with Asia. The Mongol decline, first in China,
then gradually elsewhere, raised again the question of
domination of international contacts and trade. The
end of the Mongol empires also turned attention to
a system
The Wesl und the (honging World
Bolonte 34L
sea-born trade, as the over land Asian trade routes
were disrupted. Two societies, successively, stepped up
to the challenge.
Chi*ese Thrust end Wridldr*1v*"1
a brief time China took full advantage of the new
opportunities in international trade' In a conscious
policy decision, however, the new Ming dynasty took
itself out of the main international arena, returning
to long-standing traditions in the civilization that
urged concentration on developing the Middle Kingdom and its evolving internal strengths. Rebellions in
China drove out the deeply resented Mongol overlords in 1368. A rebel leader from a peasant farni\'
seized the Mongol capital of Beijing and proclaimed
For
a new
Ming-meaning "brilliant"-dynasty that was
to last until 1644. This dynasty began with a burst of
unusual expansionism. The initial Ming rulers pressed
to secure the borders of the Middle I(ngdom. This
meant pushing the Mongols far to the north, to the
plains of what is now Mongolia. It meant reestablishing influence over neighboring governments and
winning tribute payments from states in I(orea, Vietnam, and Tibet, reviving much of the east Asian
regional structure set up by the Tang dynasty. Far
more unusual was a new policy, adopted soon after
1400, of mounting huge, state-sponsored trading
expeditions to southern Asia and beyond.
A first fleet sailed in 1405 to India, with 62 ships
carrying 28,000 men. Later voyages reached the
Middle East and the eastern coast ofAfrica, bringing
chinaware and copper coinage in exchange for local
goods. Chinese shipping at its height consisted of
2700 coastal vessels, 400 armed naval ships, and at
least as many long-distance ships. Nine great treasure
ships, the most sophisticated in the world at the time,
explored the Indian Ocean, the Persian Gulf, and the
Red Sea, establishing regular trade all along the way.
Between 1405 and their termination in 1433,
these expeditions were commanded by the admiral
Cheng Ho. A Muslim from western China, Cheng
I{o was well suited to deal with Muslims in southeast Asia on his trade route. Cheng I{o was also a
'eunuch, castrated for service at the roltal court.
China's Ming emperors retained a large harem of
wives to ensure succession. and eunuchs were needed
to guard them without threat of sexual rivalry; many
gained bureaucratic powers well be.vond this service.
Cheng llo's expeditions usually hugged the coastline, but he had an improved compass and excellent
maps as well as huge vessels that contained ample
342
PARI rrr
The Po$dossirolEro
supplies-even gardens-as well as goods for trade.
His fleets must have impressed, even terrified, the
local rulers around the Indian Ocean, many ofwhom
paid tribute to the emperor. Several missions visited
China from the Middle East and Africa. From Africa
also came ostriches, zebras, and giraffes for the imperial zoo; the latter became the unicorns of Chinese
fable. But Cheng Ho was resented by the Confucian
bureaucrats, who refused even to write much about
him in t-heir chronicles.
There is no question that the course ofworld history might have been changed dramatically had the
Chinese thrust continued, for the tiny European
expeditions that began to creep down the western
coast of Africa at about the same time would have
been no match for this combination of merchant and
military organization. But the emperors called the
expeditions to a halt in 1433. The bureaucrats had
long opposed the new trade policy, out of rivalry with
other officials such as Cheng llo, but there were
deeper reasons as well. The costs seemed unacceptable, given the continuing expenses of the campaigns
against the Mongols and the desire to build a luxurious new capital city in Beijing.
This assessment was not inevitable and it must be
explained. It reflected a preference for traditional
expenditures rather than distant foreign involvements. Chinese merchant activity continued to be
extensive in southeast Asia. Chinese trading groups
established permanent setdements in dre Philippines,
Malaysia, and Indonesia, where they added to the
cultural diversity of the area and maintained a disproportionate role in local and regional trading acrivities into the 20th centlrry. Nonetheless, China's
chance to become a dominant world trading power
was lost, at least for several centuries, with a decision
that confirmed the low status of trade in the official
Chinese scheme of things.
To Western eyes, accustomed to judging a society's dynamism by its abiJiry to reach out and gain new
territories or trade positions, China's decision may
seem hard to understand-the precursor to decline.
But to the Chinese, it was the brief trading flurry drat
was unusual, not its end. China had long emphasized
internal development, amid considerable international
isolation and concern over protection against invasion
from central Asia. Its leaders were suspicious of any
policy that would unduly elevate commercial activity.
Ming emperors consolidated their rule over the
empire's vast territory. Internal economic develop-
ment continued
as
well, with no need for foreign
products. Industry expanded, with growth in the production of textiles and porcelain; ongoing trade with
southeast Asia enriched the port cities; and agricultural production and population increased.
The shift in Chinese policy unintentionally
cleared the way for another, in most ways inferior civ-
ilization to work toward
a
new international position.
With the Arabs in partial eclipse and with China
briefly moving into the resulting trade vacuum but
then retreating, hesitant Western expansionism, ventured before 1400, began to take on new significance. Within a century, Western explorers and
traders had launched an attempt to seize international trading dominance and had expanded the
international network to include parts of the Americas for the first time.
