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Federalists vs. Anti-federalists Madison (#10) v. Brutus Is democracy best served in large or small republics? Who is likely to be elected? What is the greatest danger to democracy? Madison, Federalist #10 Faction: "A number of citizens, whether amounting to a majority or a minority of the whole, who are united and actuated by some common impulse of passion, or of interest, adverse to the rights of other citizens, or to the permanent and aggregate interests of the community." Inherent characteristic of people. Madison- Federalist 10 Latent causes of faction are thus sown in the nature of man. “the most common and durable source of faction has been the various and unequal distribution of property” p. 18 Pure democracy has no cure for the mischiefs of faction Incompatible with personal security or the rights of property. P. 20 Madison’s Solution Republican government to refine and enlarge the public views Liberty is safest in large (extended) republics many opinions and interests in large republic makes it harder for a tyrannical majority to form coalition formed in large republic are more moderate Liberty is threatened more by public passions and popular factions than by strong government Brutus’s Reply In a republic, the manners, sentiments, and interest of the persons should be similar (or else) constant clashing of opinions In a large republic “the people would be acquainted with very few of their rules, the people at large would know little of their proceedings, and it would be extremely difficult to change them. The consequence will be, they will have no confidence in their legislature, suspect them of ambitious views, be jealous of every measure they adopt, and will not support the laws they pass.” Anti-federalists small republic is best People are animated by a concern for public good strong national government would be distant from the people Madison, Federal #51 Is a large republic enough to prevent tyranny of the majority? Federalist #51, Madison Ambition must be made to counteract ambition. If men were angels, no govt would be necessary. If angels were to govern men, neither external nor internal controls on govt would be necessary In framing a govt which is to be administered by men over men, the great difficulty lies in this: you must first enable the govt to control the governed; and in the next place oblige it to control itself. Separation of Powers Madison- accumulation of all powers, legislative, executive, and judiciary in the same hands, may justly be pronounced the very definition of tyranny. Legislature makes laws, executive administers, and judiciary interprets BUT Separation is not enough. Checks and Balances #51, Ambition must be made to counteract ambition. The interest of the man must be connected with the constitutional rights of the place. giving to those who administer each department the necessary constitutional means and personal motives to resist encroachments of the others Different Bases of Support House of Representatives= only directly elected officials; every two years Senate= every six years; are selected by State legislatures until 1913 President= selected by electoral college; state legislatures; no popular vote Judiciary= appointed by President, confirmed by Senate. Life-time appointment Checks and Balances Federalist #51 President Congress- veto, propose, appeal to people, enforce laws Courts- appoint justices, enforce law Checks and Balances Congress – “necessarily predominates” Raise taxes, pass legislation Impeach president and judges determine number and jurisdiction of courts, Senate confirms judges House and Senate Courts- “least dangerous branch” can declare executive actions and laws unconstitutional. Comparison with UK Prime minister chosen by majority party. No judicial review control and responsibility concentrated in legislature Same electoral base No checks and balances Consequences GRIDLOCK? difficult to act unless there is overwhelming sustained consensus about course of action. 2008 Election- 53% Obama, Democratic Majorities; no health care reform 2008 $1 Trillion TARP bailout Losers-- Efficiency and accountability President Obama’s American Jobs Act Continuing Battle over CnB the War Power Article I. Congress can “declare war” Article II. President- commander in chief How many declared wars? Role of Courts Separation of Powers Limit the power of government Limit democratic majoritarianism (aka Tyranny of the Majority) Policy should not reflect majority public opinion New Republicanism OLD- positive political engagement – civic virtue and small republics that required some degree of equality NEW- negative limitations on government – the balance of interest based on the “invisible hand” of self-interest and on the equality of opportunity Charles Beard, An Economic Interpretation of the Constitution of the United States, 1913 Argument Evidence Analysis Charles Beard, An Economic Interpretation of the Constitution of the United States, 1913 Argument the Constitution was written by a "cohesive" economic / propertied elite- landholders (7), plantation owners (14), creditors, merchants (13), public bondholders (11), and lawyers (35). Seeking to protect their personal property (especially bonds) and economic standing. A Conservative Counter Revolution Charles Beard, An Economic Interpretation of the Constitution of the United States, 1913 EvidenceEconomic elite 55 of 72 President of Convention- wealthiest landowner in the country Shared common perspective "In their speeches in Philadelphia, their private letters [ . . . ], and their newspaper essays, the Framers made it abundantly clear that they expected the Constitution to benefit creditors and Americans who had speculated, whether in Indian land or war bonds." Charles Beard, An Economic Interpretation of the Constitution of the United States, 1913 Limited the power of popular majorities Article VI - the