Download Collectivization in the Soviet Union

Collectivization in the Soviet Union
Collectivization in the Soviet Union
Collectivization in the Soviet Union was enforced under Stalin between 1928 and 1940. The goal of this policy was
to consolidate individual land and labour into collective farms: mainly kolkhozes and sovkhozes. The Soviet
leadership was confident that the replacement of individual peasant farms by collective ones would immediately
increase the food supply for urban population, the supply of raw materials for processing industry, and agricultural
exports. Collectivization was thus regarded as the solution to the crisis of agricultural distribution (mainly in grain
deliveries) that had developed since 1927. This problem became more acute as the Soviet Union pressed ahead with
its ambitious industrialization program.[1]
In the early 1930s over 90% of agricultural land was "collectivized" as rural households entered collective farms
with their land, livestock, and other assets. The sweeping collectivization often involved tremendous human and
social costs.
Background
After the emancipation of the serfs in 1861, peasants gained control of about half of the land they had previously
cultivated, and began to ask for the redistribution of all land.[2] The Stolypin agricultural reforms between 1905 and
1914 gave incentives for the creation of large farms, but these ended during World War I. The Russian Provisional
Government accomplished little during the difficult wartime months, though Russian leaders continued to promise
redistribution. Peasants began to turn against the Provisional Government and organized themselves into land
committees, which together with the traditional peasant communes became a powerful force of opposition. When
Vladimir Lenin returned to Russia on April 3, 1917, he promised the people "Peace and Land," the latter appearing
as a promise to the peasants for the redistribution of confiscated land.
During the period of war communism, however, the policy of Prodrazvyorstka meant peasantry were obligated to
surrender the surpluses of almost any kind of agricultural produce for a fixed price. When the Russian Civil War
ended, the economy changed with the New Economic Policy (NEP) and specifically, the policy of prodnalog or
"food tax." This new policy was designed to re-build morale among embittered farmers, and lead to increased
production, while as a progressive tax, those with more money paid more.
Until this time, the Bolsheviks allowed the peasants to take the land and farm it privately.[2] In the 1920s, however,
they began to lean toward the idea of collective agriculture. Memories of World War I were that soldiers from the
Green cadres (Yugoslavia) maintained ties with the Red Guards (Russia) and helped them with food, sugar, tea,
tobacco, etc. and they transferred their experience with the organization of agricultural cooperatives of the former
Military Frontier, when the Red Army began to conquer Tomsk in Siberia.[3] The pre-existing communes, which
periodically redistributed land, did little to encourage improvement in technique, and formed a source of power
beyond the control of the Soviet government. Although the income gap between wealthy and poor farmers did grow
under the NEP, it remained quite small, but the Bolsheviks began to take aim at the wealthy kulaks. Clearly
identifying this group was difficult, though, since only about 1% of the peasantry employed labourers (the basic
Marxist definition of a capitalist), and 80% of the country's population were peasants.[2]
The equal land shares among the peasants gave rise to food shortages in the cities. Although grain had nearly
returned to pre-war production levels, the large estates who had produced it for urban markets had been divided
up.[2] Not interested in acquiring money to purchase overpriced goods, the peasants chose to eat their produce rather
than sell it, so city dwellers only saw half the grain that had been available before the war.[2] Before the revolution,
peasants controlled only 2,100,000 km² divided into 16 million holdings, producing 50% of the food grown in Russia
and consuming 60% of total food production. After the revolution, the peasants controlled 3,140,000 km² divided
into 25 million holdings, producing 85% of the food, but consuming 80% of what they grew (meaning that they ate
68% of the total).[4]
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Collectivization in the Soviet Union
2
The Soviet Communist Party had never been happy with private agriculture and saw collectivization as the best
remedy for the problem. Lenin claimed "Small-scale production gives birth to capitalism and the bourgeoisie
constantly, daily, hourly, with elemental force, and in vast proportions."[5] Apart from ideological goals, Joseph
Stalin also wished to embark on a program of rapid heavy industrialization which required larger surpluses to be
extracted from the agricultural sector in order to feed a growing industrial work force and to pay for imports of
machinery (by exporting grain).[6] Social and ideological goals would also be served though mobilization of the
peasants in a co-operative economic enterprise which would produce higher returns for the State and could serve a
secondary purpose of providing social services to the people.
The crisis of 1928
Telegrams are pouring in from numerous parts of the Soviet Union with the news that deeds of arson and murders of active Communists are
being perpetrated by the Kulaks… Soviet farms, village libraries and Soviet bureaus have been burned down by the Kulaks in their fierce
opposition against all measures undertaken by our Communist Party and our Soviet Government… Murderous attacks have been perpetrated
against Communist village school teachers and social workers, women as well as men… Seven murders and four attempted murders took
place in public assemblies or in Soviet bureaus. The roll of our Communist dead contains the names of four Chairmen of local Soviets and one
Secretary… A destructive blow at the Kulaks must be delivered immediately!
“
”
[7]
— Izvestia, November 1928
This demand for more grain resulted in the reintroduction of requisitioning which was resisted in rural areas. In 1928
there was a 2 million ton shortfall in grains purchased by the state. Stalin claimed the grain had been produced but
was being hoarded by "kulaks." Instead of raising the price, the Politburo adopted an emergency measure to
requisition 2.5 million tons of grain.
The seizures of grain discouraged the peasants and less grain was produced during 1928, and again the government
resorted to requisitions, much of the grain being requisitioned from middle peasants as sufficient quantities were not
in the hands of the "kulaks." In 1929, especially after the introduction of the Ural-Siberian Method of grain
procurement, resistance to grain seizures became widespread with some violent incidents of resistance. Also,
massive hoarding (burial was the common method) and illegal transfers of grain took place.
Faced with the refusal to hand grain over, a decision was made at a plenary session of the Central Committee in
November 1929 to embark on a nationwide program of collectivization.
