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MILITARY THOUGHT
State Ideology and External Wars:
Four Centuries of Russian Experience
V.A. MAKHONIN,
Doctor of History
Abstract. The author considers the historical experiences of Russia’s
imperial and Soviet governments in using state ideology as a fundamental
objective of external wars.
keywords: war, ideology, religion, internationalism, military assistance, allies, economics, revolution.
Over the last one hundred years Russia has gone through two tectonic disintegrations. The first one occurred in 1917, when the Russian Empire collapsed
after several centuries in existence. It was directly linked to World War I and
entailed consequences that proved catastrophic for Russia, including a bloody
Civil War that claimed many more lives than had World War I.
The second disintegration occurred a mere 73 years after the first one. In
terms of history, that was but a brief interlude. The consequences were likewise
calamitous. The second disintegration was also closely linked to a war, this time
to the Afghan war. But not that alone. The war the Soviet Union waged in
Afghanistan was not an isolated episode. This country started warfare on theaters
of military operations abroad within less than five years from the end of World
War II. The war in Afghanistan was thus the last one of some twenty wars the
Soviet Union waged at short intervals for over thirty years, from 1950 to 1989.
Since both great disintegrations happened to be closely linked to external
wars waged by the state, it may be hypothesized that it was state ideology that
shaped the kind of foreign military policy, first in Russia and later in the Soviet
Union, that eventually became instrumental in the collapse of both the Russian
Empire and the Soviet Union.
Let us speculate within the framework of this hypothesis. The last few centuries provided convincing proof that in any state the basis of both domestic and
foreign policy is state ideology. It becomes the state’s cementing element and
permeates all of its structural components, including its armed forces as an
instrument of implementing foreign policy by force of arms.
State Ideology and External Wars: Four Centuries of Russian Experience
11
The ideology of the Russian Empire was Orthodox Christianity. The triple
slogan of “For Faith, the Czar and the Fatherland” put Orthodoxy first. It is common knowledge that Russia went Orthodox Christian well before it became a
centralized state. For several centuries religion was taking hold in Russia becoming an increasingly powerful constituent of both the individual and public consciousness. And precisely for this reason Orthodoxy as the sum of certain vital
human values inevitably became part of the military organism.
By then Europe had already acquired some historical experience of this kind:
various orders of crusaders used force to spread Catholicism and made short
work of members of alien religions. A few of their campaigns were against Russia. The cross as a religious symbol graced not only their banners, but also their
clothes and armor. Even the great geographical discoveries made, for instance,
by Spanish and Portuguese seamen were accompanied by religious expansion.
Roughly from the 13th century on Russian princes began asking the blessing
of Orthodox priests for fighting righteous battles in defense of their native land
before important battles against invaders attacking Russia from all sides. Setting
off for military campaigns the warriors took icons with them. Marching along with
the troops were priests who frequently fought side by side with soldiers in battles
against invaders. Defense of one’s land was becoming a sacred cause. The principal Orthodox idea of the justice of defensive warfare was at the time succinctly
expressed by Prince Alexander Nevsky: “God is not in strength, but in the Truth.”1
It wasn’t right from the start that the Russian centralized state began to use
Orthodoxy in affairs of defense. However, when it finally achieved consolidation
after a lengthy period of coups, revolts and times of troubles and began to wage
wars abroad, Orthodoxy proved very much in demand.
Starting with the Russo-Turkish war of 1676-1681, where Russia defended
the Ukraine that had joined the Russian state, the process of extending the values of Orthodoxy to the goals of some wars got well under way. The chief factor
in this ideological thrust was religious-ethnic internationalism – protection of
Orthodox Slavs against “Turkish infidels.” That was what made war just and fair
in the eyes of the Czar’s court and justified it in the public opinion of Europe.
The core of that late medieval or early Modern Times “internationalism” was
religious-ethnic solidarity. It became the basis of the Russian Empire’s messianic ideology. Russia’s rulers thought of their country as a “third Rome,” and a
Rome, albeit a third one, implied a great empire, the possibility of influencing,
directly or indirectly, those countries where Orthodox Slavs or non-Slavs but still
Orthodox Christians made up the basis of the state.
In Europe (southern and southeastern) there were quite a few such countries. In
the mid-1600s all of them were part of the Ottoman Empire, Russia’s traditional foe.
Some Slavic communities lived in states where they were oppressed by other ethnic groups, e.g., Magyars, a fact that Friedrich Engels remarked on more than once.
