Download Globalization and the compromise of `embedded liberalism`

Questions posed by Prof. Mortensen:
a) Discuss the challenges of the ‘compromise of embedded liberalism’ in an era of globalisation.
b) Reflect on the role of ideas in the political steering of the international economy.
c) Include the relevant parts of curriculum along with: Ruggie, John G. Taking Embedded Liberalism Global:
the Corporate Connection. In: Held, David & Koeing-Archibugi, Mathias (reds.). Taming Globalization – ¨’
Frontiers of Governance. Oxford: Polity Press, 2003, p. 93-129.
Globalization and the compromise of ’embedded liberalism’
The role of ideas in the global political economy
Lauge Skovgaard
After the Second World War the academic communities and political elites in the United
States and Great Britain entered into the compromise of ‘embedded liberalism’ (Ruggie
1982). The wish for social stability and the protection of full employment combined with free
trade and stable currencies became the mantra, which governments pursued the next
following decades. But the world has changed the last fifty years, and many now questions
whether this objective is still obtainable. This essay will try to illustrate how the process of
globalization has reduced the political decision-makers’ possibilities in upholding the
compromise.
Following John Campbell’s distinction between ideas as ‘paradigms’ and ideas as ‘public
sentiments’ the essay will begin by criticizing John Ruggie’s theory on the role of ideas in
the international economic order. Paradigms are ideas that are shared by epistemic
communities, whereas public sentiments are ideas shared by large part of the general public.
Subsequently I will show how the two types of ideas, each in their own way, constrain
political decision-makers and thereby affects the political agenda of the international
economy.
The analysis will show that a grand compromise like the compromise of embedded
liberalism is dependent on whether the intellectual environment can come up with somewhat
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jointly held solutions to the problems highlighted by the civil society. As the world looks
today though, this is unfortunately not the case.
The role of ideas in the global political economy
Ruggie founds his understanding of embedded liberalism on a critique of the hegemonic
stability theory. As the hegemonic stability theory he regards the international order, and the
regimes which support it, as a concrete manifestation of authority at the international level.
But whereas the hegemonic stability theory deduces the international order from the balance
of power between states, Ruggie adds that authority has to be regarded as more than just
power. To say anything about the contents of the international economic order Ruggie states
that one has to look at the interplay between power and the dominant ideas within the
political elite. Authority is therefore a fusion of power and common values. Following this
logic Ruggie states that the theory of hegemonic stability can’t fully explain regime-change:
because in addition to changes in the power-structure, shifts in norms will also make regimes
change.
According to Ruggie the ideas the political elite are influenced, as well as constrained by,
are derived from ‘epistemic communities’ – that is experts within the leading universities,
think-tanks and professional organisations (Ruggie 1975, 1994:525-6)1. If a consensus
prevails between academic circles and the political elite on which norms and political goals
that are legitimate, one has a ‘legitimate social purpose’, without which a regime can’t exist.
That was exactly the situation after the Second World War, where the intellectual
background for the compromise of embedded liberalism were shared between political
decision-makers as well as academic experts. And that was exactly not the situation during
the inter-war period where deep divisions prevailed towards the role of the state between the
economic great powers and the academic environment (Ruggie 1982:387,392).
‘I do not claim that this model is fundamentally wrong. But it does not take us very far in
understanding (...) the transformation of international regimes’. This was written by Ruggie
in 1982 (p. 381) regards the theory of hegemonic stability. Today I would claim the same
thing about his own.
1
Se also Haas 1992.
2
In ‘Institutional Analysis and The Role of Ideas in Political Economy’ (2001) John
Campbell examines how different types of ideas affect political decision-making with
particular regard to political economy. Campbell distinguishes between ideas as ‘paradigms’
and ideas as ‘public sentiments’2. Paradigms are the ideas that Ruggie consider relevant:
ideas that flourish between the political elites as well as the leading universities, think-tanks
etc. (the epistemic communities). They are logically constructed thoughts on how the
economic-political system works, and as such underlying assumptions that makes the
foundation for concrete political solutions. Examples are Keynesianism, neoclassical
theories, Marxism, theories of ‘the developmental state’ etc.