Several forms of collective farming were suggested by the People's Commissariat for Agriculture (Narkomzem),
distinguished according to the extent to which property was held in common:[8]
• Association for Joint Cultivation of Land (Товарищество по совместной обработке земли, ТОЗ/TOZ), where
only land was in common use;
• agricultural artel (initially in a loose meaning, later formalized to become an organizational basis of kolkhozes,
via The Standard Statute of an Agricultural Artel adopted by Sovnarkom in March 1930);
• agricultural commune, with the highest level of common use of resources.
Also, various cooperatives for processing of agricultural products were installed.
In November 1929, the Central Committee decided to implement accelerated collectivization in the form of
kolkhozes and sovkhozes. This marked the end of the New Economic Policy (NEP), which had allowed peasants to
sell their surpluses on the open market. Stalin had many so-called "kulaks" transported to collective farms in distant
places to work in agricultural labor camps. It has been calculated that one in five of these deportees, many of them
women and children, died. In response to this, many peasants began to resist, often arming themselves against the
activists sent from the towns. As a form of protest, many peasants preferred to slaughter their animals for food rather
than give them over to collective farms, which produced a major reduction in livestock.
Collectivization had been encouraged since the revolution, but in 1928, only about one percent of farm land was
collectivized, and despite efforts to encourage and coerce collectivization, the rather optimistic First Five Year Plan
Collectivization in the Soviet Union
3
only forecast 15 percent of farms to be run collectively.[2]
The all-out drive, winter 1929-30
The situation changed incredibly quickly in the fall of 1929 and winter of 1930. Between September and December
1929, collectivization increased from 7.4% to 15%, but in the first two months of 1930, 11 million households joined
collectivized farms, pushing the total to nearly 60% almost overnight.
To assist collectivization, the Party decided to send 25,000 "socially conscious" industry workers to the countryside.
This was accomplished during 1929–1933, and these workers have become known as twenty-five-thousanders
("dvadtsat'pyat'tysyachniki"). Shock brigades were used to force reluctant peasants into joining the collective farms
and remove those who were declared kulaks and their "agents".
Collectivization sought to modernize Soviet agriculture, consolidating
the land into parcels that could be farmed by modern equipment using
the latest scientific methods of agriculture. It was often claimed that an
American Fordson tractor (called "Фордзон" in Russian) was the best
propaganda in favor of collectivization. The Communist Party, which
adopted the plan in 1929, predicted an increase of 330% in industrial
production, and an increase of 50% in agricultural production.
The means of production (land, equipment, livestock) were to be
totally "socialized", i.e. removed from the control of individual peasant
households. Not even any private household garden plots were allowed
for.
The First Tractor by Vladimir Krikhatsky
(Socialist realism)
Agricultural work was envisioned on a mass scale. Huge glamorous columns of machines were to work the fields, in
total contrast to peasant small-scale work.
The peasants traditionally mostly held their land in the form of large numbers of strips scattered throughout the fields
of the village community. By an order of 7 January 1930, "all boundary lines separating the land allotments of the
members of the artel are to be eliminated and all fields are to be combined in a single land mass." The basic rule
governing the rearrangement of the fields was that the process would have to be completed before the spring
planting.[9]
The new kolkhozy were initially envisioned as giant organizations unrelated to the preceding village communities.
Kolkhozy of tens, or even hundreds, of thousands of hectares were envisioned in schemes which were later to
become known as gigantomania. They were typically "divided into 'economies (ekonomikii)' of 5,000 - 10,000
hectares which were in turn divided into fields and sections (uchastki) without regard to the existing villages - the
aim was to achieve a 'fully depersonalized optimum land area'..." Parallel with this were plans to transfer the
peasants to centralized 'agrotowns' offering modern amenities.
In the prevailing socio-economic conditions, little could become of such utopian schemes. The giant kolkhozy were
always exceptional, existing mainly on paper, and in any case they were mostly soon to disappear. The peasants
chose to remain in their traditional, primitive, villages.[10]
Collectivization in the Soviet Union
"Dizzy with Success"
The price of collectivization was so high that the March 2, 1930, issue of Pravda contained Stalin's article Dizzy with
success [11], in which he called for a temporary halt to the process:
"It is a fact that by February 20 of this year 50 percent of the peasant farms throughout the U.S.S.R. had
been collectivized. That means that by February 20, 1930, we had overfulfilled the five-year plan of
collectivization by more than 100 per cent.... some of our comrades have become dizzy with success and
for the moment have lost clearness of mind and sobriety of vision." [12]
After the publication of the article, the pressure for collectivization temporarily abated and peasants started leaving
collective farms. According to Martin Kitchen, the number of members of collective farms dropped by 50% in 1930.
But soon collectivization was intensified again, and by 1936, about 90% of Soviet agriculture was collectivized.
Peasant resistance
Theoretically, landless peasants were to be the biggest beneficiaries from collectivization, because it promised them
an opportunity to take an equal share in labor and its rewards. In fact, however, rural areas did not have many
landless peasants, given the wholesale redistribution of land following the Revolution. Alternatively, for those with
property, collectivization meant forfeiting land up to the collective farms and selling most of the harvest to the state
at minimal prices set by the state itself. This, in turn, engendered opposition to the idea. Furthermore, collectivization
involved significant changes in the traditional village life of Russian peasants within a very short time frame, despite
the long Russian rural tradition of collectivism in the village obshchina or mir. The changes were even more
dramatic in other places, such as in Ukraine, with its tradition of individual farming, in the Soviet republics of
Central Asia, and in the trans-Volga steppes, where for a family to have a herd of livestock was not only a matter of
sustenance, but of pride as well.
Peasants viewed collectivization as the end of the world.[13] By no means was joining the collective farm (also
known as the kolkhoz) voluntary. The drive to collectivize came without peasant support.[14] The intent was to
increase state grain procurements without giving the peasants the opportunity to withhold grain from the market.