From the middle of the 17th century to 1917, Russia waged quite a few wars in
defense of Orthodox Slavs. The previously mentioned Russo-Turkish war of 1676-
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1681 was followed by others, of 1686-1700, of 1710-1713, of 1735-1739, of 17681774, of 1787-1791, of 1806-1812, of 1828-1829, of 1853-1856, and of 1877-1878.2
A most important element of all those wars was support for the Balkan
Orthodox Slavs’ fight for their liberation. Admittedly, Russia’s Slav brethren
themselves did not always took kindly to that support. For instance, in 1710 the
ruler of Moldavia, Dimitrie Cantemir, failed to render tangible assistance to the
Russian troops, while in Walachia Prince Constantin Brancoveanu betrayed Russia, disclosing the plans of a Russian advance to the Turkish sultan.3
There is one noteworthy feature of these wars. In purely military terms nearly all of them, with very few exceptions, were offensive on Russia’s part, that is
to say, they were waged on enemy territory, that of the Ottoman Empire. But in
terms of social content they were defensive and protective, since the purpose of
those wars was liberation of Orthodox Slavs from oppression by an empire with
an alien religion.
In the Russo-Turkish war of 1828-1829, for instance, the Orthodox Slav
motives came out with especial vividness. The Emperor Nicholas I tried to set up
friendly Orthodox Christian states in Southeastern Europe that would be independent from Turkey and the West, states whose territory could not be absorbed
and used by other powers. On the eve of the campaign Russia even entered into
a coalition with Britain and France “to support the Greeks who have risen against
Turkish rule.” The Turkish Sultan Mahmud II paid Russia in kind, by calling on
Muslim Turks to wage “holy war” against the Russians, which also meant lending a religious-ethnic coloring to the war.
The Crimean Russo-Turkish War of 1853-1856 actually started over the
issue of the keys to the holy places in Palestine, which Catholics and Orthodox
Christians hotly disputed (the sultan took the keys to the Bethlehem Temple
away from Orthodox Greeks and gave them to Catholics whose interests were
defended by Emperor Napoleon III of France, while Emperor Nicholas I
demanded that Turkey recognize the Russian Czar as the protector of all of the
Ottoman Empire’s Orthodox subjects).
It was believed at the Russian emperor’s court that Russia’s failure to support Orthodox Christians in Turkey would weaken its authority in the eyes of the
nations enslaved by the Turks (Bulgarians, Serbs, Rumanians, etc.), and that Russia’s foreign policy interests would thus suffer.
After the rout of the Turks at sea and on land, and the appearance of the
Anglo-French fleet in the Black Sea to “protect the vessels and coasts of Turkey,”
the Imperial Manifesto of February 9, 1854, announced that “Britain and France
are coming to join the enemies of Christendom against Russia which is fighting
for Orthodoxy.”4
The war of 1877-1878 began as Russia’s response to Turkey’s refusal to
accept plans of autonomy for Bosnia, Herzegovina and Bulgaria the European
powers had worked out on Russia’s initiative. That was preceded by anti-Turkish disturbances that were cruelly suppressed.5
State Ideology and External Wars: Four Centuries of Russian Experience
13
Not all politicians accepted the idea of Russia’s active involvement in settling political issues in Europe by force of arms. In the early 19th century Viktor
Kochubei, a diplomat and adviser to Alexander I, wrote in a memorandum to the
Czar: “Russia … is safe on all sides, as long as she leaves the others alone. All
too often and without the slightest provocation has she interfered in matters of no
immediate concern to her…. She waged wars that were utterly useless to her and
much too costly.”6 At first Alexander approved the points made in that memo,
but eventually gave up the idea of seriously curbing the Empire’s military aspirations.
From the end of the 18th century, when Europe was swept by a tidal wave
of revolutionary upheavals started by the French Revolution of 1789-1799, Russia did not stand idly by. In addition to the religious-ethnic solidarity, its foreign
policy developed the motive of antirevolutionary solidarity with Europe’s monarchs.
From then on Russia fought for a long time against the revolutionary France.
In 1798-1800, Admiral Fyodor F. Ushakov undertook a Mediterranean campaign, and Alexander V. Suvorov carried out his Italian and Swiss expeditions as
part of Russia’s war against France within the second coalition (of Britain, Austria, Russia, Turkey, and the Kingdoms of both Sicilies).
The Russo-Austrian-French war of 1805 was waged by Russia within the
third anti-French coalition (of Austria, Britain, Sweden, Naples, and Russia). It
was in that war that Alexander I, removing Mikhail I. Kutuzov from command
of the troops, lost the Battle of Austerlitz on December 2, 1805.
In 1806-1807, in the course of the Russo-Prussian-French war, Alexander I
set out to help Prussia, which had been attacked by Napoleon in 1806. Around
the same time occurred the Second Archipelago Expedition that involved a Baltic
Fleet squadron and six Black Sea groups (of 40 battleships, seven auxiliary vessels, and 27,000 troops) under Vice-Admiral Dmitry N. Senyavin acting on
Corfu and by the Dalmatian shores.