Besides paradigms we also have public sentiments. They are ideas that are shared by a
large part of the civil society – it is the public opinion. In contrast to paradigms they are not
characterized by being neither consistent nor precise and can therefore not specify political
solutions by themselves. But where paradigms constrain and enable politicians’
understanding of instrumentally effective decisions, public sentiments constraint the number
of available solutions regarded as legitimate. So even if a solution is understood as
instrumentally effective it will not be taken into consideration as long as it isn’t accepted by
the norms and values in the civil society. And following the same logic, the political agenda
will be marked by the public opinion, whether the epistemic communities wish it or not.
As mentioned in the beginning, increasingly it is public sentiments that affect the political
agenda of international economy. That has several explanations: according to Anne-Marie
Slaughter (Gilpin 2002:394), the ending of the Cold War has lessened security concerns and
opened the way for the rise of a ‘transnational civil society’. In addition, the information
economy, along with the arrival of the Internet has broken the information monopoly, which
states, firms and international organizations enjoyed before. Finally the Internet has made it
more possible for NGO’s and other civil society actors to join in transnational alliances and
networks. The result has been that the political elite governing the international economy has
to face the norms within civil society to a degree never witnessed before (Rosenau 2002:232;
Mathews 1997). Ruggie’s precedence to epistemic communities is therefore a problem, if one
wants to describe the normtransformations that have been going on during the 1990’s.
2
Campbell makes two further distinctions between ideas as ’programmes’ and ideas as ’frames’. But for the
present purpose the first distinction should be sufficient.
3
In this context I thus find that one can regard the relationship between ideas and interests
like this: The ideas that become influential on the political agenda are: ’derived in part form
the status of their sponsors’ (Campbell 2001:171). Meaning that different interests try to
promote different ideas, but the ideas arriving in the political agenda are primarily driven
forward by powerful actors. That is – it helps a certain scientific discipline to break through
as a political discourse if it is funded by organizational resources. The same counts for public
sentiments: it is only when the civil society gets the opportunity to get and distribute
information across borders that public sentiments become relevant for political decisionmakers3.
My argument therefore differs from those who think that the ruling ideas in society always
reflect the dominant material interests4. Because even though the institutionalisation of
paradigms is important it would be misleading to claim that the intellectual discourse solely
is dependant on political and economical interests. Besides, public sentiments are an
illustrative example that norms and values outside the ivory towers of the power elite can
have an important influence on the political agenda.
In the following I’ll show how the two types of ideas affect and constrain the political
agenda in each their way. The Washington Consensus’ perception and handling of poverty is
an example of a normtransformation supported by paradigms.
Washington Consensus – a neoliberal paradigm
Rising inflation throughout the 1960’s and 1970’s combined with low employment (also
called stagflation) meant that economists generally turned their back on Keynesianism as
their theoretical basis. Government intervention and the protection of demand were rejected
in favour of laissez-faire liberalism. By the end of the 1970’s and throughout the 1980’s
neoclassical principles thus dominated the economic discourse in the best universities in the
United States as well as Europe (Campbell 2001:171; Gilpin 2001:309-12).
Upon graduation students from these schools eventually got their degrees and went out to
work in governments, firms, banks and international organisations such as the World Bank
3
The argument only applies to liberal democracies of course, where members of the civil society has power
over the political decision-makers through their status as voters.
4
See for instance Cox 1981; Appeldoorn 2000; Bieler 2004.
4
and IMF. Backed by Reagan in the United States and Thatcher in Britain, these two
organisations were given the role to export the mantra of the market to the third world. As
Stiglitz (2002) points out, the IMF’s policies where furthermore backed by financial and
commercial interests: The leaders within the organisation had close connections with the
investment environment at Wall Street and could expect to be awarded a top post there, when
their career in the organisation ended. On the whole it meant that where the IMF originally
was created to secure balance-of-payments problems, and as such was a Keynesian invention,
the organisations social purpose was now remade into being the leader of neoclassical
principles. The same change happened within the World Bank and the result was nothing less
than a revolution within the organisation’s perception and handling of the poverty problem
(Stiglitz 2002:13; Cohn 2002:108-9; Gilpin 2001:314-6; O’Brian and Williams 2004:270-8).