Collectivization would increase the total crop and food supply but the locals knew that they were not likely to benefit
from it.[15] Peasants tried to protest through peaceful means by speaking out at collectivization meetings and writing
letters to the central authorities. When their strategies failed, villagers turned to violence: committing arson, and
lynching and murdering local authorities, kolkhoz leaders, and activists.[16][17] Others responded with acts of
sabotage, including the burning of crops and the slaughter of draught animals. According to Party sources, there
were also some cases of destruction of property, and attacks on officials and members of the collectives. Isaac
Mazepa, prime minister of the Ukrainian National Republic (UNR) in 1919–1920, claimed "[t]he catastrophe of
1932" was the result of "passive resistance … which aimed at the systematic frustration of the Bolsheviks' plans for
the sowing and gathering of the harvest". In his words, "[w]hole tracts were left unsown,... [and as much as] 50 per
cent [of the crop] was left in the fields, and was either not collected at all or was ruined in the threshing".[18] Fueled
by fear and anxiety, rumors spread throughout the villages leading to these acts.[19] Rumors associated the Soviet
government with the Antichrist (godless and evil), threatened an end to traditional ways of peasant life, and worked
to unite the peasants to protest against collectivization.
Collectivization as a "second serfdom"
Rumors circulated in the villages warning the rural residents that collectivization would bring disorder, hunger,
famine, and the destruction of crops and livestock.[20] Readings and reinterpretations of Soviet newspapers labeled
collectivization as a second serfdom.[21][22] Villagers were afraid the old landowners/serf owners were coming back
and that the villagers joining the collective farm would face starvation and famine.[23] More reason for peasants to
believe collectivization was a second serfdom was that entry into the kolkhoz had been forced. Farmers did not have
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Collectivization in the Soviet Union
the right to leave the collective without permission. The level of state procurements and prices on crops also
enforced the serfdom analogy. The government would take a majority of the crops and pay extremely low prices.
The serfs during the 1860s were paid nothing but collectivization still reminded the peasants of serfdom.[24] This
“second serfdom” became code for the Communist betrayal of the revolution. To the peasants, the revolution was
about giving more freedom and land to the peasants, but instead they had to give up their land and livestock to the
collective farm.
Women's role in resistance
Women were the primary vehicle for rumors that touched upon issues of family and everyday life.[25] Fears that
collectivization would result in the socialization of children, the export of women’s hair, communal wife-sharing,
and the notorious common blanket affected many women, causing them to revolt. For example, when it was
announced that a collective farm in Crimea would become a commune and that the children would be socialized,
women killed their soon-to-be socialized livestock, which spared the children. Stories that the Communists believed
short hair gave women a more urban and industrial look insulted peasant women.[26] After local activists in a village
in North Caucasus actually confiscated all blankets, more fear dispersed among villagers. The common blanket
meant that all men and women would sleep on a seven-hundred meter long bed under a seven-hundred-meter long
blanket.[27] Historians argue that women took advantage of these rumors without actually believing them so they
could attack the collective farm “under the guise of irrational, nonpolitical protest.”[28] Women were less vulnerable
to retaliation than peasant men, and therefore able to get away with a lot more.[29]
Peasant women were rarely held accountable for their actions because of the officials’ perceptions of their protests.
They “physically blocked the entrances to huts of peasants scheduled to be exiled as kulaks, forcibly took back
socialized seed and livestock, and led assaults on officials.” Officials ran away and hid to let the riots run their
course. When women came to trial, they were given less harsh punishments as the men because women, to officials,
were seen as illiterate and the most backward part of the peasantry. One particular case of this was a riot in a Russian
village of Belovka where protestors were beating members of the local soviet and setting fire to their homes. The
men were held exclusively responsible as the main culprits. Women were given sentences to serve as a warning, not
as a punishment. Because of how they were perceived, women were able to play an essential role in the resistance to
collectivization.[30]
Soviet power as the Antichrist
The Communist assault on religion and the church angered many peasants, giving them more reason to revolt. Riots
exploded after the closing of churches as early as 1929.[31] Collectivization did not just entail the acquisition of land
from farmers but also the closing of churches, burning of icons, and the arrests of priests.[23] Associating the church
with the tsarist regime,[32] the Soviet state continued to undermine the church through expropriations and
repression.[33] They cut off state financial support to the church and secularized church schools.[32] Peasants began
to associate Communists with atheists because the attack on the church was so devastating.[33]
Identifying Soviet power as the Antichrist also decreased peasant support of the Soviet regime. Rumors spread
mostly by word of mouth, but also through leaflets and proclamations.[34] It was preached that the Antichrist had
come to place “the Devil’s mark” on the peasants.[35] The Soviet state was promising the peasants a better life but
was actually signing them up for hell. Peasants feared that if they joined the collective farm they would be marked
with the stamp of the Antichrist.[36] They faced a choice between God and the Soviet collective farm. Choosing
between salvation and damnation, peasants had no choice but to resist policies of the state.[37] These rumors of the
Soviet state as the Antichrist functioned to keep peasants from succumbing to the government. The attacks on
religion and the Church affected women the most because they were upholders of religion within the villages.[38]
Uncertainty, despair and disorder among peasant society fueled the rumors concerning the Antichrist.[39] These
apocalyptic forecasts had existed long before collectivization but became pronounced during the 1930s.[40] Russian
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Collectivization in the Soviet Union
villages had faced war, famine, and disease, which were characteristics of the apocalypse. Throughout the years, the
eschatological thinking became more common and widespread because of the instability of the peasant mood.