The Russo-Turkish war of 1806-1812 took place because Turkey, in the
wake of Napoleon’s victory at Austerlitz, became an ally of France and embarked
on hostile action against Russia.
In 1812, Russia fought its Patriotic War against the invading armies of
Napoleon. The Russian army’s foreign campaigns of 1813-1814 became a logical continuation of that war. Those campaigns were carried out regardless of the
public opinion prevailing in Russia after the 1812 war and the view of Field Marshal Mikhail Kutuzov himself that Russians should not interfere in European
affairs. During those campaigns the Russian army occupied Eastern Prussia,
Warsaw, Berlin and Paris. After the capital of France fell, Napoleon abdicated
and was exiled by the Allies to the Isle of Elba.
In 1815, the Russian army undertook one more campaign abroad within yet
another anti-French coalition, the seventh. To fight Napoleon’s troops, after he had
escaped from Elba, a 775,000-strong grouping was formed, of which 270,000 men
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were Russians. On June 18, Napoleon was defeated at Waterloo; on June 22, he
abdicated, surrendered to the British and was exiled to the Isle of St. Helena.
The last major Russian-French conflict was the Crimean (Russo-Turkish)
war of 1853-1856, in which France and Britain conducted large-scale hostilities
against the Russian troops starting 1854.
There were other military operations in Europe as part of the move to suppress revolutionary movements. In particular, in 1849, Russian troops went on
the Hungarian campaign, in the course of which that country’s revolutionary
forces were routed. It cannot be ruled out that one of the reasons for the military
actions was the fact that the Russian political consciousness viewed the Hungarians, among other things, as centuries-old enslavers of Slavs.
One more military operation of scale, after the same pattern, was the suppression of the Polish national liberation uprising of 1863. It differed from all the
previous anti-Russian protests in that the resistance movement was this time
spearheaded by the revolutionary-minded members of the Polish elite.
Thus throughout the existence of the Russian Empire, in which Orthodoxy was
the state’s official ideology, many wars were officially justified by the need to protect Orthodox Christian Slavs. Obviously, there was also the inevitable consideration of strengthening Russia’s influence in Europe and in the southern sector (the
Crimea, the Caucasus). But the attainment of these two fundamental goals was
seen as closely intertwined. If it had not been for this purpose of protecting Orthodox Slavs, many wars waged by Russia could have been described as purely
aggressive, and the response of other states could have been very different indeed.
However, history recognizes no Subjunctive Mood. From the mid-1600s to
1917 (roughly over 250 years) Russia defended Orthodox Slavs in nearly two
dozen wars that taken together lasted over 40 years. It also suppressed revolutionary movements in Europe in 13 wars and military operations. These wars and
military operations involved hundreds of thousands of servicemen, they cost vast
amounts of money and material resources, and innumerable lives of Russian officers and men were lost. The Crimean War alone claimed over 522,000 lives.7
In this context it should be stressed that the above statistics cover only wars
in defense of Orthodox Slavs and suppression of the revolutionary movement.
The Russian Empire waged other wars as well, and they too involved many hundreds of thousands, while in World War I millions of servicemen fought and vast
resources were likewise spent, while the loss of life was simply stupendous.
The economy of the Russian Empire was essentially backward. Serfdom
slowed down the country’s progress against the backdrop of rapidly developing
capitalist relations in Europe, and it was not abandoned till 1861. The state’s economic potential ran counter to the political aspirations of the Romanoff dynasty
that claimed a key position in Europe, and failed to ensure adequate development
of the armed forces. The country bled itself white in wars, including those waged
to protect Orthodox Slavs. In 1917, the economic and military weariness from
wars that had been building up for decades crushed the empire.
State Ideology and External Wars: Four Centuries of Russian Experience
15
The essentially humane ideology of Orthodoxy was a strictly export commodity for the imperial court; Russia was willing to liberate Orthodox Slavs in
other countries from an alien religion, but its own people remained socially
oppressed. The country’s potential was simply not up to translating the state ideology into practice.
In the Soviet period of Russian history it was Marxism-Leninism that
became state ideology. That doctrine had a very powerful external constituent –
the new rulers were aiming at the victory of the revolution worldwide. That
required ideological substantiation, and the Bolsheviks had just that – liberation
of the entire human race from social oppression by exploiters. The struggle of the
oppressed against their oppressors, of the exploited against the exploiters, of the
proletarians against the capitalists began to be viewed not simply as a just cause,
it became the sacred duty of every “true communist.”
