Download Models and Myths of Science: Views of the

AMER. ZOOL., 25:727-736 (1985)
Models and Myths of Science: Views of the Elephant1
JAMES W. ATKINSON
Department of Natural Science, Michigan State University,
East Lansing, Michigan 48824
SYNOPSIS. I discuss selected philosophies of science in terms of the role of rationalism
in science and the reality status of the products of scientific reasoning. A model is then
presented in which I argue that creativity in science involves the mental manipulation of
images which are later compared to the shared empirical experience of the scientific
community. The assimilation of a scientific concept involves a re-creation of the concept
through a similar manipulation of images and empirical experience. The process of recreation can distort the original concept. The result of this process of creation and recreation is neither an objective discovery of truth nor a subjective invention of truth but
an interactive reality composed of the inquiring human mind and an objectively unknowable nature. Since the model or myth of science we accept influences many aspects of the
science-society interaction, the model I present here as well as models presented by others
ought to be carefully evaluated through the study of the history of science.
INTRODUCTION
subdisciplines of the humanities and is,
Each of the plenary lectures presented therefore, concerned with a uniquely
in commemoration of the 25th anniversary human process, science. One consequence
of American Zoologist represents a division of this is, I suspect, that one is likely to find
of the American Society of Zoologists and a greater diversity of ideas and opinions
is, I understand, intended to give a brief within our Division than within the other
overview of the current status of the par- Divisions. Thus I can not lay claim to repticular subdiscipline of biology repre- resenting all the views of my colleagues in
sented. As the representative of the newest the Division nor even the majority view if
division—the Division of the History and there is such a thing.
The title of this lecture is an allusion to
Philosophy of Biology—my task is somewhat different from the others. Typical of the ancient Indian legend of the blindmen
most of the members of our division I am and the elephant. Each of the men having
neither a professionally trained historian hold of a portion of the elephant proclaims
nor philosopher of science. I am, rather, a knowledge of the whole; each is partially
biologist who has developed an interest in right but all are wrong. So, too, the various
the history of science and a concern for the historians of science, philosophers of sciphilosophical roots and ramifications of ence, sociologists of science, and psycholscience. It would be presumptuous of me ogists of science seem to have grasped some
to claim that what follows is a report on part of the intellectual pachyderm we call
the current state of either the history of science yet none of the various schools or
science or the philosphy of science as dis- "isms" seems entirely satisfactory. It would
ciplines. In addition to this personal dif- take many more pages and much more time
ference from speakers representing other than I have available to present an adedivisions, my task differs from theirs by the quate description of all the views expressed
very nature of the division itself. Orga- by the various students of science, let alone
nized as they are, on the basis of subdis- present the strengths and weaknesses of
ciplines of science, the concern of the other each; nor can I claim to be familiar with
divisions is with phenomena of nature. Our all the subtle but important differences
Division, on the other hand, is based upon within many of these "isms." Taking a cue
from some of the philosophers of science,
I have selected a few ideas. These ideas
were chosen because of their important
1
Plenary Lecture for the Division of the History influence, or because accidents of personal
and Philosophy of Biology presented at the Annual history have led me to read some authors
Meeting of the American Society of Zoologists, 27- and not others, or because I find their ideas
30 December 1984, at Denver, Colorado.
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JAMES W. ATKINSON
particularly provocative. After a brief discussion of selected models and myths of
science, I shall present my own myth—an
example of the elephant's self-image or, at
least, that of one small part of the elephant.
Somewhere along the line I hope to address
the question of the relevance of all of this
to the working scientist.
THE BONDMEN'S VIEWS
Recently Hacking (1983) suggested that
current debates within the philosophy of
science center upon two basic concerns: 1)
the nature and role of rationality in science; and 2) the reality status of the results
of scientific inquiry. Although one might
add the question of reductionism vs. holism
(Sperry, 1983) as a third area of debate, it
is more useful for my purposes to focus on
Hacking's two categories to discuss some
of the models and myths of science.
Until very recently most of the debate
concerning rationality has focused on the
context of justification—that part of science in which concepts, theories, etc. are
accepted or rejected by the scientific community. Perhaps the most widely known
and influential view of this portion of science is that of Karl Popper. Building on
the model of the hypothetical-deductive
system of rationality, Popper placed great
emphasis on the quality of falsifiability.