Peasants saw the Soviets bringing a different life to them. The collective farm was the coming of the end because it
foreshadowed “the reign of the Antichrist on earth.” [41] Rumors of the war and invasion were also derived from
apocalyptic thinking but came as an aftermath of the rumors about Antichrist.[42] During the 1920s, peasants were
unsure whether another war would begin and fears grew rapidly. Peasants would hear that if they joined the
collective farms they would be conscripted to the military or killed by the army.
Rumors targeted peasants to cause fear among them. If peasants gave in to the Soviets, they would be choosing the
Antichrist. Peasants would face many challenges, such as famine and the threat of massacre. As a result, these
rumors worked in rallying the peasants to resist the government and collectivization because they gave the peasants a
“language of protest”.[43]
Results
Resistance to collectivization and consequences
Due to high government production quotas peasants received, as a rule, less for their labor than they did before
collectivization, and some refused to work. Merle Fainsod estimated that, in 1952, collective farm earnings were
only one fourth of the cash income from private plots on Soviet collective farms.[44] In many cases, the immediate
effect of collectivization was to reduce output and cut the number of livestock in half. The subsequent recovery of
the agricultural production was also impeded by the losses suffered by the Soviet Union during World War II and the
severe drought of 1946. However the largest loss of livestock was caused by collectivization for all animals except
pigs.[45] The numbers of cows in the USSR fell from 33.2 million in 1928 to 27.8 million in 1941 and to 24.6 million
in 1950. The number of pigs fell from 27.7 million in 1928 to 27.5 million in 1941 and then to 22.2 million in 1950.
The number of sheep fell from 114.6 million in 1928 to 91.6 million in 1941 and to 93.6 million in 1950. The
number of horses fell from 36.1 million in 1928 to 21.0 million in 1941 and to 12.7 million in 1950. Only by the late
1950s did Soviet farm animal stocks begin to approach 1928 levels.[45]
Despite the initial plans, collectivization, accompanied by the bad harvest of 1932–1933, did not live up to
expectations. Between 1929 and 1932 there was a massive fall in agricultural production resulting in famine in the
countryside. Stalin and the CPSU blamed the prosperous peasants, referred to as 'kulaks' (Russian: fist), who were
organizing resistance to collectivization. Allegedly, many kulaks had been hoarding grain in order to speculate on
higher prices, thereby sabotaging grain collection. Stalin resolved to eliminate them as a class.
The Soviet government responded to these acts by cutting off food rations to peasants and areas where there was
opposition to collectivization, especially in Ukraine. Many peasant families were forcibly resettled in Siberia and
Kazakhstan into exile settlements, and most of them died on the way. Estimates suggest that about a million
so-called 'kulak' families, or perhaps some 5 million people, were sent to forced labor camps.[46][47]
On August 7, 1932, the Decree about the Protection of Socialist Property proclaimed that the punishment for theft of
kolkhoz or cooperative property was the death sentence, which "under extenuating circumstances" could be replaced
by at least ten years of incarceration. With what some called the Law of Spikelets ("Закон о колосках"), peasants
(including children) who hand-collected or gleaned grain in the collective fields after the harvest were arrested for
damaging the state grain production. Martin Amis writes in Koba the Dread that 125,000 sentences were passed for
this particular offense in the bad harvest period from August 1932 to December 1933.
The deaths from starvation or disease directly caused by collectivization have been estimated as between 4 and 10
million. According to official Soviet figures, some 24 million peasants disappeared from rural areas but only 12.6
million moved to state jobs. The implication is that the total death toll (both direct and indirect) for Stalin's
collectivization program was on the order of 12 million people.[47]
6
Collectivization in the Soviet Union
7
It is said that in 1945, Joseph Stalin confided to Winston Churchill at Yalta that 10 million people died in the course
of collectivization.[48] However this allegation has been criticized by historian Michael Parenti. At Yalta, Churchill
asked Stalin about the famine in the USSR to which Stalin responded by raising his hands, gesturing an
unwillingness to speak about the subject, which Churchill, counting the Soviet leader's fingers, interpreted as Stalin
confessing a death-toll of 10 million people.
Siberia
Since the second half of the 19th century, Siberia had been a major agricultural region within Russia, espеcially its
southern territories (nowadays Altai Krai, Omsk Oblast, Novosibirsk Oblast, Kemerovo Oblast, Khakassia, Irkutsk
Oblast). Stolypin's program of resettlement granted a lot of land for immigrants from elsewhere in the empire,
creating a large portion of well-off peasants and stimulating rapid agricultural development in 1910s. Local
merchants exported large quantities of labeled grain, flour and butter into central Russia and Western Europe.[49]
In May 1931, a special resolution of the Western-Siberian Regional Executive Committee (classified "top secret")
ordered the expropriation of property and the deportation of 40,000 kulaks to "sparsely populated and unpopulated"
areas in Tomsk Oblast in the northern part of the Western-Siberian region.[50] The expropriated property was to be
transferred to kolkhozes as indivisible collective property and the kolkhoz shares representing this forced
contribution of the deportees to kolkhoz equity were to be held in the "collectivization fund of poor and landless
peasants" (фонд коллективизации бедноты и батрачества).
It has since been perceived by historians such as Lynne Viola as a Civil War of peasant against Bolshevik
Government and the attempted colonisation of the countryside.[51]
Central Asia and Kazakhstan
In areas where the major agricultural activity was nomadic herding,
collectivization met with massive resistance and major losses and
confiscation of livestock. Livestock in Kazakhstan fell from 7 million
cattle to 1.6 million and from 22 million sheep to 1.7 million.