The idea of protecting Orthodox Christians at the time of the Russian Empire
gave way to the idea of social justice, which brought forth the principle of proletarian internationalism. Thus Vladimir I. Lenin wrote that “internationalism is
in effect of just one kind – selfless work to promote the revolutionary movement
in one’s own country, support (by propaganda, morally, or materially) of similar
struggle, a similar line, and that line alone, in all countries without exception.”8
Moreover, the Bolsheviks now supplied a theoretical substantiation for the
need to sacrifice their own people for the sake of the mythical world revolution.
V.I. Lenin said in this connection that internationalism “requires the ability and
readiness on the part of the nation winning over the bourgeoisie to make tremendous national sacrifice for the sake of overthrowing international capital.”9
This tenet of Leninism had an enormous impact on the entire Soviet period.
Immediately after seizing power in Russia as the result of the October 1917 coup,
Lenin and his associates got down to practically addressing the problem of world
revolution. They received proof of the legitimacy of their expectations from Germany and Hungary, where a wave of revolutionary unrest swept the countries
between 1918 and 1919, and even several Soviet republics were set up, albeit
briefly.
During the Soviet-Polish war of 1920, when the forces of the Western Front
under Mikhail Tukhachevsky were approaching Warsaw, expectations of revolution in Poland and Germany by Lenin and his associates got even stronger. Order
1423 of July 2, 1920, to the troops of the Western Front signed by Tukhachevsky
and his deputies ran as follows: “Fighters for the workers’ revolution! Turn your
eyes westward. It is in the West that the future of the world revolution is being
decided. Over the dead body of bourgeois Poland lies the road to a world conflagration. Let us bring on our bayonets happiness and peace to the working
humanity. Onward to the West!...”10
Later Tukhachevsky pointed out that the Polish situation had appeared at the
time “favorable for the revolution.” Many Polish communists were convinced
that once the Red Army reached the ethnic border, “the proletarian revolution in
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Poland will be inevitable and assured.” That impression was also encouraged by
reports from Felix Dzerzhinsky, head of Polrevkom (the Polish Revolutionary
Committee).11
Apart from expectations of revolution in Poland, Russian Bolsheviks were
still hopeful that another revolutionary wave would flood Germany, too. The purpose of the northward swing in the Soviet troops’ thrust toward Warsaw is
believed by some to have been the speediest possible attainment of the German
border, which “was to accelerate the establishment of Soviet power in Germany.”
Tukhachevsky’s defeat at Warsaw prevented the units of the 4th and 15th
armies of the Western Front, cut off by the enemy from the main Front forces and
pushed against the German border, from breaking through to the east so that they
had to retreat to Eastern Prussia where they were interned.12
After the Civil War Soviet Russia’s foreign policy continued its orientation
towards proletarian internationalism. In fact, it extended that principle even to
those countries where the proletariat still had to emerge as a class. The first such
testing ground was the fight against Japan for the neighboring Mongolia and
China, which eventually turned socialist.
During the 1937-1938 war in China against the Japanese, the Soviet Union
sent there not just military assistance, but also combat pilots. The U.S.S.R. delivered to China 985 aircraft, 82 tanks, over 1,300 artillery pieces, 14,000 machineguns, and also ammunition, machinery and equipment, medicines and petroleum
products.13
Chinese officers received instruction from 3,665 Soviet military specialists
who also helped in preparing operations. In November 1937, the first Soviet
pilots came to China and went straight into battle against Japanese aircraft.14
The fight against Japan for Mongolia and China went on in 1938 in the Lake
Khasan area,15 and in 1939 by the Khalkhin-Gol River. In the latter case the
Soviet grouping numbered some 57,000 men, 542 guns and machineguns,
498 tanks, 385 armored vehicles and 515 combat aircraft. The Soviet casualties
amounted to 25,655 (9,703 of them dead and 15,952 wounded).16
After the war, the Soviet Union, which had made the decisive contribution
to the rout of Nazi Germany and its allies and had largely influenced the shaping
of the postwar makeup in the entire world (in Europe alone there emerged several states with pro-Soviet ruling parties, which subsequently became socialist
countries), proceeded from the assumption that its impact on global developments must go on resolutely expanding.
Soviet foreign policy was still based on the principle of proletarian internationalism, eventually transformed into the principle of socialist internationalism.
Accordingly the Soviet Union did its utmost to promote the victory of prosocialist forces in various countries of the world, and also supported nations trying to
shake off colonial domination, a process that gathered momentum in the wake of
World War II. Later that principle was enshrined in Article 30 of the Soviet Constitution, in materials of numerous postwar congresses of the Communist Party
State Ideology and External Wars: Four Centuries of Russian Experience
17
of the Soviet Union, and also in bilateral and multilateral treaties concluded
between the countries of the world socialist system.