THE RISE OF THE WEST
lll
Westeruc
Ewrope began to wndorgo inoportotr.t
cbaruges
in the l4th arutl l\tb centuries.
Sl?u.e
'ittpolyed ruew problenoq others created tt.ew
opportwnities. Exoru.ini,ng
th e t oy'iows
strengths and. wealenesses of this once bach.ward.
region
sets the stage
in world.
for Ewrop/s
vtew yevtta?'es
trnd.e.
The West's gradual emergence into larger world
contacts during the I5th century was surprising in
many respects. Westerners remained awed by the
powerful bureaucracies and opulent treasuries of
empires in the traditional civilization centers such as
Constantinople. Furthermore, the West was changing in some painfirl ways. The staples of medieval culture at its height were under new question by 1400.
The church, which had long been one of the orgaruzing institutions of Western civilization, was under
new attack. Medieval philosophy had passed its creative phase. Warrior aristocrats, long a key leadership
group in feudal society, softened their style of life,
preferring court rituals and jousting tournaments and
adopting military armor so cumbersome that real
fighting was difficult.
Even more strikingly, the lives and economic
activities of ordinary Europeans were in disalray. This
was a time of crisis, and Europe's expanding world
role could not reverse the fundamental challenges to
its internal economic and demographic structure.
Europeans began to suffer from recurrent famine
CHAPTER 15
after 1300 because population outstripPed the food
supply and no new food production techniques were
discovered. Famine reduced disease resistance, mak-
ing Europe more vulnerable to the bubonic plagues
that spread from Asia.
Bubonic plague, or Black Death, surfaced in various parts of Asia in the l4th century. In China it
reduced the population by nearly 30 percent by 1400.
Following trade routes, it then spread into India and
the Middle East, causing thousands of deaths per day
in the larger cities. The plague's worst European
impact occurred between I34B and 1375,b1' which
time 30 million people, one-third of Europe's population, died. The resulting economic dislocation pro-
TheWeslondtheChungingWorldBolonce
343
the late 13th and early 14th centuries provided new
access to Asian knowledge and technology. Political
stability and an openness to foreign visitors by the
great khans helped Westerners learn of Asian technologies, ranging from printing to the compass and
explosive powder. Western Europe had ideal access
in the Mongol period: It was not disrupted by the
Mongols, as eastern Europe and so many parts of
Asia were, but it was in active contact) unlike subSaharan Africa. Internal European warfare and merchant zeal made western Europe an eager learner,
for the Asian technologies promised to meet existing military and commercial needs.
The second international factor was the inten-
duced bitter strikes and peasant uprisings.
silication of European problerns in the existing
world market and international arena. From the
Sorrrces c:f }}vnan:is$l: &iledieval
Crusades onward, Western elites had become used
Yitatrity
How could the West be poised for a new international rolel The answer to that question is complex.
First, several key advances of medieval society were
not really reversed by the troubles of the decades
around 1400. For example, the strengthening of feudal monarchy provided more effective national or
regional governments for much of the West. The
Hundred Years' War between Britain and France
stimulated innovations in military organization,
including nonaristocratic soldiers recruited and paid
directly by the royal government, that enhanced central political power. Strong regional monarchies took
hold in parts of Spain and in Portugal as Christian
leaders drove back the Muslim rulers of this region.
The growth of cities and urban economies continued
to spur the commercial side ofWestern society. Even
the church had made its peace with such key principles of capitalism as profit-seeking. Technology continued to advance, particularly in ironwork-used for
bells and weapons-and timekeeping.
In short, explaining the new Western vigor
involves an understanding that some of the gains the
West achieved during the Middle Ages continued
even as certain characteristic medieval forms wavered'
Imitstiora anC trnt*rnati*nal
Prabler:as
Two additional
causes involved western Europe's
international position. New opportunities for imita-
tion were an obvious advantage. The Mongol
Empire established in Asia and eastern Europe in
to increasing consumption of Asian luxury products, including spices such as cinnamon and nurmeg, silks, sugar, perfumes, and je'rvels. In exchange
for the luxury items, Europeans mainly had cruder
goods to off'er: wool, tin, copper, honey, and salt.
The value of European exports almost
never
equaled the value of what was imported from Asia.
The resulting unfavorable balance of trade had to be
made up in gold, but western Europe had only a
limited gold supply. By 1400, the constant drain to
Asia was creating a gold famine that threatened the
whole European economy with collapse.
Furthermore, there were legitimate fears of a new
Muslim threat. The Ottoru.nn Ewpire was taking
shape, and Europeans began to fear a new Muslim
surge (see Figure ).5.I). Even before this, the Muslim capture of the last Crusader stronghold (the city
of Acre in the Middle East) in 129), gave Muslim
traders, particularly Egyptians, new opportunides to
act as intermediaries in the Asian trade, for there were
no Western-controlled ports left in the
eastern
Mediterranean. One response to this rvas a series of
conquests by the city-state of Venice along the eastern coast of the Adriatic. A more important response
was to begin exploring alternative routes to Asia that
would bypass the Middle East and the feared and
.hated Muslim realms altogether.