new government was to guarantee all debts Article I - clause prohibiting states from impairing contracts Create a national army strong enough to take the Indians' land Charles Beard, An Economic Interpretation of the Constitution of the United States, 1913 Anti - Federalists -largest creditors- George Mason -biggest bondholders, Elbridge Gerry Federalist Alexander Hamilton James Madison Charles Beard, An Economic Interpretation of the Constitution of the United States, 1913 Article VI - the new government was to guarantee all debts Restore government’s credit rating Article I - clause prohibiting states from impairing contracts Easier for creditors to borrow money Create a national army strong enough to take the Indians' land Looking for cheap land John Roche, “The Founding Fathers: A Reform Caucus in Action” Argument His view of founders? Evidence Data John Roche, “The Founding Fathers: A Reform Caucus in Action” View of Founders “were first and foremost superb democratic politicians.” Hamilton and Madison were “inspired propagandists.” Shared perspective- “how to construct a national government” that people would accept John Roche, “The Founding Fathers: A Reform Caucus in Action” Evidence/Data transcripts of convention – no C&B, Sep of P. Constitutional Evidence Federalism- no legislative supremacy Electoral College- Diamond Argument? Evidence? Implications? Trading Votes at the Constitutional Convention Two main issues: 1. Navigation Acts: Bar British ships from US ports Should Congress pass by: i. Simple Majority? ii. 2/3 Majority? Trading Votes at the Constitutional Convention Two main issues: 2. Slave Trade: key to Southern States Should slavery be prohibited: Immediately At some point in the future (e.g., 1800+) Trading Votes at the Constitutional Convention Position on Prohibition of Slavery Immediate Position on Navigation Acts Delay Simple Majority Simple, Immediate Simple, Delay 2/3 Majority 2/3, Immediate 2/3, Delay Trading Votes at the Constitutional Convention Most Desired Least Desired Eastern & Middle States Southern States Virginia Simple Majority; Immediate 2/3 Majority; Delayed 2/3 Majority; Immediate Simple Majority; Delayed Simple Majority; Delayed 2/3 Majority; Delayed 2/3 Majority; Immediate 2/3 Majority; Immediate Simple Majority; Immediate 2/3 Majority; Delayed Simple Majority; Immediate Simple Majority; Delayed Trading Votes at the Constitutional Convention The 3/5 Dilemma On what basis should House seats be apportioned? South wanted to offset the North’s population advantage Obvious connection to importation of slaves: “Are they [slaves] men? Then make them citizens and let them vote? Are they property? Why then is no other property included?” (Gouverneur Morris) Trading Votes at the Constitutional Convention The 3/5 Dilemma Morris sees moral and strategic problems: “What is the proposed compensation to the Northern States for a sacrifice of every principle of right, of every impulse of humanity?” Trading Votes at the Constitutional Convention The 3/5 Dilemma Morris sees moral and strategic problems: “On the other side the Southern States are not to be restrained for importing… nay they are to be encouraged to it by an assurance of having their votes in the Natl. Govt. increased in proportion…” Trading Votes at the Constitutional Convention Report of Committee on Detail Article VII (Sec 4 – 6): Section 4. Clause 1: No tax or duty by Congress on state exports Section 4. Clause 2: Nor on migration or importation of persons Section. 4. Clause 3: nor shall migration or importation be prohibited Section 6: No navigation act shall be passed without assent of 2/3 of members present in each House Trading Votes at the Constitutional Convention The Southern Response “The Southern States could not be members of the Union if the clause [i.e., Art VII, Sec 4, cl. 23] should be rejected.” Williamson (NC) Trading Votes at the Constitutional Convention Morris increases the pressure delete “persons” in Sec. 4.2, and substitute “slaves into North Carolina, South Carolina, and Georgia.” Trading Votes at the Constitutional Convention The Southern Response “...if himself and all his colleagues were to sign the Constitution and use their personal influence, it would be of no avail toward obtaining the assent of their Constituents.” Charles Pickney (SC) What makes these threats credible? Trading Votes at the Constitutional Convention The Strategic Situation Refuse Insist on Immediate Prohibition S Accept NE Accept Delayed Prohibition S Refuse Accept Trading Votes at the Constitutional Convention The Strategic Situation Refuse Insist on Immediate Prohibition S Accept NE Accept Delayed Prohibition S Refuse Accept Not a sensible outcome Trading Votes at the Constitutional Convention The Strategic Situation Refuse Insist on Immediate Prohibition S Accept NE Accept Delayed Prohibition S Refuse Accept No Union: A disaster for all (federalist) delegates Trading Votes at the Constitutional Convention A Vote Trade With ratification on the line, Morris proposed: “…the whole subject to be committed including clauses relating to the tax on exports and to a navigation act. These things may form a bargain among the Northern and Southern States.” Amar’s Argument More Democratic More Slavocratic #1 National Security Pluribus to Unum Why is America Democratic? Assessing the Framers Beard-- Elite Conspiracy Federalists all wealthy planters and merchants trying to get rich Roche-- Sound Politicians political expediency is the driving principle Electoral college Riker Politicians representing economic interests Diamond -- Brilliant Political Theorists We the People of the United States, in Order to form a more perfect Union, establish Justice, insure domestic Tranquility, provide for the common defence, promote the general Welfare, and secure the Blessings of Liberty to ourselves and our Posterity, do ordain and establish this Constitution for the United States of America.