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The
P R E SIDE NT I AL
R E CO R DING S
J OHN F . K ENNEDY
The
P RESIDEN T I A L
R ECORDI N G S
J O H N F. K E N N E DY
THE GREAT CRISES, VOLUME TWO SEPTEMBER–OCTOBER 21, 1962
Timothy Naftali and Philip Zelikow
Editors, Volume Two
David Coleman
George Eliades
Francis Gavin
Jill Colley Kastner
Erin Mahan
Ernest May
Jonathan Rosenberg
David Shreve
Associate Editors, Volume Two
Patricia Dunn
Assistant Editor
Philip Zelikow and Ernest May
General Editors
B
W. W. NORTON & COMPANY • NEW YORK • LONDON
Copyright © 2001 by The Miller Center of Public Affairs
Portions of this three-volume set were previously published by Harvard University Press in The
Kennedy Tapes: Inside the White House During the Cuban Missile Crisis
by Philip D. Zelikow and Ernest R. May.
Copyright © 1997 by the President and Fellows of Harvard College
All rights reserved
Printed in the United States of America
First Edition
For information about permission to reproduce selections from this book, write to Permissions,
W. W. Norton & Company, Inc., 500 Fifth Avenue, New York, NY 10110
The text of this book is composed in Bell, with the display set in Bell and Bell Semi-Bold
Composition by Tom Ernst
Manufacturing by The Maple-Vail Book Manufacturing Group
Book design by Dana Sloan
Production manager: Andrew Marasia
Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data
John F. Kennedy : the great crises.
p. cm. (The presidential recordings)
Includes bibliographical references and indexes.
Contents: v. 1. July 30–August 1962 / Timothy Naftali, editor—v. 2. September 4–October 20,
1962 / Timothy Naftali and Philip Zelikow, editors—v. 3. October 22–28, 1962 / Philip Zelikow
and Ernest May, editors.
ISBN 0-393-04954-X
1. United States—Politics and government—1961–1963—Sources. 2. United States—
Foreign relations—1961–1963—Sources. 3. Crisis management—United States—History—
20th century—Sources. 4. Kennedy, John F. (John Fitzgerald), 1917–1963—Archives. I. Naftali,
Timothy J. II. Zelikow, Philip, 1954– III. May, Ernest R. IV. Series.
E841.J58 2001
973.922—dc21
W. W. Norton & Company, Inc., 500 Fifth Avenue, New York, N.Y. 10110
www.wwnorton.com
W. W. Norton & Company Ltd., Castle House, 75/76 Wells Street, London W1T 3QT
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0
2001030053
MILLER CENTER OF PUBLIC AFFAIRS
UNIVERSITY OF VIRGINIA
The Presidential Recordings Project
Philip Zelikow
Director of the Center
Timothy Naftali
Director of the Project
Editorial Advisory Board
Michael Beschloss
Taylor Branch
Robert Dallek
Walter Isaacson
Allen Matusow
Richard Neustadt
Arthur Schlesinger, Jr.
Robert Schulzinger
Contents
The Presidential Recordings Project
By Philip Zelikow and Ernest May
xi
Preface to John F. Kennedy: The Great Crises, Volumes 1–3
By Philip Zelikow and Ernest May
xvii
Editors’ Acknowledgments
xxv
Areas of Specialization for Research Scholars
xxvii
A Note on Sources
xxix
Meeting Participants and Other
Frequently Mentioned Persons
xxxi
TUESDAY, SEPTEMBER 4, 1962
11:30–11:50 A.M. Meeting on U-2 Incident
12:35–1:00 P.M. Meeting on Soviet Arms Shipments to Cuba
4:00–4:50 P.M. Drafting Meeting on the
Cuba Press Statement
5:00–5:55 P.M. Meeting with Congressional Leadership
on Cuba
5:55–6:10 P.M. Meeting on the Congressional Resolution
about Cuba
WEDNESDAY, SEPTEMBER 5, 1962
5:00–6:15 P.M. Meeting on the DOMINIC
Nuclear Test Series
MONDAY, SEPTEMBER 10, 1962
TIME UNKNOWN. Conversation with Douglas Dillon
12:35–12:40 P.M. Meeting with Billy Graham and
Dwight Eisenhower
3
4
19
33
52
73
81
82
110
112
115
vii
viii
CONTENTS
12:40–1:02 P.M. Meeting with Dwight Eisenhower
6:45–7:15 P.M. Meeting on Berlin
THURSDAY, SEPTEMBER 13, 1962
4:55 P.M. Conversation with John McCormack,
Thomas Morgan, and Carl Vinson
TUESDAY, SEPTEMBER 25, 1962
5:00–5:56 P.M. Meeting with Maxwell Taylor on
His Far Eastern Trip
FRIDAY, SEPTEMBER 28, 1962
11:30 A.M.–12:03 P.M. Meeting on Laos
SATURDAY, SEPTEMBER 29, 1962
11:00 A.M.–12:27 P.M. Meeting on the Soviet Union
1:18–1:30 P.M. Meeting on the Crisis at the
University of Mississippi
APPROXIMATELY 1:30–1:35 P.M. Meeting with
Robert Kennedy on the Drummond Spy Case
2:00 P.M. Conversation with Ross Barnett
2:25 P.M. Conversation with Theodore Sorensen
2:30 P.M. Conversation with LeMoyne Billings
2:50 P.M. Conversation with Ross Barnett
7:36 P.M. Conversation with Torbert MacDonald
SUNDAY, SEPTEMBER 30–MONDAY, OCTOBER 1, 1962
APPROXIMATELY 10:40 P.M.–1:00 A.M. Meeting on Civil Rights
12:14 A.M. Conversation with Ross Barnett
Meeting on Civil Rights, Continued
APPROXIMATELY 12:40 A.M. Conversation from the
Oval Office between Robert Kennedy and Cyrus Vance
Meeting on Civil Rights, Continued
1:45 A.M. Conversation with Ross Barnett
1:50 A.M. Continuation of Conversation with
Ross Barnett
2:00 A.M. Conversation between Robert Kennedy and
Creighton Abrams
4:20 A.M. Conversation with Creighton Abrams
118
135
149
150
154
156
178
178
181
182
222
230
233
237
238
239
247
250
251
288
290
299
299
306
308
310
312
CONTENTS
MONDAY, OCTOBER 1, 1962
8:46 A.M. Conversation with Ross Barnett
9:31 A.M. Conversation with Archibald Cox
11:12 A.M. Conversation with Cyrus Vance and
Robert McNamara
TUESDAY, OCTOBER 2, 1962
4:20–5:20 P.M. Meeting on the Budget and
Tax Cut Proposal
5:25 P.M. Conversation with Kenneth O’Donnell and
Cyrus Vance
WEDNESDAY, OCTOBER 3, 1962
9:20 A.M. Conversation with Cyrus Vance
10:05 A.M. Conversation with John McCormack
SOMETIME THAT MORNING. Conversation with
Lawrence F. O’Brien
MONDAY, OCTOBER 8, 1962
10:30 A.M. Conversation with Mike Mansfield
12:00 P.M. Conversation with Albert Gore
4:48–5:10 P.M. Meeting on the Budget
TUESDAY, OCTOBER 9, 1962
9:54 A.M. Conversation with Mike Mansfield and
Mike Kirwan
WEDNESDAY, OCTOBER 10, 1962
TIME UNKNOWN. Conversation with George Smathers
TIME UNKNOWN. Conversation with Eugene Keogh
TIME UNKNOWN. Conversation about James Meredith
TUESDAY, OCTOBER 16, 1962
11:50 A.M.–1:00 P.M. Meeting on the
Cuban Missile Crisis
6:30–8:00 P.M. Meeting on the
Cuban Missile Crisis
ix
314
314
316
317
319
321
352
355
356
357
359
361
362
365
369
378
379
381
382
388
389
391
397
427
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T H E P R E S I D E N T I A L R E C O R D I N G S P RO J E C T
WEDNESDAY, October 17, 1962
10:00–11:30 A.M. Meeting with West German
Foreign Minister Gerhard Schroeder
THURSDAY, OCTOBER 18, 1962
10:00–10:38 A.M. Cabinet Meeting on
the Federal Budget for Fiscal Year 1964
11:10 A.M.–1:15 P.M. Meeting on the Cuban Missile Crisis
NEAR MIDNIGHT. Kennedy Summarizes a Late-Night Meeting
on the Cuban Missile Crisis
FRIDAY, OCTOBER 19, 1962
9:45–10:30 A.M. Meeting with the Joint Chiefs
of Staff on the Cuban Missile Crisis
468
469
499
499
512
572
578
578
SATURDAY, OCTOBER 20, 1962
2:30–5:10 P.M. National Security Council Meeting
on the Cuban Missile Crisis
599
Index
615
601
The Presidential Recordings Project
BY
PHILIP ZELIKOW AND ERNEST MAY
B
etween 1940 and 1973, presidents of the United States secretly
recorded hundreds of their meetings and conversations in the
White House. Though some recorded a lot and others just a little,
they created a unique and irreplaceable source for understanding not
only their presidencies and times but the presidency as an institution
and, indeed, the essential process of high-level decision making.
These recordings of course do not displace more traditional sources
such as official documents, private diaries and letters, memoirs, and contemporaneous journalism. They augment these sources much as photographs, films, and recordings augment printed records of presidents’
public appearances. But they do much more than that.
Because the recordings capture an entire meeting or conversation,
not just highlights caught by a minute-taker or recalled afterward in a
memorandum or memoir, they have or can have two distinctive qualities.
In the first place, they can catch the whole complex of considerations
that weigh on a president’s action choice. Most of those present at a
meeting with a president know chiefly the subject of that meeting. Even
key staff advisers have compartmented responsibilities. Tapes or transcripts of successive meetings or conversations can reveal interlocked
concerns of which only the president was aware. They can provide hard
evidence, not just bases for inference, about presidential motivations.
Desk diaries, public and private papers of presidents, and memoirs
and oral histories by aides, family, and friends all show how varied and
difficult were the presidents’ responsibilities and how little time they had
for meeting those responsibilities. But only the tapes provide a clear picture of how these responsibilities constantly converged—how a president could be simultaneously, not consecutively, a commander in chief
worrying about war, a policymaker conscious that his missteps in economic policy could bring on a market collapse, a chief mediator among
interest groups, a chief administrator for a myriad of public programs, a
spokesperson for the interests and aspirations of the nation, a head of a
sprawling political party, and more.
The tapes reveal not only what presidents said but what they heard.
For everyone, there is some difference between learning by ear and by
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eye. Action-focused individuals ordinarily take in more of what is said to
them than of what they read, especially when they can directly question
a speaker. A document read aloud to a president had a much better
chance of registering than the same document simply placed in the inbox. Though hearing and reading can both be selective, tapes probably
show, better than any other records, the information and advice guiding
presidential choices.
Perhaps most usefully, the secret tapes record, as do no other sources,
the processes that produce decisions. Presidential advisers can be heard
debating with one another. They adapt to the arguments of the others.
They sometimes change their minds. The common positions at the end
of a meeting are not necessarily those taken by any person at the outset.
The president’s own views have often been reshaped. Sometimes there
has been a basic shift in definition of an issue or of the stakes involved.
Hardly anyone ever has a clear memory of such changes. Yet, with the
tape, a listener now can hear those changes taking place—can follow, as
nowhere else, the logic of high-stakes decision making.
Casting about for analogies, we have thought often of Pompeii. As the
ruins uncovered there have given students of Greco-Roman civilization
knowledge not to be found anywhere else, in any form, so the presidential
recordings give students of the presidency, of U.S. and world history, and
of decision making knowledge simply without parallel or counterpart.
They are a kind of time machine, allowing us to go back and be in the
room as history was being made. And, unlike even the finest archaeological site, what we uncover are the words and deliberations of the people
themselves in the moment of action, not just the accounts, summary
notes, or after-the-fact reconstructions they left behind.
Of the six presidents who used secret recording devices, three did so
extensively. Franklin Roosevelt, Harry Truman, and Dwight Eisenhower
recorded to a limited extent. John Kennedy, however, after installing an
elaborate taping system in July 1962, used it frequently during the 16
months before his murder in November 1963. Using a different system,
Lyndon Johnson made recordings throughout his presidency, especially in
1968, his last, tumultuous year in office. Richard Nixon, after two years
without using any recording devices, installed a system which, because
voice activated, captured every conversation in a room with a microphone.
The existence of Nixon’s system came to light in July 1973 during
congressional hearings on administration involvement in the 1972
Watergate burglary. Segments of tape obtained by Congress provided a
major basis for the impeachment proceedings that led to Nixon’s later
resignation.
T H E P R E S I D E N T I A L R E C O R D I N G S P RO J E C T
xiii
The Watergate hearings brought an end to secret taping. Afterward,
it became unlawful to record conversations without knowledge and consent. As the ruins of Pompeii reveal details of Greco-Roman life only up
to August of 79 A.D., when lava from Vesuvius buried the city, so secret
recordings reveal the inner workings of the U.S. presidency only from
1940—and especially 1962—down to mid-1973.
On the premise that these recordings will remain important historical sources for centuries to come, the University of Virginia’s Miller
Center of Public Affairs plans to produce transcripts and aids for using
all accessible recordings for all six presidencies. We started with the
methods and style we used in 1996–97 to produce a then-unprecedented
volume of its kind, The Kennedy Tapes: Inside the White House during the
Cuban Missile Crisis (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1997).
Though that volume improved on the then-available transcripts of a few
Kennedy administration meetings, we kept trying to find ways to make
the transcripts still better. This was a process of trial and error.
Our initial hope was that professional transcribers, like court reporters,
could do much of the primary transcription. That did not work out well.
For those untrained in the history of the period, transcribing presidential tapes can be a bit like assembling a jigsaw puzzle without being able
to see the picture on the puzzle box, and this is especially true when the
audio quality is bad. Tapes of telephone conversations tend to be much
easier, both because the speakers are using a machine that was linked to
the original recording system (usually a Dictaphone in this case) and
because there are generally only two participants in the telephone conversation. Recordings of meetings are much harder to transcribe. Most
Kennedy recordings are of meetings; most Johnson recordings (and all
those publicly released so far) are of telephone conversations.
Originally short of funds and audio expertise, we initially worked
almost entirely with ordinary cassette copies of the tapes. We later began
relying on more expensive Digital Audio Tape (DAT) technology. We tried
out other technical fixes, starting in 1996 with a standard noise reduction
technique (called NONOISE in the trade). The results were disappointing.
We have since tried out other, much more sophisticated techniques suggested by some sound studios. Though we have learned these techniques
can sometimes be vital for especially murky material suffering from unusual
interference, there is an offsetting risk of additional distortion and loss of
data, including the subtle changes in tone that can affect accurate speaker
identification. Two of our scholars, Timothy Naftali and George Eliades,
were especially critical experimenters in this learning process.
The same two scholars helped the growing team stumble on a more
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useful bit of hardware. Looking for a way for two scholars to listen
simultaneously to the same DAT copies, Eliades suggested use of a multiple outlet headphone amplifier (Rane’s Mojo amplifier). Eliades and
Naftali also discovered that this hardware dramatically improved our
ability to boost the audio signal from the tapes. We are continuing to tinker with the hardware, including more use of CD-ROM technology. We
welcome suggestions for further improvement.
The most fundamental improvements in transcription so far, though,
have not come from machines. They came from people. Introduction of a
team method for reviewing transcripts, an innovation developed and
managed mainly by Naftali, has helped reduce the most intractable source
of error—the cognitive expectations and limitations of an individual listener. For instance, when you expect to hear a word in an ambiguous bit
of sound, you often hear it. Even without particular expectations, different listeners hear different things. So we have utilized a special kind of
“peer review” in this new realm of basic historical research.
The talents required from our scholars are demanding. They must be
excellent historians, knowledgeable about the events and people of the
period. They must also have a particular temperament. Anthropologists
and archaeologists used to taking infinite pains at a dig, teaspoon or
toothbrush in hand, might call this a talent for “field work.” So we are
especially grateful to the historians, listed on the title page of the volumes, who have displayed the knowledge, the patience, and the discipline
this work requires, rewarded by a constant sense of discovery.
In consultation with our editorial advisory board and our scholars,
we developed a number of methodological principles for the Miller
Center’s work. Among the most important are:
First, the work is done by trained professional historians who have
done deep research on the period covered by the tapes and on some of
the central themes of the meetings and conversations. They are listed on
the title page as associate and volume editors. The historians not only
delve into documentary sources but sometimes interview living participants who can help us comprehend the taped discussions. Our voice
identifications are based on sample clips we have compiled and on our
research. On occasion our list of participants in a meeting differs from
the log of President Kennedy’s secretary, Evelyn Lincoln. We list only
the names of participants whose voices we can identify. Our research has
also turned up a few minor cataloguing errors made at the time or later.
Second, each volume uses the team method. Since few people always
speak in complete grammatical sentences, the transcriber has to infer
and create paragraphs, commas, semicolons, periods, and such. Usually
T H E P R E S I D E N T I A L R E C O R D I N G S P RO J E C T
xv
one or two scholars painstakingly produce a primary draft, including the
introductory scene setters and explanatory annotations. Two or more
scholars then carefully go over that transcript, individually or sometimes
two listening at the same time, with their suggestions usually going
back to the primary transcriber. In the case of often-difficult meeting
tapes, like the Kennedy recordings, every transcript has benefited from at
least four listeners. The volume editors remain accountable for checking
the quality and accuracy of all the work in their volume, knitting
together the whole. All of this work is then reviewed by the general editors, with the regular advice of members of the project’s editorial advisory board.
Third, we use the best technology that the project can afford. As of
2001, we work from DAT copies of the recordings (not the less expensive
analog cassettes ordinarily sold to the public by presidential libraries).
Our transcribers are now moving toward transferring this digital data
onto CD-ROMs. Each transcriber at least uses a professional quality
DAT machine and AKG K240 headphones with the signal boosted by a
headphone amplifier. Each listens to a DAT copy of the library master,
checking with a DAT from which sound engineers have attempted to
remove extraneous background noise.
Fourth, we aim at completeness. Over time, others using the transcripts and listening to the tapes may be able to fill in passages marked
[unclear]. Although the Miller Center volumes are intended to be authoritative reference works, they will always be subject to minor amendments.
Editors of these volumes will endeavor to issue periodic updates. We use
ellipses in our transcripts in order to indicate that the speaker paused or
trailed off, not to indicate that material has been omitted.
Fifth, we strive to make the transcripts accessible to and readable by
anyone interested in history, including students. As the U.S. government’s National Archives has pointed out, the actual records are the
tapes themselves and all transcripts are subjective interpretations. For
instance, our team omits verbal debris such as the “uh”s that dot almost
anyone’s speech. Listeners unconsciously filter out such debris as they
understand what someone is saying. Judgments must be made. Someone
says, for example, “sixteen . . . uh, sixty. . . . ” The transcriber has to
decide whether the slip was significant or not. But the judgment calls are
usually no more difficult than those involved in deciding where to insert
punctuation or paragraphing. In the effort to be exhaustive, sometimes
there is a temptation to overtranscribe, catching every fragmentary
utterance, however unclear or peripheral. But the result on the page can
add too much intrusive static, making the substance less understandable
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now than it was to listeners at the time. Obviously, what to include and
omit, balancing coherence and comprehension against the completeness
of the record, also requires subjective judgment. The object is to give the
reader or user the truest possible sense of the actual dialogue as the participants themselves could have understood it (had they been paying
attention).
Sixth, we go one step further by including in each volume explanations and annotations intended to enable readers or users to understand
the background and circumstances of a particular conversation or meeting. With rare exceptions, we do not add information that participants
would not have known. Nor do we comment often on the significance of
items of information, except as it might have been recognized by the participants. As with other great historical sources, interpretations will
have to accumulate over future decades and centuries.
Preface to John F. Kennedy:
The Great Crises, Volumes 1–3
BY
PHILIP ZELIKOW AND ERNEST MAY
T
hese three volumes in the Miller Center Presidential Recordings
series cover the three months after Kennedy first began to taperecord meetings.
Before and after becoming president, Kennedy had made use of a
recording device called a Dictaphone, mostly for dictating letters or notes.
In the summer of 1962 he asked Secret Service Agent Robert Bouck to
conceal recording devices in the Cabinet Room, the Oval Office, and a
study/library in the Mansion. Without explaining why, Bouck obtained
Tandberg reel-to-reel tape recorders, high-quality machines for the
period, from the U.S. Army Signal Corps. He placed two of these machines
in the basement of the West Wing of the White House in a room
reserved for storing private presidential files. He placed another in the
basement of the Executive Mansion.
The West Wing machines were connected by wire to two microphones in the Cabinet Room and two in the Oval Office. Those in the
Cabinet Room were on the outside wall, placed in two spots covered by
drapes where once there had been wall fixtures. They were activated by
a switch at the President’s place at the Cabinet table, easily mistaken for
a buzzer press. Of the microphones in the Oval Office, one was in the
kneehole of the President’s desk, the other concealed in a coffee table
across the room. Each could be turned on or off with a single push on an
inconspicuous button.
We do not know where the microphone in the study of the Mansion
was located. In any case, Bouck, who had chief responsibility for the system, said in 1976, in an oral history interview, that President Kennedy
“did almost no recording in the Mansion.” Of the machine in the basement of the Mansion, he said: “Except for one or two short recordings, I
don’t think it was ever used.” So far, except possibly for one short
recording included in these volumes, no tape from the Mansion machine
has turned up.
President Kennedy also had a Dictaphone hooked up to a telephone
in the Oval Office and possibly also to a telephone in his bedroom. He
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could activate it, and so could his private secretary, Evelyn Lincoln, who
knew of the secret microphones, often made sure that they were turned
off if the President had forgotten to do so, and took charge of finished
reels of tape when they were brought to her by Bouck or Bouck’s assistant, Agent Chester Miller.
Though Kennedy’s brother, Attorney General Robert Kennedy, and
Robert Kennedy’s secretary, Angie Novello, certainly knew of the tapes and
dictabelts by some point in 1963, it is not clear that they had this knowledge earlier. Anecdotes suggest that the President’s close aide and scheduler, Kenneth O’Donnell, might have known about the system and might
have told another aide, Dave Powers, but the anecdotes are unsupported.
Most White House insiders, including counsel Theodore Sorensen, who
had been Kennedy’s closest aide in the Senate, were astonished when they
learned later that their words had been secretly captured on tape.
After Kennedy’s assassination, Evelyn Lincoln was quickly displaced
by President Johnson’s secretaries. She arranged, however, for the Secret
Service agents to pull out all the microphones, wires, and recorders and
took the tapes and dictabelts to her newly assigned offices in the
Executive Office Building, adjacent to the White House. Though Robert
Kennedy had charge of these and all other records from the Kennedy
White House, Lincoln retained physical custody.
During Kennedy’s presidency, only a small number of conversations
were transcribed. Though Lincoln attempted to make some other transcripts, she never had much time for doing so. George Dalton, a former
Navy Petty Officer and general chore man for the Kennedy family, took
on the job. “Dalton transcripts” have not been released, but everyone
who has seen them uses terms like fragmentary, terrible to unreliable, awful,
or garbage.
The tapes and dictabelts migrated with President Kennedy’s papers.
First they moved to the main National Archives building in downtown
Washington, D.C. Herman Kahn (an archivist, not the strategic analyst)
was responsible for them within the National Archives system; Robert
Kennedy was the custodian for materials belonging to the family, including all the tapes. Robert Kennedy disclosed the existence of the tapes in
1965 to Burke Marshall, a legal scholar and former Justice Department
colleague. Lincoln and Dalton were looking after the materials, and
Dalton was attempting some transcripts. The papers and the tapes then
were moved to a federal records depository in Waltham, Massachusetts.
In the summer and fall of 1967, when Robert Kennedy drafted his
famous memoir of the Cuban missile crisis, Thirteen Days, he used what-
P R E FA C E
xix
ever transcripts existed and almost certainly listened to tapes. Passages
in the book which refer to “diaries” seem nearly all to be based on the
secret recordings.1
After Robert Kennedy was assassinated in 1968, custody of President
Kennedy’s private papers became the primary responsibility of Senator
Edward Kennedy (Burke Marshall represented Jacqueline Kennedy’s
interests). Dalton was employed by Senator Kennedy, and either some
tapes or some of Dalton’s transcripts or both may have been moved into
Senator Kennedy’s own files. Despite occasional rumors, none of the custodians publicly acknowledged that the tapes existed.
When Nixon’s taping system was revealed in 1973 and Congress was
seeking access to those tapes, Senator Kennedy was a member of the
inquiring Judiciary Committee. With rumors by then rife, he and the family quickly confirmed that President Kennedy had, indeed, also secretly
taped meetings and conversations in the White House. They publicly
promised to turn the tapes over to the National Archives. During the next
two years they negotiated a deed of gift that put in the hands of archivists
at the John F. Kennedy Presidential Library in Boston, Massachusetts, all
tapes except those dealing with private family affairs.
According to Richard Burke, a longtime member of Senator Kennedy’s
staff, Dalton was instructed by the late Steven Smith, Senator Kennedy’s
brother-in-law, to remove sensitive documents from the Kennedy papers
and to cull the tapes in order to protect the family’s reputation. Burke
also claims that he read transcripts by Dalton from Oval Office dictabelts
of conversations with Marilyn Monroe and Judith Exner and that
Dalton had erased potentially embarrassing passages.2 But Burke is an
undependable source. A book he wrote about his years with the senator
is full not only of errors but of outright inventions. Yet there are others,
including at least one Kennedy Library archivist who received the
tapes, who suspected that between 1973 and 1975, Dalton — possibly
assisted by Kennedy aide Dave Powers and retired archivist and
Kennedy family employee Frank Harrington —looked at the tapes to see
what should be removed without leaving any record or documentation
1. See Timothy Naftali, “The Origins of ‘Thirteen Days,’”Miller Center Report 15, no. 2 (summer 1999): 23–24.
2. Philip Bennett, “Mystery Surrounds Role of JFK Tapes Transcriber,” Boston Globe, 31
March 1993, p. 1; Seymour M. Hersh, The Dark Side of Camelot (Boston: Little, Brown, 1997),
pp. 454–55.
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of their work. Dalton has refused to discuss what he did. Senator
Kennedy’s then–chief of staff, when interviewed in 1993 by the Boston
Globe reporter Philip Bennett, denied that Dalton had worked on the
tapes at the direction of Senator Kennedy, but Burke Marshall told
Philip Zelikow in February 2000 that he thought Dalton had been
working on the tapes for the Senator, at least in general.
In 1975, tapes recording about 248 hours of meetings and 12 hours
of telephone conversations became part of the President’s Office Files at
the library. While a treasure trove for history, this handover did not
include all the recordings that President Kennedy had made, nor were all
the recordings complete.
Fortunately perhaps, the Secret Service agents had originally numbered and catalogued the reels of meeting tapes in a simple way, so
removals and anomalies are easily noticed. There are a few. Three tapes
were received by the library with reels containing “separate tape segments.” It is possible that they had been cut and spliced, for two of these
tapes, including the one made on August 22, 1962, concerned intelligence issues and may have involved discussion of covert efforts to assassinate Castro. The Kennedy Library archivist Alan Goodrich says,
however, that the “separate tape segments” may exist simply because the
Secret Service agents were winding some partial reels of tape together
to fill out the reels of blank tape being fed into the machine.
Another tape from August 1962 is simply blank. Several more numbered tape boxes, for tapes made in June 1963, had no tapes inside,
though the library has “Dalton transcripts” for at least four of these
missing tapes. The fact that still other tapes received by the library had
been miswound suggests at least that they had been clumsily handled.
Since the library has not yet issued its own forensic reports about the
“separate tape fragments” or blank tape or made the original tape reels
available for outside examination or released the existing “Dalton transcripts” for missing tapes, we cannot draw conclusive judgments about
just what happened.
The dictabelt recordings never had any order. Lincoln seems to have
filed them randomly. Some seem to have been partially overwritten. The
Kennedy Library’s numbers merely distinguish one item from another.
They provide no guidance to chronological sequence or content. As with
the meeting tapes, the Kennedy Library has attempted to date and identify the tapes, and the editors of these volumes have confirmed and, in
various cases, amended this information as a result of further research. A
number of dictabelts were taken by Lincoln without authorization for a
private collection of Kennedy memorabilia. Some of these went to the
P R E FA C E
xxi
Kennedy Library after her death in 1995; others turned up in the hands
of a collector who had befriended her. In 1998 the Kennedy Library was
able to recover these dictabelts too, but there is no way of knowing
whether there were others and, if so, what their fate was.
Once in the jurisdiction of the Archivist of the United States, the
recordings were handled with thoroughgoing professionalism. The library
remastered the tapes on a Magnecord 1022 for preservation. The dictabelts were copied onto new masters. All copies of the tapes, including
those used for these books, derive from these new preservation masters.
Some minor anomalies were introduced as a result of the remastering.
Listeners will occasionally hear a tape stop and the recording start up,
replaying a sentence or two. That is an artifact of the remastering process,
not the original White House taping. The original tapes were also recorded
at relatively high density (1 78 inches per second). The remastered tapes
necessarily have different running speeds that produce subtle audio distortion. The new masters, for example, seem to have people talking slightly
faster than they did at the time.
The library was initially at a loss as to how to make tapes available to
the public. Many contain material still covered by security classification.
Because of the poor sound quality of most of the tapes, it was not easy to
identify sensitive passages. The library initially attempted to prepare its
own transcripts and submit these for classification review. But the task
was hard, the library staff was small, and funds were meager. Moreover,
some archivists believed as a matter of principle that the library should
not give official standing to transcripts that might contain transcribers’
errors. In the view of the National Archives and Records Administration,
only the tapes themselves are archival records. All transcripts are works of
subjective interpretation. The effort at transcription came to an end in
1983, and almost all the tapes remained under lock and key.
In 1993 the library acquired new equipment and began putting the
recordings onto Digital Audio Tape (DAT). These could be reviewed in
Washington and digitally marked without transcripts. Changes in procedures, along with determined efforts by two archivists, Stephanie
Fawcett and Mary Kennefick, accelerated the pace of declassification.
Between 1996 and 2000 about half of the recordings in the Kennedy
Library became available for public release; the rest await declassification review.
While the Kennedy Library has been careful to make no deletions or
erasures from tapes and dictabelts in its possession, the copies publicly
released, and used for these volumes, do have carefully annotated excisions of passages still security classified. These passages were excised
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digitally, not literally, and remain intact on the library’s preservation
masters. It is to be hoped that future, more tolerant declassification
reviews may someday release some of the material that currently is
excised. But even for the sanitized tapes, the library issues no transcripts.
Our work on these tapes commenced in 1995. We obtained analog
cassettes of tapes relating to the 1962 Cuban missile crisis as soon as they
were released. Painstakingly, we listened to and transcribed those tapes.
Each of us spent many hours listening to each hour of tape. Even so, our
transcripts contained large numbers of notations for words or passages
that were unclear or speakers that could not be identified. The resultant
transcripts were published by Harvard University Press in 1997 as The
Kennedy Tapes: Inside the White House during the Cuban Missile Crisis.
Because of support from the Governing Council of the University of
Virginia’s Miller Center of Public Affairs, and W. W. Norton, the transcripts of meetings on the missile crisis in volumes 2 and 3 of this series
are more complete and accurate than were our original products. We
were able to decipher in those tapes large numbers of words and passages previously incomprehensible and to identify speakers with greater
certainty. We were also able to draw on the assistance of other historians
employed in the Miller Center’s Presidential Recordings Project,
employing and benefiting from the team method we describe in our general preface on the project.
Some questions nevertheless linger because of uncertainties, already
described, concerning the completeness and integrity of the tapes now
available. Why were they made? Did Kennedy use the on/off switch with a
view to controlling, even distorting the historical record? Did others, after
his murder, tamper with the tapes in order artificially to shape the record
of events? In view of the possibility that a small fraction of the meeting
tapes were removed or mangled after the fact, can they really be regarded
as better sources than self-serving memoirs or oral histories? To the
extent that they are valid, undoctored records of conversations and meetings, do they tell us much that could not be learned from other sources?
Our judgment is that any tampering with the tapes was so crude and
ham handed that it extended only to removals. The extent of such
removals may have been constrained by the original Secret Service cataloguing system. Since missing tapes would be noticed, too many missing
tapes might cause an outcry and lead to unwelcome inquiries. So the
removals of meeting tapes, if that is the explanation for the anomalies,
were relatively limited. The situation of the dictabelts is different. Since
they were not catalogued at the time they were made, we cannot know
how many—if any—are missing.
P R E FA C E
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The most plausible explanation for Kennedy’s making secret tape
recordings is that he wanted material to be used later in writing a memoir. Since he seems neither to have had transcripts made (with two minor
exceptions in 1963) nor to have listened to any of the tapes, it is unlikely
that he wanted them for current business. He had himself written histories and was by most accounts prone to asking historians’ questions:
How did this situation develop? What had previous administrations
done? He knew how hard it was to answer such questions from surviving documentary records. And he faced the apparent likelihood that,
even if reelected in 1964, he would be an out-of-work ex-president when
not quite 51 years old.
Did Kennedy tape just to have material putting himself in a favorable
light? On some occasions, he must have refrained from pushing an “on”
button because he wanted no record of a meeting or conversation.
Especially on early tapes, there are pauses at moments when the President
was speaking of tactics for dealing with legislative leaders. Almost certainly, he made recordings only when he thought the occasions important.
As a result, the tapes record relatively little humdrum White House business such as meetings with citizen delegations or conferences with congressmen and others about patronage.
Those who have spent much time with the tapes and those who have
compared the tapes to their own experience working with Kennedy find
no evidence that he taped only self-flattering moments. He often made
statements or discussed ideas that would have greatly damaged him had
they become public. Early in the missile crisis, for example, he mused
about his own possible responsibility for having brought it on. “Last
month I said we weren’t going to [allow it],” he said. “Last month I
should have said that we don’t care.” He never seemed to make speeches
during a meeting for the benefit of future listeners. His occasional taped
monologues were private dictation about something that had happened
or what he was thinking, obviously for his own later reference.
Two other points apply. First, he had no reason to suppose that the
tapes would ever be heard by anyone other than himself unless he chose
to make them available. They were completely secret. Second, he could
hardly have known just what statements or positions would look good to
posterity, for neither he nor his colleagues could know how the stories
would turn out.
The tapes of missile crisis debates establish far more clearly than any
other records the reasons why Kennedy thought Soviet missiles in Cuba
so dangerous and important. They make abundantly clear that his preoccupation was not with Cuba or the immediate threat to the United
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States. He feared that, if he did not insist on removal of the missiles,
Soviet Premier Nikita Khrushchev would be emboldened to try to take
over West Berlin, in which case he—Kennedy—would have only two
choices. He would either have to abandon the two and a half million
West Berliners theretofore protected by the United States, or he would
have to use nuclear weapons against the Soviet Union, for there was no
imaginable way of defending West Berlin with conventional military
forces. The Soviet missiles in Cuba would then be a “knife in our guts”
constraining the U.S. nuclear threats to save Berlin.
The tapes also explain as do no other sources Kennedy’s approach to
the Mississippi civil rights crisis. They show him worrying about international economics, specifically the drain on U.S. gold reserves, to such
an extent that he questions whether the United States can or should
continue to keep troops in Europe. The tapes in some instances disclose
facts still hidden by walls of security classification, as, for example, that
the Kennedy administration had plans to create an illegal CIA unit to
investigate U.S. journalists and officials.
But the greatest value of these recordings does not reside in specific
revelations. It comes, as is said in the general preface to the project, from
giving a listener or reader unique insight into the presidency and presidential decision making. We are proud to be able to put this extraordinary source into the hands of students of history and politics.
Editors’ Acknowledgments
These initial volumes of the John F. Kennedy Presidential Recordings
Series represent the work of a team of dedicated people. Besides the
scholars listed on the title page, the editors are grateful to Lorraine
Settimo, the executive assistant of the Miller Center’s Presidential
Recordings Project, and to Andrew P. N. Erdmann, the scholar who
assisted with the Eisenhower conversations. At the John F. Kennedy
Library, Jim Cedrone, Alan Goodrich, William Johnson, and Mary
Kennefick were especially helpful. And at the National Archives, Nancy
Keegan Smith was of special assistance. Lastly, we are deeply grateful to
our editors at Norton, Drake McFeely and Sarah Stewart, who exhibit
such a rare combination of qualities: attention to detail, patience, and
vision.
Areas of Specialization for Research Scholars
RESEARCH SCHOLARS
David Coleman
Cuba, Nuclear Test Ban
George Eliades
Vietnam, Laos, Nuclear Test Ban
Francis Gavin
Berlin Crisis, International Monetary Policy
Max Holland
Domestic Politics
Jill Colley Kastner
U. S.-German Relations
Erin Mahan
Berlin Crisis, U.S.-European Relations, Congo, Middle East,
United Nations, China
Timothy Naftali
U.S.-Soviet Relations, Cuba, General Latin America,
Intelligence Policy, Nuclear Test Ban
Paul Pitman
U.S.-European Relations
Jonathan Rosenberg
Civil Rights
David Shreve
Congressional Relations, Tax and Budgetary Policy,
International Monetary Policy
CD-ROM DEVELOPER AND MULTIMEDIA COORDINATOR
Kristin Gavin
RESEARCH ASSISTANTS
Brett Avery Bush
W. Taylor Fain
Laura Moranchek
A Note on Sources
In addition to the various memoirs and other writings cited as sources in
our footnotes, we have relied upon the relevant archival holdings for the
White House and the various agencies of the U.S. government, held
mainly in the John F. Kennedy Library in Boston and the National
Archives, Washington, D.C. We have also relied on the less formal holdings of that useful private institute, the National Security Archive,
Washington, D.C.
Each footnote appearing for the first time in a chapter is fully cited
on first reference. The one exception made was for the many footnotes
citing the U.S. Department of State, Foreign Relations of the United States
1961–63 (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office). Footnotes
that include references to Foreign Relations of the United States are abbreviated as FRUS and include the volume number and page numbers. For
FRUS references other than those from 1961 to 1963, the appropriate
years are included.
Meeting Participants and Other
Frequently Mentioned Persons
T
he following is a concise guide to individuals who participated in
taped conversations. We have supplemented these brief descriptions, when possible, with the thumbnail sketches made by former presidential special consultant Richard E. Neustadt in his book
Report to JFK: the Skybolt Crisis in Perspective (Ithaca, NY: Cornell
University Press, 1999). Neustadt met the people he has written about.
We feel that his vivid brush strokes add some additional color that we, at
this distant remove, do not feel qualified to provide. We also include figures mentioned frequently in the conversations, such as foreign heads of
government, who were not present at the meetings.
Abrams, Creighton W., Colonel, U.S. Army; Assistant Deputy Chief of
Staff and Director of Operations, Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff
for Operations, 1962–1963
Ackley, H. Gardner, Member, Council of Economic Advisers, 1962–1968
(Chairman, 1964–1968)
Adenauer, Konrad, Chancellor of the Federal Republic of Germany,
1949–1963
Alexander, Henry, Chairman, Morgan Guaranty Trust in 1962
Allen, Ward P., Director, Office of Inter-American Regional Political
Affairs, Department of State
Anderson, George W., Admiral, U.S. Navy; U.S. Chief of Naval Operations,
1961–1963
Ausland, John C., State Department Representative to the Berlin Task
Force, 1961–1964
Ball, George W., Under Secretary of State, 1961–1966
A Washington lawyer with an international practice, wartime associate of
Jean Monnet (the advocate of European Union), adviser to Adlai Stevenson
in 1952, ’56 and ’60, Ball had come into the Kennedy Administration as
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Under Secretary for Economic Affairs; his focused energy, intelligence, and
application already had won him a promotion.
Barbour, Walworth, U.S. Ambassador to Israel, 1961–1973
Barnett, Ross R., Democratic Governor of Mississippi, 1960–1964
Bell, David E., Director of the Budget, 1961–1962; Director, U.S.
Agency for International Development after December 1962
An economist, former Secretary of Harvard’s Graduate School of Public
Administration, as it then was, and before that Administrative Assistant to
President Truman, Bell was personable, thoughtful, analytic, and experienced.
Billings, LeMoyne, Personal friend of President Kennedy; a roommate of
the young JFK at Choate and, briefly, Princeton
Blough, Roger, Chairman, U.S. Steel Corporation, 1955–1969
Boeschenstein, Harold, Senior Executive, Owens-Corning Fiberglass
Corporation in 1962
Boggs, Thomas Hale, U.S. Representative, Democrat, from Louisiana,
1941–1943, 1947–1972; House Majority Whip, 1961–1971
Bohlen, Charles E., Special Adviser to the President, 1961–1962; U.S.
Ambassador to France, October 1962–1968
One of the two top Russian specialists in the State Department, recently
appointed Ambassador to France. More a thoroughly skilled operator than a
deep analyst, Bohlen was bored in Paris, feeling out of things.
Bundy, McGeorge, Special Assistant to the President for National
Security Affairs, 1961–1966
Formerly Dean of Arts and Sciences at Harvard at a young age, co-author of
Henry Stimson’s memoirs, “Mac” was bright, quick, confident, determined,
striving to be the perfect staff man, juggling many balls at once.
Bundy, William P., Deputy Assistant of Defense for International
Security Affairs, 1961–1963
Carter, Marshall S., Lieutenant General, U.S. Army; Deputy Director of
Central Intelligence, 1962–1965
Castro Ruz, Fidel, Premier of Cuba, 1959–
Celebrezze, Anthony J., Secretary of Health, Education, and Welfare,
1962–1965
Charyk, Joseph V., Under Secretary of the Air Force, 1960–1963
Clark, Ramsey, Assistant Attorney General of the United States,
1961–1965
Clay, Lucius D., President’s Special Representative in Berlin, 1961–1962;
Special Consultant to the Joint Chiefs of Staff, 1962–1963
Cleveland, J. Harlan, Assistant Secretary of State for International
Organization Affairs, 1961–1965
Clifford, Clark, Personal Attorney to the President; Member, President’s
M E E T I N G PA RT I C I PA N T S
xxxiii
Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board from 1961 (Chairman from May
1963)
Cline, Ray S., Deputy Director for Intelligence, Central Intelligence
Agency, 1962–1966
Cox, Archibald, Solicitor General of the United States, 1961–1965
Day, J. Edward, Postmaster General of the United States, 1961–1963
Dean, Arthur H., Chairman, U.S. delegation, Conference on the Discontinuance of Nuclear Weapons Tests, Geneva, 1961–1962; Chairman, U.S.
delegation, Eighteen-Nation Disarmament Committee, Geneva, 1962
de Gaulle, Charles, President of France, 1958–1969
Dennison, Robert S., Admiral, U.S. Navy; Commander-in-Chief, U.S.
Atlantic Fleet and Supreme Allied Commander Atlantic, 1960–1963
Dillon, C. Douglas, Secretary of the Treasury, 1961–1965
Dillon was engagingly direct, practical, experienced, disinclined to reach beyond
his own (broad) departmental boundaries, except on Kennedy’s invitation.
Dirksen, Everett M., U.S. Senator, Republican, from Illinois, 1950–1969;
Senate Minority Leader, 1959–1969
Dobrynin, Anatoly, Soviet Ambassador to the United States, 1962–1985
Dowling, Walter C., U.S. Ambassador to the Federal Republic of
Germany, 1959–1963
Duncan, John P., Assistant Secretary of Agriculture, 1961–1963
Duvalier, François, President of Haiti, 1957–1971
Eastland, James O., U.S. Senator, Democrat, from Mississippi, 1943–1978
Eisenhower, Dwight D., 34th President of the United States, 1953–1961
Feldman, Myer, Deputy Special Counsel to the President, 1961–1964
Fisher, Adrian, Deputy Director, Arms Control and Disarmament
Agency, 1961–1969
FitzGerald, Desmond, Chief, Far Eastern Division, Deputy Directorate
for Plans, Central Intelligence Agency, 1958–1963
Forrestal, Michael V., Senior Staff Member, National Security Council,
1962–1965
Foster, William, Director, Arms Control and Disarmament Agency,
1961–1969
Fowler, Henry H., Under Secretary of the Treasury, 1961–1964
Fowler, James R., Deputy Administrator, Far East, U.S. Agency for
International Development
Freeman, Orville L., Secretary of Agriculture, 1961–1969
Fulbright, J. William, U.S. Senator, Democrat, from Arkansas, 1945–1974;
Chairman, Senate Foreign Relations Committee, 1959–1974
Gilpatric, Roswell L., Deputy Secretary of Defense, 1961–1964
Wall Street lawyer, skilled, sophisticated, broad-gauged, loyal to McNamara.
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M E E T I N G PA RT I C I PA N T S
Goldberg, Arthur J., Secretary of Labor, 1961–1962; Associate Justice,
U.S. Supreme Court, 1962–1965
Goodwin, Richard N., Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for InterAmerican Affairs, 1961–1963
Gordon, A. Lincoln, U.S. Ambassador to Brazil, 1961–1966
Gordon, Kermit, Member, Council of Economic Advisers, 1961–1962;
Director, Bureau of the Budget after December 1962
Gore, Albert, Sr., U.S. Senator, Democrat, from Tennessee, 1959–1971
Goulart, João, President of Brazil,1961–1964
Graham, William Franklin (Billy), Baptist minister and evangelist
Graybeal, Sydney N., Division Chief, Foreign Missile and Space
Activities, Central Intelligence Agency, 1950–1964
Greenewalt, Crawford H., Chairman, E. I. DuPont de Nemours and
Company, 1962–1967
Gromyko, Andrei A., Soviet Foreign Minister, 1957–1985
Halaby, Najeeb E., Administrator of the Federal Aviation Administration,
1961–1965
Halleck, Charles A., U.S. Representative, Republican, from Indiana,
1935–1969; House Minority Leader, 1959–1965
Harriman, W. Averell, Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern and
Pacific Affairs, 1961–1963
Hart, Philip A., U.S. Senator, Democrat, from Michigan, 1959–1976
Haworth, Leland, Member, Atomic Energy Commission from 1961
Heller, Walter W., Chairman, Council of Economic Advisers, 1961–1964
Helms, Richard M., Deputy Director for Plans, Central Intelligence
Agency, 1962–1965
Hickenlooper, Bourke B., U.S. Senator, Republican, from Iowa,
1945–1969; Chairman, Republican Policy Committee, 1961–1969
Hillenbrand, Martin J., Director, Berlin Task Force and the Office of
German Affairs, Bureau of European Affairs, Department of State,
1961–1963
Hilsman, Roger, Assistant Secretary of State for Intelligence and
Research, 1961–1963
Hodges, Luther H., Secretary of Commerce, 1961–1965
Hoover, Herbert H., 31st President of the United States, 1929–1933
Humphrey, Hubert H., U.S. Senator, Democrat, from Minnesota,
1948–1964; Senate Majority Whip, 1961–1964
Johnson, Lyndon B., Vice President of the United States, 1961–1963
Johnson, U. Alexis, Deputy Under Secretary of State for Political
Affairs, 1961–1964
M E E T I N G PA RT I C I PA N T S
xxxv
A senior career Foreign Service officer, most recently Ambassador to Thailand;
successful in the Service in all senses of the phrase.
Katzenbach, Nicholas deB., Deputy Attorney General of the United
States, 1962–1966
Kaysen, Carl, Deputy Special Assistant to the President for National
Security Affairs, 1961–1963
A professor of economics on leave from Harvard, Kaysen worked up expertise in defense policy and weaponry, among other things; brilliant, subtle,
confident, analytic but also a looker-around-corners.
Keeny, Spurgeon, Deputy Special Assistant to the President for Science
and Technology
A physicist with training in international relations, associated from the
start with the President’s Science Adviser’s Office, Keeny was personable,
sophisticated, discreet, and a great gatherer of bureaucratic intelligence.
Kennedy, John F., 35th President of the United States, 1961–1963
Kennedy, Robert F., Attorney General of the United States, 1961–1964
Keogh, Eugene J., U.S. Representative, Democrat, from New York,
1937–1967
Khrushchev, Nikita S., First Secretary of the Central Committee of the
Soviet Communist Party and Soviet Premier, 1953–1964
Killian, James R., Special Assistant to the President for Science and
Technology, 1957–1959
King, J. C., Chief, Western Hemisphere Division, Directorate of Plans,
Central Intelligence Agency
Kirkpatrick, Lyman B., Jr., Executive Director, Central Intelligence
Agency, 1962–1965
Kirwan, Michael, U.S. Representative, Democrat, from Ohio, 1937–1970;
Chairman, Subcommittee on Interior and Related Agencies, House
Appropriations Committee in 1962; Chairman, Democratic Congressional Campaign Committee
Kohler, Foy, Assistant Secretary of State for European and Canadian
Affairs, 1959–September 1962; U.S. Ambassador to the Soviet Union,
September 1962–1966
Kreer, Robert G., Director of the Diplomatic Communication Services,
Department of State
Kuchel, Thomas H., U.S. Senator, Republican, from California,
1953–1969; Senate Minority Whip, 1959–1969
Land, Edwin, physicist and inventor; member, President’s Foreign
Intelligence Advisory Board in 1962
Leddy, John M., Special Assistant to the Under Secretary of State until
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April 1961; Assistant Secretary of the Treasury, April 1961–June
1962; U.S. Representative to the Organization for Economic
Cooperation and Development after October 1962
LeMay, Curtis E., General, U.S. Air Force; U.S. Air Force Chief of Staff,
1961–1965
Lemnitzer, Lyman, General, U.S. Army; Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of
Staff, 1960–1962; Commander in Chief, U.S. European Command,
1962–1969
Lincoln, Evelyn, Personal Secretary to President Kennedy, 1952–1963
Loeb, James, U.S. Ambassador to Peru, 1961–1962
Long, Franklin, Assistant Director for Science and Technology, U.S.
Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, 1962–1963
Lovett, Robert A., Special Counselor to the President, 1961–1963; member,
Executive Committee of the National Security Council, October 1962
Lundahl, Arthur C., Assistant Director of Photographic Interpretation,
Central Intelligence Agency, from 1953
MacArthur, Douglas, General of the Army, 1944–1964
McDonald, David, President, United Steel Workers of America,
1952–1965
MacDonald, Torbert, U.S. Representative, Democrat, from Massachusetts,
1955–1976
Macmillan, M. Harold, Prime Minister of Great Britain, 1957–1963
A one-nation Tory in Parliament from the 1930s, close to Eisenhower since
North Africa in the ’40s, complex, shrewd, detached and tough behind a
bland, Edwardian exterior. Macmillan’s private humor and wry outlook on
life endeared him to Kennedy, despite their age difference.
Mansfield, Michael J., U.S. Senator, Democrat, from Montana; Senate
Majority Leader, 1961–1977
Marshall, Burke, Assistant Attorney General for Civil Rights, 1961–1965
Martin, Edwin M., Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American
Affairs, 1962–1964
Martin, William McChesney, Chairman, Board of Governors of the
Federal Reserve System, 1951–1970
McCloy, John J., Special Adviser to the President on Disarmament
Matters, 1961–1963
McCone, John A., Director of Central Intelligence, 1961–1965
McCormack, John, U.S. Representative, Democrat, from Massachusetts,
1928–1971; Speaker of the House of Representatives, 1961–1971
McNamara, Robert S., Secretary of Defense, 1961–1968
Recruited from the presidency of the Ford Motor Company, a driving, man-
M E E T I N G PA RT I C I PA N T S
xxxvii
aging, no-nonsense—and also no-pomposity—rationalist; his adherence to
reason and duty was so passionate as to hint at emotion hidden beneath.
Meany, George, President of the AFL-CIO, 1955–1979
Meredith, James H., First African American student admitted to the
University of Mississippi, 1962–1963
Mills, Wilbur D., U.S. Representative, Democrat, from Arkansas,
1939–1976; Chairman, House Ways and Means Committee, 1957–1976
Morgan, Thomas E., U.S. Representative, Democrat, from Pennsylvania,
1945–1977; Chairman, House Foreign Affairs Committee in 1962;
member, Joint Committee on Atomic Energy in 1962
Moscoso, Teodoro, Assistant Administrator, U.S. Agency for International
Development; U.S. Coordinator for the Alliance for Progress
Murrow, Edward R., Director, U.S. Information Agency, 1961–1964
Nasser, Gamal Abdul, Prime Minister of Egypt, 1954–1956; President of
Egypt, 1956–1958; President of the United Arab Republic, 1958–1970
Nitze, Paul H., Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security
Affairs, 1961–1963
Experienced in defense and diplomacy since 1940, sophisticated, competent,
cool, public cold warrior and private philanthropist, Nitze had all the skills
and some of the limitations of the driving young banker he had once been.
Norstad, Lauris, General, U.S. Air Force; NATO Supreme Allied
Commander, Europe, 1956–1963
O’Brien, Lawrence F., Special Assistant to the President for
Congressional Affairs, 1961–1963
O’Donnell, Kenneth, Special Assistant to the President, 1961–1963
Okun, Arthur, Staff Economist, Council of Economic Advisers,
1961–1964
Ormsby-Gore, Sir David, British Ambassador to the United States,
1961–1965
Former Tory MP, intelligent, sensitive, quick on the uptake and well connected: related both to Macmillan’s wife and to Kennedy’s late lamented
brother-in-law, the Marquis of Hartington, killed in World War II.
Pérez Godoy, General Ricardo Pío, leader of Peruvian military coup of
July 1962; leader of the military junta, 1962–1963
Pittman, Steuart, Assistant Secretary of Defense for Civil Defense,
1961–1964
Prado y Ugarteche, Manuel, President of Peru, 1956–1962
Reuther, Walter, President of the United Auto Workers,1946–1970
Roosa, Robert V., Under Secretary of the Treasury for Monetary
Affairs, 1961–1964
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Rosenthal, Jacob, Executive Assistant to the U.S. Under Secretary of
State, 1961–1966
Rostow, Walt W., Counselor of the Department of State and Chairman
of the Policy Planning Council, 1961–1966
MIT economist, a driving enthusiast and conceptualizer with a tendency to
listen to himself.
Rusk, Dean, U.S. Secretary of State, 1961–1969
Experienced, thoughtful, conventional, perhaps essentially shy, temperamentally at odds with his presumed model and undoubted mentor, General
Marshall, Rusk may never have felt at ease with JFK, to say nothing of
articulate aides like Kaysen.
Russell, Richard B., U.S. Senator, Democrat, from Georgia, 1933–1971;
Chairman, Senate Armed Services Committee
Salinger, Pierre E. G., White House Press Secretary 1961–1964
Saltonstall, Leverett, U.S. Senator, Republican, from Massachusetts,
1945–1967; ranking minority member, Senate Armed Services
Committee, in 1962
Samuelson, Paul A., Economist; member, Council of Economic Advisers,
1960–1968
Schaetzel, J. Robert, Special Assistant to the Under Secretary of State for
Economic Affairs, February 1961–March 1962; Special Assistant to
the Under Secretary of State, March 1962–September 1962; Deputy
Assistant Secretary of State for European Affairs after September 1962
Schlesinger, Arthur M., Jr., Special Assistant to the President, 1961–1964
Schroeder, Gerhard, Foreign Minister of the Federal Republic of
Germany, 1961–1966
Schultze, Charles L., Assistant Director, Bureau of the Budget, 1961–1965
Seaborg, Glenn T., Chairman, U.S. Atomic Energy Commission, 1961–1971
Shoup, David M., General, U.S. Marine Corps; Commandant of the U.S.
Marine Corps, 1960–1963
Sloan, Frank K., Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for International
Security Affairs in 1962
Smathers, George A., U.S. Senator, Democrat, from Florida, 1951–1969
Solow, Robert M., Member, Council of Economic Advisers, 1962–1968
Sorensen, Theodore C., Special Assistant to the President, 1961–1964
Sproul, Alan, President of the New York Reserve Bank, 1941–1956;
Chairman, Task Force on the International Balance of Payments,
November 1960–January 1961
Staats, Elmer B., Deputy Director, U.S. Bureau of the Budget, 1958–1966
Stevenson, Adlai E., U.S. Permanent Representative to the United
Nations, 1961–1964
M E E T I N G PA RT I C I PA N T S
xxxix
Strong, Robert C., Director, Office of Near East Affairs, Department of
State, 1961–1963
Sullivan, William H., U.N. Adviser, Bureau of Far Eastern Affairs,
Department of State until April 1963
Sweeney, Walter C., General, U.S. Air Force; Commanding General,
Tactical Air Command, 1961–1965
Taber, John, U.S. Representative, Republican, from New York, 1923–1963;
ranking minority member, House Appropriations Committee in 1962
Talbot, Phillips, Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern and
South Asian Affairs, 1961–1965
Taylor, Maxwell D., General, U.S. Army; Military Representative of the
President, 1961–1962, Chairman of the U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff,
1962–1964
[H]e had come out of retirement after a distinguished career to support JFK
in 1960: one person at the Pentagon the President knew well enough to trust.
Thant, U, Secretary-General of the United Nations, 1961–1971
Thompson, Llewellyn E., Jr., Ambassador-at-Large, U.S. Department of
State, 1962–1966
Tobin, James, Member, Council of Economic Advisers, 1961–1962
Tretick, Stanley, Staff photographer for Look magazine in Washington,
1961–1971
Troutman, Robert, Member, President’s Committee on Equal Employment Opportunity, 1961–1962
Tshombe, Moise Kapenda, Leader of the secessionist Katanga Province,
the Congo, 1960–1963
Turner, Robert C., Assistant Director, U.S. Bureau of the Budget,
1961–1962
Tyler, William R., Assistant Secretary of State for European Affairs,
September 1962–1965
Vance, Cyrus R., U.S. Secretary of the Army, 1962–1963
Vinson, Carl, U.S. Representative, Democrat, from Georgia, 1914–1966;
Chairman, House Armed Services Committee, in 1962
Wagner, Aubrey, Chairman, Tennessee Valley Authority, 1962–1978
Webb, James E., Administrator, National Aeronautics and Space
Administration, 1961–1968
Wehrley, Roy, Director, U.S. Agency for International Development
mission in Vientiane, Laos
Wheeler, Earle G., General, U.S. Army; Army Chief of Staff, 1962–1964
White, Lincoln, Spokesman, U. S. Department of State, 1961–1963
Wiesner, Jerome B., Special Assistant to the President for Science and
Technology, 1961–1964
xl
M E E T I N G PA RT I C I PA N T S
Williams, G. Mennen, Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs,
1961–1966
Wilson, Donald M., Deputy Director, U.S. Information Agency, 1961–1965
Wirtz, W. Willard, Secretary of Labor, 1962–1969
Zorin, Valerian A., Soviet Representative to the Eighteen-Nation
Disarmament Committee, Geneva, 1962–1964
Zuckert, Eugene M., Secretary of the Air Force, 1961–1965
The
P R E SIDE NT I AL
R E CO R DING S
J OHN F . K ENNEDY
T U E S DAY, S E P T E M B E R
4, 1962
3
Tuesday, September 4, 1962
The President’s Labor Day holiday in Newport, Rhode Island, ended
abruptly. A U.S. spy plane had just accidentally strayed over Soviet territory in violation of international law and the President’s 1961 pledge to
maintain a moratorium on reconnaissance flights in Soviet airspace.
Briefed first thing that morning in Newport, Kennedy sent instructions
for his chief Kremlin-watchers to meet him at the White House once he
returned. The stray plane had spent only a few minutes in Soviet airspace, and fortunately Moscow’s response was a note and not a salvo of
antiaircraft missiles. Nevertheless, with tensions high in U.S.-Soviet relations, President Kennedy wanted to minimize the effect of this incident.
He wished to waste no time in responding to the Soviet protest. In
Washington, the State Department was drafting that response for the
President’s approval.
Even before this news arrived from Russia, President Kennedy had
planned to devote considerable time on this Tuesday to discussing the
Cold War. The week before Labor Day, two Republican congressmen
had launched a searing attack on Kennedy’s Cuba policy, suggesting
that the Soviet military buildup in the Caribbean was designed to make
a missile base out of Fidel Castro’s island. Senators Kenneth Keating
and Bourke Hickenlooper were alleging that the Kennedy administration knew this and was hiding the truth about Soviet activities from the
American people. Indeed the administration did know a little bit more
about the situation in Cuba than it had announced publicly. On August
29, a CIA U-2 had flown over most of Cuba. The photographs from that
flight had revealed eight Soviet surface-to-air missile sites on the western half of the island. These were not the nuclear missiles alleged by
the Republican senators. Nonetheless, this was the first time Soviet missiles of any kind had been seen in Cuba. Kennedy had to be concerned
that it was only a matter of time before this significant development
would be leaked to his opponents.
President Kennedy felt it was time to reassert control of the situation, to take the lead in informing the public of what his experts believed
was happening in Cuba. Over the weekend the head of policy planning at
the State Department, Walt Rostow, had chaired a team to draft a major
press statement for the President. Even before Kennedy’s plane arrived
at Andrews Air Force Base, word was already going out to the congres-
4
T U E S DAY, S E P T E M B E R
4, 1962
sional leadership to be prepared for an afternoon White House briefing
on the Cuban situation.1
11:30 –11:50 A.M.
[W]e don’t owe him the whole truth . . .
Meeting on U-2 Incident2
Since the May 1960 shoot-down of a CIA U-2 spy plane piloted by
Francis Gary Powers, use of the U-2 had become a problem for the
United States in international politics. In the words of the CIA, there
was “universal repugnance, or, at the very least, extreme uneasiness
regarding overflights.”3 Hope for a short-term solution of the Berlin
problem before Dwight D. Eisenhower left office crashed with Powers’s
plane. In the United States, candidate John F. Kennedy had joined the
chorus of disapproval of Eisenhower’s decision to send a U-2 over Soviet
territory so close to a planned summit. As a result of the failure of the
Powers mission, the White House would never again send a U-2 to fly
over the Soviet bloc.4
Two years later at a moment of even greater international tension,
President John Kennedy faced his own U-2 problem. A U.S. Air Force U2 had strayed into Soviet territory on Thursday, August 30, but Kennedy
apparently only heard about it when the Soviet protest arrived early on
September 4.5 In response, the President gathered his top aides from
State and Defense to consider how to mollify the Soviets and to guard
1. Date Diary, 4 September 1962, Richard Russell Papers, Richard B. Russell Library for
Political Research and Studies, University of Georgia, Athens.
2. Including President Kennedy, Charles Bohlen, McGeorge Bundy, Martin Hillenbrand,
Robert Kennedy, Foy Kohler, Robert McNamara, and Dean Rusk. Tape 18, John F. Kennedy
Library, President’s Office Files, Presidential Recordings Collection.
3. “U-2 Overflights of Cuba, 29 August through 14 October 1962,” 27 February 1963, in CIA
Documents on the Cuban Missile Crisis 1962, ed. Mary McAuliffe (Washington, DC: CIA, 1992),
document 45.
4. Gregory W. Pedlow and Donald E. Welzenbach, The CIA and the U-2 Program, 1954–1974
(Washington, DC: CIA, 1998), p. 197.
5. After 1958, the U.S. Air Force assumed the responsibility for U-2 reconnaissance flights
along the Soviet periphery. This particular flight was under the control of the Strategic Air
Command. Like the CIA, the U.S. Air Force was not permitted to send U-2s over Soviet territory after May 1960. Although a resumption of U-2 overflights of Soviet territory was consid-
Meeting on U-2 Incident
5
against yet another U-2 incident. But the U.S. government still needed
the intelligence that U-2s could provide. Although satellite reconnaissance was still in its infancy, the successful launch of the SAMOS satellite in the summer of 1961 had taken some but not all of the pressure off
the U-2 for information on Soviet military developments. Evidently, the
U-2 involved in the 30 August incident had meant to fly parallel to the
Soviet borders to pick up electronic intelligence but had lost its way.
Kennedy began taping as Dean Rusk gives his assessment of the
situation.
Dean Rusk: It’s very clear indeed that the Soviets have got us right
on the hip on this one.
President Kennedy: Right.
Rusk: Therefore the [unclear] and—
President Kennedy: [Unclear] which I [unclear]. I saw your wife the
other day at the airport.
Charles Bohlen: Yes, sir.
President Kennedy: And I saw Avis’s sister, wasn’t that . . .?6 Avis’s
sister was there right at the airport to welcome me, along with a few
others.
Bohlen: Evidently.
President Kennedy: She said she was Avis’s sister and three boys,
and two boys.
Bohlen: Yeah.
President Kennedy: She must . . . she couldn’t have too much to do
up there if she went to the airport [unclear]. [A chuckle.]
Rusk: [Unclear] have you been briefed on what actually happened on
this?
President Kennedy: Yeah. I wonder how the pilot made the mistake?
Rusk: Well . . . very heavy winds blowing to the west and they just
blew him off course. It was at night. Obviously, it could not have been—
there—a reconnaissance photographic plane of the sort that the U-2
over a Soviet—
President Kennedy: Oh, it was at night.
ered by the Kennedy administration during the 1961 Berlin crisis, no intentional overflights of
Soviet territory took place in the Kennedy years (ibid., pp. 189–97, 201).
6. Charles Bohlen had two daughters, Avis and Celestine. Here the President is referring to
Celestine Bohlen, who later became a foreign correspondent for the New York Times.
6
T U E S DAY, S E P T E M B E R
4, 1962
Rusk: It was at night.
President Kennedy: Right.
Rusk: But I think the key element here is the basis of candor between
you and Mr. Khrushchev on a matter of this sort. Because if he develops
all sorts of wide-ranging suspicions of your own credibility then all sorts
of other tight things like Berlin, Cuba could be directly affected and, I
think, in a very adverse way. So, I would suggest for your consideration
that we send a note and make a short statement, consistent with it, saying that it was investigated immediately upon receipt of the Soviet note.
The investigation revealed that an unintentional violation may, in fact,
have taken place.
“A weather reconnaissance and air-sampling aircraft operated by
United States Air Forces in the Northern Pacific was in the area east of
Sakhalin at about the time specified in the Soviet note.7 The pilot of the
aircraft has reported that he was flying a directed course well outside
Soviet territorial limits, but encountered severe winds during this nighttime flight and may therefore have unintentionally overflown the southern tip of Sakhalin. My government has instructed me,” this will be the
note, “that the policy of the United States government with respect to
overflights of Soviet territory has in no way been altered and remains as
stated by the President on January 25, 1961. If the pilot of the aircraft in
question did, in fact, violate Soviet territory this act was entirely unintentional and due solely to a navigational error under extremely difficult
flying conditions.”
Bohlen: May I make [unclear interjection] I think you ought to say,
“expresses the regret of the United States government.”
President Kennedy: The regret thing might bring it back . . . the
whole business of ’60, where I said that we should have regretted and
[former vice president Richard] Nixon always said I apologize[d].8 I’d
just as soon . . . I tried—I’d rather use a phrase here—
Rusk: Well, if you, see if the pil—
President Kennedy: —that suggested . . . which would not put us
back in the regretting business.
Rusk: If the pilot of the aircraft in question did, in fact, violate
7. Sakhalin Island was divided between Japan and Russia until 1945, when the Soviets occupied the southern half of this long island.
8. Kennedy is referring to the politics surrounding the Soviet shoot-down of Gary Powers’s
U-2 in May 1960. The Eisenhower administration’s handling of the crisis became an issue in
that year’s presidential election.
Meeting on U-2 Incident
7
[Soviet] territory . . . You see it’s, leave that open. He may have, you see.
But [if he] did in fact violate, this act was entirely unintentional and due
solely to a navigational error under extremely difficult flying conditions.
That’s enough of a regret, I should think, at this point.
Martin Hillenbrand: Sir, may I bring up one point that I think—
President Kennedy: Yeah.
Hillenbrand: —is important to your credibility problem?
Thirty-four seconds excised as classified information.
Robert Kennedy: Can I make that point also that it’s almost the
direct wording of the note that was issued after the U-2 . . . that first
paragraph—
Hillenbrand: My point is that I just wouldn’t specify what they’re
collecting—I would leave it unspecified, but the nighttime will make it
clear that it’s not a photographic one.
President Kennedy: Well, the other thing, I, you’d have to maybe
even explain that . . .
Hillenbrand: I think you could say, “a routine.”
Bohlen: Well, but the cause of the violation was the weather, the
wind . . .
Unidentified: Right.
Hillenbrand: No doubt—
President Kennedy: The purpose of the flight—
Bohlen: The purpose of the flight was not going to—
Rusk: “A weather reconnaissance and air-sampling aircraft” . . . It
undoubtedly did some air sampling, didn’t it? Don’t all of our flights do
some of this?
Unidentified: I’m, you know . . .
Robert McNamara: I don’t [unclear], the U-2 did.
Unidentified: No, I don’t think so.
Rusk: An aircraft on a routine mission—
President Kennedy: Well, I don’t know . . . it’s . . . I think the . . . we
owe him . . . we don’t owe him the whole truth [unclear]—
McGeorge Bundy: Why don’t you just say an aircraft in international waters may have been blown over?
Hillenbrand: That’s right. All I’m suggesting is we not say while on
an air-sampling mission.
Rusk: Knock out that sentence.
Hillenbrand: I think that this would clearly affect the credibility of
[unclear].
President Kennedy: Yeah.
Hillenbrand: It is very likely that he would know that it’s not.
8
T U E S DAY, S E P T E M B E R
4, 1962
President Kennedy: Well, would he?
Bundy: Is their charge as I understood it, the first take? [President
Kennedy can be indistinctly heard.] They have charged a rather higher
degree of violation than we believe to have occurred in this matter.
They’ve talked about—
Unidentified: Nine minutes.
Rusk: They’ve only talked about nine minutes. But that may—
President Kennedy: The point is there’s no photography. That’s the
key to this U-2. Now, if we just say “nighttime,” we leave everybody to
conclude that it’s not. Unless we want to at the time, to put out background that it wasn’t a U-2, it was obviously at night, so no photography
was involved. That seems to me—that gets away from the U-2 idea.
Bundy: It is a U-2.
President Kennedy: The plane is U-2 but it gets away from—
Bundy: The mission is not to spy in the sky.
President Kennedy: Yeah.
Bundy: Spies, yeah.
President Kennedy: Does he charge it was photography?
Rusk: No, they didn’t, sir . . . they didn’t say that.
Kohler: Just say, “a U-2 reconnaissance, an American U-2 reconnaissance plane.”
President Kennedy: Well, there wasn’t reconnaissance in this.
Reconnaissance is photographic. How do we get that over?
Is that for you?
Rusk: Well, you get, then—“a weather reconnaissance aircraft operated by the United States Air Force.”
President Kennedy: Why don’t we call it “a weather reconnaissance
plane?”
Kohler: That would be perfectly all right. As long you just don’t say,
“[unclear] on a air-sampling mission,” I just . . .
President Kennedy: Right.
Bundy: In international waters.
Rusk: In the Northern Pacific.
Kohler: Yes.
Rusk: It was in the vicinity, it was in the area east of Sakhalin at
about the time specified by the Soviet note. It was not on a photographic
mission, period. The pilot of the aircraft—
President Kennedy: It was at night. It was at night and not on a photographic mission. You want to say that. We want to just have that backgrounded when we put it out, when we release this note.
Hillenbrand: You just say a weather plane—
Meeting on U-2 Incident
9
President Kennedy: Are we planning to release this note . . . ?
Rusk: We’d convert that part of it into a short statement. Just the
part that I . . . the . . .
President Kennedy: But I think [unclear interjection] we could in a short
statement that we put out, say it wasn’t photographic, it took place at night.
Hillenbrand: If you just said “a weather reconnaissance airplane
operating at night.”
Bohlen: I think that takes . . .
Hillenbrand: That would take care of it.
President Kennedy: OK, but then I think we can—whoever puts
this, if State puts it out, the thing to say is it’s obviously not U-2 because
it was . . . at night. Weather . . .
Bohlen: The only real problem we have in regard to the public statement is where this plane came from. It came from South Korea.
Hillenbrand: This is, this kind of gets us too involved—
Bohlen: And, this is one that we’ve decided . . . the best thing to do is
just say we don’t say where it came from—
Hillenbrand: You should deny it came from Japan.
Bohlen: Except [unclear] background [unclear] on background to
say that it’s been announced that there’s no U-2 operations from Japan.
You might have a little trouble with South Korea [unclear].
President Kennedy: Can we see, read that again to us now, Mr.
Secretary?
Rusk: “A weather reconnaissance aircraft operated by—”
President Kennedy: This should be to Khrushchev? Or who would
this be to ?
Rusk: This would be to—
Bohlen: No, this would be a reply to the note. This statement would
then [unclear] in an oral reply . . .
Rusk: [mumbling in the background] This [unclear] no question who
was [unclear] and who was—
President Kennedy: . . . does contain that the United States [unclear] . . .
[mumbles as he reads the draft note] the investigation will be a [unclear] to—
Rusk: Right.
President Kennedy: The investigation.
Rusk: [reading] “An investigation revealed that an unintentional violation may in fact have taken place. A weather reconnaissance aircraft
operated by the United States Air Force in the Northern Pacific, was in
the area east of Sakhalin at about the time specified in the Soviet note.”
The question [is] whether we specifically say no photography was
involved.
10
T U E S DAY, S E P T E M B E R
4, 1962
Hillenbrand: All right, well, if you put in that phrase there, “operating at night.”
President Kennedy: Well, then we’re going to background, aren’t
we? And say that . . . We’re going to say that here. We don’t say it to the
Soviets [unclear].
Rusk: [reading] “The pilot of the aircraft has reported that he was
flying a directed course well outside Soviet territorial limits but encountered severe winds during the nighttime flight and may therefore have
unintentionally overflown the southern tip of Sakhalin. My government
has instructed me to state that the policy of the United States government with reference to overflights of Soviet territory has in no way been
altered and remains as stated by the President on January 25, 1961. [If ]
the pilot of the aircraft in question did in fact violate Soviet territory,
this act was entirely unintentional and due solely to a navigational error
under extremely difficult flying conditions.”
President Kennedy: Do we want to say “every precaution will be
taken to prevent a recurrence”?
Unidentified: Sounds good.
President Kennedy: See that gets in, the regret, then after that . . .
Bohlen: This implies as though you haven’t taken [them] before.
And, of course, the course of this plane was well outside the—
Bundy: I don’t understand how this damn thing happened, I must say.
President Kennedy: I see that every—We are just restating it that
every precaution be taken to prevent a recurrence.
Rusk: “Precautions are . . .”
President Kennedy: “Every step will be taken.”
Rusk: “Precautions are . . .”
Bohlen: “The existing precautions will be . . .”
Rusk: “Precautions are . . . earlier—”
President Kennedy: “Reexamined in [unclear] terms.”
Rusk: “—directed earlier—”
Unidentified: “Reconfirmed.”
Rusk: “Precautions directed earlier by the President to avoid such
incidents remain in full effect.”
President Kennedy: But, except, we’ve had the incident. So, I think
we ought to just say, if we are going to say anything, we ought to just
say that we’re taking every step to prevent a recurrence.
Bundy: Will be reviewed. You could say it will be reviewed. That
would suggest that you—
President Kennedy: Prevent a recurrence.
Well, then . . . and then what would we release?
Meeting on U-2 Incident
11
Rusk: I think we might make a statement that in effect is this note,
even though we make the statement before the Soviets get the reply.
Bundy: Why do we . . . Why do we—?
Rusk: Make a statement entirely harmonious with—
Bundy: Isn’t it better to have the Soviet government get the answer
before we make it public that we think there may have been . . .
Bohlen: Well, that means a certain number of hours, almost till
tomorrow that we have to wait for the . . .
Bundy: Why are we in such a tremendous hurry?
Rusk: I think we ought to handle the press today.
Bundy: I think maybe we could stonewall today, saying that the matter . . . that the President’s instructions are in force and the question will
be, the case is being looked into.
President Kennedy: What would be—you know, we can say the matter is being looked into—but what would be the matter of our making
this as a public statement now before the Soviets have gotten it?
Bundy: No. I was thinking that the same argument that the Secretary
and Chip were making is . . . the critical issue here for the long haul is
that we should do nothing that makes Khrushchev think he can’t trust
you.9 It seems to me that the more seriously you respond [unclear] the
response is more seriously from the U.S. government to the Soviet government if they get it first on a private line.
President Kennedy: Did they release theirs before we got it?
Bundy: They [unclear].
Bohlen: Yes, they gave Reuters [unclear] what we got this morning.
Bundy: Well, they gave it to our man before they gave it, before they
released it. But we didn’t get it until after they had . . . is that right?
Bohlen: [Unclear] afternoon but [unclear].
Bundy: Thompson, presum—, had this, you see, as of yesterday. No,
as of one P.M. today.
President Kennedy: Well, then we’ve got two alternatives: one is to
put it out now and then put it out an hour after we—
Rusk: Well, you can give it to [Anatoly] Dobrynin and then put it out.10
Bundy: Hmm, hmm. That’s true, [unclear]. Right.
Rusk: You can just send it over to him, send it to him, and then put it
out. If it is in their hands at the time we put it out, it’s all right.
President Kennedy: Then what would we put out?
9. Chip is Charles Bohlen.
10. Anatoly Dobrynin was Soviet ambassador to the United States since mid-March 1962.
12
T U E S DAY, S E P T E M B E R
4, 1962
Rusk: We would put out the text of the note.
Bohlen: Do you want to do it in an oral statement or do you want to
make it a formal note?
Bundy: [to Robert Kennedy] Well, the question is whether we want to
add anything that says, when you see him, you’re seeing him . . .
Rusk: Make an oral statement but make the, but make the . . .
Bundy: Bobby happens to be speaking to him at 2:15, is that right? 11
Rusk: I think we ought to get this to him before you see him, so that
you can underline it, reaffirm it in whatever way is necessary.
President Kennedy: OK. We ought to . . . It seems to me that we
ought to . . . When Bobby is seeing him . . . we ought to give Bobby some
instructions as to what his attitude ought to be on various matters.
Dobrynin called you what day?
Robert Kennedy: Saturday.
President Kennedy: And he wanted to see you, he’d like to see you?
Bohlen: You’ve had a response from [unclear]?
Robert Kennedy: No, he wants to see me at 2:15. He said anytime
and anyplace. He wants to talk just . . . I don’t know what it’s about.
Bohlen: Berlin?
President Kennedy: What is it that we ought to have—What is it,
Bobby ought to, does anybody have any suggestions about what line he
should take?
Rusk: Well, I think that the principal positive thing is this question
of the nontransfer of nuclear weapons and I’d [unclear] a few minutes
with you about that.12 They have come back to it, so we’re moving to
kind of pull this together with our allies so that we can go ahead on the
nontransfer of nuclear weapons agreement with them. We’ve said that
Mr. [Andrei] Gromyko’s reply to mine was constructive and open.13 I
think you ought to take up the nuclear testing with him and point out
that—
President Kennedy: We ought to get this atmospheric . . .
11. Robert Kennedy’s 2:15 P.M. meeting with Soviet ambassador Anatoly Dobrynin is confirmed by a note in the Attorney General’s appointments diary, John F. Kennedy Library.
12. At the Geneva foreign ministers’ meeting in July, the United States had proposed an
agreement on the nondiffusion of nuclear weapons from nuclear states to nonnuclear states as
a way to assuage Soviet concerns that the United States would permit the Federal Republic of
Germany to acquire nuclear weapons. The Soviets did not find the U.S. proposal satisfactory
because it left the door open to West Germany receiving nuclear weapons as part of a multilateral NATO nuclear sharing agreement.
13. Andrei Gromyko was Soviet foreign minister since 1957.
Meeting on U-2 Incident
13
Rusk: We really ought to get going on this and that we just really
can’t understand why they make such a [unclear] deal about on-site
inspections, which can’t possibly involve espionage. That this must be
something else in their minds. But if he has any idea . . . he could give
you more about what is really in their minds about this, do they really
want to continue the testing? [Unclear]—
President Kennedy: Well, yeah, that. And then the other thing is:
what he ought [to] say about Berlin, what he ought to say about Cuba?
He ought to indicate what [unclear] are not in Cuba.
Rusk: Well, we have that proposed statement coming in on Cuba.
President Kennedy: [to Robert Kennedy]You come into that meeting
on Cuba and Berlin.
Rusk: And then Berlin, I should think that, again, we hammer the
business of the necessity of avoiding incidents, that the movement of the
traffic from Friedrichstrasse to Brandenburg Gate or to the Brandenburg
Bridge is intended to avoid incidents. And we hope their people will cooperate on that and that this is a matter that ought not to be allowed to
[unclear] because [unclear]. But you’ve been fully briefed on that earlier
report on this.
President Kennedy: Yes. Well, why don’t we see whether we get—
McNamara: [Unclear] the Attorney General add to this note also, to
repeat again that it’s the President’s personal instruction to the
Secretary of Defense that there will be no U-2 overflights . . . wish he
could.
Hillenbrand: Right. And also about photography.
McNamara: Yes, and also about the photography.
Hillenbrand: Yeah. I think coming from him—
McNamara: I believe it is extremely important that [unclear].
President Kennedy: And before you . . . Chip will have gotten this
over to them? As soon as it’s . . .
Bohlen: Yeah, we can get—
President Kennedy: But you go right now. You won’t be at this,
involved in this Cuba thing, so you can go ahead with it.
Bohlen: Well, [unclear].
President Kennedy: Then, there, when the press goes out, Manning
ought to be told that he can reiterate to the press but—14
Bohlen: OK.
14. Robert J. Manning was the State Department’s press officer.
14
T U E S DAY, S E P T E M B E R
4, 1962
Bundy: Manning is right here and—
President Kennedy: Can he get this message [unclear]?
Bundy: Yeah.
President Kennedy: Well, we just reiterate that it was a U-2 flight.
[Bohlen can be heard indistinctly in the background.]
Rusk: Do we put that in the actual statement?
President Kennedy: No, but the press, because—
Bundy: It was obviously not engaged in photography by the Soviets’
own times? Did they give times?
Unidentified: Yes.
Bundy: 19:21 hours Moscow time.
President Kennedy: That’ll just be a part of the story.
Robert Kennedy: What if he says to me [unclear]?
Bundy: You can say it again that you don’t know but you have the
impression that flights, the planes of both sides have flown near each
others’ borders. This has happened.
Hillenbrand: I would suggest that when you say to this one . . . this
flight, you know that we have to do air sampling, we have all sorts of
routine missions with these aircraft, just as yours do.
Unidentified: And the ships, too.
Hillenbrand: We have just—
Rusk: We have all sorts of aircraft flying from Alaska down
towards—
Unidentified: Excuse me.
President Kennedy: The whole problem, you see, is I don’t know
what that particular mission was, the plane was on.
Robert Kennedy: I know. We talked about it with [Director of
Central Intelligence John] McCone.
President Kennedy: Well, it wasn’t intended to be over your coast.
Rusk: And since it was at night, it obviously wasn’t photographic or—
Robert Kennedy: Yeah.
Rusk: I think—
President Kennedy: Chip, can you—
Unidentified: The Attorney General—
President Kennedy: Chip, you’ve covered the [unclear]?
Bohlen: Do you want me to . . .
Hillenbrand: Chip, do you want [unclear] to a State Department—?
Bundy: Yes, and the instruction will—
Rusk: Now what about—
Bundy: Will you tell Manning and Pierre [Salinger] that we say
nothing [unclear].
Meeting on U-2 Incident
15
Rusk: [Unclear.]
Bohlen: Well [unclear] it will automatically get to [unclear].
Rusk: Well, that’s right. We don’t send anything over tomorrow.
Bundy: Let’s not [unclear] Pierre’s article.
Bohlen: Do you want me to call and see him?
President Kennedy: Why doesn’t Chip take—what?
Rusk: I wouldn’t go over to see him.
President Kennedy: Why not?
Rusk: Why doesn’t he come to see me?
President Kennedy: He doesn’t have to—what time?—Chip, just
talk to him on the phone briefing him [on] the message [unclear]—
Rusk: Or I could send him the thing. . . . I wouldn’t talk to him on the
phone. Just a phone call telling him to . . .
Bohlen: Well, then I think we’d better do this. We’d better give this
to him and then have it repeated in Moscow by McSweeney to the
Russian [unclear].15
President Kennedy: Fine. That’s the best way.
Rusk: Give him a copy of the statement we make here and then send
this to Moscow.
Bohlen: Yeah, well, we won’t get it . . . How do I get it to him? Send
it to him?
President Kennedy: Have Chip call him up and read to him and say,
“This is the message we’re sending to McSween[ey], I’ll send you over a
copy of it but I wanted you to have it ’cause we’re going to put out a
statement—”
Rusk: Yeah. We’re making a statement on it [unclear].
Meeting breaks up.
President Kennedy: McSween[ey] ought to be told, it seems to me,
in the note that we send to him that you . . . this is what’s been given to
Dobrynin at whatever time it was and also about the public statement
put out. So—
Rusk: Yeah. [Unclear.]
President Kennedy: As long as [unclear] have this by the time
McSween[ey] gets this. McSween[ey] ought to know [unclear] will
have it. Because, you know [unclear].
Bohlen: Yeah, we’ll put this right on the wires . . .
Rusk: That’s right. Let McSweeney know that it has been made public.
Bohlen: You have to make it public.
15. John M. McSweeney was the U.S. minister-counselor at the U.S. Embassy in Moscow.
16
T U E S DAY, S E P T E M B E R
4, 1962
Rusk: [Unclear.] [Pause.]
Unidentified: You took my estimate? [Door closes.]
The incident over Sakhalin introduced a new note of caution in U.S.
intelligence gathering. At the next meeting of the Special Group, which
oversaw covert action by the U.S. government, the Air Force successfully
pushed through a policy of standing down for the time being all U-2
flights manned by the Air Force.16 The CIA, which was the only other
agency with a U-2 fleet, continued in the business. However, the loss of a
U-2 leased to the Taiwanese government only a few days later would
also put operational use of U-2s by the CIA under severe scrutiny.17 By
September 10, Kennedy officials, especially McGeorge Bundy and Dean
Rusk, were asking the CIA to shape its plans for U-2 surveillance of
Cuba so as to minimize the risk of an international incident. This would
have an effect on the timeliness of warnings to President Kennedy of the
Soviet buildup on the island.
Those events were still days away. In the meantime, after a little disjointed conversation, Kennedy’s advisers walked out of the Oval Office.
The President accompanied them and left the recorder running. Twelve
minutes of hall chatter follow amidst general sounds of secretarial work.
The President’s secretary, Evelyn Lincoln, is heard answering two telephone calls.
At approximately noon, members of an Arkansas delegation led by
Senator William Fulbright entered the West Wing of the White House.
The group included the University of Arkansas’s Schola Cantorum
choir, which had just won first prize at a choir competition in Italy, and
the ambassador of Italy, Sergio Fenoaltea. Two White House guards are
overheard discussing the group.
White House Guard #1: Did you bring over the Italian guy
[Ambassador Sergio Fenoaltea]?
White House Guard #2: Yeah. I got him.
A few minutes later the group approaches the empty Oval Office.
16. From Marshall Carter to John McCone, 8 September 1962, in CIA Documents, McAuliffe,
pp. 55–56.
17. “U-2 Overflights of Cuba, 29 August through 14 October 1962,” 27 February 1963, ibid.,
pp. 127–37.
T U E S DAY, S E P T E M B E R
4, 1962
17
White House Greeter: Mr. Ambassador, how do you do?
Ambassador Fenoaltea: Very well.
Ten minutes after the Arkansas group had entered the private secretarial
and staff office adjacent to the Oval Office to await the President, Kennedy
reentered the Oval Office. He clearly had little idea who these people were
or why they had been allowed to wait for him in an office usually closed to
public visitors. No White House staffer had informed him that Senator
William Fulbright and the Italian ambassador were waiting outside his
office. Apparently preoccupied with the two difficult foreign policy matters
of the day, Kennedy had forgotten that at his August 29 press conference
he had hailed this Arkansan choir and promised the press corps that the
choir would be visiting him at the White House within the new few days.
Staffer: It’s all set up, Mr. President.
President Kennedy: Are you going to inform me now on what I
ought to say?
Staffer: Angie’s probably got it.18
President Kennedy: Well, ask Angie—
Staffer: Pierre [Salinger] set this thing up.19
Staffer: Schola Cantorum at the University of Arkansas.
President Kennedy: Are they?
Staffer: Who’ll get Pierre?
Staffer: Pierre.
Staffer: [Unclear] to Pierre.
Staffer: Pierre!
Staffer: Are they there?
Unclear exchange. Angie Duke enters the Oval Office to clarify the situation for the President.
President Kennedy: You getting in on this Angie?
Angie Duke: Pierre’s got it now.
President Kennedy: Where’s Pierre?
Duke: He’s down in his office—
President Kennedy: Listen, from now on, Mrs. Lincoln, whenever
we’ve got a group, I want all the information right here.
18. Angie Biddle Duke was the White House chief of protocol.
19. Pierre Salinger was the President’s press secretary.
18
T U E S DAY, S E P T E M B E R
4, 1962
Amidst a babble of voices, the President asks McGeorge Bundy, who
may have been with the President in the Oval Office throughout this
momentary confusion, to find his secretary, Evelyn Lincoln.
President Kennedy: Whose [unclear] is this?
Bundy (?): [Unclear.]
President Kennedy: Tell her to come in here.
Bundy: Evelyn! [The telephone rings.]
President Kennedy: Who are those people standing there?
Evelyn Lincoln: I have no idea.
President Kennedy: Well, now don’t let people come into your office
to be listening to everything that goes on. Who are these people?
Lincoln: Who brought them in? Who brought them?
Staffer: They [unclear] take a picture. Mr. [unclear].
President Kennedy: Just keep them out until I’m ready for
Christssake.
Lincoln: Who brought them here? [Unclear.]
Staffer: Ralph Tucker?
Lincoln: Ralph Tucker?
President Kennedy: Keep them out, Mrs. Lincoln.
Lincoln: I can’t [unclear].
President Kennedy: I don’t want people standing around.
The President and Bundy are intent on having a conversation about
something that has just come to their attention. Amidst the babble in his
office, Kennedy grabs a sheet of paper.
President Kennedy: This isn’t coming in right. The United States
government would like to give you a reminder [of its present course].
Bundy: Just an argument on how they couldn’t [unclear] helpful to
the effort. Particularly about the United States. How in the world . . . the
fact of the matter is, three . . . background. Our people produced the requisition, everything.
President Kennedy: Yeah. I think we’d better have this thing organized. This is a shitty organization.
I never know what the hell I’m supposed to say . . . [what I could
use] is any suggestions.
Bundy: [Unclear] but I think not.
The choir members were successfully ushered out to the Rose Garden.
The President then joined them and the choir began to sing. The performance lasted nearly five minutes, after which the President spoke to
the audience. Laughter can be heard faintly in the Oval Office in reaction
Meeting on Soviet Arms Shipments to Cuba
19
to the President’s remarks outside, as well as some indistinct play-by-play
from White House staffers chatting as the performance took place. At
about 12:25 P.M., the President reentered the Oval Office. In a better
mood, he asked that the Arkansans be given a White House tour.
President Kennedy: Let’s see, can you get somebody to take them
through the White House?
Can you [unclear] people remind everybody that whenever I have a
group, give me a little history with suggested points and [unclear]?
Unidentified Staffer: Right. I will, sir.
Staffer: [Unclear.]
Staffer: But announce that you [unclear] out on the other side. We’ve
worked that out. The sergeant’s going to take them through.
Staffer: Yes.
Staffer: The sergeant . . .
The door opens. Someone says, “Gee, are you going to perform me
that Boogie?” Someone answers, “Oh, yes, [this] afternoon.” The
group passes through the corridor. There is a little chitchat.
Unidentified: Oh, isn’t that gorgeous.
The group from Arkansas has left and a few staffers were chatting.
Telephones continued to ring, and Evelyn Lincoln’s voice can be heard in
the background. Forgotten, the machine in the Oval Office kept running.
12:35–1:00 P.M.
I think it’s a question about Cuba in the future.
Meeting on Soviet Arms Shipments to Cuba20
The public event effectively broke Kennedy’s meeting with his national
security experts in two. While Chip Bohlen left to draft a response to the
20. Including President Kennedy, McGeorge Bundy, Marshall Carter, Robert Kennedy, Robert
McNamara, Dean Rusk, and Theodore Sorensen. Tape 18, John F. Kennedy Library,
President’s Office Files, Presidential Recordings Collection.
20
T U E S DAY, S E P T E M B E R
4, 1962
Soviet note on the U-2 incident, the rest of them moved to the Cabinet
Room to discuss Soviet activities in Cuba. At issue was what form of public statement was required to reassure the American people that Kennedy
had matters under control. Congressmen, especially Senator Kenneth
Keating of New York, had begun to question the White House’s handling
of the obvious buildup of Soviet weapons on the island. There were
rumors of the installation of Russian missiles, certainly conventionally
armed surface-to-air missiles (SAMs), but possibly even surface-to-surface
nuclear rockets. Indeed, photography from a secret U-2 flight flown over
the island on August 29 had just confirmed for Kennedy the existence of
eight SAM sites.
Although there was as yet no firm evidence of nuclear missiles, some
in Kennedy’s inner circle think that it is only a matter of time before
Khrushchev decides to install that kind of force in Cuba. This group, led
by Attorney General Robert F. Kennedy, viewed the impending public
statement as a golden opportunity to send a clear warning to Khrushchev
that the United States would never countenance a Soviet nuclear base in
Castro’s Cuba. In any case, the President wanted a public statement on
this new Soviet defensive missile system found in Cuba. On August 31, he
had told General Marshall Carter, who was running the CIA in John
McCone’s absence, to put the readout from the August 29 flight “in the
box and nail it shut.”21 A freeze on sharing this information with anyone
but the top foreign policymakers and analysts remained in effect.
However, it was not going to last forever with interest so high on Capitol
Hill and in the media.
President Kennedy remembered to turn the machine on as the
Secretary of State, a skeptic about the possiblility of any Soviet nuclear
adventure in Cuba, read aloud from a draft statement prepared by the
State Department.
Tape machines were now running connected to microphones in both
the empty Oval Office, where distant secretarial sounds could still be
heard, and in the Cabinet Room, where the President’s Cuba team had
assembled.
21. Lyman B. Kirkpatrick, Memorandum for the Director, “Action Generated by DCI Cables
Concerning Cuban Low-Level Photography and Offensive Weapons,” CIA Documents,
McAuliffe, document 12.
Meeting on Soviet Arms Shipments to Cuba
21
Dean Rusk: [reading from State draft press statement 22] “. . . in Latin
America. Whatever armed strength the Cuban regime may develop will be
restricted by whatever means—”
McGeorge Bundy: Agreed.
Rusk: “—may be necessary to that island. The U.S. will join with
other hemisphere countries to insure that Cuba’s increased military
strength will amount to nothing more than an increased burden on the
people of Cuba themselves.”
Robert McNamara: I think that’s excellent.
Bundy: I think that general sentiment—I wouldn’t call it “increased
military expen—increased expenditure on military gadgets.” I really think
we don’t want to get into the position of being frightened by this group.
Rusk: But this sense that Bob McNamara has about any placing by
the Soviets of a significant offensive capability in the hands of this selfannounced aggressive regime in Cuba would be a direct and major challenge to this hemisphere and would warrant immediate and appropriate
action.
McNamara: I worry about that because they already have 16 MiGs
which—23
Rusk: Do you feel that the MiGs are [a] significantly aggressive
[addition]?
McNamara: I do. And I further feel that they’ll be adding to what
could be interpreted as offensive strength in the months ahead.
President Kennedy: The missiles really are what are significant?
Bundy: Surface-to-surface missiles are the turning point.
Unidentified: SAMs.
Bundy: Unless they were to put jerry-built nuclear weapons on MiGs
which is—
McNamara: Yeah.
Bundy: —not a likely configuration.
22. The President’s copy of this draft is in the “Cuba, Security, 1962” folder, President’s Office
Files, Box 115, John F. Kennedy Library. The document bears Kennedy’s notations and underlining.
23. The MiGs are Soviet fighter and ground attack aircraft. By the summer of 1962, the
Soviets were to have delivered at least 41 jets and reconnaissance aircraft (MiG-19s and MiG15s) to the Cubans. See the 4 May 1961 report by Soviet defense minister Rodion Malinovsky
as quoted in “One Hell of a Gamble”: Khrushchev, Castro, and Kennedy, 1958–1964, by Aleksandr
Fursenko and Timothy Naftali (New York: Norton, 1997), p. 99. The U.S. government had
detected these older model aircraft. It had not yet, however, detected the ongoing delivery of
the most-advanced Soviet fighter/ground attack aircraft, the MiG-21.
22
T U E S DAY, S E P T E M B E R
4, 1962
President Kennedy: No.
McNamara: They can, they may well put surface-to-surface missiles
or missile launchers, artillery or missile launchers in there. They have
that equipment in their own force. In the first place, it will be a question:
Do they have it or don’t they have it? We won’t be sure. Is it equipped
with a nuclear warhead or isn’t it equipped with a nuclear warhead? Is it
substantial or isn’t it substantial? I just worry about the President having made a statement which can be used as a lever by elements of the
Congress and of the public, unless we know exactly what we’re going to
do under those circumstances. If we have a plan, we know what it is and
we’re are all agreed on it, then I think a firm statement is excellent. But
unless we have . . . it seems to me we could cause great [unclear].
Bundy: Our preliminary analysis of the consequences for us, Bob, of
the establishment of a surface-to-surface nuclear capability gives me at
least the feeling that we wouldn’t have to act.
Rusk: I think we’d have to act, Bob, exactly how and by what stages
we’d . . . for example, I would suppose that if you’re going to take on a
bloodbath in Cuba, you’d precede it by a systematic blockade to weaken
Cuba before you actually go to put anybody ashore.
McNamara: See I wonder why we . . . if we do it then, why wouldn’t
we do it today? This is one of the actions that we can consider today as a
matter of fact. There’s no question the Soviets are shipping arms to
Cuba; that’s clear. They’ve said so. Now, we can—
President Kennedy: The reason we don’t is that, is because we figure
that they may try to blockade Berlin and we would then try to blockade
Cuba. But I think that the reason we don’t today is the [unclear] is that it
wouldn’t do them that much harm for quite a while—
Rusk: [Unclear.]
President Kennedy: —and then Berlin would be the obvious
response—
Rusk: [Unclear.] The configuration in Cuba still is defensive. Now
we’ve gone to great effort to try to find serious, significant Cuban penetration into the other countries around the Caribbean. The defense minister of Venezuela said they had captured only one Czech Bren gun.
They just haven’t found anything. And, we’ve been having great difficulty in finding . . . except through money, Mexico [unclear] excuse.
Bundy: The Jordan report on this subject would be very clear and
that’s the principal argument . . .
Rusk: But we’ve, but we really have . . . If we have to go to the U.N.
to prove Cuban indirect aggression against the other members of the
hemisphere, we’d have a heck of a job proving it.
Meeting on Soviet Arms Shipments to Cuba
23
Bundy: What we find is a lot of energetic students being taught
“truth,” which is unfortunately not actionable.
Rusk: You see, at Punta del Este, we told Venezuela to capture a big
arms cache from Cuba and [unclear] helicopter pad [unclear].24 Well, there
was nothing there according to the Venezuelan minister of defense.
I am just saying, Mr. President, that we, that there is very little evidence, hard evidence, that the Cubans are really directly engaged in subversive activities in other countries around the Caribbean and Latin
America. We haven’t even been catching arms. We haven’t been able to
pin down hard evidence of the kinds of actions that would lay the basis
for any direct action in Cuba. The principal posture of Cuba at the present time is defensive as far as the policy is concerned.
President Kennedy: I think we ought to get two things. First, what
statement I put out; and second, whether we ought to get the leadership
down here, the Republican, key gasbags and others. This is . . . it’s sort of
[unclear] which they have, [then] they can put it out in a way that looks
like we’re not putting anything out, probably give them everything we
do have. At least, it’s on the, it’s on the record.
As I say, one of the problems is that a lot of stuff has been out, but it
seeps out in a way that [will] convince these fellows . . . to look like
they’re putting stuff out that we won’t put out. So, I think, that maybe,
particularly this surface-to-air missile thing we ought to give them.
Does everybody agree to that? We’re going to have to put that out anyway because that’s going to leak out—
Bundy: I think so.
President Kennedy: —in two or three days.
Bundy: I think [unclear] it would be better.
Rusk: Bob McNamara and [unclear] I are now scheduled to go before
the Foreign Relations and Armed Services Committee of the Senate
tomorrow morning for a briefing on the Soviet situation that’s bound to
get into this. 25 And I think we’d better have the leadership down here
and—
President Kennedy: Today.
Rusk: —and cancel that meeting.
Bundy: You have the leadership, I think, at breakfast tomorrow, Mr.
President.
24. The Organization of American States foreign ministers’ meeting was at Punta del Este,
Uruguay, 22 to 31 January 1962.
25. On Wednesday, 5 September 1962.
24
T U E S DAY, S E P T E M B E R
4, 1962
President Kennedy: No, I have the leader—I meant the Republicans
and Democrats.
Bundy: Oh, the regular, bipartisan body.
McNamara: There is a related point: You have asked, Mr. President,
on two or three occasions whether we believe it would be wise to ask for
authority from Congress to call up reserve and guard forces while
they’re out of session, if international events make that desirable. I personally believe it would be wise to ask for that authority, assuming that
we could achieve it without controversy. It relates to Cuba, in one
respect, that the forces that we would require could be required for
Berlin, Southeast Asia, or Cuba.
Rusk: Mr. President, I think I would agree with the Secretary of
Defense on that. I think we . . . it would be very helpful for us to have it
but I think it would more effective if we could do it quickly and quietly.
The Soviets would get the message.
McNamara: Yes. Yes—
Rusk: But, if we’re going to have a great turmoil—
McNamara: Yes.
Rusk: —and hullaballoo about it, then it would be better to have that
in connection with a specific action taken—
McNamara: Exactly—
Rusk: —[unclear] call the Congress back in special session.
McNamara: Exactly; but I mention it now because if the leadership
wants to act in relation to Cuba, one of the best actions I can think of is
exactly this.
President Kennedy: Well, now—if we, let’s say we get them down
here at five this afternoon, on an off-the-record basis we give them more
or less what we know about these things and tell them when this information is to become available and the number of people that are there . . .
and any other question they want. In the meanwhile we’re going to go
over this statement. At least we’re going to have something to say about
this. It’s going to get out . . . so that I can say to Pierre to put it out at
six. Whatever he’s going to put out, he’s going to put out the information about these sites and any other statement we’ve got [unclear]
worked out.
Bundy: I would suggest that we be very careful, Mr. President, about
going with that full statement today simply because the issues involved
are very grave and—
President Kennedy: That’s right but I think what we’ve got to do is . . .
we can’t permit somebody to break this story before we do.
Bundy: The SAM site business can be broken promptly. That doesn’t—
Meeting on Soviet Arms Shipments to Cuba
25
Bundy and the President start talking over each other.
President Kennedy: But everyone’s going to want to know what
we’re going to do about it.
Bundy: We don’t have to put all these statements out at once. They
don’t—
Robert Kennedy: Can I raise a—
President Kennedy: Yeah.
Robert Kennedy: I think that [unclear] that while you were out that I
don’t think that this is just a question about what we are going to do
about this. I think it’s a question about Cuba in the future. And then I
think that it’s the judgment of everybody around this table that this is
only one step—we’ve seen it being built up for the last six months or
eight months, whatever it might be—that this is going [to] continue.
There’s going to be . . . three months from now, there’s going to be
something else going on, six months from now . . . That eventually it’s
very likely that they’ll establish a naval base there for submarines perhaps, or that they’ll put surface-to-surface missiles in.
And what steps, we—what position will we be in at that time, if we
consider that surface-to-surface missiles, and I think maybe we should
reach a determination on that, that surface-to-surface missiles in Cuba
would be so harmful that we would have to undertake an invasion of
Cuba, or a blockade which eventually would lead to an invasion and the
Marines going in, and the airborne, et cetera. Then, whether . . . Or even
a naval base or some of these other things. That in this kind of a statement, that you traced the history of Cuba and even mention the Monroe
Doctrine and say, point out that this was captured in a different way and
the Monroe Doctrine doesn’t apply as it did in the past; but we still have
our responsibilities to national security, that, making some of these
points that were made in Secretary Rusk’s statement, and then also say
that there’re certain things that would violate our national security. And
we would then have to take appropriate action and such things would be
the establishment of surface-to-surface missiles or the putting of, of, of a
nuclear weapons base.
Now, my point is, I think that it’s much more difficult for them to
take steps like that after you’ve made that statement. That if they put
them in and then you take offensive action, then I think that the Soviet
Union is almost committed to support them. Number two, we’re going
to be in a much tougher position in the future if the Soviet Union does
sign a treaty with Cuba because then if you invade Cuba, or do . . . take
any steps like that, you know that you’re going to have a world war. At
the present time, [if] you invaded Cuba, you’re not, you’re not, certain of
26
T U E S DAY, S E P T E M B E R
4, 1962
that. In fact, I should think that they probably wouldn’t support . . . a lot
of screams around the world.
But I think that this statement . . . this gives us a reason to put out a
statement as to what really is going to be our policy, not just on the surface-to-air missiles, but what is our . . . going to be our policy as far as
Cuba in the future is concerned. I think that’s—
Rusk: The great problem, the great difficulty, of course, as we all
know [unclear] . . . I think that, looking at Cuba, I think that it would be
fairly easy to come to answers to the questions that are posed at the
present time. But the United States has such a worldwide confrontation
with the Soviet Union that when the time comes to act, the President
will have to take into account how that action relates to the worldwide
confrontation and what the situation is everywhere else at the same time
because his problems are total and comprehensive. I mean, if we were
relatively isolated in the world, which we were before World War II, we
could concentrate on Cuba and say, “If this in Cuba, then that follows.”
But we’ve got a million men overseas in confrontation with the Soviet
bloc and this is a part of that confrontation. This is the thing that makes
it so agonizingly difficult.
Robert Kennedy: Yeah. I understand that. So, therefore, I think that you
really have to reach a determination of whether putting surface-to-surface
missiles in Cuba would be where you’d really have to face up to it, and figure that you are going to have to take your chances on something like that.
Everything you do, whether you do it in Southeast Asia, or Berlin or Cuba
or wherever is going to have some effect on the Soviet Union elsewhere.
And whether there are certain things that they do that—
President Kennedy: But isn’t this what we’re saying? As I understood, that statement was that when they’ve got a—
Robert Kennedy: Yeah, but [unclear] saying—
President Kennedy: —upset the general balance in—
Robert Kennedy: The point of that, the Secretary makes, Secretary
McNamara says they’ve got that at the present time.
President Kennedy: Yes.
Robert Kennedy: Under that definition of a “substantial offensive
capability,” quote unquote, that at the present time that the Cubans and
the Russians have that in Cuba and that the . . .
Bundy: Would our [unclear], air-defense posture against those MiGs
be [unclear], Bob?
Robert Kennedy: Some congressman or senator can come in and say,
“Prove that they haven’t at the present time 16 MiGs,” and, then you’d
Meeting on Soviet Arms Shipments to Cuba
27
be in trouble. . . . “Why aren’t you doing something [unidentified mumbling] right at this moment?” Now maybe that—
Bundy: Respond how?
Robert Kennedy: Maybe you don’t have to say surface-to-surface
missiles but I think that this is an opportunity where we really face up to
what’s going to happen a year from today. Because they are going to get
tougher [unclear]. [Bundy is whispering to the President.]
Rusk: [Unclear.] I wouldn’t suppose, and of course this is . . . Bob to . . .
[the President is heard whispering, “has to study now.”]. But I would not
suppose that the mere fact that a, for example, that a motor-torpedo boat
can come roar up along the Florida coast and throw a few shots ashore
would mean that that was an offensive capability. I’m not sure that MiGs
unarmed with nuclear weapons would provide any offensive capability of
the significance that we’re talking about here.
McNamara: No, I don’t mean to overemphasize the offensive capability of them. But they’re going to continue to increase whatever offensive
capability they have—
Bundy: I think that really is a question, Bob. It seems to me that everything they have put in so far, really is, insofar as you can make these distinctions, a defensive weapon. Fighters are defensive aircraft for use against
bombers and photographic reconnaissance. The SAMs are the same thing,
surface-to-air missiles don’t go . . . are a stupid way of reaching Florida.
Robert Kennedy: Well, Mac, that’s what you do, I mean, at the present juncture, if you were them—
Bundy: No, I’m only saying that the other step seems to me a much
larger step than the development of the kind of thing we’ve seen over the
last year and a half which is fully consistent with their behavior in a lot
of other countries.
Robert Kennedy: I just . . . I think we can all assume that they are
going to take those steps eventually.
Rusk: No, I think, Bob, even there that if we were imposing a blockade, for example, we could make it very clear that any firing on the
American mainland by MiGs or anything else would lead immediately to
the destruction of Cuba.
Bundy: That’s right.
McNamara: Oh I think that’s completely clear. What they’re going
to try to do is build up a deterrent power. The first, and most obvious
steps, are air defense. But those are not likely to be enough because
really their air defense isn’t worth a damn. We can—
Bundy: If it were a war, I agree with you.
28
T U E S DAY, S E P T E M B E R
4, 1962
McNamara: All right. And therefore—
President Kennedy: If we were attacking the Soviet Union, it wouldn’t be worth much?
McNamara: No. Against . . . in Cuba it isn’t worth—
President Kennedy: Yeah.
McNamara: —much and even in the Soviet Union, it isn’t worth
very much, Mr. President, because we can go underneath it. So that isn’t
going to be sufficient for the Cubans. They are going to say, “Well, that
really didn’t help us much. We have to have more of a deterrent power.”
And this, this—
President Kennedy: The only real deterrent against a country our
size is two things: First, the fact the Soviet[s] can act against us.
McNamara: Yes.
President Kennedy: [Unclear] in Iran, Turkey or anyplace else. And
secondly, if that they can get a ground-to-ground—
McNamara: Yes.
President Kennedy: —with a nuclear weapon. That’s the real deterrent.
McNamara: Yes.
President Kennedy: Otherwise we can always move against Cuba. It
just takes two more divisions than it took . . .
McNamara: Exactly, exactly or a few more suppressive aircraft.
Rusk: Mr. President, I think there is one thing that we can be—
Unidentified: Yes.
Rusk: —as certain about is . . . it can be a given that they have no . . .
the Soviet Union would never in the world permit a nuclear weapon to
be used against us from Cuba, except as part of a general nuclear war.
President Kennedy: That’s why I agree. I don’t think . . . why they give
the, and why do they give the . . . Then why don’t we give them the . . . ?
Rusk: Now, they could—If they should announce some morning that
they were placing nuclear weapons in Cuba—
President Kennedy: Under Soviet control.
Rusk: Whether they did or not; they just announced it, that could
cause some real problems.
President Kennedy: What is it you suggest that we announce today,
aside from this statement, which is rather long? What is it, in short, you
think we ought to announce as far as what our future action should be
towards Cuba? Aside from consultations, or aside from Guantánamo?26
26. The U.S. Naval Base at Guantánamo Bay. The Cuban government granted the United
States a lease for the base in 1903 and extended it in an agreement signed in 1934.
Meeting on Soviet Arms Shipments to Cuba
29
What Bobby, I guess, is saying is that we should announce today that
if they put in ground-to-ground missiles, we will—
Robert Kennedy: They take certain [unclear]—I think, no I think
some study should go on—
Rusk: Well, if we designated ground-to-ground missiles or we specified the nuclear weapon, I think we would create a kind of panic that the
facts themselves don’t now justify.
Bundy: That’s correct.
Rusk: And that this could heat the matter up much faster than if we
could get some general language, then, take account of the point that
Bob McNamara made. . . . It would be better to get a warning to the
Soviets in more general terms so that we do not create for them a major
prestige problem in not moving down that trail and then make it very
clear to our friends in the hemisphere—
President Kennedy: This is . . . the key sentence is, “Any placing by
the Soviets of a significant offensive capability in the hands of this selfannounced . . . would be a direct and major challenge . . . would warrant
immediate—”
Rusk: “appropriate action.”
Robert Kennedy: Of course they’ve challenged us, though, repeatedly. We’ve got the Monroe Doctrine and they’ve spit in our eye on it. 27
The idea we’re going to challenge again or then. . . .
McNamara: The next sentence is excellent.28 Very strong.
Bundy: Yeah. It’s a very important sentence.
McNamara: I agree. I think it can stand without the preceding sentence.29
Rusk: I think we ought to be careful, too, about supposing that the
Monroe Doctrine has somehow disappeared or receded into the background. What has happened to the Monroe Doctrine is that it, in the
27. The Monroe Doctrine, proclaimed by President James Monroe in 1823, constituted a
warning to European powers not to intervene in the Western Hemisphere. In the twentieth
century, it provided a rationale for U.S. intervention in the Caribbean region. President
Theodore Roosevelt declared as a “corollary” to the doctrine that the United States should
maintain stable conditions and not give outside powers any cause to intervene in the region.
28. The next in the draft, with underlining as found on the President’s own copy, reads,
“Further I say to our friends in Latin America that whatever armed strength the Cuban
regime may develop will be restricted by whatever means may be necessary to that island.”
29. The previous sentence was “Any placing by the Soviets of a significant offensive capability
in the hands of this self-announced aggressive regime in Cuba would be a direct and major
challenge to all this hemisphere stands for and would warrant immediate and appropriate
(forceful) action.” In Kennedy’s copy, forceful is underscored.
30
T U E S DAY, S E P T E M B E R
4, 1962
first instance, is a hemisphere problem. The Rio Pact.30 Implementation
of the Monroe Doctrine would be attempted primarily through hemisphere action. But it still remains there as an element of American policy
and our own national self-defense. If we ever needed to move and we’d
move on the basis of the historic, special regime in this hemisphere. I
think your press conference—
President Kennedy: Of course, the point is that the hemisphere—
they are being invited in, not forcing their way in. And the Monroe
Doctrine was for another situation, which was that the country came and
invaded Latin America. This is where they are not invading it; they are
being asked in by the government, which is its de facto government.
Rusk: We also [unclear] Mr. President. We never did, so far as I can
recall at the moment, we never used the Monroe Doctrine as a flash-pan
reaction to a particular situation. It was a basis for diplomatic action, for
gnawing at it, for insisting to other governments that they respect it and
take it. And it took a lot of time in most instances to apply the Monroe
Doctrine.
Door opens and closes. There is a short pause.
I think, Mr. President, it would be a little difficult to talk about this
additional information, or to say anything sort of—we have here on the
fourth page—without some general reference and some background.
I’m not sure that this would be too sharp to say [unclear] look at it and
see that we should say [unclear] now.
President Kennedy: I don’t know about number “D. Informal consultation.” 31
Rusk: Of course that is not a—
President Kennedy: Why don’t we just say . . . take . . . consult with
foreign ministers, other members—let’s just put it that way.
Rusk: Why we can combine C and D.32 Yeah. Sure.
30. The Rio Treaty of 1947 (Inter-American Treaty of Reciprocal Assistance), better known
as the Rio Pact, was a collective security agreement. Under its provisions, an attack against
one American state would be considered an attack against all.