Restrictions on migration proved ineffective and half a million
migrated to other regions of Central Asia and 1.5 million to China.[52]
Of those who remained, as many as a million died in the resulting
famine.[53] In Mongolia, then a Soviet dependency, attempted
collectivization was abandoned in 1932 after the loss of 8 million head
of livestock.[54]
Ukraine
Most historians agree that the disruption caused by collectivization and
the resistance of the peasants significantly contributed to the Great
Famine of 1932–1933, especially in Ukraine, a region famous for its
rich soil (chernozem). This particular period is called "Holodomor" in Ukrainian. During the similar famines of
1921–1923, numerous campaigns – inside the country, as well as internationally – were held to raise money and
food in support of the population of the affected regions. Nothing similar was done during the drought of
1932–1933, mainly because the information about the disaster was suppressed by Stalin.[55] Stalin also undertook a
purge of the Ukrainian communists and intelligentsia, with devastating long-term effects on the area.[56] Many
Ukrainian villages were blacklisted and penalized by government decree for perceived sabotage of food supplies.[57]
Moreover, migration of population from the affected areas was restricted.[58][59]
A photograph of a man sowing in Uzbekistan.
Collectivization in the Soviet Union
About 40 million people were affected by the food shortages including areas near Moscow where mortality rates
increased by 50%.[60] The center of the famine, however, was Ukraine and surrounding regions, including the Don,
the Kuban, the Northern Caucasus and Kazakhstan where the toll was one million dead. The countryside was
affected more than cities, but 120,000 died in Kharkiv, 40,000 in Krasnodar and 20,000 in Stavropol.[60]
The declassified Soviet archives show that there were 1.54 million officially registered deaths in Ukraine from
famine.[61] Alec Nove claims that registration of deaths largely ceased in many areas during the famine.[62]
However, it's been pointed out that the registered deaths in the archives were substantially revised by the
demographics officials. The older version of the data showed 600,000 fewer deaths in Ukraine than the current,
revised statistics.[61] In The Black Book of Communism, the authors claim the number of dead was at least 4 million,
and characterize the Great Famine as "a genocide of the Ukrainian people".[63][64]
Latvia
After the Soviet Occupation of Latvia in June 1940, the country's new rulers were faced with a problem: the
agricultural reforms of the inter-war period had expanded individual holdings. The property of "enemies of the
people" and refugees, as well as those above 30 hectares, was nationalised in 1940-44, but those who were still
landless were then given plots of 15 hectares each. Thus, Latvian agriculture remained essentially dependent on
personal smallholdings, making central planning difficult. In 1940-'41 the Communist Party repeatedly said that
collectivization would not occur forcibly, but rather voluntarily and by example. To encourage collectivization high
taxes were enforced and new farms given no government support. But after 1945 the Party dropped its restrained
approach as the voluntary approach was not yielding results. Latvians were accustomed to individual holdings
(viensētas), which had existed even during serfdom, and for many farmers the plots awarded to them by the interwar
reforms were the first their families had ever owned. Furthermore, the countryside was filled with rumours regarding
the harshness of collective farm life.
Pressure from Moscow to collectivize continued and the authorities of the Latvian SSR sought to reduce the number
of individual farmers (increasingly labelled kulaki or budži) through higher taxes and requisitioning of agricultural
products for state use. The first kolkhoz was established only in November 1946 and by 1948, just 617 kolkhozes
had been established, integrating 13,814 individual farmsteads (12.6% of the total). The process was still judged too
slow, and in March 1949 just under 13,000 kulak families as well as a large number of individuals were identified.
Between March 24 and March 30, 1949, about 40,000<!- + - 2000 --> people were deported and resettled at various
points throughout the USSR.
After these deportations, the pace of collectivization increased as a flood of farmers rushed into kolkhozes. Within
two weeks 1740 new kolkhozes were established and by the end of 1950, just 4.5% of Latvian farmsteads remained
outside the collectivized units; about 226,900 farmsteads belonged to collectives, of which there were now around
14,700. Rural life changed as farmers' daily movements were dictated to by plans, decisions and quotas formulated
elsewhere and delivered through an intermediate non-farming hierarchy. The new kolkhozes, especially smaller
ones, were ill-equipped and poor - at first farmers were paid once a year in kind and then in cash, but salaries were
very small and at times farmers went unpaid or even ended up owing money to the kholhoz. Farmers still had small
pieces of land (not larger than 0.5 ha) around their houses were they grew food for themselves. Along with
collectivization, the government tried to uproot the custom of living in individual farmsteads by resettling people in
villages. However this process failed due to lack of money since the Soviets planned to move houses as well.[65][66]
8
Collectivization in the Soviet Union
9
Progress of collectivization in the USSR 1927-1940
Year
Number of
collective farms
Percent of
farmsteads
in collective farms
Percent of sown
area
in collective use
1927 14,800
0.8
–
1928 33,300
1.7
2.3
1929 57,000
3.9
4.9
1930 85,900
23.6
33.6
1931 211,100
52.7
67.8
1932 211,100
61.5
77.7
1933 224,500
65.6
83.1
1934 233,300
71.4
87.4
1935 249,400
83.2
94.1
1936 –
90.5
98.2
1937 243,700
93.0
99.1
1938 242,400
93.5
99.8
1939 235,300
95.6
–
1940 236,900
96.9
99.8
Sources: Sotsialisticheskoe sel'skoe khoziaistvo SSSR, Gosplanizdat, Moscow-Leningrad, 1939 (pp. 42, 43);
supplementary numbers for 1927-1935 from Sel'skoe khoziaistvo SSSR 1935, Narkomzem SSSR, Moscow, 1936
(pp. 630, 634, 1347, 1369); 1937 from Great Soviet Encyclopedia, vol. 22, Moscow, 1953 (p. 81); 1939 from
Narodnoe khoziaistvo SSSR 1917-1987, Moscow, 1987 (pp. 35); 1940 from Narodnoe khoziaistvo SSSR 1922-1972,
Moscow, 1972 (pp. 215, 240).
The official numbers for collectivized area (the column with percent of sown area in collective use in the table
above) are biased upward by two technical factors. First, these official numbers are calculated as percent of sown
area in peasant farmsteads, excluding the area cultivated by sovkhozes and other agricultural users. Estimates based
on total sown area (including state farms) reduce the share of collective farms between 1935-1940 to about 80%.