Following the defeat of the Kwantung Army and of Japan in World War II,
the prewar support of China’s communists was resumed, this time in the Civil
War of 1946-1950. At the final stage of the war (in 1950) there were two divisions stationed there: the 106th fighter aircraft and the 52nd antiaircraft artillery.
From August 1, 1950, all the equipment and munitions of the group of Soviet
troops were to be handed over to the Chinese Army under the Resolution of the
U.S.S.R. Council of Ministers.17
In the same year the Soviet Union took part in the war in Korea that was then
unfolding. In the fall of 1950, the Soviet 64th fighter aviation corps joined in the
struggle against the United States and its allies. Throughout the war a total of
18 divisions (fighter aircraft, antiaircraft artillery, technical aviation) fought in
that corps. Around 40,000 Soviet servicemen participated in the conflict.18
In the final year of the War in Korea (1953) Soviet troops took part in
“defending the gains of socialism in the GDR.” In fact, they were involved in
suppressing unrest in more than 120 cities and populated areas. Several hundred
thousand East Germans then joined the protests against socialist power.19
In another three years Soviet troops took part in suppressing antigovernment
protests in socialist Hungary (1956). The military operation involved five divisions of the Special Corps, a mechanized army, the 38th Army consisting of two
divisions, two airborne divisions, a total of 31,500 Soviet servicemen,
1,130 tanks and self-propelled units, 615 cannons and mortars, 186 antiaircraft
guns, and 380 armored personnel carriers.20
Simultaneously with actions in Hungary the Soviet Union was rendering
massive assistance to Egypt as a symbol of the struggle by nations of the East
against the world’s imperialist powers. On the eve of, during and after the Suez
crisis of 1956, a considerable amount of weapons and military technology
arrived in that country. Initially $250 million worth of supplies (230 tanks,
200 armored personnel carriers, 100 self-propelled guns, about 500 artillery
pieces, 200 fighters, bombers and transport aircraft, and also destroyers, torpedo
boats and submarines).21
On November 29, 1957, within twelve months of the Egyptians’ defeat by
the united Anglo-French-Israeli forces which had cost Egypt nearly 13,000 dead,
wounded and POWs, and loss of the bulk of Soviet weapons and military technology,22 the U.S.S.R. Central Committee Presidium approved a new resolution
on supplies of special property to Egypt. Under that document, Egypt was granted a loan of 700 million rubles to pay for deliveries of “machinery and equipment” from the Soviet Union.23
In 1958-1959, Egypt received the following types of “machinery and equipment”: destroyers, torpedo boats, submarines, 152 mm howitzers, D-44 85 mm
guns, KS-19 100 mm antiaircraft pieces, early warning radar stations, 150 T-54
tanks, BTR-152 armored personnel carriers, 15 Ilyushin-28 bombers, 40 MiG-17
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fighters, four Ilyushin-28R reconnaissance planes, three field hospital units,
1,500 ZiL-151 trucks, and other equipment.24
Shortly afterwards came the Caribbean crisis of 1962. After it was decided
to deploy Soviet nuclear warhead missiles in Cuba, 42,000 armed personnel,
equipment, ammunition, food and building materials were secretly transported to
the island in the space of two months.
The group of Soviet troops in Cuba comprised the 51st Strategic-Purpose
Missile Division, two antiaircraft divisions, two regiments of combat cruise missiles, a helicopter regiment, a squadron of six Ilyushin-28 nuclear bomb carriers,
four reinforced motorized infantry regiments, three of which had Luna tactical
missiles, a brigade of missile-carrying boats, a coast guard regiment, and an
Ilyushin-28 mine-torpedo aircraft regiment.25
Two years later (in 1964) the Soviet Union went to war against the United
States “for the triumph of socialism in Vietnam.” According to U.S.S.R. Council
of Ministers Chairman Alexei Kosygin, assistance to Vietnam during the war
cost the Soviet Union 1.5 million rubles a day26 (by the official exchange rate of
the ruble against the dollar at the time it amounted to some $2 million a day,
while the unofficial rate was two or three times that. – Author’s note.)
The Soviet Union fought there from August 5, 1964 to December 31, 1972
(eight years and five months), spending $6.2 billion on the 3,100 days of fighting. However, the unofficial estimate of the cost of Soviet military supplies gives
the even higher figure of $15.7 billion.27 Some experts argue that even that
amount is below the actual spending. Compare the U.S. Vietnam war expenditures of $140 billion.