31. The draft ends with a list of six measures to be initiated by the President, lettered A
through G. Letter D reads, “I have asked the Secretary of State to take full advantage of the
forthcoming meeting of the U.N. General Assembly to arrange for informal consultations
with the Foreign Ministers of the other members of the Organization of American States on
recent developments in Cuba as they may affect the security of the hemisphere; this is in
accord with suggestions which have come from several of our Latin American friends.”
32. C reads, “I have asked the Secretary of State to consult with our friends in the Caribbean
area about ways in which they can assist in the above programs further to insure their protection against the threat of Cuban military strength.”
Meeting on Soviet Arms Shipments to Cuba
31
President Kennedy: Good. Now, this . . . what about G?33 This is saying we are going to recognize the government-in-exile, is it?
Rusk: No, this does not go quite that far. It’s a move in that direction.
But our great problem there is that the refugees are in complete disorder
so far as leadership.
Bundy: I would question whether we want to—if we do this—then
the one that is formed will look like our puppet. It will be the Cuban
government-in-exile formed by the President on his instructions. There
is some disadvantage in that.
Rusk: I think we might be able to shorten this in various respects.
President Kennedy: Well, I think, that we can shorten this thing, boil
it down. The key thing you need right now are these missiles, also put
them into proportion: We are in much more danger from the Soviet
Union than we are from Cuba.
McNamara: Sure.
President Kennedy: So that this thing again, the fixation on Cuba as
opposed to someplace else, is really, if they’re to recognize that the missiles have changed . . . There are dangers in them. But other than that . . .
we don’t want them to fall into that . . . we want to kind of make it clear
to the country that [unclear as Bundy begins to speak] get our information
as quickly as possible.
Bundy: In that context—It seems to me, Mr. President, I would suggest that we get the information out of the White House because the
information, the question has been raised as to whether you had all the
dope, were getting the thing straight. And that needs to be got straight.
Then I, I at least would suggest at least that the major points might better be made by the Secretary of State precisely because we are not doing
anything very enormous at the moment there.
President Kennedy: Now, the only key thing would be this, all of this . . .
Bundy: You could reinforce it at a press conference.
President Kennedy: Would be . . . whatever armed strength they
develop . . . I mean, they seem to put a lot into this thing about . . . why
they . . . so, this is going to be used against other Caribbean, so that sentence is rather important.
Bundy: Very important. I agree.
33. G reads, “I feel sure as more and more Russians arrive in Cuba, more and more Cubans will be
thinking and saying: ‘Cuba sí, Russia no.’ To take full advantage of this fact I hereby invite and urge
Cuban exiles everywhere to unite within a single organization in which opportunities are left for
eventual major participation at top levels by those resisting Communist domination within Cuba.”
32
T U E S DAY, S E P T E M B E R
4, 1962
Rusk: I think that’s the kind of statement that has to be made by the
President. The declaration of a security, in effect, a security guarantee to
all—
Bundy: To the Caribbean states
Rusk: —all of Cuba’s neighbors [unclear].
President Kennedy: I think what we ought to do is . . . why don’t you
get . . . working.
Bundy: Yes, we can shorten it up.
President Kennedy: With Ted [Sorensen], to shorten it up, tighten
it up. Then let’s have a—Bobby’s going to see this fellow at 2:15—then
let’s have a meeting at, let’s get the leadership down here at five; all
we’re going to do really is to tell them about these surface—
Bundy: Bring them up—That will be essentially for briefing by
General [Marshall] Carter then?
President Kennedy: That’s right. Now, how much do we tell them
[about] how we got it?
Marshall Carter: We can give them a briefing, sir, that would give
them all without telling them exactly how we got it.
President Kennedy: I think you’ve got to say, you would say that—
when we did get it—because, you see, at the press conference I said that
we had no evidence.
Bundy: No confirmation. Fully confirmed conclusions were possible
only when, Thursday—
President Kennedy: Friday.
Bundy: —or Friday.
Robert Kennedy: Not till Saturday.
Bundy: It was Thursday night and Friday morning, wasn’t it?
Unidentified: That’s right. It was Thursday night.
President Kennedy: OK. Now you can work on this. So that part’s all
right. I don’t—there’s nothing particularly . . . I think you can just say you
got it and describe what it is to them. By then we will have this statement
in order and then I think at that time the Secretary can say we want to keep
some proportion. We’ve got Berlin and the big danger’s it would—They
don’t have offensive capability against us and they also, they don’t have an
ability to, in the final analysis, to prevent us from doing what we think
needs to be done. But the big problem is the fact of these other obligations.
So, if we lock them in, that takes care of really the big [unclear] physically.
Bundy: I think you can, do you have a judgment, is today the time to
reach that other larger question of whether we want to indicate that
some such phrase “the significant offensive capability or further development which might create a direct hazard” or something of this sort?
Whether you want to make that [unclear]?
Drafting Meeting on the Cuba Press Statement
33
President Kennedy: Well, Bobby are you suggesting that we say a
specific thing rather than [unclear] “significant offensive”—?
Robert Kennedy: Well I might be—could I work on it—
President Kennedy: OK.
Robert Kennedy: —for a little while?
President Kennedy: We’ll need it in—
Robert Kennedy: That’s my feeling. I think that we should take this
opportunity.
President Kennedy: Well, now, do we want to meet at four here and
[put an] end to this thing, in a new . . . form, with everybody having
given it some thought—?
Bundy: Right.
President Kennedy: And then we’ll have the leadership at five.
Bundy: You . . . And your current thought is that we, you would then
issue a statement through Pierre at the end of the afternoon?
President Kennedy: That is correct. Even if it’s confined—
Bundy: To a very limited—
President Kennedy: —to a statement of what the facts are plus this
key sentence from page 4. [to someone else] That’s all right [unclear]. But
even if—
The meeting ended and Kennedy left to shake hands in the Oval Office
with a congressional candidate from Missouri. After that, he went to the
Mansion for lunch and a swim.
4:00 –4:50 P.M.
The difficulty here is that the intervention is being invited.
That’s what’s causing all our difficulties . . .
Drafting Meeting on the Cuba Press Statement34
In the three hours since this group last met, Robert Kennedy has been
very busy. Besides drafting a new version of the statement on Cuba for
the President, the Attorney General met with Soviet ambassador
34. President Kennedy, McGeorge Bundy, Marshall Carter, Ray S. Cline, C. Douglas Dillon,
Carl Kaysen, Robert Kennedy, Curtis LeMay, Edwin Martin, Robert McNamara, Paul Nitze,
34
T U E S DAY, S E P T E M B E R
4, 1962
Anatoly Dobrynin at the Soviet Embassy. The Russians requested this
meeting to hand over a private letter from Khrushchev in response to
the new Anglo-American proposals on the test ban matter. Kennedy
came back from that meeting with little that was positive. Khrushchev
was unwilling to countenance a partial test ban without some form of
restraint on future nuclear tests underground. The Attorney General
had made use of the meeting to mention Cuba, but the Soviet ambassador said nothing to deter Kennedy from his belief that it was only a matter of time before Moscow put nuclear missiles on the island.35
The group was larger for this second Cuban meeting of the day.
Among the new participants were the Treasury secretary, Douglas
Dillon; the assistant secretary of state for inter-American affairs, Edwin
Martin; and the Air Force Chief of Staff, General Curtis LeMay.
Kennedy was widening the circle to confirm the instincts of his key
advisers and to tighten the statement before it went out. Discussion now
centered on the new Robert Kennedy draft. In the struggle over whether
to use the evening’s statement to send a warning to the Soviets, Robert
Kennedy had scored a victory.
The President started recording as he and his key advisers were considering how much of the intelligence data at hand on the Soviet buildup
should be revealed in this statement.
Dean Rusk : [Unclear] ships [unclear] instead of actions, suggesting
he wants [unclear].
President Kennedy: I think in this one, we ought to say . . . and to
avoid having the exact number of days ago—
McGeorge Bundy: I think so.
President Kennedy: Because otherwise it looks like it’s only been the
last minute.
Bundy: Well, I would say if it’s going to go, “It has become clear that
the suspected landing craft [unclear].
Rusk: I would not put [unclear] in terms . . . They would say yes.
And we can’t be sure of that fact.
Theodore Sorensen, and Maxwell Taylor. Others attending the meeting but not identified as
having spoken include Charles Bohlen and Martin Hillenbrand. Tape 19, John F. Kennedy
Library, President’s Office Files, Presidential Recordings Collection.
35. What Robert Kennedy did not know was that indeed his suspicions were correct and
Soviet missiles were on their way to Cuba, though they had not arrived there. However,
Ambassador Dobrynin was as much in the dark about these missile deployments as the U.S.
government.
Drafting Meeting on the Cuba Press Statement
35
Bundy: Here is the foreign intelligence [unclear] because this
[unclear] clear if we can get the substantive [unclear] on the side of
[unclear]. [Pages are flipped.]
President Kennedy: I think probably, in here somewhere, we probably ought to say is how many [unclear] technicians there are, military
technicians there are [unclear]. [Ongoing unintelligible background conversation.]
Bundy: What level of force can be stated, numbers of technicians? On
the order of 5,000, or don’t you know?
Marshall Carter: Three thousand would be closer.36
Unidentified: Three thousand.
Unidentified: We’re talking about military personnel.
President Kennedy: Technicians?
Carter: Technicians, yes sir. Military technicians.
Unidentified: Military technicians.
Carter: This is within the last month, sir.
Rusk: Military training and tactical personnel [unclear].
President Kennedy: Well, I think . . . let’s put that sentence here:
“That consistent with . . . there are . . .”
Unidentified: There appear to be about 3,000 in there, we have
[unclear].
President Kennedy: That’s about right.
Bundy: About 3,000.
Unidentified: Three thousand.
President Kennedy: What’s this statement for?
Bundy: This is to get the facts. The factual paragraph will go before
this. This is a slightly shortened version of the paragraph on page 1. [A
page is flipped.]
President Kennedy: What about saying, “There are approximately
3,000 technicians this side [unclear] there are . . . however . . .”
Carter: You could add this up. [Unclear] presence. That might work.
Unidentified: You just take that one [unclear] should probably have
another one.
Carter: Now on a substantive issue, Mr. President—
President Kennedy: Why don’t I just [say], “As I have said before,”
Bobby, “As we have said before.” [Unclear] just so it doesn’t look like this
is a new fact coming out, this one on the technicians.
36. Ultimately, the White House would put out that there were approximately 3,500 Soviet
military personnel in Cuba. The Attorney General’s draft statement has not been found.
36
T U E S DAY, S E P T E M B E R
4, 1962
Ray Cline: Sir, you asked me a question this morning about our first
evidence, we traced it back to mid-1960, to at least by July 1960 there
were some military technical advisers—
President Kennedy: Right.
Cline: —sent to Cuba from the [Soviet] bloc.
Bundy: Was that more than three years ago?
Cline: No, [unclear].
Carter: We were carrying 500 up until this most recent influx, and
there were 1,700 actually in, and 1,300 more within the last four or five
days, so that it’s about 3,500 military technicians, but we’ve been carrying approximately 2,000 agricultural and economic assistants, Soviet
types, since they first started coming in in mid-’60.
Rusk: So that number has increased since they . . . [Rusk keeps talking
under Kennedy—unintelligible.]
President Kennedy: OK, well we have to rewrite that section, I think.
I’d rather see, “As we have said before.”
Bundy: Yeah. Right.
Carter: We carry about 5,000, altogether: agricultural, economic, and
military at this time. [Pause.]
Bundy: What this statement in this form admits . . . This paragraph
here, that’s the one on which we were having a discussion this morning.
Rusk: The Attorney General redrafted it, as we said this morning . . .
Robert Kennedy (?): We’ll look at that.
Rusk: There is a paragraph here that I believe might . . . we might
just want to make two or three small changes. I think [unclear]. [Lot of
paper rustling. Short, unclear exchanges.]
Robert Kennedy: The Secretary thinks that you should . . .
Rusk: It’s page 4, I believe [unclear].
Unidentified: Have you seen this piece of paper?
Unidentified: [Unclear.]
Carter: [Unclear] I was more concerned about the first page with the
facts [unclear]. That one there that you [unclear].
Unidentified: Coordination.
Rusk: This last paragraph on page 4.
President Kennedy: Why don’t we just start at the top of page 4:
“Clearly the recent acceleration of Soviet military aid to Cuba is coming
dangerously close to a violation of the Monroe Doctrine.” I think that’s a
. . . it’s an ambivalent, ambiguous position. What [unclear] would be the
subject of endless conversation about what does constitute a violation
and what does not. [Bundy can be heard indistinctly in the background.]
Drafting Meeting on the Cuba Press Statement
37
Edwin Martin: Well Mr. President, the “however” clause which
immediately followed that sort of impliedly says—
President Kennedy: —But what is the “violation?”
Martin: What is the “vio—”? They have not yet done the following
things and the implication is that that would be—
President Kennedy: I think we ought to leave this out, this
Monroe—
Douglas Dillon: We could get into a terrible fight about the Monroe
Doctrine, because—
President Kennedy: It’s so vague.
Dillon: —others would say it has already been clearly violated.
President Kennedy: I think we ought to leave the Monroe Doctrine
out of that paragraph. I don’t think it’s necessary anyway.37
Bundy: I think if we do leave it out, if we leave out of any statement
we make, there is no point in calling attention to it in the statement at all
because it has the difficulty Douglas [Dillon] described.
Rusk: The . . . Then what about calling attention to the interAmerican security arrangement [unclear] connection?
President Kennedy: Well, I think we can just leave out the words
“since the Monroe [Doctrine] was first announced.” Just say “for over a
century and a half ” or something. Or it would just say, “For many years
the United—the American states,” that would be the bottom of page 2.
“For many years, the American states have consistently maintained their
right to prevent the use of their ter—”
Is this the principle of our agreements to prevent the use of the
territory by nonmilitary [nonhemispheric] powers or is it to prevent
the seizure of territory, or—What exactly is the Rio Treaty? What
does it provide? Is that the key document, the Rio Treaty that will
overturn it?
Bundy: The collective security arrangement.
Rusk: Well, I think it’s a general collective security phrase to ensure
the safety and territorial integrity of the defense of the Western
Hemisphere [unclear.] [Two other voices—unclear.]
Cline: How about the Declaration on Solidarity for the Preservation
of the Political Integrity of the American States, 1954, says—under the
37. The final statement did not contain any reference to the Monroe Doctrine. The U.S. position was that it had a right to react to anything that posed a threat to U.S. security or to the
security of other members of the inter-American system.
38
T U E S DAY, S E P T E M B E R
4, 1962
Rio Treaty—said it [reading] “declares that the domination or control of
political institutions of any American State by the international communist movement, extending to this Hemisphere the political system of an
extra-continental power, would constitute a threat to the sovereignty
and political independence of the American States, endangering the
peace of America—”38 I think—
Rusk: There were sweeping reservations that were read into that at
the time that [unclear].
Cline: That’s right. This is the most clear statement that we have
under the Rio Treaty on Communist intervention. It was called, “Against
International Communist Intervention at Caracas, Venezuela.”
Martin: That figured an inaccurate use of force [unclear] it all
together.
Rusk: Yes, I think the wording at the bottom of page 2 will have to
be revised to bring in the actual language of the Rio Pact.
Robert Kennedy: Can you get me—What is the language here of the
Rio Treaty?39
President Kennedy: The key point is that the Monroe Doctrine—
and all these things—is talking about the forcible seizure of the territory of one country, of a country in the Western Hemisphere, by a
foreign power. The difficulty here is that the intervention is being
invited. That’s what’s causing all our difficulties, but we therefore have
to . . .
Robert Kennedy: The Article 5 of the Rio Treaty says that “the territory or sovereignty or political independence of any American State is
affected by an aggression which is not an armed attack.”40
Rusk: That’s right.
38. “Declaration of Solidarity for the Preservation of the Political Integrity of the American
States Against International Communist Intervention,” accepted on 13 March 1954 at the
conclusion of the Tenth Inter-American Conference, held at Caracas, Venezuela. For the full
text of the declaration, see Department of State Bulletin 30, no. 769 (22 March 1954): 420. The
passage continues: “. . . and would call for a meeting of consultation to consider the adoption
of measures in accordance with existing treaties.”
39. The Attorney General is trying to rework his draft to incorporate these new ideas.
Ultimately his draft would be completely revised and cut.
40. He is presumably referring to Article 6, which reads: “If the inviolability or the integrity of
the territory or the sovereignty or political independence of any American State should be
affected by an aggression which is not an armed attack or by an extra-continental or intra-continental conflict, or by any other fact or situation that might endanger the peace of America, the
Organ of Consultation shall meet immediately in order to agree on the measures which must be
taken in case of aggression to assist the victim of the aggression or, in any case, the measures
Drafting Meeting on the Cuba Press Statement
39
Robert Kennedy: “Or by any other type of situation that might
endanger the peace.”
President Kennedy: The whole name “aggression” is the point.
These people are being invited in, that’s why—
Robert Kennedy: It’s just whether the Soviet Union establishing
bases here or putting missiles here, whether that is in fact an aggression
which doesn’t constitute an armed attack [unclear].
Dillon: It depends a lot on the—
President Kennedy: Well, we don’t have to settle that question today,
though. I mean, this is really leading up to our main points. So that I don’t
think we have to . . . I think the first sentence, [reading] “Considering U.S.
policy is necessary [unclear], the special relationship among the countries
of the Western Hemisphere, a relationship which has existed for many
years and which has been the subject of many hemispheric treaties.”
Rusk: Inter-American treaties.
President Kennedy: Inter-American treaties. [reading] “This special
relationship has been acknowledged throughout the world, and is recognized by Article 52 which provides for regional security arrangements.”41 Then we go on to January of this year . . .
[Pause.]
Robert Kennedy: You better get that changed.
Unidentified: Yes, sir.
President Kennedy: All right. Then I would say at the top of [page]
4, I’d leave that paragraph out.
Rusk: Then first, [page] 4. [Unclear.]
President Kennedy: First, take it out and say, “There is . . .” Yeah.
Rusk: At the bottom of page—
Robert Kennedy: Now what does that—
President Kennedy: [testily] You have to understand, we’re going to
have to redo this.
Robert Kennedy: Yeah.
President Kennedy: I just want to get the key . . . you have to lead up
to explaining that.
Robert Kennedy: Yeah.
which should be taken for the common defense and for the maintenance of the peace and security
of the Continent.” For the full text of the Inter-American Treaty of Reciprocal Assistance, 1947,
see Department of State Bulletin 17, no. 429 (21 September 1947): 565–67.
41. Of the Charter of the United Nations.
40
T U E S DAY, S E P T E M B E R
4, 1962
Rusk: [Unclear.] “Soviet assistance” at the bottom of page 4, “limited
to weapons normally associated with defense.”
President Kennedy: Yeah.
Rusk: And knock out the next sentence, and then say, “[Unclear] say
to our friends in Latin America [unclear].”
Unidentified: Well, you really want to say that there is nothing in the
Soviet announcement which foreshadows such an eventuality; there is nothing there which precludes it either. And you just wanted [unclear] our way.
Carl Kaysen: The reason for that sentence was really to put them . . .
to read our interpretation into it, and to force them into [unclear].
Bundy: That puts us in a position of depending on their words.
President Kennedy: Well, maybe it wouldn’t be if you keep in that sentence, “It will continue to be so confined.” I would say, that if it was going
to happen, then we would take action against it. So I would think that . . .
Rusk: I think rather than say “it will continue to be so confined,” “it
must be so confined.”
President Kennedy: We say “bloc assistance” [unclear].
Unidentified: [Unclear.]
Dillon: If you say, “It must be so confined,” does that mean you’re
going to confine it?
Rusk: Well, that’s what “it will continue to be so confined” means, in
this context. Not negotiable.
Dillon: [Unclear] statement . . .
Unidentified: What’s this about [unclear]? [Pause. Mumbling.]
Rusk: “Should it be otherwise, the greatest questions would arise . . .
but otherwise the greatest questions would arise for our friends in Latin
America.”
Unidentified: [Unclear.]
Unidentified: With all this information, it’s a little less red flaggish.
Carter: [Unclear.]
Dillon: The only thing I think you want to be careful of is . . . making
a threat to do something if they get some particular weapon in Cuba. If
you make your threat that you’ll never let it come out of Cuba, which is
still the key; but the other thing means that you’re—
President Kennedy: Well, I would say ground-to-ground missiles,
you’d—42
42. Presumably, Robert Kennedy’s draft only ruled out the placement of offensive weapon systems on Cuba. Here the President is making clear what he thinks would be unacceptable:
ground-to-ground missiles.
Drafting Meeting on the Cuba Press Statement
41
Dillon: Well, that’s . . . if you want to put it on that maybe—
President Kennedy: Yeah.
Dillon: —that’s a strong enough one to put it on, but just saying
“offensive weapons,” I don’t know what an offensive weapon is. They’d
argue. Might say tanks are but I don’t know.
Bundy: That’s a substantive question. I mean how far—it’s clear that
we want to make a statement that makes it plain that they will be confined
and not make a . . . head for the rest of the hemisphere with this stuff.43
Rusk: Well, what about this then? “To date, bloc assistance has been
limited to weapons normally associated with defense. Were it to be otherwise the greatest questions would arise.”44 [Unclear] “Our friends in
Latin America and throughout the world [unclear] Cuban regime
[unclear] restricted by whatever means make it necessary to that island.”
Nothing more . . .
Dillon: That’s right, but you don’t say you’re going to go in there . . .
Bundy: I think that “to that island” is technically not a . . . Ed [Martin]
and I have figured out [Martin makes an unclear interjection] that you can’t
keep them out of international waters with their patrol boats. So we’re
going to have to say, “kept away from any part of the hemisphere.”
Rusk: “By whatever means necessary to Cuba.”
Martin: We have [had] an alternative plan.
Bundy: [Unclear] take that “free passage of the high seas” unless
you’re going to make a special order.
President Kennedy: Let’s see which way that we are in the draft.
Now, this first—
Bundy: I think the factual part can be done very well from that first
paragraph with the corrections you’ve made. It doesn’t need to be long.
Then the question is really whether you want an extensive development,
or any development of the Rio Treaty obligations or whether you want
to go straight to some form of pledge, either as stated in the Justice draft
or anywhere else.
President Kennedy: There’s no difference between them.
Robert Kennedy: Do you have another copy of that first factual?
Bundy: No I don’t; it’s just the one.
Rusk: I think there is some mistake [unclear] in the Attorney
43. Bundy consistently doubts the Soviets would ever use Cuba as a military base from which
to threaten the United States.
44. Rusk has hit on a new formulation of the warning to the Soviets. This phrasing would
prevail.
42
T U E S DAY, S E P T E M B E R
4, 1962
General’s draft in the middle of page 4 indicating what there is not evidence of . . .
Martin: [Unclear.]
President Kennedy: I think we ought to have that and then we ought
to—
Bundy: That could follow on—
Rusk: And then the statement on—that reassures our Latin
American allies at the end.
Dillon: Well, I think the way you’ve redrafted it [unclear] objection.
President Kennedy: What we are doing is, first we’re going to give
the details of what assistance they’ve sent to Cuba.
Bundy: That’s right . . . what they have not.
President Kennedy: Secondly, we have . . . And what they have not.
Then secondly we are going to give a unilateral guarantee against the
use of any of these forces against anyone in the hemisphere.
Bundy: Against anybody else.
President Kennedy: Third, we’re going to say that the [unclear] indirect methods of taking steps against them [unclear] direct. Then I think
we ought to say something about, at the end, that we have to keep in mind
for those who are . . . This is a dangerous world and we have to keep in
mind . . . don’t want to use the word totality again, but all of the dangers we
live with. The fact of the matter is the major danger is the Soviet Union
with missiles and nuclear warheads, not Cuba. We don’t want to get
everybody so fixed on Cuba that they regard . . . So in some way or other
we want to suggest that at the end. This is a matter of [unclear] danger, as
is Berlin as is Southeast Asia as are a great many areas which are—
Bundy: I think there is a question, Mr. President, whether you want
to do that in this statement or whether that’s something we make clear
as we go along.
President Kennedy: Well, I know, I think we’ve got to say something
about that otherwise you don’t want everybody to blow on this, you get
everybody so mesmerized here that all these other places which are
also—
Rusk: I think, perhaps [unclear]—
President Kennedy: This is not an aggressive danger to us except
indirectly.
Bundy: As it now stands.
President Kennedy: Compared with these other places. Now somewhere we’ve got to get that in, it seems to me, right from the beginning.
Give some guidance.
Drafting Meeting on the Cuba Press Statement
43
Dillon: How far do these surface-to-air missiles shoot if they want to
use them to hit the ground?
Bundy: Thirty miles.
Dillon: [Unclear.]
Pause. Some flipping of pages.
Bundy: Would you like us to go and work on it?
President Kennedy: Haven’t similar missiles been given to Iraq and
what, the U.A.R. [United Arab Republic of Egypt and Syria]?
Bundy: Similar missiles are on order for Iraq and the U.A.R. and
[unclear]—
President Kennedy: Indonesia?
Paul Nitze: Indonesia has them, yes sir.
Cline: [Unclear] the equipment has been delivered to Indonesia and
they are proceeding at a very leisurely pace there and this is the only
place that they’ve set up such a program.
President Kennedy: Do you think it might—
Bundy: This is a quick, smart, secret operation.
Unidentified: That’s right.
Bundy: They were put in fast here in Cuba. It is in that sense quite
different from their ordinary military assistance. [Voices of agreement.]
Rusk: The problem with stating these points you mentioned at the
very end, Mr. President is to put [it] in terms of general tensions and
the need for making progress on all fronts, to not put it in such a way
that it appears that we are timorous about Cuba, because we are scared
to death of [unclear]—
President Kennedy: No, but what I just want to get everybody to
keep in mind, what is really—
Rusk: Right.
President Kennedy: —dangerous, and what’s really annoying—
Nitze: At some stage wouldn’t it be wise, Mr. President, to lay the
background as to why this isn’t symmetrical, why that it’s the Russians
who are really threatening people all over the world? Our measures are
defensive mainly. We feel differently. Whereas the Russians have come in
with a real aggressive phase. [Unclear.] Because otherwise you get on
this tit-for-tat kind of a thing, justification where you have to understand
time lines.
Bundy: Have you got [unclear] language Mr. Secretary as to what we
figure will be the consequences? Because that’s— [Unclear response.]
President Kennedy: Yeah, well I think we ought to . . . do we characterize this as an announcement [unclear] aggressive regime?
44
T U E S DAY, S E P T E M B E R
4, 1962
Papers rustling. Dillon is speaking to someone in the background.
President Kennedy: All right. Now let’s see. We’ve got this first page
[unclear].
Robert Kennedy: [Unclear.]
Bundy: The first paragraph, it’s on—there it is, Bobby.
President Kennedy: Now, the question, I don’t [unclear]—
Bundy: Then we would add the paragraph from page 4—
Rusk: [Unclear.]
Bundy: Of Bobby’s draft, the middle paragraph, “no evidence of,”
except I would suggest that we omit the last sentence. That seems to
me—
President Kennedy: I’ve taken that out.
Bundy: —entirely a question of their faith.
President Kennedy: All right, now what do we say after this?
Bundy: And after that we would move toward . . .
Rusk: I would say what comes below, we’re going to have to revise.
The use of [unclear].
Bundy: “I say to our friends in Latin America and throughout the
world.”
President Kennedy: [Unclear] grandiloquent thing, that’s an oratorical phrase?
Rusk: Well, “Our friends in—”
Bundy: “I can assure our friends in Latin America”?
President Kennedy: Let’s just say, “The armed strength [unclear] in
Latin America.”
Bundy: Or “whatever armed strength.” All right. And say not “to that
island,” I would think . . .
President Kennedy: Well, I think that gets over the idea we have
[unclear].
Martin: [Unclear] precious distinction.
Kennedy and Unidentified: What?
Martin: The high seas is a precious distinction in [unclear] statement.
Bundy: Well, it’s an important one because the question will come up
when they begin using the high seas with MTBs [motor-torpedo boats]
as to whether the President has committed himself to prevent that. I
would be sorry to see him in that bind.
Brief, unclear exchange. President Kennedy at one point says, “What?”
Inaudible.
President Kennedy: Bobby, you rewrite that sentence.
Drafting Meeting on the Cuba Press Statement
45
Bundy: I would say . . .
Rusk: Maybe you rewrite that sentence and let’s take the last sentence that [unclear]—
Bundy: Well, I think it’s important to say. Look, we put in another
draft—I admit that it’s not as eloquent language—“will be prevented by
whatever means might be necessary from threatening any part of the
hemisphere.”45
President Kennedy: OK.
Martin: Seems to me that gets the point across.
President Kennedy: All right. “Threatening militarily . . .” They’re
threatening every part of the hemisphere now in the indirect sense, so
that we’re talking now about the military—
Bundy: “Prevented from action against any part of the hemisphere.”
Unidentified: “Any action against—”
President Kennedy and several others: “Military action.”
Unidentified: “Military action against.”
President Kennedy: Yeah.
Rusk: And in the final sentence where . . . here we will have to write a
sentence to relate this to other problems [unclear].
Bundy: You have one other sentence though about grave damage,
which danger, which we need a decision either for or against.
Rusk: Start the paragraph: “To date, bloc assistance has been limited to
weapons normally associated with defense. Were it to be otherwise, the
greatest questions would arise. The armed strength which the Cuban
regime may develop will be restricted by whatever means.” For sure.
President Kennedy: See, the reason we’ve got to put in something at
the end, otherwise you’re going to get a suggestion of blockade right now
and blockade these shipments and . . . so that I think we better just—46
Bundy: Well, we could say simply, “Against the real dangers which
confront the world, the current threat of, the current hazards in Cuba
are not—”
Unidentified: “Kept in pers—”
Bundy: “Must be kept in perspective.”
45. This less than eloquent phrase makes its way into the final version of the statement.
46. The President is seeking more policy flexibility than would have been allowed by a strident statement. The sentence about restricting or confining Cuban power never makes it into
the final version. Instead the Cuban problem is set within the complex of concerns defining
the worldwide struggle against Communism.
46
T U E S DAY, S E P T E M B E R
4, 1962
Unidentified: “Perspective.”
President Kennedy: “The dangers which confront the world in . . .”
Unidentified: [Unclear.]
Bundy: Well, I would . . . I don’t know that I’d localize it, at all.
“Which Soviet—”
President Kennedy: “Communist.” “Communist.”
Bundy: “With which Communist aggression threatens the wor—
Communist aggressiveness,” I would say, “threatens the world.”
President Kennedy: “And the peace.”
Long pause, with the sounds of writing and page turning. Several
unclear, whispered exchanges. Someone says “statement of the general
threat.”
Robert Kennedy: [Unclear.] Read that [unclear].
Rusk: [reading] “The Cuban ques—”[unclear] “The Cuban question
must be considered as part of a worldwide challenge posed by Communist
threats to the peace and must be dealt with as a part of that larger issue in
which all free men have a prominent stake.” It gets the idea without—47
Bundy: Without [unclear] either way. It’s very clear.
Robert Kennedy: We might put that at the beginning, I think, of the
first paragraph, rather than at the end where we say [unclear] happen
[unclear]. Might be well to have this right under . . . when we get into a
discussion of this whole problem.
Unidentified: After the factual statement.
Bundy: That’s probably going to be the second paragraph.
Unidentified: After the factual statement.
Bundy: But before we . . . the defense [unclear] . . .
Unidentified: [Unclear.] All right, [unclear].
Bundy: But before we say there is no defensive [unclear] I would
think . . . Let’s put this together in detachable fragments [unclear].
[Unclear exchange. Someone says, “Time is running out.”]
President Kennedy: Five, yeah.
Robert Kennedy: Can we head up there before that? [Unclear] take it
up now?
Bundy: Well, we’ll do our best.
President Kennedy: Here’s . . I don’t know what—You’ve got
Bobby’s haven’t you?
47. Here Rusk was expressing President Kennedy’s point that Cuba must be kept in perspective,
since the real concern was the Soviet Union and the most acute dangers were in other parts of the
world. This language would also be part of the final version.
Drafting Meeting on the Cuba Press Statement
47
Bundy: Yeah.
President Kennedy: What about this business of Guantánamo?
[Unclear.]
Robert Kennedy: Here at the end.
Bundy: I swiped it out.48
Unidentified: Yeah. I think that . . .
Unidentified: [Unclear.]
President Kennedy: Yeah, we ought to have a sentence in there “as
any further . . . as further information is received and verified—”
Bundy: “It will be promptly made available.”
President Kennedy: “In accordance with the President’s statement a
week ago.”49
Robert Kennedy: That’s almost covered in that first page.
Bundy: It’s in one of the papers. I think we did get this.
Robert Kennedy: Mac, you might look at the first page.
Unidentified: [Unclear.]
Bundy: Well . . . the [Central Intelligence] agency has a brief of what
they plan to do, Mr. President, which you may want to review before the . . .
Rusk: “As further information is developed and confirmed.”50
Carter: Would you prefer to look at it or . . .
President Kennedy: What’s this on?
Carter: This is substantially what we gained in this morning, Mr.
President, except—
President Kennedy: Oh about the . . . I’d like to ask General [Curtis]
LeMay a little about what these SAM sites could mean if we were going to
carry out an attack on Cuba. What hazard would this present to you?51
Curtis LeMay: Well, it would mean you’d have to get, of course, your
force in there to knock them out so that the rest of the attacking forces
would be free to take on the other targets. That’d be the first thing we’d
do. We’d have to go in low level and get them.
48. Guantánamo would be mentioned in the final text.
49. Presumably referring to his news conference on 29 August 1962 where he addressed the issue.
50. This becomes the language of the final draft; but just before Salinger reads the statement,
the President has this rewritten so that it is clear that he has consistently promised to provide
information as “it is obtained and properly verified.” Understandably, the President is concerned about his personal credibility. Compare the news conference version to the “last draft,”
4 September 1962, “Cuba” folder, National Security Files, Box 36, John F. Kennedy Library.
Besides this change, Salinger provided additional information at the press conference on the
range of the SAMs. Otherwise, the statement as read and this so-called last draft found in
McGeorge Bundy’s Cuba file are identical.
51. On 7 September, Kennedy would order military planning for assaults on SAM sites.
48
T U E S DAY, S E P T E M B E R
4, 1962
President Kennedy: OK.
LeMay: These missiles have no low-level capability so you go in low
and take them out.
President Kennedy: You’d have to go hit the radar?
LeMay: And the missiles, too.
Unidentified: [Unclear.]
President Kennedy: Would that be a difficult operation?
LeMay: No, sir.
Rusk: They would probably have low-level, smaller antiaircraft guns.
LeMay: Lose our tactical fighters going in low, uh, huh.
Rusk: Yeah.
President Kennedy: You mean they would use antiaircraft [guns]?
Rusk: They would use 20 mm [unclear]—
LeMay: Well, they would probably not see us until we got within a
few miles of the coastline.
Rusk: Yeah.
LeMay: And you’d put part of your force on those missiles to knock
them out.
Rusk: Right.
LeMay: Of course, you’ve got to get the airfields very quick too.
Rusk: Sure.
LeMay: But this complicates any assault plans you might have. It’s
another target you’ve got to worry about.
President Kennedy: Yeah. How about . . . let’s see . . . how are we now
. . . are we going to continue our observation of the island?
Unidentified: [Unclear.]
Carter: We have not yet faced that problem, sir. We have a bird ready
to go tomorrow morning and we would like to send it to cover that portion which was obstructed by clouds on the [August] 29th mission. We
could go in across the Isle of Pines—hit the two—[pointing to a map]
hit right there on the first of the green sites and then cover the island
down and back, avoiding the present area. We don’t need any more coverage of that area now.52
President Kennedy: This would be about 75,000 feet, would it,
depending?
LeMay: Sixty-five [thousand], 70,000 feet, yes sir.
52. A U-2 photographed the central and eastern portions of Cuba on September 5. The mission detected three additional SAM sites in the central portion of the island. Heavy cloud
cover prevented the U-2 from seeing much along the eastern side of the island. “U-2
Drafting Meeting on the Cuba Press Statement
49
Carter: I think that’s a safe operation. But I think also it’s safe for the
entire island now, but next week it may not be and it might not be now.
President Kennedy: He has to go over land doesn’t he, to get this
thing, these [unclear]?
Carter: Yes sir, these are verticals.53
LeMay: Well, once these things become operational they have the
capability of shooting a U-2 down, of course. We can go to the low altitude 101s, but [unclear].54
President Kennedy: You can’t get much, can you?
LeMay: You can’t hide them very well.
President Kennedy: You don’t get much I suppose either, do you?
LeMay: Well, you’d get the definite targets you’re looking for. You’d
have to cover a big wide area. You need more sorties to do that. The specific areas you’re interested in, you could [unclear].
President Kennedy: So the question really is the hazards to this
flight tomorrow.
LeMay: Yes, sir.
Carter: I think the hazard would be very, very slight and we would
like to go ahead with it, sir.
President Kennedy: It’s fine with me. Do you have any?
Robert McNamara: I think we definitely should go ahead, Mr.
President.
Bundy: I would agree.
President Kennedy: Fine.
Now, that would be about—after that it would probably get more difficult. So what are we going to do then? We ought to go, at least—I
know it’d seem abrupt so let’s be thinking about what [unclear]. There’s
no way we can do this . . .
Thirty-three seconds excised as classified information.
Cline: This flight tomorrow, ought to give us complete coverage of the
island and I think we would assess that and perhaps suggest we do an open
flight or a . . . that it is safe for another major flight based on [unclear].
Carter: Of course, you’ll get noise from the 101s [if President
Overflights of Cuba, 29 August through 14 October 1962,” 27 February 1963, in CIA
Documents, McAuliffe, pp. 127–37.
53. Vertical photography was taken from directly overhead, rather than at an angle, pointed
inland from a flight along Cuba’s periphery.
54. The McDonnell RF-101 Voodoo was the world’s first supersonic photoreconnaissance aircraft. Originally built as a fighter-interceptor, it was a highly maneuverable, low-altitude
reconnaissance plane.
50
T U E S DAY, S E P T E M B E R
4, 1962
Kennedy adds low-level surveillance flights] but you’re going to get
noise no matter what happens anywhere.
President Kennedy: OK, why don’t we stand down for a meeting at
five. Now, on this meeting at five certainly one of the questions that is
going to come up is this question of our ability or inability to get our
NATO allies to do anything about their ships carrying this stuff. That
would be addressed to you, Mr. Secretary [unclear].
Rusk: Yes, and I will comment briefly on that, that it’s not very
promising at this point. We’ve taken it up with them again. But . . . to
explain some of the difficulties, but that’s not very helpful.
Carter: Does the opening sentence adequately take care of your
injunction [unclear] Mr. President?
President Kennedy: This is what you might read?
Carter: Yes, sir, this is what we’ll give them.
President Kennedy: Yeah, that’s fine. I think that’s right. I think the . . .
just what the facts are which is just that . . . [Loud paper rustling.]
President Kennedy: At the meeting then, I think I’ll ask that you,
General [Carter], to just brief on . . . go over that part of the material
which has been made available previously and then this recent material . . .
if you want to comment . . . and then [turn to] the Secretary of Defense
and General LeMay will then be asked about the military significance of
this. Also they’ll talk about Guantánamo. Now, if they want to talk about
this question of Guantánamo, you should respond—
McNamara: Yes, I talked to Admiral [George W.] Anderson this
afternoon, Mr. President, and he recommended that we maintain the
present forces at the present levels, unless we observe, by various means,
reinforcements of Cuban military personnel in the area.55
President Kennedy: Now, this statement of Bundy’s is—I wonder if
at this meeting the personnel we’ll want here will be Secretary of . . .
the CIA, Secretary of State, Secretary of Defense, General LeMay, and
Mr. Nitze. I wonder if the other gentlemen could perhaps go into my
office and take a look at this statement [unclear] as soon as Bundy has
it ready and then see if you fellows could come to a conclusion on it
and then if we get it all straightened out, then I will have the
Secretary of State and Defense take a look at it and we’ll put it out
right about six.
President Kennedy: Why don’t we all wait in . . .
The meeting breaks up. Only fragments of conversation can be made out.
55. Admiral George W. Anderson, Jr., was Chief of Naval Operations.
Drafting Meeting on the Cuba Press Statement
51
Bundy: Mr. President walk into [unclear]. [Bundy keeps mumbling.]
[Papers shuffling.]
McNamara: [Unclear.] I don’t have [unclear]. Yes, I think so. It
seems to me [unclear]. I’m not sure we [unclear].
Bundy: How much do we want?56
Robert Kennedy: [Unclear.]
McNamara: All right.
President Kennedy: [Unclear.] How much do we want?
McNamara: I would recommend . . . Last time you had 250,000 for
11 months. I’d recommend 150,000 for say 5 months, up to the first of
March, end of February. [Unclear.] Worked out fine [unclear] in effect
while they’re out of session. [Unclear.]
President Kennedy: Fine.
Unidentified: And I think we did a good job [unclear].
Nitze: I appreciate your help. [He laughs.]
Unclear exchanges. Meeting has broken up.
McNamara: Could I just ask, Mr. President, whether you want to
raise [unclear] question with the [congressional] leadership [unclear]. I
agree with [unclear], the surface-to-air missiles should not represent the
stage at which our traditional strength [unclear] putting nuclear weapons
there as a deterrent actually makes Cuba more [unclear] recognizable
deterrent.
Unidentified: They could put some more strength there [unclear]
concentration of artillery [unclear].
Unidentified: We’ve got [unclear].
Nitze: You have an appointment to see Foy Kohler at five? 57
McNamara: Yeah, would you call him? Thank you very much. It may
be too late but at least. But she may have already done it.
Dean Rusk had a barely audible conversation with someone before the
congressmen arrive. The Secretary of State then, it seems, left the room,
but Robert McNamara stayed behind to greet the congressmen.
56. The discussion has shifted to the call-up of reserves that Kennedy believes is necessary to
prepare the U.S. armed forces for any contingency in the rough patch ahead.
57. Foy D. Kohler would replace Llewellyn E. Thompson, Jr., as U.S. ambassador to the Soviet
Union on 27 September 1962.
52
T U E S DAY, S E P T E M B E R
4, 1962
5:00 –5:55 P.M.
. . . I think Berlin is coming to some kind of a climax this fall,
one way or another, before Christmas. And I think that today I
would think it would be a mistake for us to talk about military
action or a blockade [against Cuba].
Meeting with Congressional Leadership on Cuba58
The Attorney General and McGeorge Bundy moved to the Oval Office
to complete work on the President’s Cuba statement, as the congressional leadership filed into the Cabinet Room. Earlier in the day, the
White House invited 20 people to attend, including Speaker of the
House John McCormack of Massachusetts, Senate Majority Leader Mike
Mansfield of Montana, and Vice President Lyndon Johnson.59
Robert McNamara was in the Cabinet Room as the congressmen
arrived. At the tail end of the drafting meeting he had mentioned to the
President that a call-up of reserves might be needed during the forthcoming congressional recess. As the congressmen took their seats
around the Cabinet table, McNamara isolated a key congressional player
to put in a word about the administration’s pressing military need.
Robert McNamara: [quietly as an aside to an unidentified congressman,
perhaps Senator Russell] Well, I think the President wants to tell you
what he knew of it. While you’re standing here, may I mention that
[unclear] possibility of obtaining authority [to] call up reserve [unclear]
personnel while Congress is out of session.60 He can’t do it. The old
58. Including President Kennedy, Senators Everett Dirksen, J. W. Fulbright, Bourke
Hickenlooper, Mike Mansfield, Richard B. Russell, and Alexander Wiley; Congressmen Charles
A. Halleck, John McCormack, and Carl Vinson; Marshall Carter, Curtis LeMay, Robert
McNamara, and Dean Rusk, all identified in the discussion. Senators Thomas H. Kuchel and John
Sparkman and Congressmen Carl Albert, Leslie C. Arends, Robert B. Chiperfield, and Armistead
Selden are listed on the President’s appointments diary but not identified as speakers. Tape 19,
John F. Kennedy Library, President’s Office Files, Presidential Recordings Collection.
59. Sometime later, Senator John Sparkman of Alabama was added to the list of invitees.
According to a note to the President’s appointments secretary Kenneth O’Donnell, Vice
President Lyndon Johnson, Senators Hubert Humphrey, George Smathers, and Leverett
Saltonstall and Congressmen Hale Boggs and Thomas Morgan could not attend.
60. The 87th Congress adjourned on 14 October 1962 and the 88th Congress convened on 10
January 1963.
Meeting with Cong ressional Leadership on Cuba
53
[unclear] expired on the first of August [unclear] the resolution . . . or
rather on May—yeah, the first of August the resolution was passed. In
theory . . . that authority . . . again, unless he declares a national emergency which is [unclear] impossible to ask Congress. Now this, however,
is likely to cause controversy because of this [unclear]. It certainly would
be the wrong thing to ask for. We are united as a nation at this time.
[Unclear] I don’t think so [unclear]. Well, it’s Cuba, Berlin, and
Southeast Asia, all the [unclear]. No. No sir, I do not. [Unclear.] I wouldn’t
anticipate [unclear] requirement. [Unclear.] The authority shows, our
purpose and firmness of will. You know, we’ve asked for it only for a
period while Congress is out of session until the end of February, from
the 1st of October to the end of February. We could have it [unclear].
This bill was passed [unclear].
While McNamara has this private conversation, the number of congressmen and the voice level in the Cabinet Room rises significantly.
John McCormack: [Unclear] resolution on the holidays. Is that
right, Ev?
Everett Dirksen: Yeah.
McCormack: Constitution Day.
Dirksen: How many more of these [unclear] are going to come?
[Unclear exchanges and greetings.]
Unidentified: They’re not all here, Mr President. They’re not all
here yet. [Unclear exchange.]
President Kennedy: General, why don’t you come in and sit over
there. [Whispered exchanges.]
Dirksen: Oh, we are having fun—
President Kennedy: I know you’re having fun, but—
Dirksen: I invited you to come up to the battleground if you run out
of [unclear]. [Laughter.]
Richard Russell: It’s at the country’s expense Mr. President. I can
assure you of that.
President Kennedy: [Unclear.]
Dirksen: The last thing was [Senator Paul] Douglas trying to knock
the lobbying sections out of the bill. John Cooper came along and got it
all bitched up, then they had 15 parliamentary inquiries and as of this
moment, nobody knows what he voted on.61 But he voted on something.
Alexander Wiley: Mike, you come over here. Come on. [Whispered
exchanges.]
61. John Sherman Cooper was a Republican senator from Kentucky.
54
T U E S DAY, S E P T E M B E R
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Unidentified: [Unclear.]
Unidentified: All the big shots should be at the table, not the little
shots today. [Unclear exchanges.]
Unidentified: Pull up a chair.
Unidentified: You sit back there thinking that you’ll have people thinking that pipe as far away from everybody as possible. [Unclear exchanges.]
President Kennedy: Just wait just a minute. Alex. [Unclear.]
Unidentified: [Unclear.]
Unidentified: [Unclear] California.
Unidentified: He’s in California.
Unidentified: Oh, he’s in California?
Unidentified: Back tonight. I saw Fulbright was in town.
President Kennedy: That singing group from Arkansas here this
morning was fantastic . . . [unclear] group from the University of
Arkansas [unclear] won that prize with forty other countries at singing
medieval church music.
Charles Halleck: Is that the group that all the singing experts said
was no good? [Several voices agree. Laughter.] [Unclear.]
President Kennedy: [That] shows you you can’t believe everything
[unclear].
Unidentified: It just proves . . .
Russell: In my opinion I thought the . . .
Unidentified: Huh?
Russell: In my opinion the Italians loved it. [Unclear exchange.]
President Kennedy: I think we’re . . . I think we’re starting anyway.
This meeting is to give the leadership the latest information we have
on Cuba. Perhaps General Carter, who is executive director of the
Central Intelligence Agency, who is representing the intelligence community today in Mr. McCone’s absence, will lead off with first what we
had up till Friday, then the information we got this weekend.62
Marshall Carter: Up until Friday of last week we’ve had considerable
indications—in fact, firm indications—of Soviet shipping up to as many
as forty ships having come into Cuba since mid-July. Spasmodic reports,
many from refugees and from some defectors indicating the type of
equipment, but nothing on which we could really pin a confirmation.
New sources, highly reliable, new information that has just come in
over this last weekend now gives us clear confirmation of exactly what
62. McCone was on his honeymoon at Cap Ferrat, on the French Riviera.
Meeting with Cong ressional Leadership on Cuba
55
the Soviets have been putting in, in recent weeks. We have surface-to-air
missiles, some artillery, and some motor torpedo boats with missile
launchers.
I’d like to go into the details of exactly what this equipment is that we
have been able to confirm. They are now building, on the island of Cuba,
eight surface-to-air missile sites, one probable assembly area just south of
Havana and two additional sites, one on the far eastern side of Cuba.
I’d like to show you these on the map here. There has been very little
permanent construction at these sites, indicating that they are going in
on a crash basis and yet they could be operational, some of them, within
a week. It takes a minimum of 125 technically trained personnel to operate one of these sites and to the best of our knowledge, no Cubans have
been receiving this technical training. This excludes the security personnel and administrative personnel required to operate a site. The sites on
the western slope of Cuba, eight of them, cover the entire third of the
island. Just below Havana is what appears to be an assembly area from
the information we are getting, and in the far right, we have here an
indication of an additional site. Each of these sites has a central radar
and normally six launchers, each normally having a missile. They are
exactly the type of equipment that the Soviets utilize in Russia and is
known as their [NATO designation] SA-2. It has characteristics somewhat better than the Nike Ajax, not as good as the Nike Hercules. Its
horizontal range is 25 to 30 miles, its altitude capability 60[,000] to
80,000 feet with one system, 80,000 to 100,000 feet with an improved
system. We have not received information as to which of the systems
they are putting in. Low altitude capability is about 2,500 feet and the
maximum operational area for these missiles; the best capabilities are
between 10,000 and 60,000 feet. It appears that there will be additional
surface-to-air missile sites put in subsequently.
Now further defector and clandestine reports from the central
province indicate that at least two sites will be located there—I’ve put
them in in green—but we have not received any confirming information
on those. The pattern now is emerging that would indicate approximately 24 sites in total would cover the entire island of Cuba.
In addition to the surface-to-air missile sites that are being put in, we
have confirmed reports on eight Komar-type missile-launching motor
torpedo boats. These have an operational radius of about 300 miles at a
speed of 45 knots. Each of the boats has two missile launchers, but these
launchers are not reloadable, so that they must go back to shore or to a
mother ship to get new loads. They are radar-guided missiles and they
56
T U E S DAY, S E P T E M B E R
4, 1962
have an effective range of between 15 and 17 miles. It carries a 2,000pound high-explosive warhead. This is a conventional type of missilelaunching motor-torpedo boat such as the Soviets utilize in their waters.
Some Cuban naval personnel have received training in the Soviet Union
but we do not know whether or not they were trained on the Komartype boat. These are in addition to the 13 motor-torpedo boats and the
six submarine chasers that we had reported earlier this year.
These same highly reliable sources indicate that current shipments also
include some additional army-type armaments such as tanks and armored
personnel carriers, possibly also some combat aircraft. We now credit the
Cubans with having 60 MiG fighters operational including at least a dozen
MiG 19s. There is no report on any MiG 21s or of any bombers.
Soviet shipments of military equipment continue to show no signs of
letting up. There are about 16 Soviet dry cargo ships now en route to
Cuba and we estimate at least ten of them are probably carrying military
equipment. Total numbers of military and military-related shipments to
Cuba since mid-July approximate 65 vessels. The routine shipments of
Soviet goods continue mainly in Western bottoms.63 At least 1,700
Soviet military technicians have arrived in Cuba in late July and early
August. Bloc military personnel, as you know, first began arriving in
Cuba in mid-1960 and up until this most recent influx, we have been carrying about 500 military-type technicians, several thousand agricultural
and economic type. Thirteen hundred military-type technicians have just
recently arrived and we estimate now from 3,000 to 3,500 military technicians on the island of Cuba. We would anticipate that additional Soviet
technicians, both military and economic, would be coming in these subsequent shipments.
That concludes the present situation as we were able to confirm it
just this past weekend from, what I say, are very reliable sources, Mr.
President.
President Kennedy: Questions, gentlemen?
Russell: How many of these missile torpedo boats did you say they
had?
Carter: There are eight of them there, sir, now.
Hickenlooper: Are they water to water, water to air?
Carter: Water to water, short range, highly accurate, however, or reasonably accurate. The . . .
Hickenlooper: Not subject to water to air?
63. Ships registered in non-Communist countries.
Meeting with Cong ressional Leadership on Cuba
57
Carter: No sir. We give them an estimated probable error [in accuracy] of about 100 feet.
President Kennedy: At how many miles? At 15 miles?
Carter: At 15 miles, yes, sir.
President Kennedy: We would hope to have the rest of the information in a very short while about other sites on the rest of this island
[unclear].
Carter: Yes sir, we are seeking out information from the eastern portion of the island. And as it comes in through various sources we will
collate it and I would hope by next week or within the next ten days we
would have any new developments in that area.
Halleck: Mr. President, I wonder if I could ask something?
President Kennedy: Yeah, shoot.
Halleck: Do you consider this a defensive operation or force, or an
offensive [operation]?
Carter: Well, there are no indications of any offensive weapons right
now, sir. These weapons are defensive.
At least, the surface-to-air missiles are. The interpretation as to
tanks or armored personnel carriers—since they are on the island . . . I
think we’d better revert to the Department of Defense to make that
analysis. The motor-torpedo boats, well they are . . . I think I’m not competent to comment on that, sir. General LeMay [would be] better. I
would say they are either defensive or offensive depending upon how
they are used.
Curtis LeMay: I don’t think these torpedo boats have offensive capability. I think [unclear] defensive buildup.
President Kennedy: [whispering] Did he just say “defensive”?
Unidentified: Yes, sir.
Russell: Doesn’t matter what you say, Mr. General, if they would
decide to kick us out of Guantánamo, every bit of this stuff could be
offensive. They could bring their artillery and then put them in those
hills back of Guantánamo and run us out. Then we do what?
Unidentified: I would think they’d be [used] mainly against other
Latin American countries.
Russell: Oh, against it, yes.
Hickenlooper: Mr. President, is there any buildup or threat against
Guantánamo at the moment? I mean indication of movement or concentration?
Carter: No sir. Normal harassment that takes place all the time, sir,
but nothing . . . no real indication.
President Kennedy: Might just say something about Guantánamo.
58
T U E S DAY, S E P T E M B E R
4, 1962
Dean Rusk: Well, they seem to be staying very much at arm’s length
from Guantánamo, with any significant forces, [unclear] moving some
forces.
President Kennedy: The Secretary of Defense wants to say something about Guantánamo, what we got there?
McNamara: Yes, Mr. President. We have relatively light forces there
at the present time, approximately 1,500 men including about 400 sailors
who have been trained for ground combat.
An attack on Guantánamo would have to be met with forces from the
United States, forces which are available, which are on alert, fighter aircraft and airborne troops. [Unclear background conversation.]
Hickenlooper: Mr. President, may I ask if—is there any stepped-up
activity on the part of Soviet submarines in the Caribbean waters, the
Gulf [of Mexico], around that area, the shipping lanes?
Carter: No, sir. At least we have no indication of it, sir.
Hickenlooper: Well, I said stepped-up activity. There probably is
some activity around in there.
Carter: Very, very slight, in that area, sir. And very spasmodic.
Hickenlooper: Thank you.
Rusk: There’s been a surprisingly small amount of submarine activity in the Atlantic area by the Soviets.
Russell: Mr. Secretary, you remember how many dollars they get
each year out of Guantánamo, their employees there?
Rusk: They have 3,200 Cuban employees, of whom 1,000 live on the
base. So that means about 2,200 go back and forth every day.
McNamara: They might get something on the order of seven million
dollars a year perhaps. There are roughly 3,500 employees involved.
Russell: They’re requiring these people to turn in their dollars too,
aren’t they?
McNamara: Yes.
Rusk: So far as we know, there’s been no systematic attempt to
harass the workers on the base, nor has there been any interference with
the water supply there. They run a regular check on the water supply.
Halleck: Are the Cuban workers permitted to buy at the PX on the
base at Guantánamo and then go off base with their purchases, back into
Cuba, such as medicines, luxuries, this that and the other thing?
McNamara: I don’t believe so, but I can’t answer for certain. [Pause.]
Russell: [Unclear.]
President Kennedy: [to Rusk] Do you want to say anything?
Rusk: Mr. President, I might just comment on two points on the
political side. One, the attitude of the other American states and the effect
Meeting with Cong ressional Leadership on Cuba
59
of this on them. We do believe that this will give much further impetus to
the motion that started in the hemisphere about a year ago. We detect a
deeper concern in what’s happening in Cuba. You will recall that at the
last Punta del Este Conference in January, this hemisphere showed considerable movement in rejecting Castro as a solution to the hemispheric
problems and unanimously condemned this regime in Cuba as a MarxistLeninist government and—with not in all of the cases unanimity—took a
number of actions that moved toward hemispheric solidarity.
Since that time, the Argentine government was in fact overthrown
over this issue, the Frondizi government, and this attitude toward Castro
is one of the key sources of present tensions in Brazil where the reaction
to Castro has been getting stronger.64
In the case of Mexico, if I can make this very much on an off-therecord basis, we do get more help from Mexico, privately, underneath the
scenes, than they are willing to confess publicly or make any noise about.
They’ve got a political problem there.
But I think we can count on growing, rather than diminishing solidarity in the hemisphere, in response or in the face of this continued
buildup of arms in Cuba.
Now, on the other side of that, it seems that it’s necessary for us—we
have done this in a number of ways privately and the President has
thought about the public aspect of it—we’ve got to make it very clear to
all of our friends in the hemisphere that these Cuban armed forces aren’t
going anywhere. They’re not a threat by force of arms to the other countries of the hemisphere.
Now, you’ll be interested that we’ve—actually the special security
measures established at the Punta del Este Conference as an instrument
of the OAS . . .65 We’ve gone to extraordinary effort to try to catch the
Cubans actually smuggling arms or putting in bands in countries around
the Caribbean, and thus far we haven’t been able to turn up very much.
The principal effort that the Communists are making in Latin America
seems now to be money, and the training of young people as potential
agents, training these Cubans. But we haven’t been able to catch any of
this illicit traffic in arms that we were hoping to intercept [unclear] the
Punta del Este Conference. They seem to be playing a cautious game on
things of that sort.
Now, in the NATO framework, we have been trying to get our
64. The Argentine government under Arturo Frondizi was overthrown on 29 March 1962.
65. Organization of American States.
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T U E S DAY, S E P T E M B E R
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NATO allies to take a harder look at this Cuban problem than they have
thus far been willing to do. We’ve made some progress, but not nearly
enough in our estimate.
In the case of Canada, their trade with Cuba in 1961, [was] on the
order of 35 or 40 million dollars. This year it will be on the order of six
or seven million dollars. Part of that is because Canada is forbidding any
reexport of anything from the United States to Cuba. They are applying
the COCOM list to Cuba and it cuts off quite a number of things and
also, our own embargo on Cuba has deprived Cuba of dollars that they
might use to buy large quantities of foodstuffs and things of that sort
from Canada. So it’s partly action by Canada, partly because the Cubans
haven’t got any dollars.
We are very much concerned about the use of free world shipping in
the Cuba trade.66 But this is a very, very difficult problem to deal with,
because there is such a vast supply of shipping and a surplus of shipping
for normal trade these days, that the customary arrangements with the
Soviet bloc [are] bare-bones charters, without specifically identifying
them for the Cuba trade. A very small percentage of the tonnage available in fact goes into the Cuba trade, something like 1 percent, 2 percent,
in that order of magnitude. A number of the NATO countries claim that
they do not have the legal authority to move without having parliamentary action similar to our Trading with the Enemy Act. But, in any
event, since their problem would be to break trading relations with the
Soviet bloc as a whole, as far as shipping is concerned . . . Countries like
Norway, U.K., Greece, that have a heavy reliance upon their shipping
services for foreign exchange for their own necessities, would find it
very difficult to do that in specific relation to Cuba. Nevertheless, we are
talking about this development with our NATO allies and hope very
much that they can find some way to put pressures on those shippers
who are in fact taking an active part in the Cuba trade. But it is a difficult
one because of the vast surpluses of shipping and the nature of the charters that are normally used in the trade that get diverted or turned away
into the actual Cuban part of it.
Dirksen: What flag is predominant would you say?
Rusk: It varies: U.K., Norway, Greece.
Unidentified: Portugal.
Rusk: Portugal slightly, Italy slightly. And—
66. Referring to recent press reports that the demand for shipping between the Soviet Union
and Cuba was so high that vessels registered in NATO member countries were being used.
Meeting with Cong ressional Leadership on Cuba
61
President Kennedy: West Germany.
Rusk: Yugoslavia and West Germany, all of them are involved with it.
Russell: Mr. Secretary, you . . . speaking of the Mexican cooperation,
I was very much concerned last year when I was down there talking to
some of our people, particularly [three seconds excised as classified information] telling me about these dummy corporations that were shipping
parts and replacements to the Cubans to keep their industry going. I
understood that practically all of them were American in origin. They
were transshipping, the dummy corporations in Mexico to Cuba. And
the Canadians are pretty bad about that too. They bought a great deal of
parts and replacements [unclear] few get rich, the big boys over there.
Has that matter been [unclear]?
Rusk: We’ve seen some reduction of that, again partly because of
Cuban foreign exchange, which—
Twenty-four seconds excised as classified information.
Russell: The Russians would never let that happen you see. It’s got
too much nuisance value to . . . They’ve kept them going.
Rusk: There’s practically no trade as such now between Cuba and
Latin America, very limited now. The foreign minister of Chile, for example, told me the only thing they sell to Cuba is garlic. And we thought
that was probably something we wouldn’t worry too much about. [Some
chuckling.]
Alexander Wiley: Mr. President, may I ask a question? How do you
define the question of missile sites? I understood you to say that they
were defensive instead of offensive, is that right?
Carter: Yes, sir. These are designed for shooting down aircraft and
that’s all.
Wiley: Well, now then, the next question is, what is our policy in
relation to Cuba? I’m just back from the hinterland and everybody is
inquiring about it and I said I’ll have to talk to the executive who spearheads foreign policy or the Secretary of State. What is to be our policy?
Just to sit still and let Cuba carry on?
President Kennedy: [Unclear statement.] On this matter we are going
to make an announcement in regard to the existence of these sites today.
We’re also going to state that the United States would prevent the use
of any of these military weapons, any of this force against any neighboring
country, but that this . . . which I have never thought a very likely prospect
but at least it has been discussed. Any concern that this buildup, military
buildup would be used against another country, another neighbor would
be . . . We will indicate that if that were done, the United States would
intervene under its Rio Treaty and the Monroe Doctrine and all the rest.
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T U E S DAY, S E P T E M B E R
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As to whether the United States would intervene in Cuba in order to
. . . at this point, I would think it would be a mistake. We’re talking
about—we have to keep some proportion—we’re talking about 60
MiGs, we’re talking about some ground-to-air missiles which from the
island, which do not threaten the United States. We are not talking
about nuclear warheads. We’ve got a very difficult situation in Berlin.
We’ve got a difficult situation in Southeast Asia and a lot of other places.
So that if I were asked, I would say that I could not see, under present
conditions, the United States intervening. It would be a major military
operation. General LeMay can describe it in more detail. It would be a
major military operation.
Wiley: Blockading [unclear].67
President Kennedy: Well, a blockade is a major military operation, too.
It’s an act of war. We could blockade . . . there’s no evidence that that
would bring down Castro for many, many months. You’d have a food situation in which you’d have people starving and all the rest. In addition,
Berlin obviously would be blockaded also. And if Berlin were blockaded
one of our reprisals obviously could be the actions of various kinds against
Cuba. But I would say today . . . listen I think Berlin is coming to some
kind of a climax this fall, one way or another, before Christmas. And I
think that today I would think it would be a mistake for us to talk about
military action or a blockade [against Cuba]. Blockades are very difficult.
It’s a big island and you have to stop ships of the Soviet Union and other
ships. And it would be regarded as a belligerent act; and it would be
regarded as a warlike act. I would think we would have to assume that
there would be actions taken against countries. . . . I think that we therefore should not do that. I don’t see that the Soviet . . .
This is annoying and it’s a danger. I think the dangers to this hemisphere [unclear] by Cuba is by subversion and example. There’s obviously
no military threat, as yet, to the United States. The military threat quite
obviously is still the Soviet Union which has missiles and hydrogen bombs.
So that, in answer to your question, I would . . . even though I know a
lot of people want to invade Cuba, I would be opposed to it today. So I think
we ought to keep very close surveillance on Cuba which we are doing and
keep well informed and make it very clear that the placing in Cuba of missiles which could reach the United States would change the nature of the
. . . buildup and therefore would change the nature of our response.
Rusk: Mr. President, I think it might be worth commenting that the
67. Over previous weeks, Wiley had called publicly for a blockade of Cuba.
Meeting with Cong ressional Leadership on Cuba
63
Soviets have been reluctant to make a flat all-out commitment to Cuba.
There is a good deal of information that Castro’s famous statement last
December that he was an all-out Marxist-Leninist was a statement
which seriously annoyed the people in Moscow for two reasons: one was
that it exposed him to other people in Latin America. Senator [Bourke]
Hickenlooper and Congressman [Armistead] Selden will remember
how much of an impression that made at the Punta del Este Conference,
for example, and therefore it made him less effective in Latin America.
But secondly, the impression is that he made that statement in order
to try to force the hand of the Soviet[s] to make commitments to Cuba
that the Soviets weren’t ready to make. They have stayed—it’s not sure
now they’re making a flat all-out security commitment to Cuba in this
situation and . . . either publicly or privately.
President Kennedy: After all, the United States put missiles in
Turkey, which are ground to ground with nuclear warheads. We have to
keep some . . . it seems to me we have to weigh our dangers. I would say
the biggest danger right now is for Berlin.
Perhaps you want to comment on what happened in Berlin today and . . .
Rusk: Yes, I’d say—
Wiley: May I say, Mr. President, that I think that the majority of the
people agree with the conclusions that you’ve made, that the world is a
hot spot and we’d better not make it hotter by any of our own acts.
I got your statement to mean that we’ll be ready and willing and able
to carry on but we will not, to the slightest degree precipitate, well, a
third world war. [Pause.]
Hickenlooper: Mr. President.
President Kennedy: Yes.
Hickenlooper: I can see how the present extent of the buildup as
reported here poses no military threat of any great significance at this particular moment, physically to the United States. But, the thing that bothers me is the psychological impact on the Latin American countries.
Whether or not the continued, reported and established buildups in Cuba
of bloc country arms, technicians, people, with inaction here, I’m not suggesting action one way or the other, that isn’t part of my discussion. The
effect that it has on the Latins, and the argument that we’re a paper tiger
and the fomenting groups in Latin America say, “See look what’s happening 100 miles from the United States. They do nothing about it. The
United States is . . . we have nothing to fear, we can spit in their face, we
can do this, that, and the other thing.” That is, the dissident groups in
Latin America which are not diminishing in strength so far as I can find.
And it’s the psychological impact that bothers me, at least as much if not
64
T U E S DAY, S E P T E M B E R
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more than some of the physical threats, or potential threats that might be
involved at the moment. I think it’s quite a serious psychological situation
in Latin America. Every time it’s announced that more Russian troops,
people, more Russian technicians, whether they are troops in civilian
clothes or whether they are agricultural technicians or whatnot, predominantly it comes out that the more of those that come in . . . more missiles,
more weapons, and so on, I’m afraid it gives stimulus to those dissident
groups down there which pose an increasing difficulty for us in those
countries. I may be wrong but . . .
President Kennedy: I will say that the Soviet Union exercises some
restraint in some areas. They haven’t after all talked about a peace treaty
since 1958 and they haven’t raised it.68 We did as I say put missiles in
Turkey with nuclear warheads and they didn’t take action. We have
engaged in assistance of various kinds to Iran, Pakistan, and other areas.
So that I think that we both proceed with some caution because we both
[Hickenlooper tries to interrupt] realize where the real danger to the countries lies finally, but I quite agree that Cuba is . . .
On the other hand, Senator, I’m not so sure looking at it over the last
12 months whether you’d say that what’s happened in Cuba has particularly helped the Communist cause. I would say that there’s a lot of things
that helped the Communist cause but I think they are more internal in
each country and not what’s happened to Cuba. I would say that every
survey I’ve seen in the last 12 months shows the sharpest drop in the
support of Castro, which was, perhaps since ’59.
Hickenlooper: Mr. President, I have noticed in whatever meager and
perhaps inaccurate information I get, I think I have noticed a sharp drop
over the last year, year and a quarter, in Castro, the popularity of Castro,
or the respect for Castro as an individual, or as a leader. But Castroism is
a thing that I believe they separate from Castro in their thinking. That
is, the idea that you can take from the big fellow, that you can go take and
do it with immunity. That you can confiscate, that you can have this, that,
and the other thing, which they ally with Castro’s movement in Cuba.
They know Castro is a Commie, they know he’s under Communist domination, but I don’t know whether the Spanish say Castroísimo or, what is
68. President Kennedy is playing down his Khrushchev problem. Khrushchev’s 1958 threat to
sign a peace treaty with the East German government triggered the 1958 to 1962 Berlin crisis. Although Khrushchev had backed down from following through on this threat in 1959, he
had not stopped talking about his readiness to sign a peace treaty. Khrushchev reiterated this
threat at the Vienna Summit of June 1961 and again, most recently, in July 1962.
Meeting with Cong ressional Leadership on Cuba
65
it? Whatever. Anyway, the Castroism in Spanish is a thing that they differentiate as compared to Castro as the individual. I may be wrong about
that but that is the impression I get.
Rusk: Mr. President, I think there is no question that the extreme left
down there will tend to make some noise about this kind of buildup. I think
there is a compensating factor on the other side, Senator. I think that more
and more people of the responsible sort are becoming much more sober
about Cuba than a year ago. A year ago at Punta del Este, as you know, certain of these countries down there didn’t really think about Cuba; they were
thinking about their own internal problems and those at a distance from
Cuba—Argentina, Brazil, Chile—weren’t very helpful at Punta del Este.
Now, there are growing concerns about it. I think there is a more
sober approach. And I would have to report [unclear] that some of the
reactions have been not what ought to be done about Cuba, but to use
the Cuban situation as a pretext for saying to us: “Well, now that means,
of course, the opportunity presents itself to have more destroyers and
more cruisers and things of that sort.” And that’s as a matter for their
own military establishments. It is not really called for at this point
[unclear] in relation to Cuba. But, I think on balance the development
down there has been wholesome, in response to this. [Unclear.]
The President asked me to comment for just a moment on what happened in Berlin today. Over the weekend the three allies insisted to the
Soviet Union that their guard coming in from Friedrichstrasse to the
War Memorial would have to be moved to gates down near the War
Memorial to avoid incidents, traffic hazards, provocations that were
resulting from their use of the Friedrichstrasse Gate for their armored
personnel carriers, carriers that they adopted after the stoning incidents
ten days ago. We gave them until this morning to reply because they had
to turn around with Moscow.69
Hickenlooper: That’s the War Memorial at Brandenburg Gate?
69. An imposing Soviet War Memorial in Berlin had been erected just inside West Berlin, near
the Brandenburg Gate. Each day, Soviet soldiers charged with guarding the memorial would
travel down Unter den Linden, through the Brandenburg Gate, from East Berlin to West
Berlin. Disturbances and instances of harassment from West Berliners, particularly students,
had intensified with the recent one-year anniversary of the sealing of West Berlin (13 August)
and the killing of an East German, Peter Fechter, as he was trying to cross the Wall and
escape to West Berlin. This led the Soviets to transport their soldiers in Armored Personnel
Carriers (APCs), creating a difficult issue for the Western powers striving to keep to a minimum the Soviet military presence in West Berlin. By changing the crossing point from the
Brandenburg Gate to the Sandkrug Bridge, the Western powers shortened the distance that
the Soviet APCs would have to travel through West Berlin.
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T U E S DAY, S E P T E M B E R
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Rusk: That’s correct. So we’ve just had information from Berlin that
the Soviets did accept the Sandkrug Bridge which is just beyond the
Brandenburg Gate and is very near the War Memorial. And we were
interested and pleased that they responded in that way because they
were beginning to build up a position there and we cut that back to the
original [unclear].
Russell: That’s good news.
Short unclear exchange between Rusk and President Kennedy.
Russell: That’s good, but one question, Mr. Secretary. You hear all
kind of rumors that Castro is becoming more and more of a figurehead,
that two of the old-time Communists are running Cuba and he’s more or
less a front. Is there anything to that?
Rusk: My own reading of our information on that, Senator Russell, is
that this is not the case, that it would have, it might have been true perhaps four or five months ago but that Castro, whatever his faults, has been
more or less accepted by the Soviet Union as the person who has to be
backed even though there is friction between himself and the hard-core,
old-time Communist apparatus.70 Now, I think you do get reports about
his heavy drinking and his administrative hopelessness and things of that
sort. But we’re inclined to believe that the Soviets have agreed to tolerate
his “un-Communist” kinds of weaknesses, if you like, because they need
his hold on the Cuban people. I suspect, myself, that they’d have much
greater difficulty with the Cuban people if Castro were removed and you
had the old-line apparatus trying to take over completely.
Dirksen: General Carter, assuming that those sites you pointed out
are essentially for defensive purposes, how long would it take to convert
them to an offensive facility?
Carter: They’re not convertible, sir. You’d have an entirely new
installation. The only thing you could use would be the administrative
facilities, the buildings and roadways.
Dirksen: What else would they require?
Carter: You’d require launching pads, and an entirely new missile
delivery system and missile guidance system, if you are going into a
static operation. Now, of course, we do have mobile surface-to-surface
missiles in our own inventory and in the Soviet inventory. We have seen
no sign of those at all in Cuba.
70. In March 1962, Castro removed the powerful longtime Cuban Communist leader, Anibal
Escalante. On the shake-up in the Cuban leadership see Fursenko and Naftali, “One Hell of a
Gamble,” pp. 163–65.
Meeting with Cong ressional Leadership on Cuba
67
Russell: Is it contemplated that there’d be any change in the flight
instructions to any of our planes as a result of the construction of these
bases?
Carter: No, sir. This is—
Russell: Or would you know about that? General LeMay, do you
know about that? [A voice is heard indistinctly in the background.]
Carter: It should not be required.
Russell: Well, we’ve been getting such information by flying along
the shores and all of Cuba and not just by [unclear]. I didn’t know
whether we were going to continue to get that information or whether
it’d prevent us from knowing if they did put in an intermediate-range
missile base.71
Carter: Well, these—
President Kennedy: General, let me just say, this is going to present
us with some difficulties of securing information of the type you
describe. So that we are now considering what should be the action we
would take in order to keep informed about what additional . . .
Russell: [Unclear.]
Rusk: I think there is one point the Senator mentioned—
President Kennedy: But there is no doubt that we can’t fly low.
Rusk: As far as international waters are concerned, I’ve already
announced this week that we would insist upon our right to use international waters or international airspace for at least the planes.
President Kennedy: What are the—
Russell: Well, we won’t go into that.72
Carl Vinson: Mr. President, is there any possibility of any more drastic action through the OAS as a result of this arms buildup?
Rusk: I will be talking with the foreign ministers of the OAS and the
U.N. assembly in the next—in about ten days’ time.73 We have talked
with several of them separately on this general subject. We would like to
step up, if we can, the activities of that special security committee.
But thus far, I must say, we’ve had very little luck in getting hard information about action directed against the other countries in the hemisphere. They tend to think those are the kind of ordinary Communist
71. The chairman of the Armed Services Committee is asking about the possible consequences
of the SAM deployments on U-2 flights over the island.
72. Senator Russell was a member of the smaller group of congressmen who were regularly
informed about CIA operations.
73. Rusk met with the Latin American ambassadors the following afternoon, where he proposed an informal meeting of foreign ministers.
68
T U E S DAY, S E P T E M B E R
4, 1962
techniques of money and training [unclear] and things of that sort. Arms,
we think they haven’t been able to buy. We’d love to catch them.
Russell: The President referred to our responsibilities there to these
other countries. Just what would we do if they had an upheaval say in
[the] Dominican Republic and the Communists took over there? A
handful of Castroites there, perhaps not many. But are we under any
more responsibility there to restore some democratic form of government than we are in Cuba?
President Kennedy: Well, I’d say that that is our problem, quite obviously not the military problem, but Haiti is now a [unclear] and I would
think that the United States should intervene if it appeared that there
were going to be a revolt or a coup d’etat in the Dominican Republic that
would put Communists in control, then I would think the United States
would intervene at that point.
Russell: We moved up, I know, when it looked as if the fallen dictator’s family might—
President Kennedy: That’s right.
Russell: —move back in. I didn’t know whether that . . . of course
you’ve got about as much of a dictator on the other end of the island as
there was in Santo Domingo. Duvalier, I think, is [unclear].
Unidentified: [Unclear, but someone mentions Castro.]
President Kennedy: Yes, I think that obviously Duvalier . . . and we
don’t know where he’s going, but we have to . . . but I would think that if
we ever had any others that Castro is taking over, then the United States
would with as many other countries as we could, would try to intervene.
We have, in the case of [the] Dominican Republic, we had Colombia and
Venezuela with us. And I think that we ought to attempt to strengthen
our inner OAS arrangements in the Caribbean so that if there is a situation, we can intervene with the support of at least one or two other
Caribbean countries at the critical moment.
Hickenlooper: Well, Mr. President, isn’t there some evidence that
almost all of the Caribbean countries are willing to join in whatever
intervention the United States should determine—
President Kennedy: I’m sure with the exception perhaps of Haiti, I’m
sure they would.
Hickenlooper: Well, with the exception of Haiti, yes, yes, yes.
President Kennedy: And Mexico, I’m sure they would if they see—
Hickenlooper: Indeed.
President Kennedy: Whether they would join in Guatemala would
depend really on the conditions in Guatemala. But I would think if the . . .
Meeting with Cong ressional Leadership on Cuba
69
There might be a difference of opinion as to the personnel. And we
might say someone is Communist which the Venezuelans or someone
else might not say. But, I think, if the provocation were clear, I don’t
think there is a doubt—I don’t see anyone who would not support us at
this time with the exception of Haiti.
Unidentified: And Mexico.
President Kennedy: I think the problem always is, as it was with
Castro, is they come into power as something else, and our information
is not complete and therefore we assume that they may be all right. I
think that would be our problem with Guatemala. But I—
William Fulbright: Do you—
The President and Senator Fulbright try to speak at the same time.
President Kennedy: No, you go ahead; I’m finished.
Fulbright: Do you feel that this might be a sort of a testing out of
our adherence to the Monroe Doctrine, in part?
Rusk: May I comment on that very briefly, Mr. Chairman—Mr.
President? I’m inclined to believe that the Cuban development came as a
surprise to the Soviets two years ago. They saw in this an opportunity to
cause us some difficulty in this hemisphere. They had not planned it
quite this way all the way through and that they came aboard with large
assistance when it became necessary to support the Castro regime. I
don’t believe it started out as a probing of the Monroe Doctrine, but I do
believe that the attitude we take about the effect of Cuba in the hemisphere is very important in terms of the Monroe Doctrine, in terms of,
more importantly at this point, the inter-American defense treaties. To
be sure that the Soviets realize that there is suspicion beyond Cuba, that
they are in for trouble here . . . and then the Cuban situation has to be
looked at in this total context as a threat and so in a given circumstance
to see what has to be done at the time.
Russell: Mr. President, this statement to which you refer, you not
only refer to these missile sites, but you give all the facts as to the technicians, and . . .
President Kennedy: Yes, but the technician information has been—
Russell: The whole story is being released . . . I think that’s a very
wise—
President Kennedy: The technician material has been put out before—
Russell: [Unclear.]
President Kennedy: —but the missile sites we did not get until
Friday and that is being put out to . . . so it’s the missile sites— [Unclear
background whispering.]
70
T U E S DAY, S E P T E M B E R
4, 1962
Carter: Not in the same degree, Mr. President, as it appears.
Russell: No, it’s much later. As I understand from what General
Carter says, it’s larger than we thought it was when we made this other
statement.
President Kennedy: Well, I think we’ve known for at least two weeks.
In the State Department briefing, it seems to me the figure of 3,500 was
used, wasn’t it?
Rusk: Yes, sir.
Unidentified: [Unclear]—
Carter: Three to five thousand, I think.
President Kennedy: Right.
Carter: It’s a pretty good fix now at about 5,000 total.
Unidentified: [Unclear.]
Unidentified: That includes [unclear].
Carter: Yes, sir.
President Kennedy: That’s correct. That’s right. But, of the 5,000,
how many are military?
Carter: At the most, 3,500.
President Kennedy: So there’s 3,500, and the others are other kinds
of technicians.
Carter: Yes, sir.
Russell: I think it’s an [unclear] just to give the whole thing out.
Let’s say MiGs, and armored torpedo boats and old kit and bother nothing. Just throw it out and let the people have it . . . hearsay . . . You have
so many rumors, if you don’t do it this way . . .
The tape quality deteriorates intermittently over the next few exchanges.
Russell: . . . it’s worse than it actually is . . .
President Kennedy: Right. Well, I think we’re setting a number—I
don’t know if we got the torpedo boats in this one. Have we put out the
torpedo boats before?
Carter: No, sir.
[Pause.]
President Kennedy: Perhaps General LeMay, before we conclude,
might just want to say what the military problem is of these sites in case
there is ever a military action against Cuba. What it would take—
LeMay: This complicates the military circumstances [unclear].
These missiles are not good at altitude [unclear] go in underneath their
effective altitude and knock them out.
Unidentified: [Unclear.]
LeMay: I would [unclear] use our strategic force [unclear].
Unidentified: No.
Meeting with Cong ressional Leadership on Cuba
71
LeMay: I see no complications regarding the general operation
[unclear].
Rusk: [Unclear.]
McNamara: [Unclear.]
President Kennedy: [Unclear.] General, go see if the statement we’re
going to put out is ready. I might read it to . . .
Background conversation while Rusk is talking is unintelligible.
Rusk: Mr. President, although the forces actually in Guantánamo
may appear to be rather light, the capability of these forces on the one
side is very heavy. And further, the other side, the Cubans have gone to
considerable lengths to make it clear that they don’t have intentions of
attacking Guantánamo. One of the current jokes around the United
Nations is the Cubans [say] “Don’t the Americans hope we would attack
Guantánamo?” That kind of thing. So, I think, the lightness of the forces
in Guantánamo is not necessarily a measure of the situation.
Mansfield: Well, Mr. President, I’d hate for you to lie down, but I
think it ought it to be understood that when you issue a statement, and
give these facts and figures, that the reaction may well be a call for
action of some kind or another. I would hope that this would not be
used for the purpose of creating a situation which would tend to undermine your authority and your responsibility. I would hope that we
would move with caution and we will not be carried away by these figures and facts that you have given us this afternoon. I think we would
have to expect that there will be a certain reaction which may not be
very satisfactory.
President Kennedy: Oh, I expect that, but as I say, [short, unclear aside
to someone else]. All right, as I say we’re talking about 58 MiGs, we’re
talking about some ground-to-air missiles. That really isn’t comparable
to the threats we face all around. So that I think that’s just the perspective we have to keep it in, even though no one would desire more to see
Castro thrown out of there; but throwing Castro out of there is a major
military operation. It’s just a question of when we decide that that’s the
proper action for us to take. It is an operation which has to be mounted
over a period of time and we could anticipate that there would be reactions in other parts of the world, by the Communist bloc against other
vulnerable areas as we carve out Cuba. So I think we just have to try to
keep all that in perspective.
Mansfield: Well, that’s the point—
President Kennedy: There’s no easy aspect to throwing Castro out.
If we had it, we’d do it. Except an outright military action which
involves a great many divisions—a number of divisions—and a great
72
T U E S DAY, S E P T E M B E R
4, 1962
deal of our military power and I think we’ve got Berlin, we’ve got
Turkey and Iran . . . We’ve got southeast Asia, so I—
Unidentified: Formosa also.
Fulbright: Do you think?
President Kennedy: And Formosa.
Fulbright: Do you think, Mr. President, if we did decide to take some
firm action about Cuba, that this would turn the pancake over, that this
would start Russia off here, there, somewhere else?
Rusk: I think this will lead to a very very severe crisis indeed. I
couldn’t predict exactly what the Soviets would do but I would think
that they would almost certainly make a major move on Berlin of some
sort. You remember, the unfortunate combination of Hungary and Suez
in 1955 and ’6. Now, if on the other side, as the President indicated, the
Soviets made a move on Berlin, this opens up some possibilities with
Cuba with world support, that we would not have if we at the moment
took initiative against Cuba because of circumstances.
Fulbright: This is the other side of the pancake.
Rusk: See, that’s the other side of the pancake. Because this is a part
of the worldwide confrontation of the free world and the Soviet Union.
We have a million men outside the United States as part of this confrontation. All right, this has to be thought of in relation to the whole
because you can’t deal with these simply as little isolated [unclear]
instances but the total situation.
Russell: That’s undoubtedly true, but Senator Mansfield is right about
. . . it may cause a great deal of reaction because this Cuban thing—
President Kennedy: That’s right.
Russell: —is in the nature of an offense to the national pride, [chuckling] and there’s something personal about it too. It’s so close down
there that . . . a man wouldn’t get ruffled about something that happened
in Berlin, much less Hungary or some other part of the world, but he
would get upset about Cuba.
Unidentified: [Unclear.] [Short pause.]
President Kennedy: Well, this statement will be out and it won’t
have any reference to our meeting here but it will be a statement of fact
and you’ve heard the facts as they come along, we’ll make available to
you. And I would think that if we ever get any information about
ground-to-ground missiles then the situation would then be quite
changed and we would have to [unclear].
Unidentified: Well, thank you, Mr. President.
President Kennedy: Meanwhile we will . . .
Unidentified: Thank you [unclear] Senator Russell.
Meeting on the Cong ressional Resolution about Cuba
73
Meeting breaks up.
Unidentified: Mr. Secretary.
Unidentified: Hello, Alex. [Unclear.]
Wiley: [Unclear.]
McNamara: Yes, I wanted to speak to Senator Russell also [unclear].
Unidentified: My greatest friend.
The tape spools out.
At the end of the meeting with the congressional leadership, Robert
McNamara, it seems, gathered a few of the congressmen for a short separate meeting with the President to discuss the need for a special grant
of standby authority to permit the administration to call-up 150,000
reservists. Kennedy had been considering a call up in August as a
response to the increasingly tense situation in West Berlin. His advisers
had discouraged him. Now, it seemed that recent events in Cuba could
provide another argument for the reserve call-up that Kennedy wanted.
5:55–6:10 P.M.
. . . [D]efinitely say “in view of the developments in Cuba” . . .
people understand that . . .
Meeting on the Congressional Resolution about Cuba74
For the second time in twenty months, President Kennedy intended to
seek congressional authority for special reserve mobilization powers. In
mid-1961, following the dramatic Kennedy-Khrushchev summit in
Vienna, where the mercurial Soviet leader had vowed to solve once and
for all the Berlin problem, Congress approved a call-up as part of a program of expanding defense spending. Now it was the specter of twin
crises, in and around Cuba and Berlin, combined with the fact that
Congress was about to recess for the midterm elections, that prompted
the administration’s request.
74. Including President Kennedy, Everett Dirksen, Lyman Lemnitzer, Robert McNamara,
Paul Nitze, Dean Rusk, Richard Russell, and Carl Vinson. Tape 20, John F. Kennedy Library,
President’s Office Files, Presidential Recordings Collection.
74
T U E S DAY, S E P T E M B E R
4, 1962
Getting authorization in 1962 was going to be more difficult. In retrospect, the 1961 call-up seemed to have been a mistake. National newspapers and congressional offices received complaints from some of the
150,000 men who had been pulled away from civilian jobs and their families in 1961. Yet despite the unpopularity of the 1961 call-up, the
Pentagon had since late July been kicking around drafts of a new congressional reserve authorization. The immediate cause was a new campaign of threats from Moscow, which Khrushchev had launched in the
summer by insisting on some kind of resolution of the Berlin tangle
after the U.S. midterm elections. For over a month, these drafts had not
become policy. Although he shared his advisers’ concerns about the
implications of Khrushchev’s threats to Berlin, President Kennedy was
not prepared to push for this authorization until the political climate had
improved.
Now, with the Soviets’ hurriedly and mysteriously building up Cuban
defenses, Kennedy sensed Congress might be prepared to call up
reserves to meet an anticipated superpower conflict. A threat from Cuba
resonated more than one from Berlin with the American people. With
the administration about to make public its statement on the discovery of
Soviet defensive surface-to-air missiles (SAMs) in Cuba, it was time to
see whether public concerns over Cuba could translate into congressional support for authorization to call up 150,000 reservists in 1962.
As McNamara corralled key congressional leaders, he knew how
important it was that this request not meet any significant political opposition. Khrushchev was now in the habit of telling American visitors that
democracies would not fight. It was this notion that the administration
needed to dispel. For a message of unity and determination to be sent to
the Kremlin, any administration request for reserve authorization would
have to proceed smoothly and without controversy through Congress.
The time and place of this meeting remain unclear, though all internal evidence points to its having taken place on September 4 after the
larger congressional briefing on the Cuba statement. With this smaller
group convened, possibly in the Oval Office, the recording began with
McNamara’s reporting on the results of the 1961 U.S. military buildup
and the reasons why more was needed now.
Robert McNamara: The authority that was granted last summer has
expired. As you know it covered authority to call up 250,000 men during
a period of 11 months and that authority expired with the 1st of July.
Since that authority was granted, we have added about 300,000 men
Meeting on the Cong ressional Resolution about Cuba
75
to the regular forces: roughly 40[,000] to 50,000 men to the Navy, about
the same number to the Air Force, and 110[,000] to 120,000 men to the
Army. All of the forces are in substantially better shape today than they
were on June 30th of last year.
The Army has been expanded in terms of combat-ready divisions by
about 45 percent. There were then 11 combat-ready divisions. There are
today 16 combat-ready divisions.
The Air Force has had a very substantial expansion in its tactical air
strength. A portion of that tactical air strength that has been added,
however, is not yet combat ready and won’t be combat ready for six to
nine months.
The Navy has been expanded by the addition of a large number of
amphibious craft as well as logistical support ships.
So, we are much stronger today than we were 13 or 14 months ago
when we asked for authority to call up Reserve and Guard personnel.
On the other hand, there are both military and political and psychological reasons why it would be desirable, we believe, to have authority
to call up between 150[,000] and 250,000 personnel during the period
that Congress is out of session, say roughly from the 1st of October to
the end of February. We’ve been considering that. I just mentioned it
briefly, a moment ago, to Chairman [Carl] Vinson and Chairman
[Richard] Russell.75 They mentioned that the House would meet on
Friday—
Unidentified: On Thursday.
McNamara: Rather Thursday. We have a draft resolution, essentially
the same as the resolution passed a year ago. I think we’re all agreed, all
of us who have considered this problem, that if there is to be any controversy, any debate, any argument over whether this is a wise move or not,
it would be undesirable to submit it to—[Tape cuts off briefly.]
President Kennedy: Then [unclear] the numbers revised [by]
General [Burgess]?
McNamara: Yes, sir. We would.
President Kennedy: But it seems to me quite possible that you would
have to call up some air units before the end of the year, if not earlier.
Because I think they would be the most likely units we’d call.
We don’t have any plans to call up any [National] Guard divisions?
McNamara: No, sir. They . . . If—
President Kennedy: That’s why I think the 150 is enough. When it
75. Respectively, chairmen of the House and Senate Armed Services Committees.
76
T U E S DAY, S E P T E M B E R
4, 1962
gets beyond that, then we’re [unclear] crisis more, and after that we
draft a [unclear].
McNamara: It seems almost certain that any units that were called
up during this intervening period between now and, let’s say, the end of
February could be composed of men who had not been called up within
the last year and a half.
President Kennedy: With the exception of the air.
McNamara: Well, even in the air, Mr. President. We have located
seven squadrons of fighter aircraft and personnel who were not called to
active duty and who would therefore be the squadrons we’d call to reinforce either the U.S. reserve or to move to Western Europe.
And similarly in the Navy we think that, except under most unusual
circumstances, we could call the 8[,000] or 10,000 naval reservists that
might possibly be needed in the event of blockade and antisubmarine warfare from personnel who had not served within the past year and a half.
In the case of the Army, because of the very substantial increase in
armed strength, as I mentioned, a 45 percent increase in the number of
combat ready divisions, we see no real requirement for a call-up during
this period. But with the possibility that such might be necessary, we
would like to have authority to call up a total of at least 150,000 men.
Were it necessary to call Army personnel, again personnel could be
called who had not served within the past year and a half.
Dean Rusk: Mr. President, if I might just make a very brief comment
on the one aspect of this. If the Soviets have been cautious this past year
about Berlin in key times, a lot of it was due to the speed and the calm
with which the Congress moved last autumn in response to the
President’s request for additional strength in the military field. If this
could go through with relative quiet and speed, it would be a very useful
signal in Moscow, but if it were to create a grave controversy, then that
would be—create another problem.
Everett Dirksen: Mr. Secretary, how are we going to avoid acrimonies today in view of the gripes that obtained in the last call-up of
reserves . . . ?
President Kennedy: Sir, that’s why we’re talking to you now.
Dirksen: Yeah, [unclear].
Now, I think there is probably one way to pour some sugar on that
department and achieve that tactic, if in any kind of a statement you
were going to particularly mention . . . definitely say “in view of the
developments in Cuba” . . . people understand that . . . and a few other
things, put ’em in . . . have no doubt in their minds as to why this is
needed. You [unclear]. Now, Mr. President, I was [unclear] yesterday, I
Meeting on the Cong ressional Resolution about Cuba
77
was the guest of the Winnebago Labor Day, on Labor Day.76 The only
thing they wanted to talk about, those that talked to me, wanted to talk
about Cuba . . . in Cuba. So this is very much in the average person’s
mind and you’ll have to lay it right on the line in any statement you
make; otherwise they’ll be hell-a-poppin for one and we won’t have any
good answers for them, unless you give us the answers.
McNamara: We can say that it will not be necessary. As a matter of
fact, we can insert into the resolution, a statement that personnel who
had served within the past year and a half would not be called back
involuntarily. And we could certainly say that in view of world conditions, including Cuba, we believe it necessary to request this authority to
act during the period when Congress is out of session.
Richard Russell: Excuse me, Mr. Secretary, [unclear] go back and
get the qualified personnel without meeting again with the same group?
McNamara: Yes, we can.
Russell: The only other question you had is about the recommendation to reducing the National Guard reserve force. Is this [unclear] in
any way contemplated?
McNamara: No, definitely not.
Russell: Because that ought to be explained somewhere.
McNamara: Yes, that can be—that’s very very—
Unidentified: Yeah.
Unidentified: Who would we ask? [Unclear exchange. Then indistinct
discussion among the participants.]
Unidentified: Why don’t we lead on this?
Russell: I think that we may have some controversy about this now,
Mr. Secretary—
Unidentified: [whispers in the background] We will.
Russell: —because it’s a political year and you’re on the eve of an election. And there have been some legitimate gripes on the part of some of
these fellows who have been called up . . . [unclear] griping, there’s been a
lot of questioning, and we can get the bill through all right. But I can’t
guarantee you that if we [unclear] controversy . . . that the President’s
[unclear] I’ll do it anyhow [unclear] if he wants to do [unclear] to assume
my part of the responsibility to get that through [unclear].
Dirksen: [Unclear.]
76. Senator Everett Dirksen spoke at the Winnebago County (Illinois) Labor Day picnic
(Rockville Register Star, 4 September 1962). We are grateful for the assistance of the Everett
Dirksen Center, University of Illinois, in tracking down this reference.
78
T U E S DAY, S E P T E M B E R
4, 1962
President Kennedy: Even when pointing out that it’s deeper than
[unclear] international [unclear].
Dirksen: Deeper [unclear] so damn vulnerable [unclear].
President Kennedy: Can we do this in this manner? The Secretary of
Defense can talk to the leadership again and to Senator Russell and to
Senator . . . to Chairman Vinson in the next two or three days in more
detail about the kind of language about how no one would be called up
with the exception of [unclear] of say a thousand people because it’s possible we might want to [unclear] Cuba. If we really had an emergency,
we could call up an important [unclear]—
Russell: I bet a good many would volunteer.
President Kennedy: —go over to talk to the leadership and unless he . . .
McNamara: Yes, Mr. President, we can do that. This doesn’t—
President Kennedy: You get [unclear] think about in the next day or so.
Carl Vinson: I’m working with [unclear] this week. If it does not
have to be done this week, it might be better. [Unclear.]
The President, McNamara, and the Congressman speak simultaneously.
President Kennedy: [Unclear] through just at the end, which you
suddenly lost the . . .
McNamara: Yes, I agree [unclear], Mr President. It’s pertinent to the
subject that we discuss it more. But we will draft a resolution and discuss it further.
The meeting seems to have ended and the President has apparently left.
The recorder picks up bits of conversation.
Lincoln: Can I come in?
McNamara: [Unclear] I don’t think it’s necessary to call any of those
that were called up before. Do you?
Lyman Lemnitzer: [Unclear exchange in the background as Lemnitzer
speaks.] I wouldn’t think so and [unclear] all right.
McNamara: Yeah and get this [unclear].
Lemnitzer: I would like to have the 300 people at that point, in
January for Cuba.
McNamara: Well, those could be . . . more of those could be extended
service of people you have.
Lemnitzer: No, not exactly because we don’t have any qualified F-84
people available to do that. They would have to come from the National
Guard, if you wanted for us to move, wanted to do the job properly.
Paul Nitze: Is this a question of manpower ceiling now for you or—
McNamara: It’s really the 300 specialists on that [unclear ]—
Lemnitzer: What we did, you see, is we formed some new regular
Meeting on the Cong ressional Resolution about Cuba
79
units. We didn’t have in the regular establishment any qualified F-84
people, or practically none.77 We had to start up a school and send these
people to school. Now we’ve had a plan for getting National Guard people, by name, actually to fill these slots. They’ll all be out of school by
January so this list has been coming down all the time.
McNamara: What I’d like to avoid, Paul, is sending up a bill that has—
Nitze: One [Unclear.]
McNamara: Yeah, one for 300 people, because the criticism will be, or
a criticism against the bill, will be that we’re going to call up people that
had just recently served. I’d like to be able to put in a flat statement that
we won’t call back people who served recently.
Nitze: Of course, if you . . . You know, it might be that if you just have
a proviso covering a thousand men, this is so small that you take the heat
off of it.
McNamara: Yeah, but then it points the finger directly and you really
get a lot of gripes. I think we can—
Lemnitzer: Well, if we had a little more time, I’d imagine we could
get three hundred volunteers.
McNamara: Yeah, I think so, too.
Lemnitzer: [Unclear.] Whether it would be the exact people we
request or not [unclear].
McNamara: Well, yeah. I agree, too.
Lemnitzer: With a little time, I think we can try to find them
[unclear].
McNamara: I think so, too. And there isn’t much . . . we’re not talking about a long period here.
Lemnitzer: No.
McNamara: We are only talking about 120 days. I think we could
safely have—
Lemnitzer: [Unclear] until January it would be a great help if we
could use these men.
McNamara: Yeah.
Lemnitzer: Because by January you just get the bodies out of school.
McNamara: Yeah.
Lemnitzer: They would then start the unit training—
McNamara: Yeah.
77. Manufactured by Republic, the F-84 was a fighter-bomber introduced in 1948. The F-84
swept-wing version followed in 1951.
80
T U E S DAY, S E P T E M B E R
4, 1962
Lincoln: Do you want [unclear]?
Tape is shut off, perhaps by Evelyn Lincoln.
After these discussions, the President had a long one-on-one session
with Senator Albert Gore of Tennessee. Then he met with Sorensen and
Pierre Salinger. And finally, he closed the day with a five-minute chat
with McGeorge Bundy. None of these meetings was taped.
Meanwhile Pierre Salinger, the White House press secretary, read
the final text of the President’s statement to reporters:
All Americans, as well as all of our friends in this hemisphere, have
been concerned over the recent moves of the Soviet Union to bolster
the military power of the Castro regime in Cuba. Information has
reached this Government in the last four days from a variety of
sources which establishes without doubt that the Soviets have provided
the Cuban Government with a number of antiaircraft defense missiles
with a slant range of 25 miles which are similar to early models of our
Nike. Along with these missiles, the Soviets are apparently providing
the extensive radar and other electronic equipment which is required
for their operation. We can also confirm the presence of several Sovietmade motor torpedo boats carrying ship-to-ship guided missiles having a range of 15 miles. The number of Soviet military technicians
now known to be in Cuba or en route—approximately 3,500—is consistent with assistance in setting up and learning to use this equipment. As I stated last week, we shall continue to make information
available as fast as it is obtained and properly verified.
There is no evidence of any organized combat force in Cuba from
any Soviet bloc country, of military bases provided to Russia, of a
violation of the 1934 treaty relating to Guantánamo, of the presence
of offensive ground-to-ground missiles, or of other significant offensive capability either in Cuban hands or under Soviet direction and
guidance. Were it to be otherwise, the gravest issues would arise.
The Cuban question must be considered as a part of the worldwide
challenge posed by Communist threats to the peace. It must be dealt
with as a part of that larger issue as well as in the context of the special
relationships which have long characterized the inter-American system.
It continues to be the policy of the United States that the Castro
regime will not be allowed to export its aggressive purposes by force
or by the threat of force. It will be prevented by whatever means may
be necessary from taking action against any part of the Western
W E D N E S DAY, S E P T E M B E R
5, 1962
81
Hemisphere. The United States, in conjunction with other hemisphere
countries, will make sure that while increased Cuban armaments will
be a heavy burden to the unhappy people of Cuba themselves, they will
be nothing more.
His official day at an end, the President went for his evening swim at
7:35 P.M.
Wednesday, September 5, 1962
The President reached the Oval Office after breakfast with the congressional leadership. The international news that morning was not good.
The Soviets had decided to flex a little muscle in the air corridors linking
Berlin to the world. On Tuesday, Soviet MiGs had unexpectedly
“escorted” three commercial airplanes flying over East Germany on their
way to West Berlin. These actions stood in stark contrast to Moscow’s
apparent acceptance of a Western plan to regulate Soviet troop movements to the Soviet War Memorial in West Berlin.
The news from Moscow would not get any better in the course of
the day. The Soviets would decide to reiterate their opposition to any
four-power meeting on Berlin, asserting instead that the best way to
eliminate tension in that divided city was to sign peace treaties with both
Germanies and remove all troops from West Berlin. And on this day, the
Kremlin would also dismiss the Kennedy administration’s explanation of
the U-2 accident in the Soviet Far East. “Unworthy of responsible politicians,” said the authoritative newspaper, Izvestia.1
This morning Kennedy’s chief foreign policy advisers testified before
the Senate Armed Services Committee about the current crisis in U.S.Soviet relations. Neither Dean Rusk nor Robert McNamara mentioned
the administration’s intention to ask for standby authorization to call up
reserves. This was still closely held among the few congressional leaders
who had been briefed on Tuesday. But they did talk about Cuba, Berlin,
and the fact that the United States still had more nuclear weapons than
the Soviet Union.2
1. “Russians Scorn U-2 Note; Call the Flight Aggressive,” New York Times, 6 September 1962.
2. Executive Sessions of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee Together with Joint Sessions
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W E D N E S DAY, S E P T E M B E R
5, 1962
The President, on the other hand, had a largely ceremonial morning.
He signed into law a bill designating Frederick Douglass’s home as a
national historical site. Then, after a brief meeting with the U.S. ambassador to Portugal, the President spent some time with participants in the
Experiment in International Living program.
Kennedy returned to the White House after lunch at 3:50 P.M. He
switched the tape recorder on and off rapidly, catching what appear to be the
words, “Ambassador Steven[son].” Then silence. The President went into a
13-minute meeting with the Democratic governor of Wisconsin, John
Reynolds, before turning to the next big issue on his agenda, nuclear testing.
5:00 –6:15 P.M.
I get the impression with all this material [that] this is a case of
go out and see what happens. Because you know, nobody knows.
Meeting on the DOMINIC Nuclear Test Series3
President Kennedy was uneasy about the remaining tests in the DOMINIC
series. Following the start of the Soviet test series that summer, Defense
and the AEC had pushed for an increase in the number of U.S. nuclear tests.
The Soviet tests seemed to have revealed a much greater antimissile capability than had been expected, and there was concern that the United States
needed more information for its own ABM development. The answer for
the United States seemed to be more high-altitude tests, which could simulate the effect of nuclear war on satellites and missile communications, to
keep in step with the Soviets. For some time, Kennedy had expressed concern over high-altitude tests. There was a body of evidence that these tests
added radiation—electron particles—to the Earth’s magnetic field, a
potential hazard to satellites and, worse, to astronauts who happened to be
in Earth orbit. Over the objections of the British and some U.S. scientists,
Kennedy had approved high-altitude tests in the original DOMINIC plan.
with the Senate Armed Services Committee (Historical Series), 5 September 1962, Volume 14,
87th Cong., 2d Sess., 1962 (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1986).
3. Including President Kennedy, McGeorge Bundy, Leland Haworth, Carl Kaysen, Robert
McNamara, Dean Rusk, Glenn Seaborg, Theodore Sorensen, Robert Seamans, Jerome
Wiesner, Adrian Fisher, and James Webb. Tape 20, John F. Kennedy Library, President’s
Office Files, Presidential Recordings Collection.
Meeting on the DOMINIC Nuclear Test Series
83
Now, however, just as he fielded requests for more of these tests, Kennedy
had additional reasons to doubt his original grant of approval. On
September 1, the Atomic Energy Commission had admitted that the highaltitude STARFISH test, conducted on July 8, had unexpectedly added significant amounts of radiation to the Earth’s magnetic field, causing damage
to the fuel cells on three satellites. Of great embarrassment to the U.S. government was the fact that one of the damaged satellites, which lost its ability to communicate with Earth, was British.
Kennedy could not abandon high-altitude tests easily. At Geneva, the
U.S. and British governments had proposed a draft of a partial test ban
that would have outlawed all atmospheric and high-altitude testing as of
January 1, 1963. Although the initial Soviet reaction to this proposal had
been negative, Kennedy wished to have all high-altitude testing out of the
way quickly just in case a change in Soviet disarmament policy made a
treaty possible before the new year. Canceling the remaining tests, however, would be a direct challenge to what his military experts were telling
him about the new Soviet antiballistic missile program. They wanted him
to swallow a few, last-minute, high-altitude tests as part of DOMINIC, so
that the U.S. missile defense program could keep up with what the
Russians were doing. And, if these contradictory pressures were not
enough to keep in mind, Kennedy knew that NASA had another Mercury
space mission scheduled for September. Kennedy did not want the astronaut, Walter M. Schirra, to be endangered by a high-altitude test.4 So, if
Kennedy approved more high-altitude tests in 1962, they would have to be
scheduled with Schirra’s mission in mind. The President did not want a
high-profile postponement of that Mercury mission to draw attention to
any decision to press on with a few last high-altitude shots.
Before the nuclear test meeting began, President Kennedy and a few
of his national security advisers discussed Cuban policy. Press speculation
following the President’s September 4 statement centered on the possibility of early military action against the island. The recording picked up an
elliptical discussion of the possibilities of imposing a blockade.
Dean Rusk: I think you were starting to say something about this.
Unidentified: I think—
President Kennedy: The blockade thing is really [dead].
4. Born 12 March 1923, in Hackensack, New Jersey, Captain Walter “Wally” M. Schirra flew
on Mercury 8, Gemini 6, and Apollo 7.
84
W E D N E S DAY, S E P T E M B E R
5, 1962
Unidentified: [Unclear.]
McGeorge Bundy: A newsman?
President Kennedy: You know what I think we ought to do, would be
to get a good analysis of what the problems are of blockade—of how
long it would take to have [unclear]. [Unclear exchange.] There are a few
steps we can have ready [unclear]—
Robert McNamara: Well, things we can do now: We could even check
the [unclear]. But I am very reticent that the blockade would be very effective on that.5 [Unclear interjection.] And it would certainly lead to retaliation, then, almost certainly, I would assume, by the Soviets.6
Dean Rusk: It might in broad terms be very [unclear].
President Kennedy: Let’s deal with that unless [unclear]. My attitude on [unclear interjection by McGeorge Bundy] off by the weather.
Bundy: [Unclear.] What we could do, what could we do . . .
Unidentified: Building up an independent—
McNamara: In addition to the deterrent we [unclear].
Unidentified: —[a] target zone. When we put it out. [Unclear discussion.]
Bundy: Third paragraph. I have all the latest substantial [unclear].
McNamara: The problem is that there is still substantial doubt
whether the [unclear] Soviets retaliate with their forces in Berlin or elsewhere . . . but put that kind of a blockade in [Cuba] and it will be effective immediately with the quantities [unclear].
President Kennedy: That’s obvious.
McNamara: And we didn’t discuss [unclear].
Rusk: [Unclear.] [Unclear exchange.]
McNamara: He said it wouldn’t take any U.S. soldiers.
Unidentified: I didn’t know you said seven.
McNamara: I didn’t tell him how many. [Unclear] U.S. soldiers.
Unidentified: Sorry.
McNamara: I think—
Rusk: They believe they can hold on.
McNamara: Substantial casualties [unclear] in Cuba.
Unidentified: In any event, we got a call from your office [unclear].
Unidentified: Well, this isn’t going to be worse in the future.
[Laughter.]
5. The Soviet military buildup on Cuba.
6. In the 4 September drafting meeting the President had worried that the Soviets would
respond to any blockade of Cuba with a blockade of West Berlin.
Meeting on the DOMINIC Nuclear Test Series
85
President Kennedy: All right.
McGeorge Bundy calls the nuclear test meeting to order. The chairman
of the Atomic Energy Commission, Glenn Seaborg, is to lead off with a
briefing on the latest Soviet test series. Announced on July 21, this test
series started on August 5 with a gigantic atmospheric test estimated at
30 megatons. In the days that followed, the Soviets tested many nuclear
devices with much smaller yields.
Bundy: Mr. President, this is a preliminary meeting for a meeting of
the NSC [National Security Council] tomorrow. [Tape cut off briefly.]
And then look at the draft letter which essentially states the direct and
appropriate amount of defense commission.
Glenn Seaborg: Well, very briefly there have been 18 airburst tests,
and then there was this one underground test, where we really just got a
picture of the crater of.7 Since the start there have . . . we only have a little bit of the radiochemistry at the moment.
Twenty-nine seconds excised as classified information.
Seaborg: The other thing I think that’s interesting about the series is
there’s been a tremendous concentration on relatively small-yield tests;
we’ve gotten several in the less than 5 kt [kiloton] and some that were
probably less than 1 kt are the ones which we don’t really have a good yield
[unclear.]8 This is much more so than we’ve ever seen before when they’ve
tested.
Jerome Wiesner: That’s not surprising given the last series, which
concentrated on hard wood—
Unidentified: That’s right.
President Kennedy: But it indicates . . . what does that indicate?
Unidentified: Well, the thing it might indicate [is] that they’re aiming at the small tactical—
President Kennedy: Tactical.
Unidentified: —type of devices; that would be my guess.
Twelve seconds excised as classified information.
Seaborg: These are still pretty tenuous but there are a number of connections between Tyuratam and the other testing areas and also with
Novaya Zemlya. And there is a certain, at least, possibility that they will fire
7. An airburst is the explosion of a nuclear weapon in the atmosphere, but below 100,000 feet
and at such an altitude that the expanding fireball does not touch the Earth’s surface. Test
devices detonated above 100,000 feet are known as high-altitude tests.
8. Yield is the energy released in nuclear explosions, usually expressed in terms of the equivalent tonnage of TNT required to produce the same energy release.
86
W E D N E S DAY, S E P T E M B E R
5, 1962
something from Novaya Zemlya, coming from Tyuratam up to Novaya
Zemlya or perhaps from some other inland site. But [unclear] likely to be
Tyuratam.9
Eleven seconds excised as classified information.
Seaborg: Which were similar to those tests which occurred off in the
Novaya Zemlya area, which gives us some thought that perhaps if they
are going to do a high-altitude test, they will do it up there.
President Kennedy: This gives [unclear], all right. What problems
might that present—similar to the problem of, that we—
Seaborg: We don’t—I gather you’d have to ask Jerry [Wiesner] on
this but my feeling is that this is less likely to cause trouble than at those
higher latitudes.10 But as of last week those scientists—[unclear interjection]. No, you’re thinking of the shot . . . no those radiation effects—but
we really don’t know enough about it to be sure one way or the other—
it probably would depend on what the yield is.
President Kennedy: How much? By what factor would you have to
increase the number of—11
Unidentified: Electrons.
Unidentified: Electrons.
President Kennedy: —to make a lunar journey prohibitive?
Wiesner: It would make it difficult if you wind up with [unclear] . . .
President Kennedy: A moral [unclear].
Wiesner: More advanced . . . Would you say a factor of 50 would
really push it . . . serious trouble?
Unidentified: Well, as of right now, we feel that we probably can get
through; however, it is already a matter of concern and it is an additive
effect. And so we would really be concerned if the electronic power
increased by a factor of say ten times. I think that would almost rule out
the flight.
9. The Tyuratam Missile Test Range was east of the Aral Sea in the Soviet republic of
Kazakhstan. Referred to as Baikonur in official Soviet press releases, it was the location of the
first Soviet launch of an intercontinental-range ballistic missile in August 1957.
10. Jerome B. Wiesner was the President’s special assistant for science and technology and
director of the White House Office of Science and Technology.
11. The President has in mind the controversy about the effects of high-altitude testing on the
upper atmosphere. On 11 August the Soviets had asked the United States not to conduct any
tests that endangered their cosmonaut Major Andrian Nikolayev. Here Kennedy wonders
whether the more recent Soviet high-altitude tests had added additional charged particles—
electrons—to the upper atmosphere, which could interfere with radio communications or even
pose a threat to the lives of astronauts who orbited through this space.
Meeting on the DOMINIC Nuclear Test Series
87
Unidentified: There are actually two things that—there are a number of things you could do, I might point out. First of all, you could
launch. You see your present difficulties occur at one hot spot in the
Atlantic. If you could carry out your launchings in a way that avoided
that—handicapping your launching time. You could get it back to a very
substantial reduction by doing that. Secondly—
President Kennedy: I’d have to move the whole space program up to
New England then. [Laughter.]
Unidentified: Yeah.
Unidentified: What did we move it for then [unclear]?
Unidentified:12 [Unclear] I think you could fire from any of our bases
and avoid that. It just depends on the nature of your launch as a matter
of fact and the nature of your mission mostly.
Secondly—whereas I think NASA is justifiably worried about the
present 8R estimates of dosage, a human being could take 10 [to] 20
times that dosage of electrons, and medical people tell us, and still survive and not be sick, not be hurt. I think the [unclear]—
President Kennedy: In any case, I was thinking just because of this . . .