Second, the household plots of kolkhoz members (i.e., collectivized farmsteads) are included in the land base of
collective farms. Without the household plots, arable land in collective cultivation in 1940 was 96.4% of land in
collective farms, and not 99.8% as shown by official statistics. Although there is no arguing with the fact that
collectivization was sweeping and total between 1928 and 1940, the table below provides different (more realistic)
numbers on the extent of collectivization of sown areas.
Distribution of sown area by land users, 1928 and 1940
Collectivization in the Soviet Union
10
Land users
1928
1940
All farms, '000 hectares
113,000 150,600
State farms (sovkhozy)
1.5%
8.8%
Collective farms (kolkhozy)
1.2
78.2
Household plots
1.1
(in collective and state farms)
3.5
Peasant farms and other users 96.2
9.5
Source: Narodnoe khoziaistvo SSSR 1922-1972, Moscow, 1972 (p. 240).
Decollectivization under German occupation
During World War II, Alfred Rosenberg, in
his capacity as the Reich Minister for the
Occupied Eastern Territories, issued a series
of posters announcing the end of the Soviet
collective farms in areas of the USSR under
German occupation. He also issued an
Agrarian Law in February 1942, annulling
all Soviet legislation on farming, restoring
family farms for those willing to collaborate
with the occupiers. But decollectivization
conflicted with the wider demands of
wartime food production, and Hermann
Göring demanded that the kolkhoz be
retained, save for a change of name. Hitler
"A new order of land use — the gift of Adolf Hitler to the Russian people"
himself denounced the redistribution of land
(February 1942).
as 'stupid.'[67][68] In the end, the German
occupation authorities retained most of the
kolkhozes and simply renamed them "community farms" (Russian: obshchinnye khoziaystva, a throwback to the
traditional Russian commune). German propaganda described this as a preparatory step toward ultimate dissolution
of the kolkhozes into private farms, which would be granted to peasants who had loyally delivered compulsory
quotas of farm produce to the Germans. By 1943, the German occupation authorities had converted 30% of the
kolkhozes into German-sponsored "agricultural cooperatives", but as yet had made no conversions to private
farms.[69][70]
The image on the left is a reproduction of a fake issue of the newspaper Pravda distributed by Germans in the
Occupied Eastern Territories in February 1942. It announces "a gift of Adolf Hitler to the Russian people" — a land
reform for "the long-suffering Russian peasant". As part of the land reform, "kolkhozes are abolished and an order of
community farms is established as a transitional stage to individual peasant farms". The text under the German eagle
reads:
Peasants. The German government, having liberated you from bolshevism, has decided to give peasants land in
individual use... Own land to the toiling peasant.
The two photographs of man and woman are captioned "Free people on free land!"
Note that the standard Pravda slogan "Workers of all countries unite" is modified in this fake newspaper to "Workers
of all countries unite in a fight against Bolshevism".
Collectivization in the Soviet Union
Notes
[1] Davies, R.W., The Soviet Collective Farms, 1929-1930, Macmillan, London (1980), p. 1.
[2] A History of the Soviet Union from Beginning to End. Kenez, Peter. Cambridge University Press, 1999.
[3] Jadranski zbornik, svezak 7, Povijesno društvo Istre, Povijesno društvo Rijeke, Povijesno društvo Hrvatske. Podružnica u Puli, Izdavačko
poduzeće "Otokar Keršovani", 1969.
[4] page 87, Harvest of Sorrow ISBN 0-19-504054-6, Conquest cites Lewin pages 36-37 and 176
[5] Fainsod, Merle (1970). How Russia is Ruled (revised ed.). Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press. pp. 526.
[6] Fainsod (1970, p. 529
[7] Foreign News: Days of Wrath (http:/ / www. time. com/ time/ magazine/ article/ 0,9171,732099,00. html), TIME Magazine, November 26,
1928
[8] James W. Heinzen, "Inventing a Soviet Countryside: State Power and the Transformation of Rural Russia, 1917-1929", University of
Pittsburgh Press (2004) ISBN 0-8229-4215-1, Chapter 1, "A False Start: The Birth and Early Activities of the People's Commissariat of
Agriculture, 1917-1920"
[9] James R Millar, ed., The Soviet Rural Community (University of Illinois Press, 1971), pp.27-8.
[10] R W Davies, The Soviet Collective Farm 1929 - 1930 (Harvard University Press, Cambridge, Massachusetts, 1980), pp.ix, 42-50, 60; cf.
p.52.
[11] http:/ / www. marxists. org/ reference/ archive/ stalin/ works/ 1930/ 03/ 02. htm
[12] Stalin, J. V. (March 2, 1930 (No. 60)). "Dizzy with Success: Concerning Questions of the Collective-Farm Movement" (http:/ / www.
marxists. org/ reference/ archive/ stalin/ works/ 1930/ 03/ 02. htm) (in Russian translated by Foreign Languages Publishing House in Works,
Vol. 12, pp. 197-205, Foreign Languages Publishing House: Moscow, 1955.). Pravda. . Retrieved September 15, 2010.
[13] Lynne Viola, Peasant Rebels Under Stalin: Collectivization and the Culture of Peasant Resistance (Oxford University Press, 1996), 3-12.
[14] Fitzpatrick, Sheila (1994). Stalin's Peasants: Resistance and Survival in the Russian Village After Collectivization. Oxford University Press.
pp. 3-18.
[15] Fitzpatrick (1994, p. 4
[16] Viola, Peasant Rebels Under Stalin
[17] Fitzpatrick (1994, p. 234
[18] Mazepa, Isaac (1933-19-34). Ukrainia Under Bolshevist Rule (http:/ / books. google. com/ books?id=5wkJi1jvL3UC& pg=PA94). 12.
pp. 342–343. . Retrieved September 15, 2010.
