Download The Russian Navy

The Russian Navy
Corbett Centre for Maritime Policy Studies
The Corbett Centre launched its first naval roundtable of a dozen experts on 23 march 2009.This initiative was
inspired by our general interest in navies, the way they work, the effect they have on the strategic context in
which they operate. Navies are often windows into national policy. Their size and shape, what they say, have
and do, tell us about national foreign policy purposes. They represent state resources so they tell us about the
financial and institutional strengths and weaknesses of the state and the people they serve.
We thought the Russian Federation Navy particularly
interesting because Russian naval developments may
give us insights into the country’s future trajectory.
This is of great concern to the rest of us Europeans
because Russia remains a major, if sometimes rather
neglected, factor in our local strategic environment.
Recent headlines over the past couple of weeks
indicate an on-going debate about whether
Russia is likely to be a partner or a competitor,
raising questions about its likely trajectory and its
implications for Europe. Will Russia prove a full partner
or will its attempt to preserve its ‘sovereign space
in the international system’ lead to rivalry, a lack of
cooperation and political conflict?
The Russian economy is in a bad state as a result of the
frailties of fast track capitalism in an age of recession
and excess reliance on high commodity prices for oil
and gas. The Ruble is down 35% against the dollar,
the Russian stock market lost 75% of its value through
2008 and the official forecast for 2009 is a -6% growth
in GDP. Past deficiencies in defence procurement
remain and many in the military resist reform. This
is all likely to mean that despite financial forecasts,
the Russians will be less able to spend on defence
unless its rulers see such expenditure as a way of
re-invigorating the economy and compensating for
Russia’s present financial weakness.
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Russian analysts often refer to the
country’s ‘exceptionalism...This
may well be especially the case
when it comes to defining the
roles of the Navy.
Alongside this, some commentators have discerned
some stirrings of the bear, quite apart from its invasion
of Georgia. Russia’s evident military interest in
Venezuela and its recent exercises with China imply a
rooted dislike of what it sees as Western containment
of Russia in Europe and an American-dominated
international system. The Kuznetsov has been active,
long-range Bear flights have resumed in the North
Atlantic and the North Pacific, new submarines have
been ordered, and their seem to be plans for a military
upgrade from 2011 which concentrates on the Navy
and the Air Forces.
Russian analysts often refer to the country’s
‘exceptionalism,’ arguing that while all the above may
be true, Russia should not be judged by the standards
of other countries. This may well be especially the
case when it comes to defining the roles of the Navy.
Russian naval experience is radically different from
the standard Western maritime powers by virtue of
its geographic and strategic circumstances, its way of
government and what some have termed the Russian
way of warfare. The old Soviet Navy certainly started
differently, especially with its initial emphasis on
submarines and aircraft rather than large warships,
and its different terminology and ways of doing
business. But during the Cold War there was a gradual
process of convergence as Soviet practices began to
seem to mirror Western ones. So there is room for
debate about the standards against which we should
be judging Russian naval aspirations and performance
and what we should think about what they say and do.
During the Cold War, the famous RUKUS [Russia,
UK, US] talks launched in 1989 were an attempt to
understand Soviet thinking and practice rather better
and to seek an improvement in maritime relations.
These linkages have developed, and now include
France; they have become less academic in tone
and composition and are now more of a venue for
practitioners to come together. Perhaps it is time to
revive the original idea?
The future trajectory of the RFN may also be
deduced from a look at the evolution of Russia’s
National Security Concept, Military Doctrine and
Maritime Doctrine. The identification of the US and
NATO as the principal military threats to Russia, the
associated stress on preparation for high intensity
conflict, and the placing of the navy and air force,
behind the strategic nuclear forces but ahead of the
army is worthy of note. The increasing stress on the
importance of the Arctic likewise suggests increasing
prominence for the Navy.
As far as the actual performance of the RFN is
concerned the its forces were actively involved in
the invasion of Georgia, sinking Georgian ships,
attacking Georgian ports and supporting landing
operations in the classic Soviet manner in the Black
Sea theatre of the Great Patriotic War. But, recently,
they have shown a much greater concern for the
defence of shipping than they did then, In recent
months, the nuclear battle cruiser Pyotr Velikiy, the
frigate Neustrashimy and the destroyers Admiral
Vinogradov and Admiral Panteleyev have been active
in the troubled waters off Somalia defending Russian
and other flagged merchant shipping against pirate
attack. Russian naval forces have not been subsumed
within Operation Atalanta or CTF 150 or 151, but their
ships have participated in joint operations against
pirates with the Indian and Royal Navies and they do
attend regular coordination meetings in Bahrain. In
similar vein, the RFN is making every effort to maintain
and extend its forward diplomatic presence in the
Caribbean, the Indian Ocean and the Far East.1
But whether such activity should really be seen as
evidence of the imminent re-appearance of a powerful
and global navy despite the ambitious declaratory
plans occasionally announced in Moscow is open
to considerable doubt. Over the past 15 years or so,
the RFN has not been spared from the neglect that
was so obvious from the lumbering performance of
Russian forces in Georgia, much of their hardware is
antiquated and rusty and recent customers of Russian
military equipment – such as India- have frequently
complained of unexpected price hikes, delays in
production and poor quality.
The RFN certainly faces a major problem in the
Black Sea area where their leases on port facilities
at Sebastopol are up for renewal with the Ukrainian
authorities in 2017. The current Ukrainian regime is
most unlikely to renew this agreement. The Black
Sea Fleet is weak, and its strategic position exposed.
Russia’s apparently perverse up-grading of its facilities
(such as the Black Sea Fleet sailor’s Club] in the area,
and support for the legions of Russian military who
have retired to the area, should probably be seen as
largely as part of a political campaign to prevent the
Ukraine from ‘going West’ for fear of its consequence
for the near abroad, and indeed for Russia itself.
Nor should the emotional importance of the base,
founded by Catherine the Great to act as a gateway
to the south in rather the manner that Petersburg was
expected to do in the Baltic be forgotten.
The Roundtable came to no conclusions about the
extent of a prospective Russian naval revival, although
most were sceptical that this would be dramatic in the
foreseeable future. We did, however, resolve to follow
this session up with further studies. The topic clearly
deserves more attention than it is currently getting.
Moreover the format of this session – small groups of
selected and invited people worked well and will be
repeated, alongside larger more orthodox gatherings
on this and other topics of concern.
Further
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details of this are available in Lee
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Willett‘ The
Navy in Russia’s ‘Resurgence’ RUSI Journal February
2009. Dr Willett was one of the Roundtable experts.
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Russian Navy Seminar Report
Corbett Centre 3