We haven’t gotten any response from the Soviets—
Unidentified: I think a factor of 50 would really get you in serious
trouble. I think Bob is right that at a factor of 10 you’d begin to worry—
I think you could manage, if you found yourself in this embarrassment,
but I don’t—
President Kennedy: OK, right, in any case.
Unidentified: It also causes heaps of trouble, if you start—
James Webb: Well, I think we can shield, but it might cause us some
trouble. 13
Rusk: Would any [unclear]? Has anything happened in the recent
Soviet series that is any surprise at all?
Unidentified: No.
Seaborg: I think the only thing surprising is that they haven’t really
been—so far at this stage in the analysis—nothing surprising has showed
up. But [unclear]. I think it was a little bit of a surprise that this first one
was clean; I think one rather expected it not to be.14
12. Probably Robert Seamans of NASA.
13. Shield the astronaut from this radiation.
14. A weapon that produces less residual radiation relative to other weapons of the same
energy yield is said to be cleaner.
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W E D N E S DAY, S E P T E M B E R
5, 1962
President Kennedy: What about our tests? How would you summarize our tests, as far as . . . so, how would they? If they were talking
about our tests would they dismiss them quite as you dismiss theirs?
Seaborg: I think that they would not be able to understand the
sophistication of some of the biggest advances we have. Well, one other
point I might mention: we have electromagnetic timing measurements
on the . . . pulse measurements on a number of these high-yield shots
and so far all of them have been two-stage as far—
Unidentified: Well, we’ve missed the 25 megaton, we’ve—
Seaborg: No.
Unidentified: [Unclear.]
Seaborg: No, no. We got it but not with the airplane; we got it.15
[Unclear.]
Unidentified: That’s a two-stage one, too?
Seaborg: And that’s two-stage . . . Now this data—I think, at this
stage one must always remember one is still relatively looking . . . taking
a first look at the data.
Unidentified: I think—
Seaborg: Last year things changed several times in the process . . .
Unidentified: I think one observation that might be made here. And
I don’t want to put a lot of weight on it; but that is: this 25-megaton shot
being clean can be inter[preted] . . . I mean, it has significance in various
ways. But our most advanced ideas, namely the ripple concept, leads to
an inherently clean system and maximum efficiency.16
Unidentified: You don’t know whether it is a clean weapon or
another weapon that is—
Unidentified: Right. Or [unclear interjection] whether it’s clean to be
clean or whether it’s clean [unclear interjection].
Seaborg: I’m sorry, I believe it has lead in it. And I think that’s quite
a different process. I’ll check, and I don’t have it here, but that’s my
understanding [unclear and unclear interjection] in lead so that it’s not an
amazing development.
Webb: Well, perhaps it isn’t—
Seaborg: It wouldn’t show up in lead.
Webb: With reference to your earlier question, Mr. President, I think
15. The U.S. Air Force and the CIA cooperated in using reconnaissance planes to collect electronic signals from Soviet test ranges. The U-2 that strayed over Soviet territory in late
August was likely on one of these missions (see “Meeting on U-2 Incident,” 4 September 1962).
16. A ripple device permits the firing or releasing of two or more munitions, in this context
nuclear weapons, in close succession.
Meeting on the DOMINIC Nuclear Test Series
89
probably the single most-advanced thing they wouldn’t be able to make
much sense out of, namely the ripple, which is of course a very reduced
yield and a very complicated device. So, I doubt that they could really
make any sense of it.
Unidentified: So, they would have the same troubles we have with
their efficient weapon last time. [Chuckles.]
Webb: Yes, I think so.
Unidentified: Not being able to decipher what it was.
Seaborg: I don’t think also that they have anything like the sophisticated system that we have for [unclear].
Twenty-two seconds excised as classified information.
Kaysen: . . . I think, leads to the very low weight, high-yield weapons.
Are the two most—
Unidentified: Why in other words, yes—
Unidentified: The two most important.
Kaysen: Yes. And with some real [unclear] advances in the primary,
the primary—
Unidentified: Well, those came from underground.
Bundy: [Unclear] and did them underground. That’s correct.
Kaysen: I was speaking of—
Twenty-four seconds excised as classified information.
President Kennedy: All right, well, let’s . . . Can you?
Bundy: That’s essentially all—
President Kennedy: [Unclear] now? [flipping through chart] Where
do you want us to look?
Bundy: Well, at their yield. At the back of graph 3, Mr. President,
that you will see the series of tests which [unclear]—
Unidentified: We brought a chart that indicates that . . .
Bundy: The next to last page, page 17, following the schedule, what
it amounts to is a series of values, you get 6 of one, 5 of the other.17
Unidentified: That’s right. A total of 11.
Bundy: Of high-altitude tests primarily for determining these effects,
which we still so imperfectly understand from 50 kilometers on up, 25
kilometers on up.18
And a series of five new atmospheric tests primarily designed to
17. In reaction to the new Soviet test series, President Kennedy had indicated in August that
he would authorize an additional 11 tests in the DOMINIC series, some of which would be
high-altitude tests.
18. For details on the scope, character, and purposes of the DOMINIC test series, see Chuck
Hansen, U.S. Nuclear Weapons: The Secret History (New York: Orion Books, 1988), pp. 81–89.
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W E D N E S DAY, S E P T E M B E R
5, 1962
explore further the problem of very high yield weapons with probably
low weights. The most important being the Ripple II and Ripple III
experiments, I believe.
President Kennedy: Where are those?
Bundy: On the right-hand side.
President Kennedy: OK.
Bundy: It may be worth just a moment to explain what that is. I
should think Lee [Haworth] or Glenn [Seaborg] . . .19 Because that is
probably the most important technical development in our own Dominic
series.
Kaysen: That’s the sort of breakthrough of the Livermore laboratory.
One minute, 29 seconds excised as classified information.
During the portion of this conversation excised for reasons of national
security, the President evidently asked Glenn Seaborg a question that led
to the following discussion of the role of underground testing in the U.S.
program of nuclear trials.
Rusk: . . . you might Glenn Seaborg, before you get to the President’s
question, looking ahead at your own program underground, do you see,
[unclear] strictly from your own point of view, a period of six months
say in which you would not yourself expect to conduct underground
tests for reasons of your own? Do you . . . Are there going to be any
recesses?
Seaborg: You mean if there were . . . If the possibility existed of carrying on tests in the future on a—
Rusk: Yes.
Seaborg: Optimum time schedule?
Rusk: If there were no, if you like, interference from the outside. Are
there periods of time in which you would not be doing anything anyhow—if you were just running your own . . .
Seaborg: I think our present view is that from the standpoint of the
best rate of advance by testing, that the Atomic Energy Commission
would prefer the—
Rusk: Steady course.
Seaborg: The steady course at an optimum rate, where the tests
would be [unclear]—
President Kennedy: Let’s see—how many underground tests have
we carried on now, since last September?
Seaborg: About 15.
19. Leland J. Haworth was a commissioner of the AEC.
Meeting on the DOMINIC Nuclear Test Series
91
President Kennedy: We had 15 underground tests and 15 atmospheric tests.
Seaborg: No about 25 are—
President Kennedy: So, we’ve had 25 atmospheric.
Seaborg: About, yes.
President Kennedy: Twenty-five atmospheric tests. We’ve had 75
tests in the last 11, 10 months now.20 I can’t see what there is above . . .
ahead of us in the next nine months or a year that make it so necessary
for us to continue to test beyond what you have talked about here. So, I
mean, we are starting to talk about what, 75 times or 60, aren’t we? I
mean that’s what we’re—
Unidentified: Mr. President could I make a comment on that?
President Kennedy: Yes.
Unidentified: There is something that is in the underground program that’s of great interest to us. And that’s about mainly our clean
weapons in the low-yield range.21
Fifty-one seconds excised as classified information.
Bundy: Broadly speaking, the underground testing program can now
provide for continuous and rapid weapons development and effects tests
when we get calibration for everything up to 50 or even 100 kt.22
And I think if we were to put it this way, Mr. President, so that you
could see the choices: I don’t believe that there will be any significant,
really heavy pressure from the laboratories for continued atmospheric
tests for a period of a year to 18 months after this series is completed in
the higher yields. And I think if we were to continue without atmospheric testing in 1963, you would have high morale with a high rate of
progress.
Underground testing, simply because it is the outlet, has a kind of
psychological impact on the vitality and the energy of the laboratories
and there is, therefore, a certain cost of cutting that off. On the other
hand, the fact that we have had these 50 tests makes it perfectly plain
20. The President was only off by one test. Since the Soviets broke the moratorium in
September 1961 and by the time of this meeting, the United States had tested 27 times in the
atmosphere as part of the DOMINIC series, 44 times underground as part of the NOUGAT
series, and 5 times underground or on the surface as part of Operation STORAX—a total of
76 tests. (Gallery of U.S. Nuclear Tests, Federation of American Scientists, www.fas.org).
21. These were for tactical use.
22. The first U.S. underground test (RAINIER) occurred in 1957. By 1962, most U.S. nuclear
testing was done underground at the National Testing Site in Nevada. In fact, two-thirds of
all U.S. tests since the resumption of testing in September 1961 took place underground.
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W E D N E S DAY, S E P T E M B E R
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that in the underground area we are, not only more experienced, but better informed and better prepared than any other country.
Kaysen: Of course, somebody has [unclear]—but we are also learning
how to test higher and higher yields underground. This probably could
now be used to test weapons up to about 100 kilotons and possibly could
go up as high as a megaton. The point that Mr. Bundy makes about the
general effect on the laboratories and the state of readiness that it keeps
the laboratories in and the state of higher morale that it provides for the
laboratories is, of course, a point [that] we have made many times.23
Seaborg: I think it is just about happenstance perhaps; there has to
be a time at which the things that one, the advances one would hope to
make—the most significant advances that are down in the ground are
ones which require a series of experiments rather than a —you build up
to a point and have a sudden go/no-go test. The all-fusion weapon, is
one example.
Wiesner: But the all-fusion weapon, Mr. President, shouldn’t weigh
very heavily in your mind, in my opinion. [Seaborg is mumbling in the
background.] Because, the fact of the matter is today the all-fusion
weapon, as the result of some of the tests, looks more dismal than it did a
year ago. Keep in mind that people [unclear] make it. And it’s got to be
regarded as a long-term development program. I don’t think it should be
a major factor in seeing whatever your thinking is . . .
President Kennedy: Well, let’s go to work on these other matters
[unclear]—were you going to say something about that?
Seaborg: No, that’s all right but—
Wiesner: Wouldn’t you agree with the—
Seaborg: Well yeah, the high cleanliness . . . whether it’s all-fusion or
the other is the same general— [Unclear exchange.]
Wiesner: Which is the one that people hold out as a very cheap, and
therefore very attractive weapon. It’s still a gleam. And it is probably a
dimmer gleam now than it was a year ago.
Unidentified: Well, this is of course part of the go/no-go [unclear].
Wiesner: Yes.
Unidentified: It doesn’t make it, for us, in a year, either.
Unidentified: That’s right.
Unidentified: From a military standpoint, some of these small,
cleaner systems can be very useful. [Some agreement in the background.]
23. See Leland Haworth’s and Glenn Seaborg’s comments at the test ban meeting of 1 August
1962.
Meeting on the DOMINIC Nuclear Test Series
93
Unidentified: Yeah, I’m sure that’s right.
President Kennedy: Let’s take a look down this—how many tests are
we talking about?
Unidentified: Eleven until [unclear].
President Kennedy: And they would be run from what date to what
date?
Bundy: I would say from the third week in September to the first week
in November. But this illustrated schedule which is on page 17 probably
should be slipped and this is as good point as any to indicate the really
grave complexity of this, which is the reason we’ve asked Mr. Webb and Dr.
Seamans to be here . . . is that we have a Mercury shot scheduled now for
the 25th of September. While we do not believe that test Fluvio or test
Nike/Hercules currently scheduled for the 17th to the 22nd will do more
than very temporary damage to this orbiting area, we don’t know that.24
And it would certainly be necessary to measure the atmosphere before
sending up Mr. [Walter] Schirra.25 And our preliminary thought in a staff
discussion of this yesterday, was that we might do better, assuming that this
in principle, in the main, were it acceptable to you, Mr. President, to slip the
whole thing a couple of weeks.26 And to put this initial shot safely behind—
the Mercury shot—rather than to have any question of this kind arise.
The way the diplomatic situation has developed there is a kind of an
informal image of a January 1 point at which there may be pressure not
to do atmospheric testing in light of what you and the Russians have said
to each other; I don’t know whether Butch would agree on this.27
Adrian Fisher: Yes I would. I think January 1 is sort of a point—
President Kennedy: What? About atmospheric testing or all of
them?
Fisher: Well, January 1 is the date which we said we would—
President Kennedy: Stop the testing.
Fisher: —would like to have an effective treaty. If you put it in terms
of an effective treaty . . . But still if saying that, if you start up on January
1 with a series of large bangs, I think that gives you a little bit of a trumpet blowing an uncertain note.
President Kennedy: Of course, this Schirra may be a week or two
weeks delayed . . . might be so?
24. These high-altitude tests were subsequently postponed, scaled back, and renamed.
25. Astronaut Schirra was originally scheduled to blast off aboard Mercury 8 on September 23.
26. The remainder of the DOMINIC test series.
27. Butch was Adrian Fisher, deputy director of the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency.
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Webb: It could be. But we are certainly making every effort to go off
by the 25th.
Bundy: The alternative would be if, let’s say for the moment—that
we were to say that we gave NASA ten days or two weeks from the 25th
to try to get him up. If that, for various technical reasons, did not happen, it might be well to put the Mercury shot over to December, where
there’s another one scheduled. Then get the series out of the way, and go
forward.
McNamara: Could we not carry on some of the airdrop tests?28
Bundy: We could do that. The airdrop tests are really not a problem.
[McNamara is mumbling in the background.] But they are very easy anyway, Bob. They can be done at any point.
McNamara: I agree. I am just suggesting that instead of pushing the
whole schedule forward two weeks—
Bundy: The tight part of the schedule is the high-altitude testing
part. That’s where there are uncertainties.
McNamara: I think there is some merit in starting the testing . . .
Bundy and McNamara speak at the same time.
Bundy: I agree, [unclear] with the current tests. I would only [unclear]
started, if the Soviets stop.
McNamara: However, in that case we could start airdrops.
Wiesner: Well, there is a problem though, that the ripple weapons
have to be fabricated.
Unidentified: That’s right.
Wiesner: So that you can’t drop them tomorrow. They are still in the
laboratory, in development.
Unidentified: These were actually the earliest dates at which they
could be made ready.
President Kennedy: You mean and each weapon, in other words—
Unidentified: They are being run through the laboratory right now.
President Kennedy: This is a schedule which is based on when these
weapons will be ready?
Unidentified: Yes. I’d speak [unclear] now. [Unclear.]
Bundy: [Unclear] two ranges, Mr. President. In the high-altitude test
28. Most of the tests in the DOMINIC series (25 April 1962 to 4 November 1962)—29 out
of the 36 tests— were airdrop tests. They involved dropping the nuclear device from an
aircraft, detonating it in the air, and measuring its yield. Unlike high-altitude tests, which
were designed primarily to measure weapons effects, airdrop tests were used for weapons
development.
Meeting on the DOMINIC Nuclear Test Series
95
cases, it is based on pad availability, essentially the BLUEGILL test,29
the URRACA test,30 and the KINGFISH test31 [unclear].
President Kennedy: [Unclear]?
Seaborg: Wouldn’t this help you some, Jerry, with respect to this airplane question?
Wiesner: In what?
Seaborg: The BLUEGILL. . . . Isn’t there a problem of outfitting an
aircraft by September 17th anyway?
Unidentified: Well, there is. There is the question of whether it’s a
critical . . . a critical air [unclear] or not. [Unidentified person agreeing in
the background.] We could be ready to fire sometime in that period, but
there might be some degradation of the experiment. Of course this is
something that can happen any time in the course of an operation. But I
think at this stage it would help. However, what about HAYMAKER
prime risk two, you would [unclear] perhaps?32
Unidentified: Well, I don’t believe Ripple II, I am quite sure Ripple
II cannot. I believe that the HAYMAKER can; but I have to check it—
Unidentified: That’s right, HAYMAKER [unclear].
McNamara: In any case, HAYMAKER doesn’t have to be postponed.
That’s the point I’m trying to make here.
Unidentified: Yes.
Bundy: [Unclear] That problem doesn’t arise yet, so I think we can
start—
Unidentified: On the 23rd—
Bundy: —the third week of September . . . [Unidentified person says,
“That’s right.”]
Rusk: Does the BLUEGILL shot get into the space problem at all? 33
29. The BLUEGILL test was aborted on 3 June 1962 when the Johnston Island missile tracking system failed. The BLUEGILL Prime [the second BLUEGILL test] was the test that
blew up the launch pad and contaminated the launch site at Johnston Island on 25 July 1962.
The Thor missile engine failed after ignition, and the missile control officer hit the destruct
button while the missile was still on the ground. BLUEGILL was a high-altitude test to evaluate a W-50 warhead in a Mk 4 reentry vehicle. (Hansen, U.S. Nuclear Weapons, pp. 86–87.)
30. The highest nuclear test (1,300 kilometers) ever planned by the United States, URRACA
was controversial from the moment DOD official Harold Brown announced the schedule for
high-altitude testing 29 April 1962. It was considered the most likely test to add additional
radiation to the Earth’s magnetic field, and it was subsequently canceled.
31. The KINGFISH test was a test similar to BLUEGILL in intention and design.
32. A HAYMAKER underground test, in the NOUGAT series, took place 27 June 1962.
33. BLUEGILL Double Prime was intended to be the lowest of the high-altitude tests. Like
the earlier BLUEGILLs, it too failed.
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Kaysen: They are predicted not to.
Bundy: We think not but we would have to make a check, Mr.
Secretary, before we set up an announcement—
Rusk: It would be better for the BLUEGILL shots, if the altitude
permits it in honesty . . . to consider those ordinary atmospheric tests
rather than high-altitude outer space tests.
Unidentified: [Snickering.]
Unidentified: If you don’t, well let’s try. [Unclear interjection.] There
is some concern about the possibility of BLUEGILL getting something
up to levels that will have some effect on the man in space . . . [unclear]
far up that—
Unidentified: We don’t believe this—but we believe it enough that
we’d have to make measurements after the shot to be sure.
President Kennedy: Well, I don’t think we want it around that we
blew off something a week before that made us postpone the thing for
three months.34 I think we shouldn’t take that chance. I would rather
take it on the other end. [Unclear] telling me [unclear] had some slippage [unclear] by November 1st, well, let’s say that as we . . . then let’s
not have it then. Let them go ahead and let’s . . . then go till November
20th, [unclear] not [unclear].
Bundy: What we would actually do Mr. President, I think, is to move
the BLUEGILL-URRACA-KINGFISH series back two weeks. There’s a
particular problem about KINGFISH which is worth attention, too. And
that’s the one now scheduled next to last on the 14th of October.
President Kennedy: Well, let’s just set it as our policy that we will
not put off any tests that raises any reasonable prospect of interfering
until Schirra goes. And then let’s try to decide which of these tests we
can throw out. We don’t want to do them all, if we can help it.
Seaborg: You mean which of these we’d terminate?
President Kennedy: Yeah.
Seaborg: Well, our candidate among the developmental tests would
be the fourth, THUMBELINA.35
President Kennedy: What about URRACA?
President Kennedy had been uneasy about this planned test since the British
34. Schirra’s Mercury mission.
35. Thumbelina was the name of a nuclear device. Although there was no test called THUMBELINA in the DOMINIC series, a Thumbelina device was ultimately tested in an airdrop test
called CHAMA on 18 October 1962. The Thumbelina nuclear device was lightweight with a
small diameter.
Meeting on the DOMINIC Nuclear Test Series
97
raised an objection to it in May. Kennedy created a special panel, including
scientists Wolfgang Panofsky and James A. Van Allen, to study the radiation
effect of URRACA on the natural radiation belt—the so-called Van Allen
radiation belt—in the Earth’s magnetic field. Although this distinguished
panel assured the President that URRACA would not contribute significantly to the number of electrons, the President was biased against the test.
For months his AEC chief Seaborg and McNamara had been fighting a
rearguard action to save it. With evidence that the July STARFISH test
had added so much radiation to the magnetic field that one British and two
U.S. satellites had been severely damaged, the President was even more
determined not to take any chances with URRACA.
Seaborg: No, that’s [laughter].
Unidentified: That’s our only [unclear].
Unidentified: That’s our only [unclear].
President Kennedy: What?
Seaborg: That’s the AEC’s only high-altitude shot.
President Kennedy: I know. But we . . . I know, it’s one of the saddest
things I’ve ever . . . I mean, it needs 1,500 kilometers. [Laughter.]
Seaborg: Oh, well, no, we should have made the point that that has
been reduced, Mr. President.
President Kennedy: To what?
Seaborg: From 165 kilotons to 10 kilotons to make the contribution
to the artificial radiation belt negligible.
President Kennedy: All right. So, now it is down to 10 kt?
Seaborg: It is down to 10 kt.
President Kennedy: At 1,500 kilometers?
Seaborg: It is—
Bundy: Mr. President, if you wanted to look at the problem of the
contribution to the electrons, the test to concentrate on is KINGFISH.
Seaborg: Yes, and we should get to that, I think, because that’s—
Bundy: That’s the—
Rusk: [Unclear] the URRACA. I would like to ask an irreverent
question, if I can [unclear]?
Seaborg: Yes.
Rusk: I get the impression with all this material [that] this is a case
of go out and see what happens. Because you know, nobody knows.36 Is
that [unclear]—
36. Rusk is raising a sore subject. Only days earlier the AEC had to admit that the STARFISH
test at 400 kilometers had unexpectedly added large amounts of radiation to the Earth’s mag-
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Seaborg: Well that’s [unclear].
Wiesner: If it’s worse than that, you know. [Laughter.]
Seaborg: No, I don’t agree with that and I wouldn’t describe it that
way.
Rusk: [Unclear] saying the knowledge of the existence of unpredicted phenomena could be very important.
Seaborg: Yes, and we’ve found unpredicted things, for example, in
KINGFISH—
Unidentified: We sure did.
Wiesner: This is the place where Glenn’s loyalty to his organization,
I think—37
President Kennedy: Now tell me why it is that this is the AEC’s only
test?
Seaborg: Well, because they are effects shots and the other—38
President Kennedy: But, I mean, Livermore—Los Alamos. This is a
Los Alamos [Scientific Laboratory] test?
Seaborg: Yes.
Unidentified: This is their only high-altitude—
Seaborg: The only high-altitude test.
Unidentified: The rest are Defense Department tests.
Seaborg: That was primarily AEC’s; of course they are all at
Livermore [unclear].39 [Unclear] sort of joint.
President Kennedy: Yeah, but I don’t know . . . And that really is.
What are you going to try to find from this test?
Seaborg: How to . . . ourselves . . . test if it becomes desirable in
space. And to make the diagnosis from those tests that would be necessary for weapons development and how to ascertain whether the other
fellow is testing [unclear]—
netic field, causing damage to the fuel cells on three satellites. According to Seaborg’s later
memoir, Dean Rusk would rib him for years about AEC’s erroneous prediction about the
effects of this high-altitude test [Glenn Seaborg, with the assistance of Benjamin S. Loeb,
Kennedy, Khrushchev and the Test Ban (Berkeley; University of California Press 1981), p.156].
37. Seaborg is probably referring to the ill-fated STARFISH test. In his memoir, Seaborg
admits that the AEC had tried to hide the fact that it had been so wrong on STARFISH. In
its first assessment of the test results on 20 August, the AEC wrote that the increase in radiation had been “generally anticipated.” Yes, it had been anticipated, but for the higher-altitude URACCA test not for STARFISH; and the AEC believed these changes would be
insignificant for the Van Allen belt, in any case (see Seaborg, Kennedy, p. 157).
38. Effects shots are tests designed to test the effect of a nuclear blast on communications,
electromagnetic pulses, and so on, in outer space.
39. Lawrence Livermore Laboratory, initially the University of California Radiation
Laboratory.
Meeting on the DOMINIC Nuclear Test Series
99
President Kennedy: Well, I think what we ought to do is go around
the room and everybody throw in what test they would give up, if they
had to. And then we can . . . I say we’re going to cut this list down. What
do we want now?
Seaborg: All right. Well, I have given you the Thumbelina [device
test], yes, sir.
President Kennedy: All right. Now, Jerry [Wiesner]. What one
would you give?
Wiesner: Oh, dear.
President Kennedy: Let’s get . . . the problem is which is the least
useful scientifically?
Wiesner: I would rather go the other way and say which ones I think
are most valuable.
President Kennedy: Let’s do it my way. Let’s just . . .
Wiesner: All right, your way, well . . . [chuckling].
President Kennedy: Which one would you throw off the list?
Wiesner: My list will be longer this way. I’d agree with THUMBELINA. I would say that HAYMAKER Prime is probably useful, but not
necessary. I would—
President Kennedy: What’s the least useful?
Wiesner: Least useful: probably THUMBELINA or URRACA.
President Kennedy: URRACA. We’ve already got THUMBELINA;
so we get URRACA.
Wiesner: URRACA.
President Kennedy: All right.
Wiesner: I think Ripple III could be dispensed with, wouldn’t you
agree, [unclear]?
Kaysen: I’d give up Ripple III, before I’d give up URRACA, yes.
Unidentified: Yes.
Wiesner: Now, not all of the 10-kiloton tests in the high-altitude
series are necessary. You’ll get interesting and useful information—
President Kennedy: Yes, but, OK. Who are we going . . .
Wiesner: But, you could drop all three if you wanted to.
President Kennedy: Do you . . . one? What one do you [unclear]?
[Laughter.]
Unidentified: Well, if I were . . . I think of the high-altitude things, I
think that I would throw out first number 6. I’d just have 33c.
President Kennedy: That’s called? [Bundy whispers.]
Unidentified: Then I would throw out, I think, next the low-yield
BLUEGILL. The 25 kilometer 10 kt.
President Kennedy: Number 1?
100
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Unidentified: Four.
Unidentified: Four. No, 4. See, 4 is a two-stage package actually—
President Kennedy: Yes.
Unidentified: It’s 165 kilotons at 50 kilometers as a backup for
BLUEGILL. And if BLUEGILL is successful, then it’s 10 kilotons at 25
kilometers.
President Kennedy: [Unclear] questions. Do you have any, Mac?
Bundy: I am sure that I would agree on throwing out THUMBELINA and I think the test that you need to pay most attention to, Mr.
President, is KINGFISH number 2, in the high-altitude series.
President Kennedy: That’s right. [Four seconds excised as classified
information.] What about Nike/Hercules?40
Seventeen seconds excised as classified information.
Seaborg: I think that’s the test you’ve read, Mr. President.
Wiesner: No, no. It’s number 5.
Seaborg: Oh.
McNamara: The Nike/Hercules tests bear on KINGFISH—
Unidentified: That’s right.
McNamara: And I think today we should simply agree that we don’t
know whether KINGFISH can be carried out.41
Bundy: Right.
Five seconds excised as classified information.
McNamara: Information can be gained from the, particularly the first
Nike/Hercules, possibly from the second Nike/Hercules also, that will
bear on the potential effects of KINGFISH, and we should certainly not
carry out KINGFISH or decide to carry it out until one or both of those
Nike/Hercules tests have been carried out, Mr. President.
Unidentified: Mr. President—
Wiesner: Ah, excuse me . . . The trouble with that Bob is that the best
estimates that we have now is you drop KINGFISH much below 40 or 50
kilotons, you won’t get any of the blackout effects we are trying to study.42
McNamara: I agree fully.
40. The President is asking about tests using a Nike/Hercules missile to launch the test device
to a somewhat lower altitude, about 25 kilometers, which might accomplish the goals of some
of the high-altitude tests, like KINGFISH.
41. The Secretary of Defense is referring to the new uncertainty concerning the radiation
effects of this particular high-altitude nuclear test.
42. KINGFISH is also designed to test the effect of a very high altitude (circa 95 kilometers)
nuclear blast on command and control systems. Bringing the test lower or reducing its yield
to avoid the harmful effects on the Van Allen belt would make it less useful for this purpose.
Meeting on the DOMINIC Nuclear Test Series
101
Wiesner: [Unclear.]
McNamara: As I say, I think that the Nike/Hercules tests will however bear on whether you should carry it out at all.
Unidentified: Uh, huh. But, Mr. President, I think—
McNamara: I don’t think we can decide today, for sure—
Unidentified: No.
McNamara: —whether we should carry it out.
Carl Kaysen: I think there is a new dimension or element of the problem, which perhaps we didn’t have to worry about so much before.
Before, we looked at total yield and we looked at what’s important and
what’s not. We now have a number of 10-kt shots at different altitudes,
which hasn’t you know—Bob McNamara has just said the purpose of
finding out what we know about certain phenomena.
I think if we look at the political side of the business of putting electrons up into space, it’s not only how many electrons we actually put up,
but the total number of high-altitude shots that has some . . . That is a
problem, that is something we ought to look at, so that—
President Kennedy: Well, now, let me ask you, point out these shots
which present the electron possibility.
Forty-six seconds excised as classified information.
President Kennedy: There’s not much use our going to the Russians
and telling them about the problem of electrons and then going ahead
and doing it ourselves and adding more electrons.
Unidentified: Well, I was thinking in estimating, however, if the
Russians do put one up, in the 30- or 40-megaton amount [unclear],
which is not likely . . . But if they shot a very high yield one up to the, at
the most vulnerable altitude and increased by a factor of five or ten the
radiation that’s already up there, then we’re beginning to get into the
range where [unclear] it’s becoming not, maybe not impossible but
[unclear] which is complicated and difficult. I don’t regard it as likely
that the Russians [unclear] . . . additional.
President Kennedy: [Unclear] too; but we haven’t heard unless I ask
[unclear] that we try again with [unclear] the Russian ambassador [unclear]
not much available, not much to draw on over there.
Wiesner: I think that Carl’s point is very important in that the total
number is [unclear].
President Kennedy: Well, let’s . . . on this matter of KINGFISH, it
seems to me the Defense Department ought to come forward with additional reasons for [unclear] tests [unclear] and they can propose, so that
we maybe can cut down the electrons and can give us . . . which we
regard as . . . based on this information. What happened before [unclear]
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whether they suggest that we ought to do it or not or whether we can
strip it down to . . . enough to make [unclear] useful but not hazardous.
We can’t very well make any less [unclear] that the Russians as far as . . .
[unclear] ourselves.
Eight seconds excised as classified information.
McNamara: But we are not certain that even with that reduction by a
factor of ten that we have a safe test. We don’t know of any way to find
out other than to carry out the Nike/Hercules tests.
Wiesner: On the other hand we [unclear] number of what will happen in [unclear].
President Kennedy: The upper limit we deem . . .
Wiesner: The worst possible thing that we think could happen is,
and this we think is unlikely, it could double what’s already up there.
Unidentified: If all the electrons are ours.
Unidentified: If all the electrons that their bomb would generate—
Unidentified: If they’re all going in the wrong place would [unclear]
increase 50 percent.
Wiesner: You see. Right now we think we’ve got 25 percent of the
electrons.[Unclear.] If you got them all, you’d get 50 [unclear].
Unidentified: Of course that could be a different distribution.
Rusk: We know that some of these shots are creating a problem for
us in space [unclear]. I would suppose that our criteria have not changed
from what is necessary for national security into it would be good to do
or good to know. There is a rigorous test: What is required by national
security? [Unclear.]
Bundy: Mr. President, you asked the question what tests do we take
now. I do not find that it’s an unacceptably long list in the context of the
various ideas and possibilities and knowledge probably that we have. I
agree with the Secretary [of State] that that’s the proper test. I think
this may be our last clear chance to do this, and I think that there’s a
great deal to be said for getting in a posture in which we have clearly
found out the things we need to find out. Because we may have a year or
a year and a half when it’s not easy to find out.43
President Kennedy: You think—
Rusk: In fact, a major change in the weight-yield ratio, for example,
is very important from a security point of view that [unclear].
Wiesner: I think you have to be careful about that because it is my
understanding that this test, the Ripple II, will not put you in that posi-
43. When the pace of diplomatic negotiation would make testing politically infeasible.
Meeting on the DOMINIC Nuclear Test Series
103
tion. This will put you in a position to design a weapon, which will
require further testing, so that—
Unidentified: No, it will put you in pretty good position.
Wiesner: Except you’ll have this one. You’ll have this one, which will
not be the 30 to 40 megaton.
Unidentified: No, that’s right.
Unidentified: It might be 15.
Unidentified: Yeah.
Wiesner: I understand that. So that I think that should be clear.
Unidentified: But it will be a big gain.
Wiesner: On the other hand, Mr. President, you want to recall the
KINGFISH-type experiment was one of the basic reasons that we felt
we had to resume testing.44 Which was to get [these] effects [unclear].
Because of the bad luck we’ve had in the Pacific we’ve not carried out
this test. Many of the others, I think, would be cut if you took seriously
the criteria we started applying initially, which the Secretary has talked
about.
McNamara: I would speak to that point, Jerry. I think Ripple III
should not be cut.
Forty-four seconds excised as classified information.
McNamara: We may have to burst higher than we previously anticipated to avoid anti-ballistic missile systems. Therefore I think Ripple III
is an important test as I think Ripple II is an important test. So, I wouldn’t cut out either Ripple II or Ripple III. There are others that might be
cut; but not those two.
President Kennedy: Where are we with BLUEGILL?
Well, in any case we are agreed that we will not start these tests
until after this . . . Schirra has gone ahead, we’ll give the order, then.
McNamara: Except, Mr. President, for some air-drop tests.
President Kennedy: Air-drop tests?
McNamara: Yes.
President Kennedy: If we can. If we can do that.
Bundy: How long would you like that, figure that period would be,
Mr. President? Do you want to make it indefinite?
President Kennedy: [to the NASA representatives] Well, we ought to
be able to know within two weeks if you are ever going—we hope you
are going to go within two weeks of the time you’ve said.
44. Soviet high-altitude tests in 1961 had been at higher altitudes than had been anticipated by
U.S. analysts.
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Webb: I would certainly say that. Of course, worldwide weather is
the problem here. [President Kennedy agrees.] [Unclear] recovered. But I
think it is feasible to set the [unclear]. If we don’t get off within two
weeks of the time, we do have another [Mercury] flight scheduled in
December. We’d simply cancel that and go on with December at which
time we can have a chance to make it [unclear].
President Kennedy: It seems to me we probably won’t want to do
that. With all the . . . you don’t want to build up the Schirra flight, then
you cancel it till December. That will look like a setback. So, I would
think we’d probably have to go with this flight, if you are ready to go
September 25th . . . want to . . . waiting on the weather then, I think, we
ought to wait until you go and just do whatever else we can do which will
not affect this.
Webb: We’ll do everything we can to go at the earliest possible—
President Kennedy: Then the other problem is that these tests will
be taking place probably after the Soviets have announced that they have
desisted their tests. 45 We assume—
Unidentified: They have closed the area until the 15th of October—46
President Kennedy: So we have to assume—
Unidentified: But that doesn’t mean that they won’t continue with
any [unclear].
Rusk: No, they told us that they are going to be finished by November 1st.
President Kennedy: So we ought to be shooting for November 1st
ourselves. We don’t to want to sort of string them out at the last
moment if we can help it, obviously. That may mean therefore if we have
to . . . if we are not able to put a couple of these airdrops into that period
from September 25th that’s going to put our schedule up till November
12th and 15th, won’t it?
Bundy: The tightness in the schedule, Mr. President, is much more
likely to come not in the airdrop tests but in the high-altitude tests. The
three that are interlocked because of the launch pad problem—
Unidentified: And the airdrop won’t present much of a problem.
Bundy: —are BLUEGILL, URRACA, and KINGFISH.
President Kennedy: URRACA, KINGFISH, and what?
Bundy: And BLUEGILL on 17 September, URRACA 29 September,
and KINGFISH on 14 November.
45. The President means ended.
46. The area is the Soviet testing zone.
Meeting on the DOMINIC Nuclear Test Series
105
President Kennedy: Well, we’re all agreed that we’ve got to go with
BLUEGILL and we have to go with KINGFISH though we’re going to
have another discussion on KINGFISH, aren’t we? [Unclear exchange.]
Unidentified: Mr. President, I’d like to make one consideration that
you should have in mind, and that’ll get to the background to the test
ban negotiations, background to the discussions of outer space generally.
And there is under consideration before you the idea of heading off this
military use of space, which is the Soviet concept to get our reconnaissance satellite, with our counter position, which is no weapons of mass
destruction in outer space. Now, there’s not a general resolution on that
yet; but that’s the way the thinking tends . . . is shaping up. Now
[unclear] is [unclear] to many ones in outer space, at the same time you
make your proposal. And that’s [unclear] URRACA, and . . . [unclear
interjection] which you hold your position on KINGFISH is—
President Kennedy: Well, URRACA is in trouble . . . anyway. But the
other . . . KINGFISH is the—
Unidentified: It’s our most important test.
President Kennedy: . . . most important test. Unless we have a great
October, I [unclear].
Bundy: [Unclear] is the most important test.
President Kennedy: What?
Bundy: [Unclear] ranks after BLUEGILL, STARFISH, and URRACA,
in the earlier recommendations, I think
Unidentified: That is right.
Unidentified: One part of the reason for that I believe was DOD
wasn’t ready to go ahead with it. I think they always felt it was an
important test.
Seaborg: KINGFISH was always in the forefront of these. We didn’t
think we could do it this year.
Wiesner: Mr. President, one other thing is that [unclear] responsibility for the fallout [unclear] getting rid of Thumbelina [unclear]—
President Kennedy: Yeah.
Wiesner: Because that’ll [unclear].
President Kennedy: I see.
Bundy: I might mention, Mr. President, although it is not a part of
this specific presentation that there is also a possibility, that there is a
recommendation on it, there is a request for authority to make a fourth
lattice shot. And this would also create fall-out and those problems and
the Defense Department yesterday was apparently pulling very hard
[unclear] all this attention [unclear] the [boron?].
Seaborg: [Unclear] to trigger a shot to see about X rays up and
106
W E D N E S DAY, S E P T E M B E R
5, 1962
down. And you [unclear] experiment. You look like you get the data, but
we certainly are not interested in pushing that problem.
Wiesner: It’s a test that’s not unlike, it’s a test not unlike the one we
had [unclear] trouble [unclear] accidentally.
Seaborg: It’s about the same magnitude. There are in effect two
shots: There’s one at one-and-a-half or 1.7 megaton, kilotons each but
right on the surface.
McNamara: Mr. President, in view of the problem of the Russians
completing their tests on November 1st and ours which slipped, as we discussed it, and extending substantially beyond that point, I’d like to suggest
we take this schedule, and at least as far as the Nike/Hercules and the
KINGFISH shots are concerned, reschedule this to be completed by the
1st of November. I don’t know exactly how we’ll do that; but if you could
give us that objective, I think we can work it out. But I don’t think we
ought to have a schedule extending beyond November 1st.
Unidentified: This poses a problem with regard to Mercury.
McNamara: It does, well, but I am going to assume for the minute
that we will accept a delay in Mercury and reschedule in such a way as to
complete it by the 1st of November.
President Kennedy: How long do you think you’ll need? It’s possible
to give you five weeks; but it might only give you three.
McNamara: It might only give us three weeks; but we have constructed another pad, fortunately.
Unidentified: It doesn’t come in till the 15th—
McNamara: I know it doesn’t come in until the 15th of October; but
it is available for two weeks. And for two weeks, we will have two pads.
For the period before that, we will only have one pad.
I think we ought to simply take it as our objective to finish this off by
the 1st of November, at least on schedule.
Bundy: Mr. Secretary, I think we ought to be awfully careful about
this high-altitude test, just out of the experience we have had in trying
to cram it into a tight schedule. I would hate to see us come down to a
period in which we were missing certain things in October [unclear] for
the one that I would myself think in the light of the whole pattern of our
relations with the Soviet Union, it is essential for us to [unclear]
[McNamara begins to interject]. Pressure for [unclear].
McNamara: I don’t think it’s essential, Mac. But I think we can gain
a lot by preparing to complete it by the 1st of November. As a matter of
fact, we will begin to anticipate problems and find solutions to them.
Mac, my concern about what may happen, if we have to defer our tests
Meeting on the DOMINIC Nuclear Test Series
107
until after Mercury starts [is] Mercury may not take off until the end of
November, or the end of October. We’ve got to have some action here to
try to compress our schedule. The best way to get it is simply say,
assume you don’t start until the third . . . or three weeks after the 15th of
September and finish the 1st of November.
Rusk: But on the political side, if we were quite clear that we had
given them [unclear] their two shots go off after they had stopped, we
didn’t say that.
President Kennedy: [Unclear] finish.
Rusk: [Unclear.] Well, we wouldn’t want to do that, then the
[unclear] got to be larger [unclear].
President Kennedy: What about BLUEGILL? Now, what is
BLUEGILL doing in the way of electrons?
Wiesner: Very little. [Unclear exchange.]
President Kennedy: Can you get it at 95 [unclear]? Is that the difference?
Unidentified: Yes, the pressure goes up very greatly.
President Kennedy: You can’t [unclear] . . . dropping KINGFISH?
Unidentified: Well, the trouble is dropping KINGFISH—
President Kennedy: Now what is KINGFISH going to tell us that
BLUEGILL doesn’t?
Fifty-one seconds excised as classified information.
President Kennedy: . . . Let’s do this.
Wiesner: [Unclear] you call URRACA because we don’t know about
that very high altitude—
President Kennedy: Let’s take to . . . we’re going to be back here tomorrow. I think overnight let’s be thinking—I think we ought to . . . I think 11
[tests] is too many given our time problem. So we’ve got to try to drop—
take it down to 8. And we just have to see where we, and then let’s see what
our—given the problem of—let’s do two schedules: One in which they go
off on time—give them two days; and the other is two weeks. When . . .
And how would we organize it in order to get it done as close to the
November 1st date as Bob McNamara has suggested in recognition that
that’s not a final decision right now?
Then let’s . . . What other matter do we have to consider in regard
[to this]? There’s nothing more we can do about KINGFISH. You got
that down about as fine as you can.
Unidentified: Have to learn more, sir. It is conceivable that we will
have to wait for the yields [unclear] times and the exact height of the
[unclear]?
108
W E D N E S DAY, S E P T E M B E R
5, 1962
Unidentified: Learn as much as we can up until . . . for the time that
you need, the advance time that you need, learn as much as you can from
it [unclear].
President Kennedy: Now is there anything . . . you got three, as I
understand it, there are three Nike/Hercules?
Seaborg: Three, yes. Well, one is a scout.
Unidentified: Two are Nike/Hercules and one is a scout, XM 33c.
President Kennedy: They’re all . . .
Unidentified: The BLUEGILL one.
President Kennedy: XM 33c was put in somebody’s list. Which one
is that? What do you call it?
Unidentified: That’s six, seven, and eight [unclear].
Twenty-four seconds excised as classified information.
President Kennedy: The fact of the matter is, if the Soviet Union
ever really gets this space ship which presented us with a real military
matter, couldn’t you stop it?
Unidentified: If there are people . . . Yes, if they—
President Kennedy: Have people on it.
Wiesner: Well, if it were up above 500 kilometers or so.
Unidentified: [two people talking at the same time] Even at a low altitude,
you could do it for quite a while because quite high levels for a day—
Wiesner: For a few days this stuff could be made very intense.
Unidentified: Oh, yes we could stop it, yes.
President Kennedy: If it were manned?
Unidentified: If it were manned and we wanted to.
Wiesner: You could probably even stop electronic equipment, if you
wanted to—
President Kennedy: Yeah.
Wiesner: But it would take the [unclear].
McNamara: Well, the probability is we could shoot it down with
Nike/Zeus from Kwajalein.47
Wiesner: You could probably even stop solar cells from there.
McNamara: We will have by next May, Mr. President, [unidentified
interjection] the capacity at Kwajalein to shoot down satellites in the
order of 150- to 200-mile altitude and we can probably increase that to
800 miles of altitude, say 1,300 kilometers, within a year or two.
47. The U.S. Army’s first antiballistic missile [ABM] system was designed in the mid-1950s,
and then redesigned as the Nike-X.
Meeting on the DOMINIC Nuclear Test Series
109
President Kennedy: We assume they will have the ABM?
McNamara: And we assume they will have the same, yes.
Wiesner: You see we’re doing it with the Nike/Zeus.
McNamara: Yes.
Wiesner: And they have a comparable system.
McNamara: Yes.
Wiesner: In fact, we could do it with our regular missiles, if we
wanted to.
McNamara: There is a great probability that Leningrad system will
have some capability of this kind.48
Wiesner: See, if we really wanted to attack a satellite now, we think
we can do it relatively quickly with a Minuteman, or even with a smaller
missile.
President Kennedy: Well, in any case, we are going to be back again
tomorrow morning and we are going to see if we can get this thing down to
eight and then what the schedule ought to be in view of priorities [unclear].
Unidentified: Right.
Seaborg: Mr. President, there is one thing: Cutting the weapons
development tests won’t help much on the schedule.
Unidentified: No.
Seaborg: We have to do it on the left-hand column.
President Kennedy: Now, we are also concerned, which we haven’t
talked about much, about radiation.
Wiesner: Well, this is why I feel strongly about THUMBELINA.
Unidentified: That’s where THUMBELINA helps.
Wiesner: THUMBELINA helps a great deal; but the Ripple II and
III [tests of ripple nuclear devices] will also make a substantial difference. I understand the Secretary’s—
President Kennedy shuts off the machine.
The National Security Council, at its meeting on Friday, decided to reduce
the 11 remaining tests to 8, dropping the AEC’s HAYMAKER Prime,
URRACA, and a DOD high-altitude test. The President saved THUMBELINA because it had been designed by Los Alamos and would provide
an important development base for that laboratory. There were two
alternative sets of dates for these eight tests, depending on the date of
48. The Soviets were thought to be building an ABM system around Leningrad.
110
M O N DAY, S E P T E M B E R
10, 1962
Walter Schirra’s Mercury mission. Under no circumstances would the
high-altitude BLUEGILL shot go up until after Schirra had come down.49
Kennedy had one more meeting before the end of Thursday with
Arthur Goldberg and Walter Reuther, the head of the United Auto
Workers [UAW]. This was apparently the meeting Reuther had requested
the previous week to talk about the recent problems between the UAW
and the AFL-CIO. This was not taped.
The President left the Oval Office at 7:40 P.M.
Monday, September 10, 1962
The twin pots of Cuba and Berlin continued to simmer. Cuban policy
seemed to be increasingly a difficult domestic matter for Kennedy. The
administration had managed to keep the congressional resolution for the
reserve call-up under wraps until Senate Majority Leader Mike Mansfield
introduced it on September 7. Senate Minority Leader Everett Dirksen
had kept the secret, but just as soon as Mansfield made his statement, the
Republican leadership began a campaign in favor of much tougher action
against Cuba. At the same time, an incident half a world away was also
complicating Kennedy’s Cuba policy. On September 8 a U-2 reconnaissance aircraft on a joint U.S.-Taiwanese mission had disappeared over the
People’s Republic of China and was presumed shot down. Given the
administration’s existing concerns about the consequences of a U-2 incident over Cuba, the event in Asia reopened the debate over what risks
were acceptable to maintain surveillance over the island.
The most disturbing news to reach Kennedy was about Khrushchev
and Berlin. In his second meeting that year with a high-level U.S. visitor
(the first in May, with Salinger and Sorenson), Khrushchev had brought
Secretary of the Interior Stewart Udall to his Black Sea resort at
49. Diary of Glenn Seaborg, Entry, 6 September 1962, John F. Kennedy Library. In the end,
there would be nine remaining tests in the DOMINIC series. Five of the nine were airdrop tests,
of which ANDROSCOGGIN (2 October 1962) and HOUSATONIC (30 October 1962) tested
the Ripple II device, and CHAMA (18 October) the Thumbellina device. The ANDROSCOGGIN failed, which may be the reason why there was an extra test in this last group. The four
high-altitude tests were CHECKMATE (20 October 1962), BLUEGILL Triple Prime (26
October 1962), KINGFISH (1 November 1962), and TIGHTROPE (4 November 1962). All of
the high-altitude tests took place after Walter Schirra’s nine-hour Mercury mission on 3
October 1962.
M O N DAY, S E P T E M B E R
10, 1962
111
Pitsunda. The Soviet press was about to announce that Berlin negotiations were deadlocked and there would be a pause. Khrushchev now told
Udall, who told Kennedy, just what would happen after that pause. He
said, “We will give [President Kennedy] a choice—go to war, or sign a
peace treaty [ending occupation rights in Berlin]. We will not allow your
troops to be in Berlin.” Khrushchev added, “if any lunatics in your country want war, Western Europe will hold them back.” If that were not
enough, “It’s been a long time since you could spank us like a little boy—
now we can swat your ass. So let’s not talk about force. We’re equally
strong,” Khrushchev blustered. “You want Berlin. Access to it goes through
East Germany. We have the advantage. If you want to do anything, you
have to start a war.” But Khrushchev promised a lull before he brought
the crisis to a conclusion. “Out of resepct for your President we won’t do
anything until November [after the midterm elections].” None of this
was public. What was public was bad enough. Khrushchev had also met
with visiting U.S. poet Robert Frost, who then recounted to reporters (in
a cleaned up version of what Khrushchev actually said) how Khrushchev
had told him that “we were too liberal to fight.”1
In Congress, when the talk wasn’t on Cuba, there was discussion of a
plan to allow the self-employed to build retirement accounts of their own,
what would become the Self-Employed Pension–Individual Retirement
Account (SEP-IRA), and the President’s foreign aid bill.
The President had spent the weekend at Hammersmith Farm in
Newport, Rhode Island, catching some of the excitement of the upcoming America’s Cup Challenge. Ahead of him this Monday were a series of
important meetings, only half of which he would choose to tape.
A sense of history and, of course, politics apparently influenced the
President’s choice of what to tape this day. Former president Dwight D.
Eisenhower remained a special challenge for Kennedy. Enormously
respected throughout the world, Eisenhower retained the affection of
millions of Americans. Journalist and sometime Kennedy adviser Joseph
Alsop once described the difference in the hold that the younger
President and Eisenhower had on the American people. Kennedy commanded their minds, but only Eisenhower had been given a place in
American hearts. The former president had just returned from a lengthy
1. Memorandum of Conversation between Khrushchev and Udall, 6 September 1962, in FRUS,
15: 309. Kennedy apparently read this document, since he alluded to its contents at least once, on
tape, later in the day. On Frost, see Richard Reeves, President Kennedy: Profile of Power (New
York: Simon & Schuster, 1993), p. 351.
112
M O N DAY, S E P T E M B E R
10, 1962
European tour, which had included a long conversation with the prickly
German chancellor Konrad Adenauer. Kennedy needed Eisenhower’s
blessing, or at least a political nonaggression pact, to keep control of the
domestic debate on measures appropriate to the current tensions in
Europe. Later in the day, Kennedy would meet with his Berlin team to
discuss the latest developments and to hammer out the responses that
the Western alliance would make if Khrushchev seized West Berlin.
Possibly just before turning to Eisenhower and these foreign matters, Kennedy called his Secretary of the Treasury to discuss whether to
veto the Self-employed Pension Bill.
Time Unknown
Now, what I’ve got to indicate, therefore, is that I’ll veto it if
it’s hung on this bill and that they’ve got a better chance to
override my veto if it’s separate than they have with this bill.
Conversation with Douglas Dillon2
Despite overwhelming congressional support for H.R. 10, the Selfemployed Pension Bill, President Kennedy felt compelled to oppose the
measure. A similar bill had passed the House on three previous occasions
but had always been rejected by the Senate. Three days before this conversation, on September 7, the measure gained the approval of the Senate for
the first time, and though it emerged in a much diluted form compared to
the original House proposal, it appeared headed for only a modest reworking in the House-Senate conference committee. The precursor of the many
tax deductible private pension plans of later years, Keogh-Smathers—as it
was often called—provided for the partial deductibility of contributions to
private pension plans made by owner managers and the self-employed.3
2. Dictabelt 3A.6, Cassette A, John F. Kennedy Library, President’s Office Files, Presidential
Recordings Collection. C. Douglas Dillon, secretary of the treasury. See also transcripts for
the President’s conversations on H.R. 10 with Albert Gore on 8 October 1962, and with
George Smathers on 10 October 1962.
3. The principal sponsors of the original bill were Eugene J. Keogh, Democratic U.S. representative from New York, 1937 to 1967, and George A. Smathers, Democratic U.S. senator from
Florida, 1951 to 1969. Under its final provisions, eligible self-employed individuals could
deduct 50 percent of their contributions up to an annual maximum of $2,500 or 10 percent of
Conversation with Douglas Dillon
113
Having received estimates that it would produce a revenue loss of
$100 to $125 million, Kennedy expressed a private desire, soon made
public, that he would prefer to veto the legislation.4 The Treasury had
also weighed in against the bill and had recommended a veto on the basis
of the expected revenue drain and on the realization that the lion’s share
of benefits under the measure would go to wealthy physicians and attorneys. Only the likelihood of near unanimous congressional support and a
potential veto override gave the President any reason to consider signing H.R. 10.5 And though Kennedy believed that the bill was, indeed,
based on a principle of taxpayer equity (since it provided some private
pension plans with tax benefits comparable to those enjoyed by public
pension plans) and that it might be worthy of consideration in a larger
package of tax reform, the estimated revenue loss and the status of its
expected beneficiaries convinced him to issue a veto threat.
While it eventually would be passed as a separate bill, some of its
champions in the Senate launched a preemptive, and ultimately abortive,
search for the appropriate “veto-proof ” legislation on which to add, by
amendment, the provisions of H.R. 10. In the following conversation
with Treasury secretary Douglas Dillon, Kennedy ponders a strategy by
which the administration could convince supporters of the bill not to
hang it on other more favored legislation.
Douglas Dillon: [Unclear] allow me to say that . . . even if he’s retiring in due course—6
President Kennedy: Yeah.
Dillon: [Unclear] will be chosen shortly—
President Kennedy: Right.
Dillon: [Unclear] wait until after Congress has gone home.
President Kennedy: Right. OK . . . fine. Good.
their annual income, whichever was less. In addition, the tax benefits would not be granted to
an employer if he did not offer the same partially deductible retirement contributions to all
employees. The original House version allowed for 100 percent deductibility up to the
$2,500/10 percent limits. A Senate floor amendment by Senators Russell Long (D-Louisiana)
and Eugene J. McCarthy (D-Minnesota) changed this to 50 percent.
4. The estimated revenue loss in the original House version was $365 million.
5. It passed the House unanimously and garnered only four no votes in the Senate: Paul Douglas
(D-Illinois), Albert Gore (D-Tennessee), Pat McNamara (D-Michigan), and Wayne Morse (DOregon). The final version of the bill that emerged out of the Senate-House conference committee also passed unanimously in the House and received only eight no votes in the Senate.
6. “He” is unidentified.
114
M O N DAY, S E P T E M B E R
10, 1962
Douglas Dillon: You don’t have to worry about that.
President Kennedy: OK, good. Now, let’s see . . . this problem of
H.R. 10. They . . . see, [Everett] Dirksen and everything, they’re arguing that unless they hang it on this bill, that I’ll veto it.7 Now, what I’ve
got to indicate, therefore, is that I’ll veto it if it’s hung on this bill and
that they’ve got a better chance to override my veto if it’s separate than
they have with this bill. It’s rather . . . it may not be right, but that’s the
only way. Because, otherwise, they’re going to hang it on this bill.
Dillon: Yeah, although . . . you think they . . . you don’t think they
have the votes?
President Kennedy: Well, I . . . they won’t unless they think I’m
going to veto it.
Dillon: I see.
President Kennedy: So, I’m giving the impression that we’re going to
veto it, and I thought the Treasury people ought to at least have that line—
Dillon: Yeah, fine.
President Kennedy: —that this would be too much of a revenue loss,
it doesn’t belong in this bill, and we just have to veto it.
Dillon: Yeah, the same sort of thing we said about the Cannon
amendment.
President Kennedy: Yeah, right.
Dillon: That [unclear].
President Kennedy: OK, good.
Dillon: OK.
President Kennedy: All right. Thank you.
At 12:30 P.M. the former President arrived at the White House through a
side door. Minutes after Eisenhower’s arrival, the Reverend Billy Graham
paid a call on both Presidents in the Oval Office. Graham was just returning from a visit to Latin America and had some news to bring the
President about the strength of Fidel Castro’s supporters in South
America. President Kennedy tapes the meeting through the receiver of
his telephone. He rarely used this method of taping.8
7. Everett M. Dirksen was a Republican senator from Illinois, 1951 to 1969, and Senate Minority
Leader, 1959 to 1969.
8. It is possible that the conversation on Dictabelt 3A.7, which has not been found, was the
object of President Kennedy’s effort to tape. Ending that conversation, the President might
have forgotten to switch off the dictabelt machine and thus this room conversation was picked
up by either an open receiver or the telephone speaker.
Meeting with Bill y Graham and Dwight Eisenhow er
115
12:35–12:40 P.M.
And the anti-Communist forces are getting hysterical because
they feel that we’re not defending them like we ought to, right
or wrong.
Meeting with Billy Graham and Dwight Eisenhower9
The Reverend William Franklin Graham, Jr.—more popularly known as
Billy Graham—paid a brief courtesy call on the President before departing for the second half of his 1962 Latin America tour. Relations between
President Kennedy and Graham, the most popular Protestant evangelist
of the era, had never been close, in part because of the minister’s friendly
relations with both Dwight Eisenhower and Richard Nixon. Eisenhower’s
arrival for his luncheon with President Kennedy allowed the brief exchange
of greetings. Graham took the opportunity to reiterate the importance of
Latin America’s problems. Although Latin America was an overwhelmingly Catholic region, Graham was deeply concerned that Communist
inroads posed a general threat to religious freedom in the area. This short
conversation begins with Graham discussing his experiences during the
first portion of his Latin American tour in early 1962, when his proselytizing campaign encountered resistance by local authorities and violent
demonstrations. It was recorded on the Dictaphone connected to the
President’s telephone and, therefore, is of poor quality.10
Billy Graham: There are these guerrillas up in the mountains in
Colombia. I was there. They killed 32 in the town I was in the night I
9. Including President Kennedy, Dwight Eisenhower, Billy Graham, and Evelyn Lincoln.
Dictabelt 3A.8, Cassette A, John F. Kennedy Library, President’s Office Files, Presidential
Recordings Collection.
10. In January and February 1962, Graham toured Venezuela, Colombia, Ecuador, Peru, and
Chile. Then beginning in São Paulo, Brazil, on 25 September 1962, he toured Brazil, Paraguay,
Argentina, and Uruguay. “Billy in Catholic Country: He Collides with Clergy,” Time, 23
February 1962, pp. 77–78; Current Biography Yearbook, 1973 (New York: H. W. Wilson, 1974),
pp. 151–54; Marshall Frady, Billy Graham: A Parable of American Righteousness (Boston: Little,
Brown, 1979), pp. 441–46; Billy Graham, Just As I Am: The Autobiography of Billy Graham (San
Francisco: Harper San Francisco, 1997), pp. 188–92, 199–206, 356–57, 360–68, 389–402;
Carroll Kilpatrick, “President Confers With Ike 2 Hours,” Washington Post, 11 September
1962, pp. A1, A6; New York Times, 24 January 1962, p. 3; Wallace Terry, “Billy Graham
Condemns Sterilization,” Washington Post, 11 September 1962, p. A6.
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M O N DAY, S E P T E M B E R
10, 1962
was there.11 And they swooped down. They’ve killed over 300,000 in the
last 14 years.12 And they claim now that Castro is in control of these
guerrillas.
Unidentified: In what? In Colombia?
Graham: In Colombia.
And he says the way to the United States is through the Colombian
Andes. And hoped [unclear] get organized and give weapons to [unclear].
And so, the infiltration is tremendous. And the anti-Communist forces are
getting hysterical because they feel that we’re not defending them like we
ought to, right or wrong. And I know it’s a very delicate problem.
Dwight D. Eisenhower: But it isn’t easy. [Unclear.] But these ones, the
20[,000], the 25,000 . . . but a . . . but, the main thing . . . that they charge
. . . American policy is that [we support] an oppressive regime . . . the
supporters, that is . . . [we’re] keeping them down, and . . . And, therefore, America is wrong. “America ought to give us the weapons and not to
our bosses.” And [unclear] . . .
Graham: And how to get it to them—
Eisenhower: And [unclear]. . . . [Unclear] we were discussing, however, on the telephone today [unclear] pushing, pushing for them and I’d
like to take them on the ears: What do you mean by it?
President Kennedy: As matter of fact from Bogotá [unclear]. The, a,
there’s no a . . . the a . . . Colombia actually has, you know, [Alberto]
Lleras Camargo, he’s a first-class [unclear] government—13
Eisenhower: Oh, yes. Oh, yes. They [unclear]. The tape skips.
Unidentified: —The [unclear] president [unclear] the same thing.
The person was asked if he had been asked to help finance the [unclear]
to help them to get out of the [unclear].
Graham: Right. [Unclear exchange.] If you can do the same thing
somehow in Brazil.
Unidentified: We’ve diversified the problems down in there [unclear].
11. Graham refers to his visit to Cali, Colombia, during his Latin American tour earlier in
1962. In his autobiography published in 1997, Graham records the incident slightly differently, reporting that the guerillas killed “fourteen people not far from where we were staying”
in Cali (Graham, Just As I Am, pp. 364–65).
12. From 1948 to 1962, Colombia endured La Violencia, a period of intense violence between
Liberal and Conservative political factions that left over 200,000 Colombians dead.
13. Alberto Lleras Camargo, who had just stepped down after his second term as president of
Colombia (1945–46, 7 August 1958 to 7 August 1962), was a strong supporter of Kennedy’s
Alliance for Progress.
Meeting with Bill y Graham and Dwight Eisenhow er
117
Graham: Well, I was sure delighted to see you. Please give my
regards to the Mister Vice President.
Graham starts to leave, causing a number of people to speak at the same
time. Someone says “Nice to see you.”
Graham: Thank you very much. Nice to see you. [Multiple voices
continue.]
Unidentified: . . . in Georgia.
Graham: [Unclear.]
Unidentified: Oh, I see.
Graham: He’s playing golf—
Unidentified: Oh. Oh.
Graham: —in North Carolina right now. Good-bye. Thank you.
Unidentified: All right, Mister Graham. All right.
Graham: Fine. Thank you.
Evelyn Lincoln: Have a good evening.
Graham: Thank you. I’m so glad to see you.
Again the sounds of a number of people saying good-bye to Graham.
Someone says “Thank you very much,” and another says to Graham
“Well, we’ll wish you [unclear] Vice President.”
Graham: Yes. [Unclear.] [Laughter.] Bye. Thank you. Bye.
Unidentified: May I, Mrs. Lincoln?
Evelyn Lincoln: Sure, sure.
Unidentified: The Attorney General won’t be here until about one. And
he’ll stand by and then he’ll [unclear] unless of course the [Attorney
General] judge. He’ll go over the canal about 20 minutes to seven. Then
we’re bringing him back for a short tour [unclear] Billy Graham later
that [unclear].
President Kennedy: All right.
Unidentified: . . . and for his pictures [unclear].
President Kennedy: Are you gentlemen all set? [Two voices agree
simultaneously.]
Unidentified: Thank you, General Schulz from the rest of us.14 [Pause.]
Unidentified: We’ll need a ride. [Unclear.]
Unidentified: No. Leave that right there. [Unclear.]
After Billy Graham left the White House, Kennedy and Eisenhower
met in the Oval Office to discuss Eisenhower’s trip to West Germany.
14. Brigadier General Robert L. Schulz, retired, longtime aide to General Eisenhower.
118
M O N DAY, S E P T E M B E R
10, 1962
12:40 –1:02 P.M.
You can’t go up the autobahn waving an atom bomb. . . .
[T]he first time . . . a bridge is blown out in front of you, you
can’t begin a nuclear exchange with the Soviet Union over
getting to Berlin.
Meeting with Dwight Eisenhower15
In late July, President Kennedy’s predecessor, Dwight David Eisenhower,
made a six-week trip to Western Europe. On his return, President
Kennedy wrote him and requested a meeting. The two Presidents were
not only from different generations but also from different political parties. President Kennedy felt that Eisenhower found him young and inexperienced even though Kennedy himself thought the older man woefully
uninformed. In explaining why his brother often conferred with
Eisenhower, Attorney General Robert Kennedy recalled that “feeling
Eisenhower was important and his election was so close—he always went
out of his way to make sure that Eisenhower was brought in on all matters and that Eisenhower couldn’t hurt the administration by going off
and attacking.”16
On September 10, the two Presidents met at the White House.
Eisenhower brought Kennedy a copy of a memorandum about his conversation with West German chancellor Konrad Adenauer on August 2.17 In
the discussions before lunch, the two U.S. Presidents dealt with the topics
from that memorandum, which covered primarily NATO issues. Kennedy
was interested to discover whether Eisenhower might cause him political
trouble by criticizing his European defense policies. He need not have
been worried. There was a large degree of continuity between the two
administrations’ West European policies.
The heavy financial load that the United States carried for the mili-
15. Tape 21, John F. Kennedy Library, President’s Office Files, Presidential Recordings
Collection.
16. Edwin O. Guthman and Jeffrey Shulman, eds., Robert Kennedy in His Own Words: The
Unpublished Recollections of the Kennedy Years (New York: Bantam Books, 1988), p. 55.
17. “Conversation with Chancellor Adenauer,” 2 August 1962, Dwight Eisenhower papers,
post-presidential series, Box 27, folder: Principal file, 1962, Dwight D. Eisenhower Presidential
Library.
Meeting with Dwight Eisenhow er
119
tary defense of Western Europe, which had so vexed Kennedy during
August, remained on his mind. Kennedy was interested in hearing
Eisenhower’s thoughts on pressing for greater allied contribution to a
conventional ground force buildup in Europe.
For President Kennedy, the ongoing Berlin crisis necessitated a
NATO strategy based on graduated military responses in order to limit a
war before it escalated to nuclear conflagration. President Eisenhower
had also grappled with the crisis over Berlin.
West German chancellor Konrad Adenauer questioned President
Kennedy’s commitment to Berlin and resisted the U.S. insistence on a
conventional force buildup in Central Europe. Adenauer feared that a
NATO strategy that stressed conventional defense below the nuclear
threshold might make war more likely and thus expose West Germany
as the probable chief theater of war.
President Kennedy and Eisenhower believed that French president
Charles de Gaulle was capitalizing on Adenauer’s anxiety and disenchantment with the United States. The two American Presidents feared
that de Gaulle’s vision of Europe was anti–Anglo-Saxon in outlook and
threatened the integrity of NATO. They speculated about the various
implications of the Franco-German rapprochement, ceremoniously signaled on September 14, 1958, at Colombey-des-Deux-Églises, where the
two European statesmen met. Periodic meetings between the West
German chancellor and the French president had continued. Most
recently, in July 1962, Adenauer had spent three days in France. Then in
September, de Gaulle had visited Bonn.
Another problem that had carried over from the President’s August
meetings on Berlin and Europe was a change in the U.S. military command. Adenauer worried that it signaled a shift in U.S. nuclear strategy
toward greater reliance on conventional weapons. In late July, the Supreme
Allied Commander, Europe (SACEUR), General Lauris Norstad, had
announced his resignation, effective November 1, 1962.18 His intended
replacement was the present Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, General
Lyman Lemnitzer. Kennedy had nominated General Maxwell D. Taylor as
General Lemnitzer’s successor. Norstad had enjoyed a special relationship
with the Europeans because he had conceived SACEUR’s role as increasingly independent of Washington and had envisioned NATO as a fourth
18. Norstad’s resignation was eventually postponed to 1 January 1963 because of the Cuban
missile crisis.
120
M O N DAY, S E P T E M B E R
10, 1962
nuclear power. His departure, amidst a controversy over the deployment
of a land-based medium-range ballistic missile (MRBM) force under
SACEUR’s direct command, fueled West German and French resentment
of U.S. hegemony.
The tape recording begins as Eisenhower commiserates with Kennedy
about the European allies.
Dwight D. Eisenhower: For now, as I mentioned in my note, I think
that events have sort of overtaken—
President Kennedy: Well, I wrote him a letter, and he wrote back a
very nice letter. I talked to Globke here the other day, and evidently he
[Adenauer] goes into these fits of depression.19 Whether it’s their sort
of overdependence upon us, which makes them particularly sensitive to
what we do, but . . . I find that—I’m sure you did—somewhat harassing
because here we do these things . . . we keep our forces there. The
French have only a division and a half in West Germany instead of
four.20 The Germans just cut their defense budget from 17 billion down
to 15.8, which means they aren’t going to reach the figures that they
originally said they would.21
Eisenhower: I know. They told me they wouldn’t.
President Kennedy: Yeah, well, they just cut it within a two- or
three-week period. I think, since your visit there. The finance minister
[Ludwig Erhard] made [West German minister of defense Franz Josef]
Strauss cut it so that this has dropped—so now we’re going to appeal to
them. Well, with all that, and the fact that the British, the Army of the
Rhine is not to NATO standards—
Eisenhower: Yes, yes.
President Kennedy: I feel that sometimes that they place more burdens on us than they’re entitled to do.
Eisenhower: That’s correct and, I’m going to tell you, Mr. President,
when I went through in 1951—January—I went around to all these,
every one of these places. I said, “Now as far as I understand the policy of
my government”—that was Truman’s plan. I said, “This is an emergency
effort to get you people a chance to get on your feet. You’ve got 225 mil-
19. Dr. Hans Globke was state secretary in the office of Chancellor Adenauer.
20. As set forth by NATO Policy Directive MC 26/4 in the summer of 1961.
21. The West German Ministry of Defense had requested 18.2 billion deutsche marks. The
West German Bundestag approved a defense budget of 14.97 billion deutsche marks.
Meeting with Dwight Eisenhow er
121
lion people. We know you’ve got a collective labor force about twice the
size, in skilled labor, twice the size of ours. There’s no reason why you
people can’t keep the ground forces. Now in the meantime, the United
States has got to keep the deterrent—all the big bombs and all the rest of
it. We’ve got to keep the big thing and an enormous air force. Your
expenditures in those things don’t need to be very heavy, but you’ve got
to begin to produce these conventional and land forces.”
“Well,” which they said, “Well, you want us just to be the ol’ land
man and you come in and be the . . . you know, the glamour boys.”
I said, “To the hell with that, we’re trying to find the . . . how can we
put together our assets to have the best defense.” Now I tried to sell—I
sold this idea. I mean, they said they accepted it.
But as time has gone on, and for eight years, I desperately tried
behind the scenes to get these people to admit we ought to begin to get
out; they wouldn’t do it. And I’m afraid that just through custom they
have thought of the—begin to think of the thing as their right, that this
is just their . . . And if you say, “Well, you now ought to do a little more,
that you ought to pay for this or that [or anything].” Oh, they get very
emotional.
But Mr. Adenauer started off to tell me about relations between
France and Germany. These he said were improving markedly and rapidly, and that both he and General de Gaulle were committed to a complete rapprochement, and that his own trip through—about six or seven
days through France—had been almost a triumphal tour. He was very
pleased.22 And he said he thought that this was going on to . . . so that
very soon, they would be allowing all people to go back and forth over
their borders without even, without cards, like we demand up in . . .
cards you carry between Mexico and so on. He says it’s all just free circulation.
I said, “Well, if you start the intermarrying, then you’ll have union,
and be all right.”
He is very keen on this and, really, I think, is now looking upon
French-German friendship, and a sort of an entente, as a new type of,
almost an axis of influence in that area. This was what he said was the
encouraging part about the European thing and he thought this also of
the Common Market.23
22. Adenauer made a state visit to France in early July 1962.
23. Signed in 1957, the Treaty of Rome established the European Economic Community (EEC),
also referred to as the Common Market, and the European Atomic Energy Commission
122
M O N DAY, S E P T E M B E R
10, 1962
And I— we —had a long talk about the Common Market, which
seemed to have no —nothing—no application to defense.
Then he came . . . the next thing that bothered him though very very
much was the relief of Norstad.24 And he told the long story of the—
about this being a surprise and everything else. And he was very
unhappy—first, that he was leaving. He said, “Norstad has gotten to be
an influence that we think is almost necessary—backup.” I told him then
of my friendship with Lemnitzer, and I said, “I don’t see how you can get
a better man. Now, he hasn’t had quite as much experience in this kind of
thing [as] Norstad.”25
But he was. . . . I sent Lemnitzer over to [British field marshal Sir
Harold] Alexander as his operation officer in a big army group, and, I
said, “He does know something about allied work together.”26
Now, he said, then, but he [Adenauer] said, “By and large, we see
this as two things. You’re putting in . . . you’re sending Lemnitzer out
and Norstad out because they apparently have not understood the policies, or not have followed the policies that America is now adopting. And
you’re putting in General [Maxwell] Taylor.”27 Then he reached over
and got a book, and this book was [laughs] General Taylor’s book.28
And he said, “Now I must tell you, General,” he said, “I tell you as
your friend, if this book—if the philosophy of this book—is going to be
adopted in Europe,” he said, “I am afraid there will be disastrous consequences in Western Europe.”
And I said, “Well, you better go ahead, Mr. Chancellor.”
“Well,” he said, “well, the philosophy of this book is that we should
(EURATOM). The original six signatories were Belgium, the Federal Republic of Germany,
France, Italy, Luxembourg, and the Netherlands.
24. General Lauris Norstad, Supreme Allied Commander, Europe (SACEUR), 20 November
1956 to 1 January 1963.
25. General Lyman Lemnitzer was Norstad’s successor as SACEUR, 1 January 1963 to 1 July
1969.
26. Then Brigadier General Lemnitzer was Alexander’s U.S. deputy, his deputy chief of staff,
for the 15th Army Group during World War I.
27. Reference to General Maxwell Taylor, Lemnitzer’s successor as Chairman of the Joint
Chiefs of Staff. Taylor served as U.S. Army chief of staff under President Eisenhower from
1955 to 1959 and emerged as a leading critic of the Eisenhower administration’s policies.
28. Reference to Taylor’s The Uncertain Trumpet (New York: Harper, 1959), a landmark study of
U.S. military security needs, which indicted Eisenhower’s national security policy, generated
considerable controversy around the 1960 election, and popularized the term flexible response to
describe the need for limited military options short of nuclear war. See “Meeting about Berlin,”
6 August 1962, for a discussion of West German anxiety.
Meeting with Dwight Eisenhow er
123
not depend on atomic bombs.” And he said, “we’re going to—we shouldn’t fight and strive to fight our wars by conventional weapons.” He said,
“If we do this, and if we adopt this kind of philosophy, this means that
America is again ready to see Europe overrun. Then we will start—
starting way back to where we were in 1942—to go back and plan [to
retake a Soviet-occupied Europe] and after all of this destruction and
occupation.” And he said, “This time it won’t be as easy as it was under
Hitler.” And this should, by and large, he said, he saw this as a very
strong evidence of an enormous and revolutionary change in American
policy, defense policy in Western Europe.
And I said, “Well, now, I’m not going, I can’t quarrel about that. I
mean I can’t argue the case because I am not privy to exactly to the
inner circles of portions of what you’re saying. But I do know this.
They’ve [the Kennedy administration] said they’re spending a good
many billions to keep our deterrent in a very top shape, and the missile
work as far as I can see is not only going ahead but, from all that my G-2
friends tell me from time to time, our strength is growing up even more
rapidly than what we thought, first calculated, and to greater value.29
Therefore, I can’t see that any of our, any government—any American
government—is discounting the effect of the deterrent or its need to use
it in the face of overwhelming strength.
Now, shortly after that, that was the gist of his talk, although he
brought in all sorts of details and, you might say, auxiliary sort of reasons to support this. But then I got a word. It came out from one of his
friends, one of his people, that reached me, oh, a week later. Said that
General Taylor had given some testimony that greatly reassured
him.30 Now, I didn’t read this testimony; I didn’t want to . . . But apparently . . . The German said, that spoke to me said, that apparently
General Taylor no longer believes exactly what he said in his book
because he had changed his mind. So, the big, real thing, was when I
saw this in the paper and then this German came to see me and told me
this. I said, “Well, I think maybe there’s no need for telling you because
29. The abbreviation G-2 is used in the Army to refer to staff intelligence personnel.
30. On 9 August, while Eisenhower was touring Europe, the U.S. Senate by unanimous vote
confirmed Taylor’s nomination as Chairman of the JCS. The action followed a hearing by the
Senate Armed Services Committee. At one point, Taylor assured the committee that “I am not
returning, if you gentlemen confirm me, as a crusader for change but rather one to make the
present system as effective as possible” (see Congressional Quarterly Weekly Report, 24 August
1962, p. 1421).
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M O N DAY, S E P T E M B E R
10, 1962
it’s probably something you’d write about a friend with and knew about
the change.”
President Kennedy: Well, I think that . . . Of course, I think they misstated Taylor’s position. As you know, Taylor’s been very strong on tactical atomic weapons.
Eisenhower: Yes. Oh, yes . . . Oh, yes . . .
President Kennedy: And I, so I . . . there’s in fact . . . Norstad . . . I
think it’s a great loss—Norstad. For example, last spring . . . As you
know, [General Lucius] Clay and Norstad had a rather difficult time.31
Eisenhower: Oh did they? No, I didn’t know that.
President Kennedy: Yeah. Well, there was a good deal of tension
there.
Eisenhower: Hmm.
President Kennedy: For example, last spring, General Clay wanted to
have the civilian—at the time buzzing was taking place take place in the
corridor—he wanted a fighter escort at that time.32 General Norstad disagreed. And we went with General Norstad. And I think it was the right
thing, as [a] matter of fact. They, as you know, they called the buzzing off.
But there was a good deal of . . . I don’t know whether it’s wanting to go
back to other times—but there was a good deal of friction.
Eisenhower: I didn’t know that.
President Kennedy: But I think that Norstad is first class, but when
he came back last winter, he said . . . I guess he’s had what—two heart
attacks—or one?
Eisenhower: Yes, that’s right.
President Kennedy: So he said he wanted to resign at the end of this
year. So, then when General Lemnitzer’s time ended [as JCS Chairman],
I was either faced with having him reappointed again or putting him
back, so this seemed to be the best arrangement.
But it was unfortunate that General [James] Gavin left in September,
who had been identified with support for the French nuclear effort.33 And
General Norstad left. General Lemnitzer went in. And these things are
regarded, I think, as quite significant. And the chancellor is 86. But as I
say, I find—I think that the criticisms, which are traditionally leveled at
31. General Lucius D. Clay was the President’s special representative in Berlin until May
1962, thereafter special consultant to the Joint Chiefs of Staff. Clay was chosen for his symbolic role as the hero of the 1948 Berlin airlift while he was the U.S. military governor for
occupied Germany.
32. Reference to Soviet harassment of Western aircraft.
33. General James Gavin was the U.S. ambassador to France until mid-September 1962.
Meeting with Dwight Eisenhow er
125
the United States, when you think that the amount of ground divisions
we have there, the amount of effort we’re putting in various places.
Again the French—a division and a half in West Germany. I talked
to Ambassador [Hervé] Alphand this morning, and I said, “I don’t
understand.”34 I said, “This French-German rapprochement is wonderful, but here the Germans, who have been quite critical of us this summer, as I say, have cut their defense budget in the last month even though
they’ve got a very strong economy. And the French have a division and a
half even though your minimum goal is four under NATO, and you really
should have six.”35
He said, “Well, we’ve got them for the defense of France.”
But I said, “Well, look, you can’t have two divisions here [in Western
Europe] and two others . . .” The British are—
Eisenhower: That’s right.
President Kennedy: [Unclear] on us. So I think that the press, particularly some feed this, these European criticisms of our efforts—I think
that considering the load we carry compared to the load they carry . . .
Eisenhower: That’s right.
President Kennedy: It’s incredible.
Eisenhower: I would agree, and, a matter of fact, I would . . . I tried
my best, although every time I did the diplomats always said, “Now you
do it, you’re going to lose Europe now; that’s all there is to it because
their temper and this and that and the other thing and the psychological
reaction.”
But I tried every possible way. I said, “Well, now let’s make these
smaller divisions. Let’s begin to show them that we are concerned about
this big spending.” After all, we built almost unaided that great infrastructure that starts right at the ports and goes all the way through the
place. We’ve got airfields. We’ve got everything and, of course, de
Gaulle did not . . . De Gaulle didn’t talk to me substantively at all. He
just proved very nice, very hospitable, and all that, very kind, but we
didn’t talk about it. And he wouldn’t, you know. He’s a very very
[unclear] man.
But, on the other hand, the German gave me the understanding that
not only were they going to go right up to their target. But I said, “Of
course, your target is too small. You are a people of still only 60 million.
34. Hervé Alphand was French ambassador to the United States. President Kennedy and he
met between 11:05 and 11:34 A.M.
35. Four divisions were specified under NATO Policy Directive MC 26/4.
126
M O N DAY, S E P T E M B E R
10, 1962
You’re right there on the firing line. Our country, which is, I say, three
times the size, is doing much more than three times what you’re doing,
and you people ought to be waking up to this.” But I’m astonished that
they cut their—
President Kennedy: Yeah. Well, Bob McNamara is coming over to
give you the figures on it.36
Eisenhower: Well, I think when I write to Adenauer I’m going to tell
him that I’m astonished.
President Kennedy: That would be very helpful. I think we’ll get
Secretary McNamara to give you the figures. I think that . . . Your talk
was very helpful, too. Of course, he has great regard for you and John
Foster Dulles—37
Eisenhower: We’ve always been very friendly.
President Kennedy: Yeah. So I think the fact that you . . . That helped
reassure him very much, especially when you spoke about Lemnitzer and
Taylor.
Eisenhower: Oh yes. Oh, oh, Lemnitzer . . . to hell with it.
President Kennedy: Yeah, that’s right.
Eisenhower: And I said, “I just can’t believe that you’ll have anything
but satisfaction.” Now, he did bring out that . . . before he gave me all the
circumstantial evidence that showed that what’s his name, Norstad,
knew nothing about his immediate relief. Because he . . . Norstad, only
by happenstance had been there about five days earlier. And was talking
with him, the plans that they were going to do together, and so I said
well maybe he was under a . . .
President Kennedy: Well. . . . No . . . That’s right. We gave him . . . It
was only five days before his relief because he came back here about a
month in July. He came back in July, and we talked about this. He had earlier said that he would like to resign between August and September and
the next January—he gave a four- or five- month period. Well, we picked
October—the first of November because of the Lemnitzer, Joint Chiefs . . .
So when he came back here in July, we talked about whether we ought
to go to January, and he said no. And he also said he’d like to come out
right away because otherwise it would be rumored and his influence would
36. McNamara joined Kennedy, Eisenhower, and Secretary of State Dean Rusk for lunch and
then met in the Cabinet Room with General Marshall Carter, deputy director of the CIA, and
the two presidents.
37. Dulles was secretary of state under Dwight Eisenhower until his death from cancer in
1959.
Meeting with Dwight Eisenhow er
127
be nonexistent. So that we moved it, at Norstad’s own suggestion, with a
good deal of speed. Now they may have felt that that indicated that we
were . . . Quite the reverse, I’d give anything to have Norstad there
because I think we’re going to have a terribly difficult time with Berlin and
I think Norstad has so much experience and they have so much confidence
in him. It’s a very tough job for Lemnitzer to go in after him.
Eisenhower: That’s right. And not only that, but, at this stage, I’ll
say this: Norstad is a very tough fellow, when he [makes a] commitment. He’s a very great supporter of his own convictions, and normally, I
must say, I think [unclear]. Well, now, I can disabuse you of Laurie
[Norstad] . . . Of his mind on that particular thing because he thinks
that we were—that is our country—was trying to put them in sort of a
secondary position—take it and like it. See we started . . . It happened
when Mr. Truman called me and asked me to go over there. He . . . The
great argument, he was . . . “unanimously these 12 countries,” Mr.
President, “12 countries have asked for you.”
And I said, “Well as long as they’ve asked for me in person, Mr.
President, I mean duty is you will have to send me over.” But God, how
I’d hate to leave home. [Laughs.] I did.
So then we . . . when I was leaving. I was going out . . . and I finally
agreed to come over here and stand for this Republican nomination. And
I said to him I would be . . . “It must be done unanimously; it must be
done correctly.”
So I gave plenty of warning, and they worked and they so . . . and, I
wanted, what’s his name—
President Kennedy: [General Alfred] Gruenther.38
Eisenhower: Gruenther.
They decided to take Ridgway because Ridgway was coming out of
Korea, and I think they wanted to send him over.39 I don’t think that
Ridgway was the temperament for that kind of a job. But anyway, he
didn’t . . . He came back and became the chief of staff about a year later.
But both saw . . . all we did was done unanimously [unclear] by requesting the President to do this. He knew all this past history, and that bothered him because he said it looked like their opinions weren’t very
38. General Alfred Gruenther was a close personal friend of Eisenhower and served as his
chief of staff while Eisenhower was SACEUR, 1951 to 1952. Gruenther was then SACEUR
himself, 11 July 1953 to 20 November 1956.
39. General Matthew Ridgway was commander of the U.N. Command in the Far East, 11
April 1951 to 30 May 1952. He was SACEUR, 30 May 1952 to 11 July 1953, and served as
U.S. Army chief of staff, 1953 to 1955.
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M O N DAY, S E P T E M B E R
10, 1962
important. But I told him that just had to be something that was mechanical . . . No one would do that deliberately. He seemed to take that—
President Kennedy: Well, Norstad wanted us to move because he
thought there would be rumors about . . . As I say, Norstad asked—told
me—that he couldn’t, that this was what his desire was when he was
over in the winter.
Then when he came in July, and he talked to me about what our timing was, he said he’d like it to come as quickly as possible. So what we did
was announce Norstad and then say that if we were asked to submit
somebody, we would submit the name of General Lemnitzer and put it
up to the North Atlantic Treaty Council.
Well, of course, the French are attempting always to justify the need
for their own atomic [force], independent of us.40 So, I think, they raised
some difficulty about it but . . . I don’t know what—where these—when
you think, as I say, what the United States has done for 17 years in
Germany, I think that—
Eisenhower: There’s one point that I do think we’ve got to remember. These people have . . . They were in an awful shape; then the
Marshall Plan of course got them back, and they recognize that. I’ll tell
you the nation that speaks more publicly and openly about the help of
America, American help, is Germany. You never hear of this brought up
in France or Britain—sometimes in Britain. But up in Germany, it’s
almost a religion. Everybody that comes to you says, “Well, now, of
course, we realize what we owe to America.”
But the effort to get these people to doing their own part—I just
don’t know beyond this very argument. If it were the six divisions
there—with the little bit that, the 12 that Germany will have, the one
that France, so on. You’re bound to be back to the Rhine before you can
collect yourself.
President Kennedy: Yeah . . . yeah . . . yeah . . .
Eisenhower: You see. Unless you go into this atomic business. And if
that’s going to be true, you’ve got to have greater strength that can be
deployed rapidly. Well, if they’re going to cut down . . . There’s just . . .
President Kennedy: Yeah . . . yeah.
Eisenhower: There’s something wrong here. I don’t know just what
it is. I hadn’t heard this. I was hopeful . . . I knew that when de Gaulle
brought back his Algerian army, he was going to put most of his
40. Since assuming power in 1958, de Gaulle had declared unequivocally and repeatedly that
France would achieve independent national nuclear capability.
Meeting with Dwight Eisenhow er
129
Algerian army in France. But I never dreamed that he wouldn’t go and
fulfill his commitments—41
President Kennedy: Well, I agree. That’s what I said. I said to
[French ambassador Hervé] Alphand, “This great Franco-German . . .
We are always subject to very sharp criticism by the Germans for not
doing one thing or another.” I said, “But we are doing everything we
committed to under NATO and in addition carrying SAC, and in addition the navy, and in addition Southeast Asia.” I said, “Now, France isn’t
even fulfilling its NATO commitment.”
But, of course, the reason is that they know that they don’t depend
on the French and they depend on us. So, therefore, they’re always concerned about our intentions because they realize that without the United
States, they would be exposed. The fact is that he would be perfectly
right about in talking about our immediate use of nuclear weapons, it
seems to me, if we didn’t have the Berlin problem, because then obviously any Soviet intrusion across the line would be a deliberate one and
would be a signal for war.
When we have this problem of maintaining our position in Berlin,
where you may be using sort of gradually escalating force to maintain
yourself in Berlin, you can’t suddenly begin to drop nuclear weapons the
first time you have a difficulty. That would really be the only—and it’s a
very valid reason for our emphasizing the necessity of their building up
conventional forces. When I saw Clay, he said, “You can’t go up the autobahn waving an atom bomb. And say, the first time you put a . . . a bridge
is blown out in front of you, you can’t begin a nuclear exchange with the
Soviet Union over getting to Berlin.”
Eisenhower: Well of course, on that one, Mr. President, I’ve personally,
I’ve always long thought this from the beginning. If they believe there is
no amount of strength you can put in Berlin, they can say that. I would
think that you could . . . What’s his name—Khrushchev—said to me at
Camp David.42 He was talking about [The United States’s] needing some
41. In 1958, de Gaulle returned to power to end the French-Algerian war. Peace talks began
in March 1961, but bloodshed continued until Algeria gained independence on 1 July 1962. In
September 1961, de Gaulle had begun withdrawing French forces from Algeria. Under NATO
policy directives MC 70 and 26/4, France was committed to contribute four divisions but had
produced only two and one-third divisions to that point.
42. Rural retreat of U.S. presidents in northern Maryland, 70 miles northwest of Washington,
D.C. Established in 1942 as “Shangri-La” by Franklin Roosevelt, Eisenhower renamed it for
his grandson in 1953. When Khrushchev visited the United States in September 1959, he and
Eisenhower had several discussions at Camp David.
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M O N DAY, S E P T E M B E R
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more troops [in West Germany]—there was somewhat at that time in the
public about more, a couple more divisions, and so . . . He [Krushchev]
says, “What are they talking about?” He says, “For every division they can
put in Germany, I can put ten, without any trouble whatsoever.”
And I said, “We know that.” And I said, “But we’re not worrying
about that.” And I said, “I’ll tell you. I don’t propose to fight a conventional war. If you declare . . . if you bring out war, bring on war of global
character . . . There are going to be no conventional, nothing conventional about it.” And I told him flatly.
And he said, “Well.” He said, “That’s a relief. Neither one of us can
afford it.” “Yes,” I said that, and I said, “OK, so I agree to that, too.”
[Laughing.]
President Kennedy: Right. Right.
Eisenhower: But, you see, what these people are afraid of . . . I mean
the essence of his argument was, if you try to fight this thing conventionally from the beginning, when do you start to go nuclear? And this will
never be until you yourselves in other words become in danger and he
said, “That means all of Europe is again gone.” And that—
President Kennedy: But, of course, we’ve got all these nuclear weapons,
as you know, stored in West Berlin. All we are . . . What they are really concerned about is that the Russians will seize Hamburg, which is only a few
miles from the border, and some other towns, and then they’ll say, “We’ll
negotiate.” So then Norstad has come up with this whole strategy. I think
the only difficulty is that no one will . . . That if we did not have the problem, I say, of Berlin and maintaining access through that autobahn authority, then you would say that any attempt to seize any part of West
Germany, we would go to nuclear weapons. But, of course, they never will!
But it’s this difficulty of maintaining a position 120 miles behind
their lines—
Eisenhower: Mr. President, I’ll tell you . . . Here’s something, I can’t
document everything . . . but Clay was there. Poor, poor old Smith is
gone.43 We begged our governments not to go into Berlin.
We . . . I asked that they build a cantonment capital, a cantonment capital at the junction of the British, American, and Russian zones. I said, “We
just don’t, we can’t do this. . . . ” Well, it had been a political thing that had
been done first in the Advisory Council, European Advisory Council, in
London. And later confirmed and . . . But Mr. Roosevelt said to me this
43. Eisenhower was probably referring to Joseph Smith, who as an Army brigadier general,
had been headquarters commander for the Berlin airlift of 1948–49.
Meeting with Dwight Eisenhow er
131
twice—I’m talking about my concern. And he said, “Ike”—and he was
always very, you know, informal—he said, “Ike,” he said, “quit worrying
about Uncle Joe. I’ll take care of Uncle Joe.”
That’s exactly what he told [me]. Once in Tunis and once when I
came over here about the first or second or third of January of ’44.
That’s the last time I ever saw him. Now he just wouldn’t believe that
these guys were these tough and really ruthless so-and-sos they were.44
There’s one other thing that Adenauer brought in that you might
have interest—more than I would—under the security standpoint. He
was talking about the French problem and about bringing the British
into the Common Market.45 And he got into, you might say, into the
same nest. Now he said, “You know, just a few years, when you were
here, General, France wanted Britain in this whole—you might call it
‘association’—in order to balance off Germany.46 Now what they’re
frightened of, is that Britain comes in and Britain will have greater influence in the association than will France.”
Now he said, “This is a . . .” He cited plenty of evidence there. But he
said, “One of the reasons they’re making it so difficult for you to come
into the Common Market . . .” And he said, more or less, as a suspicion of
his, that they were going to be able to prevent [British entry into the
44. Eisenhower did travel with Franklin Roosevelt in Tunis on 21 November 1943. He also
met privately with Roosevelt at the White House on 5 and 12 January 1944. There are no
records of those conversations.
In March and April 1945 Eisenhower had refused to divert his forces to a race to capture
Berlin before the Russians, partly because he knew the postwar occupation zones had already
been decided. Later criticized for this judgment, he tended to be defensive about it [see
Stephen Ambrose, Eisenhower, vol. 1 (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1983), pp. 391–404]. In
now recalling how those zones, and Berlin’s place in them, were originally determined,
Eisenhower mixes memories of general conversations with Franklin Roosevelt about future
relations with Russia in November 1943 and January 1944, when there was probably little or
no specific discussion of Berlin, with the memory of his own subsequent early-1944 proposal
for a “cantonment capital.” Eisenhower made that proposal at a time when Roosevelt still
toyed with the idea of connecting Berlin to the edge of a sketchily imagined U.S. occupation
zone. Under pressure from the British, the Soviets, and his diplomats, Roosevelt gave way
later in 1944 to the scheme which neither he nor Eisenhower had originally supported but
which was finally adopted [see Herbert Feis, Churchill, Roosevelt, Stalin (Princeton, NJ:
Princeton University Press, 1957), pp. 360-65; Dwight D. Eisenhower, Waging Peace: The
White House Years, 1956–1961 (Garden City, NY: Doubleday, 1965), p. 335 and note 5].
45. On 31 July 1961, Prime Minister Harold Macmillan announced Great Britain’s bid for
accession for the EEC. De Gaulle rarely disguised his reluctance to accept Britain’s entrance.
46. During the negotiations for the Treaty of Rome, which established the EEC in 1957, de
Gaulle supported Britain’s entrance. The United Kingdom, however, decided against joining
the Common Market and formed the European Free Trade Association (EFTA) with Austria,
Denmark, Norway, Sweden, and Switzerland.
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M O N DAY, S E P T E M B E R
10, 1962
Common Market] because they would make it impossible really for
Britain to come in, except at the price of complete desertion of the
Commonwealth.
“And you know,” he said, very . . . very wisely, he said, “You know
today, if I were prime minister of Britain, I would not know what is the
answer here.” He says, “For immediate, economic advantage, they should
come into the Common Market. But when you think of all the tradition
and all of the connections they would have to sever and the bad will that
would be engendered throughout the [unclear],” he said, “Oh, this is a
tough problem for them.”
President Kennedy: He doesn’t really want them in? He thinks
because it will weaken the [unclear] the British and just us.
Eisenhower: No, I think . . . I think he would like them in. But he
doesn’t think France wants them in. Because the French . . . He said
France is finally getting into a position they’ve been wanting . . . to get
some kind of a lever on all of Western Europe—where they’re really
bigger . . . big shots.
President Kennedy: And once the British come in they’ll have a—
Eisenhower: That’s right. They become sort of a [unclear].
An unidentified speaker interrupts the conversation to tell Kennedy that
his lunch companions have arrived.
Unidentified: Secretary Rusk and Secretary McNamara are over at
the House.
President Kennedy: OK. We’ll walk over.
Unidentified: And General Carter had to come from CIA, as you
know . . . and he . . . Mac Bundy said that he could—
President Kennedy: I’ll tell you what we’ll do—we’ll get right after
lunch.
[speaking to Eisenhower] I just had General Carter . . .47 I just wanted
him to show you the Cuban SAM sites. . . .48
Eisenhower: I’d like to see them.
President Kennedy: [speaking to an aide] So right after lunch if he
could just . . . We’ll meet him in this office.
Unidentified: You’ll meet him here?
President Kennedy: Right. In this office. Yeah. [Conversation begins to
fade as they depart.] Why doesn’t he come because I’d like to have
47. Lieutenant General Marshall S. Carter was deputy director of the CIA.
48. Surface-to-air missiles.
Meeting with Dwight Eisenhow er
133
Secretary Rusk and Secretary McNamara . . . We’ll all meet here right
after lunch.
Unidentified: Fine.
President Kennedy: It’ll be about 2:15.49
Unidentified: Fine. [Door shuts.]
Tape recording continues for several minutes until someone enters the
room and turns off the switch. Following lunch in the Mansion, Kennedy,
Eisenhower, Rusk, and McNamara joined Marshall Carter in the Cabinet
Room. Kennedy did not tape that meeting.
On September 12, 1962, Eisenhower drafted a letter to Chancellor
Adenauer about the points discussed between the two U.S. presidents.
Eisenhower ended his letter with a passage meant to calm the aging
chancellor’s anxiety about the U.S. commitment to the defense of West
Germany: “Please do not bother to reply to this document. As a friend of
yours and your countrymen and as a loyal citizen of my own I have tried
only to act as a messenger of thoughts expressed to me personally (by
each of our two nations’ respective leaders) on subjects to which I have
adverted.”50 On September 14, Kennedy and Rusk approved this letter
before it was sent to Adenauer.
After Dwight Eisenhower left the White House, at about 3:00 P.M.,
Kennedy returned to the family quarters for a hour. He had a series of
meetings before him that afternoon, none of which he taped. For an hour
he spoke with the chairman of the Senate Finance Committee, Harry F.
Byrd of Virginia, a staunch opponent of anything that smacked of deficit
spending. Next there came a group led by the outgoing secretary of
labor, Arthur Goldberg; the secretary of the Navy, Fred Korth; the secretary of commerce, Luther Hodges; the solicitor general, Archibald Cox;
and the attorney general, Robert Kennedy. Hodges stayed on after this
meeting and was joined by Senator Robert Kerr, Theodore Sorensen, and
the White House domestic team. At 6:00, Kennedy huddled with Clark
Clifford, the Washington lawyer and intelligence community wise man,
49. Kennedy is referring to the time of the intelligence briefing set up for President
Eisenhower in the Cabinet Room after lunch.
50. Personal letter, Eisenhower to Adenauer, 12 September 1962, Dwight Eisenhower papers,
post-presidential series, Box 27, folder: Principal file, 1962, Dwight D. Eisenhower
Presidential Library.
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M O N DAY, S E P T E M B E R
10, 1962
who in early August had pushed for the establishment of a CIA unit to
help investigate press leaks.
Finally, from 6:28 to 6:45, the President met with Rusk, McGeorge
Bundy, and Robert Kennedy. Although no memorandum of conversation
exists for this meeting, its subject was almost certainly sending U-2s
over Cuba. A week earlier the Soviets had protested the straying of a U2 over Sakhalin Island, and just the day before a U-2 piloted by the
Nationalist Chinese under arrangement with the U.S. government had
been shot down over Communist China. Nevertheless the CIA was
requesting two extended flights over portions of the island not covered
by the flights of August 29 or September 5. Fearing another U-2 diplomatic incident, Secretary Rusk had concerns about flying over a country
that now had Soviet surface-to-air missile batteries. There was reason to
believe that the recently discovered SAM sites, which were in the eastern
and central portions of Cuba, might be operational. Bundy had called for
a 5:45 meeting of CIA representatives with Rusk; Lansdale; James Reber,
the head of the Committee on Overhead Reconnaissance (COMOR); and
the Attorney General in his office to discuss the Secretary’s concerns.
Rusk, Bundy, and Robert Kennedy came directly from that meeting to
see the President.
The President agreed with Rusk. The White House apparently
ordered a worldwide stand-down for all U-2 flights until September 16.
When U-2 flights resumed over Cuba, they were to be quick missions,
termed in-and-out flights, that photographed small parts of the island of
particular interest to the agency without coming near known SAM sites.
Due to unexpectedly bad weather the in-and-out flights would be further
delayed until September 26 and 29. As for the central and eastern parts
of Cuba, the areas with known SAM sites, there was, as yet, no agreement to take the risk to photograph them.51
A gathering of the administration’s Berlin team followed. Kennedy
51. The story of Bundy’s 10 September meeting was reconstructed after the fact by two CIA
officers during congressional investigations in 1963 into the intelligence background to the
Cuban missile crisis [see Ernest deM. Berkaw, Jr., to the Executive Director, CIA, 28
February 1963, FRUS, 10: 1054–55 (The FRUS version indicates this memorandum was prepared in 1963 but carries the date of 10 September 1962, giving the impression this document
was backdated for the CIA’s records.); Lyman Kirkpatrick, Memorandum for the Director,
“White House Meeting on 10 September 1962 on Cuban Overflights,” 1 March 1963, in CIA
Documents on the Cuban Missile Crisis 1962, Mary McAuliffe, ed. (Washington, DC: CIA, 1992),
document 21]. The results of the later Oval Office meeting can be inferred from Gregory W.
Pedlow and Donald E. Welzenbach, eds., The CIA and the U-2 Program, 1954–1974
(Washington, DC: CIA, 1998), pp. 199–211.
Meeting on Berlin
135
decided to tape his advisers explaining this particular national security
headache.
6:45–7:15 P.M.
[T]he planning that goes into this preferred sequence will be
extremely valuable to governments when we have to make the
decisions nearer to the time.
Meeting on Berlin52
Since President Kennedy’s meetings about Berlin in August, the administration’s contingency planning had progressed. His chief advisers now
encouraged him to approve a proposal on “Preferred Sequence of Military
Actions in the Berlin Conflict,” which largely drew on the Berlin and maritime contingency (BERCON/MARCON) plans discussed in August.53
Now President Kennedy needed to approve the sequence of military actions
before the Washington Ambassadorial Group and the NATO Council convened later in the month.
Earlier that day, McGeorge Bundy had sent Kennedy a draft of the
paper and a cover memorandum that explained disagreements about the
use of nuclear weapons and the wisdom of specifying in advance a
sequence of actions.54
The President began recording as his advisers outlined the differing
views among the Departments of State and Defense, the Joint Chiefs of
Staff, and the Supreme Allied Commander in Europe.
Dean Rusk: [voice fades in] . . . as simply a part of a catalog of plans. A
year ago the North Atlantic Council asked me and [SACEUR General
Lauris] Norstad to undertake such planning with regard to Berlin, and
52. Including President Kennedy, McGeorge Bundy, Mike Forrestal, Martin Hillenbrand,
Lyman Lemnitzer, Robert McNamara, Paul Nitze, and Dean Rusk. Tape 22, John F. Kennedy
Library, President’s Office Files, Presidential Recordings Collection.
53. Draft not found. For the revised military subgroup proposal for the Washington
Ambassadorial Group on the preferred sequence of military actions in a Berlin conflict, see
FRUS, 15: 315–20.
54. FRUS, 15: 313–15.
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these BERCON/MARCON plans on which you agreed—long ago—are
a result of that.55 Norstad feels that he needs a general planning type of
approval from the North Atlantic Council, and [the] Council ought to
know what’s going on. I do think that it is important for the North
Atlantic Council to . . . members of NATO to . . . know what may in fact
lie ahead if this Berlin matter gets, you know, more difficult because they
may be living in a kind of a dream world, and some of them may not be
facing up to the fact that this could get very tough indeed if the situation
develops further.
Now, on the interallied discussions there are two points on which
there may be some disagreement among the four principal powers. The
first would be the timing in the application of maritime sanctions. The
British are inclined to hold that off longer than we think we ought to.
We, the Germans, and the French have pretty well agreed to move on
those fairly early. But the British will want to delay for long-standing
attitudes toward maritime matters.
Secondly, there is some, there may be some difference in the stage at
which some type of nuclear weapon would be involved. I think Mr.
[Paul] Nitze could indicate the views of the different national delegations on that. Otherwise, I think the general approach is agreed among
the Four, and it would be a very sobering thing for the North Atlantic
Council to get into. The actual BERCON/MARCON plans themselves
have been already discussed with the North Atlantic Council, I believe.
Isn’t that correct?
Paul Nitze: The views of the standing group . . . the standing group
has sent its comments to the North Atlantic Council.
Rusk: Oh. Well, the governments though . . . have had means of
becoming familiar with that, with the nature—
Nitze: That’s right.
Rusk: I think it ought to be pointed out to you, Mr. President, that
Norstad is concerned about the North Atlantic Council seeming to . . .
putting too much emphasis on what we refer to as the preferred
sequence of those reactions. He does not feel that the circumstances of
the time, or the action of the enemy, would make it clear enough that this
is the way the scenario’s going to unfold. Now, we think it must be
underlined to the North Atlantic Council that we can’t guarantee our
preferred sequence, but that the planning that goes into this preferred
55. For the BERCON/MARCON contingency planning discussions, see “Meeting on Berlin,”
3 August 1962 and 9 August 1962.
Meeting on Berlin
137
sequence will be extremely valuable to governments when we have to
make the decisions nearer to the time. Of course, all these matters are
subject to later decisions by government in light of the circumstances.
President Kennedy: What is the obligation of the other NATO powers in case any of these . . . What are we asking of them? They’ve got a
Berlin commitment too, haven’t they?
Rusk: Well there’s, there’s for example, there would be . . . For example in Phase I, there would be mobilization, alert and mobilization activities which would . . .
President Kennedy: By all of the NATO powers?
Nitze: Phase II.
Rusk: I’m sorry, I thought that was certain mobilization mentioned
in Phase I, Paul, is that not right?
Nitze: [Unclear.]
Rusk: I beg your pardon . . .
Nitze: [That] supposes it to have already taken place as a result of
our [unclear].
McGeorge Bundy: We’re in Phase I.
Nitze: Yes.
Rusk: Yes, I’m sorry. It’s Phase II, isn’t it . . . [flips through pages].
Paragraph 2 at the bottom of page 3 . . .
President Kennedy: Under [unclear] and then to instruct. Now, do
we know what it is we want each one of these countries to do? For example, Belgium, what kind of mobilization, a gradual military buildup of
naval measures and air measures including repressive measures? Do we
know sort of what we’d want each of the . . . program to be?
Nitze: Long term is we want them to meet their force goals, we know
what divisions we want them to call up, and what we want them to do, in
broad terms, but in specific terms we have not . . .
President Kennedy: Let me say force goals—
Lyman Lemnitzer: Within NATO there are specific measures, what
he calls an alert, steps which they should take to move forces, to call up
[unclear] character.
Nitze: But, for instance in Phase II we would expect the British to
call up their territorials, and then to move over the top the forces that
are necessary to bring them up to the three divisions to which they are
committed by the NATO MC 26/4 force goals.
President Kennedy: Of course, isn’t that a peacetime goal? Or is that
the alert goal?
Lemnitzer: No, it is a peacetime goal, but they are not up to it.
Nitze: They are not up to it.
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President Kennedy: What country in NATO is up to its goals, except
for the United States?
Nitze: Canada.
President Kennedy: Canada?
Lemnitzer: Canada and the United States.
Unidentified: Well, Belgium is pretty well up to its commitment. So,
there are varying degrees . . .
Rusk: And the Netherlands are not too far away . . .
Robert McNamara: Well, none of them are up to it in terms of proper
logistical support. None of them are ready to fight, Mr. President, and
each of them would have to call men to active duty in Phase II in order to
prepare for the action in Phase III, and as a matter of fact, it would be the
calling of reserves to duty in Phase II that we would hope would deter
Phase III. But I think it’s fair to say none of the NATO forces are properly
equipped with combat support and logistical support forces.
President Kennedy: All of ours? Ours are?
McNamara: [Unclear] ours.
Nitze: And we would contract; perhaps reinforcing the forces we’ve
got there now. We’ve got the two division sets of equipment and we
might want to fly over . . .
McNamara: Yes, and almost certainly in Phase II we would call up
additional air squadrons.
Rusk: We nonetheless suddenly we have . . . We have column one and
column two. Column one was the Third Division force.
McNamara: Yes.
Rusk: And column two showed the additions we would hope that the
different countries would make to that. Presumably we would press
pretty early for the column two.
McNamara: Yes, but we would first press to move to column one,
which they have not moved to as yet.
President Kennedy: Well, the only thing is, do we want to say this,
on page 4, where it said, “Should the risk of loss be too great, extended
flights would be suspended.” Do we want that on any record?
Nitze: Well, there’s an important point involved here. . . . If the
Soviet Union were to use their ground-to-air missiles in the corridor, we
couldn’t continue flights in the corridor without going after those
ground installations. And, if you go after the ground installations, you
also go after the airfields from which the Soviet planes come up, would
be an expansion of the activity beyond what we contemplated in Phase I
and would really involve very serious risks of the conflict becoming a big
Meeting on Berlin
139
one. And the thought was that you’d better take these mobilization
measures which are contemplated in Phase II before you go that far.
President Kennedy: This Phase II, though, we’re talking now really
about Phase II, aren’t we?
Lemnitzer: Yes.
Nitze: Yes, during Phase II, you would continue the flights as long as
you could, but if they started using these ground-to-air missiles, or put
in a—
President Kennedy: It seems to me we ought to maybe consider
rewording that sentence because I think it sounds like maybe they will
try and then they’ll knock us down and then we’ll stop and then it will
be up to NATO when we start again. Don’t you think we ought to put it
a little more . . . we will cease and mobilize and then—
Bundy: And [many] steps will be taken.
President Kennedy: Prepare to commence again rather than sort of
leaving it more questionable.
Nitze: I think that the British are going to come in with some suggested amended language for that particular sentence. And I think their
government has approved the whole document except for that sentence
and I think they’re going to come in into our next meeting with a slight
change in it. I think they’ll make the same point that you have in mind,
Mr. President.
President Kennedy: Could you keep that in mind . . . the NATO decision? Couldn’t we say NATO would have to face the necessity, in light of
stated military preparedness for air action, beyond the scope of Live Oak
operations, in order to reestablish air access after suitable concentration of
forces has taken place?56 This other thing, they get it all, in the end.
Garbled exchange between Bundy and an unidentified speaker. Sound of
pages being turned.
President Kennedy: Now, when we say the three powers would, if
necessary . . . what are we . . . What do we want to call in the . . . Have
you got that? When do we call on NATO to make its forces, air forces
available?
Nitze: The concept is that as long as the effort is purely on the air
corridors along the autobahn, that this is a tripartite responsibility. The
56. Live Oak was the planning group created by SACEUR Lauris Norstad to deal with the
military aspects of the Berlin problem. Headed by a British major general, it also included U.S.
and French officers and a West German observer.
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10, 1962
moment it spreads beyond the air corridors or autobahn, then it becomes
a NATO responsibility.
President Kennedy: I wonder if there’s something we could impress
upon the other NATO [countries] about what their obligations will
begin to become; or do you think they’ll be impressed enough with the
prospect that it might escalate into nuclear, to be willing to participate
fully in any support they can give us short of nuclear action? In other
words, this doesn’t seem to ask very much of NATO except for this,
really, almost information sheet. Isn’t it for them, for the other members
of NATO aside from the British and the French and Germans?
Nitze: They would have to participate fully in the buildup to Phase
II. All the actions in Phase III and in Phase IV would be NATO action.
Rusk: I think we might knock out that four, the last line on page 3,
for example naval measures, national, tripartite and NATO, because
naval measures would be themselves outside of the corridor—
Nitze: Well, we’d wanted really to have some degree of flexibility so
that the three powers could do naval harassment and even some forms of
encroaching blockade without the possibility of being vetoed by NATO.
But I think you should still . . . could take out the or without. [Unclear] I
think.
Rusk: I don’t think the . . . that the veto . . . that unanimity is going
to deal with these in places in time and it’s necessary [unclear].
McNamara: The paragraph requiring the action by the other members
of NATO, Mr. President, is the second paragraph on page 4. . . . Perhaps it
is sufficiently self explanatory, and can certainly be enlarged—
President Kennedy: [Unclear] mean “to mobilize and deploy jointly
additional military forces”?
McNamara: It means . . .
President Kennedy: [reading] “Achieving the force levels and state of
readiness necessary to the defense of NATO and the launching of
BERCON/MARCON operations.” It doesn’t say what—
McNamara: Yeah.
President Kennedy: Of all M-day forces.57
Bundy: Theoretically, the M-day forces go well above the 30 division
levels or any current levels.
Nitze: Yeah.
President Kennedy: We wouldn’t want to state what those additional
military forces would be?
57. The abbreviation M-day forces stands for Reserve Forces.
Meeting on Berlin
141
Bundy: Well, they know what they are, Mr. President. Under the
existing NATO planning, they would total, if they all were produced,
something like 47 divisions, if I remember the figure correctly. General
Lemnitzer will have it in mind.
Lemnitzer: I am not sure of the total. We will check it.
Bundy: But it implies a NATO-wide mobilization, and they will all
know that that is what is implied under existing contingency plans on a
NATO-wide basis. This document, it is important to say, relates to an
existing NATO strategy. This is simply the Berlin strategy within existing NATO strategy.
Martin Hillenbrand: We have another paper which will be considered by the NAC [North Atlantic Council] at the same time, and that
relates to the specific question of tripartite-NATO relationship, and what
parts of these operations will be under necessarily under tripartite control, and where the obligation is for NATO as a whole.58
McNamara: Which we could declare by saying a major element of
military action will be for each of the Western European members of
NATO to mobilize and deploy. . . . Make it more specific.
Bundy: Under NATO M-day plans.
McNamara: Yes.
Bundy: Yeah.
McNamara: [whispering] We also hope each of the NATO nations
contemplate through the use of [unclear].
President Kennedy: Do the words on page 5, “the initiation of some
form of nuclear action” . . . has the word initiation got anything to do
[with] [unclear] [sounds of flipping pages] at the bottom? If our continued
impression would be observed, it would be the realization of the imminence
of nuclear war?59 Or is initiation satisfactory? [Unclear exchange.]
Nitze: The point we were trying to get across here was that the
other NAC members would have to realize that we might be faced with a
situation where we would have to initiate. If we could take out the words
58. The tripartite powers were the three Western powers with treaty rights and obligations in
West Germany—Great Britain, France, and the United States. The defense of the Western
position in Berlin would start as a tripartite responsibility and then expand to involve all of
NATO. The involvement of the entire NATO alliance would occur if the Soviet challenge
exceeded a certain threshold.