S**lriar Fir*cticlms in th* It*liast
Reraaissa**e
The final major ingredient of the West's surge
involved changes within the West itself, starting with
344
PART
III
lhe PostclosirolEro
*
T H
t*Y#{l#
T
r PAST#,
Population Trends
Questions: Wlrat do these population charrs
slrow abotrt relrriouships in popularion sizc,
rnd comparativc rrends in population size.
amorg the major inhabited regions of the
rvorldf Population pressure did not drive European exprnsiorr irr the l5th centurr,, bec.rrrse
population rvas falling tenporirrilv, bur were
there longer-term trends, from the r.ear 1000,
that rnighr hrve cncouragcd thc cxpansionist
ffiffi
Population kvels (Millions)
1000 1700
1800
t900
1s75
Europe 36 120 180 390 635
Asia
185 415 625 g7O 2300
(includes Middle East)
Akica
33
61 70
110
Amclicas 39 I 3 24 145
Occania I.5 2.25 2.5 6.75
i
385
545
23
inclrrde s Arrsrraliel
Totals
What mighr have caused these changesf Finall1,,
what do the charts suggest about the demographic position of Europe in the 20th centur,v
compared to the r,vorld as a whoie i
Reading population staristics provides vital
inlbrmation, but it also raises questions, including
ones about causation, which.numbers alone .*rrot
an$l.er. \Vhat other data would be most helpftil to put
these figures in appropriate worlcl history contextsi
\4trich figures are more revealing: absolute numbe rs
or pcrccntrgcs) Why?
Tears
Contiruents
eflbrtf Slhat societies shorv the gieatcst changes
in population levels benveen I000 and 18001
294.5 611.25 901.5 1627.75 3888
Nole: lorlier figures ore only e$imules; they ore fuirly o((urote indko-
wasffis&m&
Percentages or Proportions
of Total World Population
Europe
Asia
r2.2 19.6 19.7 24 16.3
9 67 .6 69.3 59.8 59.2
62
Afiica
I|.2 t0.0 7.8 6.8
Americas L3,4 2.I
Occuria 0.4 0.4
2.7
0.3
8.9
0.3
9.9
14.0
0.6
lors of relolive size.
Sazlrr; A.irpted lronr I)enni. H. Wrong, cJ.. I'opulatiott
&'rirr!
1Q71
ald
t.
Italy, r.vhere rnedieval fbrms had ncvcr ful1y taken
hoid. In 1400, Italy r.vas in rhc midst of a vital cultr,rral
ancl political movement knou.n as rhe Rennissarucq or
rebirth. The carly pl-rases of the Renaissancc stressed
more secular subjects in litcrature and art. Religious
art remained dominant but used more realistic portrayals of pcople and nature, and some r-ronreligious
therles surfaced outright. The doings of human
beings dcserved attention lbr their otvn sakc. in the
Soarrr.'Aclapte d
Sociel' (.\.977),
liom Derinis }1. Wrong, cd., ?opulation
and.
Renaissance vie$,, not as thev reflected a divine plan.
Artists and writers became more openlr, ambitious for
person'al replrtiltion and glory.
Italv
the centcr of initial ltenaissance culture
had more contact $,ith Roman traclition
than did the resr of Europe and because by tl"re 14th
centurv it led the West in banking and trade. Active
becanse
r,vas
it
commcrce and urban manufacturing ga\re Italiar-r
cities the u,calth to sponsor nelv cultural activities,
CHAPTER
I5
TheWeslondtheftongingWorld
Bolonte 345
omid old volues. Donfe, ltolion wrifer of the 1.4th cenfury,,
h|tdt o ,opy oi hi, greot work, the Divine Cgmedy, with both religious (souls tormented in
Figure 15.1. Europe's new spirit
hell) ond d"noirrorl" bhe solid, clossicol-style urbon buildings of the city.of.Florence)
symbolism greeting him. The poinfing wos designed by Domenico di Michelino for the
cothedrol of Florence in 1465.
launched in Florence and manifesting itselfin literature
and various arts. The Renaissance focused on a ne\\'
interest in stvlistic grace and a concern for practical
ethics and codes of behavior for urban gendemen' One
and contacts rvith some foreign scholars, particularly
in Byzantium, helped revive Greco-Roman styles.
Finally, the attention to government and diplomacy
by the competitive governments of Itah"s city-states
led intellectuals and political leaders to emphasize
r'vorldly culture.
ffiunta*
Vatrues and
Renaissarace ilu}.t$re
Despite its political and commercial roots, the Renaissance was first and fbremost a cultural movement)
'
Ieading l4th-centurlt r'vriter, Frato ces co P ett'arch, not
only took pride in his city and his age but explored the
glories of personal achievement with new confidence.