Hypotheses are proposed, their consequences deduced and experimental tests
carried out in an attempt to prove the
hypothesis false (Popper, 1968). Since we
seek understanding of nature in terms of
universals, we cannot prove our hypotheses true because universals are beyond our
experience. Thus we should strive to eliminate incorrect hypotheses through empirical tests. This, of course, is envisioned as
a thoroughly rational process; in ideal situations, the process adheres to the rigor
of mathematical logic and the appearance
of experimental results which do not fit the
predictions of theory culminates in either
a reformulation of the deductions or a
rejection of the original hypothesis. Popper realized that the process of falsification
was never so simple in practice. Nevertheless falsifiability is for Popper and his followers the major point of demarcation
between science and non-science. (Note
how it is used in the creationism/evolution
controversy; see Committee, NAS, 1984
for a lead into the literature.) Falsificationism also allows for a view of progress in
science. Although we cannot prove our
theories true and thus cannot claim to know
ultimate reality, the elimination of false
ideas and the repeated failure to falsify particular theories foster a sense of progressive accumulation of valid knowledge of
the world.
There were, of course, alternatives to
various versions of Popper's model of science. The most notable of these was probably Carnap's inductivist model as discussed by Hacking (1983) which, despite
the differences with Popper, nevertheless
supported the view of a fully rational science. The fundamental challenge to this
rationality, the spark that ignited much of
the current debate, was the publication of
T. S. Kuhn's The Structure of Scientific Revolutions.
The interpretations of Kuhn's ideas
remain as varied and the controversies they
generated remain as strong in the 1980's
(Gutting, 1980) as previously (Lakatos and
Musgrave, 1970). Although Kuhn is credited as one of the first to incorporate the
history of science into the philosophy of
science in a non-trivial capacity (Nickles,
1980), historians of science in general reject
or at least ignore his ideas. This is in part
because Kuhn's history of science, following as it does the tradition of Koyre, does
not present the historian with as revolutionary a view as it does the philosophers
of science (Gutting, 1980). It also derives
from the historian's emphasis on understanding the past for its own sake. Thus to
the historian of science the essential point
in Kuhn's work is the oscillation between
revolutionary science and "normal science," an oscillation for which few can find
evidence (Greene, 1980; Rheingold, 1980).
Philosophers of science, whose emphasis is
on the question of how science is done,
have engaged in debates over the meaning
and content of the term paradigm, or
whether or not opposing paradigms are
truly incommensurable. Such debates are
symptomatic of a basic disagreement as to
MODELS AND MYTHS OF SCIENCE
whether or not Kuhn has claimed that the
context of justification is irrational.
By claiming that scientific activity normally takes place within the intellectual
confines of a paradigm—a disciplinary
matrix, an exemplar, a set of methodological rules—Kuhn seemed to be claiming
that science is based on a strong element
of faith. His use of terms such as "gestaltswitch" and "conversion experience" to
describe the change from one paradigm to
another underscores this interpretation
(Kuhn, 1970; Green, 1981). It is such an
interpretation that has led some sociologists of science to see in Kuhn's ideas the
legitimization of sociological analysis of the
cognitive side of science (Gutting, 1980).
Such analyses emphasize the role of nonrational sociological forces in changes in
science and have sparked debates over the
autonomy of science. On the same basis
many philosophers have attacked Kuhn as
asserting relativism and irrationality in science. According to Gutting (1980) both
the accepting stance of the sociologists and
the attacking stance of the philosophers of
science are based on a distortion of Kuhn's
ideas. He argues that what Kuhn has
actually done is to contend that the justification of theories in science is a matter
of informed community judgment in which
many factors play a part, only some of which
conform to methodological rules. The
emphasis on community, on the scientific
group, eliminates rather than validates the
irrational personal whim of the individual
scientist as a determining factor in justification. Thus according to Gutting (1980)
Kuhn does not deny rationality in science
but expands the definition of rationality
itself to include such group judgments.