[19] Lynne Viola. "The Peasant Nightmare: Visions of Apocalypse in the Soviet Countryside." The Journal of Modern History 62, no. 4 (1990):
751.
[20] Viola, Peasant Rebels Under Stalin, 60.
[21] Fitzpatrick (1994, p. 67
[22] Viola, Peasant Rebels Under Stalin, 3.
[23] Fitzpatrick (1994, p. 6
[24] Fitzpatrick (1994, p. 129
[25] Viola, "The Peasant Nightmare,” 760.
[26] Lynne Viola, “Bab’i bunti and peasant women’s protest during collectivization,” in The Stalinist Dictatorship, ed. Chris Ward. (London; New
York: Arnold, 1998), 218-19.
[27] Viola, “The Peasant Nightmare,” 765.
[28] Viola, “Bab’i bunti,” 218-19.
[29] Viola, “Bab’i bunti,” 224-25.
[30] Viola, “Bab’i bunti,” 220-22.
[31] Viola, Peasant Rebels under Stalin, 157.
[32] Fitzpatrick (1994, p. 33
[33] Viola, Peasant Rebels Under Stalin, 49.
[34] Viola, “The Peasant nightmare,” 762.
[35] Fitzpatrick (1994, p. 45
[36] Viola, Peasant Rebels Under Stalin, 63.
[37] Viola, “The Peasant nightmare,” 767.
[38] Viola, “Bab’i bunti”, 217-18.
[39] Viola, “The Peasant nightmare,” 751.
[40] Viola, “The Peasant nightmare,” 748.
[41] Viola, “The Peasant nightmare,” 759.
[42] Viola, “The Peasant nightmare,” 760.
[43] Viola, “The Peasant nightmare,” 768.
[44] Fainsod (1970, p. 542
[45] Fainsod (1970, p. 541
[46] Fainsod (1970, p. 526
11
Collectivization in the Soviet Union
[47] Hubbard, Leonard E. (1939). The Economics of Soviet Agriculture. Macmillan and Co.. pp. 117-18.
[48] Joseph Stalin: A Biographical Companion by Helen Rappaport, p. 53
[49] Commerce in the Siberian town of Berdsk, early 20th century. (http:/ / www. berdsk. ru/ history5. shtml)
[50] Western-Siberian resolution of deportation of 40,000 kulaks to northern Siberia, May 5, 1931.[[File:Flag of Russia.svg|22x20px|border
|alt=Russia|link=Russia (http:/ / www. hrono. info/ dokum/ 193_dok/ 19310505kolh. html)]]
[51] Viola, Lynne, Peasant Rebels Under Stalin: Collectivization and the Culture of Peasant Resistance, Oxford University Press, Oxford
(1996), p. 3.
[52] Courtois, Stéphane, ed. (1999). The Black Book of Communism: Crimes, Terror, Repression. Harvard University Press. p. 168.
ISBN 0-674-07608-7.
[53] Pannier, Bruce (28 December 2007). "Kazakhstan: The Forgotten Famine" (http:/ / rferl. org/ featuresarticle/ 2007/ 12/
c58914de-953d-4dec-ab7c-16d7d9fb9a00. html). Radio Free Europe / Radio Liberty. .
[54] Conquest, Robert (9 October 1986). "Central Asia and the Kazakh Tragedy". Harvest of Sorrow: Soviet Collectivization and the
Terror-Famine. Oxford University Press. pp. 189-198. ISBN 0-19-504054-6.
[55] The Black Book of Communism (1995, p. 159
[56] "Ukrainian Famine" (http:/ / history. hanover. edu/ courses/ excerpts/ 111famine. html). Excerpts from the Original Electronic Text at the
web site of Revelations from the Russian Archives (Library of Congress). Hanover College. .
[57] "Grain Problem" (http:/ / www. loc. gov/ exhibits/ archives/ k2grain. html). Addendum to the minutes of Politburo [meeting] No. 93. Library
of Congress. 6 December 1932. .
[58] The Black Book of Communism (1995, p. 164
[59] "Revelations from the Russian Archives: Ukrainian Famine" (http:/ / www. loc. gov/ exhibits/ archives/ ukra. html). Library of Congress. .
[60] The Black Book of Communism (1995, p. 167
[61] Wheatcroft, Stephen; Davies, RW (2004). The Years of Hunger: Soviet Agriculture, 1931-1933. Palgrave MacMillan.
[62] Nove, Alec (1993). "Stalinist Terror: New Perspectives". Cambridge University Press. pp. 266. ISBN 0-521-44670-8.
[63] The Black Book of Communism (1995, p. 168
[64] Merl, S. (1995). "Golod 1932-1933--Genotsid Ukraintsev dlya osushchestvleniya politiki russifikatsii? (The famine of 1932-1933: Genocide
of the Ukrainians for the realization of the policy of Russification?)". Otechestvennaya istoriya. 1. pp. 49-61.
[65] Plakans, Andrejs (1995). The Latvians: A Short History. Stanford: Hoover Institution Press. pp. 155-6.
[66] Freibergs, J. (1998, 2001). Jaunako laiku vesture 20. gadsimts. Zvaigzne ABC. ISBN 9984-17-049-7.
[67] Leonid Grenkevich, The Soviet Partisan Movement, 1941-1945: A Critical Historiographical Analysis, Routledge, New York (1999), pp.
169-171.
[68] Memorandum by Brautigam concerning conditions in occupied areas of the USSR, 25 October 1942. (http:/ / www. ess. uwe. ac. uk/
genocide/ USSR1. htm)
[69] Joseph L. Wieczynski, ed., The Modern Encyclopedia of Russian and Soviet History, Academic International Press, Gulf Breeze, FL, 1978,
vol. 7, pp. 161-162.