59. Kennedy is hinting at the possibility that the Western powers might have to be the first to
use nuclear weapons in a conflict with the Warsaw Pact over Berlin. They would preempt the
Soviet use of nuclear weapons because of the “realization of the imminence” of total war.
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M O N DAY, S E P T E M B E R
10, 1962
initiation of, and it would still be implied when you say “will be some
form of nuclear action.”
Bundy: I think that’s better.
Nitze: “Resort to.”
President Kennedy: Yeah.
Nitze: We can just take out the initiation.
Bundy: I think “resort to” is pretty good.
President Kennedy: Yeah.
Nitze: “Resort to.”60
President Kennedy seems to take a phone call, not related to the discussion at hand.
President Kennedy: Right, OK, . . . Huntsville [Alabama]? Yeah, which
day can you do it? Next week? Why don’t you check that out and . . . Let
me see, I’ll be in Huntsville Tuesday, this week. Because it looks like I’ll be
down there this Sunday. What about the [unclear] burning of those things
[unclear]? Yeah . . . have you announced how many FBI you’ve got; or are
they putting in helicopters. Yeah, OK, fine. Right. OK. Good. Bye.61 [Hangs
up phone.]
President Kennedy: You are going [to] change that to make it . . .
Bundy: We’re going to say “resort to,” simply—
President Kennedy: “Resort to.”
Nitze: It would be “to resort to.”
President Kennedy flips his copy of the document, searching for the
offending phrase.
President Kennedy: All right, then.
Rusk: Mr. President, it’s the very last paragraph, on page 6, [unclear]
language [unclear] because it would be too much of a row to NATO, the
North Atlantic Council. Paul, I don’t see any particular point, from our
point of view, in hanging on to it. We might as well drop it.
Nitze: Apparently, the Germans have also said they wanted to drop
it. I’m not quite sure why they want to drop it.
60. The critical sentence in this planning document thus read: “If the course chosen [by
NATO] were conventional action and this fails to make the Soviet Union back down and has
not precipitated general war, the last remaining pressure to be exerted will be to resort to
some form of nuclear action” (FRUS, 15:320).
61. On 11 September 1962, President Kennedy planned to visit defense facilities at Redstone
Laboratories in Huntsville, Alabama. He would be accompanied by British defense minister
Peter Thorneycroft, who was visiting the United States 9 to 17 September. On Sunday, 16
September, Kennedy was expected to be in Newport, Rhode Island, with Thorneycroft as his
and Mrs. Kennedy’s guest.
Meeting on Berlin
143
Rusk: Well, apparently, there is [unclear] some of these big power
decisions here, this in effect, the Council is going to have to arrive at
rapid decisions at the time of execution. I think that’s really what . . .
Bundy: In realistic terms, it’s not accurate, that paragraph.
Unidentified: Yeah.
Bundy: You ought to know, Mr. President, that General Norstad
himself is worried about the restrictiveness of this paper in terms of the
use of nuclear weapons. The reason this is important is that he will be
making a presentation on his views, at a certain stage. I don’t know just
when this will, how this will work. But the Council has asked for his
views on the general issue of the future of nuclear weapons in NATO,
and this connects closely to this general question of when they will be
used in the minds of Europeans who are hesitant about what they perceive to be changes in our policy.
President Kennedy: Well, you know that President Eisenhower’s
conversation with Adenauer [unclear] some confusion, and all the rest.
Bundy: Yeah.
President Kennedy: He’s going to give . . . is General Norstad going
to give the . . . policy?
Bundy: The presentation of his paper will be handled, as I understand it, by Paul Nitze, isn’t that right?
Nitze: No, Tom Finletter.62
Bundy: Tom Finletter.
Nitze: [I’ll] bring Tom up to date on the . . .
Bundy: What will Norstad’s relation to this paper be?
Nitze: I don’t think he will have a relationship to it. He’s already
expressed his views to the Joint Chiefs on the paper. His views have been
taken account of by the Joint Chiefs [of Staff].
Lemnitzer: Yes, he’s also . . . That’s right, and we’ve recommended,
concerned with most of them and a good many of his views have been
incorporated into this paper. Not all of them, but . . .
Nitze: I think the most important one is the . . . is the second sentence, in the second paragraph on page 1.
Lemnitzer: The Joint Chiefs are most concerned [unclear] get the
idea that we were going through step by step by step.
President Kennedy: Have you tried ever [unclear] avoid the subject?
Is that the one?
62. Thomas Finletter was the permanent representative to the North Atlantic Treaty
Organization.
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M O N DAY, S E P T E M B E R
10, 1962
Bundy: Yeah. [Unclear.]
President Kennedy: [reading] “Nations may render [unclear] of
nuclear weapons. . . .”
Rusk: Point out the standard [unclear].
Nitze: This we thought met his major point. . . .
President Kennedy: Will he at some time talk about the failure of the
NATO people to come up with their, let’s say, with General Eisenhower
[unclear] . . . Adenauer complaining about us?63 Well, I think it would be
well to have these other points made.64 Did somebody make these? Or
will General Lemnitzer do that?
Lemnitzer: Well, he makes them continually, to most of the nations
particularly the British. He’s been after them for several years.
President Kennedy: What’s your impression of them?
Nitze: At the moment the French have won the most in their conversations [unclear].
Lemnitzer: [Unclear.] I think he’s already given up on the French for
the time being, for more divisions, but as they come back from Algeria, I
think that we would have to continue to press the French.
President Kennedy: Is he going to talk about medium-range ballistic
missiles?65
Bundy: At a certain point, he’s under obligation, really, to talk to
NATO. He put that off earlier on so as not to have any confusion about
his views and his retirement. But this is a separate issue. The only reason
I mentioned it is slightly cognate in the minds of many of the Europeans,
because our instinct of holding off this decision till the latest possible
moment is related in their minds to what they take to be our lack of
enthusiasm to General Norstad’s modernization program.66 He will
defend his point of view on modernization in medium-range ballistic
missiles at some point before the council. I don’t know the date of that.
63. “He” is General Norstad.
64. Kennedy is referring to the inability of NATO allies to meet the conventional force goals
set in the fall of 1957 by MC 70 and again in the summer of 1961 by MC 26/4.
65. For Norstad’s views on the deployment of MRBMs in Europe, see the “Meeting with
Dwight Eisenhower,” 10 September 1962.
66. Bundy is referring to the Kennedy administration’s foot-dragging in establishing a European
land-based MRBM nuclear force. Many administration officials, especially in the Department of
State, opposed a land-based force because the allies would demand control over the missiles in
their territory. State preferred a sea-based multilateral force (MLF), which would avoid the issue
of national control entirely by employing mixed NATO crews. Kennedy held a dim view of the
MLF. Although the President shared State’s concerns about allied pressures for their own
national nuclear forces, he doubted the MLF was a viable alternative.
Meeting on Berlin
145
President Kennedy: I think it would be helpful if he put in the, why
he regards conventional forces, and their buildup, to be completely consistent with his view on . . . because he knows I want to make an exclusive . . . I’d like to have it, so that their . . . Also it affects—
Rusk: They’re going to jump on his bandwagon as an excuse for not
going ahead with a conventional buildup.
Bundy: Yeah. Well, they do this in their own minds . . .
Unidentified: Right.
President Kennedy: Well, I think if he says that, he’s regarded as
very pure on the subject, we’re not, if he would say it, and explain it.
Could we suggest that he make that part of his presentation?
McNamara: I hope to avoid that presentation as long as possible,
Mr. President, and to the best of my knowledge it isn’t scheduled at the
present time.
Lemnitzer: Well, there’s one on the 25th of September; that was sort
of a tentative date. I don’t know whether it’s been firmed up. I don’t
[know] what the status of that one is, Mr. President.
President Kennedy: OK, [unclear] now we’ve got to go to . . . [to
McNamara] You’re coming tomorrow?
McNamara: Yes, I think so. I’m worried about [British defense minister Peter] Thorneycroft . . .
President Kennedy: Is he not—
Bundy: Isn’t Mike coming, too?
McNamara: Yes I believe so, Mac, but we have a problem that Dave
Ormsby-Gore is having a dinner for him tomorrow night.67 I don’t know
if that gets us back there in time for—
President Kennedy: You’ve got to get back in time for that.
McNamara: Yes, I’m taking him out for dinner tonight in lieu of—
President Kennedy: We’ll just send you to Huntsville—
McNamara: We could have limited [unclear]—
President Kennedy: —dinner Wednesday or is that Albert?
Bundy: Don’t know myself how high—
McNamara: The surgeon general sent me [unclear]. [Laughter.] I
don’t know.
Bundy: I think they would relax to just have this dinner without
Thorneycroft or even give up the dinner; that would be great!
Mixed exchange amidst continued laughter. Someone says, “Thorneycroft
can come late.”
67. David Ormsby-Gore was the British ambassador to the United States.
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M O N DAY, S E P T E M B E R
10, 1962
McNamara: I said we would talk to him tonight. Just say we can be
back here by nine tomorrow night, and leave with you [unclear] an hour . . .
President Kennedy: An hour isn’t . . . it seems to me you can cut it an
hour short, we’ve been through that so much.
McNamara: I haven’t—
President Kennedy: But he—
McNamara: And he hasn’t either.
President Kennedy: So it would be . . .
McNamara: It’s probably desirable to do it. I’ll talk to him and see
what his preferences are . . .
Bundy: I do think the dinner is a trivial matter.
President Kennedy: Who did you get, some congressmen and senators?
Bundy: No, just Thorneycroft and his party.
President Kennedy: Is his party all coming with us?
McNamara: No, only two or three.
President Kennedy: These are—Is [unclear] coming with us?
Bundy: I don’t know, Mr. President. You’ve got a lot of problems.
[chuckling] I wouldn’t try to manage that dinner. Nobody else can.
President Kennedy: [Unclear] give my speech . . . Is Chip [Charles]
Bohlen [unclear] is much more familiar with our whole scene than Tom
Finletter would be but perhaps Tom would—68
McNamara: Finletter, . . . I think it is a forum where he’d do it and he
has asked if Paul can come over to acquaint him with it so that he had
[unclear]. [Garbled exchange.]
Nitze: Well, we’ve considered it to be the natural thing that the U.S.
would put this forward.
President Kennedy: I mean, aren’t the British and the French
[unclear]?
Hillenbrand: We’ll put it forward as our view, and then the British,
French, and Germans would all support that.
President Kennedy: [shuffles papers while talking] . . . after the presentation of the four-power military set group proposal.
Nitze: NATO cost us a little jealousy in the Four Power, in the
Ambassadorial Group. [Laughter.]
President Kennedy: All right.
McNamara: Mr. President, Lem[nitzer] and I met with the Senate
committee this morning and this afternoon. I don’t believe we’ll have any
68. In October Bohlen is expected to leave for Europe to replace General James Gavin as U.S.
ambassador to France.
Meeting on Berlin
147
problem in putting a resolution through the Senate. Senator [Richard]
Russell has planned to do that very promptly. His [unclear], as a matter of
fact, was talking this afternoon and I believe it was unanimous.69
Rusk: I’ll [unclear].
McNamara: We’re scheduled to go before the House . . .
President Kennedy: So would they get that, including particularly
Khrushchev’s conversation with [Secretary of the Interior Stewart]
Udall about America [unclear] divided.70
McNamara: I think it’d be extremely helpful. We’d go before the House
on Thursday; we’ll have more trouble there. The process is becoming a real
controversy.
Lemnitzer: The more individual opinions in the House, with 37
members, everyone has got some particular angle to follow. . . .
President Kennedy: They can all vote for it.
McNamara: I’m sure they will. I’m sure they will.
Nitze: I think so.
President Kennedy: I would like to get, you know, this statement
[unclear] passed to them about the backlog in foreign aid; I’d like to get
what they at the Defense Department . . . if you did the comparable statistics, you know . . . he’s got this thing where he just would [unclear].
McNamara: Yes there is roughly 2 billion dollars of other than fiscal
’63 [unclear]. Now he adds fiscal ’63, whatever he’s thinking of a billiontwo, perhaps, to the two billion, so he probably comes up with three billion two or three billion four.
President Kennedy: But, I mean, if you took your total, I’m talking
about the total Defense Department . . . what is your budget?
McNamara: Oh, I can’t tell you that . . .
President Kennedy: Seventy or 80 billion?
McNamara: Oh, I can’t answer the question, Mr. President.
President Kennedy: Mac, [unclear]?
Bundy: Can I [unclear] the problem?
69. President Kennedy had asked Congress for standby authority to call up 150,000 reservists
for one year and to extend active duty tours without declaring a state of emergency. On 24
September, the House of Representatives granted him that power.
70. On 29 August, Secretary Udall arrived in the Soviet Union for an 11-day visit to see
hydroelectric projects. On 6 September, Udall met for two hours with Khrushchev. During
their conversation, Khrushchev raised the subject of Berlin and informed Udall bluntly that
the Soviets would not allow Western troops to remain in Berlin and that the United States
and its allies would not dare to go to war over this. At one point, Khrushchev told Udall that
Kennedy was not in a position to reach an agreement over Berlin because he lacked support in
Congress (see FRUS, 15: 308–10).
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M O N DAY, S E P T E M B E R
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President Kennedy: Yeah, yeah. But in other words . . . [Garbled
exchange.]
McNamara: . . . in the Defense Department. We have it for so many
years back [unclear].
Bundy: We might get Charlie Hitch to do something.71
McNamara: Oh, yes, it’s all available, and we’ll get out a quarterly
report on it.
Meeting breaks up. Voices, milling around, slamming doors, laughter.
Multiple conversations taking place. The following statements can be heard.
Bundy: Lifetime obligation to [unclear].
Lemnitzer: [Unclear] back here, but I’d like to set it up under you.
President Kennedy: Would you set it up and send me a cable?
Lemnitzer: [Unclear] all I can get, I will. I’ll get it to you on
[unclear] 11th.
President Kennedy: That’s fine.
Lemnitzer: Right.
Unidentified: [Unclear] unless he’s coming back here. The President . . .
Nitze: Are you going back to the building or not?
Lemnitzer: Yes, I am, Paul.
Nitze: Could you take my . . . this with you?
Lemnitzer: Well, I don’t want to lose it.
Nitze: Well, look, I see [unclear]. I’ll . . . let me take it home and put
it in my safe.
Unidentified: So you’re going right to your office [unclear].
Nitze: Yeah, but probably not to the Pentagon.
Lemnitzer: I’ve decided to be there [unclear].
Nitze: I can just put it in my safe.
Lemnitzer: OK. All right. [Unclear.] See you later.
Nitze: Yeah.
Bundy: Mr. President, have you got a minute?
The President goes out, leaving the machine on.
On 13 September, the Ambassadorial Group met to discuss the paper
further. The group made only minor revisions, as Rusk persuaded the
71. Charles Hitch was assistant secretary of defense for budgetary affairs. McNamara admired
Hitch, the former head of the economics division at RAND, for his efficiency and innovation. Hitch
devised the Planning-Programming-Budgeting System (PPBS), which centralized planning in the
Office of the Secretary of Defense and reduced the independence of the service secretaries.
T H U R S DAY, S E P T E M B E R
13, 1962
149
allies that NATO acceptance of the preferred sequence would demonstrate to the Soviets that any threatening move in Berlin would meet
with unified Western resistance.
Following the Berlin meeting, the President went for his evening
swim. Then it was time to return to the Executive Mansion.
Thursday, September 13, 1962
The President arrived in the Oval Office at 9:40 A.M., after breakfast with
the Democratic legislative leadership. It was his first full day in the
White House since Monday, September 10. Early Tuesday Kennedy had
flown to Huntsville, Alabama, for an intensive two-day tour of the heartland of the U.S. space program, where he received a series of briefings on
the status of his goal to put a man on the moon. By the time of his return
on Wednesday night, he had visited the Marshall Space Flight Center in
Huntsville; Cape Canaveral in Florida; the NASA facility in Houston,
Texas; and the McDonnell Douglas plant in St. Louis, which had built the
Mercury capsules and was now working on the Gemini program.
Kennedy had a press conference scheduled for Thursday evening, and
most of the morning was spent preparing. After signing a bill extending
federal protection to the Point Reyes seashore in northern California,
Kennedy met for a few minutes alone with Secretary of State Dean Rusk
before heading into a longer meeting with Rusk and a group of key
advisers to review what might be discussed at the press conference.
While Kennedy was on tour, the Soviets had issued a strong response to
the President’s September 4 statement on Cuba and the administration’s
announced intention to call up 150,000 Reserves. The Soviet Union
raised the alert status of its forces and warned that it would protect
Cuban sovereignty. President Kennedy had every reason to expect questions about this in the evening.
Walter Heller then came into the Oval Office for about half an hour,
presumably to help with any domestic economic questions. Finally, before
going to a luncheon in honor of U Thant, the acting secretary-general of
the United Nations, the President welcomed the members of the U.S. delegation to the 17th U.N. General Assembly. Senator Albert Gore of
Tennessee, who had been named to the delegation, brought along his
daughter, Nancy, and his son Al, a future vice president.
After lunch, just before dropping in on a group of Jewish leaders meet-
150
T H U R S DAY, S E P T E M B E R
13, 1962
ing in the Fish Room, the President called Speaker McCormack, whom he
had seen at the leadership breakfast, to discuss the congressional resolution on standby authority for calling up the Reserves. In McCormack’s
office were Congressmen Carl Vinson of Georgia and Thomas Morgan of
Pennsylvania.
4:55 P.M.
[T]he quicker we dispose of it, probably the better.
Conversation with John McCormack, Thomas Morgan,
and Carl Vinson1
The President talked with Carl Vinson, a Democratic representative from
Georgia and chairman of the Armed Services Committee; John McCormack,
a Democratic representative from Massachusetts and the Speaker of the
House; and Thomas “Doc” Morgan, a Democratic representative from
Pennsylvania and the chairman of the House Committee on Foreign Affairs.
The four discussed strategies for winning support of a House resolution
to grant the President special limited power to call up to 150,000 reservists
for one year and to extend active duty tours without declaring a state of
emergency. The House passed the resolution on September 24, 1962.
President Kennedy: Mr. Speaker.
John McCormack: Hello, Mr. President.
President Kennedy: Hi.
McCormack: I have Carl Vinson with me and Tom Morgan was here
a little while ago and coming back.
President Kennedy: Right.
McCormack: On this resolution on Cuba.
President Kennedy: Right.
McCormack: Tom Morgan’s going to introduce it today and Carl
Vinson’s going to introduce, both of them are going to introduce, the
same resolution.
1. Dictabelt 3B.1, Cassette A, John F. Kennedy Library, President’s Office Files, Presidential
Recordings Collection.
Conversation with McCormack, Morgan, and Vinson
151
President Kennedy: Right, fine.
McCormack: Now you have seen it?
President Kennedy: Yes, that’s correct.
McCormack: That starts our, “Where, whereas President James
Monroe,” and so forth.
President Kennedy: Right.
McCormack: That right? Then down there, “Now therefore be it
resolved.”
President Kennedy: Right.
McCormack: We’re trying to see if we can get it up to suspension on
Monday. How would that hit you?
President Kennedy: That’s fine. I think the quicker we dispose of it,
probably the better.
McCormack: Yes, because the Senate isn’t going to . . . they’re going
to refer to the Joint Committee on Armed Services and Foreign
Relations and report back next Thursday.
President Kennedy: Right, right.
McCormack: Now if we can work it out. Ah, that is . . .
[off the phone to someone else] Will you get Chairman Morgan, will you?
[back to President Kennedy] Oh, here’s Chairman Morgan. I’ll have
you talk with Tom Morgan, if I may, and also Carl Vinson.
President Kennedy: Right, right.
McCormack: [to Morgan] I’ve got the President, Tom, and the
President said if we can get it up to suspension Monday that would be fine.
[back to President Kennedy] Now here’s Tom Morgan, Mr. President.
Thomas Morgan: Yes, Mr. President.
President Kennedy: Yes, Doc, why I think the quicker, the better and
I think the closer we get to that language the better off we are. It’s the
only way to head off their giving us something much worse.
Morgan: Do you think this language is OK then?
President Kennedy: Yes, that’s the language that . . . we sent up, I
think, to the Senate—
Morgan: Yeah.
President Kennedy: Isn’t that the same language that Mike had?
Morgan: It’s the same language that Chairman Vinson had.
President Kennedy: Is that 1958? It mentions 1958?2
Morgan: Pardon?
2. President Kennedy wants to be sure this resolution mentions the congressional resolution
that helped a Republican president, Dwight Eisenhower, deal with foreign crises in 1958.
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T H U R S DAY, S E P T E M B E R
13, 1962
President Kennedy: Does it mention the year 1958?
Morgan: Just a minute, Mr. President.
[to someone in the room with him] Is it here? 1958?
[back to the President] Yes.
President Kennedy: Yeah, that’s the one. Right. Good. That’s fine.
Well, that’s good because that puts it back on them.
Morgan: Yeah.
President Kennedy: Good, Doc.
Morgan: OK.
President Kennedy: Thank you.
Morgan: Wait a minute, Mr. President. Mr. Vinson wants to talk to
you.
Carl Vinson: Mr. President?
President Kennedy: Yes, sir, Mr.—
Vinson: This is the resolution that was just sent me up from your
office down there—
President Kennedy: That’s correct.
Vinson: That I used when the Secretary of Defense was before the
committee to tell the committee that this was what we would consider,
and we do not have jurisdiction and so Mr. Morgan’s committee has
jurisdiction.
President Kennedy: Right.
Vinson: But I am going to get the sense of my committee, “do they
endorse it.” And then I’ll bring out the . . . authorization for 150,000
reservists under suspension, past that Monday—
President Kennedy: Oh, terrific.
Vinson: And then, Mr. Morgan will call up . . . on the recommendation by the Speaker for suspension of the rule and bring up the concurrent resolution.
President Kennedy: Very good.
Vinson: Now it’s all right to introduce them?
President Kennedy: That’s fine, Mr. Chairman. Yes, because I think
that’s the only way to head off their introducing a much more objectionable amendment—3
3. The New York Times that morning reported attempts by three Republican senators to add
inflammatory language to the administration’s reserve mobilization bill. One of them, Senator
Prescott Bush of Connecticut, proposed that it “put the Soviet Union on notice that the
Monroe Doctrine was not dead.” However, by the end of the day the Senate had passed the
resolution unanimously, without any amendments. The failed Republican amendments were
Conversation with McCormack, Morgan, and Vinson
153
Vinson: Uh-huh.
President Kennedy: —language.
Vinson: That’s right, because I’ve got to keep down some very objectionable amendments—
President Kennedy: That’s correct.
Vinson: . . . in my committee and this is the only way I can do it.
President Kennedy: That’s fine, Mr. Chairman.
Vinson: Thank you, Mr. President.
President Kennedy: Thanks a lot. Right.
At the President’s 6:00 P.M. press conference, Kennedy reiterated a desire
for calm regarding Soviet activities in the Caribbean. He stressed that he
believed that “these new shipments do not constitute a serious threat to
any other part of this hemisphere.” And he called for a stop to “loose
talk” about invading Cuba for it gave “a thin color of legitimacy to the
Communist pretense that such a threat exists.” Kennedy, however, did
not deny his administration’s concerns about what the future might
hold. On September 11, the Soviets had responded to his September 4
statement with a stiff public pledge of their own to defend Cuba. But the
Soviets had added that they had no intention of sending any nuclear missiles to Cuba. Thus both provoked and encouraged, Kennedy reinforced
his earlier warning to the Soviets. If Cuba, he said, “should become an
offensive military base of significant capacity for the Soviet Union, then
this country will do whatever must be done to protect its own security
and that of its allies.”4
Returning to the White House at 6:34 P.M., the President had another
warning to present. On the advice of Clark Clifford and the other members of the President’s Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board (PFIAB), the
President had invited Orvil Dryfoos, the publisher of the New York Times,
to a meeting to discuss Hanson Baldwin and the problem of leaks of classified information.5
Kennedy and Dryfoos met for nearly an hour. To dramatize the value
of the information Baldwin had described in the Times, Kennedy handed
referred to the Senate Foreign Relations Committee for possible incorporation in another resolution (New York Times, 13 and 14 September 1962).
4. The President’s News Conference of 13 September 1962, in The Kennedy Presidential Press
Conferences (New York: Coleman, 1978).
5. On the Baldwin case, see Volume 1, “Meeting with PFIAB,” 1 August 1962; Introduction to
16 August 1962; and “Meeting on Intelligence Matters,” 22 August 1962.
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T U E S DAY, S E P T E M B E R
25, 1962
Dryfoos a top secret report, codeword Keyhole, that identified Soviet
missile launch sites on the basis of satellite information. Then he briefly
left the Oval Office while Dryfoos read.
Having returned to his office, President Kennedy explained to Dryfoos
that he intended to implement a new system to guard against harmful
leaks once the director of Central Intelligence, John McCone, returned
from his honeymoon. He wanted to work out a system with McCone
and Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara so that the CIA would
receive reports on any conversations that Pentagon officials had with
journalists.
Dryfoos was impressed by the Keyhole document and said that
Hanson Baldwin would not have submitted his story had he understood
the sensitivity of his information. Nevertheless he argued strongly against
the President’s idea of using the CIA as a watchdog, citing the First
Amendment and the importance of an informed electorate in a democracy.
President Kennedy, however, kept coming back to the importance of his
CIA plan. Finally, Dryfoos asked whether the President planned to
announce this plan publicly. When Kennedy said no, Dryfoos cautioned
him that this was the type of plan that Hanson Baldwin would be the first
to find out about and it would make great front-page material.6
Following this meeting, the President went to the pool.
Tuesday, September 25, 1962
President Kennedy took some time off in mid-September 1962 despite the
crush of events in the Caribbean and Central Europe and his active participation in the midterm elections. An avid sailor, Kennedy spent as much
time watching the America’s Cup Challenge off Newport, Rhode Island, as
possible. Leaving the Oval Office on Friday afternoon, September 14, the
Kennedys spent until Wednesday afternoon, September 19, in Newport.
President Kennedy invited his good friend British ambassador David
6. “Meeting of Orvil E. Dryfoos with John F. Kennedy, September 13, 1962,” 14 September
1962, Dryfoos Papers, New York Times Archives, New York, NY. Kennedy started the meeting
by saying that he was much less worried about Cuba than he was about the situation in Berlin.
He thought people exaggerated the threat posed by Cuba. He expected the situation to get
very bad in Berlin in December. The editors are grateful to the New York Times for the use of
its archives.
T U E S DAY, S E P T E M B E R
25, 1962
155
Ormsby-Gore and Mrs. Ormsby-Gore to join his family on board the
USS destroyer Joseph P. Kennedy, Jr. to watch the races. The Australian
sloop Gretel was challenging the American sloop Weatherly.
President Kennedy returned to the White House for meetings on
Wednesday evening and Thursday. Thursday evening, September 20, he
left for a quick visit to a Democratic fund-raiser in Harrisburg, Pennsylvania, before flying back to Newport that night for the next round of
races. The Kennedys did not leave Newport again until Monday evening,
September 24. The President and Mrs. Kennedy hosted a lunch for
Mohammed Ayub Khan and his delegation at Hammersmith Farm in
Newport before leaving for Washington, D.C.
Tuesday, September 25, was President Kennedy’s first full day in the
Oval Office since Thursday, September 13, the date of the previous taped
conversation. Much of the President’s schedule this day involved Asia
and the Pacific. In the morning the President met with the coordinating
secretary of state for security of South Vietnam, Nguyen Dinh Thuan.
Then he was reunited with Benjamin Kevu, the man from the Solomon
Islands who had saved his life during World War II by delivering a
coconut with information about the location of Kennedy and the other
survivors of his destroyed PT boat. Next to enter the Oval Office was
the prime minister of Australia, Robert G. Menzies. A non-Asian event,
the swearing in of Willard Wirtz as secretary of labor, also happened
just before lunch. So, too, did a meeting with George Ball, George
McGhee, and Carl Kaysen, perhaps on the progress of negotiations with
the Europeans on a modified gold standstill agreement.1
Following his midday break, the President returned to his office for
two meetings with his brother. At the first meeting, the Attorney
General was joined by John McCone of the CIA and Carl Kaysen. In the
second meeting Robert Kennedy was alone with the President. None of
these meetings was taped.
The only meeting the President taped came at the end of the day and
involved a discussion of incoming Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff
Maxwell Taylor’s fact-finding trip to East Asia.
1. For the development of this policy see Volume 1, “Meeting on the Gold and Dollar Crisis,”
10 August 1962; “Meeting on the Gold and Dollar Crisis,” 16 August 1962; and “Meeting on
Gold and Dollar Policy,” 20 August 1962.
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T U E S DAY, S E P T E M B E R
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5:00 –5:56 P.M.
I would think the more likely thing would be . . . is they would
move there [South Korea] having moved against Quemoy and
Matsu and our having trouble in Berlin; it would be part of a
worldwide expansion rather than just a single action there.
Meeting with Maxwell Taylor on His Far Eastern Trip2
President Kennedy announced on July 19, 1962, that General Maxwell
Taylor would replace Lyman Lemnitzer as Chairman of the Joint Chiefs
of Staff, effective October 1. Before assuming his post, Taylor decided he
needed a refresher trip to the Far East. He left the country amid disturbing reports of Soviet military aid arriving in Cuba. Taylor departed on
August 31, stopping first in Japan and following an arc down to
Indonesia. The newly appointed Chairman focused on U.S. policy in the
region, especially as it concerned Communist China. He also examined
the status of U.S. military assistance programs in the Far East, looking
for ways to use U.S. aid more effectively, including substituting nuclear
for conventional forces.
The short period of time did not allow for much more than a whistlestop tour, but Taylor did meet with heads of state in many countries,
including Thanarat Sarit in Thailand, Norodom Sihanouk in Cambodia,
and Achmed Sukarno in Indonesia.
Taylor’s visit to Indonesia came soon after the United States had helped
negotiate an end to a Dutch-Indonesian dispute over West Irian, also
2. Including President Kennedy, William Bundy, Mike Forrestal, Averell Harriman, U. Alexis
Johnson, Carl Kaysen, Robert Komer, Lyman Lemnitzer, Robert McNamara, William
Sullivan, and Maxwell Taylor. President Kennedy’s daily appointment’s diary lists George
Ball and a Commander Bagley as also having attended the meeting, but they were not identified on the tape. Tape 23, John F. Kennedy Library, President’s Office Files, Presidential
Recordings Collection. Initially, the Kennedy Library dated this conversation as 28 September
1962; however, internal evidence and the existence of an Asian foreign policy meeting on
Tape 25, which could not have occurred any other day but 28 September, argues for this being
the Taylor briefing meeting of 25 September 1962.
This tape begins with a few minutes of a fragmented conversation. The quality of the
recording is so poor that only a few words can be heard. Civil rights and the President’s intention to initiate a housing bill for the District of Columbia are mentioned. A “Ken,” possibly
Kenneth O’Donnell, and a “Tom” greet each other. Given that Tape 22 contained a conversation on September 10 and the next conversation on Tape 23 occurred in the late afternoon of
25 September, it is impossible to provide an exact date for this fragment.
Meeting with Maxw ell Ta ylor on His Far Easter n Trip
157
known as West New Guinea. The Dutch, who had colonized Indonesia and
controlled it until 1948, refused to turn over West New Guinea to the
Indonesians in 1949. The colony comprised 150,000 square miles of the
most primitive territory left in the world.
The United States maintained a hands-off policy until 1960, when
the Eisenhower administration proposed to create a U.N. trusteeship for
the territory. The negotiations quickly failed. The Dutch sent an aircraft
carrier and troops to the region, to which Sukarno responded by infiltrating troops, contracting for $500 million of Soviet military aid, and
issuing belligerent statements. The Kennedy administration pursued
Eisenhower’s policy, but little progress was made until mid-1962, when
Kennedy’s negotiator, Ambassador Ellsworth Bunker, worked to bring
the two sides together. He proposed a two-year transition plan, with
West Irian remaining a U.N. trustee for the transitional period.
President Kennedy had to intervene to save the negotiations, but he
did save them and a compromise agreement was reached in early August
1962. The Dutch agreed to turn over the region to a U.N. Temporary
Executive Authority, which could begin the transfer of authority to the
Indonesians as early as May 1963.
Taylor returned on September 21. At this meeting, Taylor provided
essentially a long briefing of his trip. Kennedy did not tape the entire
meeting. He turned on the tape recorder after Taylor began speaking.
Maxwell Taylor: . . . my first orientation, and also updating of my
knowledge of some of these countries. However, one can’t go through an
area like this even though it’s sometimes reasonably familiar without
being hit by certain things which seem worth reporting. I might say
that, in general, that one reflects in going to the Far East . . . seeing the
analogies and the lack of analogies between our military problem there
and the problem in Europe. There is an analogy in the sense that we
have the problem of deterrence of war out there just as we have a problem of deterrence in the NATO area. The enemy, however, is different.
It’s Red China in one form or another. And the assets of Red China and
the weaknesses of Red China are quite different from the assets and
weaknesses of the Soviet Union.
And in military terms, and I looked at this primarily in a military way,
and I realize the one-eyed aspect of that, but the military threat from Red
China of course is manpower on the ground. They have the largest army
in the world. But secondly, and perhaps more critically from our point of
view, they also have the fourth-largest air force, and a pretty good air
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force. We don’t think they fly as well as our Chinat [Chinese Nationalist]
friends, but if you look at the inventory of aircraft that have been built up
in recent years, it ends up in [being] quite a formidable threat. So much
so that our air people in each one of the areas, say, in Korea, or in Taiwan,
or in Southeast Asia, can build a picture which is quite graphic and quite
realistic, I think, of a 1,000-plane attack say against every important target in South Korea in a very short period of time.
Now what we’ve done over the years is that we have built up in Korea
particularly and Taiwan very sizable ground forces, but we have lagged
in the air defense aspect. So that now we’re being hit almost at one time,
in a short period of time, at least, with the requirements for moreadvanced interceptors and also for a modernized air control and warning circuits. So we’re having this in South Korean, Taiwan, and also—
President Kennedy: OK. Now, do we have Hawk missiles in—
Taylor: —and in Korea.
President Kennedy: Do we have them on Formosa?
Taylor: We have them planned in Formosa.
Lyman Lemnitzer: None of them have Hawks yet but we have a
Nike-Hercules Battery there.
President Kennedy: Is that a pretty good missile?
Lemnitzer: Yes sir, it’s the best up to about 80,000 feet. It’s a very,
very accurate—
President Kennedy: As good as a SAM 2?
Taylor: It’s also a surface-to-air missile, Mr. President, something we
don’t give her credit for, a surface-to-surface missile. A credit we don’t
give to ourselves, but it has a very good accuracy up to about 90 miles.
Lemnitzer: It was moved in there at the time of the bombardment of
the offshore islands of 1958, and it’s the best missile in the world of its
kind.
President Kennedy: Can this pick up? This . . . it could be against an
ocean target. The Nike—
Unidentified: Yes, sir.
Taylor: If you could locate the target with binoculars—
President Kennedy: Radar? Do you have a firing? Do you have a
radar apparatus?
Lemnitzer: Indeed, that’s how it . . .
President Kennedy: We don’t have any Nike-Zeus on Quemoy and
Matsu, do we?
Lemnitzer: No missiles, no surface-to-air missiles on Matsu.
President Kennedy: Now, is our, [is] the number of our missiles on
Formosa inadequate?
Meeting with Maxw ell Ta ylor on His Far Easter n Trip
159
Taylor: I would say it is inadequate. That is really the point, sir, that
the air defense aspect has lagged in terms of other kinds of forces. And
unfortunately, when you look at the MAP program, as I told the senators
this morning, that’s where the money is going.3 We’re planning now to
close this gap, but most of the money in the military aid programs are
simply for the maintenance of current forces plus this additional money
for the modernization of air defense. That’s not entirely true, but it’s
generally so. So that’s one of the unfortunate things about any serious
cut in the aid program at this time is that it does hold back an area in
which we are critically weak.4
Another very interesting and I think important point militarily, Mr.
President, as you go down each country. Take Korea, which is a big
money user in that area. I looked that program over, hoping as I have in
previous years to find some way, from a military point of view, to reduce,
to recommend a reduction. This is a burden which we don’t like. It’s
been looked at year after year. But I would have to report that as long as
we keep the present assumptions in Korea, I don’t think, from a military
point of view, we’re justified in reducing our forces. In fact, we should be
putting more money, as I’ve said, into air defense.
Now, one of the reasons however, for that is that the assumption
now . . . the objective given to our forces . . . the indigenous forces in
Korea . . . is to be able, with South Korean forces, to check and hold off a
massive attack mounted not only by the North Koreans but also by the
Red Chinese. In other words, we’re setting a very high level of effort as
the goal for our, for the indigenous forces. And we’re assuming that
atomic weapons would not be used.
Now, I’ve discussed this with the Secretary and the Joint Chiefs. I
think that we should really come to you and get with a study of . . . an
analyzing of pros and cons of the use of atomic weapons in the Far East.
Those pros and cons are quite different from the situation in Europe.
Sometimes the advantages are greater; sometimes perhaps less. But I
think that if we could assume that in case of [a] massive Chinese attack
at any point in Asia, whether in Korea or in Southeast Asia, we could
certainly recast then some of our military requirements, and I would
think reorient some of our programs. So I think that’s a capital point,
and we should bring you a recommendation.
3. The acronym MAP stands for the Military Assistance Program.
4. The Kennedy administration was in the midst of a struggle with Congress over the size of
the following year’s foreign aid budget.
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T U E S DAY, S E P T E M B E R
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President Kennedy: On whether we ought to agree to the use of tactical nuclear weapons in case the Chinese should join the North
Koreans?
Taylor: That is correct, sir. Take in Korea: If they came across the
Yalu [River], we’d use them in North Korea at once. We would not, we’d
reserve judgment on whether we’d attack targets elsewhere. But if your
military people could have that assumption, I would think there’s a
pretty good chance of recasting some of our deployments.
William Bundy: May I just comment on that, if I may General? This
essentially . . . such a study was made on a political-military basis by a
group headed by General Cary of the Air Force, retired Air Force officer
under our auspices—5
Lemnitzer: That’s right.
Bundy: —with very close joint staff cooperation, and it came up with
exactly the same conclusion: that if you made this strategic assumption,
then you could safely reduce; but pointed out the pros and cons of making that assumption. In other words if you decide to use nukes sooner, in
effect you’re moving your strategy in Asia in the opposite direction of
what you are in Europe, and so on. And we can see all the pros and cons
of that. I merely say I think the studies exist for this kind of examination
now. The Joint Chiefs went into it at the same time.
Lemnitzer: We went into it in great detail. If you are in fact lowering
the threshold to the Chinese crossing the river, you’re going to use
nuclear weapons. Now that’s quite inconsistent with a policy which we’ve
expressed on, certainly in the European area, and generally throughout
the world. [Five seconds excised as classified information] and apply the
same terms that you would apply in NATO, the strength that you have
there on the ground is going to determine the threshold at which you
employ nuclear weapons. Well, I think, [the] lower the forces, the sooner
you’re going to be required to use nuclear weapons.
Taylor: I think the only thing required now would be to tell us that
you would like to have a study, that . . . assuming that we’re allowed to
plan on the use of nuclear weapons whenever the Chinese come in force
into North Korea. Then what effect would it have on force structure,
then see what came out of it.
Robert McNamara: Mr. President, may I say that that kind of a
study has been made in connection with the fiscal ’64 budget. The Chiefs
5. General Cary is unidentified.
Meeting with Maxw ell Ta ylor on His Far Easter n Trip
161
haven’t had a chance to review it. A General Cary, who’s a retired Air
Force General.
President Kennedy mumbles something, probably related to the fact that
Bill Bundy has already made the same point while McNamara was out
of the room.
McNamara: But this ought to be reviewed formally by the Chiefs and
reported to you, and I asked the Chiefs yesterday to—
President Kennedy: The point he was making, Mr. Secretary, while
you were absent, [was] that this would in a sense be a reverse of what
we were attempting to do in Europe.
McNamara: But I think the conditions are reversed. In Europe the
reason our strategy [is] as it is, [is] because we’re faced with a nuclear
force and a very strong one. In China we have no nuclear force opposing
us. And it seems to me this is enough of a difference to warrant at least
consideration of a different strategy. And I think—
President Kennedy: Whether you’d say that you would use nuclear
weapons . . . on crossing, coming into North Korea, which would not be
very overt, because they could be coming in and out of there in peacetime
conditions or whether you’d wait until they cross the cease-fire line?6
Taylor: Well the intent would be a massive invasion. If it’s not massive, it has no great military significance.
President Kennedy: I would think that if they came en masse, the
Chinese down, then of course it would be a . . . I would think the more
likely thing would be . . . is they would move there [South Korea] having
moved against Quemoy and Matsu and our having trouble in Berlin; it
would be part of a worldwide expansion rather than just a single action
there. That’s the least likely kind of military action for them to take.
Taylor: Well, I think that’s true, that there’s no great feeling that that
is a likely contingency now, but the whole situation in Red China can
change drastically. If, for example, the situation would break in Southeast
Asia, we ourselves might want to put pressure on that part of world.
McNamara: Well, we’re right in an untenable position, I think, at the
present time. We’re supplying forces which are more than enough to
support a strategy based on nuclear weapons, but less than enough to
counter a large-scale conventional onslaught. So we don’t have any—
Taylor: We’re not bound by that position.
McNamara: And this is why we started these studies, Mr. President.
6. President Kennedy is referring to a military offensive by the People’s Republic of China.
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T U E S DAY, S E P T E M B E R
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President Kennedy: I would think that the nuclear, you changed to
using nuclear, I don’t know whether it’s the Yalu River or whether you
say it’s once they cross the cease-fire line in any force. The reason that
we’re so slow about using nuclear weapons in Europe is, first, because
we’re against a nuclear force, and second, because of Berlin. Well, you
see, if you didn’t have the Berlin problem, you just had a clean line, you
would use nuclear weapons almost from the beginning if they came
across in force. That would be a signal [without] [unclear].
Well, we know it isn’t going to come that way; it’s going to come
with difficulty in Berlin, but we might have to take the first action. So I
would think that we could say that you would use nuclear weapons . . . I
don’t think you could say if they came across the Yalu River, but you
could say that we certainly [would] use it if they attack in force across
the [Korean] cease-fire line. That’s—
Taylor: I think that’s the point sir, that we would not be prepared to
hold them back by conventional methods if they came en masse. How
they got there wouldn’t particularly matter.
President Kennedy: What would that free? That might free, what
one or two [divisions] . . . we’ve got two divisions there?
Taylor: Well, we—[unclear].
Lemnitzer: I don’t think it would free very much because the divisions we’ve got in Korea are not the new U.S. divisions. They are the
divisions General Taylor, when he was commander of the Eighth Army,
organized specifically for the requirements of Korea. They aren’t very
heavy in artillery and transportation, and they aren’t very heavy in
strength. They’re smaller than our divisions.
President Kennedy: But we have two divisions there? Do we?
Taylor: We have two forward . . . two divisions.
President Kennedy: The question is whether they really, is that the
place for them to be, is it?
Lemntizer: Well I think it’s the greatest deterrent to the resumption
of hostilities in Korea.
President Kennedy: Our two divisions?
Lemnitzer: That’s right, and I also think that that representation of
our image in the United Nations command also gives us control of that
situation, which might otherwise . . . it would pass to some other nationality.
McNamara: I think it would free this, Mr. President: In the long run
it would free substantial Korean forces. I say [in] the long run because
in the short run they have such a serious unemployment problem; you
couldn’t reduce the military force in Korea today without adverse effects
Meeting with Maxw ell Ta ylor on His Far Easter n Trip
163
in the civilian economy. But in the long run it would free substantial
forces, maybe a couple hundred thousand men. In the long run it would
greatly reduce our military assistance program because we’re supplying
air power to Korea and to Taiwan, and we will have to supply it to
Thailand if we continue the present policy, which wouldn’t be required if
we understood that we could use nuclear weapons, particularly nuclear
weapons delivered by U.S. aircraft. So I think both of those effects would
take place.
Taylor: That’s correct. The present strength of the armed forces of
South Korea [is] about 600,000 as opposed to about 380,000, I think, in
North Korea. So if you really were setting up your military structure in
South Korea simply to offset North Korea, manpower-wise, you would
certainly think [that] you could make a reduction. But it would have to
go with some arrangement that you wouldn’t fear a sudden rush from
the Chinese across the Yalu. And that would be the response by nuclear
weapons.
President Kennedy: The next place was Japan. As a result of your
wire, I sent a memorandum to the secretary of defense about our capital
expenditures in Japan, our dollar expenditures, which I seem to recall
are 350 million?
McNamara: Over 300 [million]; 330, something like that.
President Kennedy: Yeah. The limitations which are described . . .
you can’t use it, we certainly couldn’t even use Japan if you really wanted
to use it. . . . Doesn’t seem to me they’d probably let you use it, would
they?7
Taylor: I think it is a question, sir. I’m afraid [in] my cable . . . I
noticed in the State summary which I didn’t think quite did [unclear]
really to my thoughts. [It] is not that the bases aren’t useful—they’re
very useful. In fact the Navy and the Air Force would say they’re virtually indispensable, at this time, in time of peace. But if you get into time
of war, then it becomes more and more unfit. And when you look at the,
we have some 680 combat aircraft in the Far East to face the Chinese
2,800 [planes]. About two-thirds of those are on Japanese bases. Now if
we start to have war with Red China, it’s very likely, as we’ve indicated
here, it would be a nuclear war, and whether we could use those . . . the
concerns of the air forces being neutralized, so to speak, by the Japanese
limitations, I don’t know. But it’s certainly a possibility. But I wouldn’t
7. Kennedy is referring to the Japanese government’s prohibition on the storage of nuclear
weapons in Japan.
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T U E S DAY, S E P T E M B E R
25, 1962
suggest for a moment that we should close up these bases. But they are
necessary now, but they are not so important that they should really be
the controlling factor in all our foreign policy toward Japan.
William Sullivan:8 Under the present rules, Japan is committed to
permit us the use of bases in Japan for the use of our forces against any
resumption of hostilities in Korea. This is a United Nations commitment
which the Japanese made. They have made efforts to evade that commitment when they entered the United Nations, and we were going to move
our Far East command out of there, but when it was put up on the basis
that their first action would be to deny the U.N. the use of Japanese bases
as their first act upon joining the United Nations, it looked a little bit
off-key. They withdrew their proposal.
Now the principal objection, the principal handicap at the present
time is the question of nuclear weapons in Japan. Japan is emotionally,
well they’re fanatical about nuclear weapons for understandable reasons.
Forty-two seconds excised as classified information.
Taylor: One other broad question, Mr. President, is the proper mix or
the proper balance between indigenous forces and our own forces when
we consider them packages for military purposes. Years ago, when the
military aid program started in the Far East, the thought was that primarily we’d be supporting ground forces. We were going to always have a
small army. We would need the training of oriental manpower to help us
hold the line in any given sensitive area. Meanwhile our Navy and our
Air Force would utilize their mobility and their striking power and their
sophisticated weapons to back up the ground forces, largely indigenous.
In the course of the years, that’s changed, rather surprisingly. At least I
was surprised at the extent now we are planning to give sophisticated
weapons, advanced interceptors, some naval craft of some sophistication
to these indigenous forces. And I think it’s very timely for us to reexamine this whole question of what is the proper mix, what should be the
objective of these forces. Now really, it’s saying in Pentagon language, to
reexamine the MAP objectives which we have country by country.
In countries such as Korea and Taiwan, for example, we use such
broad language as to say these forces are to assist U.S. forces extensively
in the event of general war. Well, that is so broad it could mean almost
anything. And I personally have the feeling that we should really
sharpen our objectives so that they state more specifically what are the
8. A sample of William Sullivan’s voice was not available. This identification is based on an
analysis of the statements made by this voice in the meeting.
Meeting with Maxw ell Ta ylor on His Far Easter n Trip
165
common-sense reasonable objectives at this time. That’s something for
DOD, for the JCS and State to work out.
In Southeast Asia, Mr. President, of course the threat is quite different. You’re impressed always that the diversity of insurgency is really the
open enemy in the four countries that we’re most concerned with. I had a
very interesting stop in South Vietnam. It was only one of these short
ones, two and a half days, and I saw many people and did a certain
amount of traveling. One of my most interesting experiences was calling
in eight junior officers, who were attached to . . . American officers
attached to the South Vietnamese units, to try to get a grassroots feeling
of how these young officers felt about their job, how they were getting
along with the local officials, and so on. I’m sure you would get a great
deal of encouragement out of hearing these young officers. They’re keen
as they can be. They like what they’re doing. They realize the importance
of their mission, and none of them would say they [have] had any real
difficulties in their personal relationships with the South Vietnamese officers. I asked that question because the press, just shortly before my
arrival, carried some such statement, and I would say based upon my
observations and many discussions it just isn’t so.
How are we doing there? Of course I’ve read the reports as all of us
have over the last 10 or 11 months, but really you have to be on the ground
to sense a lift in the national morale. It was right on the ground last
October when I was there. The hamlet program is indicative I would think
of the greater public popular support. They have either fortified or [are] in
[the] course of fortification [of] some 5,000 hamlets out of the total
16,000. This is done very largely by voluntary work on the part of the local
people with very little government guidance. They’re getting some, but the
programmer, they ran away from the government plan. Also, it’s something to see, the over 100,000 mountaineers, the Montagnards, who’ve
come out of the mountains, left their fields, left the areas in which they
want to live in order to escape communism. [Seven seconds excised as classified information.] Cleaning up the villages, getting adequate defenses for
them, and also bringing in new and improved agricultural methods, so that
the whole life of the Montagnards for the first time is showing some signs
of promise.
President Kennedy: We saw the minister this morning.9 He dis-
9. A reference to Nguyen Dinh Thuan, the coordinating secretary of state for security of
South Vietnam. He met with President Kennedy that morning to discuss, among other matters, the crop destruction program.
166
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cussed with us this question of using pesticides against their food, and I
told him we’d give them an answer one way or another by the end of the
week. They wanted to try some test runs up in areas which are clearly
Vietcong.
Taylor: They are very anxious to do that.
President Kennedy: [Unclear.] All the pluses and minuses about it.
What’s our judgment about it? I thought we ought to answer him one
way or the other.
Taylor: Well, this has been talked back and forth between State and
Defense for some time. And most people are unanimous in saying that
this rather modest initial effort should be tried.
President Kennedy: What about [Lieutenant General Paul D.]
Harkins? What does he think?
Taylor: He’s all for it. Also, Diem is for it.
President Kennedy: Can they tell, do you think, which are which—
Robert Komer:10 This has been the problem in our mind, Mr. President,
as to whether or not you can identify the Vietcong–held fields from the
Montagnard fields. And—
President Kennedy: They say [unclear] rice is planted in a straighter
line. Is there any other way? They say that in the areas which they are
talking about, they say they can. I don’t know whether—
Taylor: Well they know areas that are denied to the government
forces [where] you have to fight your way in. And the assumption is that
any rice in there is going to be used by the enemy, regardless of what the
political coloration of the man who actually planted the rice.
Unidentified: Yes.
McNamara: Mr. President, I don’t think any of us here can say for
sure whether they can tell. But what we can say is that the ambassador is
wholeheartedly in support of it, our military planners are wholeheartedly in support of it, and I believe that the risk of a trial is low. And I
would strongly urge therefore we try it.
President Kennedy: What can we do about keeping it from becoming
an American enterprise which would be surfaced with poisoning food?11
McNamara: I think we’ll be charged with that.
Taylor: We can’t avoid it.
McNamara: We can do quite a bit to avoid it.
10. A tentative voice identification. A sample of Robert Komer’s voice was not available. This
identification is based on an analysis of the statements made by this voice in the meeting.
11. The President is using surfaced to mean “revealed to be involved.”
Meeting with Maxw ell Ta ylor on His Far Easter n Trip
167
President Kennedy: Should we have Vietnamese—
Taylor: They will put it down.
McNamara: They will put it down. It would be done in their aircraft.
Komer: How about the season? Is it?
President Kennedy: Yes, [can we do it] now?
Unidentified: Is it the time in the season? [Unclear exchange.]
McNamara: There’s about eight weeks left.
Unidentified: There are.
Unidentified: Well, let’s try it then.
Taylor: There is some experience with this in Malaya, isn’t that
right? One of those two groups there.
Komer: I don’t know that they used—
President Kennedy: I think that’d be worth having if the British did
it. That would be pretty . . .
Lemnitzer: The British did do it in Malaya, Mr. President, yes.
Unidentified: They used . . .
Komer: Well, I think psychologically, Mr. President, there’s something different between a man going in with it and spraying it on the
ground and doing it from a plane or from a helicopter. I’m not arguing
against it on this ground but I do point out that there is this—
President Kennedy: The British did it on the ground?
Komer: No, they did it both, and of course we’re now doing it, we’re
now using napalm. The British used napalm. In many ways napalm is
much nastier than the—
Unidentified: Nastier . . .
President Kennedy: To burn up food, we’re doing that?
Komer: Yes. Yes, and napalm destroys the use of the soil also. Very
simple, whereas the insecticides, or these—what do you call them?—
herbicides do not.
Bundy: I think the British also did this at the very end of, towards the
end, at any rate, of their campaign in Malaya when they had the Chinese
Communists boxed in small jungle areas fairly well identified.
Unidentified: Well identified. There was no question—
Bundy: There was no question that there was any mixture of friendly
people in those areas.
President Kennedy: Well, why don’t we send out the word, and let’s
take a look at what the instructions are so they understand all the . . .
Averell Harriman: It’s too late. [Unclear.]
Unidentified: [Unclear.] No, they say—
McNamara: No, it’s definitely not too late. There are about eight
weeks left.
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T U E S DAY, S E P T E M B E R
25, 1962
Harriman: No, I don’t know, our people think that basically the peasant, whoever he is, is the one who eats the food. Two, 3 percent, or 5 percent, or 6 percent or 8 percent of Vietcong get around and that food is
taken away from whoever the peasant may be. That’s the argument that
our people make very strongly. There’s no such thing as fields, that we
know of, fields that have been grown for Vietcong. They are grown for
the villagers themselves, and that’s the argument against it, and that this
would not be depriving the Vietcong of a grain of food.
President Kennedy: Well, couldn’t we have some . . . ? It seems to me
there would have to be some proposal made that food would be supplied
to these areas by the government. Then the government would be able
to distribute—
Taylor: Once they get in, sir. But at this time these are closed areas,
no one—
Komer: Part of the problem is, if you destroy the crops, the
Montagnards come out. . . . Then being prepared to take care of them
when they do come out.
Well, now this is fairly well along [unclear], as I understand it.
Unidentified: That’s right.
McNamara: This, we have a program to do.
Komer: Yes, that’s . . .
Harriman: Our people have been through it, in China and elsewhere.
The loss will far, the losses among the peasants will far outweigh such a
relatively small gain in taking away the food from the Vietcong. But
that’s the amount of judgment which our people [feel] very strong, for
[whatever it’s worth].
President Kennedy: Who’s that? Who would that be, Governor?
Harriman: Huh?
President Kennedy: Who are those people?
Harriman: Well, Rice, who has been through it in China and seen
what happened when you prejudice the peasants against you, and he
thinks the whole thing is going to be won on the basis of whether the
peasants are with you or not.12 Come in and destroy their crops. . . . Why
it builds up an antagonism which is very hard to break.
Bundy: I think that Roger Hilsman’s theory on this is somewhat similar, for what it’s worth. It’s mainly that if you can identify the enemy
very precisely and be sure that you’re not getting possibly friendly peasants hurt too, then . . . it’s good to do it if it can be done in a rather large
12. E. E. Rice was a Foreign Service officer assigned to the Policy Planning Staff.
Meeting with Maxw ell Ta ylor on His Far Easter n Trip
169
scale because then you really want to get real military advantage commensurate with the political risk. There’s some worry that doing it just
in a few very small areas, we might take an awful political whacking and
not really get—
President Kennedy: The job done.
Bundy: The big military job done.
Harriman: And then it makes the local population ready to join the
Vietcong and changes the whole atmosphere. [Unclear.]
Taylor: Well this is another form of bombing. I think it’s the same
problem. We have the . . .
Harriman: It’s a very strong political argument against it from those
people who have had experience in this.
President Kennedy: Well, why don’t we . . . without putting an impossible burden on them, why don’t we say that we are now leaning, or inclining towards permitting this program, and that we would like to . . .
First, is there sufficient time to make it effective? Number two, can it
be done on a wide enough scale and yet with accuracy to make it worthwhile? And three, what is the technique they’re going to use to detect
what areas they are going to do and what is the system they are going to
use to determine what is Vietcong and what isn’t? And then what procedure would they make to take care adequately of the people who are not
Vietcong, but who are damaged or find themselves short of food? And
then if we get an answer back, in 48 hours or so, then we can make a final
judgment on it. Try to tell them we’ll give them a final answer when we
get back. There may be some other questions we ought to ask them.
Komer: Those are the principal ones.
Taylor: Those are the principal ones, Mr. President.
President Kennedy: Well, then, we ought to try to tell them we’ll
give them a final answer by the weekend. I’m sure they don’t want to
screw around any longer.
Taylor: One of the things, Mr. President, we need to look at with a
little more, greater attention, is the best method of reporting our
progress. In other words, how are we doing? We’re always asking ourselves that. We have never had a very good way to answer except by feel.
I found that General Harkins has anticipated this to a certain degree,
and now puts out a questionnaire, a rather heavy questionnaire, to all the
military people in the field, so that once a month they report back indicators such as ability to go in certain villages where they hadn’t been
before, and so on.
My comment to the ambassador was that I thought that this should
be a country team affair so that all the questions, the political questions,
170
T U E S DAY, S E P T E M B E R
25, 1962
[would] get injected into the same kind of questionnaire, and that once
a month we get a complete poll across the board in those areas that
we’re interested in.
Komer: As you know we suggested to the ambassador, and I think
he’s accepted this, that we send a group of Vietnamese-speaking foreign
service officers out. To station one in each of these important areas to
maintain contact with the [unclear] people to maintain contact with the
local officials and the people and try to be [the] eyes and ears of the
ambassador and the country team to help answer this question. This
would be supplementary to—
Taylor: All these things should be done. But now we have literally
hundreds of Americans all through Vietnam who are qualified observers
and they should be passing in—
Komer: That’s great. And it’s a problem of getting the information
from them really. They’re all busy people.
Unidentified: Three are being established outside of Saigon, and
they will serve as sort of vacuum cleaners to pick this stuff [out] . . .
Komer: Yes.
Taylor: Elsewhere in Southeast Asia, Mr. President, I stopped in
Cambodia and had the first insight into the [Prince Norodom] Sihanouk
personality.13 [Laughter.]. He couldn’t have been nicer, and I told him I
don’t know why you have troubles with this man. [Laughter.] In both
Thailand and Cambodia we have a real problem of emotionalism on the
question of who to support.
President Kennedy: It’s like India and Pakistan.
Taylor: Sir?
President Kennedy: It’s like India and Pakistan.
Taylor: Yes, and perhaps even more so right now. Sihanouk is a wild
man, as you know, and he really believes that both of his neighbors on
the right and the left are his enemies, mortal enemies, historical
enemies.14 These invasions are just feeling him out, that someday they’d
like to come over and stay. He believes that. I don’t think there’s anything phony about it.
Then you get over and talk to [Marshal Thanarat] Sarit, and he is of
course a wise old pro and a tough old cookie, but he gives us a pretty
good beating now.15 Oh, I think he really doesn’t mean it. He smiles when
13. Sihanouk was the Cambodian chief of state.
14. Sihanouk viewed both South Vietnam, on the right, and Thailand, to his left, as enemies.
15. Sarit was the Thai prime minister.
Meeting with Maxw ell Ta ylor on His Far Easter n Trip
171
he calls us these names, but he has behind him his people worried about
Cambodia because of the very modest military aid. They are painting the
picture of attacks by Cambodia. I said I had more confidence in the Thai
armed forces than Sarit did, and he really thought that was a possibility.
President Kennedy: How much are we giving them in our aid program? To Cambodia?
McNamara: Eleven million.
Taylor: Eleven million and change to Cambodia. Yeah.
President Kennedy: [Unclear.] And what are we giving Thailand?
A group of voices says, “Eighty million,” then, “About eighty million.”
Taylor: The real issue now is not the basic Cambodia program, but a
little increment which represented the equipment for three infantry battalions and one so-called frontier battalion which Sihanouk would
undertake to put in the northeast frontier to help stop the infiltration:
Something we’re all for. It makes all the sense in the world. And now
that we’ve had to pay this price in Thai relations, I would say we ought
to go ahead and do it. It’s about 1.7 million as I recall some [unclear].
Unidentified: That’s right
U. Alexis Johnson (?): Part of this problem, Mr. President, is also a
problem of diplomacy here, if you will. The problem of the Thais reading
this in the newspapers first—of course, anything that comes out in
Phnom Penh leaks, and it leaks to the Thais through the newspapers—
instead of our being able to tell them directly. To the degree that we can
tell the Thai about these things before they read them in the newspapers,
of course we can help. But then there’s the problem of the Thai then
talking and Sihanouk reading it. [Some laughter.]
Komer: Well, the Cambodians deliberately did this once so the Thais . . .
Johnson: They deliberately did this. The Cambodians deliberately
did this to—
Unidentified: Yes.
Johnson: We couldn’t stop it.
Unidentified: We couldn’t stop it.
Lemnitzer: This has an impact on the Vietnamese situation because
the only way that that border is going to be properly policed is for these
battalions or other Cambodian battalions to get up there and prevent the
Vietcong from circulating back and forth.
Taylor: Well they’re trying to get us also to have some of the U.N.
presence that’s been talked about, or some device like that. Perhaps a
joint military commission with the Vietnamese. Because these border
incidents are going to continue by the very nature of that frontier, and
they’re going to be a source of constant disturbance in our relations.
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T U E S DAY, S E P T E M B E R
25, 1962
Unidentified: That’s right.
Johnson: The problem here is that it’s very difficult to establish a
U.N. presence between Cambodia and South Vietnam because [of]
South Vietnam not being a member of the U.N. You can establish a U.N.
presence, if both sides have agreed in principle, between Thailand and
Cambodia. Again here, Mr. President, the problem is one of diplomacy.
The lack of any effective real communication between the Cambodians
and the Thai. And if you can put a U.N. man in there to act as a gobetween and a communicator, then this will . . .
President Kennedy: What is the status of that?
Johnson: The status of that is now that U Thant is going to talk to
both the Thai and the Cambodians at New York; now is my understanding.
Harriman: Yes. And they were going to select, they hoped to select a
Burmese.
Johnson: I’m very . . . I question the selection of a Burmese, anyway.
Let them work that out.
Harriman: They want to do it, but they’ve both agreed to this.
Johnson: They have agreed to a Burmese?
Harriman: Yes.
Johnson: All right, fine.
Taylor: I would like to pick up the comment by Mr. Johnson with
regard to the partition nature of Southeast Asia. To us it’s one strategic
area. We have a common problem there, and we are succeeding reasonably well in unifying our efforts. It’s been a real step forward, I think, on
the military side to have General Harkins. That ties together the two
principal programs.
I must say we’re still partitioned, though, in other ways. Our countries are partitioned. I think our people stationed in these countries get
“localitis.” I found that the people over in South Vietnam were fighting
[President Ngo dinh] Diem’s battle versus the Cambodians. But in
Cambodia they are fighting Sihanouk’s battle versus Diem. Now, the
thought may not be worth much, but I would think that to have our
ambassadors and our heads of MAAG get together once a quarter, just
to break down these barriers and frontiers which have certain psychological disadvantages to our own operations, would be good.16 Whether
you’d ever get Sarit, and Sihanouk and some of those people in a summit,
southeast summit, I don’t know.
16. The acronym MAAG stands for Military Assistance Advisory Group.
Meeting with Maxw ell Ta ylor on His Far Easter n Trip
173
Johnson: Now, that would blow up.
Taylor: Well it might.
Johnson: But I entirely agree, Max, on our ambassadors. I think it’s
very important. When I was out there, we used to meet once every four
to five months. Laos, our own people, we always used to get together in
Vientiane, Bangkok, Phnom Penh, and Saigon. And we’ve encouraged
that again. It’s a problem of finding the time for them to do it. That was
a most useful device. In the MAAG case, too, we used to get together.
Taylor: Well, they all have common problems now.
President Kennedy: Why don’t we get a report of when they last all
met, [can we] get the report when they last met?
Unidentified: They last all met in Baguio, I think.
Kennedy asks a question apparently about the date of that meeting and
an unclear exchange follows.
McNamara: Well the last three were there with us in Honolulu. We
had the MAAG chiefs and the three ambassadors there on July 24th.
Unidentified: Yes, we did in Honolulu, that’s right. [Unclear] stayed
over a day.
Taylor: But moving from capital to capital within the area I would
think would have some symbolic effect of stressing the neighborhood
quality of this whole problem.
Unidentified: Very much so.
Taylor: Just a couple of other questions, Mr. President . . . comments
rather. One is Thailand. I would say that Ambassador [Kenneth T.]
Young has a very tough problem there, a very complex problem, in
pulling together all the resources in the way that you’ve been stressing
across the board: military, economic, and so on.17 He’s had trouble in getting his plans in because they are complex. I think he may be short of
people. I’m not sure. I know he personally feels he ought to have
[unclear] assist him, and I reported this to Johnson.
President Kennedy: Yes.
Taylor: But he’s got a real problem. Of all the ambassadors, I think he
has more of a problem perhaps even than [Frederick E.] Nolting, [Jr.]
does.18 Because Nolting’s job is pretty well laid out in front of him now.
My final stop was Indonesia where I had a very good—
President Kennedy: Did you make a suggestion in your cable about
some internal security system being appointed to Young?
17. Kenneth Young was U.S. ambassador to Thailand, 29 March 1961 to 19 August 1963.
18. Frederick Nolting was U.S. ambassador in South Vietnam, 10 May 1961 to 15 August 1963.
174
T U E S DAY, S E P T E M B E R
25, 1962
Taylor: Yes, sir, I did.
Bundy: We are going ahead with that here.
Taylor: In Indonesia I had an inconsequential meeting with Sukarno,19
but a very, very useful contact with the military, particularly with
[Lieutenant General Abdul] Nasution and the army chief of staff, Yani.20
Nasution, was very frank, indeed, with describing the internal problems. Of
course he knows the military forces are popular with us, and he obviously
wants to keep before us the fact they are the balance wheel or the stabilizing influence vis-à-vis the Communist element in the country.
He has started a civic action program in his armed forces very much
along the model which we had in Korea, one which I think should have
long-term benefits.
Of course the whole country is burdened and will be burdened for
[an] indefinite number of years in the future by the saddle of debt to the
Soviet Union. As you know they have received credits and actually
drawn down credits of almost a billion dollars in military equipment.
They have some 500 million in economic credits. How far they’ve been
drawn down, I don’t know. But you really can visualize a country mortgaged for the indefinite future to the Soviets.
Yet on the military side the military men now [are] regretting it,
saying, “Yes of course we thought we were going to war over West Irian.
Now we’d like to turn back; we would like to give back some of this
equipment and turn to the West.” But they can’t do it. My own feeling is
we should give some aid to Indonesia, a small amount. In the military
field they need very little, LSTs, things of that sort, plus some support
for this civic action program, which really, I think, holds real promise
largely in the political field.21
President Kennedy: Have we got any Indonesian officers training
here?
Taylor: Yes, sir, we’ve always had. That program has never stopped.
We ought to give them just as many spaces as they can use.
Sullivan: This was reviewed by, you were there Averell, I think, in New
York with the Secretary and [Indonesian foreign minister] Subandrio?
19. Taylor notes in his memoirs that Sukarno talked at length “on the charms of his favorite
stars of Hollywood.”
20. Lieutenant General Abdul Nasution was chief of staff of the Indonesian armed forces and
minister of defense.
21. The abbreviation LST stands for landing ship, tank.
Meeting with Maxw ell Ta ylor on His Far Easter n Trip
175
Harriman: Yes, I met Subandrio for lunch, met three hours with him.
He made it very plain that they wanted to get out from under the
Russian influence. That’s going to be a tough thing to do, until they get
this loan paid off.
Taylor: Yes, it will be a long time.
Harriman: But I think we ought to continue. . . . I told him I thought
we ought to give him preliminary assistance and then study out their
program. But they’ll have to work something out with the IMF, and
they’re not very keen to do it, and I think we ought to hold back a
longer-range program until they develop a program which the IMF
approves. But in the meantime, given that industry is down 30 percent
some of it, give them little spare parts and raw materials which should
help them off base. Indicate that we are ready to help them when they
put their house in order.
President Kennedy: The main purpose of this buildup was West
Irian, was it?
Taylor: Yes, sir.
Unidentified: Have they delivered . . . ?
Unidentified: I think.
Taylor: Most of it’s either delivered or in the pipeline. Apparently
Sukarno and Khrushchev got together and agreed they’d put all the
steam into this thing they could. And they really, really have accomplished it. I asked couldn’t they cancel or turn back anything, and they
said most of the high-money-value articles have been delivered or are on
the way.
President Kennedy: Are they pleased there was a peaceful settlement
of West Irian or they’d rather . . . ?
Taylor: Sir?
President Kennedy: Are they pleased that there was a peaceful settlement?
Taylor: Oh, yes. Very happy about it. Very happy about our activities
in [unclear] that . . .
President Kennedy: How much did the . . . Did we ever find out how
much the Dutch put in there as far as troops? Five thousand was it or
what? I noticed this story Marquis Childs had yesterday about all this . . .22
Unidentified: They were building up to 10,000 but I don’t think they
ever got there, sir. It was around 6[,000] or 7,000. [Unclear.]
22. Childs wrote a syndicated column that the President often read.
176
T U E S DAY, S E P T E M B E R
25, 1962
President Kennedy: That’s all they put into all of West Irian?
Unidentified: I don’t think they ever got higher than that.
Unidentified: It was very low.
President Kennedy: What do the Indonesians have under arms, do
we know?
Unidentified: Maybe 350,000 now under arms, but they got about
1,200 men on the island. That’s all they have.
Taylor: They infiltrated about 2,000 into West Irian.
Unidentified: I think we’ve got it at around 1,200.
Taylor: Well, those are the principal points, Mr. President.
President Kennedy: What about . . . we were going to talk about
whether we withdraw, what we do about the withdrawal of the MAAG
from Laos.23
Michael Forrestal:24 Sir, we’re having a meeting for you on that on
Friday if that would be all right with you.25 We haven’t quite gotten that,
the program . . .
President Kennedy: Governor, do you think?
Carl Kaysen: I think we were waiting on the [Central Intelligence]
agency—
President Kennedy: SNIE?26
Kaysen: —[to] get an estimate, round up all the intelligence material
so we had the latest agreed statement on what’s happening, and that’s
due as I understand it, Thursday. We have a meeting then.
President Kennedy: I talked to the minister, I guess you may . . . on
this question of, this morning, [unclear] this question of this. We’ll just
have to wait and see what they do on that.
Kaysen: South Vietnam.
Unidentified: South Vietnam’s representation [on Laos].
Unidentified: South Vietnam’s representation, yes.
Unidentified: They seem to be drawing back slightly on that, don’t
they?
Unidentified: Yes, there’s hope. There appears to be hope in the cable.
President Kennedy: OK. All right. Is that all?
23. The Geneva Declaration on Laos required U.S. military personnel to leave the country by
7 October.
24. A tentative voice identification. A sample of Michael Forrestal’s voice was not available.
This identification is based on an analysis of the statements made by this voice in the meeting.
25. See “Meeting on Laos,” 28 September 1962.
26. Special National Intelligence Estimate.
Meeting with Maxw ell Ta ylor on His Far Easter n Trip
177
McNamara: Mr. President, I can report to you that we met with
President Ayub this morning for an hour and a quarter on the MAP program.27 [Laughter.]
President Kennedy: He said he had a lot to take up with you. [More
laughter.]
McNamara: More with you than with me, I think. We said yes and no
in the appropriate places and gave firm answers. He said he’d rather have
no than maybe. So we gave no in the places where it seemed suitable, and
then we broke up on, I thought, very friendly terms.
President Kennedy: [Unclear.]
McNamara: Yes, sir. And [Walter P.] McConaughy has since
reported to me Ayub was pleased with the results.28 We didn’t increase
the military assistance program above the amounts we had previously
decided upon. [Laughter.]
McNamara: I think it is fair to say we performed poorly last year. We
didn’t deliver nearly as much as we could have or should have. So we, in
effect, told him that, and that we have a plan for increasing our deliveries
for next year.
Unidentified: Is John McCone going to see him?
President Kennedy: Yes, Thursday.
McNamara: Thursday. I talked to McCone after I talked to Ayub this
morning.
Papers rustle; people get up and talk over each other. This indistinct
chatting continues for over five minutes; then there is silence until the
tape runs out.
This was the last formal meeting of the day. Kennedy’s movements
afterward are not clear from the official record. At 10:15 P.M. he departed
the White House for the National Theater to meet up with the First
Lady and his mother, Rose Kennedy, to catch the second act of Mr.
President. Afterward, the presidential party attended an after-theater
supper party at the British Embassy.
27. Ayub Khan was president of Pakistan.
28. Walter P. McConaughy was U.S. ambassador to Pakistan and formerly the assistant secretary of state for Far Eastern affairs, 24 April to 3 December 1961.
178
F R I DAY, S E P T E M B E R
28, 1962
Friday, September 28, 1962
The President had ahead of him a busy morning of varied engagements.
He was due to meet with George Meany of the AFL-CIO and a young
staffer in the Department of Labor, Daniel Patrick Moynihan. Then he
would turn to an off-the-record discussion of New York State politics
with the two main Democratic nominees for governor and the U.S.
Senate repectively, Robert Morgenthau and James B. Donovan. Donovan
carried another hat around the U.S. government these days. In the midst
of campaigning for the Senate, he was the central figure in the administration’s secret negotiations with Fidel Castro over the release of the
1,105 men captured during the Bay of Pigs fiasco in April 1961. Finally,
after the presentation of the report of the President’s Committee to
Appraise Employment and Unemployment Statistics, Kennedy would
have a short talk with the prime minister of New Zealand before heading
into a high-level meeting on handling policy in Southeast Asia.
11:30 A.M.–12:03 P.M.
The Communists will almost certainly seek to retain as many
of their North Vietnamese forces and military advisers in
Laos as they can do with safety.
Meeting on Laos1
President Kennedy had few achievements to show for his efforts to
improve U.S.-Soviet relations. The one exception was an agreement to
neutralize tiny Laos. Lying athwart the Mekong River, it bridged
Thailand and Cambodia in the east and the two Vietnams in the west.
Signed in July 1962, the Geneva Accords provided for the withdrawal of
1. George Ball, William Bundy, Ray Cline, Roswell Gilpatric, Averell Harriman, Roger Hilsman,
Lyman Lemnitzer, Robert McNamara, and Maxwell Taylor attended the meeting. Tape 25, John
F. Kennedy Library, President’s Office Files, Presidential Recordings Collection.
Meeting on Laos
179
all foreign advisers and troops from this strategic real estate.2 This represented a possible improvement of the situation from the U.S. perspective.
The military position of the Royal Lao government had so deteriorated in
the spring that in early June the Kennedy administration seriously considered sending some 40,000 U.S. troops to occupy the southern portion of
the country. Before a decision had to be made in Washington, the situation
stabilized. In mid-June, the Lao elite formed a national coalition government and the Geneva agreement was reached. With only a week to go
before the first major test of the uneasy peace, Kennedy gathered his Laos
team to discuss the progress of the Communist compliance. As of October
7, all foreign military advisers were to have left the country. In materials
distributed before the meeting, Kennedy’s advisers made clear their
assumption that the Communists would violate the Geneva agreement.
The North Vietnamese, in particular, were expected to maintain a military
presence in the country, to backstop the Communist Pathet Lao forces.
Kennedy faced the decision of whether the United States would adhere to
the letter of the agreement and pull out all U.S. military assistance teams.
Unidentified: [starts in midsentence] . . . later Secretary Ball and
Governor Harriman will run through for you the . . . their planning and
then perhaps after that the Defense Department, Secretary McNamara,
[and] Generals [Maxwell] Taylor and [unclear] might wish to comment on the military aspects of it.
Ray Cline:3 Sir, the United States Intelligence Board [USIB] approved
a paper on Laos on Wednesday.4 I have advance copies of it here, which I
will distribute to those who are interested.
With respect to the problems that we are primarily concerned with—
the implementation of the Geneva accords—some major conclusions
were reached which I’d just like to read.
Conclusion on the Communist intentions is as follows: [reading] “The
Communists will seek to expand their influence and power in Laos with
the ultimate aim of achieving effective control over all of the country. To
2. These were the “Declaration on the Neutrality of Laos” and a 20-article protocol. They are
printed in American Foreign Policy: Current Documents (Washington, DC: Department of State,
1962), pp. 1075–83.
3. Ray Cline was deputy director for intelligence at the Central Intelligence Agency.
4. The USIB was a interagency organization, under the chairmanship of the CIA, that oversaw the production of national intelligence estimates.
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F R I DAY, S E P T E M B E R
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this end they will nominally support the Souvanna-led government proceeding toward their goal mainly through political and subversive means.
“The Communists”—the next conclusion that is relevant to this is—
“The Communists will almost certainly seek to retain as many of their
North Vietnamese forces and military advisers in Laos as they can do
with safety. Souvanna [Phouma] will almost certainly be unable to prevent Communist use of southern Laos as a corridor for assisting the
Vietcong effort into South Vietnam.”
I think the . . . those are the conclusions relevant to the Geneva
Accords. In addition, they reached a number of conclusions on the fragility
of the political coalition in Vientiane. Unless there are specific questions, I
[unclear] the facts . . . if you want to read them. They are available here.
We have no evidence of an intention to withdraw all of the Vietminh
troops before October the 7th. Our own working estimate is that probably about 7,500, 7,000 to 8,000, Vietminh troops and advisers are still in
Laos. And there is very solid evidence of their intention to conceal at
least a considerable part of those troops by disguising them as Pathet
Lao or Lao troops.
I think that’s the general picture. We have a great deal of data on
what is actually going on in different parts of the country.
President Kennedy: What do we think is their—Did Secretary Rusk
have any success with his conversation with Gromyko in regard to
Soviet resupply? [Cline begins to speak but Kennedy cuts him off.] Or are
they blaming him because, they say, we’re doing the Meo business, the
Soviet Union—5
Cline: Yes, sir. I would say that the conversation with Gromyko was
not very satisfactory. That he indicated it was all our fault and said that—
President Kennedy: For what reason? What have we done wrong?
Cline: He specifically spoke about the supply of the Meo. But Hanoi—
he also referred to propaganda statements which the Communists are
now making which say that we are not intending to withdraw our troops
at all, either, that we are disguising them in—
Kennedy turns off the machine. The meeting continued for another 25
minutes.
At this meeting Kennedy decided to proceed with strict adherence to the
terms of the Geneva Accords. However, the United States would make a
5. The Meo were anti-Communist mountain people who were U.S. allies.
S AT U R DAY, S E P T E M B E R
29, 1962
181
substantial payment to the coalition government in Vientiane. Moreover,
in order to prepare for the expected Communist violations, Kennedy
instructed his team to develop the necessary intelligence sources so that
the world, especially the International Control Commission responsible
for supervising the accord, could be made aware of the violations in good
order. Finally, as insurance against any further deterioration of the U.S.
position in the region, Kennedy ordered the retention of U.S. troops in
neighboring Thailand.6
Ironically, the most likely use of U.S. forces in the near future was not
in far-off Asia but at home in the Deep South. Two of the men at the Laos
meeting had just come from a meeting at the Pentagon War Room with
Attorney General Robert Kennedy. The Governor of Mississippi was
resisting a court order to allow an African American James Meredith—to
register at the main campus of the University of Mississippi system. The
President had no meetings scheduled this day to discuss the progress of
negotiations between Mississippi governor Ross Barnett and the
Attorney General. But he was certainly kept informed of his brother’s
efforts to avoid a military showdown like that which had happened in
Little Rock, Arkansas, in 1957.
Saturday, September 29, 1962
The President was supposed to be in Newport, Rhode Island, for the
weekend. However, he delayed his departure and went into the office at
9:55 A.M. His first visitors were the incoming Chairman of the Joint
Chiefs, Maxwell Taylor, who stayed about half an hour, and Michael V.
Forrestal, son of legendary Secretary of Defense James Forrestal and a
key member of the President’s National Security Council staff, particularly on issues dealing with Southeast Asia. Twenty minutes after
Forrestal’s departure, the President welcomed his two closest Kremlin
watchers for a seminar on Nikita Khrushchev.
6. See National Security Action Memorandum No. 189, 28 September 1962, FRUS, 24: 904.
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29, 1962
11:00 A.M.–12:27 P.M.
Generally speaking, I think, Khrushchev has felt, at least up
until recently, that things are going his way and he needn’t
take any risks, that he is playing for the big stakes and not the
small.
Meeting on the Soviet Union1
President Kennedy had just received a letter from Soviet leader Nikita
Khrushchev by way of their top secret back channel. One of the dangers
of the President’s back-channel diplomacy with the Russians through
Robert Kennedy was that a careless remark might lead to serious misunderstanding. It appeared from the letter that the Soviet leadership
understood Robert Kennedy to have said in a private meeting with
Soviet ambassador Anatoly Dobrynin that Washington would accept a
long-term moratorium on underground testing following the signing of
an atmospheric test ban. It was a Soviet objective to halt testing underground. Given U.S. insistence on a strict verification system to strengthen
any comprehensive test ban, it seemed most likely that the superpowers
would only manage to agree on a partial test ban. Nevertheless, the
Soviets hoped to make a moratorium on underground testing a precondition to any partial test ban. Kennedy knew what his answer would be
to this Soviet misunderstanding.
Kennedy made sporadic use of the administration’s top Soviet
experts.2 Between them, Llewellyn Thompson and Charles Bohlen had
nine years’ experience as U.S. ambassador in the Soviet Union and had
witnessed Khrushchev’s rise to power.3 The President knew Bohlen much
better than Thompson but had not even consulted Bohlen before he sent
the Attorney General to see Dobrynin. On this Saturday, he called them
in to help shape his response to Khrushchev. The U.S. congressional elections were only five weeks away, after which, Kennedy assumed, the
1. Including President Kennedy, Charles Bohlen, Llewellyn Thompson, and later Jerome
Wiesner. President Kennedy also has a telephone conversation with Senator Henry Jackson
during the latter part of the meeting. Tape 25, John F. Kennedy Library, President’s Office
Files, Presidential Recordings Collection.
2. Timothy Naftali Interview with McGeorge Bundy, 16 November 1995.
3. Charles “Chip” E. Bohlen was U.S. ambassador to the Soviet Union from 1953 to 1957.
Thompson succeeded him and stayed until his return in August.
Meeting on the Soviet Union
183
Soviets would initiate a new, more dangerous challenge to the status quo
in West Berlin—a warning Khrushchev repeated in his letter.
Later the President’s science adviser, Jerome Wiesner, would join the
conversation. Wiesner would not be told that Khrushchev had written
directly to the President. Instead, in another demonstration of how information could be compartmentalized even among the President’s closest
advisers, President Kennedy would ask Wiesner to suggest responses to
certain Soviet attacks on the U.S. negotiating position at the test ban
talks, never letting on where these allegations had come from.
Kennedy started taping as Bohlen was reminiscing about his experiences with Khrushchev. Thompson can be heard deferring somewhat to
Bohlen, a better linguist and more-experienced, though not necessarily
better, Kremlinologist.
Charles Bohlen: [tape fades in] . . . other than that [unclear] he continues—his wife was the one that’s—but she’s crippled.
Llewellyn Thompson: Yeah.
Bohlen: And after the breakup of the Summit in Paris [in 1960], she
rushed down to the airport when Khrushchev was leaving and presented
him with a big bunch of roses.
Thompson: Yeah, that’s right.
President Kennedy: But [unclear] . . . that is assuming he wants to
talk to [unclear] but at least I would [unclear] that part of it. [Unclear.]
Thompson: And this letter, Chip says, is—
Bohlen: This letter is clearly an appeal [unclear] to a meeting, perhaps. This letter . . . I don’t know if this . . . [unclear] is worse.
President Kennedy: Oh, it’s not worse. It’s just the transparency of it
is less [unclear] are the Russians. Well, I’d like to have him be a little less
. . . [reading aloud from the most recent letter from Soviet premier Nikita
Khrushchev] “I would like to note with satisfaction that you now seem to
agree in principle that along with the conclusion of the treaty with . . . a
moratorium.”4
Bohlen: We had never agreed to that, at all.
4. The exact line runs: “I would like to note with satisfaction that now you seem to agree in
principle that along with the conclusion of a treaty on the ban of nuclear weapons tests in the
atmosphere, in outer space and under water a moratorium with regard to underground
explosions be accepted” (Nikita S. Khrushchev to John F. Kennedy, 28 September 1962,
FRUS, 6: 152–61).
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President Kennedy: That’s right. [continuing to read] “If this is so,
then it opens certain prospects.”
Bohlen: Do you think that’s anything that Bobby might have told
him?
President Kennedy: No, but Bobby would. . . . Well, I think Bobby
did—5
Bohlen: Did say something.
President Kennedy: Bobby did say maybe for a period of six
months—
Bohlen: Yeah.
President Kennedy: —but not an indefinite one. It seemed to me there
was nothing wrong with . . . just not quite in that form. In a legal thing . . .
that there should be no unlimited moratorium. . . . Yeah, I [unclear] to say
something. But we never put the question that way. We are not proposing
[unclear] unlimited, we [unclear] just for a certain period of time. Of
course I always knew they would do that the first time it’s needed for . . .
But then it seems to me we could follow that up quickly.
Bohlen: Yes, if it . . . what he’s saying is that after the period of moratorium, he proposes five years, which is nonsense, of course, but . . . He
says that if at the end of that time you haven’t reached an agreement on a
treaty for [the] underground thing, then you agree to reexamine the
whole thing. In other words, any treaty that you might sign for the
atmosphere or something like that, would be conditional.
President Kennedy: Well, I think Bobby used the six-months phrase;
obviously five years . . .
What is your judgment as to why they won’t take an atmospheric
test?6 Because they can’t underground . . . they can’t test underground
as well as we can? Is that the reason?
Bohlen: This might be the reason; but I also think there probably is
some element of principle in their, in the . . . Tommy, would you? . . .
They may fear that we’ve got some tricks or scientific gimmick that’s
going to increase our . . . He says it, in essence, he’s not going to make a
[unclear].
President Kennedy: [reading] “If, however, even during that term . . .
then the whole question of a ban will have to be reconsidered anew. And
if . . . insists . . . I want to say this already now and in plain terms—the
Soviet Union will consider itself free from . . . ”
5. Robert Kennedy met with Anatoly Dobrynin on 18 September 1962.
6. Atmospheric test ban.
Meeting on the Soviet Union
185
Thompson: I think they’d agree to a three-year moratorium; but not
much . . . and I doubt if you could get anything less than a two and a half
period. [Unclear] The others that could support five, that’s a bargaining—
President Kennedy: But I don’t see much advantage to us. We propose
six months; they propose five years. I don’t see much advantage to us in
that proposition. It would be an unpoliced moratorium for three years.
Thompson: Well, if this included those automatic stations—?
Bohlen: Well, he mentioned these automatic stations in here. Tommy,
is this the first time he has ever come forward with—?
Thompson: As far as I’m—
Bohlen: Yeah. And I don’t know whether—
President Kennedy: He says it’s national. Isn’t this in line with his
traditional position? That if he—
Thompson: Well, if you had a radio readout out on those stations,
that you are constantly monitoring—if they ceased to work, then you’d
obviously have—the whole thing would be up in the air. I don’t know
how effective they’d be; but I—
President Kennedy: [Unclear] we look at this part of it? I was wondering what [unclear] at Pugwash—
Thompson: Seems to me this is up to you. But there would be added
assurance because we would get reports from other stations that know if
they weren’t—if this thing wasn’t working or wasn’t reporting.
Bohlen: Yeah, but the difference between this and the on-site inspection is that I gather that there is absolutely no way no matter what readings you get where you can tell the difference between certain kinds of
natural explosion and a nuclear one. And then the idea was that when
you got readings of this kind, you would go to the spot to measure.
[Pause.]
Well, Mr. President, I think this letter gives you a vehicle to make a
response, speaking now of the Berlin section of it, which can I say, I feel
quite strongly is necessary in some form or other. Now, there are three
or four different ways that you can get this over that the regularity with
which he [Khrushchev] has been telling everybody that the United
States is too liberal, et cetera, et cetera, to fight.7 And I must say the
general feeling, I think is that, among the demonologists, is chances are
he believes this. And now the question is how can you convey—
President Kennedy: Why would he say it? What is the argument for
his saying it?
7. On Khrushchev’s statement, see the editors’ introduction, 10 September 1962.
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Bohlen: Well, he believes—if you take it from his own military point
of view—that the local military situation [that] makes the correlation of
forces is all in their favor and he probably thinks that in view of public
opinion and [unclear] of the horrors of a nuclear war that the United
States would not . . . would back away from that point. Therefore he’s
got a situation with all the advantage on his side where he can proceed.
And there’ll be a great whooping and yelling around but that nothing
will happen. But the thing he’s interested in, which is the only thing you
worry about, is a nuclear war. And this is cockeyed, I think. Although, I
don’t know, if you read some of Joe’s articles, [unclear] old Alsop’s articles about de Gaulle’s view and all this other stuff.
President Kennedy: But de Gaulle . . . that’s why I think de Gaulle . . . I
think de Gaulle would like to start to get out of Berlin and [unclear] blame
the United States. Because, if they could only get Berlin eliminated, then
they could really have a . . . Europe which would be in pretty good shape.
Bohlen: Well, I’m not so sure. But I think that de Gaulle’s basic feeling, and I’ve talked to Joe about this, and I’ve told him [that] whoever
his informant was, who I believe was [French foreign minister] Couve
de Murville.
President Kennedy: [Unclear question.] Well, he said it was [French
diplomat Jean] Laloy; he talked to Laloy.
Bohlen: Laloy?
President Kennedy: Yeah. Apparently de Gaulle asked about contingency planning. Then de Gaulle said, “Why, my dear fellow, don’t
worry—the Americans aren’t going to fight anyway. [Unclear.] Don’t
worry about it.”
Bohlen: This is de Gaulle’s, sort of, method of presentation. But I
think de Gaulle’s thought runs differently. I don’t believe that he thinks
there’s going to be a real crisis over Berlin, or what Joe would call a
crunch, in other words.
President Kennedy: Hopefully.
Bohlen: And he thinks that the thing is going to—the French have
always thought that Berlin was going to die on the vine. Couve de
Murville told me that last June.
President Kennedy: Yeah.
Bohlen: He just said . . .
President Kennedy: They don’t really care, do they?
Bohlen: “[Unclear] just stay away” and that they don’t give a damn.
No. Because if they don’t . . . they want Germany divided which is essentially their whole policy.
And I think that de Gaulle’s chief mistake about the Russian thing is
Meeting on the Soviet Union
187
that he attributes the present structure of Russian power to be identical
with the time of Stalin. And he never can forget that he stood up to
Stalin and said, “Nuts to you,” and Stalin came around. And he doesn’t
realize that this guy, and I think Tommy would—I’d like to know what
Tommy thinks about this—operates in a very different power circumstance from Stalin.8 Stalin could change anything like that himself,
whereas this guy has pressures and tendencies that he has to take cognizance of, if he . . . and this limits his personal sphere of maneuver.
But the question is, Mr. President, and this obviously is a subject
we’re not supposed to ask you. [He laughs.] But . . . this is your business
and not ours. That it seems to me very important to halt this sort of
progress that the Russians are doing in Berlin, building up this enormous record of saying that the West is not going to do it. You and
Macmillan and de Gaulle really agree with him that Adenauer gets the
big picture. And it’s very difficult to know why he’s doing it, unless it’s
in preparation for another dialogue which he talks about—
Thompson: That’s what I think is the—
Bohlen: But I think this is the likelihood; but on the other hand—
Thompson: The other thing it might be is that—
Bohlen: —what in God’s name—?
Thompson: The other reason why he might make these remarks is
that he wants to, he wants to—
Bohlen: To show those to some of the others.
Thompson: Yeah, to provoke us into a strong reply, which he can use to
ease [unclear] policy. In either case it would argue for going back at him.
President Kennedy: I mean for us to, for us to—do you want some
orange juice?
Thompson: No, thanks.
President Kennedy: For us to . . . for him to tell Americans and other
people that the Americans aren’t going to fight . . . that doesn’t seem to
me to . . . what would be the log[ic] . . . as you say unless he wants us to,
[unclear] first [unclear] to fight but I don’t ever—if that’s his opinion
you don’t really announce it, because that’s really rubbing our face in it.
Do you think therefore—it could be—He doesn’t have to have a reason
for everything. If he’s telling what he actually thinks—
Thompson: Yeah.
Bohlen: Agreed.
Thompson: He’s capable of doing it.
8. Referring to Khrushchev.
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29, 1962
Bohlen: The trouble is, that this circulates, and it’s already circulating
around Western Europe and you’re getting a sense of panic [unclear]
European countries. De Gaulle doesn’t necessarily help it at all, you know.
President Kennedy: [Unclear.] Are you saying this keeps downgrading our changes?
Bohlen: Yeah. Definitely.
Thompson: I don’t know, I think—
Bohlen: There are three or four different ways in which this particular aspect of the problem can be [unclear]. One, by you being direct. I
think you’ve seen that draft of the—
President Kennedy: Yeah, I saw yours and then Bundy did another one.
Bohlen: Yeah.
President Kennedy: Bundy’s was satisfactory . . . [unclear] be yours
or [unclear].
Bohlen: [speaks over the President] Well, it seems to me that this, in a
sense . . . part of this could be tacked on, if you’re proposing to answer
this letter of his. Some of this stuff in this draft could be a [unclear].
That would be one way of doing it, the other way would be by a public statement, which I think everybody believes would not be either convincing or very desirable at this time.
The third way would be to use a diplomatic channel, possibly you to
[Anatoly] Dobrynin or Foy [Kohler] right to Khrushchev.9 My feeling
about this is negotiating a substance as serious as this, I really think that
the direct communication thing would carry more conviction, if you did
it to Dobrynin, you had no certainty how he would—
President Kennedy: Yeah. I don’t see these . . . anybody . . . these fellows having any more of these conversations for a while. I’ll try to—
Bohlen: And I think that also if you sent your ambassador in
Moscow to talk to Khrushchev along these lines, we’re still working on
the same thing.
President Kennedy: Maybe we should get just a . . . get awfully belligerent to Kohler.
Bohlen: And the third way, Mr. President, is one that I must say that
I’ve always been inclining to [unclear] is in the field of action. These fellows have been buzzing our planes in the corridors—running these MiGs
within 2[00] or 300 yards of a passenger-loaded Pan Am plane, which
just contains all the ingredients of an accident. Because these things go so
fast, you know, 2[00] or 300 yards is just nothing. And that if you would
9. Anatoly Dobrynin was the Soviet ambassador to the United States.
Meeting on the Soviet Union
189
consider with your allies the possibility of the next time they do this, of
putting in fighter escorts for these planes and running them until they
seem to be calling it off and then call it off and then be prepared to start
again. I have a feeling that the Russians in situations of this kind pay much
more attention to action than they do to words.
[to Thompson] So what would you think of that?
Thompson: Yeah. As I was saying earlier, I think this may . . .
buzzing may be related to their annoyance at our buzzing their ships.10
It’s the prestige factor [unclear].
Bohlen: But you have a decided difference in there, is that the
buzzing of the planes in the corridor could at any point produce a terrible accident, whereas the buzzing of a ship has got very little chances to
bring about that.
President Kennedy: We . . . How much [of the] buzzing has there
been? Remember last year there was . . . [in the] spring there was a big
argument with [Lucius] Clay wanting us to put in fighters and [General
Lauris] Norstad against it. And I thought Norstad’s judgment was right.
Because fighting . . . well, it just struck me . . I would think you ought to
wait on fighters. That is one of the things we can do without [unclear]
shooting . . . put fighters in there. And I . . . It seems to me we ought to
wait until this thing gets a little higher before we do that?
Bohlen: Well—
President Kennedy: So they’re doing [unclear] we did say we’d knock
it down, then . . . at least then they’ve taken an action which is . . .
Bohlen: Yeah. But then you’ll have an accident which will create an
enormous amount of excitement in this country and you will have the
loss of life with the passengers on the plane. And I think this will force
your hand into action which will be a little beyond what should be proposed to do now.
Now the other possibility of action, which perhaps might be put in this
letter as a, sort of, a warning, but one which, I think, many of us in the
Department of State have been thinking of for a long time. And that is the
question of making West Berlin a Land of the Federal Republic. This
would mean complete recognition that you were through with East Berlin.
Well, we are de facto. But you will have a hell of a time, I think, with the
French in getting any agreement and the British to include that, and it
10. In his 28 September letter, Khrushchev makes direct reference to a conversation he had
with Llewellyn Thompson where he had complained to the U.S. ambassador about the
buzzing of Soviet ships on the high seas.
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S AT U R DAY, S E P T E M B E R
29, 1962
would require that agreement. I don’t know what the West German attitude would be.
Thompson: They’d be for it.
Bohlen: They’d be for it, I think. And the West Berliners would
surely be for it. It would have the advantage of—you’d have to have a
whole series of new agreements. That is to say, you’d have the West
German government requesting the presence of the Western troops
with the agreement of the Federal Republic. The only problem would be
how this would affect your right of access through their territory.
I just have a very strong feeling that the trend is being manipulated
by Khrushchev very much to our detriment.
Thompson: You’d certainly have to study that one carefully because
on your access . . . one of our main points now is [that] we hold the
Soviets responsible. I mean . . . they haven’t recorded that . . . but once
you make . . . do it just by agreement, the Soviets say, “Well, we have
nothing to do with this agreement; why talk to us?” You get a—
President Kennedy: Yeah.
Bohlen: Well, you might even do it in a too [unclear] sort of way but
you would leave your occupation rights there completely, but that you’d
also just change the status of the . . . West Berlin as a Land of the Republic.
Thompson: Going back to the buzzing, it seems the one thing you
could do is to put in some rather vague language in the reply, just raising
this problem instead of [unclear] our planes. [Unclear] could be coming
at it rather than just doing it.
Bohlen: A great deal of the language he uses on Cuba could be
[unclear] directly to Berlin because he’s talking about disregarding the
normal conventions, [unclear]—assigning to ourselves the right to this,
that, and the other, and this is exactly what he’s trying to do in Berlin.
President Kennedy: [reading aloud from Khrushchev’s letter] “[Unclear]
this occupation is here to stay . . . [unclear] . . . put it to the U.N.”
Did you get a report on Grewe’s last conversation with me before he
left,11 about how he thinks the Hallstein Doctrine is dated and that
they’re going to [unclear]?12
11. Wilheim Grewe was West German ambassador to the United States until September 1962.
His resignation came about because the Kennedy administration lost confidence in his effectiveness as a liaison after Rusk accused him of leaking to the press in April 1962 a Department
of State draft of an allied agreement on Berlin.
12. This doctrine, named for Adenauer’s foreign policy adviser, Walter Hallstein, held that
Bonn would refuse to maintain diplomatic relations with all countries, excluding the Soviet
Union, that recognized the German Democratic Republic.
Meeting on the Soviet Union
191
Bohlen: We picked up some [unclear] when we were in Bonn this
June. . . . But, it hasn’t got . . . a lot of the private interests in Germany
are very keen to have the Hallstein Doctrine eliminated and some of the
people in the Foreign Office. But I think old Adenauer is clearly hooked
on it. He did something recently that . . . well, the reaffirmation of the
Hallstein Doctrine.
President Kennedy turns to the section in Khrushchev’s letter about U.S.
policy toward Cuba.
President Kennedy: [reading aloud] “We haven’t done anything to
give you a pretext for that.”[Kennedy jumps ahead in the text.] “I must tell
you straightforward [ly] . . . that your statement with threats against
Cuba is just an inconceivable step.” Straightforward? He doesn’t say
whether existing . . .
[Kennedy resumes reading aloud] “Your request for an authority . . . by
the way is a step . . . apt to get red hot . . . pour oil in the flame . . . to
extinguish that red-hot glow.”13 His metaphors are a little mixed in that.
Why would he blame someone who wants to pour oil on the flames to
extinguish that red-hot glow? [Laughter.]
Thompson: [Unclear.]
Bohlen: Who writes these damn things for him?
Thompson: Does Foy know about this thing?14
Bohlen: I don’t think so. This only came in yesterday, didn’t it?
Thompson: I assume Foy will be seeing . . . calling on Khrushchev
[unclear].
President Kennedy: [reading from Khrushchev’s letter, sometimes mumbling] “to qualify . . . to remind you of the norms . . . naturally . . . would
not say anything on West Berlin. . . . For example, what is going on, for
example, in the U.S. [Congress]?”15 [The President is quite amused.]
People in the Congress?
13. Kennedy is paraphrasing as he reads. The sentence goes: “Under present circumstances,
when there exist thermonuclear weapons, your request to the Congress for an authority to
call up 150,000 reservists is not only a step making the atmosphere red-hot, it is already a
dangerous sign that you want to pour oil in the flame, to extinguish that red-hot glow by
mobilizing new military contingents.”
14. Foy Kohler was the newly appointed U.S. ambassador to the Soviet Union.
15. FRUS, 6: 159. The full quote reads:
That is what made us to come out with the TASS statement and later at the session
of the UN General Assembly to qualify your act, to remind of the norms of international law and to say about West Berlin.
If there were no statement by you on Cuba, we, naturally, as Ambassador
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S AT U R DAY, S E P T E M B E R
29, 1962
Bohlen: These are all such—
President Kennedy: What?
Bohlen: —stilted translations from the Russian. If you can see what
the Russians said, this [unclear]—
President Kennedy: [reading aloud] “How can one, for example, fail
to notice the decision of the House [of Representatives] to stop giving
U.S. aid to anybody that trades with Cuba. . . . Isn’t that an act of impermissible arbitrariness against freedom of, freedom of [movement]?”
They have the resolution. [He continues reading.] “Very serious consequences may have the resolution adopted by the U.S. Senate . . . ready
to assume responsibility for unleashing [thermo]nuclear war.”
What do you think is the reason that they are going ahead with
Cuba in this massive way? They must know that it . . . I thought one
reason why they [unclear] Berlin because we’d take a reprisal against
Cuba . . . they want to make it as difficult as possible. What other reason
can there be? Because they began this buildup in June. In late June there
was no indication of an invasion by the United States at this time, so
[unclear].
Thompson: Well, I would suspect that Castro is nervous about what
might be going on and the pressure has been pretty—
President Kennedy: Sorry?
Thompson: —within the bloc, the Communist bloc, this is a good
step for him; he’s helping this country defend itself against U.S. imperialism and . . .
Bohlen: This is the satellite bond that you get. The Poles and stuff
like that . . .
President Kennedy: Yeah.
Bohlen: They think that Castro was planning it. They sent a guy
over there, Che Guevara, you know, to try and persuade the Russians to
let them join the Warsaw Pact, to give them formal coverage and Soviet
protection.16 And the Russians refused to do this. And then this is what
Thompson and Mr. Udall were told, would not say anything on West Berlin. Your
statement forced us to do so.
We regret that this dangerous line is being continued in the United States now.
What is going on, for example, in the U.S. Congress?
16. One of Fidel Castro’s closest associates, Ernesto “Che” Guevara, visited moscow in August
to discuss the conclusion of a Soviet-Cuban defense agreement. Khrushchev, however, refused
to sign the proposed agreement.
Meeting on the Soviet Union
193
they did. And also, as Tommy mentioned, he said from the point of view
of the Communist world, it is very important for him to be out in front,
showing that he is militant, pushing for the great cause.
President Kennedy: Why do you think they refused to put him in the
Warsaw Pact?
Bohlen: Oh, because this is too much for the Russians because then
they’re not sure what the United States might do—
President Kennedy: Right.
Bohlen: —and they don’t want to be committed to go to war over
Cuba, [Kennedy mumbles assent] if there is an American attack. Oh, I think
this has been very clear all the way going back to ’60 when he first began
to rattle the rockets about Cuba, then he made a statement before anyone
would call him on that thing, he made a statement saying, “It’s just symbolic.” And they haven’t gone beyond that and this latest one, which he
refers to here; the September 11th one seems to me to have been primarily
issued in order to tack on the rider about not doing anything about Berlin.
Thompson: I think, in general, he’s, he has very much in mind that
meeting you and that, I think, if he can settle Berlin, then—
Bohlen: Well this is what bothers me . . . the hell out of me. He’s
coming over here in the end of November and this letter is really pitched
to the . . . twice he refers to the resumption of the dialogue . . . and then
in the last paragraph he talks about the: “Of great importance for finding
the ways to solve both this problem . . . are personal contacts of statesmen on the highest level.” Well that means between you and him. But,
the question is: What in God’s name could be the best solution to the
Berlin thing if you did meet?
President Kennedy: [Unclear] I don’t—unless he wants to demonstrate that he’s doing every possible—
Bohlen: Well, I mean, this still leaves the situation as it was. I think,
from your point of view, [unclear] don’t see that [there’s] anything very
much to negotiate about as long as he is insisting on the removal of certain troops.
Thompson: Well, I think, Chip [Bohlen], that if he, I think he’s, first
of all, that he is in a position where he has . . . he feels he has got to go
ahead and sign this treaty.
Bohlen: Yes, I think everybody—
Thompson: And I don’t think he wants to play Russian roulette with
that and just toss a coin and see whether there’s war or not. If he wants
to . . . he could get us to accept the East German . . . Solution C
approach, where we would accept East Germans deployed at the check-
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point.17 Each of us maintain a [unclear] position [unclear] would be
acceptable [unclear] his treaty.
President Kennedy: What’s that again? That sounded [unclear].
Thompson: Well, each of us would say, we would say, we would still
hold the Russians responsible but in a practical way we will let the . . .
accept [the] East Germans on the checkpoints as long as they don’t
interfere with our access. And they would make the statement that they
were treated as was a sovereign country. But, in fact, they are not.
Then he could go ahead and sign his treaty, and you wouldn’t be then
gambling on whether there’s war or not. And, I think, that’s about the
most that you could hope to come out with. He would hope for more, and
try for more, but in the end might settle for something like that. As long
as he can sign his treaty and then maintain the position that East
Germany is sovereign. We say it’s not. They, in the meantime, practically
control the access but don’t interfere.
Bohlen: Wouldn’t that be buying an awful lot of future trouble with
that sort of a solution because of the East Germans’ not being bound by
any agreement, anything like that; wouldn’t they go in for the harassment that the Russians are now, sort of, semidoing in a much more
intensive [unclear]?
Thompson: [Unclear] would be very dangerous, I think. But if the
Russians say then they’re out of it except that they are allies of East
Germany. The East Germans start doing something and we take some
forceful action. . . . Then, we’ve always got the sanctions against them, of
cutting off trade and all that sort of thing. So for the immediate period, a few
years, I should think that it probably would buckle them in pretty quietly.
In the meantime they would be pressuring others to recognize East
Germany and gradually, I think, time would solve the thing, which in a
way, it might. It might not be too bad. Certainly, it’s going to go along
the way it is for a long time. There could be no solution—
President Kennedy: Could he claim that he had solved this problem
by this means?
Thompson: I think so. I think he’s off the hook then. And once he’s
signed this treaty, that’s the main thing.
17. Solution C was a term thrown around during the Kennedy administration as it tried to
devise a negotiating position on the German and Berlin problems. Solution C was to seek
negotiations aimed toward an informal, interim agreement to preserve the status quo in Berlin
despite a G.D.R.-U.S.S.R. peace treaty. It appeared to offer the most likely chance of success
with the least fuss. It was a view favored by State’s old Berlin hands.
Meeting on the Soviet Union
195
President Kennedy: Why don’t you think he signed it before? On
that basis he could have signed at any time in the last two years. Why
don’t you think he signed it?
Thompson: Well, we’ve never let him know that we’d accept [the] East
Germans on the checkpoints. That’s the thing that would make the issue.
Bohlen: Well, then that international authority just is tantamount to
saying that it would be international, whether the East Germans would
be in it. We’ve never presented them a formal draft of that thing. I think
that they could . . .
I think it’s a . . . He’s coming over here . . . [Someone sighs.]
President Kennedy: He said, didn’t he? I mean, he just writes that
he’s coming, doesn’t he? [Kennedy reads] “After the election, especially in
the second half of November, it would be necessary . . . to continue the
dialogue.”
Bohlen: Yeah. He says that twice in there; there’s another. [Unclear
interjection by Kennedy.] That and coupled with the last point makes it
perfectly clear that his idea of a dialogue is between you and him.
President Kennedy: Of course that’s not very advantageous to us, is
it? Just to have he [and I] . . . And then no matter what happens it looks
like . . . we become even more obvious as the chief defender of Berlin.
Which is just what de Gaulle wants to do to us. Because he doesn’t want
to fight a war; he wants to make it all [unclear].
Bohlen: A sellout.
Thompson: Yes.
Bohlen: And I don’t know what the British attitude would be on this
sort of thing. I think [that] this will cause a great deal of ruckus and furor.
President Kennedy: What . . . de Gaulle and [unclear]?
Bohlen: A meeting between you and Khrushchev. I mean, I think, the
British and the Germans . . .
President Kennedy: Why would the British care? They’ve mucked it
up—[unclear].
Bohlen: Well, the British wouldn’t mind, I mean if they thought that
. . . they could be worried that the thing would come to a deadlock and a
big impasse and that you would be nearer the danger of war than you
were before. And the West Germans, I think, they’d probably follow
more or less the line of the French and be ready to fill the air with
denunciations of duty.
President Kennedy: And the weakness of the . . .
Bohlen: Of course this question as to why the Russians are pushing
this thing so hard is one that I have [unclear] almost four years and I
don’t think that anybody [is] clear why. . . . And de Gaulle may not care
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if the United States takes the blame for any sort of a sellout, or whatever
you want to call it, in Berlin.
But on the other hand most of the fellows in the French Foreign
Office particularly feel that Khrushchev is doing this because of the
whole effect on West Germany and on the alliance. In other words, he is
seeking larger aims than just Berlin.
I must say, I don’t think that. I think that Berlin is a . . . these are the
kind of repercussions and results [on] which he would naturally capitalize if they happened. But I don’t think he’s playing these moves on Berlin
with this in view. I don’t know what you feel about the alliance.
Thompson: Well, I think he’s hooked personally on . . . He’s always
boasted that this was his solution that he dreamed this whole thing up.
Bohlen: Yeah.
Thompson: He got way out and he’s gotten further out since.
Bohlen: Well, what I mean is that [unclear] Berlin as a thing in itself.
That if he settled this, would he then quiet down? And consider that
Europe is all tidied up? Or would it be just a move to disrupt the
Alliance, to stop progress—?
Thompson: I think it’s mainly the former. I think he—
Bohlen: I think so, too, myself; but on the other hand you can’t separate the fact that these might be the consequences which he would then
immediately try and exploit.
Thompson: He can exploit any of the—
Bohlen: Well, the thing that mystifies me about this thing is that he
himself nearly has a success on his terms which would be an enormous
humiliation and defeat for us, which I don’t think is going to happen, but
assuming that it does, still if he knows anything about history, this is the
way of bringing war very much sooner—
[Someone agrees indistinctly.]
Bohlen: —because you don’t inflict what would be a very humiliating
defeat upon a power like the United States when you don’t affect his
power 1 inch by . . . .Berlin wouldn’t affect our power at all.
President Kennedy: Right.
Bohlen: And almost all throughout history a Munich has sort of
been followed by—
President Kennedy: Yeah
Bohlen: —the war.
President Kennedy: Right.
Bohlen: So, I can’t see that if he is thinking straight, and in historical
terms, that he could have very much happiness out of either result of this
thing.
Meeting on the Soviet Union
197
President Kennedy: Well, why would they build up Cuba? Why
would . . . I mean he must . . . if he calculates correctly, he must realize
that what’s happened in Cuba this summer makes it much more difficult
for us to accept any, to engage ourselves now to have a deal over Berlin. I
mean, that’s just not been—
Bohlen: [Unclear.] This is one thing that I’m convinced of, is that the
Russian mind does not have the foggiest comprehension of the American
political process. They really believe that you are sort of the dictator of
the United States and can do any damn thing you want, and that . . .
This just comes through the doctrine. You see, they consider that the
capitalist system, that democracy in a capitalist system is just a part of
flimflam and [is] a disguise for the control by Wall Street and all this
other . . . Look at the way he keeps talking about Dean Rusk being a tool
of the Rockefellers because he was head of the thing.18 I think he genuinely believes in it. So that all this stuff that you—
Thompson: The Pentagon and Wall Street. [Unclear.]
Bohlen: Yeah. It’s a very complicated sort of process. But I think the
conclusion that they reach is that public opinion doesn’t—
President Kennedy: Really count.
Bohlen: —really have any real effect and [unclear] enormous pressure this can put on a presidency.
President Kennedy: And I suppose we don’t . . . we over . . . we
underestimate the pressures that go on him, not from public opinion but
from other [unclear].
Bohlen: Well, I think you can describe public opinion in the Soviet
Union the same way that a good general pays great attention to the
morale of his troops. In other words, he doesn’t let troop morale dictate
his course of action, because then he wouldn’t be worth a damn as a general. He is very conscious of the fact that they rely on the morale. I mean
this just . . . but this doesn’t mean any—
President Kennedy: But you don’t think that he would calculate what
they’re doing in Cuba as a broad sort of traditional position and so on
would [unclear] really intensify the feeling here greatly, and make it
much more difficult to do anything about Berlin?
Bohlen: No, sir, I think this is probably something that’s just a complete blank page in his mind. I think that—what Tommy said—I think
he did Berlin because here it was something they had engaged in about
this regime, and then the Cubans got very scared and panicky for fear
18. Dean Rusk was president of the Rockefeller Foundation.
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there was going to be another, sort of, Bay of Pigs, something like this.
Which they would probably have lost.
President Kennedy: [Comments indistinctly.]
Bohlen: And went to the Russians and said, “My goodness, my goodness, you’ve got to help us.” Their first idea was to put them in a treaty,
and then the Russians put these arms in there; and then also the effect of
his standing in the Communist world because the Chinese have been
constantly attacking Khrushchev from the left, which is the first time in
Bolshevik history that this has ever happened. Heretofore they have
always been the extreme left—denouncing yellow Soviet so-and-so as
the opportunist and everything like it. The Chinese now come and say,
“You are scared of the thing.” Now there is one factor that underlies
[unclear] that I don’t know anything about. Tommy may have some
ideas about it.
Thompson: History [unclear] points their way [unclear] move is to
keep the Chinese from doing it—
Bohlen: This is what I mean.
Thompson: —[taking] the Chinese with it.
Bohlen: Well, the Chinese are not in much shape to give very much
help.