Innovation flourished in the visual arts and music
rvell. The subject matter of art moved tor'vard nature
and people, including cityscapes and portraits of the
rich and powerful, whether the dtemes u'ere religious
or secular. Florentine painter Giotto led the u'ay,
as
346
PART
III
The Po$closkolEro
ffiffiffi&mffiffiffiffi'
Italian Renaissance Culture
lrf t
riters in the first phase of the Italian Renaissance
I V *... aware rhar r;.r;.;;;.;";;; .;i;i.
qri,.
different from that of medieval theologians and philosophers. In the passages that follor.v, Petrarch (1304-1374)
writes about his priorities in literature, inclucling the kind
ofclassical examples he revered, first in a letter to another
major writer, Boccaccio, and then in a poem. petrarch,s
cultural interests and his definition ofpersonal goals form
part of a movement called humanism (see Chapter 16).
|udging by the following documenrs, whar defined
Renaissance humanistf
[rom Petrurdn, letter to Bortoccio (1362]
Neither exhortations to virtue nor the argument of
approaching death should divert us fi-om literature; for in
good mind it excites dre love ofvirtue, and dissipates, or
at least diminishes, the fear ofdeath. To desert our studies shorvs want of selficonfidence rather than wisdom, for
letters do not hinder but aid the properly consdruted mind
r.vhich possesses them; they facilitate our life, they do not
retard it.... Ifit were otheru.isc, surely the zeal ofcertain
persons u,ho persevered to the end could not have roused
such admiration. Cato, I never forget, acquainted himself
w'ith Latin literature as he was growing old, and Greek
a
when he had reallv become an old man. Varro, r.vho
reached his hundredth year still reading and rvriting,
parted from life sooner than from his love"ofstudlr Livius
Drusus, although weakened by age and afflicrld with
blindness, did not givc up his intelpretation of the civil law,
rvhich he carried on to the great advantage ofdre state....
Besides these and innumerable others like them,
have not all those ofour own religion whom rve should
wish most to imitare dcvoted their whole lives to literature, and grown old and died in the same pursuitl Some,
indeed, were overraken by death while still at work reading or r'vriting. To none of drem, so far as I know, did it
prove a disadvantage to be noted for secular learning....
While I know that many have become famous for
piety without learning, at tl-re same time I know ofno one
who has been prevented by literature from following the
path ofholiness. The aposdc Paul was, to tre sure, accused
ofhaving his head turned by srudn but the rvorld has long
ago passed its verdict upon this accusation. IfI may be
allolved to speak for myself, it seems to me that, although
departing from medieval formalism and sriflness. \44rile
still a young apprentice to the painter Cimabue, Giotto
painted a fly on the nose of one of Cimabue,s porrrair
subjects, and it was so realistic that Cimabue repearedly
a
th9 nath ro virtue by the wa1, of ignorance may be plain,
fosters sloth. The goal of all good people is tl-re iame,
but the ways of reaching it are many and various. Some
advance slou4y, others with more spirit; some obscurely,
it
others again conspicuously. One takes a lower path,
another takes a higher path. Although all alike are on the
road to happiness, certainly rhe more elevated path is the
more glorious. Hence ignorance, however devout, is by
no means to be put on a plane with the enlightened
devoutness of one familiar r,vith literature. Nor ian you
pick me out from the whole array ofunlettered saints, an
example so holy that I cannot match it with a stiil holier
one liom the other group.
From Petrorch, the Sonnets
k.
1535)
Io o Friend, Encouroging Him lo Pursue Poelry
Torn is each virtue from its ca-rthy t_hrone
By sloth, intemperance, and voluptuous ease;
Far hence is every light celestial gone,
That guides mankind through life's
pe rple xing maze . . ..
Who now r.vould laurel, myrtle-wreaths
obtainf
Let want, let shame, Phitosophy attend!
Cries the base world, intenr on sordid gain.
What though thy favourite path be trod by
fei.v;
Let it but urge thee more , dear gende friend,
Thy great design ofglory to pursue.
Questions: \4rhat are the key purposes of intellectual activiry, according to Petrarchl IIow can these
purposes be reconciled with Christianiryf To what
extent does Petrarch's humanism suggest a more
modern oudook than that of medieval Western culture| Does this Renaissance spirit suggest factors
that might explain Europe's new expansionl Did
the Renaissance encourage human agencyf How
important were individuals in this major development, compared to the larger causes)
tried to swat it off before going back to work on rhe
canvas. Other painters, begiruring later in the
l4th centurry, started to inffoduce perspective while using new
colors and other materials. In architecture, favor shifted
CHAPTER 15
away from the Gothic to a classicism derived from the
styles of Greece and Rome. Vivid, realistic statues complemented the new palaces and public buildings.
The impact of the early Renaissance must not be
exaggerated. It had little influence outside of Italy.
Even in Italy, it focused on high culture, not popular
culture, and on the arts; there was little initial interest in science. And although it built on distinctive
political and economic forms, it was not a full break
from mcdieval tendencies.