The Soviet Union supplied Vietnam with mammoth amounts of equipment:
2,000 tanks, 7,000 guns and mortars, over 5,000 antiaircraft guns and systems,
158 antiaircraft missile units, over 700 combat aircraft, 20 helicopters, over
100 warships.28 All of those supplies, moreover, were gratuitous.
More than 11,000 Soviet servicemen and various civilian experts took part
in the war in Vietnam.29
Simultaneously with the war in Vietnam, the Soviet Union took part in the
Arab-Israeli wars of 1967 and 1973. During the 1967 war, the Soviet Union sent
to Egypt a Black Sea Fleet operational squadron consisting of one cruiser, nine
destroyers, and three submarines. Shortly afterward it was joined by a group of
warships and submarines of the Northern Fleet. The squadron swelled to 40 combat units, ten of them submarines. The ships were ready for instant action from
June 1 to 31, 1967, and were based at Egypt’s Port Said.30
The Arab countries suffered a crushing defeat in that Six Day War, losing
40,000 men, 900 tanks and 300 aircraft between June 5 and 10.31
To mend Egypt’s crippled military potential a squadron of Soviet Tupolev16 bombers arrived in Egypt on June 14, already after the hostilities were over.
These were followed by supplies of Soviet military equipment and weapons
delivered by air. In October 1967 alone Egypt received 100 MiG-21, 50 MiG-19
and 60 Sukhoi-7 fighters, plus 20 Ilyushin-28 bombers.32
State Ideology and External Wars: Four Centuries of Russian Experience
19
At the close of 1969, the Soviet Union started setting up its antiaircraft
grouping in Egypt, to which end 16 Soviet Maritime Ministry transport ships carried there 32,000 Soviet servicemen, fighting equipment, missiles, ammunition,
etc.33 U.S.S.R. Antiaircraft Force Commander-in-Chief Pavel Batitsky personally supervised the setting up of the operational group.
The grouping included a special AA missile division of three AA missile
brigades, and also a fighter aircraft group of two regiments. They were armed
with S-125 Pechora surface-to-air missile systems, Shilka self-propelled radarguided AA systems, and Strela-2 combat surface-to-air missile complexes.34
Near Cairo, Alexandria, Aswan, the Suez Canal area and elsewhere 21 Soviet antiaircraft missile divisions were deployed, armed with what was then stateof-the-art weapons. Besides, two regiments of MiG-21 interceptors were based
at military airfields not far from Cairo, Alexandria and Aswan.
At the same time the Soviet Union started handing over to the Egyptian army
modern antiaircraft facilities. From 1970 Egypt’s antiaircraft missile troops started receiving S-125 and Kvadrat antiaircraft missile systems, and Strela complexes. The numbers of AA artillery also increased, among other things thanks to
the deliveries of Shilka 23-4 systems. Between 1965 and 1972, the Soviet
Union’s military assistance to Egypt amounted to $3.2 billion.35
In the summer of 1972, against the background of an overall deterioration of
Soviet-Egyptian relations, President Sadat ordered the withdrawal of the Soviet
grouping from Egypt. However, even then Egypt got more Soviet weapons from
December 1972 to June 1973 than it had done in 1971-1972! Anwar Sadat confessed that the Kremlin swamped him with new weapons.36
On the eve of the 1973 war Egypt received yet another huge consignment of
Soviet weapons. Before the outbreak of hostilities the 400,000-strong Egyptian
troops had at their disposal over 2,000 tanks, 400 combat aircraft, and almost
200 helicopters, mostly Soviet-made. Syria had roughly the same amount of
equipment.37
In October 1973, four days after yet another phase of hostilities had begun,
Soviet Antonov-12 and Antonov-22 aircraft started making regular flights to
Cairo. Within a short period of time they had made about 900 flights. On board
the aircraft were ammunition and military equipment.38 Yet the bulk of the cargo
traveled by sea, and so did not reach its destination till the close of the war.
The U.S.S.R. transferred to the Eastern Mediterranean up to 120 warships
and other vessels, including 34 combat surface ships, 23 nuclear and diesel submarines.39 The United States, for its part, brought up the complement of its 6th
Mediterranean Fleet to 140 units, including six to eight nuclear submarines, four
aircraft carriers, 20 helicopter carriers, 20 cruisers, 40 destroyers and frigates.
Not infrequently Soviet and U.S. ships moved broadside to broadside, which
prompted seamen to come up with the joke about dog mating on the water.40
Thus in October 1973, a new Middle East crisis flared up, largely similar to
the Caribbean one of 1962. Soviet-U.S. relations took a nosedive. The Soviet
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MILITARY THOUGHT
Union announced high alert for seven paratrooper divisions. The United States
declared state of alert for its nuclear forces.41 Political prudence prevailed this
time, too. But after the crisis was defused, the Soviet Union found itself being
rapidly ousted from the Middle East.