The arrival of the Washington Consensus is consistent with Ruggie’s idea of
normtransformations; the political elites and epistemic communities both rejected former
prevalent norms and theoretical principles with the result that certain elements of tha agenda
for the governance of the international political economy changed drastically.
The agenda changed again during the 1990’s though. But this time the normtransformation
wasn’t driven by epistemic communities, but instead by public opinion.
The civil society awakens – public sentiments sets the agenda
In 1994 a number of NGO’s launched their ‘Fifty Years is Enough’-campaign which turned
against the IMF and the World Bank (Cohn 2002:403). Throughout the end of the 1990’s the
World Bank, the IMF, and not least the WTO witnessed that their meetings increasingly
became centre of massive public protests and, as in Seattle – total chaos.
The opposition was a heterogeneous blend of self-proclaimed champions for the poorer
parts of the world, environmental activists like Greenpeace, and not least unions in fear of
their jobs and the future of the welfare state. Not surprisingly, they had widely different
agendas (and motives) but yet one thing in common: a desire that the governance of
economic globalisation should take on a new path. But the attitudes expressed under the
demonstrations weren’t just limited to a few idealistic activists. The people of the United
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States and Europe are generally deeply worried about whether their jobs and social welfare
payments are taken away from them by seemingly invisible and uncontrollable forces
(Ruggie 2003).
The rebellion during the organisations’ and government-leaders’ meetings combined with
the growing scepticism among ‘ordinary citizens’ have meant that governments and
international organisations have been forced to rethink the political agenda for the
international economy5.
Public sentiments constrain politicians in a different way than paradigms though. Where
paradigms constitute the cognitive frame for solutions, which politicians finds instrumentally
effective, public sentiments do not result in concrete solutions since they are often conflicting
and unclear. The present Vice-president of the World Bank, Nemat Shafik, makes the point
like this: ’the role of the protests movements isn’t to provide solutions. It’s their job to be
critical. And then it’s the responsibility of the people inside the system – in response to these
protests – to provide solutions. And I think that’s where we are now’ 6.
‘The people inside the system’ are the epistemic communities and the political elite. If they
are to provide sustainable solutions that can be implemented and supported by international
regimes a degree of consensus is needed among the intellectual environment.
Solutions? – ideas as paradigms
The fight against poverty
Some would suggest that economists have always been disagreeing and that they always
will be. That is probably correct. But the situation today is different. Just after the Second
World War there was a basic consensus on Keynesianism as the ‘best’ model (Ruggie 1982;
O’Brian and Williams 2004:266). In the 1980’s the paradigm, as mentioned above, changed
towards neoliberalism. But today economists are divided over most issues that come to mind
– not least the agenda for fighting poverty.
5
See for instance Ruggie 2004; Keohane og Nye 2000:82, 2002:240; Mathews 1997:207,209; Mortensen 2003; Rosenau 2002:233; Gilpin
2001:394-5; Stiglitz 2002:4,9,215; O’Brian og Williams 2004:278; Cohn 2002:259-60.
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www.pbs.org/wgbh/commandingheights/lo/people/pe_name.html
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One of the great conflicts is over the foundations for growth. Shall governments – as the
neoliberals suggest – give way for the mechanisms of the market and deregulate their capitaland commercial markets as fast as possible (Friedman 1999: Coughlin et al. 1995)? Or is it –
as the neo-Keynesians believe – also the state that should sustain the general demand during
recessions (Stiglitz 2002:236-41)? A third possible recommendation among the believers in
the ‘theory of the developmental state’ is that states should try to favour and protect certain
key-industries and thereby securing the state’s competitiveness on the international markets
(Gilpin 2001:316-21). In other words, the epistemic communities formerly characterized by
consensus are today characterized by inner divisions and fragmentation; ‘epistemic disarray’,
as Ruggie (1994) calls it.
The political elite are therefore faced with a problem. They can agree that the poverty
agenda has to change course. The civil society convinced them of this. But when the
academic environment is in disarray it becomes impossible for the political decision-makers
to judge, as to which course the agenda should take. The result has been an incoherent
handling of the poverty issue among the political elite throughout the western world. A fact
that can be traced among the international organisations.