Nevertheless, these new cultural currents were an
important innovation in Western history. The full
ramifications of the Renaissance feed into. the next
period of both world and Western history (see Chapter 16). The movement was only getting started by
1400. The wide range of Italian commerce and shippilg proved to be one of the building blocks of European outreach. By the l4th century, ships, particularly
from the western Italian city of Genoa, which was less
well placed than Venice for eastern Mediterranean
trade and the resultant links to Asia, were ready f61
new roles. Ambitious city-state governments encouraged new ventures) eager to collect more tax money
and promote commerce as one of their explicit ftinctions. A general "Renaissance spirit" could also spur
innovation. !\4rereas people such as Petrarch defined
human ambition mainly h cultural terms, other urban
and commercial leaders, including seafaring men such
as Genoa's Christopher Columbus, might apply some
of the same confidence and desire for personal glory
to different areas, such as exploration or conquest.
?he lberian $pirit
*f
Religious
Mis*i*n
Along with Italy, a key center for change by the 14th
century \vas the Iberian Peninsula, where Christian
military leaders had for several centuries been press-
ing back the boundaries of the Muslim state in
Spain. Soon after 1400, major regional monarchies
had been established in the provinces of Castile and
Aragon,which would be united through royal marriage in 1469.
Even before the marriage between Ferdinand and
Isabella, Spanish and Portuguese rulers had developed
a vigorous military and religious agenda. They supported effective armies, including infantry and feudal
cavalry. And they believed that government had a mis-
sion
to promote
Christianity by converting or
expelling Arabs and Jews and by maintaining doctri-
TheWestondtheChongingWorld
Bolonce 347
nal purity within the church. Close links between
church and state, portrayed in art, provided revenues
and officials for the royal government. In retllrn, the
government supported church courts in their efforts
to enforce moral and doctrinal purity. Later in the
LSth century, this interaction led to the reestablishment of the church-run courts of the Inquisition in
Spain, designed to enforce religious orthodoxy. In
other words, Spain and Portugal were developing
effective new governments with a special sense of
religious mission and religious support. These
changes promoted the West's expansion into wider
world contacts.
WESTERN TXPANSION:
TH
I EXPERIMEN]AL
PHASI
ll
Specifi.c Eut'opean a.ttewpts to explore tbe
(beyon.rl. the earlier Vi.ki.ng voyages
Atlantic
in
the North Atlaru.tic) begatc i.n, the later l3th
c e nt ur y. E ar ly d,'is c ot eri e s'ito a' e as e d. Ewr op e arus'
interestiru settitcg up &. new coloni.ol systew.
Exrly Explor*ti**s
As early as 1291, two Italian brothers, the Vivald.i,s
from Genoa, sailed rvith trvo galleys through the
Straits of Gibraltar, seeking a Western route to the
"Indies," the spice-producing areas of south and
southeast Asia. They were never heard from again.
Although they were precursors of a major Western
thrust into the southern Atlantic, it is not even
entirely clear what they meant by the "Indies." Early
in the l4th century, other explorers from Genoa
rediscovered the Canary Islands, in the Atlantrc, PoPulated by a hunting-and-gathering people' These
islands had been known vaguely since classical times
but had never been explored by Europeans. Genoese
sailors also visited the Madeiras and probably reached
the more distant Azores by 1351. Soon after this,
ships from northeastern Spain, based in the port of
'Barcelona, sailed along the African coast as far south
present-day Sierra Leone.
Until 1430, technological barriers prevented further exploration for alternative routes. Without adequate navigation instruments, Europeans could not
risk wider ventures into the Adantic. They also needed
better ships than the shallow-drafted, oar-propelled
as
348
PART
III
The PostdosirolEro
:i.\iTS:':'.".,:
'x&''r.I
N
't."'
''...r1-1::a
'.
.,:.
tigure 15.2. Columbus is supposed to hove hod o copy of this world mop in spoin. The mop,
doting from ob.out 1489., shows the old world os Europeons were incleosingly coming to'
know il. Note how reochoble tndio looked fo Europeons using this mop.
Mediterranean galle1,s. F{orvever, efforts were under
way to develop an oceangoing sailing vessel. At the
same time, the crucial navigational problems were
met by the compass and the astrolabe, used to determine latitude at sea by reckoning from the stars. Contacts with Arab merchants (r,vho had learned from the
Chinese) provided knowledge of these devices. European mapmaking, improving steadily during the l4th
centurv. was also a key innovation. Be cause of these
advances, as well as mistaken geographic assumptions
shown on the map in Figure I5.2, Europeans were
ready soon after 1400 to undertake voyages impossible just a century before.
C,ftXrlmi;lE
Fattersa*
,
Even as these rvider-ranging voyages began, in a
familiar pattern detailed in Chapter 17, Westerners led
by the Spanisl-r and Portuguese began ro take advantage ofthe new lands they had already discovered. A
driving force behind both the further expeditions and
the efforts to make already-discovered areas economicallyprofitable was Prince Henry of Portugal, known
as lIenry the Navigator. A student of astronomy and
nautical science, Henr1. sponsored about a third of
Portuguese voyages ofexploration before his death in
1460. His mixture of motivation-scientific and intelIectual curiosity, desire to spread the name of Christ
to unfamiliar lands, and financial interest-reflected
some of the key forces in late postclassical Europe .