Thompson: [Unclear] I think it doesn’t.
Bohlen: Yeah, I think it is more in the psychological field, of his leadership in there, [Thompson murmurs assent] the other factor may be in
there. But the one question that perhaps may underlie this is that we
know now that all this flap about the missile gap is just for the birds
because they didn’t put their main effort on ICBMs and our estimate
now of the correlation of military forces is heavily in our favor [someone
mumbles assent] and not in their[s]. Now, if you go back to the history of
the Sino-Soviet dispute, you will see the Chinese undoubtedly believe,
completely literally, the Soviet claims which they were making in ’57 and
’58 of having . . . the balance having shifted in their . . . point. And I just
wonder whether or not in the Soviet hierarchy how much real understanding there is of the actual correlation of military force or whether
they are not operating on their previous, sort of, at least, announced estimate that they had sort of passed us. And their policy would be much
more intelligible if they believed that; because if they believed that they
had the nuclear, sort of, equality, or even superiority, then their lines of
action would be quite continuous, I mean, quite consistent. But it is not
consistent if it’s viewed in the light of what our estimate of the two
forces are.
President Kennedy: We are taking a look at a contingency plan for
Meeting on the Soviet Union
199
sort of building up a staging area in Florida for . . . in case we ever have
to go into Cuba. This would be impossible, I suppose, to keep this completely—we’ll look at this next week—to keep it completely submerged.
But obviously there is no sense in having about a four months’ gap
between the time we’ve decided to do something about Cuba and have to
wait. So, we want to begin to build up down there. Now, I suppose that
will surface. . . . What effect does that have?
Bohlen: Well, they’ll pick it up with all of this stuff, [unclear] calling
up this . . . Getting the authorization to call up 150,000 reservists and
state this in Congress. They’ll make a big thing out of it. And I think
this inevitably will . . .
President Kennedy: Do you see any reason not to do it?
Bohlen: I don’t. Although the question is—I’ll tell you one thing,
Mr. President, that I do think is that if you ever come to do any action
against Cuba, it would almost have to be on the basis of a declaration of
war. I mean serious action, that is—
President Kennedy: Yeah.
Bohlen: —U.S. forces and all. Because this will give you the legal
basis for a blockade and everything of this kind. If you try a blockade
without a declaration of war, then I think you get into a mess of complications with your friends and allies, as well as with the Russians. Now, if
the Cubans would make some move that would establish a reasonable
justification for a declaration of war, I think this is the only way you
could do it, if you are going to use United States forces. I don’t know
what’s being done in the sense of infiltration of people into Cuba—
President Kennedy: Well, we’ve warned them that we’ve been trying
to do that. . . . We’ve been doing that for nine months—
Bohlen: Yeah.
President Kennedy: —under General [Edward] Lansdale but he
hasn’t had much success. We’ve got these intelligence teams in there.
But, I saw the Washington Post suggested that we’d given up on internal
revolt. You [unclear] that editorial this morning?
Bohlen: I saw that. But that’s very curious [unclear]—
President Kennedy: It sounds like some guy got in there late at
night, and he wrote . . . [unclear] from the Pentagon staff.
Bohlen: [Unclear.]
President Kennedy: What?
Bohlen: That has not been the Washington Post’s general line—
President Kennedy: Oh, no.
Bohlen: —on the Cuban thing at all this year.
President Kennedy: Suddenly, a complete [unclear] operation.
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Bohlen: Some guy must have gotten a bright idea and sold it to Phil
Graham.19
President Kennedy: Yes, you’re probably [right].
Bohlen: But the . . .
Thompson: I think . . . I had the impression, that at the start of the
Cuban thing, that the Russians thought it wasn’t going to last and they
were very reluctant to get too committed, to put too much in there.
President Kennedy: Of course, if we had gone in a year ago—and it
was much easier in April after the Bay of Pigs—and you had that
become the regular United States invasion . . . I have always thought
that they would—of course you can’t tell what they would do, a year
ago. Now . . . but it always seemed to me they would just grab West
Berlin, don’t you think?
Bohlen: Well, they might have, Mr. President, and this might have
led to general war. But I think the situation is getting to the point where
there are so many places, there are many instances where if we take certain kinds of forcible actions, the Russians can retaliate. I think we tend
[unclear] to let the Berlin situation dominate our whole action [unclear].
But this is what the Russians are clearly trying to do. [Unclear.]
Thompson: I would have thought a move against Iran would have
been more likely than for Berlin.
President Kennedy: Except they could grab Berlin in two hours.
Iran, they would have to really—
Bohlen: Yeah, but any one of these things [unclear]—
Thompson: Grabbing would have meant direct fighting with U.S.
troops—
President Kennedy: What? What?
Thompson: Grabbing Berlin. And that’s, I think, much more dangerous than a move in Iran.
Bohlen: Their play is . . . the Russian game has always traditionally
been this way with the non-Communist power . . . is to push, pull, to feel
around and then judge, make their next move based upon their estimate
of the reaction to what people do. There is a phrase of Lenin in which he
said there are certain situations which you control with bayonets: if you
run into mush, you go forward; if you run into steel, you withdraw. And
since anything that Lenin said is enshrined in letters—
President Kennedy: That’s right.
Bohlen: —in gold and scarlet, I still think that Khrushchev’s attitude
19. Philip Graham was the publisher of the Washington Post.
Meeting on the Soviet Union
201
on Berlin is in one sense to test us. Now, I don’t know; but Joe Alsop
wrote about this . . . saw him the other day and I think you saw him,
didn’t you?
President Kennedy: Yeah, I saw him.
Bohlen: Joe has a new theory about the [Berlin] Wall, did he tell you
that?
President Kennedy: This was to cover up the . . .
Bohlen: This was to . . . The Wall was not to stop the refugees but to
provide the necessary circumstances where they could make a major
buildup of East German forces. And I said, “Well, I think that these
issues are one of the consequences but not necessarily the cause”—but
you know Joe when he gets on an idea—
President Kennedy: Then he’s got the idea that the solution to the
strategy is that the United States [unclear] our contingency planning, he
knows that the allies won’t do anything and therefore—
Bohlen: Yeah.
President Kennedy: —it [unclear] the United States to indicate it’s
going ahead.
Bohlen: Well, I must say, Mr. President, it depends on how your
analysis of this whole situation is. But, I think, that if we are going to do
anything, we’re going to have to do it—
President Kennedy: Quickly.
Bohlen: —unilaterally.
President Kennedy: Yeah. I just yesterday, or the day before, sent a
memorandum over to the Pentagon to ask them how long it takes to
move in. You remember that time we sent up that battle group into West
Berlin; then it turned out it took 28 hours to reach the autobahn. Well,
so now I asked whether they’ve got. . . . They’re still a long way away
from the autobahn, so we’ve got a camp there that they can make into a
barracks. So I asked them to—
Bohlen: McNamara was very much impressed with the state of training and the morale of the forces that he saw—
President Kennedy: Yeah.
Bohlen: —in Germany [in] the last two or three days. I don’t think
the strategy is worth a damn; but at least [he chuckles] the troops are in
good shape.
President Kennedy: Yeah.
Bohlen: But . . . because you might have an awful lot of pulling and
hauling with your allies, you see. For instance, suppose Khrushchev
when he signs the treaty does the following things: that he just turns
over to the East Germans the access rights to the military on the road
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and the [East] Germans say, “Well, we haven’t got any agreement with
you; they can’t go through,” leaving the air alone, because the air is a
place where we have much more freedom of maneuver. Then what’ll you
do? You will have consultations with your allies. The British, undoubtedly, will call for a conference, [Thompson or Kennedy laughs] and the
French will just sort of stay out of it totally. [Bohlen chuckles.] You know
them. And [unclear]. So you could lose an awful lot of time on this thing.
If they’re foolish enough to announce that the air corridors are
closed, then, I think, you have a very clearly indicated action which is to
send your fighters in. [President Kennedy speaks indistinctly.] But send
them in, in force. Anything you do on a subject like that, the danger is
that you send in too few forces and that this doesn’t create the impression. You ought to send in double the number of fighters that people
think would be adequate for the purpose.
And in the air, I think, this is the place where the thing is going to come
to a real . . . the crunch will happen there. Wouldn’t you think so, Tommy?
Thompson: Generally speaking, I think, Khrushchev has felt, at least
up until recently, that things are going his way and he needn’t take any
risks, that he is playing for the big stakes and not the small. In places like
Iran and others, where he could have done a lot of things, but if he did,
he’d [unclear] make it more difficult to spread further later on. And he’s
been . . . in Laos the same way and there are other complicating factors
there, but. . . . In general, I don’t think he wants to really run a real risk
of war at this time.
Bohlen: I wouldn’t think so.
Thompson: [Unclear.]
Bohlen: But then you come back to what is their estimate of the general correlation of military forces?
Thompson: Well, it certainly isn’t something that can be deliberately
calculated in this period. A wise thing to do . . .
Bohlen: Whatever happened to this idea that at one point was being
kicked around [unclear] of showing Khrushchev some—
President Kennedy: Pictures?
Bohlen: Pictures. It was leaked, I mean, it was deliberately let out of
NATO. And I think that [unclear] the probability is that they’ve got it.
The only question is do they realize to what extent we cover their installations and therefore we know what ICBM rockets they have and what
we have, which is growing every month here, I think?
President Kennedy: I think he thinks they’ve got enough to cause
such damage to us, that we wouldn’t want to accept that damage unless
the provocation was extreme. But, of course, those are all calculations he
Meeting on the Soviet Union
203
has to make about what we are going to do, and what the French will do
and what the British will do. And I suppose it just comes back to what
you . . . we were originally saying, that it’s just a question of how do we
convince him that the risk is there. And that raises whether we ought to
go with this letter or not. Or whether we just choose to ignore this and
just let this thing drop until he comes over here in November. So
McNamara had some statement this morning about the [unclear]—
Bohlen: Yes, I saw that. In fact, that got the headlines in all the
papers about the fact that we had nuclear weapons there and that in certain circumstances we were prepared to use them.
President Kennedy: Whether we ought to let it drop at that or
whether these words get to be, as you suggested . . . They begin to have
less and less effect. Because I don’t know whether [unclear].
Bohlen: And the one thing about this channel, Mr. President, so far,
thank God, is it [has been] kept completely confidential—
President Kennedy: Yes.
Bohlen: —thoroughly. One of the few things—
President Kennedy: Yeah.
Bohlen: —in the United States government operations which there
is not the slightest leak on. And this fact, I think, would lend a little
more weight to the words which you send back on it. The danger of not
answering this and letting him come over here would be he’d come over
with some positions which had obviously been agreed to in the hierarchy
of the Soviet government and that they may be completely based on a
miscalculation, on a misjudgment of the whole situation. And then he
comes over here and you meet, and you have just a complete confrontation with no formal agreement, or anything like this, and this sets off its
own chain of events. What would you think, Tommy?
Thompson: Oh, I think, if . . . if by chance, he is, he did say these
things in order to get a positive response from us that he could use with
his colleagues, or with the East Germans . . . then it would be too bad, if
we didn’t . . .
Bohlen: Well, let’s put it this way. What would you lose by having in
the Berlin part of this letter, something along this line, which you take to
be daring?20 I can’t see that you would lose anything. The only danger
that it might involve would be that it would bring it to a head; but I
20. Bohlen seems to be referring to a draft response from President Kennedy. The actual
response, as sent from Washington on 8 October 1962 did not include any reference to the
Berlin question (see Kennedy to Khrushchev, 8 October 1962, FRUS, 6: 163–64).
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don’t think the way this is worded it would have very much of this, if it’s
sufficiently general. And if he doesn’t believe it, well, you’ve wasted some
time in writing a letter, but I don’t think the consequences would be any
worse than they are. I am very much afraid of his coming over here filled
with these impressions, that our silence in the face of his—there were
four occasions now, one to [Secretary of the Interior Stewart] Udall,
one to [poet Robert] Frost—did he say it to you, Tommy, too, that
we’re not fighting on the . . . ?21
Thompson: No.
Bohlen: No. And [to] the Belgian and the Finn. And he has repeated
the same damn thing to them. And he hasn’t had any reaction whatsoever. Now that—
President Kennedy: It’s another . . . I don’t know whether I ought to
do anything about Frost about supposedly this secret Frost [unclear],
Macmillan sent these up . . . a civilized remark. But . . . I was just wondering whether there’s . . . have you talked to Frost?
Thompson: No. And I haven’t been near the [State] department, so I
don’t know . . . for the last two months, so I [unclear] . . . uninformed
[unclear].
President Kennedy: I’ll call [unclear] on the phone so he can’t say he
wasn’t asked.
What about this? Would you go along with this thought about
responding to this letter and in it, including in it . . . ?
Thompson: I agree with Chip. I think, if the letter is to have a . . .
President Kennedy: Would you get that letter you [unclear]?
Unidentified: Yes.
Bohlen: I think it’s in your [unclear].
Unidentified: I think it’s [on] the chair.
Thompson: I think now . . . You cut it down a bit, Chip.
Bohlen: Yeah.
Unidentified: [Unclear.] [Rustling of paper, then silence.]
Bohlen: You’ve got to change the first [clears his throat]. [Silence
while they read.]
President Kennedy: I think when he says that people over here agree
with him, I think he may in that case be meaning just the division of
Western Germany, which everybody does agree with him on in Europe.
Not this question of our rights and troops in West Berlin, because he’s
21. The Udall and Frost discussions on 6 and 7 September are described in the editors’ introduction, 10 September 1962.
Meeting on the Soviet Union
205
been told that so many times. He knows we don’t agree with that. But I
think he knows that de Gaulle and Macmillan and, possibly, I don’t really
care about the unification of Germany.
Bohlen: Yeah, well, except that in one of these things, I think it was
to the Belgian, he was more explicit than that, in which he said that
President Kennedy and Macmillan and de Gaulle really agree with my
solution to the Berlin thing, and it’s only Adenauer who just wants trouble, pulling the spokes from the wheel. I don’t know which is—
President Kennedy: Of course that may be just a way to [unclear] to
Germany and . . . but . . . I wish if the Germans were ever going to do
anything about the division of Germany or recognition of East Germany
. . . what kind of [unclear], they would go ahead and do it and not try to
do it when it becomes useless as a . . . when they can’t sell that position
for anything.
Actually that last conversation that Adenauer had with Norstad and
[NATO general secretary Dirk] Stikker, I don’t . . . he didn’t even mention Berlin. [Unclear] George Ball, et cetera. But he doesn’t get around
to Berlin when he talks. I don’t think he wants to see Germany reunified.
Bohlen: Hell, no.
President Kennedy: So what are we all doing?
Thompson: Khrushchev—
Bohlen: [Unclear] with the Germans [unclear] nothing in the
German ethos because one of the things that you always run into is this
deeply felt thing, blah, blah, blah [unclear] take any action [unclear], is
put off, you’ll really disrupt Germany. I must say I never totally believed
it because Germany is a [unclear] country. And I think also—
President Kennedy: We don’t want any—
Bohlen: —that the French fear of the Germans turning East,
under the present circumstances, is very illusory because Khrushchev
cannot give them Eastern Germany. He told me this and I am sure he
said it to you, but he used to use one expression to me in the last two
months: “I was there but you must understand that we are not in a
position to make any agreement with you affecting East Germany.”
What he meant by that was that they were hooked with this Soviet
invasion of East Germany, and, therefore, the only bait that he could
offer to the West Germans would be the reunification of the country
in return for their neutrality. Well if you had that possibility, my God,
we would have had that out on the table informally years ago. Don’t
you think so, Tommy?
Thompson: Uh, huh. Since we’ve got the bigger half, the bigger part,
any unification even in neutrality would eventually be [unclear]—
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29, 1962
Bohlen: Yes, I mean, that is why I think that this would have been if he
had not Sovietized, if the Russians had not Sovietized Eastern Germany,
they would have an enormous diplomatic card that they could play to
wreck NATO, wreck the German involvement in it. But since this is not
one that they could play, I don’t really see much real danger of the Germans
turning to the East, particularly as this process with France and the
Common Market is going [Kennedy can be heard indistinctly] very far now.
President Kennedy: Well, Chip, what do you think is the . . . how
pleased with . . . I suppose anything that the West Germans did about
East Germany now would be regarded as indicating that Khrushchev
was right, and we really don’t care about West Berlin. West Berlin seems
to have less and less importance once you, if you give up the idea of unification. And then . . . what are we doing then in West Berlin . . . except
for the people that are involved—
Bohlen: Well, you’ve got two and a half million people—
President Kennedy: [Unclear.]
Thompson: The symbol and [unclear].
President Kennedy: What’s the symbol got—?
Thompson: They’ll never give up the idea that eventually reunion
will be the case. It’s one thing [unclear].
Bohlen: But, of course, one of the, I think, major arguments against
doing anything formally such as recognition of East Germany is that it’s
extremely doubtful as to whether that East Germany setup is a viable
thing. I think that Khrushchev’s attitude may be primarily motivated by
a desire to do something which will increase the viability of East
Germany. He may have thought that this Wall was going to do it and
this hasn’t done it. He may think that if you could get his arrangement
on Berlin this would fix Ulbricht up. For God’s sake, all of this seems to
be very much founded on wishful thinking.
Thompson: Yeah. Perhaps on the basis that the other solution would
be to go in with a lot of money and build up East Germany to where it
would be viable and as [first deputy Soviet foreign minister Vasiliy]
Kuznetsov once told somebody, he said, “We can’t do that because that
would mean that the Germans would live better than we do and—”
Bohlen: Yes, and this is a factor, but another thing is—
Thompson: —“and that would be immoral,” he said.
Bohlen: Being a divided country, and given the temperament of the
Germans while they haven’t been unified for so damn long historically,
they nevertheless, which is a great thing for them, and I just don’t think
that even building it up would necessarily make it into a satellite country comparable to say Poland or [unclear interjection by Thompson]
Meeting on the Soviet Union
207
Czechoslovakia because it’s [unclear]. These other ones that are divided
such as North Korea and Vietnam are new countries which haven’t got
any tradition of unity.
President Kennedy: What do you think about this letter of Chip’s?
Thompson: I think that the line is sound. I think it could be . . . you
know, this would be a long thing anyway, given the testing, if this could
be maybe boiled down a little more, not quite so—
Bohlen: And you could add this part onto the thing. Of course you’ll
want to discuss this with the Secretary.
President Kennedy: Yes.
Thompson: When he is coming back?
President Kennedy: He’s coming back this Wednesday, isn’t he?
Coming back Tuesday [unclear]?
Bohlen: Mac gets back on Wednesday, doesn’t he?
President Kennedy: Yeah. So why don’t we see what, on this
[unclear] come Wednesday?
Bohlen: Yeah.
President Kennedy: But I have. . . . Why don’t we get somebody
working on a draft response to this?
Bohlen: On the Cuban [part]?
President Kennedy: To the whole thing.
Bohlen: All right, sir. Now the only question is [that] there are very
few people in the Department who know about this correspondence at
all [Kennedy is mumbling in the background], and I don’t know if, for
example, that anybody who is knowledgeable on the Cuban thing would
be . . . is in on the general knowledge of—
President Kennedy: Actually what we say on Cuba, I think, almost
anybody would know more or less the general position on Cuba as to—
Bohlen: What would you want to say on that, then?
President Kennedy: Well, I think we ought to say that this decision
of the Soviet Union to so greatly increase the military power of the . . . of
Cuba constitutes, I don’t know, an unfriendly act or whatever the diplomatic term is and that had increased tensions and made . . . reaching an
accord on matters of Berlin far more difficult and that because of the
many treaties of the United States in this hemisphere and the special
position, the historic position of the relationship of the United States
with countries surrounding it, this represents a very serious assault on
our position—something like that. Without sort of saying that we would
[unclear]—
Thompson:[Unclear] get in something about the two things that
concern us about the buildup in Cuba is: one, our own vital interest; and
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29, 1962
the other is the possible use of Cuba as a threat to other countries in this
hemisphere.
Bohlen: And you might point out, if you want to mark a difference
between let’s say our assistance to Iran, where we have no bases, of
course—we just concluded an arrangement—is that Cuba was a member
of the American defense establishment. It is just as though, it would be
more comparable if the United States had acted in the case of Hungary—
President Kennedy: [Unclear.]
Bohlen: —to give military support to the Hungarian government
which declared its—to the Soviet Union—its neutrality from the Warsaw
Pact. We can do that and what about—
President Kennedy: What about saying [that] a Cuba friendly to the
hemisphere is as significant to [us] . . . that we believe, inasmuch as you
had believed that a Hungary friendly to the Soviet Union is in your vital
interest? So that he doesn’t get off on Turkey and Iran.
Bohlen: Yeah.
President Kennedy: Then on the testing, we’re pretty . . . We know—
Bohlen: And our position—
President Kennedy: —We just can’t buy . . . on the other hand, it
seems to me, we just ought to say, “Well, in this case there’s just no . . .” I
mean he’s offering us five years and then if there is not an agreement by
then, that’s just unpoliced.
I think we ought to, I’ll get Jerry Wiesner. I’ll have to give Jerry
Wiesner these two pages and tell him that this is . . . and see if there is
anything he can do about them. Let me tap Wiesner. I think this ought
to be just paraphrased. And I can give this . . . these two pages to
Wiesner and ask him for comments at least and [unclear] [Sir Edward]
Bullard and [Sir William] Penney, et cetera. What it is they did say that
is significant, whether he is accurately restating it.22
Bohlen: Of course a great deal depends on what [unclear].
Jerry Wiesner enters the Oval Office.
President Kennedy: Oh, hi Jerry.
Bohlen: Hello, Jerry.
Jerry Wiesner: Hi.
Bohlen: What the value of these—
22. In his letter of 28 September, Khrushchev alleged that Sir William Penney, the chairman
of the U.K. Atomic Energy Authority, and Sir Edward Bullard had argued at the tenth
Pugwash Conference on Science and World Affairs, held in London 3 to 7 September 1962,
that unmanned seismic stations would suffice to verify a comprehensive test ban.
Meeting on the Soviet Union
209
President Kennedy: Could you just take this down? I’ll give you this
notation, if you have a piece of paper. “The Russian scientists have said
that according to the British scientists Bullard and Penney, at Pugwash
concerning the use of automatic seismic stations.” [Unclear.]
Wiesner: Actually I have the statement that they issued. I don’t
know whether you want to read it.
President Kennedy: What exactly did they say? Who are Bullard and
Penney? Are they very good?
Wiesner: Yeah, they are two top British scientists.
President Kennedy: What did they say?
Wiesner: Thursday’s statement . . . the group . . . this doesn’t quote
either Bullard or Penney. That’s the group that signed the document but
apparently Bullard and Penney and a number of other people worked on
it. What they’re proposing are some unmanned seismic stations in undefined number, including—
Bohlen: Two or three, he said.
Wiesner: Oh, it has to be hundreds. It has to be large numbers.
President Kennedy: Would it? Have they [unclear]?
Wiesner: They don’t say that. They say “enough.” Actually I have
had a study going since I got this document to try to find out just what
the right number is without us shooting past—
Bohlen: He mentions two or three in this letter.
Wiesner: Oh, that won’t do any good.
Bohlen: Right.
President Kennedy: Other than that we ought to . . . I’ll tell you what
we ought to do: just take these points down then you could respond to
them like we’re going to write a letter to these scientists.
Wiesner: Oh. Who is this letter from?
President Kennedy: Oh, this is from one of their people that came to us.
Wiesner: Uh, huh [possibly skeptical].
President Kennedy: [reading from the secret letter from Khrushchev] “As
we understood the idea, the suggestion is that automatic seismic stations
help with their records to determine what is the cause of this or that
underground tremor—underground nuclear blasts or ordinary earthquakes. It would be sort of a mechanical control without men. After
thinking this suggestion over we came to the conclusion that it can be
accepted if this would make it easier to reach [an] agreement. In this
case, it could be provided in a treaty banning all nuclear weapons tests
that automatic seismic stations be set up both near the borders of the
nuclear state and two to three such stations directly on the territory of
the states possessing nuclear weapons—in the areas most frequently
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S AT U R DAY, S E P T E M B E R
29, 1962
subjected to earthquaking. The Soviet government agrees to this . . .
agrees to this perhaps only because it seeks a mutually acceptable basis
for an agreement.”
Wiesner: Uh, huh.
President Kennedy: Well, I think that that sort of violates the agreement, but we also want to . . . And then it says that [he resumes reading
from the text] “The American scientists who took part in the Pugwash
Conference . . . approved of the suggestion about the use of automatic
seismic stations for the purposes of control. Soviet scientists approved
the suggestion . . . so, it appears the scientists were already in agreement
and there’s a possibility to move ahead . . . ”
I think we ought to move [unclear].
Wiesner: What they say is in the document that I have given you, is
that in principle they think this should work and it should be considered
by the governments and—
President Kennedy: [reading] “They need to be sealed in such a way
that they cannot be tampered with; they may be self-contained. The
instruments would be installed by the host government and periodically
returned to the international commission for inspection, replacement
and repair, and such.”23 See . . .
Wiesner: My basic reaction is that I would like these things to have
regular communication. I’m not sure it’s necessary, and I don’t want to
insist on it until I can prove it because [unclear].
President Kennedy: [reading further] “All the records would be
turned over to the Commission for analysis.”
Could they bug these instruments?
Wiesner: It would be pretty hard because you have, see if you have
your external seismic stations, which we still would have, you can get
calibrations on this signal.
President Kennedy: How long do you [unclear]?
Wiesner: You could—
Bohlen: But Jerry, what would happen if you had an explosion that
was suspicious, you weren’t sure?
Wiesner: Well, here’s what you’re hoping for—
Bohlen: Are these things are so good that they can detect the difference between an earthquake and a nuclear explosion?
Wiesner: Well, the thing you want, Chip, is a large number of seis-
23. Once again President Kennedy appears to be reading from a text, although these sentences
do not appear in the 28 September letter from Khrushchev.
Meeting on the Soviet Union
211
mic stations so that some of them are always close to the events. If
they’re close, you can usually tell the difference.
Bohlen: Hmmm.
Wiesner: I don’t believe that any such system would get us out of the
necessity for some mandatory inspection of the seismic areas. It would
reduce . . . Anything of this kind that you do reduces the number. But it’s
technically—
President Kennedy: I’ll tell you what you do. Would you then prepare for the . . . by Tuesday or so a response to this argument that it
needs only two or three—
Wiesner: Yeah.
President Kennedy: —agreed upon at Pugwash by first going back
to what they really said at Pugwash and the subsequent . . .
Wiesner: OK.
President Kennedy: . . . and then say what the seismic—
Wiesner: Can I get your reaction to one other idea—
President Kennedy: Fine.
Wiesner: —that I have been playing with . . . that I have actually
been trying to understand this to prepare a memo? As you know, I have
been impressed for the last year with the fact that the earthquakes—now
I think I have talked to both of you about this—[muttered assent] in the
Soviet Union occur in a very few remote places.
Unidentified: Yes.
Wiesner: And here are some maps that I’ve had made [unclear].
[Wiesner flips maps. Kennedy leaves the room?]
Wiesner: This is 1957. They’re in there. They’re in here and they’re
down here, an occasional one out there. They’re in the same place down
here. In fact, I’ve drawn an area in which I can’t find any record of seismic—
Bohlen: [Unclear.]
Wiesner: Maybe one a year in here. So, I’ve been wondering whether
if we went into this direction we would be willing to do another trick; and
that is to say, we’d accept [unclear], we would accept invitational inspections in a defined a seismic area [Bohlen mumbling in the background] and
mandatory in the seismic areas and this would probably be mandatory in
a quarter—
Bohlen: The only trouble is that these areas of where they are, they
have the big complexes.
Wiesner: I know [unclear] but one. But they’re not where your missile bases are. These are [unclear] complexes [unclear].
Bohlen: Yeah but your [unclear] bases are all in here.
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Now where is this . . . Where is . . . this place, Semipalatinsk in all of
this?
Wiesner: Semipalatinsk is in here. It’s [unclear].
Bohlen: [Unclear] for all that testing area—
Wiesner: All their testing and all their missile bases, with the exception of their Kamchatka—
Bohlen: Yeah.
Wiesner: —Terminal. Now I’ve talked to a Russian about this in
Geneva and he said, “Well, the only trouble is that these are on the borders where our intelligence complexes are.” And I said—
Bohlen: Yeah.
Wiesner: —“Sure but who cares about that anyway.” You see. Hey, 60
percent of them are out here underwater on these damn Kuril Isles. So
when you finally find out about these things, I’m ready to concede that
they probably have some basis for their suspicions of what we are trying to
do, but two or three stations would make no difference. There was a very
thorough study that was made of this a couple of years ago: if they were
willing to put in 100 or 200 of them, or maybe 50 I am not sure what the
number is, it would make a very substantial difference because what would
happen—I think you’d then go in the following way, Chip: you’d first . . .
Your external system would say there was something in here that can’t be
resolved. The next thing you’d do is call for these unmanned stations.
Either that or look at your radio records. I would suspect in a large fraction of the cases, the unmanned stations would then give you enough data
so you could resolve it and say, “This was probably an earthquake.” There
is no question that there would always be a residue—
Bohlen: Well, the only things you’re really interested in are precisely
the ones which would not be resolved by mechanical [unclear] . . . In
other words—
Wiesner: Yeah. But suppose you start with the assumption that they
are not going to cheat.
Bohlen: Yeah.
Wiesner: You just . . . and then what you are looking for in both cases
is a system of assurance. Because if they’re going to cheat, I think they
can always cheat. I could always cheat on one or two [unclear] explosions and get away with it. I don’t think they could cheat on a large test
series. . . . In fact, at present, they’ve never gotten away with it now. We
know when they’re testing—
Bohlen: Listen Jerry, tell me one thing: how valuable are underground explosions?
Wiesner: I don’t think they are terribly valuable. And I think this is
Meeting on the Soviet Union
213
the boss’s impression.24 But the fact is that we’ve got a political problem
here at home—
Bohlen: Yeah.
Wiesner: —but I think the Russians have got one, too, now, because . . .
What I’d like to see is whether you could invent a system in which [Door
closes. Kennedy comes back in the room?] we made a compromise, in which we
accepted invitation in the aseismic area and mandatory inspection in the
seismic area.
Bohlen: Yeah.
Wiesner: Do you think we would get in trouble politically, Mr.
President, with a—
President Kennedy: What?
Wiesner: —proposal that said that we would accept invitational
inspection in that part of the Soviet Union where there normally aren’t
earthquakes if they would accept mandatory inspection in the seismic
area? Here’s a map, a series of maps that show what’s going on. This is
year by year and you see it. Most of—
President Kennedy: [Unclear.]
Wiesner: —that great big bulk of the Soviet Union probably doesn’t
have an earthquake a year.
Thompson: [Unclear] that?
Wiesner: And [unclear] here [pointing to map] 60 percent are over
here in the Kuril Islands. So, we have been asking, you see, for the right
to—of course if they were smart, they would say, “Well, if there are no
earthquakes, you can’t go there, because there’s no record.” But they say,
“We’ll fake them.”
President Kennedy: What?
Wiesner: But they . . . when we say, “Well if there’s no earthquake, we
won’t go because we won’t have a basis for going.” They say, “Well, you
can fake the record.” So that they worry about the other side of . . . [points
out places on the map]. You see, all of their factories and missile bases, and
so on, are in this part of the country there. There is a little bit over here:
at Kamchatka the terminal guidance for their ballistic missile tests is
there. But I think—
President Kennedy: Well, I think if there was a chance that they
[unclear], we might try—
Wiesner: You see, I think they’ve got . . . Khrushchev’s got [unclear
24. President Kennedy.
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S AT U R DAY, S E P T E M B E R
29, 1962
interjection by Kennedy] the clear advantage of your political problem by
now. People are saying you don’t want it, if you [unclear] . . .
Bohlen: I think this is one of the things . . . that Khrushchev has the
most distorted picture of the way American democracy or any democracy
operates. I think this is one of the great inefficiencies in his whole complex.
President Kennedy: Do you think that Khrushchev says all this business about him finding inexplicable congressional action and the de jure
power and all the rest because he really does . . . astonished at that or is
it because this is this . . . What?
Bohlen: He probably thinks in the bottom of his heart that you put
them up to it.
President Kennedy: Put the Congress . . . ? [Laughter.]
Bohlen: Well, I’m kidding—actually, I’ve always . . . Well, you see, up
to very recently, I don’t know whether it’s changed so much now, no
Soviet Embassy in this town even bothered to read the Constitution of the
United States. I’ve talked to some of them, and they said, “We don’t want
[unclear] to read that.” And they literally didn’t understand anything about
the operation of our own system and any democratic system because of the
main thesis that this is just a flimflam to delude the people.
Thompson: Or they’ll say a different thing. I’ve argued with a lot of
them and they’ll say, “Well, the President can’t help with these pressures
on him; they’ll force him to do things, even if he doesn’t want to.” So that
you get both these images [unclear]—
Bohlen: Yeah, I have simplified it a lot in there. [Thompson agrees.]
And it may be with a man like Dobrynin, that they are getting a little
more understanding of how the thing works because some of his . . .
except for . . . on the basis of the fundamental Bolshevik thought, some
of this stuff, you see, that he says in public speeches and all this sort of
stuff is just a lot of nonsense.
President Kennedy shifts the discussion to the issue of providing nuclear
aid to France. Bohlen has recently been named to replace General James
Gavin as ambassador to France. Gavin announced his resignation in early
August and left Paris the week of September 20, ostensibly for personal
financial reasons but actually amidst controversy over his ongoing proposals to provide nuclear aid to France. Gavin had encouraged the sale of missile technology, enriched uranium, and compressors for gaseous diffusion
plants that separated radioactive isotopes. President Kennedy’s opening
statement to Bohlen is a sarcastic reference to Gavin’s downfall.
Gavin had not been a lone voice in the wilderness. In March 1962,
Meeting on the Soviet Union
215
Kennedy had opened debate within the administration over the question
by asking for a “new appraisal of our atomic policy in regard to France.”25
Broadly speaking, the Department of Defense and Joint Chiefs of Staff
favored nuclear sharing while the Department of State adamantly
opposed it.
President Kennedy entertained the idea of providing some form of
nuclear assistance because of U.S. balance of payments worries and fear
of Franco-German nuclear collaboration. By selling missile technology
and other information up to the level of fission weapons, he hoped to offset U.S. military outlays. He also thought it would prevent de Gaulle
from pressuring West Germany to cooperate in a nuclear program.
Throughout the spring and summer, the Department of State had
gotten the upper hand, and the administration maintained its official
unequivocal opposition to nuclear sharing with France. Behind the
scenes, however, Department of Defense officials continued to discuss
the issue with French officials. On September 5, Deputy Secretary of
Defense Roswell Gilpatric left for Europe to discuss allied contributions
to help redress U.S. balance of payments deficits arising from military
expenditures on the continent. From September 7 to 9, he met with
French defense minister Pierre Messmer and used their talks to explore
U.S.-French cooperation in research and development, procurement and
production, and logistic support.
When this meeting of September 29 occurs, the administration is seeking congressional authorization for the sale to the French government of
the Skipjack nuclear submarine, which was the Nautilus rather than the
Polaris missile-firing type. The McMahon Act of 1958, of course, prohibited assistance relating to nuclear weapons. Advocates of nuclear sharing
within the administration argued, however, that the McMahon Act had
been extrapolated into other technical areas such as missile technology.
During the meeting, Kennedy takes an important call from Senator Henry
“Scoop” Jackson, head of the Joint Atomic Energy Committee.
President Kennedy: How long do you think it will be before we get
our first cable from you suggesting we give atomic weapons to France?
[Laughter.]
25. C. V. Clifton, “Memorandum of Conference with the President,” 7 March 1962, “Conference
with President and JCS, 10/61–11/62” folder, Chester Clifton Files, National Security Files,
Box 345, John F. Kennedy Library.
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Bohlen: Mr. President, I think it will probably take at least—
Thompson: Two weeks. [More laughter.]
Bohlen: Two years. Three years. [Unclear] two years.26
Thompson: That’s all it takes?
Bohlen: Now I have been through all that drill, and I think the arguments are very solid on this. [Unclear exchange.]
President Kennedy: [Gilpatric] was told by [unclear] that this Brosio
has just bought the French position completely and that he’s followed—27
Bohlen: It seems to have a . . . Paris is a very seductive town—
President Kennedy: Is it?
Bohlen: —Mr. President. [Chuckles.]28
Wiesner: I often thought that we may be of a lot of help to them with
nuclear submarines because—
Bohlen: Well, my God. [Chuckles again.]29
Wiesner: But [unclear].
Bohlen: Listen, we could [unclear].
Unidentified: Come in [unclear] construction. As we—
Thompson: The only thing they’d settle for—our technology.
Wiesner: I understand that.
Bohlen: The technology.
Wiesner: After two years of being sore at us because we wouldn’t
help them build one. Now you’re going to sell them one! [Laughs.]
President Kennedy: [Unclear] sell you one, don’t you think?
Bohlen: Oh yeah. I think so. The French . . . to hell with the . . . the
French strategy with its . . . is not exactly the most generous [unclear].30
Thompson: Well, look, I don’t know how much this—
26. Bohlen is being flippant because he had received stern written and oral instructions from
the Secretary of State to pursue the official administration line of opposing nuclear sharing.
27. Manlio Brosio was the Italian ambassador to France. From 17 to 19 September, Gilpatric
met with Italian defense minister Giulio Andreotti in Rome to discuss defense cooperation and
Italian contributions for offsetting U.S. military expenditures. Brosio had apparently reported to
his government that de Gaulle sought greater Franco-Italian defense collaboration.
28. The Kennedy administration had adopted what former secretary-general of NATO PaulHenri Spaak said was a running joke among the West Europeans: “Italy is always looking for a
compromise. Italy’s position is to say yes to France, no to the U.K., and do what the U.S. tells
her to do.”
29. He is laughing at Wiesner’s heretical suggestion to provide some form of nuclear aid to
France. There had been acrimonious debate throughout the spring and summer over the issue.
30. Reference to their perception that both France’s force de frappe and conventional forces
were for the defense of France. De Gaulle had declared that a force de frappe would not be integrated with NATO’s nuclear forces.
Meeting on the Soviet Union
217
Bohlen: This nuclear submarine thing, I hope to God that this goes
through.31
President Kennedy: Where is it now?
Bohlen: Well, I don’t know. Gilpatric told me yesterday that he talked
to Scoop Jackson and he talked to [Admiral George W.] Anderson.
President Kennedy: And they bullied?
Bohlen: Thought that there would be a considerable amount of concern at the Department of State. Gilpatric went over there and sort of
made a conditional offer and this has produced a great sort of feeling in
the French: “Oh, boy, here the logjam is broken and this is wonderful”
and they’ve all expressed great pleasure and delight. But the only thing
is, if there’s a hitch in the congressional thing and we have to call it off,
then . . . [Unclear exchange.]
President Kennedy: Oh no, I thought Anderson had that?
Bohlen: Did you see that letter from Jim Gavin to the Secretary [of
State]?
President Kennedy: A letter, no.32
Bohlen: On this subject?
President Kennedy: No. Maybe you can send it over to me? But I
think that, as I recall Anderson was in favor, or maybe Jackson, I think,
was in favor of our doing something with the French.
Bohlen: I don’t think so.
President Kennedy: What? You know giving them some—
Bohlen: Yeah.
President Kennedy: —nuclear assistance—some of them were . . .
Wiesner: I always thought we were making a mistake in not helping
them with things that weren’t bombs. Because this made them particularly bitter. They’d say, well this is not nuclear explosives, and confront
us on . . .
President Kennedy: Well, I think it is possible that we’ll just have to
. . . The fact is the Soviet Union in all these things recognizes France as
a nuclear power, so that it wouldn’t be a question of diffusing anymore.33
Bohlen: Now, this is one of the things in this diffusion angle that has
really bothered me.
31. Reference to its going through the Joint Atomic Energy Committee.
32. No record of this letter has been found.
33. This was a concern because of President Kennedy’s hope for a test ban treaty.
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S AT U R DAY, S E P T E M B E R
29, 1962
Wiesner: But at the bottom of this is the faster you . . . the more you
help the French, the more incentive you give other people to get to that
stage, too, you see. So, I think you have to be very careful on the bomb.
Bohlen: As I’ve always understood, Mr. President, your thought on
the things you told Malraux,34 was that this is surely, but in particular
when Adenauer leaves, is going to produce a comparable German effort
to get one.
President Kennedy: Uh, huh.
Bohlen: And I would say that this is one of the places where I think
de Gaulle shuts his mind and is focusing on his needs, ready to bring
Germany into the European Community. He doesn’t seem to be paying
very much attention to the old talk about the WEU treaties.35
And you recall what Adenauer said to Rusk when we were there in
June; he talked about the atomic [unclear]. He said, “Well, of course
[unclear] when we signed the WEU agreement because it is based on
the doctrine of rebus sic standibus.36
President Kennedy: Yeah. Yeah.
Bohlen: —which gives the impression which was [unclear] rebus sic
standibus is a hell of a lot and that the situation is quite different than it was
then. I think the main thing on this thing is whether or not the French—
de Gaulle—really believes that this independent nuclear capability . . .
President Kennedy: [to Evelyn Lincoln] Is he calling me? Jackson’s
calling?
[to gentlemen in room] Jackson’s calling me. So [unclear].
[to Evelyn Lincoln] Can I get Senator Jackson please?
[to gentlemen] Yeah, let’s put that away for a little . . . [unclear] and
then let’s come back to it.
Unidentified: Uh, huh.
President Kennedy: [to Wiesner] Well, would you see if you can get
me a response [to Khrushchev’s test ban letter]?
Wiesner: Well, who’s this to? Can’t you . . .
President Kennedy: I just want a paper.
Wiesner: You want a paper?
34. André Malraux, French minister of state for cultural affairs, visited the United States from
10 to 16 May 1962 at President Kennedy’s personal invitation.
35. Western European Union.
36. Rebus sic standibus is the legal doctrine that treaties can be terminated on the ground of a
change in circumstances that defeats the treaty’s purpose. Bohlen is telling the President that
Adenauer admits to relying on this document as a possible escape hatch from the WEU agreement that bars West Germany from acquiring nuclear weapons.
Meeting on the Soviet Union
219
President Kennedy: —a paper with an explanation of it.
Wiesner: All right.
President Kennedy: I just want to know what the Pugwash scientists
did say and what, particularly about this question, of their being quoted—
Wiesner: Right.
President Kennedy: —as having only said two or three.
Hello. Can you get Senator Jackson?
Door closes. Kennedy speaks on the telephone to Senator Jackson.
President Kennedy: Hello, Scoop, how are you? Good.
Henry Jackson: I’ll see if I can’t find out about [unclear].
President Kennedy: Yeah, fine, then why don’t you come and see—
why don’t you come down next week, Monday or Tuesday?
Jackson: All right.
President Kennedy: Can I . . . I’ll call your office Monday morning
and then—
Jackson: I’ll be in a meeting [unclear].
President Kennedy: Good. Did Ros Gilpatric talk to you about—
Yeah, what is the feeling up there?
Jackson: On the [unclear], I think [unclear] used to be [unclear]. In
the meantime, [unclear].
President Kennedy: Oh. It seems to me that he accepted.
Jackson: [Unclear.]
President Kennedy: Yeah . . . right. I think. Go on. Yeah but that; but
do they think there is some stuff there that the other people don’t have?
Oh, I see. Good. OK.
Jackson: [Unclear.]
Bohlen and Thompson begin to talk while President Kennedy is on the
telephone to Jackson.
Thompson: I would say, West Berlin. I’m not sure we’re done.
Bohlen: [Unclear] consider very carefully. This is the . . . sort of an
amendment to the original resolution [unclear] much more. But it is, as
you notice, he speaks of the continued exercise of their rights in Berlin
which means, in effect, West Berlin.
President Kennedy: Oh, I see, I see. I understand what you mean.
Well, I’ll talk to you about it next, the first part of the week. Have you
told all this to Gilpatric? Right, to Gilpatric. Look, I’ll see you Monday
or Tuesday.37
37. On Wednesday, 3 October, Senator Jackson met with the President at the White House
from 11:10 to 11:30 A.M.
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S AT U R DAY, S E P T E M B E R
29, 1962
Jackson: I’ll brief him.
President Kennedy: Thank you.
Telephone conversation ends. President Kennedy turns to Bohlen.
President Kennedy: He says [unclear] the Soviets—evidently there’s
some material there, information there, [which] could be valuable to the
Soviets.38
Bohlen: This is Rickover’s position. 39
President Kennedy: That’s Rickover. And he says the suggestion,
therefore, is that the training program might be adjusted so that this
information could be available at the very end. By that time the information would not be useful—evidently they assume the Russians will have
it by then.
Bohlen: The main thing I’ll be interested in, and Gavin in this letter
said to me, if this is called off after Gilpatric’s thing. He said this would
make it very difficult for Ambassador Bohlen. In other words, this is the
kind of thing the French would consider we did.
Unidentified: [Unclear.]
Bohlen: —double-crossed them.
President Kennedy: Oh, I think we can—we’ll just indicate that we’ll
stay at it. I think we might as well . . .
Bohlen: Again, I see no objection to the thing, this resort, to the question of this leakage of secrecy that it be handled that way. That’s all right. I
think the feeling is that in the French scientific community there are some
people who are very doubtful as to their former connection to the Soviet
Union, apart from their actual connections. But I think that if this could do
it, then . . . But first, there’s one thing, you know this business of the
nuclear diffusion that the Secretary has been talking to [Soviet foreign
minister Andrei] Gromyko about, that . . . If you put France in the category, as the agreement does, as a nuclear possessing power—
President Kennedy: I am very reluctant [unclear].
Bohlen: —then you really—
President Kennedy: That’s right.
Bohlen: —just knock the ground out from under your feet about helping them, except on the grounds of unfriendliness to France. Now, I’ve told
this to the Secretary, and I think he is well aware of it. And it’ll be worth it
38. Summarizing his telephone conversation with Jackson, Kennedy tells them that there is
fear of compromising U.S. nuclear reactor technology by allowing the possibility of secrets
passing to the Soviets by sharing the Skipjack submarine with the French.
39. Admiral Hyman G. Rickover.
Meeting on the Soviet Union
221
if you really have a good tight nuclear diffusion agreement; but if you don’t
. . . That’s why I was worried about sending it on to the allies to consider
and you ought to have a lot more clarity with the Russians as to whether
they’d really need—[reference to conflict between a nuclear nonproliferation or
nondiffusion agreement and any U.S. nuclear assistance to France].
President Kennedy: That’s what I thought. We don’t want to go
through one of these terrible allied [unclear]—
Bohlen: —allied performances on a hypothetical situation.
President Kennedy: Right.
Bohlen: And, Mr. President, one more thing, you know this resolution on Berlin?
President Kennedy: Yeah.
Bohlen: —that Zablocki has sponsored.40
President Kennedy: Yeah.
Bohlen: Well, I’m going up there on Monday at ten—
President Kennedy: OK.
Bohlen: —to talk to him. And you’ve seen this draft?
President Kennedy: And I asked him to take out this question of
German . . . The government . . . the conclusion, the final. Secondly—
Bohlen: And that isn’t accurate either because the agreements don’t
provide for that.
President Kennedy: That’s right.
Bohlen: I mean, the agreements are not based on until—
President Kennedy: I think that I see no particular disadvantage.
[reading text] I don’t see any advantage of it, I don’t see it’s a great disadvantage.
Bohlen: No, it’s just that we’ve been trying to get Zablocki to lay off
it, but he’s just hot on it. You know, he feels that since we’ve asked
[unclear] reservists, he asked that you mention Cuba and Berlin that . . .
President Kennedy: Yeah, but I think . . . I just think—
Bohlen: If you have one on Cuba, you ought to have one on Berlin.
He really wants to pick up some political capital for being the—
President Kennedy: With the Germans?
Bohlen: No, with his election cam—41
President Kennedy: What [unclear] is German?
Tape spools out.
40. Clement J. Zablocki (D-Wisconsin) was on the House Foreign Affairs Committee.
41. Zablocki was up for reelection in November 1962.
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29, 1962
The secretary of the army, Cyrus Vance; the U.S. Army chief of staff,
General Earl Wheeler; and the incoming Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of
Staff, General Maxwell Taylor, entered the Oval Office next to discuss
the possible use of the Army in Mississippi. Kennedy may have wished to
tape this conversation; but he only successfully pulls the switch at the
end of the conversation, leaving the machine on to catch the strategy
session with Attorney General Robert Kennedy and Assistant Attorney
General Burke Marshall.
1:18–1:30 P.M.
The question still will remain . . . as to whether we call out the
guard today, federalize the guard today, put it on an alert . . .
Meeting on the Crisis at the University of Mississippi42
The struggle to integrate the University of Mississippi (“Ole Miss”) began
quietly in January 1961, just after the inauguration of John Kennedy.
Inspired by the words of Kennedy’s inaugural address, James H. Meredith,
a 28-year-old Air Force veteran, decided to apply to the leading institution
of higher learning in Mississippi. Requesting an application, Meredith
described himself as an “American-Mississippi-Negro citizen,” who had
been moved by all the changes “in our educational system taking place in
the country in this new age.” He noted that the application would probably
not come as a surprise to the university and hoped the matter would be
“handled in a manner that [would] be complimentary to the University
and to the State of Mississippi. Of course, I am the one that will, no doubt,
suffer the greatest consequences of this event.” Convinced that his goal of
ending segregation at the university was but one part of the great struggle
for racial justice, Meredith would later write of his “Divine Responsibility”
for ending “White Supremacy” in Mississippi, observing that desegregating Ole Miss was “only the start.”
Over the next two years, as Meredith’s case moved through the
courts and finally exploded on the grounds of the Mississippi campus, it
received national and even international attention, and Kennedy admin-
42. Including President Kennedy, Robert F. Kennedy, and Burke Marshall. Tape 24, John F.
Kennedy Library, President’s Office Files, Presidential Recordings Collection.
Meeting on the Crisis at the University of Mississippi
223
istration officials, including the President and the Attorney General,
devoted a great deal of time to managing the crisis. Before the episode
ended with the registration and matriculation of Meredith at Ole Miss in
the fall of 1962, tense standoffs, rioting, and death would come to the
university, and President Kennedy would order thousands of U.S. Army
troops to the campus in order to protect Meredith and enforce the rule
of law. Meredith’s determination to attend Ole Miss, Mississippi’s steadfast efforts to prevent him from doing so, and the conviction of the
President and his aides that it was essential to allow Meredith to enter
the university combined to make the episode one of the most celebrated
in the history of the civil rights movement.
Having decided to transfer from all-black Jackson State to all-white
Ole Miss, Meredith recognized that he would need legal assistance, which
led him to contact Medgar Evers, Mississippi field secretary of the
National Association for the Advancement of Colored People (NAACP).
Evers put him in touch with the NAACP Legal Defense Fund, where his
case would be handled by Constance Baker Motley, one of the defense
fund’s talented young attorneys. With the nation’s leading civil rights
organization behind him, Meredith embarked on what would become a
tortuous legal battle to enter the segregated institution. After Ole Miss
had denied him admission on clearly specious grounds, the struggle
moved to the courts, and over the next several months, Meredith continued to seek admission to the university. In September 1962, the federal
courts established Meredith’s legal right to attend the institution. But the
struggle was far from over, as white Mississippians—politicians, Ole
Miss students, local journalists, and ordinary citizens—united to block
the young black man from entering their beloved university.
Spearheading the movement against the integration of the university
was Governor Ross Barnett, who combined the soft-spoken demeanor of the
southern planter with the overheated rhetoric of the southern populist.
Barnett’s performance during the crisis is not easy to characterize: in speaking to the Kennedys, he was generally conciliatory, searching, or so it
seemed, for a way out of the legal and political morass. But the governor was
equally capable of appealing to the basest instincts of those who would stand
in Meredith’s path. In one of the most highly charged moments of the crisis,
Barnett declared to a crowd of 46,000 football fans attending an Ole Miss
game: “I love Mississippi. I love our people. I love our customs.” The throng
laughed, cried, and roared its approval; the moment, a spectator recalled,
resembled “a big Nazi rally.” In showdowns that saw Barnett and his colleagues confront U.S. marshals and Justice Department officials, many
Mississippians came to perceive the crisis as pitting the federal Goliath
224
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29, 1962
against the southern David—or perhaps more aptly, as providing a second
chance to fight for the honor of the south against the northern invader.
The U.S. Department of Justice was interested in the case from the
start, with Burke Marshall, assistant attorney general for civil rights,
telling Meredith that the Civil Rights Division was following his efforts
and was prepared to do everything it could to assist him. In August
1962, one month before the federal courts had established Meredith’s
right to enter the University, the Justice Department had become officially involved in the case, filing an amicus curiae brief, which argued
that several delays issued by Judge Ben Cameron of the Fifth Circuit
were improper. On September 10 Justice Hugo Black of the U.S.
Supreme Court concurred, thus paving the way for the federal order that
Meredith be admitted to Ole Miss.
While by August 1962 the Justice Department had become an active
participant in the case, its role in the person of the Attorney General
and others would increase markedly in the days ahead. During the latter
part of September, Robert Kennedy would engage in some twenty conversations with Governor Barnett in an effort to work out a plan to register Meredith at Ole Miss, an eventuality the Mississippi politician
seemed determined to prevent.
Meredith was scheduled to start classes at the university, after registering on September 25. But Governor Ross Barnett prevented Meredith
from registering, blocking his entry into the trustee’s room in a state office
building in Jackson, where the registration was scheduled to take place.
Accompanied by John Doar of the U.S. Justice Department and James
McShane, chief U.S. marshal, Meredith was forced to leave after Barnett
willfully refused a court order to admit him, declaring he did “hereby
finally deny you admission to the University of Mississippi.” The large
crowd roared its approval, an onlooker cried “Three cheers for the governor,” and Meredith departed, along with his federal escorts.
The following day, September 26, Meredith, again accompanied by
Doar and McShane, headed to the Ole Miss campus in Oxford to register for classes. The car carrying the three men, escorted by the highway
patrol, was forced to stop a few blocks from the entrance to the campus.
Backed up by state troopers, county sheriffs, and a line of patrol cars,
Lieutenant Governor Paul Johnson approached Meredith, Doar, and
McShane. Filling in for Governor Barnett (low clouds had prevented
him from flying up from Jackson to Oxford), Johnson said, “I would like
to read this proclamation,” which stated that Mississippi was “interposing” its powers and would deny Meredith admission to the university.
Meeting on the Crisis at the University of Mississippi
225
After some gentle pushing between McShane and Johnson, it was apparent the Mississippian would not yield. After they exchanged some
words, McShane turned in retreat, and Meredith, Doar, and a retinue of
federal marshals departed the scene, prevented once more from fulfilling
their court-ordered task.
On September 27, the group again tried to register Meredith. This time
an elaborate plan had been worked out in discussions between Attorney
General Robert Kennedy and Governor Barnett and his friend Tom
Watkins, by which the U.S. marshals would draw their guns on Barnett and
Paul Johnson in a “show of force.” Once this symbolic act had been completed, the Mississippi politicians would stand aside and allow Meredith to
pass (with his escorts) and register for classes. But the plan was thwarted, as
some 2,000 people, including students, farmers, and self-styled vigilantes,
converged that day on Oxford from all over Mississippi, determined to stop
Meredith from registering at the university. A worried Barnett telephoned
the Attorney General late in the day to report that he was uncertain if he
could maintain order and claimed he had been unable to disperse the crowd.
The Attorney General, never comfortable with the planned “show of force,”
ordered Meredith’s convoy, which was heading from Memphis to Oxford, to
turn back. Less than 50 miles from Oxford, the group turned around,
recrossed the Tennessee border, and returned to Memphis.
On Friday September 28, the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals found
Governor Barnett guilty of contempt. Barnett, who did not appear in
court, was found guilty in absentia and given until the following
Tuesday to clear himself by retracting his proclamation and allowing
Meredith to register. In the event he failed to do so, the Court declared
Barnett would face arrest and a fine of $10,000 a day for each day he
remained in Meredith’s path.
On September 29, President Kennedy would become more directly
involved in the crisis, having previously allowed the Attorney General to
assume primary responsibility in the affair. That morning Robert Kennedy
had been on the telephone with Ross Barnett and his chosen intermediary,
Thomas Watkins, an attorney from Jackson, Mississippi. The deal reached
the day before had fallen through. Now the Mississippians wanted an even
larger show of federal force before giving in and letting Meredith register
at Ole Miss.
The President had to decide whether the U.S. Army or a federalized
Mississippi National Guard would be needed to cope with the increasingly tense situation.
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29, 1962
Unidentified: . . . the witness is on the telephone, so you know that
he says, “I can’t do it any longer.” Second point of it is that even if you
have the problem of, on Sunday if you call the guard on Sunday, this is
the quietest time in those towns, and you will look like you’re calling the
guard when there’s nothing happening. Sunday is the psychologically
quiet time, unless they incite somebody to meet. And so it ought, even in
Little Rock, there’s no doubt we read about Sunday always looks like
everybody was going to church, and the Life magazine pictures will look
like the very devil. 43
On the other hand, it’s the easiest time to mobilize, when there’s
nobody around. And that’s an advantage. A third critical point, I guess, is,
what if the governor chooses, in effect, to call out the guard before you do
and again, if he says you’re challenging him on keeping law and order.
And he said, “All right, I’ll keep law and order.” For one thing, he’ll tell
you if you’d call off Meredith, why there won’t be any disturbance.
President Kennedy: But I can’t call off Meredith for that.
Unidentified: No. No. I agree with you.
President Kennedy: I don’t have the power to call off Meredith.
Unidentified: But he’ll put it in the conversation that you’re the one
inciting the trouble.
President Kennedy: I understand that.
Unidentified: But the other point is, do you want him to call the
guard? If he says, “Well I could keep law and order, I guess, if I call out
the guard,” you have to think of whether he might preempt you on that.
President Kennedy: Well, let him do it. Let him do it. I don’t mind
that. That’d be all right.
Unidentified: You can always federalize the guard [unclear] or even
get the chance to.
President Kennedy: So now the question really is . . . I think we ought
to go ahead [with] my contacts, and your conversation and telegram, with
Barnett, number one. Now the question therefore, we know what the
result of that’s going to be. The question still will remain with us today as
to whether we call out the guard today, federalize the guard today, put it
43. The reference is to the autumn 1957 Little Rock crisis in which the governor of Arkansas,
Orval Faubus, defied a federal court order to desegregate Little Rock’s Central High School.
Faubus used the National Guard, ostensibly to prevent violence but in reality to block nine
African American students from enrolling in the all-white high school. After scenes of hatefilled mobs harassing the students appeared on national television, President Eisenhower
called in 1,000 federal troops and 10,000 federalized National Guardsmen in order to protect
the young African Americans.
Meeting on the Crisis at the University of Mississippi
227
on an alert, start an intermediate step in the guard, or do we wait till
Monday and do it? Or do we wait till Barnett sent me an answer? I think
I’ll . . . Well, in any case, I’ll wait for Barnett’s answer, I guess. Then I
would think unless he sends me such a vague . . . I don’t know what kind of
wire he’ll send me. What’ll he say to me, or send me?
Robert Kennedy: Maybe he’ll attack Meredith, I suppose.
President Kennedy: But he won’t say whether he can keep order,
will he?
Robert Kennedy: No, I think he’s . . .
President Kennedy: He’ll give me an answer saying, “If you will just
call off that thing, we can keep order.” So it won’t be a clean answer to
me. So we still have to . . .
Robert Kennedy: Yeah, but you can of course, you can phrase the
telegram in such a way that’s going to make it look difficult.
President Kennedy: All right, let’s get this wire written. Let’s get
something, Burke [Marshall], as to what I’m supposed to ask him in two
or three questions.
Burke Marshall: All right.
President Kennedy: Now, what about the guard? In other words, if
we decide in the next hour or so, after I’ve talked to Barnett, et cetera,
getting them there, how would a proclamation be handled . . . [trails off
as the President walks away] . . . It will take . . . It will require a federal
proclamation to that effect.
Unidentified: Right.
President Kennedy: I don’t know whether this requires a television
speech or not [unclear].
Unidentified: That’s what I hoped [unclear].
Robert Kennedy: [Unclear] the purpose and then [unclear].
Unclear exchanges. The voices get distant. Kennedy is heard saying,
“The one tomorrow night to the country.”
President Kennedy: Evelyn? Burke, do you want to dictate a memorandum for this conversation, guidance, what is it I want to say to
Barnett?
Robert Kennedy: Well, why don’t we, just the three of us go and . . .
President Kennedy: And a telegram? To follow?
Unidentified: If we do that [unclear], yes.
President Kennedy: OK, then I’ll call . . . If we’ve got to go with the
guard, it seems to me we ought to call out [unclear] regiment should go.
Unidentified: What’s the word, sir? If you call [unclear].
President Kennedy: Yeah.
Unidentified: . . . federalizing the guard . . .
228
S AT U R DAY, S E P T E M B E R
29, 1962
Unidentified: . . . put them in the armories, just about, I’d say that’d
be [unclear] use, and I would say the first battle group of the [unclear]
the Cavalry Regiment under Colonel Martin. Now, I would suggest that
we go ahead and move General Billingslea of the Second Infantry
Division Headquarters in there and put him in command . . .44
Unidentified: Under Vance?45
Unidentified: Right, under Vance.
Unidentified: None of the others . . .
President Kennedy: To do what? To do what?
Unidentified: Well, Billingslea would be the Army officer in overall
charge. Put him into Memphis right now.
President Kennedy: Where is he now?
Unidentified: He’s down at Benning now. 46
President Kennedy: I see.
Several unclear exchanges follow.
Unidentified: No, I agree. We were going to use, first, two M.P. battalions . . .
President Kennedy: How many would there be in one?
Unidentified: Well, there would be 800 men, all told. And we’d also
bring in the battle group from the Second Infantry Division at Fort
Benning to give [unclear].
President Kennedy: How about the map of the town and so on? Is
there somebody around who knows which way and can direct the guard
to go . . . ?
Unidentified: Oh, yes. [Unclear] military [unclear] set of maps
[unclear].
President Kennedy: Will you have a regular Army fellow with them
or will it be Billingslea?
Unidentified: You have regular Army. [Several speakers at once.]
President Kennedy: Has Billingslea [unclear] made an analysis of
what he would do with the various forces?
Unidentified: People have been working on . . .
Unidentified: Right. And Creighton Abrams will be down . . .47
Unidentified: Maybe he should talk to [unclear].
44. Colonel Martin is not further identified. General Billingslea is Brigadier General Charles
Billingslea.
45. Cyrus R. Vance, secretary of the Army.
46. Fort Benning, Georgia.
47. Major General W. Creighton Abrams was assistant deputy Army chief of staff for military
operations.
Meeting on the Crisis at the University of Mississippi
229
Robert Kennedy: [Unclear.]
Unidentified: I can talk to Senator Stennis, if you like, Mr. President,
on this thing, but I do think it would be wise to at least bring it up.48
President Kennedy: You or [unclear]?
Unidentified: I’d be very happy to do it . . .
President Kennedy: I could see him. He’s in Washington, is he?
Unidentified: Yes, he’s in Washington.
President Kennedy: Well, I’ll see him about five or six. He’s talked to
me personally about [unclear] our problem. So [unclear] by that time,
I’ll have had my conversation with Barnett, and we’ll send Barnett a
wire and hopefully, I’ll get a hold of him. [Unclear.]
Unidentified: Maybe you’d better go through an ambassador, instead
of yourself. [Lengthy unclear discussion about Barnett follows.]
Leaving the machine running, the President walks over to the family
quarters at approximately 1:25 P.M.
Evelyn Lincoln: Did he go over to the Mansion?
Unidentified: He’s in the pool with [unclear].
Lincoln: Oh. [Then about five minutes of distant conversation during
which someone says, “Is he coming back?”]
President Kennedy apparently decides against a swim. Instead he returns
to the Oval Office with the Attorney General.
President Kennedy has still not decided whether he will stay in
Washington overnight. Slated to meet his friends Lem Billings and
Congressman Torbert MacDonald in Newport, Rhode Island, Kennedy is
still holding out the option of flying out after he speaks to Ross Barnett.
Robert Kennedy: Jack?
President Kennedy: I think I’m going to go up there after we give
[unclear] depending on when we . . . [Unclear] don’t want some Micks
in Newport, Rhode Island [unclear]. [Unclear] going to make a speech
tomorrow night.
What about getting Sorensen to work? 49 Does he say Arthur’s been
working on it?50
Robert Kennedy: Yeah.
Can I talk . . . can I get Arthur? Do you want to get Arthur?
48. Senator John Stennis of Mississippi.
49. For the past week, White House counsel Sorensen had been hospitalized with an ulcer. On
Friday, Sorensen had sent a memorandum to the White House with his suggestions for handling the crisis. Evidently the President hadn’t yet seen it. Theodore C. Sorensen, Kennedy
(New York: Harper & Row, 1965), p. 484.
50. Arthur Schlesinger, Jr., was a presidential special assistant.
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S AT U R DAY, S E P T E M B E R
29, 1962
Unclear discussion. The President walks over to Evelyn Lincoln’s office
and has an unclear discussion with her.
President Kennedy: Yes, you just have to get him. I just want to
speak to him at home. Where is he? At home?
Lincoln: [Unclear.]
Unidentified: Mr. President?
President Kennedy: Yeah.
A brief unclear discussion follows. Then the Attorney General
launches into a discussion of a new spy case.
Approximately 1:30 –1:35 P.M.
If you’re caught spying as a diplomat . . . [y]ou can’t try them?
Meeting with Robert Kennedy on the Drummond Spy Case51
On September 28, the FBI arrested Yeoman First Class Nelson Cornelius
Drummond of the U.S. Navy and charged him with conspiring to pass
defense secrets to the Soviet Union. Drummond was apprehended while
sitting in a car in Larchmont, New York, with two officials from the
Soviet delegation to the United Nations. The FBI agents found eight
classified naval documents on the car seat between Drummond and the
Soviet officials.
Drummond had been under surveillance for some time and had
apparently shown unusual signs of wealth for an enlisted man whose
monthly salary was $318. Given their diplomatic status, the Soviet officials were not liable to arrest, although they were detained briefly before
their identity was established. Shortly after the Russians were apprehended, the U.S. government demanded their expulsion.
Robert Kennedy: They called [unclear] give those guys as much time
as he can. Tell him, you can’t believe the Russians would do this. You
51. Tape 24, John F. Kennedy Library, President’s Office Files, Presidential Recordings
Collection.
Meeting with Robert Kennedy on the Drummond Spy Case
231
can’t, you must be . . . You know they brought out the card thing, the
Russians are diplomats . . .
Unidentified: The Russians would do that. Ughhhh!!!
Unidentified: [Unclear] that they’ve misunderstood. They . . .
Robert Kennedy: It’s all about getting those two men.
President Kennedy: What?
Robert Kennedy: [Unclear.]
President Kennedy: What were they doing?
Robert Kennedy: We got the chief petty officer [unclear] who gave
them a lot of valuable information. [Unclear] since 1958.
President Kennedy: Why, was he stationed in Moscow, was he for
awhile?
Robert Kennedy: [Unclear.] And he’s been living way above his
means. [Unclear.] So they got on him.
President Kennedy: How did they catch him?
Robert Kennedy: They started following him. He spent a lot of
money and then he [unclear] couldn’t get any good stuff on the documents. So when he was short of money, they would watch him [unclear].
And they followed . . . thought he was going to go last week, so they followed all the way out [unclear]. Sometimes he’d drive at [unclear] miles
an hour. But they had cars stationed all the way. And then they went
finally chasing him to Westchester. [Unclear] he was with the third secretary of the delegation of the Soviet Union.
President Kennedy: At the U.N. or here?
Robert Kennedy: The U.N.
President Kennedy: Yeah.
Robert Kennedy: They were sitting in the car, with the documents,
with the dough.
President Kennedy: They just arrested them?
Robert Kennedy: So, they called me at once because they thought that
[unclear] speak Russian [unclear]. They asked for diplomatic immunity.
President Kennedy: Yes.
Robert Kennedy: Said [unclear] could not believe that the Soviet Union
would be involved. You would think you must be personally [unclear] the
Russians. We can’t let you go. So they took him down. [Unclear] had to
wait until someone came down.
President Kennedy: [Unclear.]
Robert Kennedy: [Unclear.] United Nations delegation about 4:30
this morning.
President Kennedy: Did what?
Robert Kennedy: [Unclear] and then they just let them go.
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S AT U R DAY, S E P T E M B E R
29, 1962
President Kennedy: They let them go? Why?
Robert Kennedy: Because they got diplomatic immunity.
President Kennedy: If you’re caught spying as a diplomat, all you do
is expel them? You can’t try them?
Robert Kennedy: [Unclear] cause the guy confessed.
President Kennedy: There isn’t anything you can do under law to a
guy at an embassy who is caught spying? Have any of our people been
imprisoned?
Robert Kennedy: No. They only get expelled. [Unclear] at the United
Nations. That’s the way we do it all [unclear] now. Being stationed here
in the United States. You know, those other two fellows have been complaining. [Unclear.]
President Kennedy: What about . . . what’s Kenny O’Donnell [say]
about this?
The President turned off the machine at about 1:35. He then called Mrs.
Kennedy, perhaps to discuss the prospects of his joining her in Newport,
Rhode Island, at the end of the day.
A few minutes later, Arthur Schlesinger reached the White House. He
was just in time to witness the President’s next telephone conversation
with the Governor of Mississippi. An air of unreal humor pervaded the
Oval Office. When he was told that Ross Barnett was on the phone
Kennedy affected the manner of a ring announcer: “And now—Governor
Ross Barnett.” “Go get him, Johnny Boy,” replied the Attorney General.52
52. Arthur Schlesinger, Jr., recounted this scene in Robert Kennedy and His Times (Boston:
Houghton Mifflin, 1978), p. 344. Soon afterward the U.S. government demanded the expulsion of the two Russians.
On July 19, 1963, Drummond was convicted of conspiring to commit espionage for the
Soviet Union, and on August 15, 1963, he was sentenced to life imprisonment. The judge, who
spoke of Drummond’s “heinous” crime, could have imposed the death penalty, but said he
decided on a life sentence out of compassion for the ex-sailor’s wife and parents.
Conversation with Ross Barnett
233
2:00 P.M.
[T]he problem is, Governor, that I got my responsibility, just
like you have yours . . .
Conversation with Ross Barnett53
President Kennedy: . . . Mississippi.
Unidentified: Yes, Mr. President.
President Kennedy: Thank you.
Unidentified: Hello. Hello.
President Kennedy: . . . calling, if they want to know who’s calling.
Unidentified: All right. Fine, Mr. President. [Long pause.]
President Kennedy: Hello.
Unidentified: All right.
President Kennedy: Hello? Hello, Governor?
Ross Barnett: All right. Yes.
President Kennedy: How are you?
Barnett: Is this . . .
President Kennedy: This is the President, uh . . .
Barnett: Oh. Well, Mr. President [unclear].
President Kennedy: Well, I’m glad to talk to you, Governor. I am
concerned about this situation down there, as I know . . .
Barnett: Oh, I should say I am concerned about it, Mr. President. It’s
a horrible situation.
President Kennedy: Well, now, here’s my problem, Governor.
Barnett: [Unclear.] Yes.
President Kennedy: Listen, I didn’t put him in the university, but on
the other hand, under the Constitution . . . I have to carry out the orders,
carry that order out, and I don’t, I don’t want to do it in any way that
causes difficulty to you or to anyone else. But I’ve go to do it. Now, I’d
like to get your help in doing that.
Barnett: Yes. Well, uh, have you talked with Attorney General this
morning?
President Kennedy: Yeah. I talked to him and in fact, I just met with
him for about an hour, and we went over the situation.
53. Dictabelt 4A1, Cassette A, John F. Kennedy Library, President’s Office Files, Presidential
Recordings Collection.
234
S AT U R DAY, S E P T E M B E R
29, 1962
Barnett: Did he and Mr. Watkins have a talk this morning, Tom
Watkins, the lawyer from Jackson, or not?54
President Kennedy: Yes, he talked to Tom Watkins, he told me.
Barnett: Yes, sir. Well, I don’t know what . . . I haven’t had a chance
to talk with him . . .
President Kennedy: Now just wait . . . just one minute because I got
the Attorney General in the outer office, and I’ll just speak to him.
Barnett: All right. [Long pause.]
President Kennedy: Hello, Governor?
Barnett: Yes. Hold on.
President Kennedy: I just talked to the Attorney General. Now, he
said that he talked to Mr. Watkins . . .
Barnett: Yes.
President Kennedy: . . . and the problem is as to whether we can get
some help in getting this fellow in this week.
Barnett: Yes.
President Kennedy: Now, evidently we couldn’t, the Attorney General
didn’t feel that he and Mr. Watkins had reached any final agreement on that.
Barnett: Well, Mr. President, Mr. Watkins is going to fly up there
early tomorrow morning.
President Kennedy: Right.
Barnett: And could you gentlemen talk with him tomorrow? You . . .
President Kennedy: Yes, I will have the Attorney General talk to
him and then . . .
Barnett: Yes.
President Kennedy: . . . after they’ve finished talking I’ll talk to the
Attorney General . . .
Barnett: All right.
President Kennedy: . . . on the phone and then if he feels it’s useful
for me to meet with him . . .
Barnett: I thought . . .
President Kennedy: . . . I’ll do that.
Barnett: I thought they were making some progress. I didn’t know.
President Kennedy: Well, now . . .
Barnett: I couldn’t say, you know.
President Kennedy: . . . he and Mr. Watkins, they can meet tomorrow. Now, the difficulty is, we got two or three problems. In the first
54. Thomas H. Watkins was the Mississippi lawyer and Barnett aide who served as an intermediary in the crisis.
Conversation with Ross Barnett
235
place, what can we do to . . . First place is the court’s order to you, which
I guess is, you’re given until Tuesday. What is your feeling on that?
Barnett: Well, I want . . .
President Kennedy: What’s your position on that?
Barnett: . . . to think it over, Mr. President.
President Kennedy: Right.
Barnett: It’s a serious matter, now that I want to think it over a few
days. Until Tuesday, anyway.
President Kennedy: All right. Well, now let me say this . . .
Barnett: You know what I am up against, Mr. President. I took an
oath, you know, to abide by the laws of this state—
President Kennedy: That’s right.
Barnett: —and our constitution here and the Constitution of the
United States. I’m, I’m on the spot here, you know.
President Kennedy: Well, now you’ve got . . .
Barnett: I, I’ve taken an oath to do that, and you know what our laws
are with reference to . . .
President Kennedy: Yes, I understand that. Well, now we’ve got the . . .
Barnett: . . . and we have a statute that was enacted a couple of weeks
ago stating positively that no one who had been convicted of a crime or,
uh, whether the criminal action pending against them would not be eligible for any of the institutions of higher learning. And that’s our law,
and it seemed like the Court of Appeal didn’t pay any attention to that.55
President Kennedy: Right. Well, of course . . .
Barnett: And . . .
President Kennedy: . . . the problem is, Governor, that I got my
responsibility, just like you have yours . . .
Barnett: Well, that’s true. I . . .
President Kennedy: . . . and my responsibility, of course, is to the . . .
Barnett: . . . I realize that, and I appreciate that so much.
President Kennedy: Well, now here’s the thing, Governor. I will, the
Attorney General can talk to Mr. Watkins tomorrow. What I want,
would like to do is to try to work this out in an amicable way. We don’t
want a lot of people down there getting hurt . . .
55. On September 20, Meredith was found guilty in absentia of false voter registration and
was fined $100 and costs and sentenced to one year in the Hinds County jail. The conviction
on this clearly specious charge occurred the same day that Mississippi Senate Bill 1501 passed
the legislature. The bill barred persons guilty of a criminal offense from attending state institutions of higher learning. In addition, on 20 September, Governor Barnett was appointed
registrar of the university. Five days later, the Board of Trustees rescinded the appointment.
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S AT U R DAY, S E P T E M B E R
29, 1962
Barnett: Oh, that’s right . . .
President Kennedy: . . . and we don’t want to have a . . . You know it’s
very easy to . . .
Barnett: Mr. President, let me say this. They’re calling, calling me
and others from all over the state, wanting to bring a thousand, wanting
to bring 500, and 200, and all such as that, you know. We don’t want
such as that.
President Kennedy: I know. Well, we don’t want to have a, we don’t
want to have a lot of people getting hurt or killed down there.
Barnett: Why, that’s, that’s correct. Mr. President, let me say this.
Mr. Watkins is really an A-1 lawyer, an honorable man, has the respect
and the confidence of every lawyer in America who knows him. He’s of
the law firm of Watkins and Eager. They’ve had an “A” rating for many,
many years, and I believe this, that he can help solve this problem.
President Kennedy: Well, I will, the Attorney General will see Mr.
Watkins tomorrow, and then I, after the Attorney General and Mr.
Watkins are finished then, I will be back in touch with you.
Barnett: All right. All right. I’ll appreciate it so much, now, and there
. . . Watkins’ll leave here in the morning, and I’ll have him to get into
touch with the Attorney General as to when he can see him tomorrow.
President Kennedy: Yeah, he’ll see him and . . .
Barnett: Yes, sir.
President Kennedy: . . . .we will, then you and I’ll be back and talk
again.
Barnett: All right.
President Kennedy: Thank you.
Barnett: All right.
President Kennedy: OK.
Barnett: I appreciate your interest in our poultry program and all
those things.
President Kennedy: Well, we’re . . . [laughs softly].
Barnett: Thank you so much.
President Kennedy: OK, Governor. Thank you.
Barnett: Yes, sir. All right now.
President Kennedy: Bye now.
Barnett: Thank you. Bye.
Conversation with Theodore Sorensen
237
2:25 P.M.
[G]ive me some thoughts . . . the speech, is that right?
Conversation with Theodore Sorensen56
Theodore Sorensen had been hospitalized with an ulcer earlier in the
week. Kennedy telephoned him at the hospital, requesting that he provide
some suggestions for a televised speech on the Mississippi crisis that
Kennedy thought he might have to deliver Sunday night. Sorensen noted
that Republicans were taking a segregationist line, which would help the
President avoid a partisan attack. (He would be criticized by both sides.)
With some irony, Kennedy himself remarked that this strict Republican
line was not one Eisenhower had followed in the Little Rock crisis (when
the Republican President intervened with federal troops). Sorensen clarified his point, noting that he meant the Republicans in Alabama.
President Kennedy: . . . sort of a South Caro—
Theodore Sorensen: . . . [word unintelligible] campaign going on in
Alabama, and the Republicans are taking the straight Ross Barnett line
and so forth.
President Kennedy: Well, except Eisenhower, they . . . [laughs].
Eisenhower’s taking a little away from them.
Sorensen: No, I mean the Republicans in Alabama.
President Kennedy: Yeah, but I mean, well I, you, and Burke can talk,
because the legal . . . our legal obligations on Tuesday affect when we go
with this guard; that’s the point.57
Sorensen: Yeah.
President Kennedy: OK, and you’re thinking about, give me some
thoughts . . . the speech, is that right?
Sorensen: Right.
With the Mississippi situation very much unresolved, the President’s
hopes to salvage what was left of his Newport weekend were dimming.
56. Dictabelt 4A2, Cassette A, John F. Kennedy Library, President’s Office Files, Presidential
Recordings Collection.
57. Burke Marshall was assistant attorney general for the Civil Rights Division.
238
S AT U R DAY, S E P T E M B E R
29, 1962
LeMoyne Billings, Kennedy’s roommate at Choate and a Kennedy family
intimate since 1934, called during the afternoon Mississippi discussions
to learn that he probably wouldn’t be seeing his friend up in Newport.58
Billings was having his own difficulties getting there.
2:30 P.M.
I guess it’s not going too well . . . [f]or you because of the
Mississippi deal.
Conversation with LeMoyne Billings59
Unidentified: Mrs. Lincoln?
Lincoln: Um-hm.
Unidentified: Mr. Lem Billings.
Lincoln: Could you hold just one minute?
Unidentified: Sure. [Short pause.]
President Kennedy: Lem? Hello.
Unidentified: There you are.
President Kennedy: Lem?
LeMoyne Billings: Hello.
President Kennedy: Where are you?
Billings: Oh. Hi. I’m a . . . I’ve missed my damn plane, so I’m going to
have to shoot up to Boston and back to Providence.
President Kennedy: Oh, I see. Well, I’m still . . . doesn’t look like I
may be able to go there.
Billings: Oh, go at all?
President Kennedy: That’s right.
Billings: Oh, I better not go until . . . until you know.
President Kennedy: OK. You’re in a . . . Just leave your message
where we can—
Billings: I’m at LaGuardia now. When do you think you’d know? Or
you don’t know?
58. Schlesinger, Robert Kennedy and his Times, p. 13.
59. Dictabelt 4B1, Cassette A, John F. Kennedy Library, President’s Office Files, Presidential
Recordings Collection.
Conversation with Ross Barnett
239
President Kennedy: Well, it looks like it will be sometime . . . Why
don’t you go back into New York?
Billings: All right.
President Kennedy: And then I will be in touch with you.
Billings: OK. Good.
President Kennedy: Because I . . . because you can always come up
later.
Billings: OK. As I said, I guess it’s not going too well, huh?
President Kennedy: Where?
Billings: For you, because of the Mississippi deal.
President Kennedy: Yeah.
Billings: OK. I’ll see you later.
President Kennedy: OK. Bye.
2:50 P.M.
Well . . . as I understand it, Governor, you would do everything you can to maintain law and order.
Conversation with Ross Barnett60
The President and the Attorney General speak to Governor Barnett,
making clear that their primary objective is to maintain order and that
they expect the governor to work to that end. Barnett hopes his friend,
Tom Watkins, will be able to help hammer out a solution to the problem caused by Meredith’s determination to register. The Attorney
General tells Barnett that his conversations with Watkins (they had
spoken twice that day) have been unhelpful, noting Watkins’s suggestion that Meredith register secretly at Jackson on Monday, instead of
at the Oxford campus. As Barnett had actually initiated the plan
through Watkins, he finds it attractive, noting an earlier ruling had
ordered it. In addition, the plan would permit him to demonstrate his
unyielding opposition to desegregation (he almost certainly planned a
60. President Kennedy and Governor Barnett were later joined by Robert Kennedy. Dictabelt
4C, Cassette A, John F. Kennedy Library, President’s Office Files, Presidential Recordings
Collection.
240
S AT U R DAY, S E P T E M B E R
29, 1962
public stand to prevent Meredith’s registration), and also because he
could claim the federal government had decided by stealth to enroll
Meredith anyway.
President Kennedy: Hello.
Ross Barnett: All right.
President Kennedy: Governor.
Barnett: Mr. President. Yes, sir.
President Kennedy: Oh, will you talk to Mr. Watkins? The Attorney
General did.
Barnett: No, I haven’t talked with him now in a couple of hours . . .
President Kennedy: Oh. Well, now . . .
Barnett: . . . I talked with him though about two hours ago, Mr.
President, and he said he was going to talk with the Attorney General
and go see him tomorrow morning.
President Kennedy: Oh. Well, in the meanwhile, then, the Attorney
General talked to Mr. Watkins to see whether there was some . . . Wait
just a second. The Attorney General’s right here. He’ll tell you what he
talked to Watkins and Watkins was going to talk to you. Wait a minute.
Barnett: All right. All right.
President Kennedy: He’ll come right on the other phone.
Barnett: Yeah, sure.
President Kennedy: Wait just a [unclear].
Barnett: All right. All right.
Robert Kennedy: Hello?
Barnett: Yes, sir, General. How are you?
Robert Kennedy: Fine, Governor. How are you?
Barnett: Fine, fine.
Robert Kennedy: I talked to Mr. Watkins, you know, earlier this
morning.
Barnett: Oh, yes?
Robert Kennedy: And he really did not have much of a suggestion.
He had mentioned yesterday the possibility of our coming in tomorrow
Monday with marshals, and . . .
Barnett: Yes.
Robert Kennedy: . . . that under our understanding for Thursday
that the marshals would show up and that you and the others would
step aside and Mr. Meredith would come into the university. Well, he
felt that when he mentioned he talked to me today, he said that he
thought that would create some problems, which they could not over-
Conversation with Ross Barnett
241
come. And he suggested at that time, some alternatives which were not
very satisfactory.
Barnett: Well . . .
Robert Kennedy: And then he mentioned the fact that he might come
up early tomorrow morning.
Barnett: Well . . .
Robert Kennedy: I called him back after I heard the President’s conversation with you . . .
Barnett: Yes.
Robert Kennedy: . . . and said that I thought I’d be glad to see him,
but I thought that unless we had some real basis for some understanding
and working out this very very difficult problem that really he was wasting his time; and that one of the basic requirements, in my judgment,
was the maintenance of law and order, and that would require some very
strong and vocal action by you, yourself. . . .
Barnett: Well, I’m certainly going to try to maintain law and order,
Mr . . .
Robert Kennedy: Yeah.
Barnett: . . . General, just the very best way that I can.
Robert Kennedy: But in the . . .
Barnett: I, I talked with the student body the other day and told
them to really, to have control of the physical and mental faculties. But it
didn’t do much good it seemed like.
Robert Kennedy: Well . . .
Barnett: They cheered and carried on, but then they just started raving and carrying on, you know.
Robert Kennedy: Yeah. I think, Governor, that if we . . . as a very
minimum and as a start, an order by you and the state that people could
not congregate in Oxford now in groups of three or five, larger than
groups of three or five; the second, to get the school authorities to issue
instructions to the students that if they congregate in groups that they
are liable for expulsion. If that was done this afternoon, I think that
would be a big step forward. And that anybody carrying an arm or a,
arms or a club, or anything like that would be liable to punishment.
Barnett: Well . . .
Robert Kennedy: Those kind of steps by you . . .
Barnett: Yes.
Robert Kennedy: . . . would indicate an interest in maintaining law
and order.
Barnett: Well, General, I certainly, I’ll tell the chancellor to
announce to all the students to keep law and order and to keep cool
242
S AT U R DAY, S E P T E M B E R
29, 1962
heads. But the trouble is not only the students, but it’s so many thousands of outsiders will be there.
Robert Kennedy: Yes, but I think, if you said, Governor, not just to . . .
Barnett: Yeah.
Robert Kennedy: . . . keep cool heads, but that they couldn’t congregate.
Barnett: How many do you figure on sending down?
Robert Kennedy: Well, that’s a . . . I think that the President had
some questions for you that he thought that maybe if we could get some
answers to them that . . .
Barnett: Yeah.
Robert Kennedy: . . . that would be what [it would] depend [on].
[speaking to President Kennedy in the room] Mr. President . . .
Barnett: Mr. General, why don’t you . . . I believe that if you and Tom
Watkins could get together it would help a lot. He’s a very reasonable
man, and, and he’s, he knows, he knows the situation down here as well
as anybody living. If you all could get together tomorrow morning, I
really think that it would pay. I think it would help.
Robert Kennedy: Well, he doesn’t have any suggestions, he just told
me, Mr. Governor.
Barnett: Yes. Well, I . . .
Robert Kennedy: So I don’t know what . . .
Barnett: . . . I thought he did have.
Robert Kennedy: Well, he didn’t. I mean he said something about
sending Meredith, sneaking him into Jackson and getting him registered
while all of you were up at . . .
Barnett: Yeah.
Robert Kennedy: . . . at Oxford. But that doesn’t make much sense,
does it?
Barnett: Well, I don’t know. Why? Why doesn’t it? That’s where
they’d ordered him to go at first, you know.
Robert Kennedy: Yeah.
Barnett: You see, there’s an order on the minutes, Mr. General, for
him to register . . .
Robert Kennedy: Well, would you . . .
Barnett: . . . [unclear].
Robert Kennedy: . . . you’d get . . . As I understand it, you’d get
everybody up at Oxford, and then we’d, and then . . .
Barnett: Oh, well, that’s exactly what Tom Watkins must have had in
mind, you know.
Robert Kennedy: Yeah.
Barnett: Let me talk with Tom and call you back in a little while.
Conversation with Ross Barnett
243
He’s not but a block from me. That’s what he had in mind, I think. And,
of course, you know how it is in Jackson. Monday they, no school’s going
on here, you know, and . . . Uh, of course nobody would be anticipating
anyone coming here, you know.
Robert Kennedy: Are you going up to Oxford on Monday? Is that
your plan?
Barnett: Well, that’s what I planned to do, yes, sir. The lieutenant governor and I, both, I guess, we’ll have to be up there to try to keep order,
you know. And, we’re to be up there pretty early Monday morning.
Robert Kennedy: Will you?
Barnett: We’ll be up there, unless you ask us not to.
Robert Kennedy: Yeah.
Barnett: Well, like, you see, we’ll be up there and that’s where all the
people will be. Yeah. I thought you and Watkins were going to talk
about that kind of a situation, then what’d be the best thing to do under
those conditions, you know.
Robert Kennedy: Yeah, I think, Governor, that the President has
some, uh, questions that he wanted some answers to . . .
Barnett: Well . . .
Robert Kennedy: . . . make his own determination.
Barnett: . . . that’s right. He wanted to know if I would obey the
orders of the court, and I told him I, I’d have to do some . . . study that
over. That’s a serious thing. I’ve taken an oath to abide by the laws of
this state and our state constitution and the Constitution of the United
States. And, General, how can I violate my oath of office? How can I do
that and live with the people of Mississippi? You know, they’re expecting
me to keep my word. That’s what I’m up against, and I don’t understand
why the court, why the court wouldn’t understand that.
President Kennedy: Oh, Governor, this is the President speaking.
Barnett: Yes, sir, Mr. President.
President Kennedy: Now it’s, I know that . . . your feeling about the
law of Mississippi and the fact that you don’t want to carry out that
court order. What we really want to have from you, though, is some
understanding about whether the state police will maintain law and
order. We understand your feeling about the court order . . .
Barnett: Yes.
President Kennedy: . . . and your disagreement with it. But what
we’re concerned about is how much violence [there] is going to be and
what kind of action we’ll have to take to prevent it. And I’d like to get
assurances from you that the state police down there will take positive
action to maintain law and order.
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Barnett: Oh, they’ll do that.
President Kennedy: Then we’ll know what we have to do.
Barnett: They’ll, they’ll take positive action, Mr. President, to maintain law and order as best we can.
President Kennedy: And now, how good is . . .
Barnett: We’ll have 220 highway patrolmen . . .
President Kennedy: Right.
Barnett: . . . and they’ll absolutely be unarmed.
President Kennedy: I understa—
Barnett: Not a one of them’ll be armed.
President Kennedy: Well, no, but the problem is, well, what can they
do to maintain law and order and prevent the gathering of a mob and
action taken by the mob? What can they do? Can they stop that?
Barnett: Well, they’ll do their best to. They’ll do everything in their
power to stop it.
President Kennedy: Now, what about the suggestions made by the
Attorney General in regard to not permitting people to congregate and
start a mob?
Barnett: Well, we’ll do our best to, to keep them from congregating,
but that’s hard to do, you know.
President Kennedy: Well, they just tell them to move along.
Barnett: When they start moving up on the sidewalks and different
sides of the streets, what are you going to do about it?
President Kennedy: Well, now, as I understand it, Governor, you
would do everything you can to maintain law and order.
Barnett: I, I, I’ll do everything in my power to maintain order . . .
President Kennedy: Right. Now . . .
Barnett: . . . and peace. We don’t want any shooting down here.
President Kennedy: I understand. Now, Governor, what about, can
you maintain this order?
Barnett: Well, I don’t know.
President Kennedy: Yes.
Barnett: That’s what I’m worried about, you see. I don’t know
whether I can or not.
President Kennedy: Right.
Barnett: I couldn’t have the other afternoon.61
61. Barnett is undoubtedly referring to 27 September, when some 2,000 people, including students, farmers, and self-styled vigilantes, converged on Oxford from all over Mississippi,
intent on stopping Meredith from registering. A worried Barnett telephoned the Attorney
Conversation with Ross Barnett
245
President Kennedy: You couldn’t have?
Barnett: There was such a mob there, it would have been impossible.
President Kennedy: I see.
Barnett: There were men in there with trucks and shotguns, and all
such as that. Not a lot of them, but some, we saw, and certain people
were just, they were just enraged.
President Kennedy: Well, now, will you talk . . .
Barnett: You just don’t understand the situation down here.
President Kennedy: Well, the only thing is I got my responsibility.
Barnett: I know you do.
President Kennedy: This is not my order; I just have to carry it out.
So I want to get together and try to do it with you in a way which is the
most satisfactory and causes the least chance of damage to people in
Mississippi. That’s my interest.
Barnett: That’s right. Would you be willing to wait awhile and let
the people cool off on the whole thing?
President Kennedy: Till how long?
Barnett: Couldn’t you make a statement to the effect, Mr. President,
Mr. General, that under the circumstances existing in Mississippi, that,
uh, there’ll be bloodshed; you want to protect the life of, of, of James
Meredith and all other people? And under the circumstances at this
time, it just wouldn’t be fair to him or others to try to register him at
this time.
President Kennedy: Well, then at what time would it be fair?
Barnett: Well, we, we could wait a, I don’t know.
President Kennedy: Yeah.
Barnett: It might be in, uh, two or three weeks, it might cool off a little.
President Kennedy: Well, would you undertake to register him in
two weeks?
Barnett: Well, I, you know I can’t undertake to register him myself . . .
President Kennedy: I see.
Barnett: . . . but you all might make some progress that way, you
know.
President Kennedy: [Laughs.] Yeah. Well, we’d be faced with, unless
we had your support . . .
Barnett: You see . . .
President Kennedy: . . . and assurance, we’d be . . .
General that day to report that he was uncertain if he could maintain order, claiming he could
not disperse the crowd.
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Barnett: . . . I say I’m going to, I’m going to cooperate. I might not
know when you’re going to register him, you know.
President Kennedy: I see. Well, now, Governor, why don’t, do you
want to talk to Mr. Watkins?
Barnett: I might not know that, what your plans were, you see.
President Kennedy: Do you want to, do you want to talk to Mr.
Watkins then . . .
Barnett: I’ll be delighted to talk to him, we’ll call you back.
President Kennedy: OK, good.
Barnett: Call the General back.
President Kennedy: Yeah, call the General, and then I’ll be around.
Barnett: All right. I appreciate it so much . . .
President Kennedy: Thanks, Governor.
Barnett: . . . and I thank you for this call.
President Kennedy: Thank you, Governor.
Barnett: All right.
President Kennedy: Right.
Barnett: Bye.
President Kennedy finally goes to the swimming pool. Burke Marshall
and the Attorney General returned to the Justice Department, where
they put finishing touches to two important telegrams, one to Louis
Oberdorfer and the Justice Department’s team in Oxford and the other
on behalf of the President to Governor Barnett. The Justice Department
ordered 300 deputy marshals to move to the campus at Oxford at 3:00
P.M., September 30, by helicopter.62 The plan was to lay the groundwork
so that Meredith could peacefully register at the Lyceum administration
building on Monday. The gist of the President’s wire was quite different.
The White House was prepared to accept the plan for Meredith’s sneak
registration at the university’s Jackson, Mississippi, campus on Monday
while the Governor and the Lieutenant Governor made their public
stand in Oxford.
A little after 7:12 P.M. on September 29, Barnett and the President
spoke again, their third conversation of the day.63 Beyond discussing the
62. Angie Novello to Evelyn Lincoln, 29 September 1962, with attachment, Robert F.
Kennedy, Personal Correspondence, Civil Rights, Mississippi, Box 11.
63. Due to a technical error with the recording system, this third conversation was not
recorded. An approximate time for this conversation comes from a memo written by Robert
Conversation with Torbert MacDonald
247
Monday plan for Meredith’s sneak registration, Barnett assured Kennedy
that the highway patrol would maintain law and order and guarantee
Meredith’s safety. The Kennedy administration, it seemed, had worked
out a deal. Robert Kennedy was with his brother in the White House at
the time of the call and then left for the night.
Although a political solution now seemed likely, Kennedy knew he
wouldn’t be going to Newport this weekend. He called an old friend,
Congressman Torbert MacDonald of Massachusetts, who he hoped
would substitute for him at a political event there.
7:36 P.M.
[Y]ou have to make a judgment about whether these trips are
worthwhile or those speeches are worthwhile.
Conversation with Torbert MacDonald64
Evelyn Lincoln: Hello?
Unidentified: I have Congressman MacDonald for the President, in
Malden. [Pause.]
President Kennedy: Hello. Hello?
Torbert MacDonald: Hello, Mr. President.
President Kennedy: How are you doing?
MacDonald: Oh, all right. How are you?
President Kennedy: Where are you? Up at York?
MacDonald: Oh, no. No, I’m in Malden, Jack.
President Kennedy: Oh, I see.
MacDonald: Yeah.
President Kennedy: Listen. Bill was down here this weekend. I didn’t
know whether you’d be able to come down.
Kennedy’s secretary Angela Novello in February 1963 (see Novello to Burke Marshall, 19
February 1963, Robert Kennedy, Mississippi File). At 7:12 Barnett called the Justice
Department to alert Robert Kennedy that he would be in his office for the next 10 to 15 minutes. Burke Marshall relayed this message to the Attorney General, who was with his brother
at the White House. Robert Kennedy responded that Barnett should be told that “he was out
of the office for a few minutes and to find out if this call was in answer to the wire sent by the
President.”
64. Dictabelt 4D2, Cassette A, John F. Kennedy Library, President’s Office Files, Presidential
Recordings Collection.
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S AT U R DAY, S E P T E M B E R
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MacDonald: Oh.
President Kennedy: And get Sam Atkinson.
MacDonald: Well, not until the first of the week.
President Kennedy: Oh, you can’t?
MacDonald: No.
President Kennedy: You can’t get away there tomorrow?
MacDonald: No.
President Kennedy: Oh. OK.
MacDonald: How long is he going—
President Kennedy: Well, he’s got to go back to . . . work tomorrow
night, late. What do you got tomorrow?
MacDonald: Well, you know, it’s been a full week.
President Kennedy: I know. Oh, I know you’ve had . . . I agree with that.
MacDonald: And, uh—
President Kennedy: You have to speak tomorrow?
MacDonald: Yeah.
President Kennedy: Oh.
MacDonald: And . . . they’ve sent some stuff up for me that has been
postponed during the week, you know.
President Kennedy: Yeah, yeah.
MacDonald: And so . . . I’d love to . . . not until . . . What time is . . .
he going back?
President Kennedy: Well, he’d probably go back . . . I don’t know. You
know, in time to get there at class Monday morning. But I didn’t know
whether you could sort of arrange your schedule, because it seems to me
this is going to be one of those things that you wouldn’t want to miss.
MacDonald: I’d certainly . . . I’d certainly try to do it—
President Kennedy: Well, why don’t you check on it and then give
me a call in the morning?
MacDonald: All right. I will.
President Kennedy: Will you be home in the morning?
MacDonald: Yes.
President Kennedy: Well, I . . . My judgment would be . . . based on
long years of . . . Bill’s been down here today. I’ve just talked to him. And
my judgment would be that it . . . it’s worth the trip.
MacDonald: Well, it’s worth the trip if I can do the trip.
President Kennedy: Yeah, but, well, you have to make a judgment
about whether these trips are worthwhile or those speeches are worthwhile.
MacDonald: Well, it’s—
President Kennedy: [laughing] OK.
Conversation with Torbert MacDonald
249
MacDonald: It isn’t just that, Mr. President.
President Kennedy: I understand. Oh, I understand. But I just
wanted to be sure that you knew about it.
MacDonald: The spirit is willing—
President Kennedy: OK.
MacDonald: —and of course—
President Kennedy: Yeah, I know.
MacDonald: I think this will be nice.
President Kennedy: OK. Well, in any case—
MacDonald: You really want me to call you tomorrow?
President Kennedy: Well, no. But I think it would be worth doing.
MacDonald: Well, how about in the afternoon or night tomorrow?
President Kennedy: Yeah. Can you come down tomorrow?
MacDonald: Well, late afternoon, maybe. Yes.
President Kennedy: You mean when you get finished?
MacDonald: Well, I figure that I could get out of here by about four,
five o’clock in the afternoon—
President Kennedy: Yeah. That’s fine. Good.
MacDonald: All right.
President Kennedy: OK. I’ll call you. I’ll give you a call in the morning. You can get a hold of [unclear] Atkinson.
MacDonald: All right.
President Kennedy: OK. Bye now.
The President went to the Mansion and had some ice cream sent up. He
was settling into his evening’s activities when his brother called with bad
news. The deal with Barnett was off. For the next two hours, he was on the
telephone with Robert Kennedy and deputy press secretary, Andrew
Hatcher. At one point the President even roused Theodore Sorensen from
his hospital bed to draft a speech he could use if he decided to call in troops.
Ultimately, the President decided to federalize the National Guard, an
eventuality already under consideration. At 11:50 P.M., he sent word to the
Secret Service that he wanted to be notified when the Justice Department
had sent over the proclamation, which he intended to sign that night. At
11:58 P.M., Kennedy sat down with Norbert Schlei, head of the Office of
Legal Counsel, in the Oval Room of the family quarters and signed
Proclamation 3497, which ordered those who were obstructing justice in
Mississippi “to cease and desist therefrom and to retire peaceably forthwith.” He then signed an executive order placing the Mississippi National
Guard units under federal control. Kennedy inquired whether these docu-
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1, 1962
ments were the same as those Eisenhower had signed in 1957 in the Little
Rock case. Schlei said they were, noting the wording had been improved.
As Schlei prepared to leave, Kennedy tapped the table, pointing out that it
had belonged to General Ulysses S. Grant. Not wanting to antagonize the
South, Kennedy advised Schlei not to mention Grant’s table to the press.
The South was already agitated. As Kennedy directed the drawing up
of the proclamation, Governor Barnett attended an Ole Miss football
game at Jackson Memorial Stadium, where 46,000 fans cheered not only
for their beloved university against the Kentucky Wildcats but also for
their Governor. It was then that Barnett, responding to the chant of “We
want Ross,” strode onto the floodlit field, stepped to the microphone, and
declared, “I love Mississippi. I love her people. I love our customs.”
Just after midnight, President Kennedy went to sleep. The crisis he
had predicted that fall was starting, but it was starting in Oxford,
Mississippi, not West Berlin.
Sunday, September 30–Monday, October 1, 1962
After attending mass at St. Stephen’s Church, the President hosted a lunch
for the British foreign secretary, Lord Home, at the White House. The
Anglo-American agenda was full. But Berlin, the Congo, and Cuba dominated the conversation. The discussion continued for a while after lunch.
For the moment, Mississippi was the most dangerous place in the
world for the federal government. After the British delegation left,
Kennedy turned his principal attention to the problem of safely registering an African American, James Meredith, at the all-white University of
Mississippi in Oxford. Governor Barnett had come up with a new plan for
ending this stalemate peacefully. He proposed that Meredith be brought to
the campus surrounded by a large group of federal agents. Barnett was
looking for a dramatic way to save face. The defenders of a white Ole Miss
would attempt to stare down Meredith but would then retreat in the face
of a much larger force. The Attorney General, to whom the Governor had
suggested the “show of force” scheme, turned it down. Robert Kennedy
then threatened Barnett with making public that the Governor had been
negotiating with the Kennedy brothers behind the backs of the segregationists. The Attorney General’s threat resulted in a new Barnett scheme.
He suggested that the federal government sneak Meredith onto the campus that afternoon. Barnett would then announce in a speech that he had
Meeting on Civil Rights
251
been tricked and Meredith was on campus. The President and Robert
Kennedy preferred this plan. At 6:00 P.M., James Meredith flew into
Oxford accompanied by some Justice Department officials. Before his
arrival, a force of 300 U.S. marshals had assembled around the Lyceum,
the main administration building on campus. The deputy attorney general, Nicholas Katzenbach, who was in charge of operations on the campus, had expected that Meredith would be able to register that day. But
this was impossible. So, as Governor Barnett issued a press release that
Meredith was on campus, U.S. marshals remained posted around the
Lyceum, while some distance away, in the dormitory Baxter Hall,
Meredith was under federal protective guard for the night. The goal was
to keep him safe so that he could register the next morning.
At 10:00 P.M., the President spoke to the nation. He had delayed his
speech two hours to await word that Meredith was safely on campus.
From that moment on, the unexpected displaced the expected.
Approximately 10:40 P.M.–1:00 A.M.
I haven’t had such an interesting time since the Bay of Pigs.
Meeting on Civil Rights1
“Let us preserve both the law and the peace, and then, healing those
wounds that are within we can turn to the greater crises that are without and stand united as one people in our pledge to man’s freedom.”
With those words, President Kennedy ended his televised address to the
nation on the situation in Mississippi. The speech was intended to signal
a victory in James Meredith’s struggle to be the first African American
to register at the University of Mississippi. Yet words less relevant to a
crisis have seldom been spoken by a U.S. president.
As the President began his speech at 10:00 P.M., Eastern Standard
Time, the situation was already unraveling in Oxford, Mississippi.
James Meredith had arrived on campus with a large escort of U.S. marshals two hours earlier. According to an arrangement fixed earlier in
1. Including President Kennedy, Robert Kennedy, Burke Marshall, Lawrence O’Brien, Kenneth
O’Donnell, and Theodore Sorensen. Tapes 26 and 26A, John F. Kennedy Library, President’s
Office Files, Presidential Recordings Collection.
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1, 1962
the day, Kennedy called Mississippi governor Ross Barnett, who was
expected to announce ruefully that the state of Mississippi had been
“physically overpowered” and Meredith was on campus. Kennedy was
then supposed to give a conciliatory speech that stressed the victory of
the rule of law.
The rule of law was not winning where it counted this night, on the
streets of Oxford. In the interval between the Governor’s concession
speech and Kennedy’s address, all hell broke out at the university. A
crowd of 2,500 surged toward the Lyceum, the university’s central
administrative center. With 300 federalized U.S. marshals and handpicked border patrol officers now on campus and ringing the Lyceum,
the Governor’s representatives on campus decided to withdraw the
Mississippi highway patrol officers who had given a semblance of calm
to the campus in the tense days since the appeals court had ordered
Barnett to admit Meredith. Sensing a shift in the balance of power, the
crowd surged forward, and in self-defense the federal marshals launched
a volley of tear gas canisters. “I would like to take this occasion to
express the thanks of this nation to those southerners who have contributed to the progress of our democratic development. . . . ” A cloud of
tear gas was rising from the campus and Kennedy gave this discordant
speech. Aides had tried to stop him as news of the growing riot reached
the White House. But the telecast had begun.
In the half-hour following the speech, the news from Mississippi has
gotten progressively worse. A jerry-built communications set-up relayed
information from the campus to the White House. A series of walkietalkies carried by the marshals and Justice Department aides in and
around the Lyceum kept Nicholas Katzenbach, Attorney General Robert
Kennedy’s field commander, informed. Using a pay telephone in the basement of the building, Katzenbach or the Attorney General’s press secretary, Ed Guthman, conveyed this information to Robert Kennedy or his
assistant Burke Marshall in the White House. Meanwhile down the mall
at the Justice Department another Kennedy aide, Ramsey Clark, the assistant attorney general, maintained a direct line to the Justice Department’s
makeshift Oxford headquarters, which was in a post office building a few
minutes from campus. Periodically, Clark called the Attorney General at
the White House with updates.
President Kennedy started taping as the impromptu domestic crisis
team was absorbing news that the mob had turned violent. Burke Marshall
was handling the telephone in the Cabinet Room for the Attorney General,
with the President a worried observer.
Meeting on Civil Rights
253
Robert Kennedy: [on the phone] Now don’t you have to . . . Do you
have some other men? Yeah. Did you get all the marshals there now?2
President Kennedy: State police or . . .
Robert Kennedy: [on the phone] How many you’ve got? And they’re
all there? Yeah. How are the state police? Is the crowd getting bigger?
Unidentified: [talking to Robert Kennedy in the room] [Unclear] wants
you?
Robert Kennedy: That’s fine.
[on the phone] OK, well I’ll get back. I’ll let you know.
[off the phone] Well, I think that—
President Kennedy: What?
Robert Kennedy: They think they have it in pretty good shape. [Puts
down the receiver.]
President Kennedy: [Unclear.]
Robert Kennedy: Did one marshal get his arm broken?
President Kennedy: His arm broken?
Robert Kennedy: The lousy, I mean, there you are appointed, some
politician gets you appointed deputy marshal and you’re sitting in the
courtroom . . . [telephone rings] moving . . . close to the judge . . . and
suddenly . . .
Burke Marshall: [on the phone] Hello. Yes, he is.
President Kennedy: His arm broken, what, by a bottle?
Unidentified: No, but he said they’re throwing [unclear]. It’s Ed.
President Kennedy: Who?
Unidentified: Ed.
Robert Kennedy: [on the phone] Oh, Ed.3 Well, how’s it look to you?
Kenneth O’Donnell: Yeah, there might not be quite as much rush for
those bumps they’re handing out right after . . .
Robert Kennedy: [on the phone] Is it under control? Would you bring
the guard in?4
Theodore Sorensen: Yeah, but tomorrow’s going to be worse than
today.
Marshall: Yeah, I was . . . even tonight.
Unidentified: [Unclear.]
2. The civilian contingent of U.S. marshals, border police, and federalized prison guards arrived
in stages between 7:00 and 9:00 P.M. Washington time (5:00 and 7:00 P.M. Mississippi time).
3. Probably Edwin Guthman, director of public information, Department of Justice.
4. Earlier in the day President Kennedy federalized the Mississippi National Guard. There
were units in Oxford and Jackson, Mississippi, that could be deployed if necessary.
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1, 1962
Marshall: . . . where the [unclear] keep up with him tonight.
President Kennedy: Yeah. You can’t help but get at it.
O’Donnell: That was the last [unclear] from the outside of the campus [unclear].
Unidentified: [Unclear.]
Sorensen: Most people like to—
Unidentified: [Unclear.]
Sorensen: Most people like [unclear] and then [unclear].
Lawrence O’Brien: I wish they were. Got to keep them in line though.
Robert Kennedy: [on the phone] Are they mad at the marshals?
O’Brien: . . . otherwise [unclear].
Sorensen: As I say [unclear].
Robert Kennedy: Evidently they just . . .
President Kennedy: [Unclear] from Alabama, who’s come to think a
lot of them are [unclear].
Unidentified: Get the judge to say that [unclear].
Unidentified: [Unclear.]
Unidentified: I [unclear] . . .
Robert Kennedy: [on the phone] OK, well, I’m going to see if I can
get these troops started anyway.5 We can see. Well, I think if they, I
think it’s better that we can control the situation. I don’t think it’s worth
screwing around. The weekend.6
President Kennedy: It’s going to be a long fall in Oxford, I think.
Robert Kennedy: [on the phone] I’ll see if I can’t get them going anyway. OK.
While Robert Kennedy is speaking on the telephone, in the background an
unidentified man says, “Kermit’s having trouble with his homework.”
Unidentified: What’s the story now?
Robert Kennedy: Well, he thinks the situation’s under control now,
but you know—
President Kennedy: —I think we ought to get the guard within, you
know, shouting distance outside of town. I think it’s probably [unclear].
Unidentified: Blocked off those roads?
Robert Kennedy: Yeah. There’s enough people coming in from . . .
They got the . . .
5. The crisis has entered a new phase. It is about 10:45 P.M. in Washington, two hours earlier in
Mississippi, and the Kennedy administration is preparing to deploy the U.S. Army in Oxford.
6. Task Force Alpha is waiting for orders in Memphis. Organized in the last 24 hours, it
includes the 503rd Military Police Battalion, the 31st Light Helicopter Company, the 138th
Truck Company, a medical detachment, and two tear gas experts. The Attorney General is
pressing the introduction of these troops on his men in Oxford.
Meeting on Civil Rights
255
Unidentified: That’s [unclear].
Robert Kennedy: Well, [unclear] they got the people on the roads,
just to keep them informed about it.
Marshall: [on the phone] Hello?
Robert Kennedy: Then we get all around the city so as to [unclear].
Marshall: [on the phone] This is Burke Marshall.
Robert Kennedy: . . . came in and get control of . . . and then we have
control over the air. But if you have gas, you’ve got a pretty good operation going. They got 500 marshals . . .7 [Laughter in the background.]
Marshall: [on the phone] [Unclear.]
Unidentified: [Unclear.]
Robert Kennedy: You see, they’re sitting there and they’re throwing
iron . . .
President Kennedy: Spikes?
Robert Kennedy: . . . spikes, and they’re throwing Coke bottles, and
they’re throwing rocks.
Unidentified: I gather they’re [unclear]—
Robert Kennedy: Well, you tell that guy that just came out of
Cleveland from . . . just appointed by . . .
Marshall: [on the phone] Dean?8
President Kennedy: [Unclear.]
Robert Kennedy: Miller.
Marshall: [on the phone] I know that [unclear].
President Kennedy: But Bobby [unclear]’s a bookie from [unclear]—
Sorensen: [Unclear.]
O’Brien: That isn’t the way the American people envision marshals
[unclear].
Marshall: [talking to people in the room] Is it Johnny Vaught?9
Unidentified: [Unclear.]
Robert Kennedy: Yeah, the coach. What’s the good coach’s name?
Unidentified: Johnny Vaught.
Robert Kennedy: Let’s see if we can get him.
Unidentified: He won’t believe it.
Robert Kennedy: He might . . .
President Kennedy: What’s Barnett doing?
Marshall: [on the phone] . . . TCU or . . .
7. Apparently there were only 300. See Taylor Branch, Parting the Waters: America in the King
Years, 1954–63 (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1988), pp. 662–63.
8. Dean P. Markham.
9. John H. Vaught was a University of Mississippi coach.
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Robert Kennedy: [Unclear.]
Marshall: Did he come from Tennessee? TCU, wasn’t it?
President Kennedy: Texas Christian University then.
Robert Kennedy: Where he came from originally?
Unidentified: Yeah.
President Kennedy: I think he was out of Texas. Yeah.
Unidentified: He was.
Marshall: [on the phone] Dean [Markham]?
President Kennedy: What are we waiting for . . . Cy Vance to tell us
how long it will take?
The U.S. Army had forces on standby in Memphis, Tennessee, to calm
the situation in Oxford, Mississippi, and there was supposed to be a local
Mississippi National Guard unit available for reinforcing the federal
marshals on campus.
Marshall: [on the phone] Do you think you could find him and talk to
him?
President Kennedy: Why don’t we just tell him to get on and tell
him to take them out [unclear].
Marshall: [on the phone] Yeah. Vaught saw the [unclear].
Unidentified: [Unclear.]
Marshall: [on the phone] Yeah.
President Kennedy: Let’s see this article.
Marshall: [on the phone] See if he talks to the kids, yeah.
President Kennedy: [reading] “Ross Barnett, Jr., son of the Mississippi
governor [unclear].”10
Marshall: [on the phone] Well, did Vaught talk to them tonight?
President Kennedy: [reading] “[Unclear] National Guard Patrol
[unclear].”
[Laughter.]
Marshall: [on the phone] Why don’t you do it, and then if you think it
would do any good to have some.