A redefinition of rationality also seems
to be taking place among those philosophers who have attempted to deal with the
other major part of science, the context of
discovery (Nickles, 1980). The attempt to
describe a logic of discovery was abandoned with the naive realism of the inductivists (Laudan, 1981). Popper and others,
including the positivists, dismissed the origin of scientific ideas as an intuitive process
beyond rational analysis. Wartofsky (1980),
revealing perhaps some Kuhnian influ-
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ence, claims that this state of affairs stems
from the establishment of mathematical
systematicity as the paradigm of rationality
in the 17th century. He calls for a broader
definition of rationality which includes the
"creative-inventiveness of the craftsman,"
a sort of mental "tinkering" with concepts
and facts, "practical imagination." He
labels such a broader definition of rationality "scientific judgment": "In scientific
judgment, then, the act of creation consists
in imagining new ways of relating present
facts, or imagining new facts in such a way
as to realize them by some mode of action—
i.e., by experimental practice, by technological innovation" (Wartofsky, 1980).
A similar concern for image, imagining,
and imagination is expressed by the theologian Garrett Green (1981). Using Kuhn's
ideas as a bridge between science and religion, Green argues that "a paradigm is . . .
an analogical image for understanding
something else." Thus he attributes to paradigms an imaging power which both
focuses thought and confines it, provides a
basis for making sense of experience and
establishes criteria by which experiences
are judged important or irrelevent. Green
also points out that the use of the term
"imagination" suggests to many that the
results are imaginary. He calls this an illusion—derived from a misunderstanding of
science as the objective discovery of some
ultimate reality—a view known as naive
realism.
This brings me to the consideration of
the second area of concern according to
Hacking (1983), the reality content of scientific concepts. Though naive realism may
remain as the common misunderstanding
of science among the lay public, it has so
few adherents among scientists or philosophers of science that it deserves little space
here. So too the positivist attempt to
restrict science to empirical description
devoid of all reference to an underlying
reality has proven unable to surmount its
criticisms (Putnam, 1981; Shapere, 1984),
and thus will not occupy us here. As stated
above, Popper's model of science suggests
that science does approach reality despite
our inability to prove our theories true.
Once again it is Kuhn's model of science
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JAMES W. ATKINSON
which has stimulated controversy. Many of beliefs which have proved successful and
his critics have interpreted his views as sup- free of specific doubt; or regarding which
porting a relativistic concept of science in the doubts that exist are either wellwhich the creation of paradigms is, in fact, founded estimates of error ranges that are
the creation of new worlds. Whether or narrow enough, at least in some contexts,
not such an interpretation is a distortion to permit useful investigation, or else are
of Kuhn's views (Gutting, 1980), it has, judged, on the basis of what we know, to
along with the relativisitic views of Paul be insignificant, not compelling, in some
Feyerabend (1981), stimulated a great deal other way." Although Shapere may find
of reaction. Part of the result of this reac- such reasoning to be free of the taint of
tion is the articulation of new, more sophis- relativism, such terms as "belief," "conticated versions of realism. There are two text," and "basis of what we know" proversions of realism which I will focus upon vide ample room for the anti-realist to take
here: that of Dudley Shapere (1984) and heart. The difficulty here seems to be that
that of Ian Hacking (1983). Both claim to Shapere, by relying on background theorepresent a break from the traditional ries, has attempted to develop his realism
on the basis of what Hacking calls the "repapproach of the philosophy of science.
Calling for a " . . . return to an exami- resenting" side of science (Hacking, 1983).
With a provocative speculation that the
nation of actual science and its historical
concept
"real" developed in human disdevelopment . . . ," Shapere finds a basis
course
only
after the ability to create an
for realism in the process of testing theories. There is a tension between what Shap- image which can represent something,
ere calls the "condition of objectivity" Hacking contends that an uncontestable
according to which an observation must be basis for realism can be found only in the
independent of the scientific idea to be "intervening" portion of science:
tested (though it may be laden with other
Science is said to have two aims: theory
theory) and the "condition of relevance"
and
experiment. Theories try to say how
according to which the observation must
the world is. Experiment and subsequent
be relevant to the idea being tested. This
technology change the world. We reptension generates a kind of dynamic shiftresent
and we intervene. We represent
ing along a continuum ranging from neuin order to intervene, and we intervene
tral descriptions such as "membranous vesin the light of representations. Most of
icle" to less neutral descriptions such as
today's debate about scientific realism is
"self-replicating respiratory organelle," to
couched
in terms of theory, represenfully theory-laden descriptions such as
tation, and truth. The discussions are
"evolutionary remnant of a commensal
illuminating but not decisive. This is
prokaryote." The shift along this continpartly
because they are so infected with
uum seems to be governed by the degree
intractable metaphysics. I suspect there
of conviction for the truth of background
can be no final argument for or against
theories necessary for interpretation of the
realism at the level of representation.