Portugal by 1439 had taken conrrol of the
to colonists. Soon
Azores and had granted land
Spaniards and Portuguese had conquered and colonized the Madeiras and Canaries, bringing in Western plants, animals, weapons) and diseases. The result
was something of a laboratory for the larger European
colonialism thar would soon rake shape, particularly
in the Americas. European colonists quickly ser up
large agricultural estates designed to produce cash
crops that could be sold on the European market.
CHAPTER 15
lheWeslondfie ChongingWorld
Bolonce 349
the Atlantic began to occur as the island colonies were
being fully settled. The ventures summed up the swirl
of forces that were beginning to reshape the West's
role in the world: inferiorities and fears, particularly
with regard to the Muslims; new energies of Renaissance merchants and Iberian rulers; economic pressures; and a long-standing populatioll surge.
in DEPTH
The Problem of
Ethnocentrism
Many cultures encourage an ethnocentric outlook, and the culture of the West is certainly one
of them. Ethnocentrism creates problems in interpreting world history. The dictionary definition of
ethnocentrism is "a habitual disposition to judge
foreign peoples or grouPs by the standards and
practices of one's own culture or ethnic $roup"and often finding drem inferior. Most of us take
pride in many of our own institutions and values,
and it is tempting to move from this pride to a dis-
Figure
approval of other peoples when they clearly do not
share our behaviors and beliefs. Many Americans
have a difficult time understanding how other peoples have failed to establish the stable democratic
political structure of our own country. Even liberals who pride themselves on a sophisticated appreciation of different habits in some areas may adopt
an ethnocentric shock at the oppression (by current American standards) of women that is visible
in certain societies today or in the past. Indeed,
unless a person is almost totally alienated from his
or her own society, some ethnocentric reactions
are hard to avoid.
15.3. This I \th-century engroving portroys Vosco do
oudience with the lndion ruler of Colicut in 1498.
Go*o't
First they introduced sugar, an item once imported
from Asia but now available in growing quarltities
from Western-controlled sources. Ultimately, other
crops, such as cotton and tobacco, were also introduced to the Atlantic islands. To produce these market crops, the new colonists brought in slaves from
nortlwestern Africa, mainly in Portuguese ships-the
first examples of a new, commercial version of slavery
and the first sign that Western expansion could have
serious impact on other societies as well.
These developments about 1400 remained
modest, even in their consequences lbr Africa. They
illustrate mainly how quickly Western conquerors
decided what to do with lands and peoples newly in
their grasp. The ventures were successful enough to
motivate more extensive probes into the southern
Atlantic as soon as technology permitted. Indeed, voyages of exploration down the coast ofAfrica and across
'
Nevertheless, unexamined ethnocentrism can
be a barrier in dealing with world history' We will
grasp other times and places better, and perhaps
use our own values more intelligendy, ifwe do not
too readily dismiss cultures in which "objectionable" practices occur.
Ethnocentrism is not just an issue for modern
Westerners. Civilized peoples in the past routinely
accused outsiders of barbaric ways, as in the
Islalnic characterizations of the Mongols described
in Chapter 14. But the current power of Western
standards makes our own ethnocentric potential a
real issue today in dealing with world history, as in
350
PART
Irr
The PosrrlosirolEro
the tendency to dismiss any people who did not
exploit the latest available military technology as
disapproval and understanding in dealing r,vith
practices such as female infanticidef M/hat are some
somehou, inferior.
nonethnocentric rvays to interpret initial European
Controlling ethnocentrism does not mean
abandoning all standards, as if any social behavior
were as good as any other. It does involve a certain open-mindedness and sophistication. Reducing distracting levels of ethnocentrism can be
k
aided by some specific procedures.
is imporrant
to realize that few cultr,rres behar.e irrationally over
long periods of time. They may differ from our
taste, but their patterns respond to valid causes
and problems. Our orvn values are not without
complexity. We sometimes believe things about
our o\ /n society that are not as trlle as we want)
or, in judging other socieries, we forget about
drawbacks in our own surroundings. Perspective
on our orvn habits, including awareness of how
other cultures might judge us, helps us resrrain
our ethnocenffism.
However, ethnocentrism may become a particularly strong impulse in dealing with some of the
changes in world history taking shape about 1400.
The West was gaining strength. Bccause rnanv
Americans identify with Western civilization, it is
tempting to downplal, some of the subdeties and
disadvantages ofthis process or to exaggerate the
extent to which the West began to organize world
history more generally.
The balance of power among civilizations rvas
beginning to shift abour 1400, and it is legitimate-not simply ethnocentric-to note that the
West's rise was one of the leading forces of this
change. It is unnecessary to ignore the many
other patterns continuing or emerging-includ-
ing nerv vigor in several other societies-or to
gloss over the motives and results that the West's
rise entailed. The rise of the West u,as not just
"good." It did not result simply from a triumph
of progressive values. At the same time , avoiding
ethnocentric impulses in evaluating this crucial
transition period
in u,orld history does not
require an anti-Western approach. Balance and
perspective are essential-easy
easy
to
sav)
not
ahvays
to achieve.