In 1995 the World Bank realized that it had to modify its approach towards the poverty
problem, should it wish to stay an effective organisation. James Wolfensohn was appointed
as new President and with him he announced that Joseph Stiglitz – a recognized neoKeynesian – was going to be his chief-economist (Cohn 2002:403). This marked a clear
change away from the neoliberal agenda of the 1980’s. But against this Keynesian turn, is the
IMF, which still promotes an entirely different agenda. Regardless of the new rhetoric among
the organisation’s leaders, it has insisted on its neoliberal visions (Stiglitz 2002:215). In other
words, the division within the academic environment has planted itself among some of the
world’s most powerful organisations, with an incoherent poverty agenda as the result.
In addition to global inequality the citizens of the western world are, as mentioned, deeply
concerned about their welfare privileges in light of the fastened economic liberalisation – can
the compromise of embedded liberalism persist in the age of globalisation? You have to ask
that question to those who are occupied with political and economic analyses every day, but
academia is, again, deeply divided:
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Globalisation and welfare – embedded liberalism
States and firms function in a qualitatively different environment than before. This
development can be described as a process of globalisation that is, a combination of
internationalisation, political and economic liberalisation, and a technological revolution
(Woods 2002:25). States have chosen to open their markets and thereby made it possible for
firms and investors to operate across national borders. Minimized communication- and
transportation costs have made it easier for firms and investors to operate internationally
through new patterns of behaviour. Firms have been able to integrate their production chains
across vast geographical distances and enter into new and more alliances and networks to
keep up with the increased international competition. Investors are now able to react much
faster and with more intensity through new credit instruments and investment markets such
as the Eurodollar-market (Kahler and Lake 2003:4; Keohane and Nye 2000). In this context
the question concerning embedded liberalism arises – can the compromise persist in a truly
global economy?
On the basis of a study made by Geoffrey Garret, Ruggie (2003) believes that you can trace
a shift from the ‘compensating’ to the ‘competitive’ state. Globalisation has constrained the
ability of states to uphold the welfare systems that were meant to cushion the worst
consequences of the economic liberalisation. Free trade and deregulation of the financial
markets have had a negative affect on public expenditure. The tax foundation in the OECD
countries furthermore befalls the poorer parts of the population instead of firms and
investors. If the governance of economic globalisation doesn’t take on a new path, we’re
dismantling the compromise of embedded liberalism. And Ruggie isn’t the only one who
reaches that conclusion:
Neo-Gramscians like Appeldoorn (2000) and Bieler (2004) think that globalisation
promotes a transnationalistic class, which on a global as well as regional level ‘disembeds’
liberalism. The multinational companies make alliances in the battle against social welfare
privileges. Through a different line of argument Susan Strange (1994:182;1999) reaches the
somewhat same conclusion and thinks that the state system – ‘the Westfailure System’, as
she calls it – can no longer protect the weak in society by social redistribution. And from an
entirely different paradigm, Thomas Friedman (1999) argues that welfare systems and
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corporative state-society models restrict economic growth in an age of globalisation, and
therefore threatens to leave the European states behind.
Among the academic environment there is far but consensus concerning this question
though. Let me just name a few examples: Gilpin (2001:368-71) thinks that the restrictions
on macroeconomic steering are the same as they’ve always been, which are the eternal
‘trillemma’ between stable currencies, free movement of capital and macroeconomic
autonomy. Paul Krugman agrees (in Dicken 1999:86-8; not to mention Hirst and Thompson
2006:ch. 6) and doesn’t think that the empirical data accords with Ruggie’s postulate. And
regarding Garret’s study, different studies come to opposing conclusions. Kiser and Laing
(2001) as well as Swank (2002) find that neither capital- nor firm taxes have fallen the last 20
years among the OECD-countries. Taxes on work and consumption have furthermore been
quite stabile, and the tax system therefore doesn’t punish the poor, as was Garrets conclusion.