Simultaneously with the Soviet Union’s part in the war in Vietnam and in
Arab-Israeli wars, the Soviets suppressed the 1968 antigovernment uprising in
Czechoslovakia. The operation involved 18 Soviet divisions from the 1st Guards
Tank Army, the 20th Guards All-Arms Army, the 16th Air Army (from the Group
of Soviet Troops in Germany), the 11th Guards All-Arms Army (Belorussian
Military District), the 13th and the 38th All-Arms Armies of the Trans-Carpathian Military District, and also the 14th Air Army of the Odessa Military District.42
To cover the active grouping in Hungary the Southern Front was deployed.
Apart from that front the Balaton operational group (comprising two Soviet divisions, plus Bulgarian and Hungarian units) was deployed to support the crossing
of troops into Czechoslovakia. In all, the number of Soviet forces deployed in
Czechoslovakia was 170,000 men.43
For twenty years (from 1975 to 1994) the Soviet Union’s massive forces and
technology were involved in the conflict in Angola. Starting from 1975, large
amounts of combat machinery, armaments, equipment, food and medicines
began arriving in Luanda by air and by sea from the Soviet Union, Yugoslavia
and the GDR. Munitions were also delivered by military transport planes. Also,
U.S.S.R. Navy warships arrived at the Angolan coast.
In 1976, the Soviet Union delivered to Angola significant numbers of helicopters, aircraft, tanks, armored personnel carriers and small arms, multiple
rocket launchers, artillery pieces, mortars, antitank missiles and other armaments.
Angolan land forces had T-54B and T-55 tanks, BMP-1 armored personnel
carriers, artillery systems of D-30 122 mm howitzers, SD 85mm guns, self-propelled antiaircraft launching vehicles, and also all manner of small arms. Their
air force had MiG-21 BIS, MiG-23 ML, Sukhoi-22 MI aircraft, Mi-17 (Mi-8
MT), and Mi-24 helicopters.
Angola’s Navy successfully used Soviet minor and medium assault landing
ships, torpedo- and missile-carrying boats and gunboats.44
In the late 1970s and 1980s some 3,000 Soviet military advisers and specialists served in Angola, and some of them took part in the fighting against
UNITA groups and the South African regular army.
An operational brigade of surface ships of the Soviet Navy was permanently based at the Soviet naval base in Luanda. Soviet Navy ships and submarines
on missions in the southern hemisphere frequently sailed into the base for rest
and refueling. Communications with them were maintained through the powerful zonal communications center we had built in Angola. Soviet Tupolev-95 RTs
naval reconnaissance aircraft flying along the Severomorsk-Havana-LuandaSeveromorsk route regularly landed at the Luanda airfield.
State Ideology and External Wars: Four Centuries of Russian Experience
21
Nearly 11,000 Soviet advisers and specialists, including over 100 generals
and admirals, served in Angola at various times between 1975 and 1994.45
From 1974 to 1977, the Soviet Union armed and trained, within a very short
space of time, the army of Somalia whose leaders declared themselves in favor
of socialism. In 1977, there were 2,000 Soviet military advisers and specialists
working in Somalia. Altogether 3,911 Soviet servicemen served in Somalia,
while over 3,000 Somali officers were trained in the U.S.S.R.46
When the Somali army of 12 mechanized brigades invaded neighboring
Ethiopia in 1977, it had the following Soviet equipment: 250 tanks, 350 armored
personnel carriers, 79 MiG-type fighters, two antisub ships, 10 patrol boats and
other kinds of hardware.47
In the same year the Somalis insisted on speedy removal of Soviet specialists from their country because the Soviet Union did not support their invasion in
Ethiopia. Apart from the armaments and military hardware, the Soviet side left
behind in Somalia a communications center, the seaport of Berbera fitted out by
Soviet specialists, a tracking station, a depot for tactical missiles, a 175,000-barrel fuel depot, and living quarters to accommodate 1,500 men.48
Simultaneously with its campaign in Angola the Soviet Union took part in
17-year-long Ethiopian wars (from 1975 to 1991). These cost this country (by
official statistics alone) $10 billion.49 In 1977, thousands of Soviet servicemen –
generals, officers, warrant officers, cadets and soldiers – were sent over “to
defend the socialist gains of the Ethiopian people.” Together with the Cuban contingent numbering between 17,000 and 20,000 men (Cuba was virtually wholly
financed by the Soviet Union, including the maintenance of the Cuban military
contingents in Angola and Ethiopia), they took part in repulsing the Somali army
invasion.