Ouestions: \4/hy can ethnocentrism complicate interpretations ofrvorld historyl l{ou, can one balance
expansionl
CUTSIDE TH E WCRLD
NETWORK
)j, The inteynationnl fi,arueworh
that had deyel-
oped d.wring the postclax,icol period enobraced
naost of Asia, Ewrope, and. Afri.ca. This net-
work left out ir.toportant!/?/lups on.d, regiotr,s
that had thei.r, o'tyn ilgot,ous h,istot",ies/n the,ir
centat".ies.
Developments in the Americas and Polynesia
were not affected by the new international exchange.
During the next period of world history,
these
regions all r,vere pulled into a new level of international contact, but a lvorld balance sheet in 1400
must emphasize their separateness.
At the same time, several of the societies outside
the international neturork were experiencing some
ner,v problems during the l5th century that would
iear.e them r,.r-rlnerable to outside interference thereafter. Such problems included nerv political strains in
the leading American civilizations and
a
fragmentarion
of the principal isiand groups in Polynesian culture.
F*{itie*.i
{ssee*s
ir: t}c* Am*ri*es
As discussed in Chapter 11, the Aztec and Inca
empires ran into increasing difliculties nor long after
1400. Aztec exploitation of subject peoples for gold,
slaves, and religious sacrifices roused great resent-
ment. What rvould have happened to the Aztec
Empire if the Spaniards had nor inter\rened after
1500 is not clear, but it is obvious that disuniq, c1sated opportunities lbr outside intervention that
rnight not have existed otherwise. The Inca system,
though far less brutal than that of the Aztecs, provided ongoing tension betr.veen central leadership and
iocal initiative. This cornplicated effective controi of
the vast expanse of the Inca domains. Here too,
ol,erextension made change likely by the
I500s-
indeed, the empire u.as already receding somewhateven rvithout European intervention. At the same
CHAPTBR
I5
TheWestondthe ChongingWorld
Bolonce 351
these prer.iously uninhabited islands before the 7th
century, traveling in great war canoes' From the 7th
century until abor"rt 1300 or 1400, recurrent contacts
time, other cultures were developing in parts of the
Americas that might well have been candidates for
new political leadership, ifAmerican history had proceeded in isolation.
remained between the Hawaiian islands and the
Iarger Society Islands group, allowing periodic new
migration. From about 1400 until thc arrival of
European explorers rn 1778, Hau,-aiian society was
cut off even from Polynesia.
Polynesians in Hawaii spread widely across the
islands, in agricultural clusters and fishing villages
Expansi*n, Migratiti*,
*nd Cc"rnq**st i{t FalS'**sia
A second culture that was later pulled into the
expanding rvorld network was that of Polynesia.
Here, as in the Americas, important changes took
place during the postclassical era but with no relationship to developments in societies elser'vhere in
the rvorld. The key Polynesian theme from the 7th
century to 1400 was expansion) spurts of migration, and conquest that implanted Polynesian cul-
amid the volcanic mountains. Hawaiians were inventive in using local vegetation, weaving fabrics as well
as rnaking materials and fishing nets from grass. They
also imported pigs from the Society Islands-a vital
source of meat but a source of devastation to many
plant spccies unique to Hawaii. Politically, Hawaii
was organized into regional kingdoms, which were
highly warlil<e. Society was structured into a caste system with priests and nobles at the top, who reserved
many lands for their exclusive use. Commoners were
viewed almost as a separate people, barred from certain activities.
ture rvell beyond the initial base in the Societv
Islands, as Tahiti, Samoa, and Fiji arc called collectively (Map 15.r).
One channel of migration pointed northward to
the islands of Hawaii. The first Polynesians reached
Thus, with a Neolithic technology the Hawaiians created a complex culture on their islands. Without a written language, their legends and oral
histories, tracing the genealogies of chiefly families
back to the original war canoes, provided a shared set
Hawaiian
]"6 ls/ands
ofstories and values.
Es*Iatcd Achicv*ettsslt*
b3. tla* &{ar:ris
arqu'esas lslands
'
Samoa'"
-. --a
rtlt
J
Another group of Polynesians migrated thousands of
'c,\
..d "
tsocie
tclan
Easter
I
.
PACIFIC OCEAN
called Maoris, successfully adapted to an environrnent
ISOOMiLES
O
l.--.-----*----i
.l
o
1500 KTLOMSEBS
,
l5.l Polynesian Expansion. Storting in the 7th
century, the Polynesions exponded north and soulh of their
Mop
stortinig point
in lhe Society lslonds.
miles to the southu,est of the Society Islands, perhaps
as early as the Sth century, when canoe or raft cretl's
discovered the two large islands that today make up
New Zealand. The original numbers of people were
small but were supplemented over the centuries that
fbllowed by additional migrations from the Polynesian home islands.The Polynesians in Ner'v Zealand,
considerably colder and harsher than that of the
home islands. They developed the most elaborate of
all Polynesian art and produced an expanding popu'lation that rnay have reached 200,000 people b)'the
18th century, primarily on the northern of the tlvo
islands. As in Hawaii, tribal military leaders and
priests l-reld great power in Maori society; each tribe
also included a group of slaves drawn from prisoners
ofrvar and their descendants.
