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Curriculum Vitae, November 2011 BUNYAMIN “BEN” ONAL Department of Finance, Suite 1229 Robinson College of Business Georgia State University 35 Broad Street, Atlanta, GA, 30303 Cell: (786) 281-4927 Office: (404) 413-7318 Fax: (404) 413-7312 Email: [email protected] EDUCATION Ph.D., Finance, Georgia State University, Atlanta, USA, Expected May, 2012 A.B.D., Economics, Florida International University, Miami, USA, May, 2007 B.Sc., Economics, Middle East Technical University, Ankara, Turkey, January, 2004 AREAS OF INTEREST • Research: Corporate Finance, Corporate Governance • Teaching: Corporate Finance, Investments, Financial Markets and Institutions RESEARCH To Delegate or Not to Delegate to Stock Markets? The Case of Boards with Related Industry Expertise (Job Market Paper) – Under review, Journal of Finance I examine the extent to which boards with expertise in the firm’s related industries, i.e., downstream (customer) or upstream (supplier) industries, delegate their monitoring and advisory functions to stock markets. Directors from related industries (DRIs) are argued to acquire information about product markets more readily. This, in turn, is predicted to alleviate the need for stock-based incentives particularly for firms with greater dependence on product markets and those with less informative stock prices. The evidence documented in this paper is largely consistent with these predictions. A number of additional tests suggest that this evidence is not likely to be explained by the potential conflict of interests between the firm’s stockholders and DRIs. Hence, I conclude that boards with related industry expertise delegate to stock markets to an optimally lesser extent due to their informational advantages. • Seminar Series, Georgia State University, 2011 (scheduled) Board Expertise: Do Directors from Related Industries Help Bridge the Information Gap?, with Nishant Dass, Omesh Kini, Vikram Nanda, and Jun Wang – Under review, Review of Financial Studies In this paper, we investigate the importance of board expertise by analyzing the role of “directors from related industries” (DRIs) on a firm’s board. DRIs are officers and/or directors of companies in the upstream (supplier) or downstream (customer) industries of the firm. About 40% of firm-years in our sample have at least one DRI. We propose and test information, market structure, and agency hypotheses about when DRIs are likely to add value. Consistent with the information hypothesis, DRIs are present when the information gap is more severe, such as in innovative firms/industries and in firms with less informative stock prices. Consistent with the market structure hypothesis, DRIs are also more likely in firms with larger market share and in more concentrated or vertically integrated industries. After correcting for endogeneity, DRIs have an economically significant impact on firm value and performance – especially when information problems are worse and boards have relatively greater power to monitor managers. Hence, a possible explanation for DRIs not being sought more widely is managerial resistance to monitoring by a better informed board. Finally, DRIs appear to enhance the ability of firms to handle negative industry shocks, suggesting that they narrow the information gap. • • • • • 23rd Australasian Finance and Banking Conference, 2010 Summer Research Conference in Finance, Centre for Analytical Finance, Indian School of Business, 2011 Seminar Series, Georgia Institute of Technology, 2010 Seminar Series, University of Georgia, 2010 Seminar Series, Tulane University, 2010 Page 1 of 3 Curriculum Vitae, November 2011 The Influence of Directors from Related Industries in Shaping Firm Policies, with Nishant Dass, Omesh Kini, and Vikram Nanda We investigate how “directors from upstream (supplier) or downstream (customer) industries” (DRIs) on a firm’s board help shape corporate policies. The literature has argued that directors can enhance firm value and has roughly ascribed this to their monitoring and advising roles. While the directors’ role in monitoring the management is well understood, the precise impact of their advice on corporate policies is less clear. We fill this gap in the literature by analyzing the impact of DRIs on specific corporate policies. We find that firms that have DRIs tend to have: (1) shorter cash-conversion cycles, (2) lower inventory, (3) lower accounts receivable and, (4) higher accounts payable. We also find that firms with DRIs are less financially constrained, as measured by their cash-to-cash flow and investment-to-cash flow sensitivities. Further, investment responds less to stock prices (measured by Tobin’s Q) in firms with DRIs when the stock prices are not very informative – suggesting that DRIs act as alternative conduits of information. In a similar vein, we find that firms with DRIs utilize their production factors more efficiently (as