empirical input. Fully neutral descriptions
(Hacking, 1983)
are said to be too impoverished to serve as
new knowledge yet they serve as a kind of Unlike Popper who sees experimentation
base to which scientists may retreat if they as subservient to theory, Hacking treats
come to doubt the accepted background experiment as at least an equal partner with
theories. Such doubts must be "compel- theory, often capable of standing alone,
ling," presumably arising from empirical independent of theory. Only rarely are
anomalies or developments in related dis- experiments designed specifically as tests
ciplines; they are not based on general to falsify a theory. More often they are
philosophical doubts. In Shapere's words designed to answer "what will happen if
" . . . that mere possibility of doubt, as we . . ."questions. Having developed from the
have learned in science, is no reason tradition of manipulating objects of our
[emphasis Shapere's] not to build on those macroscopic world such as rocks, tables,
MODELS AND MYTHS OF SCIENCE
and chairs—objects whose reality is questioned only by the extreme idealist—the
experimental, intervening activity of science demonstrates the reality of so-called
theoretical entities by using them as experimental tools. Thus the electron becomes
accepted as a real thing not when it successfully avoids falsification, but when it is
used to investigate other phenomena as in
the electron microscope.
THE ELEPHANT'S VIEW
Perhaps at this point it is appropriate to
turn to the elephant's self-image. Just as
we as individuals have a self-image which
is compounded of internal impressions and
reflections in a mirror, the concept of science presented by scientists themselves is
made up from their own experience and
reflections from various philosphers, sociologists, or historians of science. The model
I propose is no different. It is based upon
my own experience as a scientist, some
knowledge of the history of science, and
reflections from some of the selected philosophical "mirrors" described above.
The philosophy of science seems to have
a split personality, sometimes claiming to
be merely descriptive and at other times
clearly attempting to be legislative—telling scientists how they ought to proceed
(Hull, 1974). As a branch of academic philosophy the philosophy of science tends
toward formalism—adherence to formal
logic and a concern for the careful use of
language. No doubt we could all benefit
from a more careful use of language and
methods of analysis which may clear up
fuzzy thinking. However, sometimes philosophers of science let their formalism and
their tendency toward legislation combine
to generate a picture of an ideal to which
they wished scientists would conform rather
than a description of how science is actually
done. Not only is such an approach misleading, it may actually be destructive to
try to confine science to a formal mold.
The model proposed below is not intended
as a formal prescription.
The creative aspect of science, known
among philosophers of science as the context of discovery, appears to be the least
describable in terms of the formal logic of
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mathematical systematicity. Wartofsky's
"tinkering" with concepts suggests a playful manipulation of images. These images
are derived from empirical experience and
ideas, concepts, and beliefs provided to the
scientist by the cultural environment
including, of course, formal education.
Work in artificial intelligence has indicated
that the amount of knowledge included in
memory is a major factor in reasoning ability (Waldrop, 1984); this is indicative, perhaps, of the role of such background theories or "interfield links" (Darden, 1980)
and thus the importance of the prepared
mind. In such a mind these images may be
used as tools or toys, thus Wartofsky's
"tinkering" is a free playing with concepts
by which we are intervening, manipulating, experimenting with images and noting
the result. Geneticist Barbara McClintock
describes such a manipulation of images
while working with Neurospora chromosomes:
I found that the more I worked with
them the bigger and bigger [they] got,
and when I was really working with them
I wasn't outside, I was down there. I was
part of the system. I was right down there
with them, and everything got big. I even
was able to see the internal parts of the
chromosomes—actually everything was
there. It surprised me because I actually
felt as if I were right down there and
these were my friends. (Kellor, 1983)
McClintock's biographer, Evelyn Kellor,
cites this quotation and others to argue that
the act of creation involves a "loss" of self
or a merging of self with the phenomenon.