352
PART
rrr
The PosrdosirolEro
Overall, Polynesian society not only spread but
also developed increasing complexity in the centuries
of the postclassical era. Maoris produced a rich oral
tradition in which fascinating legends combined with
an emphasis on oratorical skill. Woodworking and
decoration advanced steadily. The Polynesians did not
work metals, but they produced a vigorous economy
by combining imported crops and animals with veg-
etation native to the new setdements. AII these
achievements were accomplished in total isolation
fiom the rest of the world and, particularly after
1400, substantial isolation of each major island
grouping from the rest of the Polynesian complex.
Polynesians were the last of the major isolated cultures to encounter the larger world currents brought
forcefully by European explorers in the 18th century.
When this encounter did come, it produced the same
effects that it had in the Americas: r,rrlnerability to disease, weakness in the face of superior weaponry and
technology, and cultural disintegration.
i
Conclusion
Further Readings
On the world network, see lerry Bentley, Old. Wortd
Encoanters: Cros Cwbural Contacts and. Exchanges in preMod.eyn Tiwes (1993).Crucia-l changes in the Middle East
are covered in F. Babinger's Mehmed. the Conqueror and IIis
Titna (1978) on the Ottoman leader who captured Constantinople, and Bernard Lewis's The Arabs in lTistory (4th
ed., l95B), which offbrs a brisk interpretation of Arab
H. Islamoglu-Inan, ed., The Ottoruan
Ernpire antl the World. Econorury (1987). On China under
the early Ming dynasry see Charles O. Ilucker's Tbe Ming
decline . See also
Adding Up the Changes
tiat began to take shape after
1400 was the most important change since the fall of the
The world history framework
classicai empires almost a thousand years before, and
to last in broad outline for ce ntrrries.
The overall result ofchange affected even societies whcre
existing patterns persisted. Sub-Saharan Africa, for example,
was not experiencing great political or cultural shifts around
1400. Regonal kingdoms fell and rose: The empire of Mali
fell to regional rivals, but another Muslim kingdom, Songhay,
soor arose in its stead, flourishing ber$reen L464 and 1591.
African political and religious themes persisted for several cenruries, but the context for Aiiican history was shifting. The
decline of the Arabs reduced the vitality ofAfrica,s key traditional contact with the international nerwork. In contrast to
the Europeans, Africans had no exchange with the Mongols.
Even as Africa enjoyed substantial continuity, its power relationship with western Europe was beginning to change, and
dris became a source of further change.
it was
It
is tempting to see some sort of master plan in the
various changes that began to occur around 1400. People
who emphasize an ethnocentric approach to world history,
stressing some inherent superiorities in Western values,
might be tempted to simplify the factors involved. However, a series of complex coincidences may be a more accu-
rate explanation, as in other cases in which the framework
of world history changed substantially.
The causes of new western European activity were
complex. They mixed new technologies, derived mainly
from imitation, and a new set of economic problems, with
elements of a new oudook (itseif both Christian and se cular) tossed in. Independent developments in the Americas
and elsewhere flgured in, as did crucial policy decisions in
places such as China. Each of the separate steps can be
explained, but their combinarion was pardy accidental.
Several eiements of the world history transition
deserve particular attention. Technology played a roie, as
opportunities to copy Asian developments were supple mented by European initiative , particularly in gunnery and
ship design. The role of individuals, such as Prince Henry,
must be compared with the impact of more general forces
such as Europe's international trade woes.
Itt Origint end. Etobing Institwtions (1978).
An important, highly readable interpretation of the
Dyruasty:
West's rise in a world contexr is C. Cipolla's Guns, Sails and.
Etnpires: Technologicnl Innoyation and the Eat ly Phnses of
European Expansion, 1400-1700 (1985). See also ]. H.
(f963) andThe Discotery of
the Sea (1981). A.n important inre rpretation of new West-
Parry's Age of Reconnaissance
ern interests is S. W. Mintz's Sweetness and Powet": The Place
in Modern Hixory (1985).
On the Black Death and economic dislocation, see M.
W. Dols's The Blach Death in ths Mid.dle East (1977),W.
H. McNeill's Plagwes ontl. Peoples (1976), and the very
readable B. Tuchman's ADistant Mityor: The Calnrnitous
14th Century (1979). Aprovocative study of relevant Western oudook is P. Arids's The How, of Owr Death (I9Bl).
J. Huizinga's The Waning of the Mid.d.le Aga (1973)
deals with dre decline of medieval forms in Europe . The early
of Swgor
Renaissance is treated
in D. Hay's
The
Italian
Renaissance
(1977); see also C. Hibbert, Flot ence: The Biography of a City
(1993)..For more cultural emphasis, see C. Trinkhaus's ZZe
Scope of Renaissance
llwru.aniswt. (1983). On Spain, see F.
Braudel's The Med.iteyyanean and. the MetLiterraneoto World.
(2 vols., 1978), and see E. Paris's The End. of Days (1995) on
Spanish Jews and the Inquisition. On expansion in general,
see Robert Bardett's The Mahirug of Europe: Conqwest, Colonization and Cultural Change (1993).