Unidentified: Did he get called up?
Robert Kennedy: Do we have any other phone system other than
that, this we’re using here?
Marshall: No.
Unidentified: We don’t have anything else?
President Kennedy: You want to get [unclear] and Secretary on it.
10. Ironically, the Governor’s son was called up with his Mississippi National Guard unit to
fight against his father’s segregationism.
Meeting on Civil Rights
257
Marshall: All right.
Unidentified: Do you want in or out?
Marshall: [on the phone] All right. [Pause.]
Marshall: [to people in the room] He said he wants to keep all the football squad out of it if there were any demonstrations.
O’Brien: That would have been a hell of a squad. [Unclear] a couple
of hundred [unclear].
Unidentified: They want [unclear].
Unidentified: Yeah.
Unidentified: This reminds me a little bit of the Bay of Pigs.11
Unidentified: Yech! [Laughter.]
O’Brien: [Unclear], I will say that . . .
Sorensen: Well, especially when Bobby said we’d provide air cover.12
[Laughter.]
O’Brien: Yeah [unclear] they know [unclear].
Sorensen: We could control the air . . .
Unidentified: Except on one of the [unclear]. [Laughter.]
O’Brien: Ed described [unclear].
Unidentified: [Unclear.]
O’Donnell: What do you think [of] the response to Jim McShane’s
men without the President protecting them?13 As you say, they [unclear].
Unidentified: [Unclear.]
O’Donnell: What about Jim? [Laughter.]
Unidentified: One of the two places.
Sorensen: My guess is, Bobby, that we’ll have the control of outsiders
down pretty good.14 You may be able to introduce—
Marshall: —Well, we don’t have . . .
Robert Kennedy: Well, the only thing is to keep . . .
Marshall: . . . control of outsiders, I don’t think [unclear].
Robert Kennedy: Yeah, we haven’t had any trouble from outsiders
11. In April 1961, the United States backed an invasion force composed of Cuban exiles that
sought to overthrow the Castro regime in Cuba. The invasion, marred by a series of errors in
planning and execution, failed miserably, much to the chagrin of the new administration.
12. The reference here is to the U.S. decision not to provide air cover to support the invasion
force during the Bay of Pigs landing. Some claimed the administration’s failure to do so
doomed the operation.
13. James McShane was chief of the federal marshals.
14. Outsiders was the codeword for Ku Klux Klansmen, John Birchers, and other extremists
who had been threatening to descend on Oxford from across the Deep South to keep Ole Miss
white.
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yet. I suppose you’ll always have the difficulty of people storming onto
the campus. They have a lot of gates. It’s a hell of a big campus, you
know. So you have a few marshals and a few people at each gate, and I
suppose you can stick a car in [unclear] . . .
Marshall: [on the phone]15 Hello [unclear]. Yeah. All right.
Robert Kennedy: . . . we can always storm in there at eight tomorrow
morning or ten tomorrow morning. The problem is, you see, when you
don’t have anybody there that’s really interested in maintaining law and
order, and where their primary interest is to get us to bring troops in.16
You can imagine what would have happened if we’d gone through with
what he wanted to do tomorrow morning.
Marshall: [on the phone] It’s now against them.
Sorensen: Yeah.
Robert Kennedy: Walk in there and try to get through and he’s there
with all his . . . That’s what his plan was. That he’d be there with his
state police and sheriffs, and then assistant sheriffs and then volunteers
behind him, four lanes. And then we were to push our way through.
Unidentified: His agreement was they wouldn’t fire.
Marshall: [on the phone] [Unclear] the state troopers.
Unidentified: . . . tend to resist them anyhow.
Robert Kennedy: Yeah. With nobody else knowing the plot but him
and me.
Evelyn Lincoln: Peter Lawford is on the phone.17
Marshall: [on the phone] Well, he called on the students to act as
responsible citizens.
President Kennedy: That’s slightly ironic. I wish we’d taken that part
out.
Marshall: [on the phone with Joseph Dolan] Yeah. All right, Joe.
[to the people in the room] He says that the state police are against us.
President Kennedy: Who does?
Marshall: [on the phone] Hello. Yeah.
Robert Kennedy: Of course, filled with all this poison.
Unidentified: This way we’ll now [unclear].
15. Marshall is monitoring a continuously open phone line to Justice Department officials in
Mississippi.
16. Robert Kennedy is referring to his failed negotiations with Ross Barnett. The Mississippi
Governor’s primary concern seemed to be to maneuver the Kennedy White House so that it would
overplay its hand in Oxford and make political martyrs out of the Governor and his defenders.
17. According to a White House telephone memorandum, Peter Lawford called the President
at 10:50 P.M. (Evelyn Lincoln Collection, Box 5, John F. Kennedy Library).
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Unidentified: Feel a [unclear].
Marshall: [on the phone] Well, he could probably do that [unclear].
Unidentified: Jack [unclear] here in the Cabinet Room, would there
be [unclear].
Marshall: [on the phone] He may be trying to avoid that.
Robert Kennedy: And he just got word they ran him . . . [Laughter.]
Unidentified: And you said [unclear].
Unidentified: [Unclear.] [Laughter.]
Unidentified: They court-martialed every last one of them.
Marshall: [to the people in the room] Dean [Markham] tried to call
the coach and his wife says he’s out.
Unidentified: You should have thought of that quote during the election. I would . . .
Unidentified: That’s how I get the coach.
Unidentified: [Unclear.]
Robert Kennedy: [Unclear.] Why don’t I try [unclear]?
Marshall: [on the phone] Well, Bob will try to call him. Dean?
Robert Kennedy: Get the number.
Marshall: [on the phone] Dean? Oh, Dean. Dean? Listen, why don’t
we get Bob to try to call him from here? Well, he may . . . His wife may
be lying to you.
Sorensen: What do you think the chances are that Barnett is being
honest with you and he’s not . . .
Marshall: [on the phone] All right. Well, we’ll see what happens.
Sorensen: [unclear] . . . the state police? He’s just . . .
Robert Kennedy: I don’t think he would.
Marshall: [on the phone] All right.
Robert Kennedy: I don’t think he’s telling them to lay off, but I don’t
think they’re enjoying this. You know, it’s one thing to get in for the
wrong reason and not have a problem, and they see we’re having problems and then, might have a sense of greater problems.
Sorensen: He said he didn’t want to get anyone killed, though, or
does he mind that?18
Marshall: [on the phone] Sounds like it’s out of the country.
Robert Kennedy: The only thing, like he said the other day to me, if fifty
people get killed down here, it might be embarrassing for the two of us.19
[Laughter.] It might hurt us, and then he went on to say that [unclear].
18. Referring to Ross Barnett.
19. Again referring to Ross Barnett.
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Marshall: [Unclear] two, three, four.
Lincoln: Secretary Vance.
Marshall: [on the phone] See, now, we’ll give that a try.
Robert Kennedy: [Unclear.]
It appears that Robert Kennedy goes to speak with the secretary of the
Army, Cyrus Vance, who briefs him on the readiness of the forces in
Memphis to intervene.
Marshall: [on the phone] Well, no, I’ll stay here.
Unidentified: Bobby’s had [unclear].
Unidentified: Huh?
Unidentified: Bobby’s had a tough one.
Unidentified: [Unclear.]
Unidentified: Really a battle plan.
Unidentified: The Teamsters in Mississippi.
Unidentified: [Unclear].
Unidentified: They’re just fighting the law.
Marshall: [on the phone] Yeah.
Unintelligible side conversation while Marshall listens on the telephone.
Marshall: [on the phone] No, you mean our marshal?
Unidentified: [in a side conversation] You’re just saying [unclear].
Marshall: [on the phone] Gee whiz. Well, can’t we get them some
food?
Unidentified: Hear that?
Robert Kennedy: So they go to the armory in Oxford. And there’ll be
someone there within an hour.20
Marshall: [on the phone] I know, but I mean, can’t we get . . .
Robert Kennedy: . . . company.
President Kennedy: They’ll be at . . .
Robert Kennedy: And they’ll be . . .
President Kennedy: . . . they’ll be at the armory in Oxford?
Robert Kennedy: Yeah. Well, in four hours they’ll have about 800,
900.
President Kennedy: In Oxford? But that’s not in the, that’s not at . . .
Robert Kennedy: Well, that’s the armory there, so they’re not at the
university.
President Kennedy: Yeah.
Robert Kennedy: I think that’s the . . .
20. The Attorney General had been given inaccurate information. The first contingent of U.S.
troops would not reach the airport at Oxford for another four hours.
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President Kennedy: That’s the best. I think that’s fine. The problem
is really the time lapse, isn’t it?
Robert Kennedy: Well, I think that it’s in the . . . They’re going to be . . .
I mean, if you can tell, from what they say, they’re going to be all right for
an hour.
Marshall: [on the phone] Well, I know, but I . . .
President Kennedy: Then what happens after that?
Robert Kennedy: Well, then you could . . . We have [a] company of . . .
President Kennedy: Oh, you’re, so they’re flying them in?
Robert Kennedy: . . . couple of hundred. No, we’ll have a couple of . . .
They’ll be a couple of hundred there within an hour.
The President is relying on the Attorney General for information about
the troop movements. The order went out to Memphis at 11 P.M. to load
the first contingent of 200 men aboard helicopters for the one-hour
flight to Oxford. The White House assumes that the military operation
is already in progress. In fact, it hasn’t even started.
President Kennedy: Oh, I see. The others . . .
Robert Kennedy: And there’ll be eight within four hours if he needs
them.
President Kennedy: Oh, I see.
Unidentified: [Unclear] said there’d be 200 within . . .
Marshall: [on the phone] Yeah.
President Kennedy: Where will they go?
Robert Kennedy: They’d all go into the armory.
President Kennedy: I see.
Robert Kennedy: And they’re all Mississippians.
Unidentified: They’re dying in there.
Robert Kennedy: And they got gas masks.
Marshall: [may be on the phone] How long are they going out to . . .
Unidentified: Yes.
Robert Kennedy: And the General’s getting in touch with Nick, and
he can use them any time he wants.21 I’ll tell Nick or you can.
President Kennedy: So there’ll be 200 there within an hour? [Unclear
exchange.]
Marshall: [on the phone] Oh, Dean? Can we get Nick?
Robert Kennedy: He did a hell of a job on the narcotics thing.
President Kennedy: Who?
Robert Kennedy: Yeah.
21. Nick was Nicholas Katzenbach, the deputy attorney general.
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President Kennedy: Was it a success? The conference?22
Robert Kennedy: Certainly. It really was.
President Kennedy: Background.
Marshall: How long will it take?
Robert Kennedy: They’ll have a company there within an hour.
Marshall: Yeah.
Robert Kennedy: And 800 within four hours.
Marshall: Oh, I see, a company. [Unclear] uniforms [unclear] Mississippians.
President Kennedy: [Unclear.]
Robert Kennedy: Well, I think that what we at least show that the
marshals couldn’t do it by themselves, so.
President Kennedy: Are we showing him or are they showing us?
[Laughter.]
Unidentified: Don’t you think that this . . . [Unclear exchange involving the President.]
Marshall: [talking on the phone] Hello, Nick?
Unidentified: [Unclear] southerners on [unclear].
Marshall: [talking on the phone] Just a minute, Bob wants to tell you
about these, and . . .
President Kennedy: [Unclear] news at eleven.
Robert Kennedy: [on the phone] Hello, Nick? Well, there’ll be a company there at the armory within an hour. And there’ll be 800 there, as I
understand it, within four hours.23 Now, General Billingslea is going to
get in touch with you.24 Blakerslee or whatever the hell he’s named.
Marshall: Billingslea.
Robert Kennedy: So, how does that sound?
President Kennedy: Need any more marshals or some equipment?
Are the marshals holding up for some tear gas?
Robert Kennedy: [on the phone] Is the gas coming in there?
Unidentified: Now, what is next?
Marshall: They gassed some of our own marshals.
22. The White House Conference on Narcotics and Drug Abuse, organized by Dean
Markham, was held 27–28 September 1962.
23. This is Task Force Alpha, a 687-man team stationed at Millington Naval Air Station in
Memphis. The advance group of 170 was supposed to have left by helicopter already. The rest
was to travel by Interstate 55 to reach Oxford in the early morning. At this point, no troops
from the Task Force had yet left Millington.
24. Brigadier General Charles Billingslea was commander of the 82nd Infantry Division, Fort
Benning, Georgia.
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President Kennedy: Did they?
Marshall: Dean says it’s bad for their morale.
Robert Kennedy: [on the phone] [Unclear.]
Unidentified: What?
Unidentified: Which isn’t too high, anyway.
Marshall: Well, they’re doing a good job.
O’Brien: You’re not kidding.
Marshall: They haven’t had anything to eat.
Unidentified: They’ll manage it.
Robert Kennedy: [on the phone] I don’t mind that.
Unidentified: It’s [unclear].
Robert Kennedy: [on the phone] And they should be home watching
the President on television.
Unidentified: [Unclear.]
Robert Kennedy: [on the phone] Listen, Nick. You got enough gas
there now? OK, you’re in pretty good shape now, though?
Marshall: [whispering] We’ll make these decisions tomorrow.
Robert Kennedy: [on the phone] Well, is anybody trying to get . . .
With Robert Kennedy on the telephone and another conversation going
on simultaneously in the Cabinet Room, the recording becomes very difficult to understand. The President is apparently distracted by word that
James Reston has just filed a story for the New York Times alleging
that Nikita Khrushchev was inviting Kennedy to a summit meeting.
Unidentified: What is Reston [unclear] knock it down anyway.
[Unclear] ought to knock it down.
Unidentified: Do you have an explanation for [unclear]?
Robert Kennedy: [on the phone] Is that enough time for you?
President Kennedy: . . . see now I can get [unclear].
Robert Kennedy: [on the phone] Did anybody else get any [unclear]?
Unidentified: [Unclear.]
Unidentified: When we visit Vienna, you . . .
Robert Kennedy: [on the phone] Yeah.
Unidentified: . . . the chairman extended an invitation to you and
Mrs. Kennedy.25 Basically it’s a standing invitation.
President Kennedy: Yeah. That’s right.
Robert Kennedy: [on the phone] Well, should we try to find out if
they . . .
25. Nikita Khrushchev, the general secretary of the Central Committee of the Communist Party
of the Soviet Union, also held the title of chairman of the Council of Ministers of the U.S.S.R.
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Unidentified: [Unclear] the American embassies. I hope your president comes over.
Unidentified: [Unclear] for a long time.
President Kennedy: [Unclear.] That’s exactly it. That’s why Reston’s
words [unclear].26
Unidentified: [Unclear] do you see it? What did you say?
Robert Kennedy: Is there any other way we can get gas?
President Kennedy: At the appropriate time.
Unidentified: At the appropriate time. Well, see Reston’s hitting the
West Coast tomorrow and he wants a story. That’s his story.27
President Kennedy: We ought to knock it down tonight; that’s just
kicking that Reston right in the balls, isn’t it?
Unidentified: What’s that?
Unidentified: It is aimed at that.
Unclear speakers.
Unidentified: [Unclear] Udall.28
President Kennedy: That’s for Udall.
Unidentified: That’s right. Three columns. Head.
President Kennedy: Front page?
Unidentified: Front page.
President Kennedy: It’s just an inaccurate story.
Sorensen: Sure. Well, it’s an irresponsible story.
President Kennedy: I’m surprised Reston would do it. He said we got
an invitation?
Unidentified: Well, I haven’t seen the text.
President Kennedy: It depends how he words it. Our answer would be
that on many occasions, Mr. Khrushchev has said that he would be glad to
welcome—he’s told visitors—to welcome President and Mrs. Kennedy
when conditions would permit, but unfortunately because of the . . .
Sorensen: And Adzhubei told you that.29 And Dobrynin has said that.30
President Kennedy: He told you . . . yeah. I mean we’ve all on many
occasions have stated that we’d be glad to have President and Mrs.
26. James Reston was chief Washington correspondent for the New York Times.
27. In a front-page story that appeared in the New York Times on 1 October, James Reston
wrote that Soviet premier Nikita Khrushchev had sent a private invitation to Kennedy to visit
the Soviet Union. According to Reston, the message was delivered to Kennedy by Interior
Secretary Stewart Udall, who had recently returned from the Soviet Union.
28. Stewart L. Udall was secretary of the interior.
29. Aleksei I. Adzhubei was editor of Izvestia and Khrushchev’s son-in-law.
30. Anatoly Dobrynin was Soviet ambassador to the United States.
Meeting on Civil Rights
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Kennedy when the situation was such, but of course with the difficulty
we have in Berlin and other areas, it’s been generally agreed in both
Moscow and the United States that the situation would not have been
appropriate to [unclear]. That’s our position.
Unidentified: [Unclear] outcome.
President Kennedy: I don’t think we ought to at night knock down
Reston, ought we? Do you want to call him up? Or is that just going to
make him mad?
Sorensen: Well, you can’t . . . Don’t bother calling him up.
President Kennedy: But if he knocks it down?
Sorensen: He can’t. [Unclear.]
President Kennedy: What?
Sorensen: It’s probably too late anyway.
President Kennedy: What?
Sorensen: And his story is gone. [Unclear.]
President Kennedy: [Unclear.] I just think he’d be embarrassed about
that. This one.
Unidentified: Yeah, but I don’t think . . . Why don’t you just in your
morning briefing tomorrow give a routine answer? [Unclear voices.]
The President’s attention returns to the more immediate problem in
Oxford, Mississippi.
Marshall: I think that General Abrams and General Billingslea are
working on it. 31 Do you want to send those women down there?
Robert Kennedy: I guess I better not.
Marshall: What about the others? The lawyers?
President Kennedy: What women are these?
Marshall: Secretaries.
Robert Kennedy: Secretaries.
President Kennedy: Down to where, Oxford?
Marshall: Yeah.
President Kennedy: Oh, you mean Nick’s secretaries?
Marshall: Yeah.
Robert Kennedy: Yeah. Well, why don’t I put a hold on it and I’ll talk
to him later on tonight.
Marshall: Hold on [unclear].
President Kennedy: You don’t have any men secretaries?
Marshall: [Unclear] could probably find them. I would think [unclear].
31. Major General Creighton Abrams was assistant deputy Army chief of staff for military
operations.
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President Kennedy: The FBI must have them.
Sorensen: At least one or two here in the correspondence section.
Marshall: They must have one.
Unidentified: [Unclear.]
The conversation becomes unclear and appears to be winding down.
Only a few fragments are understandable before there is a break in the
tape. When taping resumes, Robert Kennedy is on the telephone while an
indistinct conversation goes on beside him involving Evelyn Lincoln.
Robert Kennedy: [fades in] Yes [unclear].
Unidentified: Who’s writing these speeches?
Unidentified:[Unclear] the numbers you got.
Robert Kennedy: [on the phone] Yes, he did. Well, the Governor’s
announced it. The President’s announced it. Yeah. [Another phone rings.]
Unidentified: Yeah.
Lincoln: [Unclear] be back?
Robert Kennedy: [on the phone] Yeah. What do they think of it?
Lincoln: [answering the second phone] Hello?
President Kennedy and Theodore Sorensen are having a separate conversation.
President Kennedy: [Unclear] says the debates didn’t do any good.
Robert Kennedy: [on the phone] No.
Sorensen: I just knew that’s a crock. I just can’t believe that. I know
that [unclear].
President Kennedy: I know it didn’t change Republican votes, but the
point is, my trouble was to keep the Democrats.
Sorensen: I know. [Evelyn Lincoln can be heard in the background.]
Robert Kennedy: [on the phone] Does it look under control? Yeah.
Where are you going to get the guards to? Well, we’ve got a couple of
hundred in the beginning and eight, seven or eight [unclear].
Sorensen: And then the undecided on this, well, that’s a major part,
the undecided. [Unclear] poll shows that you . . . the effect of a campaign
is to move the undecided into your camp.
President Kennedy: Yeah.
Sorensen: . . . and that included the debates and the Houston speech.
I’m sure the call had a lot [unclear].32
Robert Kennedy: [continues on the phone] Do you? [Pause.] Well,
would you favor that I had troops coming in there? Yeah. Well, they’re
32. Sorensen is reminiscing about the key moments in the 1960 campaign. “The call” probably
refers to then Senator Kennedy’s telephone call to Coretta Scott King in October 1960 when
her husband, the Reverend Martin Luther King, Jr., was in a Georgia jail.
Meeting on Civil Rights
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on their way. [Pause.] OK. No. [Pause.] Well, you can just stay there.
What about . . . Is Nick there? Well, I’d just like to find out what he’s
heard on getting that gas in there.
Marshall: Do you want to talk to Cy [Vance]? Cy would know.
Robert Kennedy: [on the phone] Yeah. Well.
President Kennedy: Can we get, what’s his name? The Governor’s
man?33
Marshall: [starts speaking on the phone] Hello?
Robert Kennedy: He’s getting him.
Marshall: [on the phone] Hello? Oh, listen, he went off and I’m on.
Unidentified: [in the background] What about gas?
Marshall: [on the phone] Well, are they on their way, do you know?
[A telephone rings.]
President Kennedy: [faintly in the background] Should I talk with the
General directly?34
Lincoln: Jim, did you want your girl to stay?
Unidentified: If she could do me one last favor, which is to bring me
a glass of milk
Marshall: [on the phone] All right. Where were they, at the airport?
Lincoln: A glass of milk? [Unintelligible exchange.]
Robert Kennedy: [Unclear] from now?
Marshall: [on the phone] [Unclear] well that’s something to . . .
Unidentified: Evelyn’s got some beers in the refrigerator.
Marshall: [on the phone] Well, they’re coming in. Well, have they
walked out on you? They don’t have any gas masks.
It appears that Sorensen and the President have reentered the room.
Sorensen: [Unclear] matter, did we like [unclear] the troops on the
ground?
President Kennedy: It seems to me [unclear].
Sorensen: Yeah.
President Kennedy: The governor has said the troops withdrew. The
marshals were . . . with nothing to do.
Sorensen: We’ll announce that. Yeah, but . . .
Marshall: [on the phone] The gas should be in there in a few minutes.35
Robert Kennedy: Is that Nick?
Marshall: [to Robert Kennedy] This is Ed.
33. Apparently a reference to Tom Watkins, the intermediary in the Barnett-Kennedy negotiations.
34. Up to now, the White House team has relied on Secretary Vance’s descriptions of the
movements of Task Force Alpha in Memphis.
35. The federal force protecting the Lyceum ran out of tear gas. Because the Mississippi
National Guard lacked their own supply, canisters of tear gas had to be flown in from Memphis.
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President Kennedy: How do we get the gas in and out of there?
Robert Kennedy: [apparently speaking to someone else] I guess you can
come in.
Unidentified: I know, but one of us. [Chuckles.]
Marshall: [on the phone] They have?
Unidentified: Students [unclear] when they have a riot like this one,
do they?
President Kennedy: Well, that’s what I said. [Unclear.]
Unidentified: [Unclear.]
Robert Kennedy: You what?
President Kennedy: There weren’t any riots like this at Harvard just
because some guy yells . . . [Chuckling.]
Unidentified: What’s that?
Unidentified: That’s the only thing that [unclear].
Unidentified: Um huh.
Unidentified: Move [unclear].
President Kennedy: What?
Robert Kennedy: [could be on phone] Well, you ought to leave it to
the [unclear].
Sorensen: [Unclear] have student riots like this and it is [unclear]
you ought to be prepared for the worst, but . . .
President Kennedy: That’s it. That’s what we’re preparing for.
[Laughter.]
Unidentified: Yeah, and evidently we got it.
President Kennedy: Where is Nick? Is he up in the attic or just . . .
[Laughter.]
Sorensen: He’s in the pillbox.
President Kennedy: He’s a candidate [unclear]. Get him out of there.
O’Donnell: Nick might see that this is a job that he was [unclear]
every year.
Unidentified: And almost died [unclear]. [Unclear exchange.]
O’Brien: You know, with the marshals, Bobby, at least they were out
booking numbers or something . . . [unclear] in Chicago.
Marshall: [possibly on the phone] No one saw it [down there].
[Laughter.]
Marshall: [on the phone] No, no. [Unclear.]
President Kennedy: [Unclear.]
Soon the White House would face the problem of arranging a convoy to bring the gas from the
airport in Oxford to the campus.
Meeting on Civil Rights
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Marshall: [possibly on the phone] No. [Unclear.]
President Kennedy: There are no Boston marshals, are there?
Marshall: [to the President] The coach is going to go out and talk to
them.
President Kennedy: Perhaps, perhaps . . .
Marshall: [to the people in the room] Perhaps?
Unidentified: Yeah [unclear].
President Kennedy: That’s why the . . . police . . . I remember in a riot
at Harvard, these guys go around and start asking for your identity card.
Unidentified: University police.
President Kennedy: Yeah. That’s the only one that scared the shit
out of me.
While Marshall continues on the phone, some voices can be heard.
Someone says, “If you could only ask her about . . . ” And Evelyn
Lincoln says, “That would be fine.”
Unidentified: We just got three points in the [unclear] match.
President Kennedy: This [unclear] department.
Marshall: [on the phone] He wants . . . Well, here’s Bob. He’ll talk to
you himself.
Robert Kennedy: [on the phone] Hello? Yeah. Right. Okay. Now, the
question I think we have to decide, and Nick’s going to have to talk to
that general, if 200 fellows walking up there in uniforms, whether that’s
going to help or whether it’s going to really make it a . . . They’re all
Mississippians. No, I don’t know. They all have tear gas. But I think he
should talk to the military fellow there and see whether that would be
of . . . Well, they said he’d been in touch with them. [Pause.] All right.
Have we got the gas in there yet? [Pause.] Yeah. Could you if you had
your uniform on?
President Kennedy: Are we going to get this every night?
Robert Kennedy: [on the phone] Hello?
Unidentified: [responding to the President] Huh?
President Kennedy: Are we going to get this every night?
Robert Kennedy: [on the phone] Are you in touch with the military?
Sorensen: [to the President] I think that may well be Barnett’s strategy.
President Kennedy: [Unclear.]
Sorensen: You know it’s what happened to Autherine Lucy.36 She had
some trouble—
36. In February 1956, an African American woman, Autherine Lucy, entered the University of
Alabama under a court order. Rioting ensued, and university officials suspended Lucy for her
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Robert Kennedy: [on the phone] Well now, is the gas on the way?37
Unidentified: What did she do, withdraw?
Unidentified: Yeah, personally [unclear]. Isn’t that right?
Robert Kennedy: [on the phone] Will you? Do you want these troops
in there?38 Yeah. OK. [Pause.] He got hit by what? Yeah.
Unidentified: Who?
Robert Kennedy: Is he going to live? The state police have left?
[Unclear] put them in?
Marshall: I [unclear] talk with the Governor.
President Kennedy: What’d he say?
Marshall: He said they can’t have pulled them out.
Sorensen: What?
Marshall: Watkins.
Robert Kennedy: [having heard Marshall’s exchange with the President]
And he said, Watkins says, “They can’t have pulled out of there.” Yeah.
They have, though?
President Kennedy: What’s Watkins say otherwise?
Robert Kennedy: [on the phone] Six what?
Marshall: [to the President] He said it’s dead.
Robert Kennedy: [on the phone] [Unclear.]
Marshall: He just talked to the Governor and the Governor had just
talked to the highway patrol [and] that everything was under control.
Concern rises in the Cabinet Room as news arrives that General Edwin
Walker is in Oxford to rally extremists in defense of a segregated
University of Mississippi. The President and the Attorney General begin
to take more seriously the need to deploy the U.S. Army on campus.
Robert Kennedy: [on the phone] Oh why? There’s going to be a fight
in the infirm[ary] . . . Have the marshals done pretty well?
Marshall: The Bureau says there are people coming in from out of town.
Unidentified: There are, huh?
Marshall: Yeah.
Robert Kennedy: [to the people in the room] General Walker’s been
out downtown getting people stirred up.39
[on the phone] Can we get it arranged to get him arrested?
own protection. When she criticized the decision, she was expelled from the university, a ruling upheld by a federal judge.
37. The Mississippi National Guard stationed at the Lyceum had run out of tear gas and were
waiting for a new supply. It wouldn’t reach them until much later.
38. At this point Katzenbach tells the Attorney General that he doesn’t need any troops.
39. Major General Edwin A. Walker, retired. For additional information on Walker, see
“Conversation with Archibald Cox,” 1 October 1962, note 5.
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President Kennedy: By the FBI.
Robert Kennedy: [on the phone] [Unclear.] Well, let’s see if we can
arrest him. Will you tell the FBI that we need an arrest warrant.
President Kennedy: What’s his crime?
Robert Kennedy: [to the people in the room] He’s been stirring people up.
Sorensen: Incitement.
President Kennedy: Inciting.
Sorensen: Inciting insurrection.
Robert Kennedy: Obstruction of justice.
President Kennedy: [Grunts.] Would the FBI have trouble arresting
him on . . .
Robert Kennedy: [on the phone] Yeah.
President Kennedy: How many agents do you have down there? I
think you ought to get those MPs into there and over near the airport. I
don’t see what you’ve got to lose, if they’re at the airport. You can always
send them back.
Robert Kennedy: [on the phone] Yeah. OK. All right. I’ll do that. Now,
will you clear it with Nick? He said we didn’t need them a minute ago.
O’Brien: As far as [unclear].
Unidentified: [Unclear] is no longer . . .
O’Brien: . . . it depends on which is, you know, but I think that the
thing is, you have less risk [unclear] they do and bring ’em in.
Robert Kennedy: [on the phone] Yeah. All right. Oh, can somebody
sit on this? That’s it. [Hangs up the phone.]
[to the people in the room] He said that if they get the gas, they don’t
have a problem. 40
President Kennedy: When do they think they are going to get it?
Robert Kennedy: Well, they think a couple of minutes, at least.41
Unidentified: Somebody’s injured? [Unclear.]
President Kennedy: Who got hurt?
Robert Kennedy: They’re going to have . . .
Unidentified: No way, I tell you.
Marshall: [on the phone] [Unclear] terrible [unclear].
President Kennedy: Imagine them coming in there with gas masks
and beginning again.
Unidentified: Yeah.
President Kennedy: That’s what happens to all of these wonderful
operations. War.
40. Referring to Katzenbach.
41. A new supply of tear gas was about ten minutes away.
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O’Brien: They haven’t [unclear] some of the gas in those gas masks
so they all be [sound of sniffling].
Unidentified: And the next group. [Laughter.]
Unidentified: Well do you have . . .
President Kennedy: General Walker. Imagine that son of a bitch having been commander of a division up till last year. And the Army promoting him.
Unidentified: You’re right.
Unidentified: Yes.
Sorensen: Have you read Seven Days in May? 42
President Kennedy: Yeah.
Unidentified: Damned good book.
President Kennedy: I thought that . . .
Sorensen: It’s pretty interesting.
Unidentified: Yeah.
Sorensen: I read it straight through. It’s interesting.
Unidentified: I didn’t really like it.
O’Brien: Unrealistic? [Laughter.]
Sorensen: And you thought it was too far-fetched, then?
President Kennedy: No, I thought this [had a] sort of awful amateur’s
dialogue.
Unidentified: Yeah, it was a [unclear].
Unidentified: No, it’s not great writing, but I mean—
President Kennedy: It’s not even good. . . . The only character that
came out at all was the general. The president was awfully vague. But I
thought the general was a pretty good character. [Extended pause.]
Robert Kennedy: . . . well, then General Walker starts bringing those
fellows, you know . . .
President Kennedy: What?
Robert Kennedy: If General Walker starts bringing in fellows from
[unclear] and that—
Marshall: There are rumors all over the place.
President Kennedy: He’s bringing in what?
Robert Kennedy: He’s getting them all stirred up. If he has them
march down there with guns, we could have a hell of a battle.
Unidentified: Thugs.
Sorensen: Did the FBI say Walker’s there [unclear]?
42. Popular novel of 1962, written by Fletcher Knebel, about a military plot to overthrow the
U.S. government.
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Robert Kennedy: No. No. Walker’s baiting them.
Marshall: [on the phone] John?43
Robert Kennedy: They need to keep an eye on him.
Marshall: [on the phone] Is that football coach doing any good?
Lincoln: Tom Watkins is calling you.
Robert Kennedy: Why don’t you get it?
Two simultaneous phone conversations proceed.
Marshall: [on the phone] Oh, just a minute, I’m going to go and talk
to this fellow, Watkins.
Robert Kennedy: [on the phone] Hello? Oh yeah. How’s it going?
Marshall: [on a different phone] Hello? Yes? [Unclear.]
Unidentified: . . . which isn’t based on just anything. We certainly do
want it to go as far as ever. We’ll just about [unclear] work hard [unclear].
Robert Kennedy: [on the phone] Well, I get the picture. What about
getting the . . . Is Nick there? Would you ask him what the story is with
the gas?44
Unidentified: [possibly on the phone] What route is it going to be?
Sorensen: We talk about [unclear].
Robert Kennedy: [on the phone] You just, yeah . . .
Sorensen: [Unclear] be a shame to [unclear].
Unidentified: [in the background] John, do you want some milk?
Robert Kennedy: [on the phone] Yeah, well, I think they got a report
from them five minutes ago. [Unclear.] John said he’s stirring people up.
It’s a long way from Wisconsin. Yeah, I know.
Oh, Nick? Oh, what’s the story? Well, I think I’m . . . Won’t you be able
to get it? How far away is it? Can these students see that? Is it covered all
right? How much more . . . You’d guess about how much longer? Yeah. OK.
[to Marshall] How was Watkins?
Marshall: He says [unclear] can’t send anything, can’t do anything.
President Kennedy: What are they saying? He’s there now?
Robert Kennedy: They’re saying . . .
President Kennedy: Where are they? Up around the third floor?
Where are they? Are they in the administration building with Meredith?
Robert Kennedy: No. Meredith is in another building.45
President Kennedy: Nobody knows where he is?
43. Probably John Doar, on the staff of the Civil Rights Division, Department of Justice.
44. The car bringing tear gas from the airport got lost on its way from the airport.
45. Meredith was in a dorm room in Baxter Hall. Evidently the President was unfamiliar with
the geography of the campus or the plan to protect Meredith.
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Sorensen: How many are guarding the administration building?
Robert Kennedy: He’s got forty or fifty marshals. The gas is a quarter of a mile.
President Kennedy: But they can’t get it through the . . .
Robert Kennedy: Well they just . . . Yeah. You know.
Marshall: They’re not guarding anything there.
Sorensen: Then why don’t . . .
Marshall: . . . the students.
Sorensen: . . . why don’t they just let . . . The marshals just left?
Marshall: What do you mean?
Sorensen: [Unclear] spend the night . . .
Unidentified: Where are the marshals?
President Kennedy: Why don’t they go inside the building? I think
they would. I haven’t had such an interesting time since the Bay of Pigs.
[Chuckling.]
Unidentified: Cuba [unclear]?
Robert Kennedy: Since the day what?
President Kennedy: Bay of Pigs.
Unidentified: Does Tom Watkins sound like he’s—
Robert Kennedy: The Attorney General announced today, he’s joining Allen Dulles at Princeton University. 46 [Laughter.]
Marshall: He sounds . . .
Unidentified: You might take up this [unclear].
Marshall: So he is. He’s a very reliable fellow.
President Kennedy: What?
Marshall: He’s been a very reliable fellow. But he sounds—every
time . . . every time there’s a suggestion that that conversation would get
out, he sounds concerned.
Robert Kennedy: [on the phone] Hello? No, I’m just wondering if you
heard. No.
Unidentified: Do you want to hold that?
Marshall: Yeah.
Robert Kennedy: [on the phone] When they say he’s sending more
gas, we’ll know we’re in.
Marshall: Sending what?
Robert Kennedy: More gas.
Marshall: [on the phone] Oh, I’m just holding it. Who?
46. Dulles was the retired director of Central Intelligence.
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Unidentified: [Unclear] is loose as a goose. [Laughter.]
Marshall: [on the phone] That’s all right. This is Burke Marshall. A
what? A priest. Oh.
O’Brien: That’s the best shot they could take. That’ll [unclear] in
Mississippi.
Unidentified: Tell him to get that collar on quick.
Marshall: [on the phone] Do you know if the football coach has talked
to the students?
O’Brien: More appropriately [unclear] if his sweatshirt’s on.
President Kennedy: Yeah. [Unclear] He may be down there [unclear].
Unidentified: He’s coming.
Unidentified: Well the football coach would make a, get him, pretty
good [unclear]. [Laughter.]
Unidentified: Is that it?
Unidentified: It’s got to be better [unclear].
Unidentified: [Unclear.]
Unidentified: Training.
Marshall: Where was that company?47
Robert Kennedy: Right there. It’s just forming up.
Marshall: Oh, it’s just forming?
Robert Kennedy: The only question is, you want them there now?
That’s up to Nick.
Marshall: Yeah.
Robert Kennedy: All you’re going to have up to assist is 150 –200
fellows.
Marshall: Yes, it’s all there.48
Robert Kennedy: I think it’s all there. It’s within the hour, and that
was fifty minutes ago. I am [unclear].
President Kennedy: Yeah, I think we ought to, I wouldn’t hesitate to
put them there. I don’t think that’s where we’re going to have the difficulty. Not way beyond it. The problem is looking as if we’re not doing
enough rather than too much right now.
Marshall: Yeah.
President Kennedy: Good.
O’Brien: Oh, I agree.
President Kennedy: Better get them over there.
47. This is apparently a reference to a local unit of the federalized Mississippi National Guard.
48. This advance contingent was still three hours away from Oxford.
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Marshall: I wonder if we shouldn’t just put them over there?
Robert Kennedy: Yeah, but if it’s forming up and we can’t put—
Marshall: Because it might discourage some of these people from . . .
Robert Kennedy: Throwing?
Marshall: Yeah.
Robert Kennedy: That’s why, he’s in a . . . They’re just guessing.
[Pause.]
Robert Kennedy: If they get the gas, it’s not really a—
President Kennedy: Problem?
Robert Kennedy: . . . problem because they’re going to get the . . .
Marshall: Unless the Bureau . . . See the Bureau says that their people are moving in.
Unidentified: From outside?
Marshall: Yeah. And they might be armed.
President Kennedy: You see, once some one fellow starts firing,
everybody starts firing. That’s what concerns me.49
Marshall: Yeah.
President Kennedy: If one person fires . . .
O’Brien: How are they getting in?
Marshall: What?
O’Brien: How are these people coming into the campus?
Marshall: How?
O’Brien: Yeah. Why don’t they have the, I thought . . .
Marshall: Well, you see . . .
O’Brien: . . . they had the entrances wired off.
Marshall: . . . that would be state police.
O’Brien: The state police which means that the city’s gone back.
Marshall: [on the phone] Yeah? Well, that’s good. All right. Well,
that’s good.50
President Kennedy: What’s that?
Marshall: [to the President] They got the gas. They just got a gas truck.
Lincoln: Geoghegan for you.51
Marshall: [on the phone] Hello? [Unclear.]
President Kennedy: They got a gas truck.
49. Robert Kennedy seems to be supporting his team’s view that once the tear gas arrives, the
marshals under Katzenbach’s command can stabilize the situation.
50. At 11:44 P.M. this news was reported to Ramsey Clark, assistant attorney general, Lands
Division, who was overseeing the war room at the Justice Department during this crisis.
51. William Geoghegan, assistant deputy attorney general, legislative program, Department of
Justice. He was manning the command center at the Justice Department with Ramsey Clark.
Meeting on Civil Rights
277
Marshall: Yeah. Well, just hang on; I’ve got to go to another phone
for a minute.
Unidentified: I’ll hold this one.
Robert Kennedy: [on the phone] All right, can we get the answer to
that?
Unidentified: Which?
Marshall: [Unclear.]
Unidentified: Or I can . . .
Evelyn Lincoln: [Unclear.]
President Kennedy: Do you have a switchboard? How do you handle
that?
Robert Kennedy: Yeah. I’m going to get direct lines in . . .
President Kennedy: From that building?
Robert Kennedy: Well, not this. We just kept an open line. But our
various installations around there, we have direct line that we put in last
week.52
[on the phone] Hello. Is Nick there? Let me speak to him, please.
[on the phone with Katzenbach] Yeah. Oh, you’re all set? Do you? I
think we should move that army up anyway, don’t you?53 Well, yeah. Up
to you? Yeah. I don’t want to make it appear that we didn’t do enough.
Let me ask Ed what he thinks, being there and talking. All right.
[to the people in the room] But he doesn’t think but, of course, the
problem is that they can’t . . . If we can get that Walker.
Marshall: That state trooper was seriously hurt.
Robert Kennedy: [on the phone] The kid’s arm?
President Kennedy: That’s too bad. What happened? Did one of
those pellets hit him?
Marshall: Yeah. But we’re flying him to Memphis to the hospital.
President Kennedy: Did he break his back? Did it break his back?
Marshall: I don’t know. But they’re putting him on a border patrol
plane and flying him up to the hospital in Memphis.
Robert Kennedy: [on the phone] Ed, did the coach come?54
[to the people in the room] Well, he said, this is completely under control.
52. This is presumably the direct line between Louis Oberdorfer at the Justice command center in the Oxford Post Office and Ramsey Clark at the Justice Department.
53. Robert Kennedy, who has accepted the President’s suggestion, may still be operating
under the assumption that the advance contingent from Memphis had already reached the
armory in Oxford, a short distance from the campus. In fact, this group was still in Tennessee.
54. Apparently Guthman spoke to John Vaught, the Ole Miss coach, who assured him that
there was only a small group of troublemakers.
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President Kennedy: What does he say about the students, what they
want?
Robert Kennedy: Ed just said that, they say that because it’s a relatively—compared to what a big campus it is, and there are so many students—it’s a relatively . . .
President Kennedy: Small group?
Robert Kennedy: . . . small number. Because, you know . . .
President Kennedy: Too bad that fellow getting hurt.
Unidentified: [Unclear] pitchfork.
Unidentified: Just . . .
Unidentified: [Unclear.]
President Kennedy: Mrs. Lincoln?
Lincoln: Yes.
President Kennedy: Do you want us to put on the TV? Listen
[unclear]. Ask him to send it over some [unclear].
Robert Kennedy: [on the phone] Oh, yeah.
Unidentified: [Unclear.]
Robert Kennedy: [on the phone] Well, do you think that they’re going
to move in there with some guns, though, from out of town?
Unidentified: [Unclear.]
Unidentified: Uh-huh.
Unidentified: Now here’s how you get errors [unclear].
Robert Kennedy: [on the phone] How do the marshals feel? Is that
where the . . . OK? Did they do anything about that?
Unidentified: It’s still [unclear].
Robert Kennedy: [on the phone] So that’s all right?
Unidentified: [Unclear] soldiers.
Robert Kennedy: [on the phone] I mean if anything . . . Is there anything you can do to send, you can’t send anybody in and arrest that
Walker, can we?55
Sorensen: She started a [unclear].
Robert Kennedy: [on the phone] Suicide.
Sorensen: I wouldn’t hesitate to [unclear].
Robert Kennedy: [on the phone] Are these kids breaking up at all?
Sorensen: [Unclear] haven’t used the [unclear] since I was a kid.
Robert Kennedy: [on the phone] Can’t arrest any of them? Well, I
don’t know whether it would break it up or what.
55. About a half hour earlier (11:32 P.M.), Clark at Justice had instructed the FBI to arrest
General Walker, if possible.
Meeting on Civil Rights
279
Marshall: My guess is it won’t matter.
Robert Kennedy: [on the phone] Would not. But you think the situation’s under control? How long will this ammunition last? Yeah, about that.
But better plan for two hours. All right. Well, Nick, I think we just . . . we
should . . . it’s got to be up to you, being on the scene, as to whether you
need these fellows, but I think it’s gone beyond the stage that . . . What’s
Millington?56 Well, they’re going to form in the armory there. Isn’t that
pretty close? Well, why don’t they go over to the armory? Are you in touch
with them, Nick?57 Well, I can’t send them right away. Well, did he get it up
there? [Pause.] Well, they can’t hurt you, though, can they?
Marshall: Did the guard unit seal off the campus?
Robert Kennedy: [on the phone] Yeah, but they keep telling me that
you’re in touch with the military, and that this . . . So are you in touch
with them? Well, I mean, have they told you how many they’re coming
and . . . Well, can you ask them what the hell they’re doing?58 And will
you let me know? Right. [Pause.] Hello?
[to the people in the room] Oh, I’m just trying to get the operator.
[on the phone] Oh, would you hold? [He puts the phone down.]
Marshall: Wouldn’t that be just the thing for the guard to do?
Robert Kennedy: What?
Marshall: Seal off the campus.
Robert Kennedy: Yeah.
Marshall: And they’ll fight it?
President Kennedy: What’s the problem now?
Robert Kennedy: Well, it’s not a problem. It’s the same problem . . . of
getting the people in there. They think that they have it under control.
President Kennedy: Are you questioning whether to bring the
guard in?
Robert Kennedy: No, I’m just questioning . . . I’m just trying to figure the fact that they don’t know when they are going to get there, and
all the rest of it. That is what I’ve been thinking about. And when you’re
dealing with, sort of, unknowns . . .
[on the phone] Hello?
Marshall: He can’t communicate with the guard?
56. Millington, Tennessee, site of the Memphis Naval Air Station.
57. The Attorney General wants to know whether Katzenbach had spoken with Lieutenant
Colonel John Flanagan, the chief of Task Force Alpha.
58. Ramsey Clark has apparently told the Attorney General that Katzenbach is fully informed
about the movements of the Memphis force.
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Robert Kennedy: Yeah, he can through my office.59
President Kennedy: Who is Vance in touch with? Memphis?
Robert Kennedy: That’s where the General is.60 And he’s going to
get on this plane and come down?
Marshall: Who’s the general? Is it General Abrams?
Robert Kennedy: Billingslea.
Marshall: Billingslea.
Robert Kennedy: Have you seen him?
Sorensen: Is he a National Guard general? Or . . .
Robert Kennedy: I think regular.
Sorensen: Huh?
Marshall: [Unclear.]
President Kennedy: Regular.
Sorensen: Brought down in the National Guard under his [unclear].
Robert Kennedy: Yeah, he’s the theater commander. [Pause.]
President Kennedy: This is what they must do every night in
Teheran and these places.
Unidentified: That’s a hell of a job, don’t you think?
President Kennedy: [Unclear.]
Unidentified: Taking care of mobs and so forth. [Unclear.]
President Kennedy: [Unclear] beginnings.
Robert Kennedy: Yeah, because we say you don’t have to use too
much force.
President Kennedy: The margin of force is . . .
Lincoln: [Unclear.]
President Kennedy: Yeah.
Marshall: [on the phone] Hello? Hello?
Lincoln: Ramsey Clark calling in. 61
President Kennedy: Who?
Robert Kennedy: Ramsey Clark.
President Kennedy: Where is Nick? And where’s his command center? Is it right in the administration building?
Robert Kennedy: Yeah.
President Kennedy: He can see all that’s going on?
59. Only Robert Kennedy’s aide at Justice, Ramsey Clark, is able to communicate with the U.S.
Army or the National Guard. Katzenbach or Oberdorfer can only reach them through
Washington.
60. Referring to General Billingslea.
61. Clark was overseeing the war room at the Justice Department during this crisis.
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Robert Kennedy: Yeah. And then, Jim McShane’s head of the marshals. And, Joe Dolan . . .62
President Kennedy: What’s Joe doing there?
Marshall: He’s sort of . . .
Robert Kennedy: Lou Oberdorfer.63
Unidentified: [Unclear.]
President Kennedy: McShane enjoy this?
Robert Kennedy: No, but I think they all like him.
President Kennedy: He’s pretty tough.
Robert Kennedy: He knows what he’s doing. I don’t think anybody’s
going to push him around much. Let’s see, we’ve got some other good
ones that they have. And then we’ve got three . . . We’ve got also about
150—
Marshall: Bob, are you sure Nick’s in touch with the guard? He just
told Ramsey that he wasn’t and that he’d like to know when they’re on
their way.64
Robert Kennedy: Yeah, well, that’s what I gave . . . He said the only
way through is through the office. Of course, Cy keeps saying that
they’re talking to one another. Let’s get Cy. You want to get Cy Vance
for me?
Marshall: [in the background, on the phone] Hello, Ramsey? [Unclear.]
You’re not in touch with . . .
Unidentified: Sure is a great day.
President Kennedy: What?
Unidentified: It’s been a great day.
O’Brien: Well, in substance, they’re defending this administration building and keeping students out of that one building where these students—
Robert Kennedy: Yeah; then they have a student that’s—
O’Brien: Yeah.
Robert Kennedy: —named Meredith in another building.
O’Brien: Yeah. They don’t know where [unclear], do they?
Robert Kennedy: Yeah, I suppose they do. I don’t know if they know.
Marshall: Right.
Robert Kennedy: And they’ve got 35, 40 marshals there. Actually,
62. Joseph P. Dolan was assistant deputy attorney general in the Justice Department.
63. Louis F. Oberdorfer was assistant attorney general in the Tax Division of the Justice
Department. He is running the command center in the Oxford Post Office.
64. Nick Katzenbach told Ramsey Clark at 12:05 A.M. (10:05 P.M. Mississippi time) that the situation had reached a point where he needed reinforcements. He wondered when the local
National Guard unit would arrive.
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out of the 500 that we have, about 330 or so are border patrolmen—the
Immigration and Naturalization Service and about 150 marshals.
O’Brien: They’re a little tougher, aren’t they?
Robert Kennedy: Yeah. The border patrol . . . But they haven’t been
through this, when we sent our marshals through a long special training. They haven’t been through that, but they’re very well disciplined.
They were the best [unclear].
Unidentified: Were they?
Marshall: That’s an impossible situation. No one’s in touch with the
guard unit, as far as I can see.
President Kennedy: Is it from Cy?
Lincoln: Secretary Vance.
President Kennedy: Yeah. [Pause.]
O’Brien: Maybe it’s by design. The guard unit is in touch with no one.
O’Donnell: [Unclear] to call the Attorney General’s office to call
them back to Memphis.
Marshall: Well, they have to call the Attorney General’s office to get
the Attorney General’s office to call the Secretary of the Army. The
Secretary of the Army to call to Memphis, and then back to the
Secretary of the Army to . . .
O’Donnell: They’re not really in Memphis but they’re supposedly
there on the road now. Aren’t they?
Marshall: They’re forming at the armory.
O’Donnell: They formed this afternoon. I saw them form on television.65
Marshall: But they’re forming . . .
Sorensen: Again.
Marshall: —again at the armory in Oxford. You see, it’s a local unit.
O’Brien: Well, where were they forming when you saw them?
Sorensen: That’s what I’m talking about, that’s . . .
Marshall: But that’s that company.66
Sorensen: That’s just the Oxford units, you mean?
Marshall: Yeah.
Unidentified: Well, who are the [unclear]?
65. There is confusion in the room between Task Force Alpha and the local Mississippi
National Guard’s units shown getting prepared on television that afternoon.
66. Again, as stated in note 65, there appears to be some confusion among the men as to
whether they are discussing the movements of Task Force Alpha from Memphis or another
local Mississippi National Guard unit in the Oxford area.
Meeting on Civil Rights
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Sorensen: Well, we [unclear] students. Huh?
Unidentified: Who were the [unclear]?
O’Donnell: You ought to include the student members.
Marshall: Yeah.
O’Donnell: Well, how about the ones that formed in Jackson this
afternoon?
Unidentified: Oh, but they . . .
Marshall: See, Jackson is 180 miles away.
O’Donnell: But aren’t they supposed to be on their way now?
Marshall: Yes. Uh. huh. Four hours away means about three.
O’Donnell: Then there’s a couple of thousand on their way, aren’t
they?
Sorensen: [Unclear.]
Marshall: Fifteen hundred. Twenty-five.
O’Donnell: The question is who’s in touch with their commander
[unclear] will carry out.
Marshall: Well, the one they would want to get in touch with right
now are the ones that . . . There’s a company in Oxford.
Sorensen: That are right there in the armory.
Marshall: Yeah.
Sorensen: The ones that are right there.
Marshall: Well, a company could do a lot of good.
Sorensen: Maybe there’s a phone in the armory.
Marshall: [on the phone] Hello? If they what? [Laughter in background.]
Sorensen: [Unclear.]
Lincoln: Ramsey [unclear].
O’Donnell: [Unclear.]
Unidentified: Yeah.
Marshall: Well, after dark. [Unclear.]
Unidentified: The hours are [unclear]. They’ll probably charge the
telephone. [Unclear.]
O’Brien: I just put that together. I thought it was valid.
Sorensen: It isn’t quite clear yet what our [unclear] administration
building is.
Unidentified: You know, I can’t think what [unclear].
O’Brien: [Unclear] I assume the students think he is there or why
would they keep [unclear]?
Marshall: Well, the marshal stood there.
Unidentified: Let’s say the marshal [unclear].
O’Brien: [Unclear] near a pay phone.
284
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Unidentified: [Unclear] the phones in there. [Laughter.]
Unidentified: Phones.
Unidentified: I think maybe you’re right. That’s what it is.
Marshall: [Unclear.]
Unidentified: [Unclear] tough when you’re fighting the bastards.
Unidentified: Is there any fight with [unclear]?
O’Brien: They got a very good [unclear].
O’Donnell: Yeah. Well, if the [unclear] injured, they . . . Then you
could get their [unclear] to [unclear] the students.
Unidentified: I can’t help, my impression was that the National
Guard unit was on its way to Oxford from their outlying [unclear].
Sorensen: Well some are, apparently, four hours away, but the one at
Oxford is being called to the armory in Oxford.67
O’Brien: By whom?
Unidentified: Cy. [Laughter.]
Unidentified: What’s the problem?
Unidentified: Well, it’s a rather vague one, I think. I don’t think I
could normally get in touch with them, the National Guard.
Sorensen: A bicycle could go to the armory faster.
Unidentified: Somebody ought to go down there.
Unidentified: Well, the general will be [unclear].
Unidentified: [Unclear.]
Unidentified: Yeah, [unclear] starting to fire . . .
President Kennedy: Want to call the Governor on that?
Sorensen: Unless they get rid of the . . .
Unidentified: [Unclear] fire marshals.
President Kennedy: [Unclear] marshals.
President Kennedy: Did you talk to Barnett?
Marshall: [Unclear.]
Unidentified: Students riot?
Robert Kennedy: Well, I don’t [unclear] Walker’s crowd.
Sorensen: He’s arrived on campus? [Unclear] changes from outsiders.
Robert Kennedy: What?
Sorensen: I think there’s really a good justification for [unclear]
students.
President Kennedy: Well, [unclear] I would not . . .
Robert Kennedy: Not now.
67. Evidently, because of the delay in getting Task Force Alpha down, the Secretary of the
Army has located some National Guard reinforcements closer to the campus.
Meeting on Civil Rights
285
President Kennedy: The only way that [unclear].
Marshall: [on the phone] Hello? Yeah.
President Kennedy: They can keep their options open because [unclear]
the MPs have left yet.
Marshall: [on the phone] They need the Guard [unclear].
O’Brien: [Unclear.] Walker’s intent.
Unidentified: Huh?
O’Brien: General Walker’s plan.
Unidentified: [Unclear] Walker’s military career?
Sorensen: I hear it was pretty good.
Unidentified: It used to be in somebody . . .
Sorensen: [Unclear] beachhead.
Unidentified: We should . . .
O’Donnell: Better get Cy Vance. The General [unclear] he used to
shove messages over to the Germans [about] what area they were going
into. He would himself lead a company of guys no matter, and slit the
throats coming back on the way out. I tried to [unclear] they always had
a message that they were coming.
Unidentified: [Unclear.]
Unidentified: I asked Lemnitzer, one day, I said, gee, I just couldn’t
believe that any guy . . . That I saw him on television, I couldn’t believe
that such a stupid . . . could become a general because [unclear].68
O’Brien: [Unclear.]
Unidentified: You have exams or anything like that?
Unidentified: [Unclear] demonstrate conduct so . . .
Unidentified: Yeah.
Sorensen: According to [unclear]. In [unclear] and approach you on
question [unclear].
Unidentified: Yeah.
O’Brien: I saw them.
Unidentified: Yeah.
Unidentified: [Unclear.] The President could take [unclear].
Unidentified: [Unclear.] We’ll do it in the House.
Unidentified: Why, I hear those guys won’t mind their trucks.
They’re watching too much television. He saw the [unclear].
Unidentified: He thought they needed mobilizing. See all of them,
they all had to go down and organize that, plus TV. They watch themselves on TV.
68. General Lyman Lemnitzer was Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.
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Unidentified: Would they like to be sworn in the federal service?
[Laughter.]
Unidentified: No.
Sorensen: I guess that’s the most we get now.
President Kennedy: [Unclear] to Cy Vance right here. [Unclear.]
Unidentified: Where is he?
Unidentified: Vance is [unclear].
Unidentified: Say listen, we’re contributing a lot to this.
Unidentified: Yeah.
O’Brien: Makes it kind of fascinating. It’s getting like an election
night or something. That door opens, I went for the next bulletin.
Unidentified: Bob asked me to stay and sleep good and then watch
the . . .
President Kennedy: Now look, you ought to do [unclear], as soon as
Vance calls us back.
Robert Kennedy: [on the phone] Hello? Hello?
Unidentified: [Unclear.]
Unidentified: He’s been shot.69
Robert Kennedy: [on the phone] Oh, can you get them back?
Unidentified: Walker isn’t . . .
Robert Kennedy: [on the phone] Oh, hello. Is Nick there?
Marshall: [Whispers.] [Unclear.]
Unidentified: [Unclear.]
Robert Kennedy: [to someone in the room] [Unclear.] The thing is
[unclear] about the military . . . He can’t tell me, can’t tell you anything.
Unidentified: Is there any word from Cy or [unclear]?
President Kennedy: I suppose he could get in the [unclear]. The
problem really is from there to here, not from . . .
Robert Kennedy: [on the phone] Oh, Ed? Yeah, what’s bad again?
[Pause.] What can you do, though, you see those guards can’t get in
there for awhile.
[to the people in the room] An AP man got shot.70
[on the phone] Well, I can’t find out from the military. [Pause.] He
says what? Where does he get that word from? How does Ramsey Clark
know in 15 minutes, do you know?
69. Marshal Graham E. Same of Indianapolis was shot in the neck and in critical condition.
“How a Secret Deal Prevented a Massacre at Ole Miss,” Look, 31 December 1962.
70. William Crider of the Associated Press.
Meeting on Civil Rights
287
Marshall: What’s that [unclear]?
Robert Kennedy: [on the phone] Well, how long can you hold there?
[Sound of door opening.]
Unidentified: [Unclear.]
Lincoln: Ramsey Clark.
Marshall: [on the phone in the distant background] Hello? Yeah.
Robert Kennedy: [on the phone] Yeah.
[putting down the phone and speaking to the people in the room] They’re
storming where Meredith is.71
President Kennedy: Oh. The students are or the . . .
Robert Kennedy: [Unclear.] They’re storming where Meredith is.
Marshall: [in the background] They’re outside. [Unclear.] Yes. Yes.
President Kennedy: Well, are the other marshals going?
Robert Kennedy: [on the phone] Hey, Nick?
President Kennedy: [Unclear] necessary . . . You better try to stick
them, all the marshals in. . . . I suppose get in the cars. . . . I don’t see
how they can . . . They may not be able to move him out, I suppose.
Unidentified: Because they’re in . . .
Robert Kennedy: [on the phone] Well, you better move them all out
and see if we can’t get them. You go ahead and do it. All right. [Puts the
receiver down.]
Marshall: Bob, do we have any word on the MPs?72
Robert Kennedy: Yeah, they’re on their way. You want to get Nick?
President Kennedy: What?
Robert Kennedy: You want to get Nick?
President Kennedy: All right.
Telephone rings.
Lincoln: Hello?
Unidentified: Hello, [unclear].
O’Donnell: You don’t want to have a lynching.
O’Brien: Yeah. [Long pause.] Good. [Long pause.]
O’Donnell: [on the phone] Hello? Oh, you want Bob? Yeah. Who is
this? Ken O’Donnell. Yes. Yeah.
Unidentified: [Unclear.]
71. Fortunately, this was only a false rumor. Throughout the riot the lightly guarded Baxter
Hall escaped any serious harassment. There were only 24 marshals guarding Meredith in his
dormitory.
72. Task Force Alpha. It is still in Memphis.
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1, 1962
O’Donnell: [on the phone] Were they after him, or what? Are they
after him now? [Pause.] Yeah. OK. [Replaces the receiver.]
[to Robert Kennedy] Bobby, it was the [unclear] that [unclear] firing.
Sounds of people coming into the room. An indistinct conversation is
overheard where someone says “side arms.”
Robert Kennedy: [on the phone] Hello? Hello? Well, I think they have
to protect Meredith now. Well, that’s what I mean. They better fire, I
suppose. They got to protect Meredith. What? [Pause.] [Unclear] can’t
do anything. Is Meredith all right?
Unidentified: Well, I don’t know. If they can.
Robert Kennedy: [on the phone] They better protect Meredith now.
Well, can you make sure that he’s protected, Dean? [Pause.]
While Robert Kennedy hastened to react to the possibility that Baxter
Hall might be stormed, the President was in the Oval Office trying to
pressure Governor Ross Barnett to help restore order to the campus.
Kennedy was especially concerned that the injured man receive medical
attention. This conversation was taped.
12:14 A.M.
We couldn’t consider moving Meredith if we haven’t been able
to restore order outside. That’s the problem, Governor.
Conversation with Ross Barnett73
Ross Barnett: . . . the Commissioner of the highway patrol to order
every man he’s got.
President Kennedy: Yeah. Well, now, how long’s that going to take?
We don’t want somebody . . .
Barnett: Well, I haven’t been able to locate him.
President Kennedy: You can’t locate . . .
Barnett: He went to the . . . Here’s what happened. He went to the
doctor’s office with this man that was hurt.
73. Dictabelts 4E and 4F, Cassette A, John F. Kennedy Library, President’s Office Files,
Presidential Recordings Collection.
Conversation with Ross Bar nett
289
President Kennedy: Yeah.
Barnett: And I finally located him there after you’d told me to get,
have him to get more people, don’t you see, if . . .
President Kennedy: Yeah.
Barnett: You needed ’em.
President Kennedy: Yeah.
Barnett: And he thought then that fifty he had would be sufficient.
President Kennedy: Yeah.
Barnett: But I told him by all means to order out every one he had if
he needed it.
President Kennedy: Yeah.
Barnett: And I’m certainly trying in every way . . .
President Kennedy: Well, we can’t consider moving Meredith as
long as, you know, there’s a riot outside because he wouldn’t be safe.
Barnett: Sir?
President Kennedy: We couldn’t consider moving Meredith if we
haven’t been able to restore order outside. That’s the problem, Governor.
Barnett: Well, I’ll tell you what I’ll do, Mr. President.
President Kennedy: Yeah.
Barnett: I’ll go up there myself . . .
President Kennedy: Well, now, how long will it take you to get there?
Barnett: . . . and I’ll get a microphone and tell them that you have
agreed to re—, to, for ’em to be removed . . .
President Kennedy: No. No. Now, wait a minute. How long . . .
Barnett: [Unclear.]
President Kennedy: Wait a minute, Governor.
Barnett: Yes?
President Kennedy: Now, how long is it going to take you to get up
there?
Barnett: About an hour.
President Kennedy: Now, I’ll tell you what, if you want to go up
there and then you call me from up there. Then we’ll decide what we’re
going to do before you make any speeches about it.
Barnett: Well, all right. Well . . .
President Kennedy: No sense in . . .
Barnett: . . . I mean, whatever you, if you’d authorize . . .
President Kennedy: You see, if we don’t, we got an hour to go, and
we may not have an hour.
Barnett: This, this man . . .
President Kennedy: It won’t take you an hour to get up there.
Barnett: . . . this man has just died.
290
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1, 1962
President Kennedy: Did he die?
Barnett: Yes.
President Kennedy: Which one? State police?
Barnett: A state policeman.
President Kennedy: Yeah, well, you see, we got to get order up there,
and that’s what we thought we’re going to have.
Barnett: Mr. President, please. Why don’t you, can’t you give an
order up there to remove Meredith?
President Kennedy: How can I remove him, Governor, when there’s
a riot in the street, and he may step out of that building and something
happen to him? I can’t remove him under those conditions. You . . .
Barnett: Uh, but, but . . .
President Kennedy: Let’s get order up there; then we can do something about Meredith.
Barnett: . . . we can surround him with plenty of officials.
President Kennedy: Well, we’ve got to get somebody up there now to
get order and stop the firing and the shooting. Then when you and I will
talk on the phone about Meredith . . .
Barnett: All right.
President Kennedy: . . . but first we got to get order.
Barnett: I’ll, I’ll call and tell them to get every official they can.
President Kennedy: That’s right and then you and I will talk when
they get order there, then you and I will talk about what’s the best thing
to do with Meredith.
Barnett: All right then.
President Kennedy: Well thank you.
Barnett: All right.
President Kennedy hangs up.
Meeting on Civil Rights, Continued
President Kennedy returns to the Cabinet Room to report on his conversation with the Mississippi Governor.
President Kennedy: He wants us to move him again. And I say,
“Well, we can’t move him if the situation’s like this.” And he says, “Well,
we’ll take care of the situation if you move him.”
Robert Kennedy: I can’t get him out. How am I going to get him out?
President Kennedy: That’s what I said to him. Now, the problem is, if
he can get law and order restored, . . . OK, we’ll move him out of there if
he can get order restored.
Meeting on Civil Rights , Continued
291
Unidentified: I don’t see how we can . . .
Long pause. Sounds of doors opening and closing. Evelyn Lincoln can be
indistinctly heard talking in the background.
Robert Kennedy: [on the phone] Now we’d better get this . . . Now,
they might not recognize the kids today. Get him . . . get him up there
and get him out or something. I don’t know what the exit is. Yeah, yeah,
they’re shooting at other . . .
Unidentified:. [Unclear.] He said [unclear] to you immediately.
Robert Kennedy: I’m glad to see that . . . They always make sure of
everything, even if they don’t know what time it is.
[on the phone] Can we be all right? Will they be all right? Have they
gotten into the room? I think we just have to protect him no matter
what it is.
O’Donnell: [Unclear.]
Robert Kennedy: [on the phone] All right. Would you get that, Ed?
See if we can get Barnett to get [the] highway patrol to bring doctors
in. [Door opens.]
Robert Kennedy: [on the phone] Nick? I’ll hold.
O’Brien: Doctor.
Sorensen: From the inside of the arm[ory] or wherever [unclear].
O’Brien: [on the phone] Hello.
President Kennedy: What about removing him if Barnett says that
he can restore law and order?
Robert Kennedy: Well, that’s not what they, they’re firing at the
marshals.
Unidentified: I’d sure as hell put all those bastards in the can.
Unidentified: Yeah. That’s for sure.
O’Brien: [on the phone] Hello. What’s it look like?
O’Donnell: [Edwin] Guthman’s so scared he can’t talk. Helpless
feelings on the other end of that phone. You have to [unclear].
O’Brien: [on the phone] This is Larry O’Brien. [Pause.]
O’Donnell: [in the background] I hate to say it, but I [unclear].
Unidentified: Well, we ought to do that [unclear] to Barnett.
[Indistinct exchange.]
O’Brien: [on the phone] Yes. Yes. Hello? Yes. Hello?
[to the people in the room] Two marshals have been shot.
[on the phone] Yes, we’re on this line down there. We’re on this line.
Well, we’re talking down there. This is Larry O’Brien in the Cabinet
Room. Hello? Yeah. So I understand. Yeah. Yeah. Are you able to move
them out of the administration building to where the boy is?
292
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1, 1962
Marshall: Have they got authority to return, Bobby?
O’Brien: They know it.
Unidentified: [Unclear.]
O’Brien: First. I thought they said [they] haven’t eaten since this
morning. [Unclear.] [Unclear] in the field, probably didn’t spend a lot of
time on the campus.
Evelyn Lincoln: [Heard faintly in the background.]
Unidentified: [Unclear] people [unclear].
Unidentified: [Unclear] one reason was that the people [unclear].
O’Brien: They say they can’t determine just what his next move is.
Let’s see what’s going to happen. He says these students are getting
ready with a flying wedge to hit the dormitory and [face] these guys.
He says, “No, they just have to face us, and somebody’s going to get it.”
Unidentified: Have they not shot back yet? The marshals?
O’Brien: Apparently not. Said some of them were hit with buckshot. But
there are two of them seriously hurt. They really don’t know how badly yet.
The problem . . . One’s bleeding in the throat. [Possible door sound.]
President Kennedy: Well, can I talk to them directly and on . . .
Robert Kennedy: Do you want to get Nick for me?
O’Brien: [on the phone] Hello? Is Nick there? All right.
Robert Kennedy: The problem is, if we move him, they’re liable to
[unclear].
Sorensen: About two hours.
President Kennedy: What about the Guard?
Robert Kennedy: Well, can’t the 82nd [unclear].
Unidentified: How long before they get any more guards?
Robert Kennedy: He told me he’d have several bunches in an hour.
President Kennedy: An hour from now?
Robert Kennedy: And in a pinch they’d have about [unclear interjection]. They took two hours.
Marshall: And they [unclear]. [Continues speaking faintly in the background.]
Unidentified: [Unclear.]
O’Brien: [on the phone] Yeah? Nick? Hold on, here’s Bobby.
Robert Kennedy: [on the phone] Hey, Nick? Oh, I just got, Ramsey
just asked me for . . . if they had permission to fire back. Do you have to
do that? Well, can’t they just retreat into that building? [Pause.] Is he
safe over the other place? Oh, I think that they can fire to save him. But
now, can you hold out for an hour there? [Pause.] Can you hold out if you
have gas? Is there much firing? Is there any way you could figure a way
to scare them off ? [Pause.] I’m sorry for that. I think that if we start a
Meeting on Civil Rights , Continued
293
battle with . . . Up in the air? Except then it might really start them. . . .
Once you start firing, they can forget this . . . Will that help? OK. OK.
[Puts down the receiver.]
President Kennedy: [on the phone] Will you hold?
[to the people in the room] Do you think they can hold for an hour?
Robert Kennedy: If they have gas.
President Kennedy: And do they?74
Robert Kennedy: I think it really depends on how much firing.
[Phone rings in the background.]
Unidentified: Pardon.
Lincoln: [answering phone] Hello? Hello?
Unidentified: How much firing?
Robert Kennedy: The guards have arrived since you . . .
Lincoln: [on the phone] This is Evelyn Lincoln. [calls out] Cy—
Robert Kennedy: Cy Vance. . . . The President can take it.
O’Brien: [on the phone] Hello. [Long pause.] Hello.
[to the people in the room] Pretty damn hard once firing takes place, to
shut it off.
Unidentified: Yeah, I know.
Operator: Hello?
O’Brien: [on the phone] Hello.
Operator: Yes, do you want a line?
O’Brien: [on the phone] Just leave it open. Hello. Yeah. Yeah. Yeah.
Well, we’ll leave this line open. All right. Right. [Puts the receiver down.]
[to the people in the room] Well, they can’t even get the injured guy to
the college dispensary. They’re trying to get a wedge to get him through.
O’Donnell: Trying to get him through the crowd? [Long pause.]
Sounds of a door opening and closing can be heard as Robert Kennedy
returns to the room, probably after a conversation with Cyrus Vance, the
secretary of the Army.
Robert Kennedy: Damn Army! They can’t even tell if [unclear] the
MPs have left [yet].75
The Attorney General now realizes that he hasn’t any federal reinforcements in town. And Vance at the Pentagon cannot even tell him when
the advance contingent of Task Force Alpha will arrive at the Oxford
armory.
74. No. The embattled federal forces at the Lyceum are still without tear gas.
75. It is about 12:17 A.M., over ninety minutes since the Attorney General ordered the movement of the troops from Memphis.
294
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O’Brien: [on the phone] Hello?
O’Donnell: Whether they’ve left yet?
Robert Kennedy: Won’t even attempt to tell us.
O’Brien: [on the phone] Hello? Yeah. All right.
Sorensen: You mean they’re not in contact with anyone . . .
Robert Kennedy: Well, who knows what the reason is? Cy Vance
doesn’t know yet. [Pause.]
[Robert Kennedy leaves the room again.]
Lincoln: [Unclear.]
Pause. Sound of door opening. It appears that a midnight snack is being
served.
Unidentified: Cheese on this?
Unidentified: Yes.
O’Brien: [on the phone] Hello?
Unidentified: [referring to the snack] And a roll.
O’Brien: [on the phone] Nothing, huh? Right.
Unclear voice in the background.
O’Brien: [on the phone] Huh? Yes.
O’Donnell: [Unclear.]
O’Brien: Well, where were they?
O’Donnell: [Unclear.] Out of the way. [Unclear.] I’ll be a son of a
bitch if the President of the United States calls up and says, “Get your
ass down there.” Yeah, I would think they’d be on that fucking plane in
about five minutes.
Unidentified: They sort of roped them in.
O’Brien: So, where they are afraid the problem is the . . . now this flying wedge of students that’s going to tackle the dormitory.76 Half these
guys, you know, they’ve about had it.
O’Donnell: But what’s the point of it . . . these guys . . . burning and
looting. I suppose they are going to kill us when they get here.
O’Brien: Yeah.
O’Donnell: You start firing at a bunch of students?
O’Brien: They’re afraid it’s going to happen.
O’Donnell: Uh?
O’Brien: That’s what they’re afraid is going to happen.77 . . . marshal
76. Baxter Hall, where Meredith is located.
77. Tape 26 ends. There appears to have been some conversation lost before the Secret Service
replaced the tape reel. Tape 26A begins, John F. Kennedy Library, President’s Office Files,
Presidential Recordings Collection.
Meeting on Civil Rights , Continued
295
seriously hurt; the others, some others got buckshot. Well, this must have
been done under the premise that something’s going to happen [unclear].
[on the phone] Hello?
Pause. An indistinct conversation can be heard in the background.
O’Brien: [puts down the receiver] If necessary, is there any way that
we could get an ambulance?
Sorensen: The police ought to be able to get an ambulance to the
[unclear].
Unidentified: The Governor said, “Make sure and take that boy out
of there, and everything will be all right.”
O’Brien: That’s the main thing.
Unidentified: I’d take him out. By tomorrow, with those 5,000 bayonets.
Unidentified: Certain that there be no repercussions whether you
choose to bring troops in or not.
Unidentified: No. No. I agree.
Unidentified: [Unclear.]
O’Brien: . . . write this thing off now. Obviously, the townies [unclear].
Robert Kennedy: They had in mind. [Doors open.]
Sorensen: One that was hit by the gas?
Unidentified: Yeah. [Unclear.] [Unclear exchange.]
Robert Kennedy: Well, we can’t last that long. [Doors close.]
O’Brien: [talking on the phone] Hello. Yeah. Hmm. Don’t worry. Oh
yeah.
Robert Kennedy: The son of a bitch. He knows [unclear]. [Door opens
and closes.]
President Kennedy: What? Yeah.
Robert Kennedy: [Unclear.] It’s not about the policemen. It’s about
other people being shot. If you get Barnett to get Meredith off the
campus . . .
President Kennedy: What?
Robert Kennedy: Just to get Meredith off the campus. That’s what he
wants.
Unidentified: Well he can [unclear]. [Sound of water being poured.]
Robert Kennedy: That’s what he said.
President Kennedy: Well, he wants to be able to say that he asked me
to get him off. And that I refused.
Robert Kennedy: Now, he’s too . . .
President Kennedy: You’ve got to get law and order and then you
can discuss what to do about Meredith. But he can’t do anything. He
doesn’t even get ahold of the head of the state police.
296
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1, 1962
Robert Kennedy: What do they say?
O’Brien: They don’t know. Nothing at the moment.
Robert Kennedy: We’ll have to stick it to that Walker.78 [Door opens
and closes.]
Sorensen: Can’t you get him arrested?
Robert Kennedy: Well, I can’t do it now.
Sorensen: Why not?
Robert Kennedy: Well, he’s out there in the field.
Unidentified: You mean there’s nobody that can go out and arrest
him?
Robert Kennedy: Yeah.
O’Brien: [talking on the phone] Hello?
Robert Kennedy: Is he still being shot at, Larry?
O’Brien: [talking on the phone] No. Any shooting? Things quiet now?
Quiet. Yeah. Yeah.
[talking to people in the room] Everything’s quiet around there, but he
doesn’t know . . . they’re trying to check the dormitory.
Robert Kennedy: The what?
O’Brien: Trying to check around as to what’s going on in the dormitories. He says it’s quiet around the area. One fellow’s seriously hurt and
they’re trying to get an ambulance.
Marshall: There’s supposed to be an ambulance going in, too. [Door
sounds.]
Unidentified: Jesus!
Sorensen: Sad day in our country.
No conversation as they wait for information to come in. Doors open
and close.
Sorensen: Any word yet on the military?
Marshall: Well, they’re just leaving Memphis.79
Sorensen: Can they handle that [unclear]? [Unclear exchange.]
Robert Kennedy: Hey, Burke?
Marshall: Yeah.
Robert Kennedy: Want to talk to Watkins?80 You put the call in?
Marshall: What?
Robert Kennedy: Watkins.
Marshall: Should we call him?
78. Major General Edwin A. Walker, retired.
79. At 12:26 P.M., the departure of Task Force Alpha was still about ninety minutes away.
80. Thomas A. Watkins.
Meeting on Civil Rights , Continued
297
Robert Kennedy: Yes.
Doors open and close followed by silence. Then again there are sounds of
doors opening and closing, with Evelyn Lincoln’s voice in the background
and an unclear exchange in the foreground ending with “Jesus Christ.”
The President enters the room.
President Kennedy: [Unclear] casualties [unclear] unless we’re lucky.
O’Brien: The state policeman died. It’s too bad.
Unidentified: [Unclear.]
O’Brien: [talking on the phone] Hello? Yeah. Yeah. All right.
Unidentified: [Unclear.]
President Kennedy: Shotgun wound in his back.
O’Brien: [talking on the phone] Hello? [Pause.] Right. No. All right.
[talking to people in the room] He told me they ought to get [unclear]
the fighting was [unclear] the campus [unclear] the assistant dean
[unclear].
Unidentified: I understand it was [unclear]. [Voices can be heard murmuring in the background.]
O’Brien: Yeah.
The Attorney General enters the room.
Robert Kennedy: What’s he say, Larry?
O’Brien: Nothing at the moment. He just said that we’ve got a
stretcher.
[on the phone] Hello? Maybe he . . .
Robert Kennedy: [on the phone] Hello? Well, how does it look now?
O’Brien: So they sent 18 men out to the dormitory.81 They weren’t
sure if they were receiving fire or not.
Robert Kennedy: [on the phone] And what about there, they firing at
all now? [Pause.] Is Nick there? [Pause.] Well, I’d like to talk to him to
see what the . . . Oh, they’re there? Yeah. Who’s this?
Marshall: Let the people pick [unclear].
Robert Kennedy: [in an aside] Now, they told them they had to land.
[Unclear exchange.]
Robert Kennedy: They think we shouldn’t do that.
Unidentified: Not today.
Robert Kennedy: You shouldn’t just, you shouldn’t say things.
Unidentified: Why don’t you pick up the phone? That will get them
flying.
81. Originally Katzenbach posted 6 men to guard Meredith; as the situation deteriorated on
campus, 18 additional men were dispatched from the Lyceum front to reinforce Baxter Hall.
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Robert Kennedy: [Unclear] probably shouldn’t say anything [unclear].
These guys have capable fellows there.
O’Brien: Yeah.
Robert Kennedy: The National Guard. They can [unclear].
O’Brien: Yeah.
Robert Kennedy: [talking on the phone] Yeah. Oh Nick? How’s it
look? The fellow from the London paper was there, was he?82 London
paper. [talking to the people in the room] He says the fellow from the
London paper died. . . . Yeah.
President Kennedy: We ought to get some more troops. I wonder if
it takes this long to get people ready around here.
Robert Kennedy: [on the phone] Have the troops, have the National
Guard showed up? Did they fire? Are they firing at all down there?
Unidentified: [Unclear.]
Robert Kennedy: [on the phone] Is it quieter?
Marshall: [Unclear.]
Robert Kennedy: [on the phone] Who’ve you got up there at the other
place? Yeah, but I mean I think you want to get somebody that’s up there
that knows how important it is to keep Meredith alive. Yeah, but I mean
it should be somebody that you know. And that should stay right by
Meredith and shoot anybody that puts a hand on him. And it has got to
be the absolute . . . OK? [The telephone rings in the background.]
[speaking to the people in the room] It’s a little quieter. [Unclear.]
The Attorney General steps out to call secretary of the Army Cyrus
Vance to inquire about the status of the long anticipated Task Force
Alpha. Hoping to reduce any further delays, the Attorney General
wants to know whether the advance contingent can be flown directly to
the campus. Robert Kennedy used his brother’s telephone and the call
was taped.
82. At approximately 12:30 A.M., Jack Rosenthal of the Justice Department called the White
House to report that a reporter for the London Daily Sketch, Paul Guihard, had been killed in
the riot. His body was found next to a women’s dormitory on campus. See Dictabelt 4F2,
Cassette A, John F. Kennedy Library, President’s Office Files, Presidential Recordings
Collection.
Meeting on Civil Rights , Continued
299
Approximately 12:40 A.M.
[H]ow long before they’ll be there?
Conversation from the Oval Office between
Robert Kennedy and Cyrus Vance83
Cyrus Vance: Yeah, see the problem is one of light getting in there,
and they’re just going to get in wherever they can on the campus.
Robert Kennedy: Yeah, and then they’re, we could use at least a couple hundred right there.
Vance: Yeah, well . . .
Robert Kennedy: I don’t know how. They don’t have transportation
in from the airport.
Vance: No. They will land on the campus. These are their instructions. Wherever they can get in, Bob.
Robert Kennedy: OK.
Vance: Right.
Robert Kennedy: But when, how long before they’ll be there?
Vance: Uh, well, they left—take a look at my watch—must be about,
I would guess 10 or 15 minutes ago. And it was supposed to take about
an hour. Bob, I don’t want to guess . . .
Robert Kennedy: No.
Vance: . . . at the thing because I don’t know precisely.
Robert Kennedy: OK. All right.
Vance: Right.
Robert Kennedy: Thanks.
Robert Kennedy hangs up.
Meeting on Civil Rights, Continued
At approximately the same time that Vance is confirming to Robert
Kennedy that the helicopters have taken off, General Charles Billingslea
calls the Justice Department (12:42 A.M.) with similar information. The
first helicopters actually took off at 2:08 A.M. (12:08 A.M. Mississippi time).
O’Donnell:[Unclear.] Somebody shot [unclear] the London paper
[unclear].
83. Dictabelt 4F3, Cassette A, John F. Kennedy Library, President’s Office Files, Presidential
Recordings Collection.
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Unidentified: Right.
Unidentified: It’s going to be a big story over in Europe, don’t you
think?
Unidentified: Yeah.
O’Donnell: I have a hunch that Khrushchev would get those troops
in faster. That’s what worries me about this whole thing.
Unidentified: Why?
O’Donnell: I think that . . .
O’Brien: You know, but most of them [unclear] you get them there
first [unclear].
O’Donnell: [Unclear.]
O’Brien: [Unclear.]
O’Donnell: I just don’t quite understand it. I mean, why would
[unclear].
O’Brien: [on the phone] Hello? Anything doing?
Marshall: Larry, is there any sign of the Guard?
O’Brien: [on the phone] Find any Guard there at all? Any arrivals?
Any word?
Unidentified: I wish those marshals would arrive. No state police
guarding them [unclear] troops [unclear]. The state police they can’t
find [unclear].
Marshall: That’s what the Governor said. We didn’t find the state police.
Unidentified: [Unclear.]
O’Brien: [on the phone] Yeah, I know. National Guard.
O’Donnell: The MPs are airborne? At least?
Marshall: What?
O’Donnell: Are they airborne?
Marshall: Yeah. They’re airborne. No, they are. They are in fact airborne.
Unidentified: Yeah.
Marshall: I mean, unless they’re lying to us.
Sorensen: Well, they were not exactly accurate when they told us
that they were.
Marshall: They were two hours off to begin with.
O’Brien: [on the phone] Not at the airport?
Marshall: [Unclear] off something like that.
Sorensen: It wasn’t two hours? [Unclear] regular Army?
Marshall: Yeah.
O’Brien: [on the phone] Yeah.
Marshall: Or at least one of them.
O’Brien: [on the phone] Yeah. Fine. Right.
Meeting on Civil Rights , Continued
301
[talking to people in the room] The current problem is how to get the
trucks off the campus back to the airport to bring the troops in.
Marshall: Are the troops . . .
O’Brien: The MPs.
Marshall: They’re going to land on the campus.
O’Brien: Well, he said that there’s a question whether they can or not.
Marshall: Why?
O’Brien: Well, I don’t know. Lights or what have you.
O’Donnell: They have a helicopter?
Marshall: Yeah.
O’Brien: So that’s what they’re checking out now. They were going to
have them land in the airport and bring them in by truck, but now . . . ?
Marshall: They can’t get the trucks off the campus?
O’Brien: Yeah.
Door opens. The President and the Attorney General enter.
Sorensen: A few hundred students and rednecks have really got the
entire U.S. Army [unclear].
Unclear chatter; someone jokes, “Take a cab from the airport.”
Unidentified: Think some of the townspeople would drive them in?
Marshall: [Unclear.]
President Kennedy: What about a baseball field with night lights or
anything like that?
O’Brien: [talking on the phone] Hello?
Robert Kennedy: Burke, should we [unclear] them?
Marshall: We cannot [unclear].
Robert Kennedy: Yeah.
O’Brien: [talking on the phone] Well, they won’t be able to land.
Unidentified: Unless they can open it. [Unclear] can get it open.
O’Brien: Yeah.
Robert Kennedy: But can Ramsey look at the map and see whether,
where else there is?84
Marshall: Well, there is a practice field right next to the large [unclear].
Robert Kennedy: Well, why don’t they [unclear].
Marshall: That’s where they [unclear].
Robert Kennedy: Well, I don’t know whether they can find it,
though. [Unclear.]
Marshall: If there’s no lighting. That’s a problem.
84. Ramsey Clark was assistant attorney general in the Lands Division of the Department of
Justice.
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O’Donnell: [Unclear] the weather’s all right, we can [unclear].
Unidentified: In the dark?
O’Brien: [talking on the phone] Yeah. [Unclear exchange.] [talking on
the phone] Yeah.
Unidentified: Helicopters.
O’Brien: [talking on the phone] Yeah.
Unidentified: [Unclear.]
Robert Kennedy: Second time in.
O’Brien: [to the people in the room] Maybe they have sixty guardsmen
there now. One of them was just wounded, so they know they’re there.85
President Kennedy: One of the guards was wounded?
O’Brien: They said they just brought him in. So he says they estimate they’ve [unclear]. He arrived in a group of sixty.
Unidentified: You were right about it anyway.
President Kennedy: What?
Unidentified: That’s good anyway.
Unidentified: [Unclear.]
O’Brien: Sixty men . . . sixty men under the command of a Captain
Falkner, is the name.86
O’Donnell: That’s Faulkner’s son.87
O’Brien: Yeah.
O’Donnell: [Unclear.]
Marshall: [talking on the phone] All right. Where did they land?
O’Brien: One of the Oxford group, then?
O’Donnell: Yeah. Must be.
O’Brien: That’s what they have, sixty.
Marshall: [Talking on the phone unintelligibly in the background. Unclear
exchanges.]
O’Brien: [on the phone] Yeah. Yeah. Oh. Yeah.
[to the people in the room] Taking care of those sixty guardsmen pretty
quick. One of them got hit in the arm with a brick. He’s down. And the
other one got a cut across [unclear].
Unidentified: [Unclear.]
O’Donnell: He won’t like it.
85. The first confirmation for the White House that some National Guard reinforcements, a contingent of some 55, had reached the campus. Ramsey Clark at Justice learned this at 12:48 A.M.
86. Captain Murry Falkner, cousin of William Faulkner.
87. William Faulkner, author.
Meeting on Civil Rights , Continued
303
Unidentified: The corpsman.
O’Brien: [talking on the phone] Well, as long as they’re [unclear] backs
to the bricks and rocks, that’s a hope. Yeah. Yeah. [Unclear exchange in the
background.]
O’Brien: [talking on the phone] Is that right? Yeah. Yeah. Yeah. OK.
Right.
O’Donnell: [Unclear] the marshal who fired that gas gun . . .
O’Brien: [talking on the phone while Marshall is whispering in the background] No shooting, now though, huh? Yeah. Anything going? Yeah.
Good. OK. He’s in the next room. I’ll keep this line open. OK. All right.
[Meanwhile, an indistinct conversation is going on in the background.] OK,
Dean, I’ll tell him.88 He’s in the next room [unclear]. OK.
O’Donnell: [Unclear.] [telling a story] He said, “All right.” He said,
“Who?” He said, “Governor, this is the Boston Post.” “Who the hell else
would it be this time of the night?” “Governor, your daughter’s car has
been found cracked up down on the Cape. Do you have any statement?”
“Certainly, the thief must be apprehended.” [Laughter.]
Sounds of the door opening and closing followed by a pause.
O’Brien: You say you’re unsure about that car that’s been showered
and hit with bricks.
Unidentified: [Unclear.]
O’Brien: [talking on the phone] Hello? Hi Joe. [Pause.] Yeah. [Pause.]
Larry O’Brien. Yeah. [Pause.] Yeah. Well, I’ll get on it . . . yeah. OK.
[Pause.]
Sorensen: They say if you ever made a chronological listing of the
reports we’ve gotten over that phone in the last three hours, it wouldn’t
make any sense at all.
O’Brien: [talking on the phone] Hello. [Pause.] Yeah. You want
Bobby? Who’s this? Yeah, hold on a minute. [Puts down receiver.]
He wants Bobby. [Sounds of door opening and closing.]
Robert Kennedy: [talking on the phone] Hello? Yeah.
O’Brien: [Unclear.]
Robert Kennedy: [talking on the phone] They tell me the fellow from
the London paper was killed. . . . Well, they found him back of some
dormitories. Yeah. Yeah, that’s true. What are we going to say about all
this, Ed?89 You know, we’re going to have a hell of a problem about why
88. Dean P. Markham.
89. Probably Edwin Guthman, director of public information at the Department of Justice.
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we didn’t handle the situation better. Yeah, yeah. [Pause.] OK. Well, I
think we are going to have to figure out what we are going to say.
[Pause.] Do you want to? Oh yeah, well you did terrific. I think it’s just
a question of the fact that I made the decision to send [pause]. OK. You
want to hold on?
Marshall: [on the phone] Hello? This is Burke. Yeah. Yeah.
Lincoln: Bill Geoghegan calling you. 90 Want to take it?
Marshall: [on the phone] Yeah. Oh, Mrs. Lincoln? Oh, Ed? Listen, can
you hold on just a minute while I take a call from Bill? Hello? Just hold on.
Phone rings. Then there are sounds of a door opening and closing.
Operator: What number?
Lincoln: One line. [Door opens and closes.]
Marshall: [on the phone] Ed? They can’t get the trucks out to them.
We’re going to try to land some on the campus. [Pause.] We’re not.
[Pause.] Yeah, we ought to do that. It’s really a [pause]. Yeah. Let him
know if they’ve gone. . . . Oh, he was there, all right. What he was doing
I don’t know. I don’t know, Ed.
Robert Kennedy: [Unclear.]
Marshall: [on the phone] Yeah. Yeah, they did . . . Yeah. OK. They’ve all
been evacuated, I underst—[pause]. Yeah. Real war. No. God, that’s dumb.
That’s uh, that Army, you know, they’re just late. Well, they’re in the air.91
Yeah. I don’t think they do. They’ve got pistols. Well, they’re . . . Yes, they
do. I mean, they’ll all be there by the morning, Ed. Yeah, I know. Yeah.
Robert Kennedy: Is Ed there?
Marshall: What?
Robert Kennedy: Ed?
Marshall: He just said, “Hold on,” and . . .
Robert Kennedy: I’d like to speak to him, then.
Marshall: Fine. [on the phone] Hello? Who’s this? Oh Dean? Is Ed
around? Could—well, when he comes back, Bob wanted to talk to him.
[Pause.]
[to people in the room] Do they know what they’re going to do with
the MPs?
Unidentified: Not exactly.
Robert Kennedy: Well, I think they [unclear] and maintain law and
order, and then they can figure it out.
90. William A. Geoghegan was assistant deputy attorney general in the Department of
Justice. He was the number two at the crisis center in the Justice Department.
91. It was about 12:55 A.M. and the helicopters are about to take off.
Meeting on Civil Rights , Continued
305
Marshall: Well, I mean, do they know where they’re going to land
them?
Robert Kennedy: Oh, in another 15 or 20 minutes, I think. They have
it pretty much under control, though, in effect. [Unclear.]92
Marshall: Oh, here’s Ed. [on the phone] Just a minute, Ed.
Robert Kennedy: [on the phone] Hey, Ed? I think that probably you
should get that crowd together and brief them on all that, when it quiets
down and all. [Door opens.]
Lincoln: Bill Geoghegan’s calling you.
Robert Kennedy: [on the phone] Yeah, but you see, we’re going to be
blamed for not doing enough. And I think that you trace it. First, that
we had the agreement with the Governor. Uh—Do you . . . Do you want
to hold on? [He puts the receiver down.]
Marshall: [on the phone] Hello, Ramsey?
Robert Kennedy: [seems to walk to other side of the room] Well, he’s
besieged, of course, from behind. . . . But he’s under siege.
President Kennedy: So has he agreed with us?
Robert Kennedy: Yeah, of course, he just figured that he . . . but I
mean uh—
[on the phone] Hello.
Unidentified: What about?
Robert Kennedy: [on the phone] What about the reporters there? Do
they see the picture? [Unidentified background conversation.]
Robert Kennedy: [on the phone] Yeah, I just think that, but the point
that we want to get over you know is that the Governor said . . . made
this arrangement. We didn’t sneak him in. I think that’s going to be the
cry, that we snuck him in unprepared.
Well, can I tell you what the . . . Of course, the point is, at first, he
said, he came in in [a] helicopter, and of course they know he didn’t, and
then the gate was opened to everybody to come through . . . and the state
police guided him in. Yeah. Well, I just think that we are going to take a
lot of knocks because of people getting killed, the fact that I didn’t get
the people up there in time.
President Kennedy: [on another phone] Well, now, did Bob Watkins
[unclear].93
92. The advance contingent of Task Force Alpha landed at 1:50 A.M. Not only were they about
45 minutes later than the Attorney General had assumed, but these troops had to land at
Oxford airport due to the cloud of tear gas that obscured any possible landing areas in or near
the campus. The situation on the campus was still far from being under control.
93. Tom Watkins, Governor Barnett’s intermediary.
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Robert Kennedy: [on the phone] I think the fact, then, they promised
the state police would stay and then the state police left. And he took
responsibility . . .
President Kennedy: [on the phone] All right.
Robert Kennedy: [on the phone] . . . under this arrangement for maintenance of law and order.
President Kennedy: [on another phone] Yeah.
Robert Kennedy: [on the phone] I’ll do that, but I just thought you’d
cover the points, and OK . . .
President Kennedy: [on another phone] All right. Just call me now
that it’s going to be important [unclear].
Robert Kennedy: [on the phone] Yeah, but I mean, just so you know
the facts and so that that we can . . . Yeah. OK.
Robert Kennedy: [on the phone] Now, how is it down there now?
Marshall: OK. I’ll call you [unclear].
Robert Kennedy: [on the phone] OK.
Unidentified: Yeah.
Robert Kennedy: [on the phone] OK. Would you hold?
Marshall: Well, we ought to get . . . Oh, have we called up other
Guard units?
Robert Kennedy: Well, they were sending them all, I guess.
Marshall: They are?
Robert Kennedy: Well, I’m not sure. [Unclear.]
Doors close and the machine is left running. It is about 1:00 A.M. and
the Cabinet Room is empty. Someone enters the room again and turns
the machine off.
1:45 A.M.
[W]e’ve got to get this situation under control.
Conversation with Ross Barnett94
President Kennedy is losing his patience both with the U.S. Army, which
has yet to arrive on the scene in Oxford, and with the Mississippi
Governor, who has not contributed anything to restoring order at Ole
94. Dictabelt 4F4, Cassette A, John F. Kennedy Library, President’s Office Files, Presidential
Recordings Collection.
Conversation with Ross Bar nett
307
Miss since the unfortunate decision to remove the state troopers over
four hours earlier. The President does not know that Governor Ross
Barnett is indeed preparing to speak to the people of Mississippi about
the crisis in Oxford. All that is known in Washington is that the FBI in
Oxford has just detected a group of 150 state troopers sitting in their
cars doing nothing but watching the unfolding tragedy.
The conversation begins with unrelated fragments of phone conversation,
perhaps on another line; then the recording of the main conversation begins.
Unidentified: He treated a number of other people. I asked him how
many doctors he had, and how many . . .
Recording switches to following conversation.
Ross Barnett: [Unclear—]
President Kennedy: Yeah.
Barnett: —and I, he said that what we were talking about we wouldn’t have any trouble. Do it tonight, you know.
President Kennedy: Yeah. Well, our people say that it’s still a very
strange situation. They wouldn’t feel that they could take a chance on
taking him outside that building. Now if we, can we get these fellows? I
hear they got some high-powered rifles up there that have been shooting
sporadically. Can we get that stopped? How many people have you got
there? We hear you only got 50.
Barnett: Well, I have approximately 200 there now, Mr. President.
That’s not that . . .
President Kennedy: You got 200?
Barnett: Sir, about 200.
President Kennedy: Well, now let me get in touch with my people.
Barnett: . . . and we don’t have but 210 or [2]12, patrolmen, you see.
President Kennedy: I see. Well, now, let me get my people back again.
Barnett: I’m doing everything in the world I can.
President Kennedy: That’s right. Well, we’ve got to get this situation
under control. That’s much more important than anything else.
Barnett: Yes. Well, that’s right.
President Kennedy: Now, let me talk to my people, and let me find
out what the situation is there.
Barnett: Yes.
President Kennedy: They called me a few minutes ago and said they
had some high-powered rifles there. So we don’t want to start moving . . .
Barnett: Mr. President . . .
President Kennedy: . . . anybody around.
Barnett: . . . people are wiring me and calling me saying, “Well,
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you’ve given up.” I said, I had to say, “No, I’m not giving up, not giving
up any fight.”95
President Kennedy: Yeah, but we don’t want to . . .
Barnett: “I never give up. I, I have courage and faith, and, we’ll win
this fight.” You understand. That’s just to Mississippi people.
President Kennedy: I understand. But I don’t think anybody, either
in Mississippi or anyplace else, wants a lot of people killed.
Barnett: Oh, no. No. I . . .
President Kennedy: And that’s what, Governor, that’s the most
important thing. We want . . .
Barnett: . . . I’ll issue any statement, any time about peace and violence.
President Kennedy: Well, now here’s what we could do. Let’s get the
maximum number of your state police to get that situation so we don’t
have sporadic firing. I will then be in touch with my people and then you
and I’ll be talking again in a few minutes; see what we got there then.
Barnett: All right.
President Kennedy: Thank you, Governor.
Barnett: All right now.
President Kennedy: I’ll be back.
President Kennedy hangs up.
1:50 A.M.
[C]an you get them so that we stop this rifle shooting?
Continuation of Conversation with Ross Barnett96
Kennedy again emphasizes to Barnett the importance of restoring order,
while Barnett assures the President that he is doing everything possible
to gain control of the situation.
95. Throughout the evening, the Governor was deluged with calls and telegrams urging him
not to “sell out” to the Kennedys. In response to such talk, Barnett went on the air shortly
before midnight (local time), and declared, “I call on Mississippians to keep the faith and
courage. We will never surrender.”
96. Dictabelt 4F5, Cassette A, John F. Kennedy Library, President’s Office Files, Presidential
Recordings Collection.
Continuation of Conversation with Ross Bar nett
309
President Kennedy: Hello.
Unidentified: Just one moment, sir.
Unidentified: There you are, sir. There’s the President.
President Kennedy: Hello. Hello.
Ross Barnett: Mr. President?
President Kennedy: Yes, Governor.
Barnett: I just talked with Colonel Birdsong . . . 97
President Kennedy: Right.
Barnett: . . . who is our director of the highway patrol . . .
President Kennedy: That’s right.
Barnett: . . . and he assures me that he has approximately 150 men
there now.98
President Kennedy: Now, we got a report that they’re all in their
cars two or three blocks away.
Barnett: I told ’em, just like you asked me, to get moving.
President Kennedy: I see. Now, can you get them so that we stop this
rifle shooting? That’s what we got to stop.
Barnett: Well, he says he’s doing all that he can. He says they’re
strangers in there.
President Kennedy: I know it, well that’s what we hear.
Barnett: And he’s calling for 50 more, and that’ll put it up around
200.
President Kennedy: Can they get those students to go to bed?
Barnett: Well, he says he’s trying to, and I don’t think it’ll be long
before he can get them all to bed.
President Kennedy: OK. Will you stay at . . .
Barnett: Maybe not, I can’t tell.
President Kennedy: Well, let’s stay right at it. We ought to be, that’s
what we got to do before we can do anything.
Barnett: . . . he’s reporting constantly to a gentleman who has control of the activities of the troops there.
President Kennedy: Yeah.
Barnett: And he understands that he’s doing all he can.
President Kennedy: Well, I think that it’s very important, Governor,
aside from this issue; we don’t want a lot of people killed just because they,
particularly, evidently two or three guardsmen have been shot. And, of
course, our marshals and then that state trooper, so we don’t want . . .
97. T. B. Birdsong was head of the Mississippi Highway Patrol.
98. This is presumably the 150 men seen sitting in their cars near campus.
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2:00 A.M.
When will they be there?
Conversation between Robert Kennedy and Creighton Abrams99
Task Force Alpha finally arrived at the Oxford Airport at 1:50 A.M., after
the cloud of tear gas over Ole Miss had prevented a daring landing at the
campus. The President and his brother feared new delays. It had taken
Captain Murry Falkner’s National Guard Unit well over an hour to
move the few miles from downtown Oxford to the Lyceum. With the airport even farther away from the campus, the White House wondered how
the U.S. Army could accelerate the deployment of its 200-man advance
contingent.
The tape begins with General Creighton Abrams’s trying to explain
the Army’s plan to move the men. Abrams is monitoring the situation
from the Millington Naval Air Station, outside Memphis, Tennessee.
Creighton Abrams: Mr. Geoghegan reports to me that there are more
than enough trucks at the strip, with 180 men in the helicopters. 100
Robert Kennedy: You got 180 men? Where are the rest of them?
Abrams: Moving on the road.
Robert Kennedy: When will they be there?
Abrams: Uh, about two hours and three-quarters. That would be
quarter of three in the morning our time.
Robert Kennedy: Quarter of five our time? How many of them are
there?
Unidentified: [off the phone in the room] Quarter of five.
Robert Kennedy: How many of them are there?
Abrams: The 500.
Robert Kennedy: And when do the rest of . . .
99. Dictabelts 4F7 and 4G1, Cassettes A and B, John F. Kennedy Library, President’s Office
Files, Presidential Recordings Collection.
100. Geoghegan and Ramsey Clark at the Justice Department War Room have maintained the
only continuous contact to the U.S. Army during this crisis. The U.S. Army evidently relies on
the Justice Department War Room for information about the battle conditions in Oxford.
After this crisis, the Army would be criticized for not having done any preliminary reconnaissance in Oxford.
Conversation between Robert Kennedy and Creighton Abrams
311
Abrams: Behind that’s another battalion, marching right behind
them, of 680.
Robert Kennedy: They’re MPs?
Abrams: MPs.
Robert Kennedy: What was the delay in getting them out of
Memphis?
Abrams: They . . . I don’t know the details of it, Mr. Kennedy. They . . .
this is the best response they could make, apparently, under the circumstances.
Robert Kennedy: Well, who’s in charge of that?
Abrams: Each of those battalions has a battalion commander, and both
battalions are under the command of General [Charles] Billingslea. They
had a meeting over here this afternoon, which I did not attend. But they
had a meeting in which they discussed all these plans.
Robert Kennedy: Well, didn’t they say they could get off and down
there within an hour?
Abrams: Yes, they expected a much more rapid response than has
occurred. I know General Billingslea did.
Robert Kennedy: What happened then?
Abrams: I don’t know.
Robert Kennedy: Is somebody going to find out?
Abrams: Yes, sir.
Robert Kennedy: [Sighs.] What about the battle group?
Abrams: We have gotten ahold of the battle group and have diverted
them. We got ahold of them at [unclear].
Robert Kennedy: When will they be down there?
Abrams: . . . Tennessee. I don’t have a new estimate on that, sir.
We’ve, it’s only been within the last 15 or 20 minutes that we got ahold
of them, and it hasn’t been recast. But I can get it very shortly.
Robert Kennedy: Yeah. Will you call me back at the White House?
Unidentified: [Unclear.]101
Abrams: I will.
Robert Kennedy: OK. Thank you.
Abrams: Yes, sir.
Robert Kennedy hangs up.
101. This conversation continues on Dictabelt 4G.
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S U N DAY, S E P T E M B E R
30– M O N DAY,
OCTOBER
1, 1962
4:20 A.M.
General, you ought to consider what kind of communication
you’re going to set up at that airport because you’re going to
have people flying in there.
Conversation with Creighton Abrams102
Five and one half hours after President Kennedy ordered U.S. troops to
the campus at the University of Mississippi, Task Force Alpha reached the
riot zone. President Kennedy is frustrated by the delays and misinformation swirling about this entire operation. Once he knows that the troops
have arrived, he decides to make a point of stressing the need for better
coordination and implementation once daylight returns to Oxford.
Evelyn Lincoln: Hello.
Unidentified: General Abrams calling the President from Millington,
Tennessee.103
Lincoln: [off the phone to President Kennedy] General Abrams is on
the line at the other end.
President Kennedy: Hello. Hello?
Unidentified: Here you are, sir?
Creighton Abrams: General Abrams.
President Kennedy: Yes, General.
Abrams: I have a report from General [Charles] Billingslea.
President Kennedy: That’s right. Now, the Attorney General has
him on the other phone.
[off the phone to Robert Kennedy] Is that General Billingslea you got?
[back to Abrams] We got him on the other phone. So we’ll be talk . . .
Abrams: The MP company arrived on the campus at 2:15 local time.
President Kennedy: Right. OK, now, General, what about the rest of . . .
When are these other MPs going to get there? Do you know?
Abrams: The 503rd MPs should arrive at approximately zero fourthirty.
President Kennedy: That’s local time there?
102. Dictabelt 4G2, Cassette B, John F. Kennedy Library, President’s Office Files, Presidential
Recordings Collection.
103. Location of Memphis Naval Air Station.
Conversation with Creighton Abrams
313
Abrams: Local time.
President Kennedy: That’s, in other words, that’s two hours?
Abrams: Local time here.
President Kennedy: That’s the group that set out by truck, is it?
Abrams: Yes, sir.
President Kennedy: So, your addition—
Abrams: They’re followed by another MP battalion that should arrive
at five. There, there’s just the length of the battalion between them.
President Kennedy: In other words, but the next MP group to arrive
won’t be for two hours. Is that correct?
Abrams: That’s correct, sir.
President Kennedy: Then after that there’ll be some more in a half
hour. Then what about that battle group?
Abrams: They, they . . . Just a moment, sir.
[off the phone to someone in the room] The battle group is [unclear].
[back to President Kennedy] Six o’clock, sir.
President Kennedy: What? Six o’clock.
Abrams: Six o’clock.
President Kennedy: Well, now, General, you ought to consider what
kind of communication you’re going to set up at that airport because
you’re going to have people flying in there. Seems to me you ought to
have very good communications with that airport as well as the campus.
Abrams: Yes.
President Kennedy: With General . . . In other words, General
Billingslea ought to have a communication with the airport. You ought
to have a communication with the airport and Billingslea because we’re
going to have people flying in there all day tomorrow.
Abrams: Yes.
President Kennedy: And then, of course, we got the problem of
transportation and all the rest. So these are all matters that you’ll be
dealing with. But I think communication is very important.
Abrams: Yes, sir.
President Kennedy: OK. Fine, General. Thank you.
President Kennedy hangs up.
The arrival of U.S. troops calmed the situation immediately on campus.
The student mob dispersed and an uneasy peace took hold. The change
in the situation in Oxford gave the President an opportunity to get some
sleep. The Attorney General and Burke Marshall went to the Justice
Department, and Kennedy retired to the Mansion for a nap.
314
M O N DAY, O C T O B E R
1, 1962
Monday, October 1, 1962
The President managed to get about three hours’ sleep after the previous night’s vigil. Still in the family quarters, he called Governor Ross
Barnett to press for some local assistance in keeping order. Concerned
that a large number of outsiders would be in the area, the President
believed that local officials would be especially useful in helping to keep
the peace.
8:46 A.M.
And I think that doesn’t change your position on the issue, but
at least it helps maintain order, which is what we’ve got to do
today.
Conversation with Ross Barnett1
Begins in midconversation.
Ross Barnett: . . . let the public know we’ve talked so many times,
don’t you think?
President Kennedy: That’s correct. Now here’s what I’m going to . . .
Barnett: Now, I can tell you . . . I think you said it mighty well last
night, that “tried to reach the conclusion and couldn’t,” or words to that
effect.
President Kennedy: Now, I was very . . . As you know in my speech, I
didn’t even mention [unclear] . . .
Barnett: “[Unclear] fail,” I believe you said.2
President Kennedy: That’s right, you know, and I didn’t go into . . .
Barnett: You made a wonderful statement there.
1. Dictabelt 4G3, Cassette B, John F. Kennedy Library, President’s Office Files, Presidential
Recordings Collection.
2. The text of Kennedy’s 30 September 1962 radio and television speech on the situation at
the University of Mississippi can be found in the Public Papers of the Presidents: John F. Kennedy,
1962 (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1963), pp. 726–28.
Conversation with Ross Bar nett
315
President Kennedy: Well, now, the thing is, Governor, I want your
help in getting these state police to continue to help during the day
because they’re their own people. And we are going to have a lot of
strange troops in there, and we are going to have paratroopers in and all
the rest. And I think the state police should be the key, and that depends
on you.
Barnett: Oh, I . . . You’ll have, you’ll have the whole force that we
have.
President Kennedy: Well, now, you tell them . . .
Barnett: The [unclear] men are not equipped like yours.
President Kennedy: I understand that. But during the daytime they
can help keep order on these roads and keep a lot of people from coming
in. And I think that doesn’t change your position on the issue, but at
least it helps maintain order, which is what we’ve got to do today.
Barnett: All right, Mr. President.
President Kennedy: Thank you, Governor.
Barnett: I’ll stay here now.
President Kennedy: Thank you very much.
Barnett: Thank you so much.
President Kennedy: And keep after your state police now.
Barnett: I will.
President Kennedy: Thanks.
Barnett: I’ll call him as soon as we hang up . . .
President Kennedy: Thanks.
Barnett: . . . n’ tell him to do all he can to keep peace.
President Kennedy: OK, thanks, Governor.
Barnett: And when’ll I hear from you again?
President Kennedy: I’ll be talking to you about noon, my time.
Barnett: OK. Thank you so much. Good-bye.
President Kennedy: OK, Governor.
President Kennedy hangs up.
Still upstairs at the White House, the President called the solicitor general, Archibald Cox, to discuss some legal issues raised by the Oxford
riot. In particular, the President was considering seeking the arrest of
Governor Barnett and Major General Edwin Walker. The President was
due to see Cox at the Supreme Court in less than a half hour at the
swearing in of Arthur Goldberg as associate justice. He was giving the
Solicitor General some warning as to what was on his mind.
316
M O N DAY, O C T O B E R
1, 1962
9:31 A.M.
I wonder if we can get more precise information on where we
are legally on arresting people, including the Governor if necessary and others?
Conversation with Archibald Cox3
Phone rings.
Evelyn Lincoln: Hello.
Unidentified: I have Mr. Archibald Cox, the solicitor general, returning the President’s call.
Lincoln: OK.
President Kennedy: Hello.
Archibald Cox: Good morning, Mr. President.
President Kennedy: Good morning, I’m just on my way up there.4
Now, the only question I had was whether there are any additional
proclamations or powers, et cetera, that we might need in the Mississippi
matter if it gets worse, for arresting people, and under what charge and
what legal penalties they face, and so on. For example, we want to arrest
General Walker, and I don’t know whether we just arrest him under disturbing the peace or whether we arrest him for more than that. 5 I wonder if . . . How long are you going to be at the court this morning?
Cox: Not beyond half past ten.
3. Dictabelt 4G4, Cassette B, John F. Kennedy Library, President’s Office Files, Presidential
Recordings Collection.
4. The President was on his way to the Supreme Court to attend the swearing in of Arthur J.
Goldberg as associate justice.
5. Major General Edwin A. Walker, U.S. Army, retired, was on the scene in Oxford and was
present in the crowd on the night of the riot. On 1 October, he was arrested on four charges,
including insurrection, and was held in lieu of $100,000 bail. After his arrest, Walker asserted,
“They don’t have a thing on me.” He also issued a statement to Governor Ross Barnett, claiming his (Walker’s) efforts had been undertaken on behalf of the “stand for freedom everywhere.”
While Walker apparently played more of an observer’s role in the melee, prior to the riot, he
had issued a call from his home in Dallas, urging “patriotic” Americans to join him in
Mississippi to oppose the federal government and the integration of the campus. Worth noting
is that in 1957, Walker had commanded federal troops in Little Rock, Arkansas, in a celebrated
event in the history of the civil rights movement; in 1962, he observed, he would be on the
right side. After resigning from the Army in 1961, Walker had devoted himself to public affairs;
his activities often centered on the claim that Communists had infiltrated the U.S. Government
and the country generally. On 6 October, Walker was released on $50,000 bail, and returned to
Texas the next day, where he was greeted by some 200 supporters. He was never tried.
Conversation with Cyrus Vance and Robert McNamara
317
President Kennedy: Yeah, well then I wonder if we can get more precise information on where we are legally on arresting people, including
the governor if necessary and others?6
Cox: Right.
President Kennedy: And what the penalties are because we might
want to announce that on the radio and television that anyone involved
in any demonstration or anything would be subject to this penalty, and
maybe the General could announce it.7
Cox: Right. Good-bye.
President Kennedy: All right. OK. Thank you.
Cox: Thank you.
After returning from the Supreme Court, the President met with David
Bell and Elmer Staats on the federal budget. At 11:30 A.M., the President
would be presenting the Distinguished Service Medal to General Lyman
Lemnitzer, the outgoing Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. Cyrus
Vance, the secretary of the Army, was expected to be in attendance.
Before Vance came to the White House, Kennedy wanted to be sure that
the U.S. Army contingent in Mississippi was going to be large enough
for any contingency.
11:12 A.M.
Now how are we doing on our schedule?
Conversation with Cyrus Vance and Robert McNamara8
President Kennedy: Hello.
Cyrus Vance: Yes, Mr. President.