"The ultimate descriptive task, for both
artists and scientists, is to 'ensoul' what one
sees, to attribute to it the life one shares
with it; one learns by identification" (Kellor, 1983). Is not such "ensouling" an identification with images, part of mental intervening, an involvement, a deep interaction
with the world? Through such mental
intervening images may gain a status in our
mind equivalent to the reality status Hacking claims empirical intervening gives to
theoretical entities (Hacking, 1983). This
then provides a rationale for what Laudan
(1981) calls the context of pursuit, a feeling
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JAMES W. ATKINSON
that a given concept is worthy of more
careful rational and empirical analysis. Such
an explanation of creativity may explain
the confidence many creative individuals
have in their own ideas. For example Barbara McClintock describes a strong sense
of conviction for her ideas regarding chromosomes which resulted from such a
manipulation of images.
The role of background theories in this
process is critical because they can serve
both as images for tinkering and constraints on tinkering. It is the constraining
function that prompts claims of irrationality in Kuhn's model of "normal science"
operating within the confines of a paradigm. Rather than being an indication of
irrationality perhaps this paradoxical dual
role of paradigms is characteristic of human
reason. Image manipulation is essential for
the highly successful creative function of
the mind; yet a chaotic, totally free-flowing
interaction of images would make human
communication and cooperation impossible by creating as many worlds as there are
people or too many images for each person
than they could possibly handle. In terms
of the play analogy, the child with no toys
may be unable to build in his sandbox while
the child with too many toys may be too
bewildered or the sandbox too full for creative building to occur. Some sort of balance is necessary. Perhaps here is the difference between the creative genius and
the rest of us; i.e., the constraint function
of knowledge is stronger for most of us.
There is, no doubt, much more to the
phenomenon of human creativity than this.
Gruber, for example, discusses the creative
individual as an evolving system made up
of subsystems: " . . . an organization of
knowledge, an organization of purpose, and
an organization of affect" (Gruber, 1980).
The segments of the system interact in a
"dense and complex" manner in which
insight develops or evolves rather than
leaping into existence whole. The playful
mental tinkering model described above
seems to suggest just such a developing or
evolving process.
Once a concept or theory has been publicly articulated, the more rationally formal process of justification begins. Cer-
tainly the various criteria discussed by
philosophers of science interact in this process. Internal coherence, comprehensiveness, simplicity, falsifiability, aesthetic elegance, and cohesiveness with other
accepted ideas will each play its part in theory acceptance, varying in weight depending on the theory being judged, the individual or group doing the judging, and what
C. S. Lewis (1964) called the '"psychology
of an age." There is, however, another
aspect of this process which may supercede
these criteria. Concepts that come to have
a paradigmatic role in science are not
merely accepted, they are assimilated.
Assimilation requires a re-creation. The
manipulation of images which was part of
the original creative process occurs once
more in the mind of the audience. The
"tinkering" with images which takes place
in the act of re-creation is probably not
identical in sequence or in impact on the
individual as that which took place in the
mind of the originator, yet it is similar in
that it can lead to a conviction as to the
truth or reality of the concept in question.
Perhaps this is what Kuhn's "gestalt-switch"
or "conversion experience" really signifies. Evelyn Kellor (1983) attributes Barbara McClintock's isolation and temporary
ostracism from the genetics community in
part to an inability to communicate within
a shared language which could carry her
audience with her with respect to her idea
of transposition. Kellor's interpretation
seems to fit this idea of re-creation.
McClintock and her audience did not share
the same images. They could not "see"
what she saw, until they were able to
recreate the image patterns of McClintock's
mind, at least in part; they were unable to
fully understand her ideas, to assimilate
them into their concept of genetic reality.
Initially, a few were able to do so and later
other bits of background theory, other
images, became assimilated which allowed
geneticists to perform this act of re-creation, assimilate McClintock's concepts and
grant her the accolades which were her
due.
The act of re-creation is not an all-ornone phenomenon; there is a continuum.