measured by labor and total factor productivity) – signifying that the industry expertise of DRIs helps the firm better anticipate industry conditions and trends. What Drives Cross-Border Bids between Countries of Different Level of Development? This paper presents a comprehensive analysis of the economic incentives in cross-border bids between developing and developed countries. The participation of developing-country firms in cross-border merger and acquisition (M&A) activity, particularly in developed markets, has recently been on sharp rise, making them important actors in the global arena. I run a horse race between the agency, resource-based and investor protection hypotheses on cross-border bids to detect the incentives of these new global bidders in developed markets. I also study the incentives of developed-country bidders in developing nations. In general, I find that the incentives of developed- and developing-country bidders differ substantially. Consistent with the resource-based hypothesis, developing-country bidders offer a significantly higher premium to vertically-related developed-country targets than what they offer to developing-country targets. The free cash flow theory is not likely to explain the behavior of developing-country bidders. Developed-country bidders, on the other hand, seem to be motivated by potential gains from improving shareholder protection in developing markets. Finally, bidders from both developing and developed countries that target firms in their primary sector tend to avoid (or offer a lower premium to) those in developed countries. This can be due to the presumably harsher competition in developed markets. • Seminar Series, Georgia State University, 2008 • Financial Management Association Meetings, Reno, NV, 2009 Work in Progress CEO Incentives Following Acquisitions in Related and Unrelated Industries Board Expertise and Productivity of R&D Activities, with Nishant Dass, Omesh Kini, and Vikram Nanda Market for Corporate Control and Outside Opportunities of Target Executives, with Harley E. Ryan How do Index Additions and Deletions Affect Firm Policies? with Lixin Huang and Omesh Kini SEMINARS/CONFERENCES • Presenter and Discussant, Financial Management Association Meetings, Reno, NV, 2009 • Presenter, Georgia State University Seminar Series, 2008 and 2011 (scheduled) TEACHING EXPERIENCE • Temporary Instructor ,Georgia State University, 2011 – Present Courses taught: Advanced Corporate Finance (FI 4300) and Corporation Finance (FI 3300) • Graduate Teaching Assistant, Georgia State University, 2010 – 2011 Courses taught: Corporation Finance (FI 3300) • Instructor, Florida International University, 2006 – 2007 Courses taught: Principles of Microeconomics • Teaching Assistant, Florida International University, 2004 – 2006 • Math and Statistics Tutor, Florida International University, 2006 Page 2 of 3 Curriculum Vitae, November 2011 HONORS/AWARDS • Travel Grant for the Third Paris Spring Corporate Finance Conference, Université Paris-Dauphine and Georgia State University, Summer 2011 • Teaching Excellence Award, Georgia State University, Spring 2011 • Temporary Instructorship, Georgia State University, Spring 2011 – Present • Stephen D. Smith Doctoral Research Grant, Summer 2010 • Clyde Kitchens/Thoben Elrod/Delta Sigma Pi Doctoral Fellowship, Fall 2010 • Travel Grant for the Financial Management Association Meetings in Reno, Georgia State University, Fall 2009 • Max Burns Fellowship, Georgia State University, Fall 2007 – Present • Graduate Assistantship, Florida International University, Fall 2004 – Spring 2007 PROFESSIONAL AFFILIATIONS • American Finance Association • Financial Management Association COMPUTER SKILLS • Statistical: Stata, SAS, Matlab • Databases: Compustat, CRSP, SDC Platinum, ExecuComp, BEA Input/Output Tables, CDA/Spectrum, I/B/E/S, RiskMetrics (formerly IRRC) PERSONAL DETAILS • • • • Languages: English (Fluent), Turkish (Native), Kurdish (Mother Tongue) Date of Birth: May 1, 1982 Citizenship: Turkey US Visa Status: F-1 SOCIAL ACTIVITIES/HOBBIES Soccer, Basketball, Cooking, History Books, Music, Folk Dances, Turkish Student Association at GSU (as Vice President), and International Student Association Council (ISAC) at GSU REFERENCES: Omesh Kini (Dissertation Chair) Professor of Global Markets and Professor of Finance Georgia State University Phone: (404) 413-7343 Email: [email protected] Mark A. Chen Associate Professor of Finance Georgia State University Phone: (404) 413-7339 Email: [email protected] Nishant Dass Assistant Professor of Finance Georgia Institute of Technology Phone: (404) 894-5109 Email: [email protected] Vikram K. Nanda Professor of Finance and Chair in Finance Georgia Institute of Technology Phone: (404) 385-8156 Email: [email protected] Harley (Chip) E. Ryan SunTrust Professor of Capital Markets and Associate Professor of Finance Georgia State University Phone: (404) 413-7337 Email: [email protected] Page 3 of 3