And in contrast to Garret they actually find a positive relationship between free trade and the
size of the public sector (!). So even though globalisation obviously has affected the tax
systems and macroeconomic steering of states, Swank still thinks that states can: ‘maintain
relatively extensive networks of social protections and services if they so choose. (..) there
appears to be no overriding internationally generated structural imperatives for tax
reduction that force all welfare states to ‘run to the bottom’ (p. 409). The discussion is of
course far more sophisticated than presented here. But for the present purpose that is more or
less irrelevant since the conclusion is nonetheless clear: economists as well as political
scientists are fundamentally divided over the impact of globalisation on the welfare statesystem.
The growing concern about the survival of the welfare state and the conditions of the
employment markets has – as it was the case with the poverty issue – forced political
decision-makers to modify their agenda. But the politicians are again facing a basic problem.
The civil society has strong expectations that their political leaders will try to sustain a
balance between free trade and the goal of social welfare and stability. But since academia is
deeply divided over the impact globalisation has on the welfare-state they are in need of
advice! Can liberalisation of the capital- and commercial markets continue without
undermining the welfare-state? Or do we need a ‘social agenda’ where market liberalisation
must have second priority to new issues like labour market policies and social welfare-nets?
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Academia is in disarray and the result has – as expected – been an incoherent political
agenda.
As Clinton wanted to be re-elected he saw himself forced to answer the public protests.
During the Seattle-meeting he therefore defended the unions’ concerns with globalisations’
negative impact on the western labour markets (Gilpin 2001:13). An agenda that is in line
with the embedded liberalisms goal of having a market economy within a social frame. But
on the other side of the trade agenda we face an entirely different neoliberal project, which
the inclusion of GATS within the international free-trade regime is a clear example of.
Forced deregulation of trade in services is in direct contrast to the compromise of embedded
liberalism, which accepted that national key interests should be allowed state protection
(Ruggie 1994). Like with the poverty-question we therefore have two contrasting paradigms
in play within the political agenda of international economy in the 1990’s. The compromise
of embedded liberalism has been replaced by a series of competing agendas, resulting in
control of the international economy becoming incoherent and fragmented (Rosenau
2003:232).
Conclusion
The essay’s focus has been on the social purpose of regimes. This is obviously only one
part of the story. If one wishes to account for why states has an interest in letting themselves
be bound and constrained by regimes you need a different theoretical perspective. But the use
of theory depends on the question you ask, and when the subject is on the contents of
regimes, I agree with Ruggie that one needs a focus on the phenomenological dimension of
regimes, that is – the role of ideas (Ruggie 1982:382).
Ruggie’s separation of power and ‘legitimate social purpose’ was thus needed for a better
understanding of international regimes. But depending on which type of idea the social
purpose draws on, it has different consequences for the political steering of the international
economy. Not just relating to content but also to whether the politicians actually can come up
with political solutions. That was the point John Campbell made with regards to political
economy at the national level; this essay has done it with regards to the control of the
international economy.
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I’ve shown that the political agenda of the international economy has experienced
normtransformations the last 25 years, but depending on which type of idea that has
supported them, they’ve had different consequences. Transformations deriving from
paradigm-changes give politicians clear solutions to the problems they think to face.
Normtransformations supported by public sentiments on the other hand are dependant on
paradigms if they shall be implemented in practise.
But because of the division in the academic environment, this has shown to be a difficult
task indeed. For the first time in many years we are experiencing a curious absence of
‘epistemic consensus’. From the 1950’s to 70’s Hayek was ‘banished’ to the Austrian
mountains and Keynesianism was the undisputable leading discourse. The compromise of
embedded liberalism could flourish. In the 1980’s the picture changed and the Phillips curve
was rejected in favour of laissez-faire principles and neoliberal politics. Today the consensus
has been replaced with a split within the academic communities, and that is important.
The new agenda of the civil society demands answers. But the political solutions are
doomed to stay inconsistent as long as a state of ‘epistemic disarray’ exists among academia.
A coherent agenda (legitimate social purpose) leading the international regimes and
economic great powers is therefore not in sight. The compromise of embedded liberalism has
been replaced by a series of diverging and competing agendas.
__________________________
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Other
Interview with Nemat Shafik: www.pbs.org/wgbh/commandingheights/lo/people/pe_name.html
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