In some cases only a portion of the image
MODELS AND MYTHS OF SCIENCE
manipulation takes place and the ideas
become altered in the process of assimilation. Gruber (1980) points out that
although Darwin used metaphors such as
the tangled bank, the irregularly branching tree, wedging, artificial selection, and
war in developing his thought, it was primarily the war and artificial selection metaphors (images) which were assimilated by
his contemporaries. This resulted in a distorted emphasis on the competitive aspects
of natural selection, the "nature red in
tooth and claw" image which continues to
haunt public debate over evolution. If, in
fact, image intervening or re-creating is
necessary for assimilation of ideas, individuals with a different constellation of available images may be unable to come to a
common conclusion. A reading of Roe's
analysis of the 18th century Haller-Wolff
debate over preformation (Roe, 1981)
reveals that apparently common visual
images yielded very different conceptual
images of embryonic development. The
visual images were manipulated with different sets of mental images; neither individual was able to successfully re-create the
other's creation, neither was able to assimilate the other's views. Their arguments
went past one another. Although this may
sound very much like Kuhn's claims that
opposing paradigms are incommensurable, there is a significant difference. In my
view incommensurability is not a property
of paradigms or theories. It is, rather, produced by the re-creating process; that is, it
occurs when different sets of background
images preclude re-creation and thus
assimilation of concepts. Although preformation and epigenesis seem to be incommensurable in the Haller-Wolff debate,
they blend together well two hundred years
later when images of information storage
and utilization in DNA and RNA are available as mental tools with which to manipulate them.
This re-creation process may also play a
part in the public reaction to scientific concepts. If the image generated by the scientific concept can be manipulated mentally with images from common experience
and the accepted background knowledge
of the culture, it can and probably will be
733
assimilated, become an accepted part of
the cultural world view. On the other hand,
if the lay-public does not possess the mental
tools necessary to manipulate the images
created by scientists, such scientific knowledge will be ignored or rejected and scientists and scientific institutions held in
suspicion. It behooves us as scientists to be
aware of the nature of public education in
general and to not restrict our concerns to
science education exclusively.
This image manipulation model of discovery and justification raises the question
of objectivity vs. subjectivity, of realism vs.
anti-realism. If the tinkering of images in
the process of creation and re-creation were
all there is to science, the knowledge gained
thereby would clearly be epistemologically
subjective and metaphysically idealistic.
There is, however, the empirical element.
One demarcation between science and the
humanities is that whatever the mental
images produced in the process of creation
and re-creation sooner or later they must
be related to empirical experience of the
natural world. Such experience serves as a
source of images for mental intervening in
creation and re-creation so that the concepts created are tied to experience—
Shapere's "condition of relevance" (Shapere, 1984). They are also involved in other
aspects of the context of justification.
Although Hacking is correct in stating that
experiments are rarely done as formal
attempts at falsification (Hacking, 1983),
such empirical testing does take place.
However, a more frequent area of contact
between images and empirical experience
is in the application of the criteria of comprehensiveness in which concepts, theories, etc. are applied to new empirical experiences. As Hacking asserts, it is the use of
theoretical entities in the process of intervening with nature that gives such entities
the status of reality (Hacking, 1983). Similarly, I argue that the theories themselves
gain the status of reality—i.e., truth—by
their use in making sense of experience.
What do we mean when we attribute reality to either theories or theoretical entities
in this way?
We cannot mean objective or real in the
same way the naive realist of the past did,
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JAMES W. ATKINSON
for we claim that status only when our active
involvement takes place. That is we are not
claiming that such entities or theories are
real or true independent of the intervening
itself. Philosophers of science tend to belittle the old "tree in the forest" argument
against realism (Ruse, 1980; Hacking,
1983), which points out that all knowledge—all experience—is human experience. Questions such as: "Does the tree in
the forest make a sound when there is no
one to hear it?" can not be answered. Of
course we assume "there is a there there"
that trees, forests, and vibrations in the air
exist independent of our knowledge of
them. However, it is important to remember that this is an assumption and that that
assumption is made only because we have
knowledge of trees, forests, and vibrations
of the air derived from our interaction with
the world. Such a definition of reality can
be found in quantum physics. The physicist
Richard Schlegel once stated: "The act of
observing therefore not only is necessary
for information about an event but also
contributes to its coming into being"
(Schlegel, 1979). In other words, reality is
an interaction between us and something
else. We may call that something else
"nature" or the "natural world" but we
have no knowledge of it; it is not real without the interaction. Such a definition of
reality is not subjective in the sense that
reality is produced by the mind; after all,
the interaction requires the "something
else" as well as the "us." Being neither
objective nor subjective, scientific knowledge is perhaps best termed interactive.