President Kennedy: Oh, yeah, I understood they’re having some riot-
6. Barnett was never arrested because the Kennedy administration believed the potential costs
outweighed any possible gains that might accrue from his arrest and prosecution. According
to a January 1963 White House memorandum [see Victor S. Navasky, Kennedy Justice (pbk.
ed.; New York: Atheneum, 1977, pp. 237–38], there was little point in arresting and trying
the governor, which would have made him a “hero.”
7. Attorney General Robert Kennedy.
8. Dictabelt H, Cassette B, John F. Kennedy Library, President’s Office Files, Presidential
Recordings Collection.
318
M O N DAY, O C T O B E R
1, 1962
ing downtown, and so on, and throwing rocks, and so on, at the troops.
Now how are we doing on our schedule?
Vance: Our schedule is still proceeding as I gave it to you [seems to be
sound of hanging up a telephone], sir.
President Kennedy: Yeah, well, you don’t know . . . Has anybody
arrived this morning?
Vance: [speaking off the telephone to someone in the room] Has anybody
arrived this morning from those 1,700?
[speaking to President Kennedy] Not yet, due in earliest at, what [speaking off the phone to someone in the room], ten o’clock their time is it? Let’s
see, what’s their time?
President Kennedy: Midnight. That’d be midday.
Vance: 11:20.
President Kennedy: 11:20 their time?
Vance: Yep.
President Kennedy: That’s 1:20 our time, isn’t it?
Vance: Yes.
President Kennedy: Now that is what, 1,700 more?
Vance: Yeah. That’s, let’s see, that first increment is 900. Yeah.
President Kennedy: And they’re due in at 1:20? What group is that?
Vance: 1:20. Yeah, 1:20 our time.
President Kennedy: What group is . . . ?
Vance: That is the 82nd Airborne.
President Kennedy: Right. I see. OK. Fine. All right. Are you going
to come over to this ceremony . . . ?9
Vance: No, I thought I’d better stay here, sir.
President Kennedy: I see. Well, now I talked to Secretary McNamara;
he said something about you might be able to have 20,000 troops by midnight. Is . . . ?
Vance: That’s right. We are taking steps to get them in. The orders
have been given. The only limiting factor may be the weather, which is
closing in. But we’re developing alternates so that we can get them in
some way or other.
President Kennedy: I see. You mean you might send them to Memphis
and then what?
Vance: If we can’t get into Memphis, we’ll try Columbus. Now this
may add a little bit of time in getting them back, so we may not be able
9. The Distinguished Service Medal was presented to General Lyman Lemnitzer in the White
House Rose Garden on 1 October 1962.
T U E S DAY, O C T O B E R
2, 1962
319
to finally make it by twelve, but we’ll do everything we can to get them
in as soon as possible.
President Kennedy: I see. OK. Fine.
Vance: Just a second; Bob [McNamara] is here.
Robert McNamara: Hello, Bobby.
President Kennedy: Yes. Oh, this is . . . No, this is the President.
McNamara: [Unclear], oh, Mr. President.
President Kennedy: Yeah.
McNamara: I think that with the priority the Air Force is giving this
and we’re diverting all our MATS aircraft and our troop carrier aircraft,
we can get them there by midnight.10
President Kennedy: Right. I see. You coming over for this . . . ?
McNamara: No, sir. I just gave my citation to Ros and he will read it.
I thought I’d stay here . . .
President Kennedy: I see. OK.
McNamara: . . . and follow this.
President Kennedy: Righto. Fine. Thank you.
McNamara: Thank you.
President Kennedy hangs up.
By late in the day, a force of nearly 5,000 National Guardsmen and soldiers were in Oxford, Mississippi. As of the next morning, 8,735 troops
would have reached the town.
After the ceremony for General Lemnitzer, the same group witnessed the swearing in of Maxwell Taylor as Lemnitzer’s replacement.
The President then went for a swim and his lunch. In the afternoon, he
had an unrecorded conversation with George Ball, Ralph Dungan, and
Carl Kaysen. This brought the President’s official day to an end.
Tuesday, October 2, 1962
The legislative tide was turning in the administration’s favor. In July it
had seemed President Kennedy would achieve very little of his domestic
agenda due to congressional obstruction. But in two months, what was
10. The acronym MATS stands for Military Air Transport Service.
320
T U E S DAY, O C T O B E R
2, 1962
once called the “Won’t Do” Congress had been somewhat transformed.
On Monday the Senate had passed a version of the Foreign Aid Bill that
restored 70 percent of the cuts made by the House. And this morning
the President was able to sign one more bill that had seemed in trouble
earlier in the summer. At a 9:30 A.M. ceremony he signed the U.N. Bond
Act, which authorized a substantial U.S. loan to the international organization. This was encouraging too, in light of Kennedy’s concerns in late
August that events in the Congo would derail its passage.
Kennedy was taping very little at this point. Following a meeting with
former U.S. ambassador to France James Gavin, the President received a
confidential briefing from military aide Major General Chester V. Clifton.
It is possible the President received the results of the September 29 inand-out U-2 flight over Guantánamo and the western tip of Cuba. This
mission brought evidence of new SAM sites but no surface-to-surface missile installations. Cuba was certainly the subject of a meeting at 11:12 A.M.
with George Ball and Carl Kaysen. Ball presented the President with a
series of alternatives for dealing with non–Soviet bloc ships trading with
Cuba. As a result of this meeting, the President chose “to close all United
States ports to any ship that on the same continuous voyage was used or is
being used in Bloc-Cuba trade.”1
Cuba was also the focus of a luncheon given by Kennedy for the foreign ministers of 19 Latin American countries. There he pressed for a
joint hemispheric approach to the increasing Soviet presence in Cuba.
The one meeting Kennedy taped was a discussion of the 1963 budget
in light of its implications for future tax policy. Current budget estimates
exceeded the political threshold of $100 billion, a first for the federal
budget, with a $6 billion deficit. Would a budget that size kill any possibility of tax cuts in 1963? Already Kennedy had to consider the possible
political consequences in 1964 of this level of deficit spending.
1. Memorandum from Acting Secretary of State Ball to President Kennedy, 2 October 1962,
FRUS, 11: 3–4. Carl Kaysen noted the President’s reaction to this memorandum in National
Security Action Memorandum No. 194, 2 October 1962, ibid., pp. 4–5.
Meeting on the Budg et and Tax Cut Proposal
321
4:20 –5:20 P.M.
So, if we go ahead with the idea of a substantial tax cut, we
don’t believe in these people who say that they have to cut
expenditures equivalently. But we do believe that you have to
put on a performance that looks like you’re being careful with
the expenditures.
Meeting on the Budget and Tax Cut Proposal2
As the 87th Congress struggled to finish its business—adjourning on
October 13, 1962—and with the 1962 midterm elections fast approaching,
President Kennedy hoped to settle on a budget policy that would enhance
the prospects for his party in the midterm election, the passage of pending
tax cut legislation to be introduced in 1963, and his own reelection effort in
1964. He would make clear in the following discussion that the kind of policy he desired—a deficit now, produced largely with a tax cut and increased
or accelerated public works expenditures—would be exceedingly difficult
to sell to either Wilbur Mills or Harry Byrd, respective chairs of the House
and Senate committees on which the fate of his tax cut proposal ultimately
rested. Rehearsing the economics of gap-closing and full employment,
Kennedy and his advisers would discuss both the budget as a whole and
specific questions related to individual budget items.3 Should the official
budget be changed to reflect trust fund transactions? Would Senate
Finance Committee chairman Harry Byrd swallow any budget over the
potentially shocking $100 billion mark and still endorse the administration’s tax cut proposal?4 Could committee chairman Wilbur Mills deliver a
2. Including President Kennedy, Gardner Ackley, David E. Bell, C. Douglas Dillon, Walter
Heller, Charles Schultze, Theodore Sorensen, and Elmer B. Staats. Tape 27.1, John F. Kennedy
Library, President’s Office Files, Presidential Recordings Collection.
3. When Ted Sorensen wondered aloud why raising the employment “score” from 93 to 96 percent, from A-minus to A, deserved such high political priority, Kennedy’s Council of Economic
Advisers (and staff economist Arthur Okun in particular) undertook to outline and document
the changes in general economic conditions that resulted from small changes in unemployment
rates. What came to be called Okun’s law suggested that 3 extra percentage points in unemployment implied a 10 percent gap between actual and potential GNP. This gap was estimated to be
approximately $51 billion at the time of Kennedy’s inauguration and had closed to approximately $30 billion at the beginning of 1962.
4. Indeed, when Lyndon Johnson finally convinced Byrd to pass the 1964 Tax Cut bill out of the
Senate Finance Committee in January 1964, a budget introduced then under $100 billion
assured the success of President Johnson’s lobbying efforts. “Harry,” Johnson announced after
322
T U E S DAY, O C T O B E R
2, 1962
tax cut from the House Ways and Means Committee with sufficient alacrity
to lift the economy before it fell too far behind its full-employment potential? Would a recession be required to force Mill’s hand, or could the
administration convince him and others that to wait for a recession would
mean failing to exploit the potential of an economy that was growing but
growing all too sluggishly?
Because the performance of the U.S. economy had most recently fallen
short of administration projections—a $555 billion GNP at midyear,
when the Council of Economic Advisors had forecast $570 billion—the
administration’s full-employment goal, established conservatively at 4
percent, was no longer a realistic target for 1963 but had to be pushed
back to the middle of the presidential election year of 1964.5 Slippage in
the employment target was a symptom of a larger problem for the
President and his economic team. Leading economic indicators were
offering only an indistinct picture of current economic trends; the significant durable goods orders category, for example, had reversed its direction every month from May to August. Kennedy needed to know where
the economy was heading to make a firm decision on tax cuts.
Somehow the White House had to reconcile a certain reluctance to
act, in the face of opposition from Congress and much of the U.S. business community, with a growing unease at inaction, produced by an
uncertain, perhaps teetering, domestic economy. To find a good economic policy when the best was beyond the political pale, as Kennedy
adviser Walter Heller once put it, was the task at hand as the President
convened the following meeting.
Begins in midconversation.
Elmer Staats: . . . well, we’ve thought of that, Mr. President, just to
inject . . . one note of optimism is that I think it is very likely that you
will not have a deficit on the income . . . the national income basis which,
as you know—and nobody else seems to know [unclear] the question—
presenting the official budget for fiscal year 1965, “I’ve got the damn thing under $100 billion . . .
way under. It’s only $97.9 billion. Now you can tell your friends that you forced the President of
the United States to reduce the budget before you let him have his tax cut” [quoted in Richard
Goodwin, Remembering America: A Voice From the Sixties (Boston: Little, Brown, 1988), p. 262].
5. The 1963 target was introduced in Kennedy’s first Economic Report to Congress delivered
on 22 January 1962 [see “Message to the Congress Presenting the President’s First
Economic Report. 22 January 1962,” Public Papers of the Presidents, John F. Kennedy, 1962
(Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1963), p. 45].
Meeting on the Budg et and Tax Cut Proposal
323
that the amount of the deficit will be less than the amount of the cut . . .
the net reduction in taxes.6 So that you could say that tax reduction is
really what’s causing the deficit. You need that for full-range growth
because . . .
President Kennedy: That is what sustains the argument that the
deficit is necessary to counteract [unclear], but you’d have a tough time
justifying this tax cut because they’ll say we should reduce expenditures.
As much as you have intended to reduce the taxes, we’re going to have to
make the argument that the deficit is desired.
Douglas Dillon: Yeah, well, also you have the other argument that
tax reduction is desirable to take the brakes off growth and provides
incentives and that to make reductions equivalent to that would mean
that you’d have to cut your defense budget and things like that. And,
obviously, either way it’s the—
President Kennedy: Well, I don’t, I don’t mind taking on that argument so much. I’m not as—
Dillon: Although I find the second one, that’ll pitch everything on the
economic angle, that people don’t understand, although I think it’s . . .
will have to be made politically.
Theodore Sorensen: That’s really my point also, Doug. In other
words, we can say that, at least on the income . . . national income basis,
we could give you a balanced budget if we’re not thinking a tax cut, but
we think the tax cut is needed.
David Bell: Well, you can’t, economically, sustain precisely that point . . .
if I recall the figures correctly. Because without the tax cut, the economy
would not be pushing high enough so that that would be true, you see.7
Sorensen: Because of the feedback on taxes?
Bell: Exactly—because of taxes. But, the point, I think, is—
President Kennedy: Well, the problem is . . . is ’64.
Dillon: Another thing that complicates that, Mr. President, is this idea
of what we said we’d do is to make a retroactive tax cut. And, the effect of
that really is that, for most of these assumptions, are that you won’t be able
to get any of that retroactivity in operation except by refunds which take
place in ’64. So in ’64 you have a double deduction: you have the deduction
6. The national income basis is a method of budgetary accounting, unlike the standard federal
procedure known as the administrative budget, that includes trust fund receipts and expenditures (Social Security, highway grants-in-aid, unemployment compensation, etc.), omits government transactions in financial assets (e.g., federal loans), and records liabilities when they
are incurred (accrual basis) and not when cash changes hands.
7. To produce enough revenue to achieve balance.
324
T U E S DAY, O C T O B E R
2, 1962
on the income side, not only from tax-rate reduction but also from the
refunds for ’63, which are claimed backwards. So it’s—I’ve forgotten what
the figure is—about a 3 or 4 billion dollar deficit.
Bell: [Unclear.]
President Kennedy: Deficit?
Bell: Yeah. But . . . the assumption is made here that the figures you
see there is about 2 billion dollars. The deficit in ’60—fiscal ’64, which
represents refunds—
Charles Schultze: If—
Bell: —to people who paid—
Schultze: If you—
Bell: —their taxes in ’63.
Schultze: If you look on page 7, and look at that fiscal ’64 figure of a
13 billion dollar deficit, if the reductions were not retroactive, that figure
would be 9.6 billion.
Bell: Yes, you’re right. And—
Schultze: And even if the . . . if the corporate rates were retroactive,
but we coupled that with the Mills plan, but the personal rates were not
retroactive, it would still be 9.6—8
Bell: You’d get—
Schultze: You get below your 10 billion figure. This means that a
great deal of the . . . we put this into the picture, if we did that, went back
to where we left off and we left out the commitment, just on the personal
income tax, your 981/2 billion figure would be less than a 100 billion; it
would be a substantially less increase than in previous years; you could
probably cut your deficit below 10 billion to this 9.6; and you could cite
the fact that the tax cut is equal to about three fourths of the deficit.
That is, that the tax cut of 7 billion that this is based on is equal to threefourths of the deficit. Now, the argument against that is that the lack of
retroactivity would not permit your return to full employment, but
would bring it down to about 41/2 percent rather than 4 percent in ’64.
Bell: The retroactivity part of it that you really have to be asked to
make a decision on, very obviously, is a tricky one, because the time you
need the economic boost from a tax cut would probably be next spring,
8. Wilbur D. Mills, chairman of the House Ways and Means Committee, had suggested in earlier meetings with the President and other administration officials that the Internal Revenue
Service could reduce withholding rates, alone or in conjunction with a tax cut, to jump-start
the economy.
Meeting on the Budg et and Tax Cut Proposal
325
and that’s not the most likely time to get the tax bill enacted. So, this is
going to be a difficult legislative problem.
President Kennedy: Unless you have to divide it, I don’t know. We
could look for that.
Dillon: Even if you do that, if, you see, if it passes very quickly, you . . .
there’s no particular feeling that, say if it even became law some time in
May, then you probably couldn’t get the refund checks out in time. On the
other hand, in ’63 . . .
President Kennedy: There’s nothing we can do about the deficit,
then, with respect to recession in the winter or spring, is there? As far as
a tax cut?
Walter Heller: But, do you really think that’s a . . . that’s an inescapable
con[clusion] . . . legislative judgment, given the fact that there had been a
couple of cases where Congress has whistled through a tax cut?
Dillon: Oh, if we could get a tax cut through in March, we could get,
oh . . . we could get, definitely, some of the refunds out in time, but not
all of them.
President Kennedy: Well, John Gerrity called, said in about thirty
minutes Kaiser Steel’s going to take the price on it and cut it. 9 Twelve
dollars a ton across the board?10
Unidentified: Fools! [A whistle.]
Unidentified: A cut!
Unidentified: A cut!
President Kennedy: Twelve dollars a ton?
Unidentified: Gee! [Unclear exchange. Laughter.]
Staats: Well, I would . . . Let’s see, It would be . . .
Unidentified: Eight percent . . .
Staats: One hundred and four dollars . . .
9. John Gerrity was the Washington bureau reporter for the New York–based Daily Bond
Buyer. See Walter Heller’s later comments in the transcript.
10. Later that day, Kaiser Steel Company announced cuts on products from its Fontana,
California, mill. It changed its price for plates and structural shapes to $108 a ton from $122
a ton; for hot-rolled steel to $104 a ton from $116.50 a ton (compared to the $106 a ton
charged by eastern mills); and for cold-rolled steel to $143 a ton from $148 a ton. The price
cut on which Kennedy and his advisers are commenting here is the price cut for Kaiser’s hotrolled steel. Chairman Edgar Kaiser noted later that day that the cuts were made to end
regional differences, to make the West more competitive domestically, and to “materially
assist in combating foreign steel imports to the West coast.” Immediately after the Kaiser
cuts, U.S. Steel’s Geneva Steel division in Torrance, California, and Pittsburg, California,
announced comparable cuts.
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Unidentified: Twelve dollars . . .
Staats: I mean 140 dollars, which is about—
Unidentified: Eight percent.
Bell: Eight percent. Yeah.
Heller: This fellow Gerrity’s very close to the steel industry. . . .
President Kennedy: Who is it?
Heller: And there’s a good chance that that’s right. He’s a reporter
now for the Bond Buyer. He used to be up on the Hill. That’s one Irish
Catholic—
President Kennedy: What’s the effect going to be of that? On the
economy?
Sorensen: It ought to be good.
President Kennedy: Good?
Bell: It’ll stimulate buying of steel. . . .
President Kennedy: How would it?
Bell: On the other hand, it may be regarded as a symptom of a—
President Kennedy: Recession?
Bell: —of a recession.
Heller: Yes, I think the first reaction will be—
Unidentified: Stockholders will—
Heller: —the stock market will say—
Unidentified: [Unclear.]
Heller: —now the squeeze is going to get tighter.
Schultze: This may be what this stuff ’s all about, anticipating this.
[Unclear.]
Unidentified: [Unclear.]
Gardner Ackley: That lowers their profit position, too.
Schultze: Well, that’ll be the principal thing, I think, the impact on
profit.
Heller: Of course, steel users will not be entirely unhappy about this.
President Kennedy: That’s Roger’s. Roger Blough’s six-dollar
increase . . .11
Heller: This is a retroactive—
11. The President is referring here to the $6 a ton across-the-board increase implemented by
Roger Blough and U.S. Steel back on 10 April 1962, followed by increases by five other steel
companies the next day, and rescinded by all when the President objected publicly, said that he
had been double-crossed, and began deploying his government contract, antitrust, and tax law
leverage to force the rescission.
Meeting on the Budg et and Tax Cut Proposal
327
President Kennedy: Roger Blough is obviously . . . is just saying that—
Heller: —justification for the President’s action.12
Bell: Not long—
President Kennedy: Well, he could say, “No, it isn’t a justification,”
that if he ignored it, they would have to bring it down anyway.
Unidentified: No, I think it’s better than my calling Roger.
President Kennedy: [Unclear.]
Ackley: What Walter’s saying is that this is not [unclear] this enterprise system we have, and so are our foreign competitors.
Dillon: And so . . .
Unidentified: They have [unclear].
Schultze: I would lay a small bet that this won’t—
Unidentified: [Unclear.]
Schultze: —involve one, more than one company.13
President Kennedy: Why?
Schultze: Why—
Heller: One percent of the industry, Mr. President.
Staats: And a maverick 1 percent at that.
Heller: Yeah.
Dillon: They don’t . . . barely sell the Pacific coast.
Schultze: This is a market maneuver, not only on the stock market
but in order to get Kaiser up a notch or two, you see.
Heller: Yeah, that’s right. That’s the competitive system.
President Kennedy: They’re all just a bunch anyway, you know.
Unidentified: [Unclear], that’s right.
Bell: Since the outlook for the economy is not clear . . .
Heller: Well, now, Dave, before . . . is it, is this an operating assumption that we can’t possibly get a quick, simple kind of tax reduction,
across the board, of some kind?
Dillon: When? By March?
Bell: I take it that it depends on what the economic situation looks
like.
President Kennedy: I think it’s . . . I suppose it’s possible that you
12. Heller’s implication is that Kennedy’s effort to achieve a rescission of the April 1962 steel
price increases was an effort to force the steel companies to abide by, rather than thumb their
noses at, market fundamentals. Able to raise prices in the short run due to oligopoly positions
in the U.S. market and lucrative government contracts, the U.S. steel industry’s pricing power
was fast being undermined by increasing foreign competition.
13. As noted above, U.S. Steel’s Geneva division did follow suit.
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could always, well, if you had any votes or if you broke even in the congressional election maybe you can justify coming back and doing it if
you really thought it was necessary.14
Ackley: The economic conditions, I think, are obvious enough.
Dillon: Well, the vote answer is that’s the new Congress. They wouldn’t
start doing anything until close to the first of February.
Schultze: I would say in answer to your question, Walter, my own
judgment would be that if the economy is more or less moving along at
the present tide, no. You’ve got to have something that’s recognizable as
a recession.
Unidentified: [Unclear.]
Heller: Is there any, anything approaching a commitment from
Wilbur Mills to move fast if—?
President Kennedy: Oh, well, you know, it just depends really, on the
situation. I think—15 [Unclear exchange.]
Dillon: If you get those hearings, if they both have hearings, you
know, [unclear] but certainly Byrd would on anything like this. 16
President Kennedy: In June and July, is that the one?
Unidentified: In fact there [unclear] the hearings [unclear] month.
Bell: Well, in view of the fact, the possibility that, or the fact that we
don’t know what the most likely possibility is for the economy at this
stage, we are suggesting that the tax bills, in effect, be worked on over
the next Monday or two . . . which would be appropriate for either contingency—if the outlook looks very good going on into ’63, or looks as
though a recession is going to be breathing down our neck. And that if
these questions of the timing and retroactivity and the nature of the tax
reduction and all that, on which the Treasury will be working on, be
brought back to you later this fall.
The presentation here, however, is intended to indicate that whichever
way it goes, you . . . it looks as though it’s kind of political to present a
deficit in ’64 of the size and magnitude . . . that we may want to be presenting a proposition for economic reasons, which would be . . . make a
14. The President is returning to the idea of the special session of the lame duck Congress,
which he discussed with Wilbur Mills on August 6 (see Volume 1, “Meeting with Wilbur
Mills,” 6 August 1962).
15. Kennedy had arranged several recent meetings with Mills to discuss this issue (ibid).
16. Harry F. Byrd, Sr., was a U.S. senator from Virginia, 1933 to 1965; chairman of the Senate
Finance Committee, 1955 to 1965; and founder of the Joint Committee on Reduction of
Federal Expenditures.
Meeting on the Budg et and Tax Cut Proposal
329
pretty, a pretty large deficit indeed. Now, so far as the expenditures are
concerned, we do have a need for some instructions on them at this point.
If you look at the thing that says “attachment” there, there’s no reason for
you to be called. And I’ll tell you in just a minute some other political
facts. The key point is that, as indicated there on pages 1 and 2, we find
built-in changes of about 5 billion dollars, which means—17
President Kennedy: What will those be . . . the major . . . in space, I
suppose?
Bell: Yeah. Space. At the bottom you’ll see a billion and a half of it is
defense, another billion and a half for NASA.18
President Kennedy: Where’s that? Oh, I see . . . both under five billion. Now, is that the pay increase?19
Bell: No, we do not count the pay increase as built-in, Mr. President;
we count that as optional. That’s on top of this. This is simply the
increased expenditures associated with the procurement plans and the
force plans that you’ve already approved.
President Kennedy: Three billion of the five billion is defense and
space . . . ?
Bell: Right.
President Kennedy: And a half a billion, really a half, is HEW?20
Bell: Right.
President Kennedy: Now, you’ve got a billion and a half left.
Bell: You’ve got a full table on page 5.
President Kennedy: I see.
Bell: Now, beyond this, we think there is another billion seven, which
represents sensible carrying forward of your program, and, indeed, it
includes legislative proposals that are not passed this year but which
you’ve already recommended to the Congress. And that, the nature of
which . . . the amounts of those increases are also indicated in the table
on page 5. This is how we get the one being kept forward.
17. Early versions of this item may be found in the Theodore Sorensen Papers, Classified
Subject Files, Budget, 1966, Box 44, and Bureau of the Budget, Box 47.
18. National Aeronautical and Space Administration.
19. The reference is to the effects of the “Pay Bill” that Kennedy would sign nine days later on
11 October 1962 granting pay increases to all federal employees [see “Remarks Upon Signing
the Postal Service and Federal Employees Salary Act of 1962,” Public Papers of the Presidents,
pp. 756–57].
20. Department of Health, Education and Welfare (later the Departments of Education and of
Health and Human Services).
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President Kennedy: Yeah.
Bell: And we should warn you that there are a number of the cabinet
officers and agency heads that think these figures are too tight. And that
is also indicated in the table on page 5.
Staats: In other words, that’s [unclear], Mr. President, are in excess
of the amounts that we indicated here.
President Kennedy: Because [unclear] . . . what is the billion five
based on?
Unidentified: [Unclear.]
President Kennedy: [Unclear.]
Bell: It is . . . out of the back . . . very detailed statements that includes
. . . The biggest single item is the 500 million dollar increase in Navy aircraft . . . Navy aircraft expenditures which . . . let’s see, payments on the
planes that are, that are now being ordered or were ordered last year,
F4Hs in very large part.21 And another 300 million dollars of shipbuilding, increased expenditures for shipbuilding under the shipbuilding program which has already been embarked on. There, that’s principally the
start-up on Polaris submarines.22 There are other elements which add up
to close to a billion and a half as [unclear].
President Kennedy: AEC?23
Bell: Now, we would take the AEC down a little bit. This is strongly
opposed by Seaborg and it implies that both a tight program on weapons—
our advice does—and a tight program on civilian power reactors and that
sort of thing.24 The NASA program, if you would draw your attention to
the fact that our figures—the figure we have included in the 100.4 billion
which is 4 billion dollars of expenditures for NASA—that figure now looks
low, not because they are going to add anything in particular but because,
well, they’ve got better cost figures and this figure should be, according to
them—we haven’t fully reviewed this—about 4.7. We think that that’s
unnecessarily high, but it clearly is several hundred million dollars too low
unless some change were to be made in the ongoing program.
21. The F4Hs were fighter planes, later renamed F4A, and also known as “Phantoms.”
22. Polaris submarines, nuclear-powered submarines capable of submerged firing of Polaris ballistic missiles, began patrolling the seas in 1960. The third generation of Polaris submarines,
typified by the USS Lafayette and the USS Alexander Hamilton and capable of firing the 2,500mile A3 Polaris missile, were, at the time of this meeting, currently under development.
23. The abbreviation AEC stands for Atomic Energy Commission.
24. Glenn T. Seaborg was chairman of the U.S. Atomic Energy Commission, 1961 to 1971.
Recipient of the 1951 Nobel Prize in chemistry and discoverer of many of the known
transuranium elements, including plutonium, Seaborg also worked on the Manhattan Project
during World War II.
Meeting on the Budg et and Tax Cut Proposal
331
President Kennedy: I don’t like that. I notice aid to impacted school
districts and all the rest, built-in increases . . .25
Bell: Yes.
President Kennedy: That’s Interior . . . oh, we’re just not going to be
able to do all that, except saline water [unclear] less than that, but some
of the rest of that Interior, Justice . . .26
Bell: Beginning on page 15, Mr. President, we have indicated what
the kind of cutbacks below our figures which would be necessary to
reach this alternative target figure of 98.5. Let me get back to that point.
President Kennedy: What’s that on? What page?
Bell: On 15.
Unidentified: I think it’s to some advantage, though, Dave, to know
how [unclear] will look at the various increased expenditures.
Unidentified: Yeah, and lead up to—
President Kennedy: What about our putting in a . . . What effect
would it have if we put in the federal budget for the next three years? As
you know, the Congress, suddenly, they vote for these programs; nobody
realizes where it’s going to go. We have to take all this. I don’t know
whether we would gain or lose if we put in some of the next three years’
expenditures, and income, and estimates already put in this year.
Bell: Well, they would show . . . and a steadily improving relationship
between receipts and expenditures.27 I’m sure they would be sharply
attacked as “pie in the sky,” as just making the situation look good.
They would be perfectly honest figures, but any figures that far
ahead are necessarily fairly shaky. We would have to—in defending
them—we would need to not to unveil any news . . . that wouldn’t be
hard to defend under those carrying forward existing programs.
President Kennedy: What about when the FAA does a supersonic
string of jet transports?28 I see the French and the British have joined
together on that. I’m interested in that, because that’s a . . . an area
where we’ve got to maintain our position. There also is a dollar in it . . .
sale of aircraft abroad.
Bell: Well, it’s an item that thus far we do not have in—
President Kennedy: Yeah.
25. Additional federal aid to school districts in areas of prominent federal installations, justified on the basis of diminished property tax base in the affected areas, was $229 million in the
final education appropriations bill for FY 1963.
26. “Saline water” refers to pilot desalinization projects.
27. Not, perhaps, what President Kennedy expected to be forecast.
28. The abbreviation FAA stands for the Federal Aviation Administration.
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Bell: —the 100.4. So that would mean—
President Kennedy: I’d like to see if we could get a breakdown of
what he’s going to do with that 100 million, and then the arguments as
to why you don’t think they put it in.
Bell: [Volume fades several times during Bell’s comments.] Yes, well, we have
at our request, he has been making these contractors with special studies.
That’s not our concern. It’s difficult to separate the figures by the first of
December. Bob McNamara, as you may know, Mr. President, has expressed
some skepticism about this supersonic transport, whether we ever get an
urgency in terms of the market for it. 29 There’s also the question of why we
don’t do this with the British and the French. Why do we insist on being
competitive? It’s going to cost us a hell of a lot of money to develop it, and
it’s going to cost them a hell of a lot of money to develop it; maybe we ought
to do it together. How much of a revolutionary notion that would be—
Staats: Doesn’t he have a feeling it’s more of a prestige item—?
Bell: Yes.
Staats: —than it would be commercially profitable in that program,
for a long, long time?
Bell: This is a very high [unclear] for this fall’s budget consideration.
Do you want a special memorandum early in this—?
President Kennedy: Well, I don’t mean to put it in there, but I, anyway . . . I was just sort of interested in itself . . . Whatever the proper
time would be.
Bell: Well, in any event, it’s not in our . . . [sound fades and returns] . . .
at this point, Mr. President.
Ten-second pause.
President Kennedy: Cancel the Skybolt?30 Well, you can’t do that;
there’s a commitment with the British, I think.31 Can’t cancel Skybolt.
Mobile Minuteman and [unclear] in all services.32 And a big Fall
29. Robert S. McNamara was secretary of defense.
30. The transport was an air-launched missile system on which Britain had relied to prolong its
manned-bomber nuclear deterrent. An American commitment to share Skybolt with the British
had been initiated in the Eisenhower administration, most likely at Camp David in March 1960.
Early in November 1962, according to Richard Neustadt’s “Top Secret” report to the President on
“Skybolt and Nassau,” “the Secretary of Defense put to the President and to the Secretary of State
the likelihood that we would terminate our Skybolt program” [Richard Neustadt, Report to JFK:
The Skybolt Crisis in Perspective (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1999), p. 27].
31. “They can’t cancel Skybolt on us,” one Air Force General told a budget bureau aide in
1962. “The British are in with us” (Neustadt, Report to JFK, p. 30).
32. The FY 1963 budget proposal included funding for 200 additional Minuteman intercontinental ballistic missiles (surface-to-surface).
Meeting on the Budg et and Tax Cut Proposal
333
increase in equipment modernization. Proposed pay legislation. Well,
he’s going to have . . . they have . . . . Are they due as much as the other
federal employees?33
Bell: We had thought so, and therefore we had . . . our figures include
a pay increase as of January 1 in ’64, one year after this Spring.
President Kennedy: Well, I’m inclined to think we’d have difficulty
avoiding increasing their pay.
Staats: You’d have difficulty letting it start earlier than that, and they
had difficulty, as you may recall, Mr. President, in getting them to postpone it because—
President Kennedy: Yeah. Well, I think we’ve got to go on that.
Bell: Well, these aren’t the only things you could do, but they are
illustrative of the fact that anything you did to try to knock this $100
billion figure down is going to run you into budgets like this.
Ten-second pause.
Bell: I would think, for instance, that it would be quite difficult to
eliminate all new starts for public works.34
President Kennedy: NASA. We got a pretty good . . . have you got a
good budget group that goes with . . . looking at all these NASA expenditures?
Bell: Yes, we do. It’s handled by the same people that handle the military budget: Veatch35 and Shapley,36 and then about four able, younger
guys who have been watching the program the last two or three years. We
have a pretty good feeling about the work, in so far as the budget side of it
is concerned . . . on the NASA program. But it’s a big program; . . . it’s
jumping up every day.
President Kennedy: It’s a question of whether we’re doing too many
things [unclear].
Bell: Well, this will be coming to you in about three weeks with a special study and report on that. But, it does not look to me as though you
are going to want to trim it back to the extent it would be necessary to—
Ackley: Does your report read that, Defense and NASA, we’re deal-
33. Due to the “Pay Bill,” signed into law by President Kennedy nine days later (11 October
1962).
34. See “Cabinet Meeting on the Federal Budget for Fiscal Year 1964,” 18 October 1962, in
which Bell advises against a policy of “no new starts.”
35. Ellis H. Veatch, chief of the Military Division, Bureau of the Budget. Though this division
would be renamed on several occasions, Veatch remained its chief until 1974.
36. Willis Shapley, deputy to Ellis Veatch and budget analyst for NASA and other scienceoriented agencies and programs.
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ing with both space, both military and space just thrown together. . . .
Can your report [unclear]?
President Kennedy: I’m going to look here for some of the . . .
What’s your thought, Mr. Secretary?
Dillon: Well, the basic problem, where we see it, is that it’s probably
based on the extensive experience up until tax time of this year—
February, March, and quite a little bit—but we feel that instead it would
just be impossible to go up and get a tax reduction if our spending . . .
our increase in spending next year is larger than the increase in spending that we’ve had in any year so far. And that’s what the 100.4 is.
But the increase in spending in fiscal ’62 over ’61 was 6.2 billion
[unclear], and ’61 over ’60, rather, ’62 over ’61 it was 6 billion. And the
proposed increase here is 6.7 billion . . . increase in expenditures. And . . .
which is a larger increase than we’ve had before, so we just really, we
have to somehow get that down a respectable amount below the 6.2 and
6 billion increases, which were the previous ones, if we’re going to justify
a tax reduction.
Now the exact amount below is a difficult thing to judge. We said
981/2, which would put the increase at 4.8 compared with, with the 6
and 6.2. But the bulk of the real increase is that we think it has to be
substantially below what we think [unclear]. It might be you would
hold on the debt limit thing which you came mighty close to veto,
which could be quite a . . . be very difficult. Of course, we’ll know better, we’ll be able to measure this better after we see what happens in
November, but—
President Kennedy: Obviously, if we get . . . set back seriously in
November, we will—
Dillon: Well, on the debt limit case, we seem to have the Republican
vote.37 Increasingly, they all decide they want to vote against the increase so
that when . . . This is just not responsible, but it is just symptomatic of a—
President Kennedy: Yeah. I’m sure it’s going to—
Dillon: So, if we go ahead with the idea of a substantial tax cut, we
don’t believe in these people who say that they have to cut expenditures
equivalently.38 But we do believe that you have to put on a performance
that looks like you’re being careful with the expenditures.
37. The administration had already lobbied successfully for a prior debt limit increase in
March 1962.
38. Harry F. Byrd, for example.
Meeting on the Budg et and Tax Cut Proposal
335
Unidentified: I would turn around and [unclear] your spending
increasing faster than you ever have—
Dillon: [Unclear] certain [unclear]. Well, right across the board for a
total figure of 6.7 increase, which is about 15 percent or 10 percent bigger than you’ve ever done before.
Bell: Aren’t the . . . but the bulk of the increase under our . . . more
than two-thirds of the increase that we projected here would be in the
national security and international field, and so on. So it could not be
attacked on the grounds it was letting loose of the strings on the civilian
side. I know that Aikman is not party to the increase with something at
West Point, but I guess he is.
Now, it’s difficult to make an accurate estimate—along the lines Doug
is talking about—because we don’t know how firm this 93.7 figure’s going
to be. It’ll be another three or four weeks before we have a really . . . a good
solid figure for ’63 expenditures, now that the Congress is completing
action. Remember last year when we had our midyear budget review, we
suddenly came up with a billion dollar agricultural expenditure that we
hadn’t expected. Now we hope we’ve guarded against any unexpected
finds this year, but we shouldn’t think of the 93.7 as too precise, as yet.
Think of it as being—
President Kennedy: Of course, Ken Galbraith, though, thinks we’re not
going to get the tax cut at all while we run a deficit. 39 It might be you’d do
better for the economy if you have the expenditures for those . . . [unclear]
and Berlin, that you get them and . . . tax . . . but, however, that’s a viewpoint we’re just not going to be able to get. 40 Economic education has not
proceeded enough to let you . . . to think of the Congress, as tough as this is
going to be—next one probably—to get that kind of a tax cut through.
Bell: This is about the proper position to take. This is hammereddown-type figure in the program that you’ve—
President Kennedy: Except I will say everybody wants to increase these
expenditures. I know how desirable all these programs are, but I just . . .
Bell: Remember, sir, that this is . . . the figure they gave us originally
was 108 billion.
Sorensen: More than the [unclear], Mr. President, it seems. What
39. John Kenneth Galbraith was ambassador to India and a Harvard economist. Galbraith had
argued, quite prominently, that increased expenditures were a preferred alternative to tax cuts
if the administration sought a fiscal stimulus.
40. Military buildup and added expenditures related to the ongoing Berlin crisis.
336
T U E S DAY, O C T O B E R
2, 1962
the Budget Bureau has done in their [unclear] submissions, and it worries me that some of it we’ve already cut too far to get down to the 100.4.
Bell: The third and fourth columns there.
President Kennedy: As far as 1964, the agency—
Bell: Yeah.
Unidentified: Yeah.
Ten-second pause.
Sorensen: So that while I’m sympathetic to Doug’s point, I don’t
know where the $2 billion can be cut out.
Twenty-second pause.
President Kennedy: About this goal in three years. Has that got the . . .
where do you think . . . or are we just suggesting what these expenditures
are going to be?
Heller: I like the idea.
Sorensen: I don’t think it . . . I’m trying to think of . . . you’d just,
you’d just be taking on that and many more enemies unnecessarily.
Bell: Maybe because it would show the expenditures rising.
Sorensen: Yes.
President Kennedy: Well, It doesn’t rise so much, though, except in
space. So far I’ve gotten space. They got NASA. That’s the big rise.
Bell: Well, these figures would have to be revised a lot—
President Kennedy: Yeah.
Bell: —further than they have been.
President Kennedy: That’s right.
Bell: My guess is—
President Kennedy: I don’t see any enormous—
Bell: —if you tightened them up, they would probably look like—
President Kennedy: HEW’s the biggest.
Bell: —105, 109.
President Kennedy: And HEW went from 4.2 in ’62 up to 9.3.
Dillon: Well, economic aid—
President Kennedy: Well, we’ll have to just cut that back. But, I see
nothing else except for HEW with a really big rise. Treasury interest,
but the—
Sorensen: Housing and Home Finance.
Bell: It would be comforting to a lot of people to see those NASA figures, because it would show that they’re going to taper off after another
year or more of a rapid rise.41 HEW would be the big issue, that’s right.
41. Figures are in the form of multiyear projections, discussed here.
Meeting on the Budg et and Tax Cut Proposal
337
President Kennedy: What is that increase for?
Bell: Well, it’s a—
President Kennedy: Population increases?
Bell: No, there’s a big increase in education, which is connected with
the bill, the elementary and secondary bills you’ve had up there now.
President Kennedy: Well, they’re not going to pass that.42 That’s just
a . . . start off with that realization.
Bell: What do you mean? You—
President Kennedy: Starting off, we ought to talk about whether
we’re going to go again with that.
Bell: Oh, yes, I see what you mean. Well, that’s . . . that’s a . . . well,
that’s at least a billion dollars and maybe more, but the increase that
shows here between ’64 and ’69 . . . Another substantial increase is in the
higher education field. There is some increase in welfare, which is natural. You know, they go up every year—by 2[00], 3[00], or 400 million
dollars. And—
Staats: NIH goes up over a billion dollars. 43
Bell: NIH keeps on rising—I’ve forgotten the precise rate we’ve
assumed in here, but 2 or 3, say $250 million a year, something like that—
increase.44
Dillon: Regularly.
Bell: The people who are in favor of health research have their eyes
set on $2 billion by 1970. This would be . . . to take it there this is less of
a rapid rate of increase than they have proposed. I believe those are the
principal increases in HEW, I don’t—
President Kennedy: HHFA.45 That would be . . . what’s the reason for
that hike?
Bell: Well, that’s mostly built-in. That’s the steady rise in the Urban
Renewal program which was financed a year ago, with the Housing Act
of ’61. And it would be showing quite substantial increases in outlays as
the cities get their Urban Renewal projects to the point at which payments made to those cities—
President Kennedy: What about mass transit?
Bell: Mass transit’s in here, also. I’ve forgotten the precise figures
42. These bills, for additional aid to schools, were defeated in the 87th Congress.
43. The abbreviation NIH stands for National Institutes of Health.
44. The original budget proposal for NIH for FY 1963 was $741 million, an increase of $113
million over FY 1962.
45. Housing and Home Finance Agency.
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that are here. If you want to think seriously about this, Mr. President, we
can very readily put together a memo to show you the kinds of figures
connected to programs that would be implicit in—
President Kennedy: Well, it would only be if it were not going to be
a rapid increase which would look like we’re inundating them. And the
only advantage would be if you’re going to give an impression that this
is [unclear].
Dillon: This is [unclear] increase.
Bell: Well, and if it does give that impression . . . I mean it logically
does. Whether it would look that way and be politically vulnerable, I—
Heller: Dave, I doubt that it would look that way, and I’m not sure
that we want them all saying that it’s—[Unclear exchange.]
Dillon: —things way ahead of us and not too [unclear].
Unidentified: Umm . . .
Unidentified: That’s true.
Dillon: That’s very ostentatious.
Bell: Well, it’s up in the air with 3 more billion dollars than we said
we’d [unclear].
Heller: Well, not only that, when you’ve got the economy going full
tilt, you’d probably want to hold back some programs.
Bell: That wouldn’t be so hard.
Unidentified: Yeah.
Unidentified: On the other hand, you might take some [unclear].
Dillon: I think on the expenditures thing, while 981/2 seems a good
figure, providing you freeze inflation, but, the basic essence of the thing
is that you just have to come back, so that your increase in expenditures
is something clearly less than it has been. And I would say that this
shows you’ve done the best you possibly can on expenditures at the same
time you—
Schultze: This would . . . I would say, Doug, that in the eight years I
was up there, I never heard anyone use that as a measuring stick.46
Dillon: What?
Schultze: Whether expenditures increased more this year than they
increased last year or the year before that. And, secondly . . . and my
guess is that this increase, percentage-wise, is smaller than those previous increases.
Dillon: Probably about the same.
46. From 1952 to 1959, Schultze served as a staff economist with the Council of Economic
Advisers.
Meeting on the Budg et and Tax Cut Proposal
339
President Kennedy: Well, I don’t think the . . . you know, I think it’s
just really a question of whether it’ll be a 100 billion figure and so on,
plus the fact you’re asking for a tax cut of 6 or 7 million dollars; and then
have . . . maybe you can’t do anything about it.47 If you ask for a tax cut
with a $4 billion deficit, it’s probably just as hard a political struggle if
you ask for it with 6 billion . . . probably. We don’t know how many people who . . . all of the Republicans are going to be against us unless we
get a tax bill which is so designed to take care, in a sense disproportionately, of their constituency.48
Dillon: Because one thing is, too, is that this figure is a higher figure
than anyone has contemplated anywhere. It’s gonna be a shock. But
there’s not much you can do about it. I think everyone, I think, expects a
4 or 5 billion dollar increase in expenditures, but I don’t think any of
them think it should be moved this high next year. Even Mr. Byrd hasn’t
mentioned that [unclear].
Heller: Well, the Senate bill is high.
Sorensen: We’re probably going to go this high this year.
Dillon: Huh?
Sorensen: Yes, he [unclear]—
Unidentified: Well . . .
Sorensen: —in one of his speeches.
Dillon: Hmm.
Bell: If we can . . . one of the things that you’re suggesting, implicitly,
is that if you estimate a little generously on the ’63 expenditures, which
we’re about to put out a release on, that you’re likely—
Unidentified: Yeah.
Bell: —if that were 95 billion dollars instead of 93.7 . . . The
Congress, after all, has added a number of things. They moved forward
the date of the pay increase, and added money for health research and
military perks, and so on. Then, the big jump in ’63 to ’64, would fit your
description even of these figures.
47. Speaking rapidly here, President Kennedy said “million dollars” when he meant to say “billion dollars.”
48. Convinced that aggregate demand was the linchpin to greater private investment and to
the growth of the economy, both President Kennedy and Chairman Heller of the CEA originally sought a tax cut proposal under which the lion’s share of the decreases would go to individuals and to the less well-off. Other cuts and incentives for wealthier individuals and for
corporations were gradually added in as the political obstacles became clearer and the necessary amendments were considered. This was true in the area of tax reform as well, where even
more compromises had to be made to secure only a few somewhat modest changes.
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Dillon: Uh-huh . . . uh-huh. [Unclear.]
Bell: I don’t know but—
Schultze: One way of looking at it, in capsule form in terms of fiscal
policy, is that the first two years we’ve tried to get the economy going by
increasing expenditures and the budget deficits. Now if we go to a sharp
increase in expenditures and tax cuts on top of it, we leapfrog over the
intermediate step which is tax cuts, withholding expenditure increases—
down, which is a—
Bell: The budget that was presented to them—
Schultze: —kind of an intermediate step.
Bell: —in January of this year, because the budget will show a relatively small expenditure increase—under 21/2 billion dollars—and a balance if the economy would perform as we hoped it would. Now, the
reason there isn’t a 31/2 billion increase in expenditures, but 6, is because
’62 expenditures were lower than we thought they would be, by about $2
billion, a little over. And ’63 is going to be higher than we thought in
January. But the budget policy was a very conservative one in January.49
It wasn’t a . . . it wasn’t a deficit policy to lift the economy; it was deliberately a balanced-budget policy.
Schultze: No, I’m speaking in terms of results, so—
Bell: Yeah.
Schultze: But what we—[Unclear exchange.]
Bell: Well—[Unclear exchange.]
Bell: The result is that the economy has not moved forward as it
should and we’re stuck with a deficit. It isn’t because we planned it
that way.
Dillon: No.
Schultze: Oh, no. No, we haven’t planned it . . . yeah.
Heller: We need to remember that on the . . . on the basis that makes
economic sense—the income and product account—we went into balance . . . second quarter of this year, virtually.50
President Kennedy: What about the change in our method of
budget-keeping as far as the repayable loans, and so on?51 Has anybody
got any thoughts on that?
49. Revenues, from lower-than-expected levels of economic growth, also trailed most forecasts
for this period.
50. Income account is national income accounts basis. See note 3.
51. Prepared on the national income accounts basis, the federal budget would not include federal repayable loan outlays or proceeds.
Meeting on the Budg et and Tax Cut Proposal
341
Bell: We’ve been working with the council.52 We had some brief discussion earlier on this. We have a staff paper that everybody is looking
at. If you take out repayable loans, it doesn’t take out very much, around
$3 billion or 3 plus, in this particular series of budget years. If you just
take it out and say the budget should be regarded as the figures exclusive of this, you don’t gain enough to make much impact on the deficit
figures, and you pick up a fight for yourself without much benefit. In
consequence, and third . . . secondly, we looked at the questions of . . .
President Kennedy: Three billion dollars might be of use to us.
Bell: Well, yes . . . in the sense that it would reduce the budget deficit,
apparent deficit. We’ve assumed that we should present a set of budget
figures that represent the federal financial transactions in some kind of
total sense. And then we say, and alongside of it, here are the income and
product account figures which are a more accurate indicator of the economic effects of the federal budget.
And, of course, the repayable loans are excluded from that so that the
income and product account deficit will presumably look that much better than the cash figures that we use. And, accordingly, we get that benefit . . . we expect we will have that benefit by using the income and
product account figures.
And our question, therefore, is what about the overall budget figure?
Do we also take it out of there? You can, of course, ask, “Should we take
more out?” We could take out repayable loans plus capital items of various kinds. Go to a quasi-capital budget. We’ve had some preliminary discussion with Walter and his boys on this. There’s a little disagreement
among us, and I think it might be better if we brought the question to
you a little later rather than today.
Heller: I agree.
Bell: I think there’s some majority sentiment against rather than for
this point, but it isn’t a matter that’s closed up, nor . . . one on which
we’re ready to ask you to sign off.
Take the Chamber of Commerce committee. You’ve seen the preliminary draft of their report that you asked Mallon53 to set up, I mean,
Plumley.54 Mallon’s the chairman of the committee. . . .
52. The President’s Council of Economic Advisers, Walter Heller, James Tobin, Kermit
Gordon, and staff.
53. Henry Neil Mallon was chairman and director of Dresser Industries.
54. H. Ladd Plumley was chairman and president of State Mutual Life Assurance Company of
America and president of the U.S. Chamber of Commerce. President Kennedy asked Plumley
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President Kennedy: Have they been through much of this with you
about what the expenditures are?
Bell: We met with them, yes. There are on the committee two or
three quite able people—Frank Pace55 is a member, and Norman Ness56
is a member—who really know what they’re talking about. They’re . . .
we’ve been working with them all along. And one of them showed us a
draft of the report in an early stage, and what it was, if they carry
through as it is now drafted, it’s going to recommend, implicitly, abandonment of the administrative budget, but the use of the cash statement—consolidated cash statement—as the main presentation of federal
receipts and expenditures.57 Now, this is not necessarily a bad idea. This
would show a total which next year would be around 116 billion dollars
of expenditures and around a hundred and—
Schultze: About three and a half lower in deficit.
Bell: Yeah. Now, that includes all the trust fund receipts. It includes
the trust funds, and since the trust funds are gonna be running some
small surplus next year, that will help the overall . . . would help the
overall appearance of the budget . . . cut the deficit. You could say this is
the overall summary of the federal receipts and expenditures. Within
this, there are the following categories—
President Kennedy: What’d be the advantage of having this?
Bell: Well . . .
President Kennedy: Why do they think it’s a good idea, this group?
Bell: Well, they have different ideas. Some of them think it’s good simply because it would produce a bigger figure than the one we’re now using.
President Kennedy: And they want to—
Bell: Make a horror story . . . say that the budget is obviously getting
out of hand. Others simply say that this is a better representation of the
transactions in the federal government, and a better figure to have in
people’s minds is how big the federal government’s financial transactions actually are in relation to anything you want to measure it
against—total national income or product or what not.
and others at the U.S. Chamber of Commerce to study both government budgeting and the
administration’s tax cut proposal.
55. Frank Pace, Jr., was chairman and director of General Dynamics Corporation.
56. Norman Ness was vice president and director of the International Milling Company,
Minneapolis, and director of the Minneapolis Grain Exchange.
57. Like the national income budget, the consolidated cash basis includes trust fund receipts.
Unlike the national income budget, it records transactions on a cash, rather than accrual, basis
and includes net loans and other credit transactions. In FY 1967 the federal government
would begin reporting its official budget in this form.
Meeting on the Budg et and Tax Cut Proposal
343
President Kennedy: There’s no doubt that all these programs are
desirable. I mean, like mass transit, I can go explain things that ought to
be done. The question really . . . I mean even in defense . . . I mean in
these other countries, nobody else is spending this kind of [unclear] are
even cutting their defense expenditures and all these other people. We’ve
got space and AEC in addition to defense, and foreign assistance which
none of the rest have. It’s really a question of whether we’re spending
and figuring and thinking about a tax cut, whether these agencies, I
don’t think we have confidence in their [outlook] . . . because they’re
only considering their own agency and not the overall . . . We really have
to worry about—
Bell: Their figures are 108; ours are 100. We’ve taken a big discount
from their figures already. We think that these both represent a reasonable
program to carry forward the kind of things that you . . . all of us have considered are desirable for the growth and security of the country.
Furthermore, we think that this is a . . . these are figures which are easily
sustainable by the economy. There isn’t the slightest doubt that this is a
sensible program in terms of the use of resources. On any real grounds, this
is a good program; however, what it is that the [unclear] that Doug talks
about and other political considerations are obviously very important.
Sorensen: As you know, Mr. President, this is one kind of meeting we
have where we all agree about what we’ve done. When we have a meeting on, let’s say, on military assistance, and somebody else on how a dam
will save that state, and so on, and it’s a . . . it gets pretty tough to . . . I
think the Budget Bureau has cut hard. Now, and we . . . I think we really
need a decision from you today as to whether we want a budget in the
neighborhood of 100.4 or in the neighborhood of 98.4, so they can go
ahead and make their tax, economic, and budget decisions on that basis.
If you find on pages 15 to 19—
President Kennedy: I think we ought to—
Sorensen: [Unclear] that those things ought to be cut out, then.
President Kennedy: Well, I think we probably ought to try to get it
under a 100 billion just for . . . if we can do that, then we have the political argument of the tax thing. So I suppose we’d better try to put it
ninety . . . I know that nobody doesn’t like to go the 99.3 route, but . . .
Sorensen: Because it just means for sure that you bust the 100 maybe
the year after, which is a worse year to do it.
Bell: Well . . .
President Kennedy: They’re going to say a 100 billion budget anyway, but why don’t we say—[Obscuring noise.]
Unidentified: Keep it below a 100 . . . half a billion of leeway.
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President Kennedy: That’s right.
Bell: Well . . .
Heller: If we shift emphasis to the other budget, they’re going to be
well above a 100 billion anyway.
Unidentified: Well, this is, again, the—
President Kennedy: This is the advantage of the cash—58 [Unclear
exchange.]
Bell: That’s true, Mr. President. That would be one advantage to following the Chamber of Commerce suggestion . . . cash total.
President Kennedy: Well, here’s what I’d like us to do with all . . .
to make this decision with a little more light than I have now. I think
the Treasury, if the Secretary thinks that that’s what we ought to do.
But I think we ought to get from the Treasury, after a consultation
with the Budget [Bureau], what it is we would take out in order to
reach that figure. Then we can tell whether we ought to do it, whether
it’s worth . . . whether the advantage we gain in the way we sell it,
whether it’s worth taking out 2 billion dollars. I don’t know. . . . That’s
what we have to decide. It may not well be, and I don’t know enough
about what we’d be taking out. Have you got down what we’d be taking
out of it?
Unidentified: Right. That’s what [unclear].
Dillon: Well, that’s . . . there’s a lot of things together there; I don’t
know whether they’re the only things to be taken out or not.
Unidentified: That’ll take a little longer than it’s worth?
Bell: We definitely tried to take the marginal items.
Dillon: What you considered really marginal?
Bell: [Unclear] not only [unclear].
President Kennedy: Those are the ones that we all want to take . . .
from 16 to 19?
Bell: That’s right. These are the ones which we think would be the—
President Kennedy: Well, we can’t . . . we can’t postpone the pay
thing.59
Dillon: Well, I just never figured that we could do anything about
the Skybolt. We’ve got an international commitment on that. [Unclear.]
President Kennedy: [Unclear] into Skybolt?
Bell: Skybolt is . . . it’s pretty close to being up for consideration for
58. Consolidated cash budget.
59. Federal pay raises instituted by the “Pay Bill” signed nine days later (11 October 1962).
Meeting on the Budg et and Tax Cut Proposal
345
cancellation on its own merits. If it weren’t for the British commitment,
we might very well be recommending it as a normal part of—60
President Kennedy: Let me ask how much the British are putting
into the development of Skybolt compared to us?
Bell: Oh, damn little . . . damn little. It’s practically all ours.
Schultze: Mr. President, we haven’t really looked at the expenditure
figures since July. We made an estimate in July. Since that time we
haven’t a program to counter . . . a different mix or different selection
and then on . . . we haven’t attempted to do that today.
Bell: One thing that might be interesting, Mr. President . . .
President Kennedy: I think you ought to do that though, if you’re
gonna give—
Bell: We could pretty well, if you wanted us to, we could go shoot at
an increase—if that made any sense—an increase of less than $6 billion
from whatever the ’63 figure turns out to be when we know. I don’t think
that makes much difference in terms of bill consultations, but Doug said
he’d work with the Ways and Means Committee. . . . It may mean something to them.
President Kennedy: Do you think that if they’re given 100.4 is . . .
This is aside from what the increase is. Is it just the percent of the
increase that disturbs you, or is it the 100 billion?
Dillon: Well, it’s everything all added together. I mean it’s the fact
that it’s a 100 billion; that’s more than anybody expects. Now, if we’d
been at 96, and everybody had known that we’re coming up to 100, that’s
one thing. But Byrd and all these other people who think that we just
spend money much too fast, they’ll make their own estimates and say,
“Well, next year it’ll be another 4 or 5 billion and we’d be approaching
100 billion dollars.” None of them are dreaming that you’re going to go
over it, and so it would be a shock to them. And, again, I think that’s a
fact that we have to recognize. It’s very important. For that reason, the
100 billion figure does mean something to them. And I think it’d be better if the . . . 99.3, that much out of 100.4, because it’d look like you’ve at
least tried.
60. Days later, on 26 October 1962, after receiving confidential information from Roswell
Gilpatric that Secretary McNamara would seek to cancel the Skybolt program, Dave Bell sent
a memorandum to McGeorge Bundy, intended originally from the President, that noted a
“firm recommendation by the Secretary [McNamara] that the SKYBOLT missile be cancelled” (Neustadt, Report to JFK, p. 33).
346
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2, 1962
Schultze: Well, the simplest line to take, which is a very difficult line
to take budgetwise, but the simplest line to take from the standpoint of
accuracy, is that in this year in which we’re trying to reduce taxes and get
the economy moving to this prescription, we’re going to live with our
built-in increases, the things we have to live with, and we’re not going to
authorize any new programs. This is a price we’re going to have to pay.
Now, this is the only kind of simple, political logic, I think, that you can
make, rather than a . . . than a pick and choose. And, I guess—
President Kennedy: Now, I’ll tell you what; let’s get on with it.
Unidentified: About the consulting . . .
President Kennedy: Why don’t we get the Treasury with the Bureau
of the Budget to tell us what they would take out of that, in order to save
that which—
Dillon: We could do that, but [unclear] moot point is [unclear].
President Kennedy: [Unclear] we’ll have alternatives for what we
choose or not choose.
Dillon: [Unclear.]
President Kennedy: Well, that’s one question. Now, those will have
to wait until we see what you’re suggesting we omit in order to cut this
thing down.
Sorensen: Well, that . . . even that isn’t necessary, Mr. President,
unless the Treasury feels that the list which Dave’s put together on
pages 16 to 19 is not an adequate list.
Staats: I have a slant, Mr. President . . . [Unclear exchange.]
Staats: This list here adds up . . . adds up to 2.8 billion. To get down
to Doug’s figures, it’d be only 1.9. So we have definitely put in here more
items that add up to 2.8 than you would need to get down to—
President Kennedy: Why don’t you give us a [unclear].
Dillon: Some of the things aren’t on this list. For instance—
President Kennedy: What else have we got to decide?
Bell: That’s all . . . at this point.
President Kennedy: [Unclear] do something else, so we can talk a little more?
Bell: All right.
President Kennedy: But, in other words, we don’t see any new budgeting procedures that are going to make our problem easier, do we?
Bell: I do not, Mr. President, but we haven’t signed off on—
President Kennedy: Is everybody agreed that we shouldn’t try to put
up an advance sort of list? It seems to me in some of these programs
where the increase will be much marked and where there is going to be a
plateau, that it may be advantageous to indicate it.
Meeting on the Budg et and Tax Cut Proposal
347
Bell: Yes. [Unclear exchange.]
Dillon: —the space program, and particularly with HEW you could
say that this list was [unclear]. [Unclear exchange.]
President Kennedy: —we won’t allocate for [unclear]. I think it’s facing the facts, because they’re the ones . . . two-thirds of our increases have
been in these areas. We can look for the next three or four years at this . . .
Ackley: We soften the impact of the $100 billion breakthrough, if we
add in the cash figures.
President Kennedy: It doesn’t say foreign aid, too. We’ve got to consider what we should do with foreign aid.
Dillon: That’s something we want to look at, because actually these
figures—foreign aid—are too high, and the Budget Bureau reduced
them themselves, because they were based on back when . . . before
Appropriations had cut substantially. [Unclear] reduced these figures
automatically, so we [unclear].
Bell: [Unclear.] McNamara is not necessarily, when he gets through
with the next month or so, going to come in with figures this low.
Certainly, they’re not going to be lower, and they may very well be substantially higher. If he adds divisions, for instance, that he is considering—
President Kennedy: They’re the 16, in addition?
Bell: Above 16. That was Max Taylor’s recommended addition.61
President Kennedy: Well, Max is going to be an expensive chief.
Dillon: He’s gonna be an expensive [unclear]. [Laughter.]
Bell: The space budget looks as though it’s going to have to be
higher than what we have here. Seaborg, Celebrezze,62 Freeman63 are
among the agency heads who have already put us on notice that they
will be proposing substantially larger figures.
President Kennedy: [Unclear.]
Bell: It isn’t going to be easy, but we come to this figure. If you want
to go to the lower figure, then I think we should start it by talking to the
Cabinet . . . who we’re going to need to take along. But we should say to
the Cabinet that the figures that they and we have been talking about,
that you have reviewed now, and they look to you too high, and you have
instructed us to go back and trim them back. Because this is the kind of
61. General Maxwell D. Taylor, former superintendent of the U.S. Military Academy and
Army chief of staff, had been sworn in by President Kennedy as Chairman of the Joint Chiefs
of Staff on 1 October 1962, the day before convening this recorded tax and budget meeting.
62. Anthony J. Celebrezze was secretary of health, education, and welfare, July 1962 to July 1965.
63. Orville L. Freeman was secretary of agriculture, January 1961 to January 1969.
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2, 1962
backing that we would require to go back to these people and open it up
on the low side.64 And that could be better, you know . . . easier than—
Dillon: [Unclear.]
Bell: I’m not saying we don’t want to do it. But I think we ought to, if
that’s the way you want it.
Dillon: One thing, Mr. President, that’s . . . I think important.
Looking at this, it’s one of the big areas, and this is this NASA program
where for us to cut back anything you’d have to slow up the date of the
landing on the moon. I asked Dave what that meant and he said that
meant ’67. Now . . . well, I . . . we’ve always had this commitment to be
there by the end of the—
President Kennedy: No, we really felt that ’67 . . . . We said the end of
the—
Dillon: End of the decade.
President Kennedy: Yeah. I think we probably should not . . . I think
we . . . currently there may be some things we’re doing in space which
are superfluous or just supportive but not vital. But I don’t think we
ought to . . . I’d rather unbalance my budget and all the rest, and—
Dillon: You want us to get there by ’67?
Unclear exchange between Dillon and President Kennedy.
President Kennedy: —not have the commitment. Then if we could
justify it, we could make a mistake and we’d be penny-wise and [poundfoolish]. And really . . . except, the only question I really have is whether
that agency isn’t doing many more things up in space than—
Bell: Well . . .
President Kennedy: —than is to be done.
Bell: Yeah.
President Kennedy: And the Defense Department.
Bell: Yeah, with this we have—
President Kennedy: Our Titan III, and so on.65
Bell: Yeah. For this we have a full-scale review which is now . . . just
coming into focus now, and we’ll be back to you in about two weeks on it,
which takes Titan III versus the C1 and the other elements.66 There isn’t
much duplication, direct, as you know. But the Air Force has a Gemini
program, now, as well as NASA. They want to use Gemini for military
flyers, to learn how to operate out there. And we are questioning that, so
64. See “Cabinet Meeting on the Federal Budget for Fiscal Year 1964,” 18 October 1962.
65. The Titan III was the largest intercontinental ballistic missile.
66. The C1 is the Lockheed C-130 Hercules transport plane.
Meeting on the Budg et and Tax Cut Proposal
349
that . . . But I don’t think there’s much there; we won’t find there’s a
great deal of duplication to cut out. I think that we will achieve—when
we bring this to you, and it’s been nailed down—some limits on the military program which will be very helpful.
Meeting begins to break up.
Unidentified: [Unclear.] I’m going to meet Senator Douglas on the
[unclear].67
President Kennedy: I’m meeting him at 5:30. [Unclear exchange.]
Dillon: Mr. President, if you could say that I have talked about this
overview, now, you know . . . if that would counteract the New York
Times last Sunday?68
President Kennedy: Yeah, yeah. That’s right, about the business thing.
Yeah. Well, what we can . . . what we’re going to put in the economy, we
got there. What we’re going to take out as opposed to the [unclear] . . . the
heart. What can we say?
Dillon: Well, we . . . I guess they’re getting the figures together. I think
that on an expenditure basis, on a national income accounts basis, we’re
giving much more stimulation, certainly, than we were in the last . . . in the
second quarter of this year. I think that would be something that . . . you’ll
have the figures in a couple of days, that—
Bell: Yeah, [unclear] difficulty is—
Dillon: —you could talk about.
Bell: —not the difficulty. But what the point is, that on an income . . .
on a real basis . . . on an income and product accounts basis, what we are
doing now is running a deficit. That is stimulating the economy. We, of
course, have not publicly announced any figure for the deficit. And we
will not, presumably . . . will not do so until this review of the budget
comes out a few days after the election . . . except determining that we
have plans for it, as the—
President Kennedy: I mean, isn’t it possible for us to say that we’re
spending $4 billion more to [unclear] last quarter?
67. Paul H. Douglas was a Democratic senator from Illinois, 1949 to 1967, and chairman of
the Joint Economic Committee, 1959 to 1967.
68. Possibly James Reston, “Seattle: The Mood of the Country and President Kennedy,” New
York Times, 23 September 1962, p. 10E. Reston noted: “Not since the heyday of antiRoosevelt feeling in the Thirties has there been such personal and emotional feeling against
‘that man in the White House.’” Though this feeling may well be what Dillon hopes to counteract, Reston concluded by adding that “the main strategic objective of the Democratic
party now, as always, is to have elections decided on a simple partisan basis, and the
Republicans, by making a party issue out of the steel price controversy and the stock market
crash, have clearly furthered this aim.”
350
T U E S DAY, O C T O B E R
2, 1962
Bell: It would be possible, yes.
Dillon: Just to say that. Something like that.
President Kennedy: I think we have to go to . . . can’t we say that in
the first six months there was this plateau effect during the last—
Dillon: Everyone knows there’s a seasonal effect, and I think you’ve
got to disengage a little bit out of that, because that is so . . .
Bell: The seasonal effect is—
Dillon: You can’t take credit for the seasonal effect. That wouldn’t—
Bell: Well, the seasonal effect is not real. That’s simply a cash—
Dillon: A cash—
Bell: —that situation there. It doesn’t have to mean that—
Dillon: [Unclear.]
Bell: —there’s a real effect on the economy.
Sorensen: Oh, you mean we’re putting in 4 billion dollars more, seasonally adjusted?
Bell: Yes, that’s right.
Heller: Well . . .
Dillon: In fact, you’re putting in some more, but—
Bell: Yeah.
Dillon: —in addition, they’re putting in more demands; it’s just seasonal.
President Kennedy: I think we ought to try to get it in shape for putting out, whether it ought to be put out by the Treasury, or the council,
or the Budget Bureau . . . . We can decide when we take a look at the figures.
Bell: That’s fine.
President Kennedy: I think that with all this trouble, right now, the
market’s having, the quicker we do that, the better.
Bell: Well, now, we’ll have the figures, I think, tomorrow.
President Kennedy: What do you think, the Sunday [New York]
Times? Should we get that fellow who writes to . . . where is the most
effective . . . ?
Heller: I think in the Sunday Times and send it [unclear].
Bell: Sunday Times, Monday Wall Street Journal. I think that’s probably the way to do it.
Dillon: [Unclear.]
President Kennedy: Well, I think that we ought to probably let
Treasury or the . . . if we’re going to put it in those mediums, we ought
to let Treasury or the Bureau of the Budget do it.
Schultze: How about Treasury?
Dillon: Well, no one’s going to get past the [unclear].
Meeting on the Budg et and Tax Cut Proposal
351
Bell: [Laughter.]
President Kennedy: [Unclear.] I don’t think we—
Bell: [Unclear] statement of fact.
President Kennedy: Maybe it ought to come from the Bureau of the
Budget. I don’t think we want to have Walter do it. 69
Bell: No, I think that’s right.
Dillon: [Unclear] political thing with the Bureau of the Budget.
[Unclear exchange.]
Unidentified: I think we can—
Dillon: It might need to be done right after the Congress quits.
Bell: There’d be some logic in a preliminary flash figure right after
the Congress leaves, you know, it would be something to hang it on
there if the Congress left and our quick estimate of the effect of their
actions on the budget seems to . . . indicates that we are now—
President Kennedy: I think it ought to come out of the [Bureau of
the] Budget. So let’s try to do it as quickly as we can. We can estimate
Congress going on Saturday. Maybe we could do it in the Sunday papers
or Monday because that’s a quicker—
Bell: OK.
President Kennedy: OK.
President Kennedy turns the machine off.
Before welcoming the chairman of the Joint Economic Committee,
Senator Paul Douglas of Illinois, into his office, the President had to take
care of a matter even more pressing than the ’63 budget. At about 2:30
P.M., Governor Barnett had called the White House to request that the
federalized Mississippi National Guardsmen be returned to state control. The President understood that he had to minimize the amount of
time that Oxford appeared to be under siege. Kennedy began taping a
conversation of this matter with Kenneth O’Donnell in the Oval Office
before calling the secretary of the Army, Cyrus Vance. With the recorder
still running in the Oval Office, Kennedy also taped most of the telephone conversation with Vance.
69. Walter Heller was chairman of the Council of Economic Advisers. Compared to Dave Bell
at the Bureau of the Budget, and Treasury Secretary Douglas Dillon, Heller was considered
the most outspoken liberal voice in the administration on matters economic.
352
T U E S DAY, O C T O B E R
2, 1962
5:25 P.M.
[T]he first 24 hours the use of force was desirable, and now it
won’t be. So that I suppose every time you get a picture of somebody getting knocked down, it feeds the fire around that place.
Conversation with Kenneth O’Donnell and Cyrus Vance70
On October 2 as of 8:00 A.M., 8,735 Army troops had reached Oxford,
with more heading toward the town. By the next day (October 3), the
number would reach 9,827. According to the New York Times, the total
number of troops (including the National Guard) in Oxford and the surrounding area was approximately 15,000. The Army units were under
the direction of General Hamilton Howze.
President Kennedy: Secretary Vance, he doesn’t [unclear].71
Kenneth O’Donnell: Now, Mr. President, there are 2,500 National
Guard troops that we’d like to take out, you know, the chlorine that sunk
[unclear].
President Kennedy: Yeah.
O’Donnell: There is a danger that we are going to use guards to do it.
[Unclear] have not been federalized. Twenty-five hundred to do it anyway.
President Kennedy: Get the guards in. Well, what will they use?
O’Donnell: The 2,500 are not involved anyway for the [unclear].
President Kennedy: Yeah. Who conducted? Who [do] we turn them
over to?
O’Donnell: The state.
President Kennedy: All right.
O’Donnell: And these are the ones who’ll try to do something?
[Unclear.]
President Kennedy: OK, fine. Now, who are we going to have
announce that?
O’Donnell: Vance just called me, he said he’s proceeding to do it but
he won’t . . .
70. Tape 27, John F. Kennedy Library, President’s Office Files, Presidential Recordings
Collection. The telephone call with Cyrus Vance is on Dictabelt 4J.1, Cassette B, John F.
Kennedy Library, President’s Office Files, Presidential Recordings Collection. They have been
spliced together to reproduce all sides of this three-way conversation.
71. Cyrus Vance was secretary of the Army.
Conversation with Kenneth O’Donnell and Cyr us Vance
353
President Kennedy: Will he announce it then?
Evelyn Lincoln announces that Secretary Vance is on the line.
Evelyn Lincoln: Secretary Vance.
President Kennedy: [on the telephone] Hello?
Cyrus Vance: [Unrecorded.]
President Kennedy: Oh, yes this is fine about the 2,500 troops then?
Vance: [Unrecorded.]
President Kennedy: About being used for that chlorine business?
Vance: [Unrecorded.]
President Kennedy: Yeah, for that purpose?
Vance: [Unrecorded.]
President Kennedy: And then they would not be called back in?
Vance: [Unrecorded.]
President Kennedy: Right. Now, [the dictabelt recording begins here]
what about the other, the troop situation down there? How do you, how
are you, how many . . .
Vance: We have got, it should be about 10,000 now. Those are what
Howze is trying to stabilize in the Oxford area, sir.72 And what we propose to do on this, was General Wheeler was going to get in touch with
General Howze, ask him to prepare a plan with respect to the phased
withdrawal of troops of Mississippi.73 And to submit that back so that we
could then come and submit it to you, sir.
President Kennedy: Yeah, the quicker we could probably make some
public indication of that, then, of course, the better off—
Vance: Right, sir.
President Kennedy: —psychologically it would be. They think that
that’s the number that they may need for awhile?
Vance: Yeah. They think that for the time being or so that this is the
safest number to have there.
President Kennedy: I see.
Vance: It may be somewhat excessive, sir, but my feeling is it’s better
to be safe on [unclear].
President Kennedy: Now, do they have some instructions down there
about how they should handle people? That they . . .
Vance: Minimum force [unclear] minimum force.
President Kennedy: . . . so we could, you know, that’s been sort of
restated. I think it may have to be restated today because in the first 24
72. Hamilton Howze, commander of the 18th Airborne Corps, was in charge of the military at
the Oxford campus.
73. General Earle G. Wheeler.
354
T U E S DAY, O C T O B E R
2, 1962
hours the use of force was desirable, and now it won’t be. So that I suppose every time you get a picture of somebody getting knocked down, it
feeds the fire around that place. So I suppose at least it ought to be
brought to his attention to see how he thinks it should be done.
Vance: Right. Well, we will do so.
President Kennedy: OK. Fine.
Vance: Sir, do you want to release anything [unclear], would you like
us to do it in terms of the public release?
President Kennedy: Let me just think about that. Now, we’ve got the
question of this release back to the state. Probably if we do it, it’s a little
bit too . . . Has he asked us to do it, Barnett? Has Barnett asked us for
them or who’s asked?
Vance: Barnett has not asked us; Barnett has not asked us to do this.
President Kennedy: Yeah. Who has asked us to do it?
Vance: Mr. President, I can’t tell you who in the state of Mississippi has.
President Kennedy: He did. You see, well, now . . . Why don’t we do it
this way? You people announce that the President has approved the troop—
Vance: All right. [Unclear] “the President has approved.” We’ll
release it over here and check the [unclear] . . .
President Kennedy: We ought to find out who’s asked us to do it,
though, so that . . .
[off the phone to Kenny O’Donnell] Well, when did he ask us to do it?
O’Donnell: The Governor asked us to.
President Kennedy: Well, when did he ask us, do you know?
O’Donnell: He asked us about 2[:00] or 2:30.
President Kennedy: [on the phone to Vance] The guess is that they,
Kenny says that the Governor asked the civil defense, and so on. Of
course, I suppose he didn’t ask for the troops because he didn’t have to
ask us for the troops.
O’Donnell: No, he asked them for a declaration of a national emergency so he could get . . . [unclear].
President Kennedy: We’d given them that [unclear], that we’d give
them a declaration of national emergency?
[speaking to Vance on the phone] Well, now who have you been talking
to about this, Cy? Is it McDermott?74
Vance: McDermott. Yeah.
President Kennedy: About the 2,500? What they’re going to do with
74. Edward A. McDermott was director of the Office of Emergency Planning and a member
of the National Security Council.
W E D N E S DAY, O C T O B E R
3, 1962
355
2,500 troops, I don’t know. We agreed to help them get the thing out.75 But I
don’t know what they’re going to do with 2,500 soldiers to get it out, so . . .
Vance: The letter I have from McDermott says, “While we have no
way to judge the appropriate figure, the state director of civil defense of
Mississippi has informed the Public Health Service officials that 2,500
troops would be needed.”
O’Donnell is saying something to the President in the background.
President Kennedy: [to O’Donnell] Did they?
O’Donnell: He hasn’t [unclear] number of troops.
President Kennedy: I see. All right, well, I see. Well, then, I would
think we ought to say that at the request of the civil defense director—
Vance: State director of civil defense of Mississippi.
President Kennedy: —that yes, the President has approved the . . .
Vance: Yeah. Fine.
President Kennedy: And so we don’t get Barnett into it . . .
Vance: Right.
President Kennedy: Right. OK. Fine.
Vance: Yes, indeed, sir.
President Kennedy: Thank you, bye.
After hanging up the telephone, the President switches off both tape
machines.
President Kennedy’s next appointment was with Senator Paul Douglas
of Illinois. The Douglas meeting and one later with Allan E. Lightner,
Jr., the senior U.S. diplomatic representative in Berlin, went untaped.
Kennedy left the office for the pool at 8:00 P.M.
Wednesday, October 3, 1962
The Kennedy administration continued making gains in Congress. The
Senate sent the White House a tax revision bill containing the Kennedy
business investment deduction. The price for this was the defeat of a
measure to recoup some of the lost revenue through a withholding tax
75. Possibly another reference to the chlorine.
356
W E D N E S DAY, O C T O B E R
3, 1962
on dividends and interest. Compromises also surrounded Senate passage
of the Foreign Aid Bill. The administration did not get as large an
appropriation as hoped; but the Senate was far more generous than the
House, which had cut the tab from $4.8 billion to $3.6 billion. The
Senate authorized $4.4 billion.
What little President Kennedy taped this day dealt with influencing
the Senate-House conference on foreign aid to discourage the House from
incorporating its cuts in the final bill. Kennedy also added to his record of
taped civil-rights calls to the secretary of the Army, Cyrus Vance.
9:20 A.M.
We would like to come over if we can . . . General Wheeler
and I, to discuss [a] withdrawal plan with you, sir.
Conversation with Cyrus Vance1
On October 3, 9,827 Army troops remained in Oxford. Small numbers of
forces began to depart from Oxford by truck and helicopter for either
Memphis or Columbus Air Force Base. Nevertheless, the total number of
regular troops in Oxford continued to increase slightly over the next
several days, reaching 10,113 by the morning of October 8.2
President Kennedy: Cy?
Cyrus Vance: Yes, Mr. President.
President Kennedy: Morning.
1. Dictabelt 4J.2, Cassette B, John F. Kennedy Library, President’s Office Files, Presidential
Recordings Collection.
2. On October 8, the Army removed the remaining check points from the Ole Miss campus,
allowing cars to enter without being searched. Despite this, troops still patrolled the grounds,
the town of Oxford, and the surrounding countryside. More than 5,400 troops that had been
standing by at installations in Memphis and Columbus, Mississippi, were ordered to return to
their bases. According to the New York Times, on 8 October, 3,000 National Guard troops,
14,000 regular troops, and 1,500 military police remained on duty. Of the regular troops on
duty, half were at bases in Memphis and Columbus, 90 miles away.
On 10 October, the Army completed a significant withdrawal of troops from the Oxford
area, reducing the number of men from 10,000 to 5,200. The remaining troops were divided
nearly equally between regular Army and federalized Mississippi National Guard members.
At peak strength, there had been some 23,600 men in Oxford and the surrounding area.
Conversation with John McCormack
357
Vance: Morning, sir. We would like to come over if we can, about
twelve, General [Earle G.] Wheeler and I, to discuss [a] withdrawal
plan with you, sir.
President Kennedy: Good. Fine. OK, I’ll be right here.
Vance: Fine, sir.
President Kennedy: Good. OK.
Vance: See you then.
Robert Kennedy recalled that as a result of the logistical foul-up on the
night of September 30, the President was “as mad at Cy Vance and the
information that Cy Vance was giving him as I’ve seen him during the
course of the administration. He asked for an investigation to be conducted.”3 Vance and Lieutenant General Earl G. Wheeler, the new chief
of staff of the U.S. Army, were due to come to the White House later that
morning to discuss the withdrawal plan for Oxford and, perhaps, to discuss the conduct of the presidential investigation.
Before the arrival of Vance and Wheeler, the President made telephone calls to the Speaker of the House and to Lawrence F. O’Brien, a
special assistant to the President, who handled congressional affairs, to
discuss the forthcoming conference on the foreign aid bill.
10:05 A.M.
I don’t know what my psychology would be these days on Otto.
Conversation with John McCormack4
The President wanted to discuss with the Speaker of the House possible
strategies for getting an increased authorization for foreign aid out of
the upcoming conference on the Foreign Aid Bill committee meeting.
Otto Passman, Democratic representative from Louisiana and chairman
of the Foreign Operations Subcommittee of the House Appropriations
3. Edwin O. Guthman and Jeffrey Shulman, eds., Robert Kennedy in His Own Words: The
Unpublished Recollections of the Kennedy Years (New York: Bantam Books, 1988), p. 168.
4. Dictabelt 4K.3, Cassette B, John F. Kennedy Library, President’s Office Files, Presidential
Recordings Collection.
358
W E D N E S DAY, O C T O B E R
3, 1962
Committee, an inveterate foe of foreign aid, would have to be induced to
accept, in conference, the addition of $300 to $400 million to the $3.6
billion in foreign aid in the House version of the bill. Apparently before
starting to record, the President had told McCormack that Larry
O’Brien, his special assistant for congressional relations, would be coming up to the Hill to see him and Passman.
President Kennedy: . . . foreign aid conference. I didn’t know whether it
would be possible for him to come up and speak to you about our thoughts.
Then perhaps you and I could talk on the phone again and you could give
me your judgment about what we ought to try to work out with Otto.
John McCormack: Sure. A . . . absolutely. And . . . we meet at eleven
today, and Larry can come up anytime. . . . Oh, I’ll come off the rostrum
once we get going. We’re going into the . . . I’ll get into the third supplemental, so will it be convenient for him about half past eleven or so?
President Kennedy: Good. Fine. I’ll have him up there.
McCormack: I think . . . You see, Otto agreed; when I said my understanding . . . I’ll put it that way . . . that he’d go at least 300 in this title
one, and probably a little more.
President Kennedy: Right. Right.
McCormack: Is that right?
President Kennedy: Right. That’s right. He . . . you remember, we
were talking about 350 and then he said, “Well, we will go over 300 and
see what more we can do.” Now, in view of the fact that we did well in the
Senate, actually an even split would take us to 400 million over the House
figure. So I thought that if he went up there with . . . Larry would have
two sets of figures, and then we could just see what we could do with him.
McCormack: And I was thinking that a . . . My thought would be
that . . . that you and I and Passman and whoever you wanted in from the
department would sit . . . get together down at the White House.
Naturally it would be at the White House.
President Kennedy: Right. Right.
McCormack: I think your . . . the psychological effect, don’t you see?
President Kennedy: Right. I don’t know what my psychology would
be these days on Otto. [Laughter.] I’ll tell you—
McCormack: Well, I know, Mr. President, it’s a pretty tough . . . It . . .
it may not get all we seek, but it will get a hell of a lot more than he
would give to someone else.
President Kennedy: OK. Good. Well, I’ll have Larry up there and
then I’ll be glad to meet whenever . . . you think would be best today.
Conversation with Lawrence F. O’Brien
359
McCormack: Today?
President Kennedy: Well, I think if they are going into conference
tomorrow, either today, or whatever time you thought. Today or tomorrow would be fine with me.
McCormack: Better today. In other words, he’d . . . he would allocate
it, as I understood it, anyway you wanted.
President Kennedy: Right. What we got to try to do is get him up to
as near 400 as we can.
McCormack: I know. I agree with you.
President Kennedy: I’ll have Larry up there, though, at 11:30.
McCormack: All right.
President Kennedy: Thanks, Mr. Speaker.
McCormack: Right. Right.
The President then called Lawrence F. O’Brien to inform him of his discussion with the Speaker.
Sometime That Morning
[O]nce you get him briefed on the 400 . . . we can arrange to
see Otto.
Conversation with Lawrence F. O’Brien5
President Kennedy spoke to Special Assistant Larry O’Brien to follow
up on his discussion with the Speaker of the House John McCormack.
The President anticipated having a personal lobbying session with
Congressman Passman at the White House, but wanted O’Brien first to
talk over the foreign aid numbers with the Speaker. Kennedy would also
raise an unidentified matter with O’Brien. That portion of the conversation was either not recorded or erased.
Unidentified: Hello.
Evelyn Lincoln: The President asked for Mr. O’Brien. He’s on.
5. Dictabelt 4K.6, Cassette B, John F. Kennedy Library, President’s Office Files, Presidential
Recordings Collection.
360
W E D N E S DAY, O C T O B E R
3, 1962
Unidentified: OK.
President Kennedy: Larry?
Larry O’Brien: Yes, sir, Mr. President.
President Kennedy: Tell him to call . . . . The Speaker said that he’d
call you at 11:30 and then, perhaps, he will want to arrange—once you
get him briefed on the 400—6
O’Brien: All right.
President Kennedy: —we can arrange to see Otto, if necessary, down
here.7
O’Brien: Right.
President Kennedy: Now, the second thing is that I talked to Charlie . . .8
O’Brien: Yeah.
Secretary Vance and General Wheeler entered the White House at 12:14
P.M. Kennedy did not tape this meeting. After these military advisers left,
the President had lunch with J. Edgar Hoover, the director of the Federal
Bureau of Investigation. The President then went to the Executive
Mansion for the rest of the day. He did not swim today and may have
been feeling the initial effects of the illness that would keep him in bed
all of October 4.
During the afternoon, the President presumably received reports on
the progress of Walter Schirra’s nine-hour space mission. In early
September, Schirra’s mission had influenced the scheduling of the final
phase of the DOMINIC nuclear test series because of concerns over the
radiation effects of high-altitude testing.9 At 6:17 P.M., the President
spoke with Schirra, who had returned safely and was onboard the aircraft carrier USS Kearsage. At 6:30, the President held an unrecorded
meeting in the Oval Room of the White House with his Soviet specialists. It is not known when that meeting ended.
6. The Speaker of the House, from 1962 to 1971, was John W. McCormack, Democratic congressman from Massachusetts, 1928 to 1971.
7. Otto Passman was a Democratic U.S. House member from Louisiana, 1947 to 1977, and
chairman of the Foreign Operations Subcommittee of the House Appropriations Committee.
The most powerful and outspoken opponent of foreign aid in Congress, Passman continually
clashed with the Kennedy administration over its foreign aid requests.
8. Unidentified.
9. See “Meeting on the DOMINIC Nuclear Test Series,” 5 September 1962.
M O N DAY, O C T O B E R
8 , 1962
361
Monday, October 8, 1962
After spending all of October 4 upstairs at the White House with a cold,
the President set off on a three-day campaign swing through Ohio,
Michigan, and Minnesota. Having returned home Sunday night, the
President entered the Oval Office at 9:32 A.M.
While the President was out of Washington, the Berlin situation had
heated up again. On October 6, a British military vehicle, seeking to
come to the aid of a man who had been shot at the Wall, had been prevented from entering East Berlin. Meanwhile talks on Berlin between
Soviet foreign minister Andrei Gromyko and Dean Rusk had brought no
progress. On Sunday the three Western powers were considering a formal protest to the Soviets because the bar on the British military vehicle
was a violation of the Four Power agreements.1
Also during the President’s absence, another U-2 had flown a Cuba
mission. In accordance with the September 10 decision on the reconnaissance plan for Cuba, this U-2 hugged the Cuban coast without crossing
over any territory to avoid identified surface-to-air missile (SAM) sites.
Back from his honeymoon, the director of central intelligence, John
McCone, wanted the next U-2 flight to be more daring. Agents on the
island were reporting the existence of surface-to-surface missiles and
missile sites in one of the regions of Cuba not photographed since
August 29. McCone wanted a U-2 to cover those areas, even though this
meant risking the loss of the plane to a Soviet-made SAM.
McCone had met resistance from the West Wing of the White House
and was on the President’s schedule for October 8. On October 5,
McGeorge Bundy, the special assistant to the President for national security affairs, had defended the reconnaissance plan in conversation with
McCone. Bundy argued that the lack of “hard information” from the center of the island was not really cause for concern because the Soviets
“would not go so far” as to put nuclear missiles in Cuba.2 McCone would
have his chance today to make his case directly to the President.
1. See the New York Times, 6–8 October 1962; Telegram, Rusk (New York) to State
Department, 6 October 1962, FRUS, 15: 348–51.
2. McCone, “Memorandum of Discussion with the President’s Special Assistant for National
Security Affairs” (Bundy), 5 October 1962, FRUS, 11: 13–15.
362
M O N DAY, O C T O B E R
8, 1962
Before McCone’s arrival, the President had scheduled a meeting with
Senator Wayne Morse of Oregon. As Morse was about to enter the
White House, the President called the Senate Majority Leader, Mike
Mansfield, for some advice.
10:30 A.M.
I think that a lot of them are a little bit afraid of Mike
because of his power on the Interior and other appropriations
committees over there. They thought, well, they better go along.
Conversation with Mike Mansfield3
A fight had developed on Capitol Hill over a proposed $10 million appropriation for a National Aquarium in Washington, D.C. The sponsor of the
project was Representative Mike Kirwan of Youngstown, Ohio. A longtime
supporter of organized labor and New Deal–Fair Deal legislation, Kirwan
was best known in recent years as a champion of pork-barrel legislation.
Chairman of the Interior and Related Agencies Subcommittee of the
House Appropriations Committee (and second-ranking Democrat on the
Appropriations Committee), he was nicknamed Big Mike and Prince of
Pork. Democratic Senators Wayne Morse of Oregon and Frank Church
of Iowa and others opposed the aquarium, with support from newspapers
that termed it a blatant boondoggle.4
Senate Majority Leader Mike Mansfield’s secretary, Bobby Baker,
one of the most astute vote counters on the Hill, had alredy warned
Democrats against letting principle dictate their positions on the aquarium, and Morse, Church, and others who ignored this advice had already
suffered Kirwan’s retribution, seeing the conference committee on the
Interior Appropriations Bill eviscerate public works planned for their
states. With Mansfield, Kennedy sought to rescue Morse and the others
and undo some of the potential political fallout. Having asked the nation
to give him more Democrats in the upcoming midterm elections, to
3. Dictabelt 4K.7, Cassette B, John F. Kennedy Library, President’s Office Files, Presidential
Recordings Collection.
4. Morse had developed a reputation for stubbornness and had shown a willingness to take
on his own party—Republican until 1952, an interlude as an independent, and Democratic
from 1955.
Conversation with Mik e Mansfield
363
change a simple numerical majority into a working majority by adding
liberals and moderates to offset conservative southern Democrats,
Kennedy could ill afford a party quarrel of this kind.
Recording begins in midconversation.
President Kennedy: I suppose that he’s going to blow me out of the
water? 5
Mike Mansfield: Not you. Kirwan.
President Kennedy: Yeah, but he’s asked . . . I suppose he’s probably
going to ask me to do something. Is there anything I can do?
Mansfield: Well, now, the only thing is this: What . . . he’s very much
disturbed that because of his opposition to the Aquarium Bill, that
Kirwan has knocked out a lot of his projects—6
President Kennedy: That’s right.
Mansfield: —in the Public Works Bill. He will show you newspaper
clippings which will indicate his and Edith Green’s defeat.7 And there’s
nothing that you can do. . . . All you can say is that you’ll call up Kirwan
and see what you can do, and we’ll probably get Bob Kerr to do the same
thing over here.8
President Kennedy: I see. Well, why did the senators let it go?9
Because, I suppose they’re mad at him [Morse] too, aren’t they? He’s
been kicking everybody around for so long that—
Mansfield: Well . . .
President Kennedy: —finally, they decided to kick him, I guess,
didn’t they?
Mansfield: Of course, well . . . that’s partly it, but it was a personal
thing with—
President Kennedy: Kirwan.
Mansfield: —Mike. And I think that a lot of them are a little bit
5. Referring to Morse.
6. Morse was upset that the Interior Department Appropriations Bill, after passing the Senate
and having been sent to House-Senate conferees, had been stripped of planning appropriations
for the Columbia and Willamette river channel projects, funds for construction of the Yaquina
Bay and Harbor project, and funds for a reclamation project at Pendleton, all in Oregon.
7. Edith Green was a Democratic U.S. House member from Oregon, 1955 to 1974.
8. Robert S. Kerr was a U.S. senator from Oklahoma, 1948 to 1963, and chairman of the
Senate Finance Committee. The irony of Kennedy’s request to have Kerr intercede on behalf
of Morse here is that Morse had recently led a filibuster against Kennedy’s Comsat proposal, a
proposal to privatize government satellite development, ultimately steered through to passage
by none other than Senator Kerr.
9. In the conference committee.
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M O N DAY, O C T O B E R
8, 1962
afraid of Mike because of his power on the Interior and other appropriations committees over there. They thought, well, they better go along.
President Kennedy: Yeah.
Mansfield: And it’s . . . the amounts are really small. They don’t
mean anything.
President Kennedy: Yeah . . . yeah.
Mansfield: But I think that, if you will, say, you will call Kirwan,
and I’ll get Bob Kerr to talk to Kirwan. That might be the best way
out of it.
President Kennedy: Yeah . . . yeah. Well, why don’t I call Kirwan
before I see Wayne, and see whether I can do anything?
Mansfield: OK.
President Kennedy: But, I mean, Wayne . . . [chuckles] OK, Mike.
Right.
Mansfield: OK, Mr. President.
President Kennedy: Good-bye, now.
Following this bit of legislative business, Kennedy met with Wayne Morse
for twenty minutes. The rest of the morning was devoted to foreign policy,
and the President did not tape any of it. John McCone and McGeorge
Bundy came to discuss, among other topics, the secret negotiations with
Fidel Castro over the release of the Bay of Pigs prisoners. James B.
Donovan, mediator for the United States, had just arrived in Havana for
his second meeting with Castro. Having negotiated the trade of Soviet spy
William Fisher, also known as Rudolf Abel, for imprisoned U-2 pilot
Francis Gary Powers in the winter of 1962, Donovan was trusted by both
sides in the Cold War as an honest negotiator. And U-2s may have figured
in another aspect of this conversation. As mentioned in the editors’ introduction for October 8, McCone was in the midst of a campaign to persuade the White House to permit a U-2 to fly over east central Cuba,
where agents had pinpointed a possible missile installation. Bundy had
opposed McCone’s recommendation on October 5, considering it an
unnecessary risk. McCone must have made some progress, as he was able
to press Kennedy further on the need for a U-2 overflight of Cuba again
the next day, October 9.
Following this Cuba discussion, the President met with his science
adviser, Jerome B. Wiesner. The DOMINIC test series still had a month to
go, and with the successful completion of the Schirra mission, there was
nothing holding back the last remaining high-altitude tests. Then the
President performed some more legislative business, which he did tape.
Conversation with Alber t Gore
365
12:00 P.M.
Now, it’s really your choice, and I think that if you ask Hubert
and Bob not to override, they would not and would fight it.
But, I don’t know whether you want to put that much at stake
on it or not.
Conversation with Albert Gore10
The Self-employed Pension Bill, H.R. 10, was passed 361–0 by House
vote on September 25 and 70–8 by Senate vote on September 28.
Permitting self-employed persons to establish tax-deductible pension
funds, it vexed the President in several ways. It was estimated to cost the
U.S. Treasury an expected $100 to $125 million at a time when President
Kennedy hoped to produce a tight budget for the upcoming fiscal year—
mostly to secure passage of his tax cut proposals; it represented an
important step toward taxpayer equity but did not cover all groups with
equal claims; and it struck the President that if introduced later, in a general tax reform package, it might well help secure passage of such reform,
in itself a principal goal of the administration.11
Because Senator George Smathers (D-Florida) threatened to block a
pocket veto by keeping Congress in session as long as it would take,
President Kennedy had determined that he could only sign the bill or
issue an outright veto. The lopsided margins by which the bill had passed
did little to encourage a veto, and his conversation here with Senator
Albert Gore, a prominent supporter of the administration and member of
the Senate Finance Committee, would focus on the likelihood of an override were Kennedy to issue a veto.12 Gore was one of the eight senators
who voted against the measure during its final passage, contending that it
conflicted with the administration’s tax reform proposals designed to
10. Dictabelts 4K.8 and 48.2, Cassettes band M, John F. Kennedy Library, President’s Office
Files, Presidential Recordings Collection. Albert A. Gore was Democratic U.S. senator from
Tennessee, 1953 to 1971.
11. “The President’s Special News Conference with Business Editors and Publishers,” Public
Papers of the Presidents, John F. Kennedy, 1962 (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing
Office, 1963), pp. 714–15. Under the bill, a self-employed person would be allowed to deduct
from taxable income 50 percent of contributions to a retirement fund. The annual deductions
would apply to a maximum of 10 percent of annual income with a ceiling of $2,500.
12. Along with Senator Paul Douglas of Illinois, Gore was the chief supporter of administration plans for general tax reform.
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M O N DAY, O C T O B E R
8, 1962
eliminate special favors for the wealthy and politically well connected.
Having ten days with which to act on passed legislation while Congress
remained in session, Kennedy was fast approaching the deadline for a
decision on a veto.
President Kennedy: Hello.
Albert Gore: Yes?
President Kennedy: Albert, how are you?
Gore: Fine. How are you, Mr. President?
President Kennedy: Oh, very good. Well, now, it looks, unfortunately
like we’re beginning to run out of time—
Gore: Yeah, I’m afraid so.
President Kennedy: —on H.R. 10. Unfort[unately] . . . I wish to hell
that Congress had gotten out Saturday.13 Now, what is your thought
about how we should do this? I don’t want to veto it if . . . unless we’ve
got a prayer. Now, do you think we could . . . what do you think we could
get in the Senate? I don’t think we can do very well in the House.
Gore: Well, it depends on [unclear] . . . Mike will help you. 14
President Kennedy: Yeah, but Hubert’s for the bill. 15
Gore: Well, he’s for the . . . Now, Ralph Yarborough told me that he
would sustain a veto—16
President Kennedy: Right.
Gore: —and announce for it. I’d say it would depend on Hubert and
Bob Kerr.17 If they will resist overriding a veto, then Mike and I can corral enough others to prevent its being overridden.
President Kennedy: Well, now Hubert has told me at the last week’s
breakfast, and he said it again Saturday, that he wants . . . that he’s for
the bill.
Gore: Well . . .
President Kennedy: I’ll tell you what I’ll do is I’ll get ahold of
Hubert and . . . but . . . and see where he thinks we are. What we don’t—
13. Allowing for a pocket veto.
14. Mike Mansfield was a Democratic U.S. senator from Montana, 1953 to 1977, and Senate
majority leader, 1961 to 1977.
15. Hubert H. Humphrey was a Democratic U.S. senator from Minnesota, 1949 to 1964 and 1971
to 1978; majority whip during the Kennedy administration; and vice president, 1965 to 1969.
16. Ralph Yarborough was a Democratic U.S. senator from Texas, 1957 to 1971.
17. Robert S. Kerr was a U.S. senator from Oklahoma, 1948 to 1963, and chairman of the Senate
Finance Committee during the Kennedy administration until his death on 1 January 1963.
Conversation with Alber t Gore
367
Dictabelt 4K.8 ends at this point, in the middle of the conversation
between President Kennedy and Senator Gore. The conversation is continued on Dictabelt 48.2.
President Kennedy: —to do is end up the session which is beginning
to pass some pretty good bills, and have it . . . have us overridden so that
we’re 300 to 3 in the House and, you know, get about 8 or 9 votes in the
Senate. That won’t . . . if we could get it close then we’ve got a . . . then it
seems to me that we’d be glad to . . . I’d like to veto it.
Gore: Yeah.
President Kennedy: But what we ought to do is see how many we can
get; otherwise we’ll end up on such a negative note that we won’t be in
very good shape going into the election to ask for a Democratic Congress,
and we’d give the Republicans something to write about for a week.
Gore: Well, of course, I want you to do whatever you think is best to
be done.
President Kennedy: Right.
Gore: I am more or less saying that if you want to make a fight to
prevent the veto from being overridden, my opinion is it can be defeated
in the Senate. But it can’t be defeated unless you put yourself on the line
on the thing. Now, it’s really your choice, and I think that if you ask
Hubert and Bob not to override, they would not and would fight it. But,
I don’t know whether you want to put that much at stake on it or not.
President Kennedy: Right. Well, let me do this. Let me talk to Mike
Mansfield. He’s against the bill, Hubert’s for the bill, and Smathers is for
the bill. And, of course, Bobby Baker’s for the bill. . . .18
Gore: Well, you know it’s a hell of a thing, with a Democratic majority, to have a paid employee who is a lobbyist for a special interest bill.
President Kennedy: I know, well, he’s working for you fellas.
Gore: I know [laughing].
President Kennedy: [chuckling] Not for me.
Gore: He never did work for you in the Senate.
18. Bobby Baker was secretary to the Senate majority leader, 1955 to 1963. As secretary to
Senate majority leaders Lyndon Johnson and Mike Mansfield, Baker established himself as a
preeminent head counter and dispenser of unofficial favors. He also became an unofficial lobbyist through his Washington, D.C., law firm, Tucker and Baker, and earned a substantial
income even as he drew the meager salary attached to his official occupation. Though officially
attached to Senator Mansfield at this point, Baker worked much more closely with Senator
Kerr and often reflected Kerr’s views on any particular piece of legislation or government
business. In January 1967, Baker would be convicted of income tax evasion, theft, and conspiracy to defraud the government.
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M O N DAY, O C T O B E R
8, 1962
President Kennedy: [laughing] No, I know that . . . I know that. But I
will talk to Mike and ask Mike what . . . how many votes he thinks he can
get and also Bob Kerr, and I’ll be talking to you again before we do anything. Now, it may be that the House won’t have a quorum by Wednesday.
We can see what that situation is. But I won’t do anything on this thing
until late . . . until whatever the time limit is on it.
Gore: I doubt very much if the House will have a quorum, and the
Senate will have a hell of a time getting a quorum.
President Kennedy: Well, we’ll take a look. So we’ve got another 48
hours on it, and in the meanwhile, I’ll be talking to you before
what[ever] . . . I make a decision.
Gore: Whatever you do is satisfactory to me, and I’ll come back up
and make whatever fight you want made.
President Kennedy: OK, fine . . . well—
Gore: Whatever you decide, Mr. President.
President Kennedy: Good. Well, I’m going to have breakfast with
Mike in the morning and then I’ll be back in touch with you before we
make a final decision.
Gore: OK.
President Kennedy: Thanks, Albert.
On October 10, 1962, two days after this conversation and six hours
before the deadline, Kennedy signed the Self-employed Pension Bill
without comment.
Kennedy’s last appointment before lunch was an unrecorded meeting
with Walt W. Rostow, counselor of the Department of State and chairman of the Policy Planning Council.
The only meeting the President taped on this day was a continuation
of the previous Tuesday’s $100 billion budget discussion. This followed
an unrecorded meeting of Bell, Sorensen, O’Brien, and O’Donnell.
Meeting on the Budg et
369
4:48–5:10 P.M.
[S]ome feel that we’re going to have to break the 100 billion
dollar barrier. So we might as well break it now as in the election year.
Meeting on the Budget19
Though Pennsylvania senator Joseph Clark lamented in 1963 when discussing the national debt and the federal deficit that “no topic in our
time has been the victim of so much nonsense,” few then were willing to
countenance the ideas of President Kennedy and his economic advisers
on the subject. Kennedy and CEA chairman Walter Heller and other
administration economists called for a small measure of deficit spending,
for accelerated public works outlays, and for a federal income tax cut to
move the nation’s economy toward full employment and toward its productive potential.20 Though U.S. corporations had increased their indebtedness in the 1957 to 1962 period by approximately 200 percent, U.S.
individuals by approximately 380 percent, and state and local governments by approximately 400 percent, the federal government was
expected to avoid this trend; Kennedy’s political opponents lost little
sleep driving this point home to the American public.
As President Kennedy planned for last-minute campaign stops,
mostly in the Midwest and Northeast (and in Senator Clark’s home state
on five separate occasions), former President Eisenhower was engaged in
a campaign tour of his own, stumping for Republican congressional candidates, speaking pejoratively of Kennedy’s domestic program as the
“Far Frontier,” and warning the nation of Kennedy’s, and by proxy, the
Democratic Party’s, fiscal recklessness. At the meeting detailed below,
Douglas Dillon, Kennedy’s secretary of the Treasury, and formerly
under secretary of state in the Eisenhower administration, began by
recalling the methods under which spending plans had been presented in
19. Including President Kennedy, David Bell, C. Douglas Dillon, Henry Fowler, Walter Heller,
Charles Schultze, Theodore Sorensen, and Elmer Staats. Tape 27A, John F. Kennedy Library,
President’s Office Files, Presidential Recordings Collection.
20. See “Letter to the President of the Senate and to the Speaker of the House Transmitting a
Proposed Stand-By Capital Improvements Act. 19 February 1962,” Public Papers of the
Presidents, pp. 143–44; “Remarks Upon Signing the Public Works Acceleration Act. 14
September 1962,” ibid., pp. 682–83.
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M O N DAY, O C T O B E R
8, 1962
the previous administration. Though the first part of the meeting was
not captured on tape, the recorded portion began with Dillon counseling
the use of low-spending estimates and reminding his colleagues in the
Kennedy administration of how that device had helped the Eisenhower
administration limp toward its modestly higher spending targets.
Kennedy pressed Chairman Heller to use the White House as a “pulpit for public education in economics.” Nevertheless, the President
believed that there were limits on what the administration could do.
Though a tax cut would be difficult to pass, increased spending—in an
obvious and direct fashion—seemed politically out of the question.21
Consequently, with an eye toward the creation of a conservative-liberal
coalition and the postwar reconfiguration of a tax code designed largely
for World War II, Kennedy gravitated more and more toward the tax
cut proposal as the preferred economic stimulus.22 Accordingly, questions like how to spend more on targeted investments, how to avoid draconian cuts elsewhere, and how to present a budget that would appear
“responsible” enough to win a tax cut, defined the discussion as Kennedy
and his advisers considered and wrestled with the administration’s
future budget proposals.
Begins in midconversation.
Douglas Dillon: . . . expenditures on the low side, because it wouldn’t
mean anything if they actually . . . if more was spent because it was . . .
how much you would spend on past commitments, whether you spent
more than estimated. It doesn’t stop you from delivering something
that’s already in the pipeline. And we deliberately made our estimates
low, thinking they might run over, and actually they very seldom, if ever,
did. Oh, it was . . . services couldn’t deliver quite as many and some happily stayed with it. But the key thing is what you request. And in a way,
what you rec[ommend] . . . put down for these two items in expenditures; you really run off the preceding year’s tendency for a good esti-
21. Heller noted that when Kennedy called for a balanced budget in his 1961 State of the
Union address, “we counted seven escape hatches” [quoted in Walter W. Heller, New
Dimensions in Political Economy (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1966), p. 31].
22. Kennedy may never have given up on the idea of economic prosperity through increased
government spending. Only 11 days before his assassination, with the tax cut bill as yet bottled up in the Senate Finance Committee, Kennedy reminded Heller, “First we’ll get your tax
cut, and then we’ll get my expenditure programs” (quoted in Heller, New Dimensions, p. 113).
Meeting on the Budg et
371
mate rather tightly. So I think that these two figures can stand up very
well on the basis of the previous criterion.
President Kennedy: I think we can do something there. Now, the . . .
Peace Corps.
David Bell: This is also, of course, the USIA and the State Department;
there are small increases for both.
Elmer Staats: For the Peace Corps, this would hold them at about the
level of where they would be just about a year from now. About a year
from now they’ll be just about 10,000.
President Kennedy: Soybeans? Has Larry O’Brien left?23 We’re
going to know a little more after this election about agriculture.24
Dillon: Sure. Well, Dave said there have been some other reductions;
. . . price support would be real difficult.25 He said he felt soybeans was
possible and wouldn’t make any difference anyway if you can use it
right.26
Bell: The main . . . the main money in here is the rural housing loans.
That’s the main issue, Mr. President.
Dillon: Let’s see . . . it’s 50 million and 75.
Bell: The REA generating loans is also a tough one.27 [Pause.] Well,
these—
Dillon: In determining anything, it’s just . . . just not going up as fast
as you were doing. That’s the whole point . . . if that’s where you’re planning to go.
President Kennedy: I don’t think we can probably get medical care
by if we don’t cover the non–Social Security beneficiaries.28
23. Lawrence F. O’Brien was special assistant to the President for congressional relations,
1961 to 1965.
24. In the domain of agricultural policy, the Kennedy administration was attempting to move
away from price supports to a regime characterized by direct payments to producers and lessened market interference.
25. The reference is to reductions in agricultural price supports.
26. Soybeans, emerging as a major export crop, were not subject to acreage control limitations, nor would they later be eligible for direct payments. In most years—1957, 1958, and
1961 being the exceptions—soybean market prices had remained above predetermined support levels.
27. The REA is the Rural Electrification Administration.
28. Kennedy’s proposal for medical care for the aged was not faring well, politically, and at the
end of his administration, stood as one of his more notable legislative failures. Indeed, the
Medicare proposal that finally became legislation in 1965 required quite a bit of political
maneuvering, the addition of a Medicaid program for the poor of all ages, and the force of the
Johnson landslide in the 1964 presidential election in order to prevail.
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M O N DAY, O C T O B E R
8, 1962
Dillon: Well, this is just a deferment for one year—
President Kennedy: Yeah.
Dillon: —if you wanted to.
President Kennedy: Yeah.
Bell: Now, this would mean on the education, Mr. President, this
would mean no program at all in the elementary and secondary field.
That’s what the implication of this would be.
President Kennedy: Well, we can’t get it by.29 It’s just really as if . . .
almost a political question as to whether we update it or recommend it,
because [unclear] I think was—
Bell: There have been these suggestions to . . . Remember this year
you had a recommendation for a quality improvement bill. And this 141
million is just everything we had in for that and, as well as, direct aid to
school districts for construction and teachers’ salaries and so on.
President Kennedy: All right. Well I want Ted [Sorensen] to look at
what we ought to do about . . . what we ought to recommend in the field of
education.
Theodore Sorensen: I think, like many things in this list, Mr.
President, we can make a judgment on this at the time we make our legislative program judgments, and the time we make that judgment really
is after election day. If we lose 40 seats, we’re not going to be going up
with the same education bill.
President Kennedy: If we lose ten seats. We lost one already.
Twenty-second pause.
All right, on the Interior Department, I think we can do something
on that by taking another item . . .
Bell: Well, the Indian schools is an important—
President Kennedy: That’s pretty hard to do, we don’t want to . . .
but the other thing, oceanography, helium, conservation, water fowl land
acquisition, fisheries program, increased acquisition of recreational land,
acceleration to improvement of parks and public lands. All those—
Dillon: This is all increased acquisition and acceleration of improvements that we’re talking about; they’d still be moving ahead at present
rates which is already increased over what was ever done before.
[Unclear] that’s all we’re talking about.
President Kennedy: Occupational safety legislation. What is that, now?
29. As he predicted, Kennedy’s aid to education proposals for the 87th Congress were
defeated.
Meeting on the Budg et
373
Bell: That’s a legislative proposal and it’s not much money. Six or
eight million . . .
Sorensen: Grants to states. It’s a very small amount.
Bell: Yeah, 6 or 8 million dollars.
President Kennedy: What does it do? What do we do with them?
Bell: They would be grants to the state labor departments to promote occupational safety standards in factories.
Unidentified: It’s research.
Bell: [Unclear] would also be involved.
Dillon: And, as I said to this thing, this is illustrative—
Unidentified: Uh-huh.
Dillon: —and economic [unclear] 6 or 7 million dollars . . .
Bell: The key point here—
President Kennedy: Well, I think the only way you’re really going to
save much with these 6 and 8 million dollar grants—
Unidentified: [Unclear.]
Bell: Yes. That’s right.
President Kennedy: [Unclear] big programs are too—
Bell: Yeah.
President Kennedy: —have too . . . but, I mean, if you get these agencies all thinking about these smaller ones . . .
Bell: Well, the important issue here would be the training . . . piece of
that. We got in a big fight with the Labor Department about that. We’re
already a good deal lower than they think we should be.
Twelve-second pause.
President Kennedy: GSA.30 That could—
Bell: That, of course, is, that’s work on buildings, primarily. And you
can set that about any pace you want.
President Kennedy: Reduced direct housing loans are proposed,
25,000 housing loans, 23,000 loans?
Bell: Yeah.
President Kennedy: I don’t know really why the Veterans
Administration is in the direct loans these days, anyway. How is it?
Bell: Simply for historical reasons. We got in after World War II. And
successive Budget Bureaus and presidents have been trying to get them
out. Last year, after a considerable fight with Teague, we got an agreement
under which this program goes along, but the veterans begin to lose eligi-
30. The abbreviation GSA stands for General Services Administration.
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M O N DAY, O C T O B E R
8, 1962
bility after a certain number of years.31 And a good slug of the veterans are
beginning, now, to lose their eligibility under that legislation. So this will
be phased out in a period of four or five more years . . . the bulk of it, as I
recall. By ’68, I think . . . you’re just about through with this. But that was
the best we could do in terms of the legislative agreement. And, meantime,
they do have the authority and the veterans are eligible. So you, presumably, have to . . . they . . . they’re under restriction now. They’re holding
back. They could lend a lot more. The question is kind of where you draw
the line of how much heat you’re willing to take to prevent loans being
made that actually could be made under the existing law.
Unidentified: Yeah.
Bell: Twenty-five thousand is about the level this year, and it’s about
the same as the level last year. This involves some cutback.
Fourteen-second pause.
President Kennedy: But, some feel that we’re going to have to break
the 100 billion dollar barrier. So we might as well break it now as in the
election year.
Dillon: Well, I think you may well. . . . I don’t know what you’re
gonna be in, you may well break it in NOA; that’s going to be a different
figure entirely.32 We’re talking about expenditures here. How much
higher is NOA in August, here?
Sorensen: I thought we’d already broken a 100 billion dollars.
Unidentified: Oh, we’re up by 6 or 7 billion.
Dillon: Well, that was a different NOA. [Pause.]
Sorensen: You know that it’s being broken this year?
Unidentified: Yeah.
Bell: About to be five . . . under these figures which are August 30th
figures.
Dillon: So that . . . that includes—
Bell: Mostly 2 billion dollars for the IMF and a lot of things like
that, that are not actual expenditures.33 It won’t be actual expenditures.