[70] Alexander Dallin, German Rule in Russia, 1941 - 1945: A Study of Occupation Politics (London, Macmillan, 1957), pp.346-51; Karl Brandt,
Otto Schiller and Frantz Anlgrimm, Management of Agriculture and Food in the German-Occupied and Other Areas of Fortress Europe
(Stanford, California, Stanford University Press, 1953), pp.92ff. Ibid., pp.96-9, gives an interesting case study of the dissolution process.
Further reading
• Ammende, Ewald. "Human life in Russia", (Cleveland: J.T. Zubal, 1984), Reprint, Originally published: London,
England: Allen & Unwin, 1936, ISBN 0-939738-54-6
• Conquest, Robert. The Harvest of Sorrow: Soviet Collectivization and the Terror-Famine, Oxford University
Press, October 1986, hardcover, ISBN 0-88864-110-9; trade paperback, Oxford University Press, November,
1987, ISBN 0-19-505180-7; hardcover, ISBN 0-19-504054-6
• Davies, R. W. The Socialist Offensive (Volume 1 of The Industrialization of Soviet Russia), Harvard University
Press (1980), hardcover, ISBN 0-674-81480-0
• Davies, R. W. The Soviet Collective Farm, 1929-1930 (Volume 2 of the Industrialization of Soviet Russia),
Harvard University Press (1980), hardcover, ISBN 0-674-82600-0
• Davies, R. W., Soviet Economy in Turmoil, 1929-1930 (volume 3 of The Industrialization of Soviet Russia),
Harvard University Press (1989), ISBN 0-674-82655-8
• Davies, R.W. and Stephen G. Wheatcroft. Years of Hunger: Soviet Agriculture, 1931-1933, (volume 4 of The
Industrialization of Soviet Russia), Palgrave Macmillan (April, 2004), hardcover, ISBN 0-333-31107-8
• Davies, R. W. and S. G. Wheatcroft. Materials for a Balance of the Soviet National Economy, 1928-1930,
Cambridge University Press (1985), hardcover, 467 pages, ISBN 0-521-26125-2
12
Collectivization in the Soviet Union
• Dolot, Miron. Execution by Hunger: The Hidden Holocaust, W. W. Norton (1987), trade paperback, 231 pages,
ISBN 0-393-30416-7; hardcover (1985), ISBN 0-393-01886-5
• Hindus, Maurice. Red Bread: Collectivization in a Russian Village, Indiana University Press, 1988, hardcover,
ISBN 0-253-34953-2; trade paperback, Indiana University Press, 1988, 372 pages, ISBN 0-253-20485-2; earlier
editions dating from 1931 are available at used book sellers.
• Lewin, Moshe. Russian Peasants and Soviet Power: A Study of Collectivization, W.W. Norton (1975), trade
paperback, ISBN 0-393-00752-9
• Library of Congress Revelations from the Russian Archives: Collectivization and Industrialization (http://www.
loc.gov/exhibits/archives/coll.html) (primary documents from the period)
• Martens, Ludo. Un autre regard sur Staline, Éditions EPO, 1994, 347 pages, ISBN 2-87262-081-8. See the
section "External links" for an English translation.
• Nimitz, Nancy. "Farm Development 1928–62", in Soviet and East European Agricultures, Jerry F. Karcz, ed.
Berkeley, California (US): University of California, 1967.
• Satter, David. Age of Delirium : The Decline and Fall of the Soviet Union, Yale University Press (1996),
hardcover, 424 pages, ISBN 0-394-52934-0
• ' Smith, Hedrick. The Russians (1976) ISBN 0-8129-0521-0
• Taylor, Sally J. Stalin's Apologist: Walter Duranty : The New York Times Man in Moscow, Oxford University
Press (1990), hardcover, ISBN 0-19-505700-7
• Tottle, Douglas. Fraud, Famine and Fascism: The Ukrainian genocide myth from Hitler to Harvard. Toronto:
Progress Books, 1987. ISBN 0-919396-51-8.
• Zaslavskaya, Tatyana. The Second Socialist Revolution, ISBN 0-253-20614-6 (a survey by a Soviet sociologist
written in the late 1980s which advocated restructuring of the economy)
External links
• "The Collectivization 'Genocide'", in Another View of Stalin, by Ludo Martens (http://www.plp.org/books/
Stalin/node67.html). Translated from the French book Un autre regard sur Staline, listed above under
"References and further reading".
• "Reply to Collective Farm Comrades" by Stalin (http://www.marx2mao.com/Stalin/RCFC30.html)
• Ukrainian Famine: Excerpts from the Original Electronic Text at the web site of Revelations from the Russian
Archives (http://history.hanover.edu/courses/excerpts/111famine.html)
• "Soviet Agriculture: A critique of the myths constructed by Western critics" (http://www.usm.maine.edu/eco/
joe/works/Soviet.html), by Joseph E. Medley, Department of Economics, University of Southern Maine (US).
• "The Ninth Circle" (http://www.sabre.org/ukrlib/books/ninth.circle/ninth.circle.toc.html), by Olexa
Woropay
• Prize-winning essay (http://www.faminegenocide.com/2003-competition/07-luhovy-famine-genocide.html)
on FamineGenocide.com (http://www.faminegenocide.com/)
• 1932-34 Great Famine: documented view by Dr. Dana Dalrymple (http://www.ukrweekly.com/Archive/1983/
128312.shtml)
• COLLECTIVIZATION AND INDUSTRIALIZATION (http://www.loc.gov/exhibits/archives/coll.html)
Revelations from the Russian Archives at the Library of Congress
13
Collectivization in the Soviet Union
Further reading
• Roy D. Laird, "Collective Farming in Russia: A Political Study of the Soviet Kolkhozy", University of Kansas,
Lawrence, KS (1958), 176pp.
• Robert G. Wesson, "Soviet Communes", Rutgers University Press, 1963
14
Article Sources and Contributors
Article Sources and Contributors
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