Scientific reality also requires that the interaction be a community property, acceptable in terms of community judgment
involving shared experience and shared
images; that is, personal biases, personal
idiosyncracies, and totally unique experiences should not be included.
Perhaps we can summarize this model of
science by defining science as a process
whereby the human capacity for imagination creates and manipulates images in the
mind producing concepts, theories, and
ideas which incorporate and tie together
shared human sensory experience and
which are assimilated into human culture
through a similar act of re-creation. These
concepts, theories and ideas constitute a
body of knowledge of that interaction of
humans with nature which is accepted as
reality. Since reality is a process of interaction and the human experience and mind
are both capable of generating an almost
infinite array of images, scientific knowledge has changed and will continue to
change, sometimes with revolutionary
quickness and at other times with a slow
gradual evolution.
THE IMPORTANCE OF EVALUATION
This is a crudely drawn model which
requires additional supporting evidence
drawn from both the history of science and
the experience of active scientists. It may
be no better than a number of other models
or myths available. Certainly some will
claim it is worse than other models. The
elephant's self-image may be as incomplete
and distorted as the blindmen's. Regardless of the potential weaknesses of this particular model, it is essential that any such
model be evaluated. The image of science
that model generates ought to be evaluated
for its cohesiveness, its coherence with
other accepted ideas, its aesthetic elegance,
its falsifiability, and—most importantly—
its comprehensiveness; i.e., does the model
encompass specific examples of science as
actually experienced?
Evaluation of such models or myths of
science is important for several reasons.
Brush (1974) has pointed out that the use
of the history of science in science education depends upon whether the aim is to
train individuals to be neutral fact finders
or critical scholars—different myths of science generate different goals for science
education. Moore (1980), calling for something more than the conventional description of science in terms of methodological
rules, sees in Kuhn's model of science a
useful approach to the teaching of science
to the nonscientists. Clearly science education at all levels takes place within the
context of some particular model of science, different models will yield different
educational procedures and course content. Public expectations of science and with
it government relations with science are
MODELS AND MYTHS OF SCIENCE
735
also a function of the model of science toire"—a language and perspective which
which is accepted. Brush (1976) argues that can foster a subjective, relativistic view of
both "excessive respect and excessive hos- science, though they know science is not
tility for science stem from the same dis- adequately described in purely contingent
terms. The resolution of such dilemmas
torted view of the nature of science
The "distorted view" according to Brush requires increased communication not only
is the inductivist-empiricist views of the among the blindmen but also with the connaive realists, which he says has "betrayed" cerned if occasionally myopic elephant.
science. Stressing what he calls an intuitive- Perhaps institutions such as the ASZ
creative process of discovery in science, through its Division of the History and PhiPopper (1981) expressed fear that: ". . . losophy of Biology can play a part in such
the spirit of science is in danger. Big sci- a process of communication.
ence may destroy great science . . . ." A
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS
model of science which claims objective
discovery through science not only attracts
I wish to thank Dr. Larry Spencer,
large amounts of government support, it Brother C. Edward Quinn and the Division
also stimulates emulation. "The borrowed of the History and Philosophy of Biology
authority of science becomes a powerful of the ASZ for encouraging me and giving
prestige symbol for unscientific doctrines" me the opportunity to express my ideas. I
(Merton, 1973). Kinget (1980) attributes would also like to thank Dr. Jane Maienthe "undeniable failure" of so-called objec- schein whose thoughtful criticism of these
tive psychology to just such an unwar- ideas has prompted me to attempt to clarify
ranted borrowing of the authority of sci- their presentation. And a special thanks to
ence. Of course, scientists also behave in Elizabeth H. Atkinson for her invaluable
accordance with some particular model of aid in the preparation of this manuscript.
science. Many of us have witnessed disputes
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