Dillon: If we break it next year in NOA so the budgets that are going
in would be over—
Bell: No, it’s broken now!
31. Olin E. “Tiger” Teague was a U.S. representative from Texas, 1947 to 1979; chairman of
the House Committee on Veterans Affairs, 1963 to 1973; and a much-decorated World War II
veteran.
32. The abbreviation NOA stands for new obligational authority.
33. The abbreviation IMF stands for the International Monetary Fund.
Meeting on the Budg et
375
Dillon: Well, it will be again next year.
Bell: Oh, yes, yes . . . [unclear].
Dillon: So, for that reason, I would think in the . . . if it’s broken, then
the . . . I’m only thinking of the expenditure side, would seem to be your
. . . your tax reduction . . . what chance you have to get it.
Walter Heller: Well, there . . . there, you know, there are some other
arguments that point on the up side. Every dollar of expenditure increase
gives you more punch. You get a dollar of tax reduction because you’re
surer of the economic impact and certainly the . . . the slack in the economy.
Secondly, I suppose there is there some validity in the argument that if
Congress is going to cut taxes, and they’re going to want to make a showing of cutting your expenditure proposals—as part of the price of admission of the tax cut—to put them up a little higher doesn’t make you look as
good, I grant, if they cut, but it gives them the feeling that they’ve paid the
price of admission for a tax cut. Well, it’s just that a number of these
things, I think, are cheaper if we do them now than if we do them later.
Dillon: The real problem with that cutting business is that they get
those people involved, and the Ways and Means Committee and the
Finance Committee are not the Appropriations Committee, and they
will, they’ll [unclear]. The chances of getting any tax reduction is going
to be very difficult anyway, and it’s required that . . . showing that we’re
really trying to hold down expenditures.
Bell: I think . . . I believe, now, that you have to—
Dillon: Well, they’re not—
Bell: I don’t make anything out of your third argument. The others, I
think, are something that, you know . . .
Unidentified: [Unclear.]
Bell: The basic problem is that the President’s program would cost
this much. And if you’re going to cut it, you’re going to cut the programs. And this is on the one side, and the strategy of dealing with the
Congress is on the other side, although there are arguments both ways
on the strategy side.
Dillon: But these are all sort of picking at things, and—
Unidentified: [Coughs.]
Dillon: —certainly they are all . . . the foreign aid ones are not
enough, are not any cuts, actually, and—
Bell: Yes, Congress—[Unclear exchange.]
Dillon: —very little.
Bell: Yeah, not very much, but—
President Kennedy: How about the Indian thing we can cut, but that
isn’t very much money in that anyway . . . it’s only about 4 or 5 million?
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M O N DAY, O C T O B E R
8, 1962
Bell: Which, sir?
President Kennedy: The Indian schools.
Bell: Oh no, sir, it’s more than that. I’d say, probably, 15 or 20 million.
President Kennedy: Is it really?
Bell: Yeah. You see, the previous administration left us in lousy shape
on Indian schools.
Staats: I don’t believe it’s that much in this one year, but it’s about a
three- or four-year program all together. But in the first—
President Kennedy: Are the schools pretty bad?
Bell: Well, yeah.
Staats: Yeah, pretty—
Bell: Some of the kids didn’t have school at all.
Staats: A lot of the children just don’t have any school.
President Kennedy: Well, if we’ve got to get a good speech, well, we
ought to give it Wednesday night or through this weekend.34 I ought to
stick to my script, about some of the things we’ve done. As I say, that
thing on agriculture is really impressive. It’s hard to give these speeches
to these . . . threefold, obviously, but it seems to me, over the weekend, if
we can sort of get about three or four speeches—like this Indian school
thing—it’d show what we’ve done there as opposed to . . . it would build
a better base for—
Bell: I think this is, this is 10 million dollars.
President Kennedy: I think that’s sort of the theme for this weekend.
Bell: Ten million dollars [unclear].
President Kennedy: Congress will be closing . . . these will be deadlocked.
Unidentified: [Unclear] the Indian schools.
Dillon: The increase.
Unidentified: Ten [unclear], sir.
President Kennedy: It’s a hell of a story, the . . . I think the agency
may even see it right. Put them all together . . . four different speeches or
three, you’ll have a chance to do these domestic things.
[Pause.] OK, now . . .
Dillon: We simply . . . approach on this, as Ted said, a lot of these
decisions you can’t take until you sit down and do the final thing. It’s just
34. President Kennedy gave a series of congressional campaign speeches in Ohio, Michigan,
and Minnesota, 5 to 7 October 1962, and in New Jersey, Pennsylvania, Kentucky, and New
York, 12 to 15 October 1962. Wednesday, 10 October 1962, he spoke in Baltimore, Maryland.
Meeting on the Budg et
377
a question whether to start off trying to make decisions up here or start
off down here and then if you spot down—
President Kennedy: All right, well, let’s start off with 98.5, Dave, and
then let’s . . . we’ll have to get each one.35 Anything that’s added beyond that
will have to be added as a result of a decision that we’ll take individually.
Bell: OK.
President Kennedy: We may go up to 108 billion, [unclear] go back
to a hundred, but let’s start with the . . . Are you going to [unclear]?
Dillon: I don’t know where you come out.
Unidentified: Before the last election—
Staats: These are bridges we can cross a little better after we get a
little further along with our message. [Pause.]
Dillon: Mr. President, you might like to note that [unclear].
Unidentified: [Unclear.]
Unidentified: [Unclear.]
Dillon: [Unclear.]
President Kennedy: We can divide that, Ted, I was thinking that. . . .
So what do you think about this thing, trying to—
Sorensen: Well, I think, you know it depends a little bit on the audience.
President Kennedy: Hard to make it as a speech, but I . . . I’d like to
get it in as a sort of—
Sorensen: Going on nationwide television, that is something that—
Unidentified: [Unclear.]
Sorensen: [Unclear] I’m already concerned [unclear] that the whole
thing together, although that’s . . . that’s—
President Kennedy: That’ll be a boring speech?36
Sorensen: It’s a less-boring speech. What you need to remember is,
given that audience type and—
Unidentified: [Unclear.]
Sorensen: Out in Minnesota and all . . .
President Kennedy: You haven’t got about15 [unclear] that’s a mean
feat. [Unclear] can stand on the ground. Now those [unclear].
Unidentified: Yeah.
35. Reference is to the $981/2 billion administrative budget (excluding trust fund transactions).
36. After his 13 August 1962 televised address to the nation on economic policy, delivered with a
plethora of statistics and accompanying charts and graphs, President Kennedy seemed particularly concerned that such presentations never be delivered again in such an uninteresting style.
378
T U E S DAY, O C T O B E R
9, 1962
President Kennedy: That poll shows Judd ahead.37
Sorensen: [Unclear] the firsthand meeting [unclear].
Unidentified: [Unclear.]
President Kennedy: If Judd gets to 43 percent . . .
Sorensen: Yeah, [unclear] and Andersen’s pulled up an old [unclear].38
Unidentified: [Unclear.]
Unidentified: That just seems ridiculous.
Heller: Did Hubert say that he was doubtful about that poll?38
President Kennedy: Which one?
Heller: This . . . you haven’t [unclear] this poll, this last one?39
President Kennedy: Yeah, well, no . . . I think we’d better, I don’t
think they’ve got much of a poll. I just think the problem is that . . . oop,
turn that up, will you? Just turn them up.
The President turned off the machine.
The Secretary of the Treasury stayed behind to continue the discussion
with the President and Walter Heller. The President had some time for
more telephone calls, then he went to the pool at 7:03 P.M.
Tuesday, October 9, 1962
The President left only one recording from this important day. An hour
before he was to sign a piece of pork barrel legislation to satisfy a difficult and powerful congressman, the President called Senate Majority
Leader Mike Mansfield for mutual congratulations on the approval of a
compromise version of the foreign aid bill providing for a $300 million
increase over the amount voted by the House.
37. Walter H. Judd was a Republican U.S. representative from Minnesota and keynote speaker
at the 1960 Republican National Convention. Judd, in what was considered a mild upset at the
time, lost in the 1962 election to Democratic state senator Donald M. Fraser.
38. This is mostly likely a reference to Elmer Lee Andersen, governor of Minnesota, then running for reelection in 1962. His reelection bid resulted in the closest election in Minnesota
history with a loss to his opponent by 91 votes.
39. Hubert H. Humphrey was a U.S. senator from Minnesota.
40. A University of Minnesota professor of economics before joining the Kennedy administration, Walter Heller was particularly interested in this Minnesota congressional race.
Conversation with Mik e Mansfield and Mik e Kirwan
379
9:54 A.M.
Are you sure you don’t want to witness this—this extraordinary action as I’m bulldozed and bludgeoned and beaten into
being the greatest friend of the fish . . . ?
Conversation with Mike Mansfield and Mike Kirwan1
Congressman Michael “Big Mike” Kirwan had raised the hackles of Senator
Wayne Morse by removing, in conference committee on the Interior and
Other Agencies Appropriations Bill, several large public works projects
destined for Morse’s Oregon. His sole reason, publicly announced, was
that Morse had refused to support his $10 million national aquarium proposal for the same bill. Recognizing both the capricious nature of Kirwan’s
maneuvers and also the importance of pleasing the chair of the Democratic
Congressional Campaign Committee, who was also a senior member of the
Appropriations Committee, Kennedy asked Senator Mansfield and Senator
Robert Kerr of Oklahoma to help him settle the Kirwan-Morse dispute.
President Kennedy confers here with Mansfield before speaking to Kirwan
in an effort to conclude a settlement agreeable to Kirwan, Morse, and the
President himself. And though the President signed the Aquarium Bill
later that morning, as he promises here, and Kirwan dutifully restored
Morse’s public works projects in the Supplemental Appropriations Bill, the
national aquarium project itself, planned for the Hains Point area of the
nation’s capital, remained dependent on congressional funding that was
ultimately never provided.
Mike Mansfield: [Unclear] it’s for you, Mike Kirwan and I.
President Kennedy: Right.
Mansfield: I told Mike to put the Oregon items back.
President Kennedy: Right.
Mansfield: And, he would appreciate it—if you’re going to do it—he
asked [unclear] that you sign the Aquarium Bill as soon as you can.
President Kennedy: Right. In other words, you would not wait on it?
1. Dictabelt 49.1, Cassette M, John F. Kennedy Library, President’s Office Files, Presidential
Recordings Collection. Mike Mansfield was Democratic U.S. senator from Montana, 1953 to
1977, and Senate majority leader, 1961 to 1977. Michael J. Kirwan was a Democratic U.S. representative from Ohio, 1937 to 1970.
380
T U E S DAY, O C T O B E R
9, 1962
Mansfield: No.
President Kennedy: Right.
Mansfield: It would make Mike very happy.
President Kennedy: Oh, good. I’ll sign it this morning, then.
Mansfield: Fine [unclear] here—wait a minute. Good-bye. Here’s
Mike.
President Kennedy: Yeah.
Mike Kirwan: Hello.
President Kennedy: Hello, hello.
Kirwan: Yes.
President Kennedy: How are you doing?
Kirwan: This is Mike . . .
President Kennedy: Are you sure you don’t want to witness this—
Kirwan: No, no . . . no.
President Kennedy: —this extraordinary action as I’m bulldozed and
bludgeoned and beaten into being the greatest friend of the fish . . . ?
Kirwan: That’s . . . . Do you want me to go down, then?
President Kennedy: I’ve eaten more fish . . .
Kirwan: What? Well, do you want me to go down?
President Kennedy: Well, why don’t you come down and watch it?
Kirwan: All right. That’s what I’ll . . . when are you going to do it?
President Kennedy: Well, I’ll do it whenever you want to be down here.
Kirwan: All right. I’ll go right down now, then.
President Kennedy: OK. Right.
The President had an important meeting on Berlin scheduled with the
French foreign minister, Maurice Couve de Murville, with whom he
intended to share U.S. estimates of how long it would take the allies to
respond to a Soviet provocation in Berlin. It would take four days, for
example, to launch a battalion-sized probe on the Berlin autobahn. The two
men would agree that, given the current tensions on Berlin, contingency
planning had to be improved to allow for a much faster response time.2
The President also had two significant meetings on Cuba. Before
lunch he met with John McCone, Robert Kennedy, Edwin Martin,
George Ball, McGeorge Bundy, and Ralph A. Dungan. In the late afternoon he met again with John McCone, and included Maxwell Taylor and
Roswell Gilpatric. The principal decision facing Kennedy was whether to
endorse the CIA request for a U-2 flight over San Cristóbal in west cen-
2. Memorandum of Conversation, 9 October 1962, FRUS, 15: 351–55.
W E D N E S DAY, O C T O B E R
10, 1962
381
tral Cuba. The flight was to be over Cuba for only 12 minutes but would
come close to some identified SAM sites. The risks were high. The last
time the CIA had photographed this part of the island was August 29
and new SAM sites might have been constructed since then. The
President approved this mission.3 The U-2 would make its direct overflight on October 14.
Wednesday, October 10, 1962
John McCone made an unscheduled visit to the White House on October
10. The Director of Central Intelligence (DCI) had just met with the
House Appropriations Committee to discuss James B. Donovan’s negotiations with Fidel Castro on the Bay of Pigs prisoners. McCone found
some congressional uneasiness about these negotiations. Newspapers on
Tuesday had carried front-page stories on Donovan’s mission, a potential partisan political issue. Donovan was running for the Senate against
the Republican Jacob Javits in New York. It was reported that the 1,113
prisoners were expected back in Miami by the weekend.1 The DCI also
wanted to brief the President on low-level photographs of the cargoes
on the Soviet merchant ships headed for Cuba. Several ships carried
crates that photoanalysts believed contained IL-28 bombers. This was
the first hard evidence of the delivery of weapons that might be construed as offensive in character.
Kennedy did not tape this meeting; however, from McCone’s detailed
summary it is clear that the President was disturbed by these new photographs.2 As he had done when the first U-2 photographs of SAM sites
were developed, Kennedy asked that this material be withheld from the
rest of his administration. His argument was that the domestic political
situation was such that any leak of the information about possible
bombers would reduce his independence of action. McCone argued
against strict restriction and gained the President’s approval to reducing
the circle of the informed to the President’s key advisers and those intelligence officers required to give expert analysis.
3. Gilpatric “Notes on a Meeting with the President,” 9 October 1962, described in FRUS, 11: 17.
1. “Final Parley Set on Cuba Captives,” New York Times, 9 October 1962. James Donovan
returned from Cuba on October 11 empty handed.
2. Memorandum on Donovan Project, Meeting 10 October 62, John McCone, FRUS, 11: 17–19.
382
W E D N E S DAY, O C T O B E R
10, 1962
“We’ll have to do something drastic about Cuba,” McCone recorded
the President as saying. Kennedy expected a new operational plan for
Cuba from the Joint Chiefs of Staff in the week of October 14.
At some point during the day, the President called an old friend,
Senator George Smathers of Florida. Like McCone, Smathers was a prod
on the subject of Cuba. The President, Smathers later recalled, “always
identified me with pushing, pushing, pushing.”3 The immediate reason
for the telephone call was that the President had signed Smathers’s Selfemployed Pension Bill. The President so disliked his friend’s bill that he
signed it without ceremony.
Time Unknown
I just don’t want these guys around; particularly if this Cuban
thing ever works out . . . So, we’ve got to get them out tomorrow night. Then everybody goes home, and, shit, nobody knows
what the hell’s going on.
Conversation with George Smathers4
Wanting to avoid the imminent override of a veto he had hoped to deliver,
Kennedy consented to sign H.R. 10, the Self-employed Pension Bill, only
hours before its deadline, and three days before the adjournment of the
87th Congress. The bill’s chief Senate sponsor, George Smathers of
Florida, had warned the President on September 28 not to consider a
pocket veto; Smathers pledged to keep Congress in session past the signing deadline to prevent just such a possibility. Though President Kennedy
objected to the legislation on the grounds that it would reduce federal
revenue by $100 to $125 million and would largely benefit wealthy attorneys and physicians, he signed it, reluctantly, and called Smathers afterward to break the news. There would, however, be no signing ceremony
for this bill and Kennedy would ask Senator Smathers not to broadcast
news of the signing that evening.
3. Cited in Arthur M. Schlesinger, Jr., Robert Kennedy and His Times (New York: Ballantine
Books, 1978), p. 530.
4. Dictabelt 50.3, Cassette M, John F. Kennedy Library, President’s Office Files, Presidential
Recordings Collection. George A. Smathers was a Democratic U.S. senator from Florida, 1951
to 1969.
Conversation with Georg e Smathers
383
Despite their differences over this bill, Kennedy and Smathers enjoyed
a warm relationship marked by frequent golf outings and White House
breakfasts. Ostensibly a courtesy call to inform Smathers of the latebreaking news, this conversation would meander, as well, into a discussion of the James Meredith–University of Mississippi crisis, the Donovan
negotiations with Castro, and the lingering showdown over the handful
of appropriations bills yet to be completed.
President Kennedy: [Unclear] Smathers that I’d do what you want to
do, and I just signed that goddamned bill.5
George Smathers: Did you really?
President Kennedy: Yeah, in spite of the fact that they tell me there
isn’t a quorum present up there. I just figured that a hundred were going
to show—in spite of what Drew Pearson said.
Smathers: I was getting ready to say, that article by . . . Drew
Pearson’s going to be mad at you.6
President Kennedy: Well, I know that. He is going to be mad at me,
but that won’t be new.
Smathers: Yeah. That’s right, well he’s such a bad guy . . . But you
really signed it?
President Kennedy: Yeah, I signed it.
Smathers: Well, I think that’s fine. Actually, Mr. President, I—
President Kennedy: No, no, no . . . don’t tell me how good it is.
Smathers: No, I’m not going to tell you how good it is; I’m going to
tell you, politically, it’ll be good. It’ll be good.
President Kennedy: What about . . . can you get those guys out of
there tomorrow night? 7
Smathers: I think so. It’s Russell now. 8
5. The Self-employed Pension Bill, H.R. 10, also known as the Keough-Smathers Bill.
6. Reference to a Drew Pearson column published that morning in the Washington Post, discussed in greater detail, below (see Drew Pearson, “The Washington Merry-Go-Round: Sen.
Smathers Puts Up Roadblock,” Washington Post, 10 October 1962, p. D11).
7. A reference to the Senate and to Congress in general. On the heels of the first national elections during the Kennedy administration, the President is anxious to see Congress adjourn
and head home for the last few weeks of the campaign.
8. Richard Russell, Democratic U.S. senator from Georgia, was in the middle of a fight with
House conferees over the Department of Agriculture Appropriations Act, one of a handful of
appropriations bills not yet completed. Jamie Whitten, Democratic U.S. representative from
Mississippi and chair of the House Agriculture Subcommittee of the Appropriations
Committee, had suggested that Senate amendments not previously considered by a House
384
W E D N E S DAY, O C T O B E R
10, 1962
President Kennedy: I know, but, God, can’t we tell him we’ll give it
out of the contingency or we’ll do it with something else? I mean isn’t
there something that we can do with that goddamned Jamie Whitten?9
Smathers: I know it, it’s awful. But that’s the . . . everything else is
soluble—quickly . . . except that. I—
President Kennedy: Well, if we get everything else, I just don’t want
these guys around; particularly if this Cuban thing ever works out, we
want them out of there.
Smathers: That’s right.
President Kennedy: So, we’ve got to get them out tomorrow night.
Then everybody goes home, and, shit, nobody knows what the hell’s
going on.
Smathers: Exactly . . . exactly.
President Kennedy: There’s nothing that can be done with those god
. . . Come on. You’d think those southerners . . . I thought you southerners were thick as thieves?
Smathers: Well, we are! We are! But not . . . but Jamie doesn’t want
to go home. The difficulty is—
President Kennedy: He doesn’t want to go home?
Smathers: He doesn’t want to go home. He wants to stay up here.
President Kennedy: That’s a—
Smathers: And Dick Russell doesn’t want to go. He told me this afternoon, he said . . . I said, “Dick, can’t we get this damn thing settled?” And
he said, “Well, not before next week.” I said, “Well, Jesus Christ!” And he
said, “Well, frankly, I’m not much interested in going home anyway.”
President Kennedy: God, that’s a selfish fucking attitude, isn’t it?
With a lot of guys running for reelection?
Smathers: Yes, it is . . . yes. I know it. It’s terrible. But many southerners don’t want to go home. This is a problem. Sam Ervin said, 10 “I’ve
lost my enthusiasm for going home, now with this Mississippi thing.”11
President Kennedy: He thinks he’s going to get a lot of—
committee or sent down from the President were to be excluded from the conference report
and final bill. Angered on the basis of principle and by the removal of a $1.6 million amendment for a peanut-marketing research facility in Dawson, Georgia, Russell intended to keep
Congress working until he got his way.
9. See note 8.
10. Samuel J. Ervin, Jr., was Democratic U.S. senator from North Carolina, 1954 to 1975.
11. Reference to the crisis at the University of Mississippi following James Meredith’s
attempts to register from 25 September to 1 October.
Conversation with Georg e Smathers
385
Smathers: Sikes12 and Herlong, all of these fellas ought to be running, and they’re here.13 Paul Rogers talked to him a little while ago . . .
he’s not going home!14
President Kennedy: Why? He doesn’t want to listen to all that moaning?
Smathers: Well, they don’t want to listen to all that moaning and
they don’t want to be put in a position where they’ve either got to jump
on you or, you know, get with Barnett.15 And they don’t figure that
either one is too good at the moment. So they’re just trying to let it cool.
President Kennedy: Yeah, yeah.
Smathers: And this is what I think is wrong—
President Kennedy: Of course, I think they ought to be able to get
some middle position . . . just regret this—
Smathers: That’s right. Well, the southern governors did very well.
President Kennedy: Yeah . . . yeah.
Smathers: They did very well.
President Kennedy: I think, why don’t they just keep quiet about it
and just say “Well, it’s a regrettable incident—period.” That’s all I’d say
if I were a southerner.
Smathers: Yeah.
President Kennedy: Just say “I regret what happened, this is not very
. . . ” you know, and then just go on to something else. Shit, nobody’s—
Smathers: Well, that’s what I’m saying. We handled it all right—
President Kennedy: Then nobody knows whether you regret that
Meredith entered or you regretted that troops were used or you regretted bloodshed or you regretted that you knew me.
Smathers: That’s right. I deplore—
President Kennedy: [Unclear.]
Smathers: —extremism. See, we handled it well in Florida, and it could
have been handled with a little . . . exercised a little judgment and—
President Kennedy: Leadership.
Smathers: —and leadership, it could have been handled elsewhere.
And then I’d move on.
12. Robert L. F. Sikes was a Democratic U.S. representative from Florida, 1941 to 1979, and
senior member of the House Appropriations Committee.
13. A. Sydney Herlong, Jr., was a Democratic U.S. representative from Florida, 1949 to 1969.
14. Paul G. Rogers was a Democratic U.S. representative from Florida, 1955 to 1979.
15. Ross Barnett, segregationist governor of Mississippi from 1960 to 1964, refused to register
Meredith at Ole Miss, touching off a riot and President Kennedy’s deployment of federal troops.
386
W E D N E S DAY, O C T O B E R
10, 1962
President Kennedy: [Snickers.]
Smathers: Thompson said he was pretty disturbed about the fact that
. . . you . . . didn’t take his word for it . . . said Thompson.16 We’re going
to finally find the southern [unclear] that is going to say, “Thompson
talked to me about going to the President.” We haven’t found it yet. And
Drew Pearson gets you right over the barrel.
President Kennedy: What about Drew? He was pretty mean this
morning, wasn’t he?17
Smathers: God, he was nasty. Jesus!
President Kennedy: That comes out of “my shins are black and blue”?
Smathers: That’s right. I eat your food and then I spit all over you
and kick you in the shins . . .
President Kennedy: He doesn’t know about all those votes you gave us?
Smathers: That’s right. He doesn’t want to know about them. He’s
going to stay with those four fellas, or eight fellas.
President Kennedy: Estes? He’s got Estes.18
Smathers: Estes and Albert.19
President Kennedy: Yeah, Estes feeds him that stuff.
Smathers: Yeah, I know it.
President Kennedy: Estes and Albert.
Smathers: That’s right.
President Kennedy: And Wayne.20
Smathers: And Wayne gives it to him. Wayne’s up here raising hell
again.
President Kennedy: Is he? About what? His public works?21
Smathers: Yeah.
16. Reference to William “Bill” Thompson, president of the East Coast Railway, who had recently
joined President Kennedy, Smathers, and Bill Dale of the First National Bank of Orlando for a
cruise aboard the presidential yacht, Honey Fitz. All three of Kennedy’s guests were the subject of
an acerbic Drew Pearson column in the Washington Post that morning and were cited as evidence
of Kennedy’s predilection for treating his political enemies better than his political allies.
17. Pearson, “Sen. Smathers Puts Up a Roadblock.” “The interesting thing,” Pearson noted,
assaying the Kennedy-Smathers relationship, “is that the more the debonair Senator kicks him
on the legislative shins, the more his old golfing partner comes back smiling.”
18. Estes Kefauver was Democratic U.S. senator from Tennessee, 1949 to 1963, and the
Democratic vice-presidential nominee in 1956.
19. Albert A. Gore was Democratic U.S. senator from Tennessee, 1953 to 1971.
20. Wayne Morse was Republican U.S. senator from Oregon, 1945 to 1952; Independent U.S.
senator from Oregon, 1952 to 1955; and Democratic U.S. senator from Oregon, 1955 to 1969.
21. Public works projects for Oregon removed during conference committee on Interior and
Other Agencies Appropriations Act at the behest of Representative Michael Kirwan, the chair
of the House conferees.
Conversation with Georg e Smathers
387
President Kennedy: Jeez! We got that all fixed!
Smathers: I know, but he’s still mad, and still talking about it, and he
came in and made a big speech yesterday about how he told you. . . . He
said, “I said, Mr. President, I’m not going to permit this to happen. I’m
not going to let our Democratic party . . . ”Have you ever heard anything
so repulsive in your whole life?
President Kennedy: I know it. He never says . . . It doesn’t matter to
me, and here we got it all fixed with Kirwan and I signed his goddamned
bill, 22 and I called him up and said he’ll let it go on the Supplemental.23
No, no, he wants to . . . he’s sore at me because I took away his issue.
Smathers: That’s right. That’s right.
President Kennedy: But he comes . . . oh well.
Smathers: But he’s making some more over here.
President Kennedy: Another speech?
Smathers: Yeah. He’s got a speech on . . . I don’t know what the hell
it was. Something about the District of Columbia.
President Kennedy: Wait until he hears about H.R. 10.
Smathers: Oh, he’ll die. He’ll die. Well, I’m delighted you signed it,
and—
President Kennedy: Well, don’t say anything about it for a while.
Until they get out of there tonight. OK?
Smathers: I won’t say anything.
President Kennedy: OK. It’ll come out soon enough.
Smathers: Yeah.
President Kennedy: Gore will be coming in [unclear] up from
Tennessee.24
Smathers: Yeah. That’s right.
President Kennedy: OK.
Smathers: Thank you a million.
President Kennedy: Righto.
Smathers: I really appreciate it, and best of luck.
After speaking with Smathers, the President called the House sponsor of
the pension bill.
22. Michael J. Kirwan was a Democratic U.S. representative from Ohio. See “Conversation
between President Kennedy and Mike Mansfield,” 8 October 1962, for additional detail on the
Kirwan-Morse confrontation.
23. Supplemental Appropriations Bill.
24. President Kennedy had promised to inform Senator Gore of his intentions regarding H.R. 10.
388
W E D N E S DAY, O C T O B E R
10, 1962
Time Unknown
Oh, God. You are the greatest . . .
Conversation with Eugene Keogh25
Congressman Eugene J. Keogh, the third-ranking member of the House
Ways and Means Committee, had championed and cosponsored the Selfemployed Pension Bill with Senator George Smathers.26 After signing
the bill quietly on October 10 and first phoning Smathers with the news,
the President then telephoned Keogh, most likely to deliver the same
news. What follows is a fragment of their conversation, in which Keogh
endorses the Communications Satellite Act, signed by President
Kennedy several weeks earlier on August 31, 1962.
Eugene Keogh: [Unclear] this communications satellite.
President Kennedy: Oh, God. You are the greatest . . . I just called
you and Smathers. You, obviously have a direct line to each other, or else
you’ve got one down here.
Keogh: No, I just cut him off to talk to you.
President Kennedy: Did you? Well . . .
Keogh: I do commend it though.
President Kennedy: I said to Smathers, “Don’t—
Before the end of the day, the President had a conversation with an
unidentified official about James Meredith’s public criticisms of the racial
composition of the troops sent to maintain order in Oxford, Mississippi.
On October 9, the Army had begun withdrawing large numbers of
troops from Oxford.
25. Dictabelt 49.1, Cassette M, John F. Kennedy Library, President’s Office Files, Presidential
Recordings Collection.
26. Eugene J. Keogh was Democratic U.S. representative from New York, 1937 to 1967. Keogh
retired in 1967 after 30 years in Congress, though he was only 59 years old at the time.
Conversation about James Meredith
389
Time Unknown
[A]pparently, we had no Negro troops on patrol.
Conversation about James Meredith27
On October 9, 1962, in a handwritten statement, James Meredith
asserted that the U.S. Army had “resegregated” the troops that remained
on campus. As Meredith wrote: “The first two days of my stay at the
University . . . the military units looked like American units. All soldiers
held their positions and performed the task for which they had been
trained. . . . Since that time the units have been resegregated. Negroes
have been purged from their positions in the ranks.” That same day,
Secretary of the Army Cyrus Vance stated that when troops were “first
employed in the Oxford area Negro soldiers were not used on patrols in
order to avoid unnecessary incidents.” On October 6, when the situation
was stabilized, African American troops were again used “in the performance of all normal functions in the units in all operations.”
President Kennedy: Now today, James Meredith charged that the
Army was segregating them and I wondered what had been done with
that discussion I had Friday night.28 Do you know anything about it?
Unidentified: No, sir. Except that Cy[rus Vance], you know he’s out
at the hospital, as you probably heard, at long last. Cy, he called me just a
few minutes ago and said that he talked with your brother about this.
President Kennedy: Yeah.
Unidentified: And that he wants to put out a statement. Now what
the facts are, apparently, we had no Negro troops on patrol.
President Kennedy: Yeah.
Unidentified: They were in the units, but they have been returned to
their full duties within the last days, or day or so, something like that.
We’re trying to find out exactly what Meredith said and we are fixing up
a statement for Cy to put out, describing exactly what the situation is.
President Kennedy: Well, you better let me have it.
27. Dictabelt 50.2, Cassette M, John F. Kennedy Library, President’s Office Files, Presidential
Recordings Collection.
28. “Meredith Charges Army Segregated Oxford Force,” New York Times, 10 October 1962.
390
W E D N E S DAY, O C T O B E R
10, 1962
Unidentified: All right.
President Kennedy: As I say, I assume that after I talked to him
Friday, he began to put them back in again.
President Kennedy: The only thing is [Deputy Attorney General
Nicholas] Katzenbach told me that on the patrols it was just the white
soldiers . . .
Unidentified: . . . Yes . . .
President Kennedy: . . . so I didn’t know what happened with that
discussion I had had Friday.
Unidentified: No, Cy didn’t tell me about talking with you, but I
assume that’s when they did it because I know . . .
President Kennedy: . . . Well, as of yesterday, they were still just
white in the patrol cars.
Unidentified: I see.
President Kennedy: So I’d like to find out. You better call Cy again
and ask him what he did after Friday, number one. Tell him, number two,
to be careful what he says because evidently Katzenbach said yesterday it
was just whites. And then let me know what the statement’s going to be
before you put it out.
Unidentified: Yes, sir.
President Kennedy: OK. Thanks.
Unidentified: Right. Bye
The President had at least one Mississippi-related meeting this day.
Between 5:26 and 5:50 A.M. he met with the U.S. Army chief of staff,
General Earle G. Wheeler. Kennedy did not tape it.
The White House was turning its attention ever more to the
midterm elections. At 8:00 P.M. the President left for a two-hour visit to
Baltimore. Thursday, October 11, would be a half day in the Oval Office.
Following meetings with the U.S. ambassador to Guinea, William
Attwood, and the journalist John Gunther the President signed the
Trade Bill and left for New York City. From Thursday afternoon
through Sunday night, October 14, the President would campaign in
New York, New Jersey, and Pennsylvania.
T U E S DAY, O C T O B E R
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391
Tuesday, October 16, 1962
On September 4 President Kennedy responded to reports of Soviet arms
shipments to Cuba by choosing to issue (through press secretary Salinger)
a statement noting that this was happening and drawing a line that
warned only against Soviet deployment of “offensive” weapons in Cuba.
Everyone, including the Soviets, understood that in this context offensive
meant systems able to deliver nuclear weapons to the United States. The
White House statement was at least as significant for what it said Kennedy
would tolerate. It told administration insiders, like those involved in the
ongoing debate about the future of the Mongoose program against Castro,
that Kennedy would accept Soviet arms shipments to Cuba. Kennedy’s
best hope thus was to overwhelm the critics with a barrage of official
statements downplaying the significance of these shipments of “defensive”
arms in order to deflate the opposition case.
The Republicans had reacted with even more serious charges. Probably
on the basis of the many reports and rumors coming out of Cuba and conveyed by private Americans in contact with Cuban exile groups, Republican
senator Kenneth Keating of New York announced on the floor of the Senate
that there were “Soviet rocket installations in Cuba.” With Republicans on
the offensive, Kennedy felt obliged to make yet another statement. Bundy’s
advice was critical. President Kennedy would be giving a press conference
on September 13. Cuba was bound to come up. On September 11 the
Soviet government declared unequivocally that Moscow had not sent and
would not send nuclear missiles to Cuba. There was no need for this, the
Soviet government announced. The next day Bundy urged Kennedy to
repeat, in person, the line Salinger had put out on September 4. Bundy
opened his memo by telling Kennedy that if he wanted to invade Cuba, he
should then reject his advice, because Kennedy would be minimizing the
Soviet threat there. But, as Bundy knew, President Kennedy had told his
aides repeatedly that he did not want a U.S. invasion of Cuba, that the real
danger came from the Soviet Union, and that this danger was likely to
arise later that year in Berlin.1
1. On the sources for Keating’s allegations, see Max Holland, “A Luce Connection: Senator
Keating, William Pawley, and the Cuban Missile Crisis,” Journal of Cold War Studies 1 (Fall
1999), pp. 139–67. Bundy to President Kennedy, “Memorandum on Cuba for the Press
392
T U E S DAY, O C T O B E R
16, 1962
President Kennedy himself underscored a position that accepted
what was already discovered and drew a line against what the Soviets
had just promised they would not do. Kennedy said that “unilateral military intervention on the part of the United States cannot currently be
either required or justified.” He added that if Cuba “should ever . . .
become an offensive military base of significant capacity for the Soviet
Union, then this country will do whatever must be done to protect its
own security and that of its allies.” The administration mounted a forceful campaign of denial, with the President right in the front line. The
Soviet assurances were repeated by the amiable Soviet ambassador,
Anatoly Dobrynin, who spoke with Robert Kennedy and soon afterward
with the U.S. ambassador to the United Nations, Adlai Stevenson, saying
flatly to each man that the Soviet government had no intention whatever
of using Cuba as an offensive military base.
Over the month until the crisis actually broke, Kennedy remained of
the view that the notion of the Soviets’ turning Cuba into a missile base
came largely from the imagination and zeal of Republicans campaigning
for Senate and House seats up for election in November (although his
brother Robert and the Republican CIA director, John McCone, had also
voiced this fear). Largely at the instance of Keating and Republican
Senator Homer Capehart of Indiana, the Senate on September 20 passed
by 86 to 1 a resolution authorizing the use of force against Cuba “to prevent the creation or use of an externally supported offensive military capability endangering the security of the U.S.” On October 10, Keating rose in
the Senate to charge that the Soviets were establishing intermediate-range
missile bases in Cuba.
Kennedy knew of no intelligence data that warranted the Senate resolution or supported Keating’s allegation. He had learned that, in addi-
Conference,” 13 September 1962, National Security Files, Box 36, “Cuba General September
62,” John F. Kennedy Library. Bundy’s introduction comes quickly and clearly to the point:
1. The congressional head of steam on this is the most serious that we have had. It affects both
parties and takes many forms.
2. The immediate hazard is that the Administration may appear to be weak and indecisive.
3. One way to avoid this hazard is to act by naval or military force in the Cuban area.
4. The other course is to make a very clear and aggressive explanation of current policy and
its justification.
Bundy then argued for this “other course,” urging Kennedy to explain “The threat is under control [Bundy’s emphasis]. Neither Communist propaganda nor our own natural anger should
blind us to the basic fact that Cuba is not—and will not be allowed to become—a threat to the
United States.”
T U E S DAY, O C T O B E R
16, 1962
393
tion to surface-to-air missiles (SAMs), the Soviets were sending crates
containing unassembled IL-28 bombers to Cuba. These bombers, though
capable of carrying nuclear weapons, were being phased out of the Soviet
Air Force as obsolete. In themselves, they were not a cause for worry.
Moreover—though this was before evidence came in regarding the IL28s—the CIA’s topmost analytic group, its Board of National Estimates,
produced a Special National Intelligence Estimate. Use of Cuba by the
Soviet Union as a base for offensive ballistic missiles, said the board,
“would be incompatible with Soviet practice to date and with Soviet policy as we presently estimate it. It would indicate a far greater willingness
to increase the level of risk in U.S.-Soviet relations than the U.S.S.R. has
displayed thus far. . . .”2
But as September turned to October with new kinds of Soviet arms
being discovered in Cuba almost every week, an increasingly worried
President was keeping an eye on accelerated contingency planning by
State and Defense in case he was driven toward some kind of military
action against Cuba.3 Kennedy not only had reason to feel justified in discounting the Republicans’ charges; he also felt he had a right to curb
suspected leaks from the intelligence community feeding those charges.
After he had shown Kennedy photographs of the crates containing IL-28
bombers on October 11, McCone noted: “The President requested that
such information be withheld at least until after the elections as if the
information got into the press, a new and more violent Cuban issue
would be injected into the campaign and this would seriously affect his
independence of action.”4
That Kennedy could make such a request of McCone, a Republican, is
remarkable, but the final phrase, about his “independence of action,” may
well have had wider significance to him. A letter from Khrushchev dated
September 28 had brought Kennedy potentially ominous news about
2. Special National Intelligence Estimate 85-3-62, “The Military Buildup in Cuba,” 19
September 1962; reprinted in CIA Documents on the Cuban Missile Crisis 1962, ed. Mary
McAuliffe (Washington, DC: Central Intelligence Agency, 1992), pp. 91–93.
3. Kennedy met with the Joint Chiefs of Staff on September 14 and was already wondering
about the feasibility of an air strike against SAM sites. See the meeting on 21 September in
which he reminded McNamara about the need to keep the plans up to date. On 2 October,
prodded by the Chiefs, McNamara offered them a big list of contingencies for possible action,
led off by a Soviet move against Berlin or Soviet deployment of “offensive” systems to Cuba
(see Kennedy to McNamara, 21 September 1962, in FRUS, 10: 1081; McNamara to Taylor, 2
October 1962, in FRUS, 11: 6–7).
4. McCone, “Memorandum on Donovan Project,” 11 October 1962, in CIA Documents,
McAuliffe, pp. 123–25.
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T U E S DAY, O C T O B E R
16, 1962
Berlin. In it, Khrushchev said, “the abnormal situation in Berlin should
be done away with. . . . And under present circumstances we do not see any
other way out but to sign a German peace treaty.” Moreover, Khrushchev
commented angrily on agitation in the United States for action against
Cuba. The congressional resolution, he said, “gives ground to draw a conclusion that the U.S. is evidently ready to assume responsibility for
unleashing nuclear war.” Khrushchev asserted that he would not force
the Berlin issue until after the U.S. congressional elections, but he
seemed to say that, by the second half of November, time would run out.
Kennedy discussed his reactions to the letter with his top “demonologists,” a nickname for his advisers on the Soviet Union, in the conversation that he recorded on September 29.
Therefore, as mid-October arrived, Kennedy and members of his circle had reason to expect a crisis, perhaps their greatest crisis yet, over
Berlin. To them, Khrushchev remained a mystifying figure, and in his
last high-level meeting with an American, on September 6 with Interior
Secretary Stewart Udall, Khrushchev had crudely threatened to go to
war in order to force the issue in Berlin. Then there was Khrushchev’s
meeting at the same time with the poet Robert Frost, in which the Soviet
leader said he believed the United States and Western Europe to be weak
and worn out. He invoked Tolstoy’s comment to Maxim Gorky about
old age and sex: “The desire is the same; it’s the performance that’s different.” As Frost cleaned this up when answering questions from U.S.
reporters, it came out: “He said we were too liberal to fight.” This was
how Kennedy first heard it, and it infuriated him, not least because it
provided fodder for Republicans in the congressional campaign.5
On Sunday, October 14, on ABC’s news program Issues and Answers,
Bundy was denying the presence of Soviet nuclear missiles in Cuba to the
national television audience just as a high-flying U-2 reconnaissance aircraft of the U.S. Strategic Air Command was flying a limited photographic mission directly over Cuba. For nearly a month, Director of
Central Intelligence John McCone had pressed for such a flight.
Secretary of State Dean Rusk had resisted. McCone suspected that the
Soviets planned to turn Cuba into an offensive military base. Rusk worried lest some protests about U.S. overflights or some incident like that of
1960 complicate delicate ongoing negotiations. Moreover, Rusk knew
that most Soviet experts, including those in McCone’s own CIA, thought
5. Richard Reeves, President Kennedy: Profile of Power (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1993),
p. 351.
T U E S DAY, O C T O B E R
16, 1962
395
McCone wrong. When Soviet SAMs were spotted in Cuba at the end of
August, McCone pressed harder for U-2 flights, for he interpreted these
SAMs as harbingers of offensive surface-to-surface missiles. Rusk’s resistance also hardened, for the Soviet SAMs were SA-2s, which had shot down
Powers’s U-2 in 1960. The shootdown of a Taiwanese U-2 over western
China on September 8 added to Rusk’s and Kennedy’s fears. Bundy had
allied himself with Rusk. On September 10 Kennedy chose the cautious
approach. But, as worrying evidence mounted, McCone—with Robert
Kennedy’s support—won approval on October 9 for another U-2 flight
directly over Cuba.6 That flight took place on October 14.
During October 15, experts at the CIA’s National Photographic
Intelligence Center (NPIC), in a nondescript building at 5th and K Streets
in Washington, pored over photos from that October 14 U-2 flight over
Cuba. Seeing images of missiles much longer than SAMs, they leafed
through files of photos from the Soviet Union and technical data microfilmed by Soviet officer (and Anglo-American spy) Oleg Penkovsky. They
came up with a perfect match. These were medium-range ballistic missiles
(MRBMs) of the SS-4 family. At about 5:30 in the afternoon, Arthur
Lundahl, the head of NPIC, passed the news to CIA headquarters out in
Langley, Virginia.7
In ignorance of what was in progress at NPIC, McNamara had met
that afternoon with the Joint Chiefs of Staff and dozens of lower-level officials. Although McNamara explained that Kennedy had decided not to
take any military action against Cuba during the next three months, the
group reviewed plans for a massive air strike on Cuba and for an invasion.
That evening, Bundy and his wife gave a small dinner at their home
on Foxhall Road for Charles (Chip) and Avis Bohlen. Chip Bohlen was
going off to be U.S. ambassador to France. Called away to the telephone,
Bundy heard CIA deputy director for intelligence Ray Cline say cryptically, “Those things we’ve been worrying about—it looks as though
we’ve really got something.” “It was a hell of a secret,” Bundy wrote
later. Though he considered immediately calling Kennedy, he concluded
that a few hours made no difference. The President had been in New
York State, speaking for Democratic congressional candidates, and had
6. For more background on the discovery of the missiles, see Graham Allison and Philip
Zelikow, Essence of Decision: Explaining the Cuban Missile Crisis (2d ed.; New York: Longman,
1999), pp. 219–24, 331–37.
7. Full details are in Dino Brugioni, Eyeball to Eyeball: The Inside Story of the Cuban Missile
Crisis, ed. Robert F. McCort (New York: Random House, 1991), pp. 187–217. (Brugioni was in
NPIC at the time.)
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T U E S DAY, O C T O B E R
16, 1962
gotten back to Washington in the early hours of the morning. Bundy, as
he also wrote later, “decided that a quiet evening and a night of sleep
were the best preparation” the President could have for what lay ahead
of him. Kennedy never reproached Bundy for giving him that extra rest.8
Bundy brought his news to the private quarters of the White House
at about 9:00 A.M. on Tuesday, October 16. In the major morning papers,
the President had seen one front-page story about Cuba. The Washington
Post reported that “Communist sources” were floating a rumor of a possible trade—the West to make concessions on Berlin in return for a
slowdown in the Soviet buildup of Cuba. State Department spokesman
Lincoln White denied seeing any such proposal and said, “It would have
been kicked out the window so fast it would have made your head swim.”
The Post’s front page and that of the New York Times featured a Boston
address by Eisenhower, attacking the Kennedy administration’s “dreary
foreign record.” In his administration, Eisenhower said, “No walls were
built. No threatening foreign bases were established.”
President Kennedy told Bundy to round up officials—secretly—for a
meeting later that morning. He phoned his brother Robert and asked
him to come to the White House, where they briefly discussed the sensational news. At 9:25 President Kennedy began his regular schedule,
meeting astronaut Walter Schirra and his family. In a brief break, just
before 10:00, the President went to Kenny O’Donnell’s office and, as
O’Donnell later recalled, said, “You still think the fuss about Cuba is
unimportant?”
“Absolutely,” O’Donnell answered. “The voters won’t give a damn
about Cuba.”
Kennedy then gave O’Donnell the news. “I don’t believe it,” O’Donnell
replied. “You better believe it,” Kennedy said and added drily, “Ken
Keating will probably be the next President of the United States.”9
After two more routine meetings that morning, Kennedy was able to
open up about the missiles again for about half an hour with Bohlen, who
was paying a previously scheduled farewell call as he prepared to depart
for Paris. Kennedy finished his meeting with Bohlen and went on to the
Cabinet Room.
8. McGeorge Bundy, Danger and Survival (New York: Random House, 1988), pp. 395–96.
9. Kenneth P. O’Donnell and David F. Powers, with Joe McCarthy, “Johnny, We Hardly Knew
Ye” (New York: Pocket Books, 1972), p. 369.
Meeting on the Cuban Missile Crisis
397
11:50 A.M.–1:00 P.M.
We’re certainly going to do [option] number one. We’re going
to take out these missiles.
Meeting on the Cuban Missile Crisis10
Kennedy was in the Cabinet Room with his five-year-old daughter,
Caroline, when his advisers filed into the Cabinet Room, accompanied by
Lundahl and other experts from NPIC who set up photograph displays
on easels. As Caroline was taken back to the residence and the meeting
began, Kennedy turned on the tape recorder.
Marshall Carter: This is the result of the photography taken Sunday,
sir. There’s a medium-range ballistic missile launch site and two new
military encampments on the southern edge of the Sierra del Rosario in
west-central Cuba.
President Kennedy: Where would that be?
Carter: West-central, sir. That’s . . .
Arthur Lundahl: South of Havana. [quieter, as an aside] I think this
[unclear] represents these three dots we’re talking about.
Carter: Have you got the big pictures?
Lundahl: Yes, sir.
Carter: The President would like to see those.
The launch site at one of the encampments contains a total of at least
14 canvas-covered missile trailers measuring 67 feet in length, 9 feet in
width. The overall length of the trailers plus the tow bars is approximately 80 feet. The other encampment contains vehicles and tents but
with no missile trailers.
Lundahl: [quietly to President Kennedy] These are the launchers here.
Each of these are places we discussed. In this instance the missile trailer
is backing up to the launching point. The launch point of this particular
vehicle is here. This canvas-covered [unclear] is 67 feet long.
Carter: The site that you have there contains at least eight canvas-
10. Including President Kennedy, George Ball, McGeorge Bundy, Marshall Carter, C. Douglas
Dillon, Roswell Gilpatric, Sidney Graybeal, U. Alexis Johnson, Vice President Johnson,
Robert Kennedy, Arthur Lundahl, Robert McNamara, Dean Rusk, and Maxwell Taylor. Tape
28, John F. Kennedy Library, President’s Office Files, Presidential Recordings Collection.
398
T U E S DAY, O C T O B E R
16, 1962
covered missile trailers. Four deployed probable missile erector launchers. These are unrevetted.11 The probable launch positions as indicated
are approximately 850 feet, 700 feet, 450 feet—for a total distance of
about 2,000 feet.
In Area Two, there are at least 6 canvas-covered missile trailers,
about 75 vehicles, and about 18 tents. And in Area Number Three we
have 35 vehicles, 15 large tents, 8 small tents, 7 buildings, and 1 building under construction. The critical one — do you see what I mean?— is
this one.
Lundahl: [quietly to President Kennedy] There is a launcher right
there, sir. The missile trailer is backing up to it at the moment.
[Unclear.] And the missile trailer is here. Seven more have been enlarged
here. Those canvas-covered objects on the trailers are 67 feet long, and
there’s a small building between the two of them. The eighth one is the
one that’s not on a particular trailer. [Unclear] backs up. That looks like
the most-advanced one. And the other area is about 5 miles away. There
are no launcher erectors on there, just missiles.
President Kennedy: How far advanced is this?
Lundahl: Sir, we’ve never seen this kind of an installation before.
President Kennedy: Not even in the Soviet Union?
Lundahl: No, sir. Our [nine seconds excised as classified information].12
But from May of ’60 on we have never had any U-2 coverage of the
Soviet Union.13 So we do not know what kind of a practice they would
use in connection with—
President Kennedy: How do you know this is a medium-range ballistic missile?
Lundahl: The length, sir.
11. An erector launcher trailer can carry a missile and then be secured in place at a designated
launch point. The missile launcher is then erected to the firing angle and the missile is fired
from it. To say the site is unrevetted means that earthworks or fortifications to protect against
attack or the blast from the missile have not been constructed.
12. In an earlier, less stringent declassification of this material, more of this sentence was left
intact, reading (once errors were corrected): “Our last look was when we had TALENT coverage of [three seconds excised as classified information] and we had a 350-mile [range] missile
erected just on hard earth with a kind of field exercise going on.” TALENT was a codeword
for overhead photography. The briefer was probably describing photography of the Tyuratam
missile test range in the Soviet Union.
13. May 1960 was when Soviet air defenses shot down a CIA U-2 reconaissance aircraft
piloted by Francis Gary Powers. Then-President Eisenhower suspended further U-2 flights
over the Soviet Union. Powers was captured and eventually repatriated to the United States.
Meeting on the Cuban Missile Crisis
399
President Kennedy: The what? The length?
Lundahl: The length of it, yes.
President Kennedy: The length of the missile? Which part? I mean
which . . . ?
Lundahl: The length of the missile, sir, is—
President Kennedy: Which one is that?
Lundahl: This will show it, sir.
President Kennedy: That?
Lundahl: Yes. Mr. Graybeal, our missile man, has some pictures of
the equivalent Soviet equipment that has been dragged through the
streets of Moscow that can give you some feel for it, sir.
Sidney Graybeal: There are two missiles involved. One of them is
our [designation] SS-3, which is 630 mile [range] and on up to near
700. It’s 68 feet long. These missiles measure out to be 67 foot long. The
other missile, the 1,100 [mile range] one is 73 foot long.
The question we have in the photography is the nose itself. If the nose
cone is not on that missile it measures 67 feet—the nose cone would be 4
to 5 feet longer, sir—and with this extra length we could have a missile
that’d have a range of 1,100 miles. The missiles that were known through
the Moscow parade—we’ve got the data on that [unclear] on the pictures.
President Kennedy: Is this ready to be fired?
Graybeal: No, sir.
President Kennedy: How long . . . ? We can’t tell that can we, how
long before it can be fired?
Graybeal: No, sir. That depends on how ready the GSC [ground support for the missile] [is], how—
President Kennedy: Where does it have to be fired from?
Graybeal: It would have to be fired from a stable, hard surface. This
could be packed earth. It could be concrete, or asphalt. The surface has to
be hard. Then you put a flame deflector plate on that to direct the missile.
Robert McNamara: Would you care to comment on the position of
nuclear warheads? This is in relation to the question from the President—
when can these be fired?
Graybeal: Sir, we’ve looked very hard. We can find nothing that would
spell nuclear warhead in terms of any isolated area or unique security in
this particular area. The mating of the nuclear warhead to the missile—
from some of the other short-range missile data—[it] would take about a
couple of hours to do this.
McNamara: This is not fenced, I believe, at the moment?
Lundahl: Not yet, sir.
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T U E S DAY, O C T O B E R
16, 1962
McNamara: This is important, as it relates to whether these, today,
are ready to fire, Mr. President. It seems almost impossible to me that
they would be ready to fire with nuclear warheads on the site without
even a fence around it. It may not take long to place them there, to erect
a fence. But at least at the moment there is some reason to believe the
warheads aren’t present and hence they are not ready to fire.
Graybeal: Yes, sir. We do not believe they are ready to fire.
Maxwell Taylor: However, there is no feeling that they can’t fire
from this kind of field position very quickly: isn’t that true? It’s not a
question of waiting for extensive concrete pads and that sort of thing.
Graybeal: The unknown factor here, sir, is the degree to which the
equipment has been checked out after it’s been shipped from the Soviet
Union here. It’s the readiness of the equipment. If the equipment is
checked out, the site has to be accurately surveyed—the position has to
be known. Once this is known, then you’re talking a matter of hours.
Taylor: Well, could this be an operational site except perhaps for the
fact that at this point there are no fences? Could this be operational now?
Graybeal: There is only one missile there, sir, and it’s at the actual,
apparently, launching area. It would take them—if everything were
checked out—it would still take them in the order of two to three hours
before they could get that one missile up and ready to go, sir.
Lundahl: Collateral reports indicated from ground observers that
convoys of 50 to 60 of these kinds of Soviet vehicles were moving down
into the San Cristobal area in the first couple of weeks of August. But
this is the first time we have been able to catch them on photography, at
a location.
Theodore Sorensen: You say there is only one missile there?
Graybeal: There are eight missiles there. One of them is in what
appears to be the position from which they’re launched, in the horizontal, apparently near an erector to be erected in vertical position.
Dean Rusk: Near an erector? You mean something has to be built?
Or is that something that can be done in a couple of hours?
Graybeal: Mobile piece of equipment, sir. We haven’t any specific
[unclear] on this, but here is the way we believe that it could actually be
lifted. Something of this nature. [Unclear] evidence would be the erector’s helping to raise the missile from its transporter up into a vertical
position with the flame deflector on the ground.
McNamara: Am I correct in saying that we have not located any
nuclear storage sites with certainty as yet?
This is one of the most important problems we face in properly interpreting the readiness of these missiles. It’s inconceivable to me that the
Meeting on the Cuban Missile Crisis
401
Soviets would deploy nuclear warheads on an unfenced piece of ground.
There must be some storage site there. It should be one of our important
objectives to find that storage site.
Lundahl: May I report, sir, that two additional SAC [U-2] missions
were executed yesterday. They were taken to the Washington area last
night. They’re currently being chemically processed at the Naval Center
in Suitland and they’re due to reach us at the National PI Center around
8:00 tonight.14 Both of these missions go from one end of Cuba to the
other, one along the north coast and one along the south. So additional
data on activities, or these storage sites which we consider critical, may
be in our grasp, if we can find them.
McNamara: And is it correct that there is, outside of Havana, an
installation that appears to be hardened that might be the type of installation they would use for nuclear warheads, and therefore is a prospective source of such warheads?
Lundahl: Sir, I couldn’t put my finger on that. The Joint Atomic
Energy people may be looking at that and forming a judgment.15 But
from photos alone I cannot attest to that.
Carter: There would appear to be little need for putting this type
of missile in there, however, unless it were associated with nuclear
warheads.
Rusk: Don’t you have to assume these are nuclear?
McNamara: Oh, I think there’s no question about that. The question
is one of readiness to fire, and this is highly critical in forming our plans.
The time between today and the time when the readiness to fire capability develops is a very important thing. To estimate that, we need to
know where these warheads are. And we have not yet found any probable storage of warheads. And hence it seems extremely unlikely that they
are now ready to fire, or may be ready to fire within a matter of hours, or
even a day or two.
Twenty-four seconds excised as classified information.16
14. These are references to the Naval Photographic Intelligence Center in Suitland,
Maryland, and to the National Photographic Interpretation Center, directed by Lundahl, that
was part of the CIA.
15. Lundahl was referring to the Joint Atomic Energy Intelligence Committee (JAEIC) of the
U.S. Intelligence Board.
16. In an earlier, less stringent, declassification of this material, most of the next sentence was
left intact, reading (once errors were corrected): Lundahl: “ . . . If new types of radars, or
known associated missile firing radars or associated with missile firing, are coming up on that,
that might be another indicator of readiness. We know nothing of what those tapes [of electromagnetic emissions] hold, at the moment.”
402
T U E S DAY, O C T O B E R
16, 1962
Rusk: When will those be ready? By the end of the day, do you think?
Lundahl: They’re supposed to be in, sir. I think that’s right. Isn’t it,
General Carter?
Carter: The readout from Sunday’s [U-2 flights] should be available
now. We have done some—
Rusk: Weren’t there flights yesterday as well?
Carter: Two flights yesterday.
Rusk: You don’t have the results from those yet?
Carter: No.
The room is silent for about eight seconds.
President Kennedy: Thank you.
Lundahl: Yes, sir.
President Kennedy: Well, when is . . . ? [Are] there any further
flights scheduled?
Carter: There are no more scheduled, sir.
President Kennedy: These flights yesterday, I presume, cover the . . .
Lundahl: Well, we hope so, sir—
McGeorge Bundy: [Unclear], Mr. President. Because the weather
won’t have been clear all along the island. So we can’t claim that we will
have been—certainly we surely do not have up-to-date photographic
coverage on the whole island. I should think one of our first questions is
to—
President Kennedy: Authorize more flights.
Bundy: —consider whether we should not authorize more flights on
the basis of COMOR priorities.17
There’s a specific question of whether we want a closer and sharper
look at this area. That, however, I think should be looked at in the context of the question of whether we wish to give tactical warning and any
other possible activities.
McNamara: I would recommend, Mr. President, that you authorize
such flights as are considered necessary to obtain complete coverage of
the island. Now this seems to be ill defined. But I purposely define it that
way because we’re running into cloud cover on some of these flights and
I would suggest that we simply repeat the flight if we have cloud cover
and repeat it sufficiently often to obtain the coverage we require.
17. The acronym COMOR stands for the interagency Committee on Overhead Reconaissance,
a committee of the U.S. Intelligence Board. Chaired by James Reber, COMOR set guidelines
and priorities for U.S. surveillance overflights of other countries.
Meeting on the Cuban Missile Crisis
403
President Kennedy: General Carter, can you go do that?
Carter: Yes, sir.
McNamara: Now this is U-2 flying.
Carter: U-2, sir.
McNamara: This specifically excludes the question that Mac [Bundy]
raised of low-level flying, which I think we ought to take up later, after our
further discussions of the possibilities here.18
Lundahl: I have one additional note, sir, if I may offer it.
Of the collateral information from ground observers as to where
these kinds of trailers have gone, we don’t have any indications elsewhere on the island of Cuba except for this San Cristóbal area, where we
do have coverage. But we have no ground collateral which indicates
there might be an equivalent thing going on somewhere else.
President Kennedy: In other words, the only missile base—intermediate-range missile base—that we now know about is this one. Is that correct? Is this one or two? This is one. . . .
Carter: There’s three of them.
Lundahl: Three, sir.
Bundy: Three [unclear] associated. Do I understand that this is a battalion, as you estimate it, Mr. Graybeal?
Graybeal: Yes, sir. We estimate that four missiles make up a battalion.
So that in this one that you’re looking at, Mr. President, has eight missiles. That’d be two battalions out of a regiment size. This one in front of
the table is a second separate installation from which we can see six missiles. So there are probably two more battalions there. The other missiles
may be under the tree. The third installation has the tents, but there are
no missiles identified anywhere in that area.
President Kennedy: These are the only [ones] we now know about?
Graybeal: Yes, sir.
Lundahl: Other than those cruise missiles that you’re familiar with,
those coastal ones. And the surface-to-air missiles.19
18. Low-level reconnaissance overflights went underneath clouds, low and fast, over their targets. These flights were carried out by air force or navy tactical reconnaissance units with aircraft like the F-101 or F8U. In September the CIA had asked McNamara to dispatch low-level
overflights over Cuba but at that time he declined, preferring to leave the work to the U-2.
19. The Soviet SAM sites in Cuba were first identified after a U-2 overflight of Cuba on 29
August and the White House was briefed about this discovery on 31 August. The discoveries contributed to the first U.S. warning to the Soviets against deploying “offensive
weapons” announced on 4 September. The same U-2 mission revealed another kind of mis-
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Unidentified: Any intelligence on that thing?
President Kennedy: Mr. Rusk?
Rusk: Mr. President this is, of course, a very serious development.
It’s one that we, all of us, had not really believed the Soviets could carry
this far. They seemed to be denying that they were going to establish
bases of their own [in Cuba] and this one that we’re looking at is a
Soviet base. It doesn’t do anything essential from a Cuban point of view.
The Cubans couldn’t do anything with it anyhow at this stage.
Now, I do think we have to set in motion a chain of events that will
eliminate this base. I don’t think we can sit still. The question then becomes
whether we do it by a sudden, unannounced strike of some sort or we build
up the crisis to the point where the other side has to consider very seriously
about giving in, or even the Cubans themselves take some action on this.
The thing that I’m, of course, very conscious of is that there is no
such thing, I think, as unilateral action by the United States. It’s so intimately involved with 42 allies and confrontation in many places that any
action that we take will greatly increase the risks of a direct action involving our other alliances and our other forces in other parts of the world.
So I think we have to think very hard about two major courses of
action as alternatives. One is the quick strike. The point where we think
there is the overwhelming, overriding necessity to take all the risks that
are involved in doing that. I don’t think this in itself would require an
invasion of Cuba. You could do it with or without such an invasion—in
other words, if we make it clear that what we’re doing is eliminating this
particular base or any other such base that is established. We ourselves
are not moved to general war. We’re simply doing what we said we would
do if they took certain action. Or we’re going to decide that this is the
time to eliminate the Cuban problem by action [unclear] the island.
The other would be, if we have a few days from the military point of
view, if we have a little time, then I would think that there would be another
sile site, near Banes in eastern Cuba, that CIA analysts needed more time to analyze. They
finally judged (correctly) that this missile was a cruise missile (more akin to a small
unguided jet aircraft, without a ballistic trajectory) with a range of 20 to 40 nautical miles,
apparently designed for coastal defense. President Kennedy was briefed in person about this
finding on 7 September (see Brugioni, Eyeball to Eyeball, pp. 120 –27).
President Kennedy was concerned that the nature of this arguably defensive system not
be misunderstood and that news about it not leak out into the ongoing, volatile domestic
debate over his response to the Soviet buildup in Cuba. A new codeword classification,
PSALM, was thereupon created—with a tightly restricted distribution—for future reports on
Soviet deployments in Cuba. A new, even more explicit, public warning against deployment of
“offensive weapons” was announced by the White House on 13 September.
Meeting on the Cuban Missile Crisis
405
course of action, a combination of things, that we might wish to consider.
First, that we stimulate the OAS procedure immediately for prompt action
to make it quite clear that the entire hemisphere considers that the Rio Pact
has been violated, and [unclear] over the next few days, under the terms of
the Rio Pact.20 The OAS could constitute itself as an organ of consultation
promptly, although maybe it may take two or three days to get instructions
from governments and things of that sort. The OAS could, I suppose, at
any moment take action to insist to the Cubans that an OAS inspection
team be permitted to come and itself look directly at these sites, provide
assurances to the hemisphere. That will undoubtedly be turned down, but
it will be another step in building up our position.
I think also that we ought to consider getting some word to Castro,
perhaps through the Canadian ambassador in Havana or through his
representative at the U.N. I think perhaps the Canadian ambassador
would be the best, the better channel to get to Castro, get him apart privately and tell him that this is no longer support for Cuba, that Cuba is
being victimized here, and that the Soviets are preparing Cuba for
destruction, or betrayal. You saw the [New York] Times story yesterday
morning that high Soviet officials were saying, “We’ll trade Cuba for
Berlin.” This ought to be brought to Castro’s attention. It ought to be
said to Castro that this kind of a base is intolerable and not acceptable.
The time has now come when he must, in the interests of the Cuban people, must now break clearly with the Soviet Union and prevent this missile base from becoming operational.
And I think there are certain military actions that we might well
want to take straight away. First, to call up highly selected units, up to
150,000, unless we feel that it’s better, more desirable, to go to a general
national emergency so that we have complete freedom of action. If we
announce, at the time that we announce this development—and I think
we do have to announce this development some time this week—we
announce that we are conducting a surveillance of Cuba, over Cuba, and
we will enforce our right to do so. We reject the condition of secrecy in
this hemisphere in a matter of this sort.
20. The Organization of American States (OAS) was created after World War II as a collective
organization of states in the Western Hemisphere for several cooperative purposes, including
the task of responding (by a two-thirds vote) to aggression from a member or nonmember
state, including economic or political sanctions. The founding documents were signed in
Mexico City (1945) and especially the Inter-American Treaty of Reciprocal Assistance, signed
in Rio de Janeiro (1947) and usually referred to as the Rio Pact. The OAS, spurred by the
United States, had adopted sanctions against Cuba in early 1962.
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We reinforce our forces in Guantánamo.21 We reinforce our forces in
the southeastern part of the United States, whatever is necessary from
the military point of view, to be able to give, clearly, an overwhelming
strike at any of these installations, including the SAM sites. And also to
take care of any MiGs or bombers that might make a pass at Miami or
at the United States. Build up heavy forces, if those are not already in
position.
We then would move more openly and vigorously into the guerrilla
field and create maximum confusion on the island [of Cuba]. We won’t
be too squeamish at this point about the overt/covert character of what
is being done.
We review our attitude on an alternative Cuban government, and get
Miro Cardona and his group in, Manuel Ray and his group, and see if
they won’t get together on a progressive junta that would pretty well
combine all principal elements, other than the Batista group, as the leaders of Cuba. And have them, give them, more of a status—whether we
proceed to full recognition or not is something else. But get the Cuban
elements highly organized on this matter.
I think also that we need a few days to alert our other allies, for consultation in NATO. I’ll assume that we can move on this line, at the same
time, to interrupt all air traffic from free world countries going into
Cuba, insist to the Mexicans, the Dutch, that they stop their planes from
coming in. Tell the British, and anyone else who’s involved at this point,
that if they’re interested in peace they’ve got to stop their ships from
Cuban trade at this point. In other words, isolate Cuba completely without, at this particular moment, a forceful blockade.
I think it would be important for you to consider calling in General
Eisenhower, giving him a full briefing before a public announcement is
made as to the situation and the courses of action which you might
determine upon.
But I think that, by and large, there are these two broad alternatives:
One, the quick strike.
The other, to alert our allies and Mr. Khrushchev that there is an
utterly serious crisis in the making here, and that Mr. Khrushchev may
not himself really understand that or believe that at this point.
I think then we’ll be facing a situation that could well lead to general
war. Now with that we have an obligation to do what has to be done, but
21. Guantánamo was and is a U.S. naval base on the eastern end of Cuba, with U.S. rights
secured by a long-term treaty signed decades before Castro seized power.
Meeting on the Cuban Missile Crisis
407
to do it in a way that gives everybody a chance to pull away from it before
it gets too hard.
Those are my reactions of this morning, Mr. President. I naturally
need to think about this very hard for the next several hours, what I and
my colleagues at the State Department can do about it.
McNamara: Mr. President, there are a number of unknowns in this
situation I want to comment upon and, in relation to them, I would like to
outline very briefly some possible military alternatives and ask General
Taylor to expand upon them.
But before commenting on either the unknowns or outlining some
military alternatives, there are two propositions I would suggest that we
ought to accept as foundations for our further thinking. My first is that if
we are to conduct an air strike against these installations, or against any
part of Cuba, we must agree now that we will schedule that prior to the
time these missile sites become operational. I’m not prepared to say
when that will be. But I think it is extremely important that our talk and
our discussion be founded on this premise: that any air strike will be
planned to take place prior to the time they become operational. Because,
if they become operational before the air strike, I do not believe we can
state we can knock them out before they can be launched. And if they’re
launched there is almost certain to be chaos in part of the East Coast or
the area in a radius of 600 to 1,000 miles from Cuba.
Secondly, I would submit the proposition that any air strike must be
directed not solely against the missile sites, but against the missile sites
plus the airfields, plus the aircraft which may not be on the airfields but
hidden by that time, plus all potential nuclear storage sites. Now this is a
fairly extensive air strike. It is not just a strike against the missile sites,
and there would be associated with it potential casualties of Cubans, not
of U.S. citizens, but potential casualties of Cubans in, at least, in the hundreds, more likely in the low thousands—say two or three thousand. It
seems to me these two propositions should underlie our discussion.
Now, what kinds of military action are we capable of carrying out
and what may be some of the consequences? We could carry out an air
strike within a matter of days. We would be ready for the start of such an
air strike within a matter of days. If it were absolutely essential, it could
be done almost literally within a matter of hours. I believe the Chiefs
would prefer that it be deferred for a matter of days. But we are prepared
for that quickly.
The air strike could continue for a matter of days following the initial
day, if necessary. Presumably there would be some political discussions
taking place either just before the air strike or both before and during.
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In any event, we would be prepared, following the air strike, for an
invasion, both by air and by sea. Approximately seven days after the
start of the air strike that would be possible, if the political environment
made it desirable or necessary at that time.
Fine. Associated with this air strike undoubtedly should be some
degree of mobilization. I would think of the mobilization coming not
before the air strike but either concurrently with or somewhat following,
say possibly five days afterwards, depending upon the possible invasion
requirements. The character of the mobilization would be such that it
could be carried out in its first phase at least within the limits of the
authority granted by Congress. There might have to be a second phase,
and then it would require a declaration of a national emergency.
Now this is very sketchily, the military capabilities, and I think you
may wish to hear General Taylor outline his.
Taylor: We’re impressed, Mr. President, with the great importance
of getting a strike with all the benefit of surprise, which would mean ideally that we would have all the missiles that are in Cuba above ground,
where we can take them out.
That desire runs counter to the strong point the Secretary made, if
the other optimum would be to get every missile before it could become
operational. Practically, I think, our knowledge of the timing of the
readiness is going to be so difficult that we’ll never have the exact, perfect timing. What we’d like to do is to look at this new photography, I
think, and take any additional, and try to get the layout of the targets in
as near an optimum position as possible, and then take them out without
any warning whatsoever.
That does not preclude, I don’t think Mr. Secretary, some of the things
that you’ve been talking about. It’s a little hard to say in terms of time,
how much I’ve discussed. But we must do a good job the first time we go
in there, pushing a hundred percent just as far, as closely, as we can with
our strike. I’m having all the responsible planners in this afternoon, Mr.
President, at 4:00, to talk this out with them and get their best judgment.
I would also mention among the military actions we should take, that
once we have destroyed as many of these offensive weapons as possible,
we should prevent any more coming in, which means a naval blockade.
So I suppose that, and also, a reinforcement of Guantánamo and evacuation of dependents.
So really, in point of time, I’m thinking in terms of three phases.
One, an initial pause of some sort while we get completely ready and
get the right posture on the part of the target, so we can do the best job.
Then, virtually concurrently, an air strike against, as the Secretary
Meeting on the Cuban Missile Crisis
409
said, missiles, airfields, and nuclear sites that we know of. At the same
time, naval blockade. At the same time, reinforce Guantánamo and evacuate the dependents. I’d then start this continuous reconnaissance, the
list that you have is connected, continuing over Cuba.
Then the decision can be made as we’re mobilizing, with the air strike,
as to whether we invade or not. I think that’s the hardest question militarily in the whole business, and one which we should look at very closely
before we get our feet in that deep mud in Cuba.
Rusk: There are certainly one or two other things, Mr. President.
[Soviet foreign minister Andrei] Gromyko asked to see you Thursday
[October 18]. It may be of some interest to know what he says about
this, if he says anything. He may be bringing a message on this subject. I
just want to remind you that you are seeing him and that may be relevant to this topic. I might say, incidentally, sir, that you can delay anything else you have to do at this point.
Secondly, I don’t believe, myself, that the critical question is whether
you get a particular missile before it goes off because if they shoot those
missiles we are in general nuclear war. In other words, the Soviet Union
has got quite a different decision to make if they shoot those missiles,
want to shoot them off before they get knocked out by aircraft. So I’m
not sure that this is necessarily the precise element, Bob.
McNamara: Well, I would strongly emphasize that I think our planning should be based on the assumption it is, Dean. We don’t know what
kinds of communications the Soviets have with those sites. We don’t
know what kinds of control they have over those warheads.
If we saw a warhead on the site and we knew that that launcher was
capable of launching that warhead I would, frankly, I would strongly
urge against the air attack, to be quite frank about it, because I think the
danger to this country in relation to the gain that would accrue would be
excessive. This is why I suggest that if we’re talking about an air attack I
believe we should consider it only on the assumption that we can carry it
off before these become operational.
President Kennedy: What is the advantage? There must be some
major reason for the Russians to set this up. It must be that they’re not
satisfied with their ICBMs. What’d be the reason that they would . . . ?
Taylor: What it’d give them is, primarily, it makes a launching base
for short-range missiles against the United States to supplement their
rather defective ICBM system, for example. That’s one reason.
President Kennedy: Of course, I don’t see how we could prevent further ones from coming in by submarine. I mean, if we let them blockade
the thing, they come in by submarine.
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McNamara: Well, I think the only way to prevent them coming in,
quite frankly, is to say you’ll take them out the moment they come in.
You’ll take them out and you’ll carry on open surveillance. And you’ll
have a policy to take them out if they come in.
I think it’s really rather unrealistic to think that we could carry out
an air attack of the kind we’re talking about. We’re talking about an air
attack of several hundred sorties because we don’t know where these
[Soviet] airplanes are.22
Bundy: Are you absolutely clear on your premise that an air strike
must go to the whole air complex?
McNamara: Well, we are, Mac, because we are fearful of these MiG21s.23 We don’t know where they are. We don’t know what they’re capable of. If there are nuclear warheads associated with the launchers, you
must assume there will be nuclear warheads associated with aircraft.
Even if there are not nuclear warheads associated with aircraft, you must
assume that those aircraft have high-explosive potential.
We have a serious air defense problem. We’re not prepared to report
to you exactly what the Cuban air force is capable of; but I think we must
assume that the Cuban air force is definitely capable of penetrating, in
small numbers, our coastal air defense by coming in low over the water.
And I would think that we would not dare go in against the missile sites,
knock those out, leaving intact Castro’s air force, and run the risk that he
would use part or all of that air force against our coastal areas—either
with or without nuclear weapons. It would be a very heavy price to pay
in U.S. lives for the damage we did to Cuba.
Rusk: Mr. President, about why the Soviets are doing this, Mr.
McCone suggested some weeks ago that one thing Mr. Khrushchev may
have in mind is that he knows that we have a substantial nuclear superiority, but he also knows that we don’t really live under fear of his nuclear
weapons to the extent that he has to live under fear of ours.
Also, we have nuclear weapons nearby, in Turkey and places like that.
President Kennedy: How many weapons do we have in Turkey?
Taylor: We have the Jupiter missiles.
Bundy: We have how many?
McNamara: About 15, I believe to be the figure.
22. A sortie is one mission by one airplane. If eight airplanes flew against a target, that would
be 8 sorties. If the planes flew two missions in one day, that would be 16 sorties in the day.
23. The MiG-21 (NATO designation “Fishbed”) was a short-range Soviet fighter-interceptor
that could, in some configurations, carry a light bomb load against nearby targets.
Meeting on the Cuban Missile Crisis
411
Bundy: I think that’s right. I think that’s right.
Rusk: But then there are also delivery vehicles that could easily be
moved through the air.
McNamara: Aircraft.
Rusk: Aircraft and so forth, route them through Turkey.
And Mr. McCone expressed the view that Khrushchev may feel that
it’s important for us to learn about living under medium-range missiles,
and he’s doing that to sort of balance that political, psychological flank.
I think also that Berlin is very much involved in this. For the first
time, I’m beginning really to wonder whether maybe Mr. Khrushchev is
entirely rational about Berlin. [Acting U.N. secretary-general] U Thant
has talked about his obsession with it. And I think we have to keep our
eye on that element.
But they may be thinking that they can either bargain Berlin and Cuba
against each other, or that they could provoke us into a kind of action in
Cuba which would give an umbrella for them to take action with respect to
Berlin. In other words, like the Suez-Hungary combination [in 1956]. If
they could provoke us into taking the first overt action, then the world
would be confused and they would have what they would consider to be
justification for making a move somewhere else.
But I must say I don’t really see the rationality of the Soviets pushing it this far unless they grossly misunderstand the importance of Cuba
to this country.
Bundy: It’s important, I think, to recognize that they did make this
decision, as far as our estimates now go, in early summer, and that this
has been happening since August. Their TASS statement of September
12 [actually 11] which the experts, I think, attribute very strongly to
Khrushchev himself, is all mixed up on this point. It has a rather explicit
statement: “The harmless military equipment sent to Cuba designed
exclusively for defense, defensive purposes. The president of the United
States and the American military, the military of any country, know what
means of defense are. How can these means threaten the United States?”
Now there. It’s very hard to reconcile that with what has happened.
The rest, as the Secretary says, has many comparisons between Cuba
and Italy, Turkey, and Japan. We have other evidence that Khrushchev
honestly believes, or at least affects to believe, that we have nuclear
weapons in Japan. That combination . . .
Rusk: Gromyko stated that in his press conference the other day, too.
Bundy: Yeah. They may mean Okinawa.
McNamara: It’s unlikely, but it’s conceivable the nuclear warheads
for these launchers are not yet on Cuban soil.
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Bundy: Now it seems to me that it is perfectly possible that they are
in that sense a bluff. That doesn’t make them any less offensive to us,
because we can’t have proof about it.
McNamara: No. But it does possibly indicate a different course of
action. And therefore, while I’m not suggesting how we should handle
this, I think this is one of the most important actions we should take: to
ascertain the location of the nuclear warheads for these missiles. Later in
the discussion we can revert back to this. There are several alternative
ways of approaching it.
President Kennedy: Doug, do you have any . . . ?
Douglas Dillon: No. The only thing I would say is that this alternative course of warning, and getting public opinion, and OAS action, and
telling people in NATO and everything like that. It would appear to me
to have the danger of getting us wide out in the open and forcing the
Russians, the Soviets, to take a position that if anything was done they
would have to retaliate.
Whereas a quick action, with a statement at the same time saying
this is all there is to it, might give them a chance to back off and not do
anything. Meanwhile, you’ve got to think that the chance of getting
through this thing without a Russian reaction is greater under a quick
strike than building the whole thing up to a climax, and then going
through with what will be a lot of debate on it.
Rusk: That is, of course, a possibility, but . . .
Bundy: The difficulties. I share the Secretary of the Treasury’s
[Dillon’s] feeling a little bit. The difficulties of organizing the OAS and
NATO. The amount of noise we would get from our allies saying that if
they can live with Soviet MRBMs, why can’t we? The division in the
alliance. The certainty that the Germans would feel that we were jeopardizing Berlin because of our concern over Cuba. The prospect of that
pattern is not an appetizing one.
Rusk: Yes, but you see, everything turns crucially on what happens.
Bundy: I agree, Mr. Secretary.
Rusk: And if we go with the quick strike, then, in fact, they do back it
up, then you have exposed all of your allies and ourselves to all these great
dangers without the slightest consultation, or warning, or preparation.
Bundy: You get all these noises again.
President Kennedy: But, of course, warning them, it seems to me, is
warning everybody. And obviously you can’t sort of announce that in
four days from now you’re going to take them out. They may announce
within three days that they’re going to have warheads on them. If we
come and attack, they’re going to fire them. So then what’ll we do? Then
Meeting on the Cuban Missile Crisis
413
we don’t take them out. Of course, we then announce: “Well, if they do
that, then we’re going to attack with nuclear weapons.”
Dillon: Yes, sir. That’s the question that nobody—I didn’t understand—nobody had mentioned is whether this takeout, this mission, was
going to be able to deal with it with high explosives?
President Kennedy: How effective can the takeout be, do they think?
Taylor: It’ll never be a hundred percent, Mr. President, we know. We
hope to take out a vast majority in the first strike. But this is not just one
thing, one strike—one day, but continuous air attack for whenever necessary, whenever we discover a target.
Bundy: You are now talking about taking out the air force as well, I
think, speaking in those terms.
I do raise again the question whether we [unclear] the military problem. But there is, I would think, a substantial political advantage in limiting the strike in surgical terms to the thing that is in fact the cause of
action.
Alexis Johnson: I suggest, Mr. President, that if you’re involved in
several hundred strikes, and against airfields, this is what you would do:
Preinvasion. And it would be very difficult to convince anybody that this
was not a preinvasion strike.
I think also, once you get into this volume of attack, that public opinion reaction to this, as distinct from the reaction to an invasion—there’s
very little difference. And from both standpoints it would seem to me
that if you’re talking about a general air attack program, you might as
well think about whether we can eradicate the whole problem by an
invasion just as simply, with as little chance of reaction.
Taylor: Well, I would think we should be in a position to invade at
any time, if we so decide. Hence that, in this preliminary, we should be
thinking that it’s all bonus if we are indeed taking out weapons.
President Kennedy: Well, let’s say we just take out the missile bases.
Then they have some more there. Obviously they can get them in by
submarine and so on. I don’t know whether you just can’t keep high
strikes on.
Taylor: I suspect, Mr. President, that we’d have to take out the surface-to-air missiles in order to get in. To get in, take some of them out.
Maybe [unclear].
President Kennedy: How long do we estimate this will remain secure,
this information, until people have it?
Bundy: In terms of the tightness of our intelligence control, Mr.
President, I think we are in unusually and fortunately good position. We set
up a new security classification governing precisely the field of offensive
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capability in Cuba just five days ago, four days ago, under General Carter.
That limits this to people who have an immediate, operational necessity in
intelligence terms to work on the data, and the people who have—
President Kennedy: How many would that be, about?
Bundy: Oh that will be a very large number, but that’s not generally
where leaks come from. And the more important limitation is that only
officers with a policy responsibility for advice directly to you receive
this.
President Kennedy: How many would get it over in the Defense
Department, General, with your meeting this afternoon?
Taylor: Well, I was going to mention that. We’d have to ask for
relaxation of the ground rules that Mac has just enunciated, so that I can
give it to the senior commanders who are involved in the plans.
President Kennedy: Would that be about 50?
Taylor: No, sir. I would say that, at this stage, 10 more.
McNamara: Mr. President, I think, to be realistic, we should assume
that this will become fairly widely known, if not in the newspapers, at
least by political representatives of both parties within, I would say, I’m
just picking a figure, I’d say a week. And I say that because we have
taken action already that is raising questions in people’s minds.
Normally when a U-2 comes back, we duplicate the films. The duplicated copies go to a series of commands. A copy goes to SAC. A copy
goes to CINCLANT.24 A copy goes to CIA. And normally the photo
interpreters and the operational officers in these commands are looking
forward to these. We have stopped all that, and this type of information
is going on throughout the department.
And I doubt very much that we can keep this out of the hands of
members of Congress, for example, for more than a week.
Rusk: Well, Senator Keating has already, in effect, announced it on
the floor of the Senate.
Bundy: [speaking over Rusk] Senator Keating said this on the floor of
the Senate on the 10th of October: “Construction has begun on at least a
half-dozen launching sites for intermediate-range tactical missiles.”
Rusk: That’s correct. That’s exactly the point. Well, I suppose we’ll
have to count on announcing it not later than Thursday or Friday of this
week.
Carter: There is a refugee who’s a major source of intelligence on
24. Commander in Chief, U.S. Forces, Atlantic. Headquartered in Norfolk, CINCLANT at this
time was Admiral Robert Dennison.
Meeting on the Cuban Missile Crisis
415
this, of course, who has described one of these missiles in terms which
we can recognize, who is now in this country.
President Kennedy: Is he the one who’s giving Keating his stuff ?
Carter: We don’t know.
Bundy: My question, Mr. President, is whether, as a matter of tactics,
we ought not to interview Senator Keating and check out his data. It
seems to me that that ought to be done in a routine sort of way by an
open officer of the intelligence agency.
Carter: I think that’s right.
President Kennedy: You have any thoughts, Mr. Vice President?
Vice President Johnson: I agree with Mac that that ought to be done. I
think that we’re committed at any time that we feel that there’s a buildup
that in any way endangers, to take whatever action we must take to assure
our security. I would think that the Secretary’s evaluation of this thing
being around all over the lot is a pretty accurate one. I wouldn’t think it’d
take a week to do it. I think they ought to [unclear] before then.
I would like to hear what the responsible commanders have to say
this afternoon. I think the question we face is whether we take it out or
whether we talk about it. And, of course, either alternative is a very distressing one. But, of the two, I would take it out—assuming that the
commanders felt that way.
I’m fearful if we . . . I spent the weekend with the ambassadors of
the Organization of American States. I think this organization is fine.
But I don’t think, I don’t rely on them much for any strength in anything like this.
And I think that we’re talking about our other allies, I take the position that Mr. Bundy says: “Well we’ve lived all these years [with missiles]. Why can’t you? Why get your blood pressure up?” But the fact is
the country’s blood pressure is up, and they are fearful, and they’re insecure, and we’re getting divided, and I don’t think that . . .
I take this little State Department Bulletin that you sent out to all the
congressmen. One of the points you make: that any time the buildup
endangers or threatens our security in any way, we’re going to do whatever must be done immediately to protect our own security. And when
you say that, why, they give unanimous support.
People are really concerned about this, in my opinion. I think we
have to be prudent and cautious, talk to the commanders and see what
they say. I’m not much for circularizing it over the Hill or with our allies,
even though I realize it’s a breach of faith, not to confer with them.
We’re not going to get much help out of them.
Bundy: There is an intermediate position. There are perhaps two or
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three of our principal allies or heads of government we could communicate with, at least on a 24-hour notice basis—
Vice President Johnson: I certainly—
Bundy: —ease the . . .
Vice President Johnson: Tell the alliance we’ve got to try to stop the
planes, stop the ships, stop the submarines and everything else they’re
[the Soviets] sending. Just not going to permit it. And then—
Bundy: Stop them from coming in there.
Vice President Johnson: Yeah.
President Kennedy: Well this is really talking about are two or three
different potential operations.
One is the strike just on these three bases.
The second is the broader one that Secretary McNamara was talking
about, which is on the airfields and on the SAM sites and on anything
else connected with missiles.
Third is doing both of those things and also at the same time launching a blockade, which requires, really, the third and which is a larger step.
And then, as I take it, the fourth question is the degree of consultation. I don’t know how much use consulting with the British . . . I expect
they’ll just object. Just have to decide to do it. Probably ought to tell
them, though, the night before.
Robert Kennedy: Mr. President?
President Kennedy: Yes?
Robert Kennedy: We have the fifth one, really, which is the invasion. I
would say that you’re dropping bombs all over Cuba if you do the second,
air and the airports, knocking out their planes, dropping it on all their
missiles. You’re covering most of Cuba. You’re going to kill an awful lot
of people, and we’re going to take an awful lot of heat on it. And then—
you know the heat. Because you’re going to announce the reason that
you’re doing it is because they’re sending in these kind of missiles.
Well, I would think it’s almost incumbent upon the Russians then, to
say, “Well, we’re going to send them in again. And if you do it again,
we’re going to do the same thing to Turkey. And we’re going to do the
same thing to Iran.”
President Kennedy: I don’t believe it takes us, at least . . . How long
does it take to get in a position where we can invade Cuba? Almost a
month? Two months?
McNamara: No, sir. No, sir. It’s a bare seven days after the air strike,
assuming the air strike starts the first of next week. Now, if the air strike
were to start today, it wouldn’t necessarily be seven days after today, but
I think you can basically consider seven days after the air strike.
Meeting on the Cuban Missile Crisis
417
President Kennedy: You could get six divisions or seven divisions
into Cuba in seven days?
Taylor: No, sir. There are two plans we have. One is to go at maximum speed, which is the one referred to you by Secretary McNamara,
about seven days after the strike. We put in 90,000 men in 11 days.
If you have time, if you can give us more time, so we can get all the
advance preparation and prepositioning, we’d put the same 90,000 in, in
five days. We really have the choice of those two plans.
President Kennedy: How would you get them in? By ship or by air?
McNamara: By air.
Several: Airdrop and ship.
McNamara: Simultaneous airdrop and ship.
President Kennedy: Do you think 90,000 is enough?
Taylor: At least it’s enough to start the thing going. And I would say
it would be, ought to be, enough.
McNamara: Particularly if it isn’t directed initially at Havana, the
Havana area. This is a variant. General Taylor and . . .
President Kennedy: We haven’t any real report on what the state of
the popular reaction would be to all this, do we? We don’t know
whether . . .
Taylor: They’d be greatly confused, don’t you think?
President Kennedy: What?
Taylor: Great, great confusion and panic, don’t you think? It’s very
hard to evaluate the effect from what the military consequences might be.
McNamara: Sometime today, I think, at the State Department, we
will want to consider that. There’s a real possibility you’d have to invade.
If you carried out an air strike, this might lead to an uprising, such that
in order to prevent the slaughter of the free Cubans, we would have to
invade to reintroduce order into the country. And we would be prepared
to do that.
Rusk: I would rather think if there were a complete air strike against
all air forces, you might as well do it. Do the whole job.
President Kennedy: Well, now, let’s decide what we ought to be
doing.
Robert Kennedy: Could I raise one more question?
President Kennedy: Yeah.
Robert Kennedy: Is it absolutely essential that you wait seven days
after you have an air strike? I would think that seven days, that’s what
you’re going to have all—
Taylor: If you give less, you run the risk of giving up surprise. If you
start moving your troops around in order to reduce that.
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Robert Kennedy: Yeah. The only thing is, there’s been so much
attention on Berlin in the last . . . Would you have to move them so that
everybody would know it was Cuba?
Taylor: Well, it’s troops, plus shipping even more so, you know.
You’re going to have to assemble the ships necessary, and that will be
very very overt, and we can think of no way to cover that up.
McNamara: May I suggest, Max, that we mention this other plan we
talked about. We should be prepared for a series of eventualities after the air
strike starts. I think it’s not probable, but it’s conceivable that the air strike
would trigger a nationwide uprising. And if there was strong opposition
among the dissident groups, and if the air strike were highly successful, it’s
conceivable that some U.S. troops could be put in in less than seven days.
Taylor: That’s correct. At first our air, our airdrops, and our Marines.
Well, the airdrop at least, beginning in five days. That might do the trick
if this is really a national upheaval.
McNamara: So we should have a series of alternative plans is all I’m
suggesting, other than the seven days.
Robert Kennedy: I just think that five days, even a five-day period—
the United States is going to be under such pressure by everybody not to
do anything. And there’s going to be also pressure on the Russians to do
something against us.
If you could get it in, get it started so that there wasn’t any turning
back, they couldn’t . . .
President Kennedy: But I mean the problem is, as I understand it . . .
you’ve got two problems.
One is how much time we’ve got on these particular missiles before
they’re ready to go. Do we have two weeks? If we had two weeks, we
could lay on all this and have it all ready to go. But the question really is
whether we can wait two weeks.
Bundy: Yeah.
Taylor: I don’t think we’ll ever know, Mr. President, those operational questions, because with this type of missile, it can be launched
very quickly with a concealed expedience—
Bundy: Do we have any intelligence—
Taylor: —so that even today, this one, this area, might be operational. I concede this is highly improbable.
Bundy: One very important question is whether there are other
areas which conceivably might be even more operational that we have
not identified.
McNamara: This is why, I think, the moment we leave here, Mac, we
just have to take this new authority we have and put it—
Meeting on the Cuban Missile Crisis
419
Bundy: May I ask General Carter whether the intelligence, the collateral intelligence [information from human sources], relates only to
this area, as I understood it this morning?
Carter: That’s right. That’s why we specifically covered this area on
the one [U-2 flight] Sunday [October 14] because [unclear].
McNamara: May I go back for a second, however, to the point that
was raised a moment ago? Mr. President, I don’t believe that if we had
two weeks, if we knew that at the end of two weeks we were going in, I
don’t believe we could substantially lessen the five- or seven-day period
required after the air attack, prior to the invasion, for the size force we’re
talking about. Because we start with the assumption the air attack must
take them by surprise. We would not be able to take the actions required
to shorten the five- to seven-day period and still assure you of surprise in
the air attack. And, therefore, we haven’t been able to figure out a way to
shorten that five- to seven-day period while maintaining surprise in the
air attack.
President Kennedy: What are you doing for that five days? Moving
ships, or where are the ships?
McNamara: Moving ships. And we have to move transport aircraft
by the scores around the country. We should move ships. Actually, the
ship movement would not be as extensive in the 7-day invasion as it
would be in an 11-day [invasion] after the air strike.
Taylor: [Unclear] place after the air strike.
McNamara: We have been moving already, on a very quiet basis,
munitions and POL. We will have by the 20th, which is Friday I guess
[actually Saturday], we will have stocks of munitions, stocks of POL
prepositioned in the southeast part of this country. So that kind of movement is beginning.
President Kennedy: What’s POL?
McNamara: Petroleum, oil, and lubricants. So that kind of movement
has already been taking place and it’s been possible to do it quietly.
President Kennedy: What about armor, and so on? What about armor?
McNamara: The armor movement would be noticeable if it were carried out in the volume we require. And hence the point I would make is
that, knowing ahead of time, two weeks ahead of time, that we would
carry out the invasion, would not significantly reduce the five- to sevenday interval between the strike by air and the invasion time, given the
size force we’re talking about.
Taylor: I think our point of view may change somewhat with a tactical adjustment here, a decision that would take out only the known missile sites and not the airfields. There is a great danger of a quick dispersal
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of all the interesting aircraft. You’d be giving up surprise. There’s no
[unclear] attack. Missiles can’t run off quite as readily.
President Kennedy: The advantage of taking out these airplanes
would be to protect us against a reprisal by them?
Taylor: Yes.
President Kennedy: I would think you’d have to assume they’d be
using iron bombs and not nuclear weapons. Because, obviously, why
would the Soviets permit nuclear war to begin under that sort of halfassed way?
McNamara: I think that’s reasonable.
Roswell Gilpatric: But they still have 10 IL-28s and 20 to 25 MiG21s.25
President Kennedy: So you think that if we’re going to take out the
missile sites, you’d want to take out these planes at the same time?
Gilpatric: There are eight airfields that are capable of mounting
these jets. Eight—
Bundy: But, politically, if you’re trying to get him to understand the
limit and the nonlimit and make it as easy for him as possible, there’s an
enormous premium on having a small, as small and clear-cut an action as
possible, against the hazard of going after all the operational airfields
becomes a kind of—
President Kennedy: General—
McNamara: War.
Gilpatric: —the number of hours required for each type of air strike,
if we were just going for the . . .
McNamara: Yeah, sure. Sure.
President Kennedy: Well, now, what is it we have, what is it we want
to, need to, do in the next 24 hours to prepare for any of these three? It
seems to me that we want to do more or less the same things, no matter
what we finally decide.
25. The IL-28 (NATO designation “Beagle”) was a twin-engined light/medium jet bomber of
an early postwar design (production began in 1950) with a cruising radius of about 750 miles,
able to carry 6,500 pounds of nuclear or conventional (“iron”) bombs. On 28 September a
Navy reconaissance aircraft in the Atlantic had photographed a Soviet freighter carrying ten
fuselage crates for these bombers to Cuba. The Soviet freighter arrived on 4 October. Due to
delay in the Navy’s transmission of its photos to CIA interpreters, the IL-28s were not identified until 9 October. McCone briefed President Kennedy about this discovery on 11 October.
At that time Kennedy told McCone, “We’ll have to do something drastic about Cuba” and said
he was looking forward to the JCS operational plan that was to be presented the following
week (see McCone to File, “Memorandum on Donovan Project,” 11 October 1962, in CIA
Documents, McAuliffe, p. 124; Brugioni, Eyeball to Eyeball, pp. 172–74).
Meeting on the Cuban Missile Crisis
421
Bundy: We’ve authorized, Mr. President, we have a decision, for additional intelligence reconnaissance.
A minor decision that we’ll talk to Keating. It seems to me—
President Kennedy: I don’t think Keating will be that helpful.
Bundy: We’ll leave that out.
President Kennedy: Yeah.
Robert Kennedy: I think that then he’ll be saying afterwards that we
tried to . . .
Bundy: All right. The next item. I should think we need to know the
earliest readiness for the various sizes of air strike and how long they
would take to execute.
President Kennedy: Mean probability.
Dillon: One other question is: What, if anything, has to be done to be
prepared for an eventuality of a Soviet action?
Bundy: [Unclear] alert [unclear].
President Kennedy: And then I think what we ought to do is to figure out: What are the minimum number of people that we really have to
tell. I suppose, well, there’s de Gaulle.
Bundy: You want de Gaulle. It’s hard to say about Adenauer. You’ve
got to tell, it seems to me, you’re going to have to tell SACEUR, and the
commandant.26
Dillon: I would think this business about the Soviet reaction, that
might be helpful if we could maybe take some general war preparation
type of action that would show them that we’re ready if they want to
start anything without, what you might, risk starting anything. You just
don’t know. . . .
Bundy: On this track, one obvious element on the political side is: Do
we say something simultaneously to the Cubans, to the Soviets, or do we
let the action speak for itself ?
Rusk: This is the point, whether we say something to the Cubans and
the Soviets before any, before . . .
President Kennedy: I think, what we ought to do is, after this meeting this afternoon, we ought to meet tonight again at six, consider these
various proposals.
In the meanwhile, we’ll go ahead with this maximum, whatever is
needed, from the flights. And, in addition, we will . . .
26. The acronym SACEUR stands for NATO’s Supreme Allied Commander, Europe—always
a U.S. officer. The SACEUR at that time was General Lauris Norstad. The commandant was
the commandant of the U.S. Sector of Berlin, Major General Albert Watson.
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I don’t think we’ve got much time on these missiles. They may be . . .
So it may be that we just have to . . . We can’t wait two weeks while
we’re getting ready to roll. Maybe we just have to just take them out,
and continue our other preparations if we decide to do that. That may be
where we end up.
I think we ought to, beginning right now, be preparing to present
what we’re going to do anyway. We’re certainly going to do [option]
number one. We’re going to take out these missiles.
The questions will be whether, what I would describe as number two,
which would be a general air strike. That we’re not ready to say, but we
should be in preparation for it.
The third is the general invasion. At least we’re going to do number
one. So it seems to me that we don’t have to wait very long. We ought to
be making those preparations.
Bundy: You want to be clear, Mr. President, whether we have definitely decided against a political track. I, myself, think we ought to work
out a contingency on that.
Rusk: We’ll develop both tracks.
President Kennedy: I don’t think we ought to do the OAS. I think
that’s a waste of time. I don’t think we ought to do NATO.
We ought to just decide who we talk to, and how long ahead, and how
many people, really, in the government. There’s going to be a difference
between those who know that—this will leak out in the next few days—
there are these bases. Until we say, or the Pentagon or State, won’t be hard.
We’ve already said it on the . . . So let’s say we’ve got two or three days.
Bundy: Well, let’s play it, shall we, play it still harder and simply say
that there is no evidence. I mean, we have to [unclear] be liars.
President Kennedy: We ought to stick with that until we want to do
something. Otherwise we give ourselves away, so let’s—
Bundy: May I make one other cover plan suggestion, Mr. President?
President Kennedy: Yes.
Bundy: There will be meetings in the White House. I think the best
we can do is to keep the people with a specific Latin American business
black and describe the rest as intensive budget review sessions.27 But I
haven’t been able to think of any other.
President Kennedy: Nobody, it seems to me, in the State Department.
I discussed the matter with Bohlen of the Soviet part and told him he
could talk to [Llewellyn] Thompson. So that’s those two. It seems to me
27. In this context the word black means to keep undercover, covert.
Meeting on the Cuban Missile Crisis
423
that there’s no one else in the State Department that ought to be talked to
about it in any level at all until we know a little more.
And then, as I say, in Defense we’ve got to keep it as tight as possible,
particularly what we’re going to do about it. Maybe a lot of people know
about what’s there. But what we’re going to do about it really ought to
be, you know, the tightest of all because [unclear] we bitch it up.
McNamara: Mr. President, may I suggest that we come back this
afternoon prepared to answer three questions.
First, should we surface our surveillance? I think this is a very important question at the moment. We ought to try to decide today either yes
or no.
President Kennedy: By “surface our”?
McNamara: I mean, should we state publicly that, that you have
stated we will act to take out any offensive weapons. In order to be certain as to whether there are or are not offensive weapons, we are scheduling U-2 flights or other surveillance—
Bundy: [chuckling] This is covert reconnaissance.
McNamara: Well, all right, or reconnaissance flights to obtain this
information. We’ll make the information public.
President Kennedy: That’d be one. All right, why not?
McNamara: This is one question. A second question is: Should we
precede the military action with political action? If so, on what timing?
I would think the answer is almost certainly yes. And I would think
particularly of the contacts with Khrushchev. And I would think that if
these are to be done, they must be scheduled, in terms of time, very, very
carefully in relation to a potential military action. There must be a very,
very precise series of contacts with him, and indications of what we’ll do
at certain times following that.
And, thirdly, we should be prepared to answer your questions regarding
the effect of these strikes and the time required to carry them off. I think—
President Kennedy: How long it would take to get them organized.
McNamara: Exactly. We’ll be prepared—
President Kennedy: In other words, how many days from tomorrow
morning would it . . . How many mornings from tomorrow morning
would it take to get the, to take out just these missile sites, which we
need to know now. How long before we get the information about the
rest of the island, do you figure, General?
Bundy: It could take weeks, Mr. President.
President Kennedy: Weeks?
Bundy: For complete coverage of a cloud-covered island.
Unidentified: Well, depending on the weather.
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Taylor: Well, we’ve got about 80 percent now, don’t we?
Carter: Yes, sir. It depends much on what we get out of yesterday’s
flight, sir. They won’t be—
Bundy: There are clouded areas, Mr. President, as I understand it.
And there are areas that are going to be very substantially in permanent,
or nearly permanent, cloud cover.
Carter: We’ll have preliminaries by six tomorrow morning.
President Kennedy: Well, there is the part of the island that isn’t
covered by this flight we’re [expecting to learn about] by tomorrow
morning. What about doing that tomorrow, plus the clouded part, doing
low level? Have we got a plane that goes—
Bundy: We can certainly go low level, and we have been reluctant to
do that.
The one thing to worry about on low level is that that will create a
sense of tactical alert in the island. And I’m not sure we want to do that.
Our guess is that the high-level ones have not, in fact, been detected.
Taylor: I think that’s correct.
Bundy: No reactions.
President Kennedy: I would think that if we are going to go in and
take out this, and any others we find, that we would at the same time do
a general low-level photographic reconnaissance.
Bundy: You could at the same time do a low level of all that we have
not seen. That would certainly be sensible.
President Kennedy: Then we would be prepared, almost any day, to
take those out.
Bundy: As a matter of fact, for evidentiary purposes, someone has
made the point this morning that if we go in on a quick strike, we ought
to have a photographic plane take shots of the sites.
President Kennedy: All right. Well, now, I think we’ve got to watch
out for this, for us to be doing anything quickly and quietly and completely. That’s what we’ve got to be doing the next two or three days. So,
we’ll meet at 6:00?
Robert Kennedy: How long? Excuse me. I just wondered how long it
would take, if you took it and had an invasion.
Taylor: To mount an invasion?
Robert Kennedy: No. How long would it take to take over the island?
Bundy carries on a side conversation about how to describe this meeting
to the press.
Taylor: Very hard to estimate, Bobby. But I would say that in five or
six days the main resistance ought to be overcome. We might then be in
there for months thereafter, cleaning that up.
Meeting on the Cuban Missile Crisis
425
McNamara: Five or seven days of air, plus five days of invasion,
plus—
President Kennedy: I wonder if CIA could give us the state . . . the
latest on his popular . . . so we get some idea about our reception there.
I just hate to even waste these six hours. So it may be that we will
want to be doing some movements in the next six hours.
Unidentified: About the execution of the [unclear]?
President Kennedy: Yeah.
The meeting now begins to break up. Various separate conversations
begin as some people leave. President Kennedy’s next appointment was
for a formal lunch with the crown prince of Libya.
President Kennedy: I want to add [unclear], better also. Are you two
coming to lunch?
Rusk: I was supposed to, but . . .
President Kennedy: George, are you supposed to come?
Ball: No.
President Kennedy: You went to check out [unclear].
Rusk: Ros [Gilpatric], were you supposed to go [unclear]? Could you—
President Kennedy: Six tonight?
Bundy: Six.
President Kennedy: All right, seven.
Bundy: Seven is better actually for you, Mr. President. Is 6:30 manageable? That would be still better because you’re supposed to be out
there [at a dinner party] at eight.
President Kennedy: Well, that’s all right. That, then, seven. Between
6:30 and 7:00. As close to 6:30 as you can, be there.
How many would there be? I’d like to have, I think we ought to have
the members of the Joint Chiefs of Staff here. [Unclear reply from Gilpatric.]
Well, then, you bring who you think ought to be brought.
Bundy: [calling to departing participants] And I urge everybody to use
the East Gate rather than the West Gate.28
President Kennedy: I think we ought to get . . . What’s Mr. McCone
doing out there, General?
Carter: He’s burying his stepson tomorrow morning.29
28. The West Gate was on the same side of the White House as the White House Press Room
and was the usual path for observing the comings and goings of official visitors. The East
Gate was the usual entrance for the residential side of the White House, used more for social
functions and tours.
29. McCone had remarried in August. His wife’s son, Paul Pigott, had died on 14 October
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Others are talking in the background.
Robert Kennedy: He’s back tomorrow.
Unidentified: I just talked to him on the phone. I think he’d rather come
back.
President Kennedy: So, why don’t . . . you discussed it with him? Is
he familiar with this information?
Carter: Yes, sir. He’s aware of what has happened.
Robert Kennedy: I talked to him about an hour ago.
President Kennedy: Is he coming here?
Robert Kennedy: He’ll be here tomorrow morning. They’re burying
the child today, his son.
President Kennedy: Why don’t we leave it in his judgment. [Mixed
voices.]
Robert Kennedy: I think we might tell him. He said he’s going to talk
to you about this. Maybe just tell him about the meeting tonight.
President Kennedy: All right. Now the other question is on—he’s
[McCone] the man to talk to the General, Eisenhower. Where is the General
now? Eisenhower?
I’ll take care of that. I’ll have [unclear]. I want to get [unclear].
Bundy: [apparently to Dillon] It’s too complicated. [Dillon makes an
unclear reply.] Yeah.
Rusk: George, the President wants you to take my place at lunch [with
the Libyan crown prince].
Ball: All right. But I’ve got . . . You know that I’ve got a 1:45 speech.
Look, look, maybe they can reschedule that. [Rusk makes an unclear reply.]
They can reschedule that.
Rusk: That’s fine.
There is a brief, unclear exchange between President Kennedy, McNamara,
and Taylor about reconnaissance flights and then Kennedy leaves, with the
tape machine still running.
Taylor: [Unclear] mission pilots [unclear]. If we can make a decision
here to use whatever facilities we have. [Mixed voices.]
McNamara: [Unclear] hold off on this thing until tomorrow. [Unclear]
first thing.
Bundy: But you will run the reconnaissance?
McNamara: Yeah, I was just talking to him. I’m going to get there right
now. And I would suggest in this period we get [unclear names] and every-
from injuries suffered in an auto racing accident in California. McCone had left Washington to
accompany the body to Seattle for the funeral.
Meeting on the Cuban Missile Crisis
427
body else and sit down at the table and figure out where these planes are.
And consider what camps there are. [Mixed voices.]
Why don’t you come down with, drive back [with us]? Why don’t you
ride—pick up your car and drive over with us to the Pentagon and have
lunch with us over there? Why don’t you call from here [unclear names] and
come over, or anybody else you choose? [Unclear.] And then we can sit
down [unclear] and sort out in great detail and see what we really need.
Vice President Johnson: [concerned about improving his jet transport and
communications as he travels] I have [unclear] authority. I wonder if there’s
any good reason why you shouldn’t go to somebody and put [unclear]. If
you had immediate [unclear] or something else, I’m away from you for four
or five hours. I have a Grumman Gulfstream that I’ve leased. I want you to
lease it for MATS [Military Air Transport Service], after the election. Let
me use it for the [Lockheed] Jetstar. It’s a hell of a lot better for these small
airfields. When I think about [unclear].
Anyway, I have a lease now and what I’d like to have is the best communication that you have that you’re . . . if it can be done.
McNamara: Oh sure, sure.
Vice President Johnson: As it is now, I’m going to get 100–200 miles
from Washington on the [unclear reference to communication].
McNamara: Oh sure.
6:30 –8:00 P.M.
I think any military action does change the world. And I
think not taking action changes the world. And I think these
are the two worlds that we need to look at.
Meeting on the Cuban Missile Crisis30
The morning meeting had ended with an understanding that the Pentagon
team would analyze possibilities for a quick air strike, possibly followed
by an invasion. Rusk and others at State would study how the adminis-
30. Including President Kennedy, George Ball, McGeorge Bundy, Marshall Carter, C. Douglas
Dillon, Roswell Gilpatric, U. Alexis Johnson, Vice President Johnson, Robert Kennedy, Edwin
Martin, Robert McNamara, Dean Rusk, Theodore Sorensen, and Maxwell Taylor. Tapes 28
and 28A, John F. Kennedy Library, President’s Office Files, Presidential Recordings Collection.
428
T U E S DAY, O C T O B E R
16, 1962
tration could act promptly and effectively against the missiles without
surprising allies in the hemisphere and Europe and possibly losing their
support.
While this went on, Kennedy kept to his announced schedule. He
presided over a formal lunch for the crown prince of Libya. Adlai Stevenson
was present. After lunch, Kennedy invited Stevenson to the family quarters.
Showing Stevenson the U-2 photos, Kennedy said, “I suppose the alternatives are to go in by air and wipe them out or to take other steps to render
the weapons inoperable.” Stevenson’s position was: “Let’s not go into an air
strike until we have explored the possibilities of a peaceful solution.”
During the afternoon, Stevenson took part in the meetings at the
State Department. So did Soviet experts Bohlen and Thompson and the
assistant secretary for Latin America, Edwin Martin.
At Justice, Robert Kennedy had meanwhile held in his own office a
meeting of those involved in Operation Mongoose. Describing the “general dissatisfaction” of the President with progress thus far, the Attorney
General focused discussion on a new and more active program of sabotage that had just been prepared by the CIA. Pressed by the CIA representative (Richard Helms) to explain the ultimate objective of the
operation and what to promise the Cuban exiles, Robert Kennedy hinted
the President might be becoming less averse to overt U.S. military
action. He wondered aloud how many Cubans would defend Castro’s
regime if the country were invaded. After discussing the possibility of
having Cuban émigrés attack the missile sites, he and the rest of the
group seemed to agree this was not feasible.
At the Pentagon, the Joint Chiefs of Staff conferred with CINCLANT, the commanders of SAC and the Tactical Air Command (TAC),
and the general commanding the 18th Airborne Corps. McNamara
joined later. Presuming that the Soviets would not initiate a nuclear war
against the United States, the JCS favored an attack, regardless of
whether the missiles were operational. They nevertheless approved several prudential steps to increase U.S. readiness for nuclear war. After
McNamara left, the JCS agreed that they did not favor use of low-level
reconnaissance flights over Cuba, fearing that they would “tip our hand.”
They also agreed they would rather do nothing than limit an air strike
only to MRBMs.31 In the last 40 minutes before returning to the White
31. Based on notes taken from transcripts of JCS meetings in October–November 1962. The
notes were made in 1976 before these transcripts were apparently destroyed. They have since
been declassified and are available from the National Security Archive, in Washington, D.C.
Meeting on the Cuban Missile Crisis
429
House, McNamara and Gilpatric worked out an outline of three alternative courses of action, which McNamara would present at the meeting.
From 4:00 on, Kennedy himself had been occupied with his regular
schedule. He was able to return to the missile problem only as his advisers gathered in the Cabinet Room at 6:30. Taylor arrived a bit late, after
the meeting began. President Kennedy activated the tape recorder as the
meeting opened with the intelligence briefing.
President Kennedy: Find anything new?
Marshall Carter: Nothing on the additional film, sir. We have a much
better readout on what we had initially.
There’s good evidence that there are back up missiles for each of the
four launchers at each of the three sites, so that there would be twice the
number, for a total of eight which could eventually be erected. This would
mean a capability of from 16 or possibly 24 missiles.
We feel, on the basis of information that we presently have, that these
are solid propellant, inertial guidance missiles with 1,100-mile range,
rather than the oxygen propellant [and] radar controlled [type]. Primarily because we have no indication of any radar, or any indication of any
oxygen equipment. And it would appear to be logical from an intelligence
estimate viewpoint that if they are going to this much trouble, that they
would go ahead and put in the 1,100 miles because of the tremendously
increased threat coverage. I’ll let you see the map.
President Kennedy: What is this map?
Carter: That shows the circular range capability.
President Kennedy: When was this drawn? Is this drawn in relation
to this information?
Carter: No, sir. It was drawn in some time ago, I believe. But the
ranges there are the nominal ranges of the missiles rather than the maximum. That’s a 1,020 [mile] circle, as against 1,100.
President Kennedy: Well, I was just wondering whether . . . San
Diego de los Baños is where these missiles are?
Carter: Yes, sir.
President Kennedy: Well, I wonder how many of these [maps] have
been printed out.
McGeorge Bundy: The circle is drawn in red ink on the map, Mr.
President.
President Kennedy: Oh, I see. It was never printed?
Carter: No, that’s on top.
President Kennedy: I see. It isn’t printed.
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T U E S DAY, O C T O B E R
16, 1962
Carter: It would appear that with this type of missile, with the solid
propellant and inertial guidance system, that they could well be operational within two weeks, as we look at the pictures now. And once operational they could fire on very little notice. They’ll have a refire rate of
from four to six hours, for each launcher.
President Kennedy: What about the vulnerability of such a missile to
bullets?
Robert McNamara: Highly vulnerable, Mr. President.
Carter: They’re vulnerable. They’re not nearly as vulnerable as the
oxygen propellant, but they are vulnerable to ordinary rifle fire.
We have no evidence whatsoever of any nuclear warhead storage near
the field launchers. However, ever since last February we have been
observing an unusual facility which now has automatic antiaircraft weapon
protection. This is at Bejucal. There are some similarities but also many
points of dissimilarity between this particular facility and the na