In 1977, Addis Ababa started getting plentiful military shipments from the
Soviet Union by sea and by air. The first consignment of weapons was estimated
at $385 million. It included 48 fighters, 300 tanks, BM-21 Grad multiple rocket
launchers, artillery systems, etc. In all the air lift involved 225 Antonov-22 and
Ilyushin-76 transport aircraft that brought over machines and armaments worth
one billion dollars, including 600 armored personnel carriers, 60 MiG-21 aircraft,
two squadrons of MiG-23s, vast amounts of tanks and some 400 artillery pieces.50
Apart from all that Soviet combat vehicles and weapons came by sea on
board 50 war and transport ships sent to the port of Aseb. From there the machinery traveled under its own steam or on trailers to the central and eastern areas of
the country. T-54 and T-55 tanks were delivered in large batches, as were artillery
systems, including 130mm guns, antiaircraft means, MiG-21 and MiG-23 fighters, small arms and vehicles.
In the fall of 1977, a group of generals and other officers from the Soviet
General Staff directorates and Armed Forces services were sent to Addis Ababa.
The head of the group was General of the Army V.I. Petrov, first deputy of the
Commander-in-Chief of the Land Forces.
22
MILITARY THOUGHT
Once the Somali aggression had been repulsed, the Soviet servicemen were
moved to the north and took part in operations against separatists in the provinces
of Eritrea and Tigray. The large-scale, intense military assistance from the Soviet Union continued. Over 11,000 Soviet military advisers and specialists served
in Ethiopia at various times.51
Against the backdrop of the Soviet Union’s massive involvement in warfare
in Angola and Ethiopia, the Soviet Army fought in Afghanistan for over nine
years (1979-1989) on an “internationalist aid” mission. The Soviet contingent in
Afghanistan was the largest in 1985 – nearly 109,000 men, including
106,000 servicemen. During their stay in Afghanistan Soviet troops took part in
416 planned operations, most of which were on a large scale.52
The U.S.S.R. sent to Afghanistan a total of 620,000 servicemen, workers and
employees of the Soviet Army, frontier troops, and KGB and Interior Ministry
agencies. According to Mikhail Gorbachev, the war in Afghanistan cost the Soviet Union five billion rubles annually; at the official exchange rate of the ruble
against the dollar at the time that amounted to almost $8 billion.
The overall death toll (men killed, dying of wounds and disease, perishing in
accidents, crashes, etc.) in the Soviet Armed Forces (together with the frontier and
police forces) reached 15,051; 469,685 men were wounded. Also lost were 118 aircraft, 333 helicopters, 147 tanks, 1,314 infantry fighting vehicles, airborne combat
vehicles, and armored personnel carriers, 433 guns and mortars, 1,138 radio stations, command-and-staff vehicles, 510 engineering vehicles, 1,369 trucks and
gasoline tankers.53
The withdrawal of Soviet troops from Afghanistan in 1989 marked the end
of massive Soviet military operations abroad. The Afghan war was followed by
the disintegration of the Soviet Union, the world socialist camp, and the Warsaw
Pact, which radically shifted the balance of forces in the world.
Thus in Soviet times internationalist aid to other nations was at its highest in
the post-World War II period. The Soviet Union spent vast amounts of money
(billions upon billions of dollars) to uphold the principle of proletarian/socialist
internationalism. In all, the fighting on foreign theaters of operations claimed the
lives of several divisions of Soviet officers and men.
The Bolsheviks’ readiness to make “enormous national sacrifices for the
sake of overthrowing international capital” meant to Russia in the 20th century a
loss of tens of millions of lives, starting with the Civil War and all the way down
to the war in Afghanistan. Never before in the history of human civilization had
a single nation besides ours destroyed itself on this monstrous scale “in the name
of the happiness of other people.”
So what do we have to show for it? After the second disintegration a fair proportion of our Slav brethren in Europe found themselves in NATO, which can
hardly be described as Russia’s ally. Even before that Orthodox Christian Greece
joined the North Atlantic Alliance. Germany, which Russia fought twice in the
world wars of the 20th century, was more prompt to start cooperation with Rus-
State Ideology and External Wars: Four Centuries of Russian Experience
23
sia in the business of building the strategic North Stream gas pipeline than was
Bulgaria in agreeing to allow the Southern Stream to run through its territory.
The non-Slav allies of the Soviet Union in the Warsaw Pact also ended up in
NATO, and even former Soviet republics did likewise. Some of the once socialist countries had outstanding debts to Russia as the Soviet Union’s legal successor, to the tune of billions of dollars, but flatly refused to pay back, so Russia
started to write off the debts. Over the last few years this country has written off
tens of billions of dollars’ worth of such debts. By doing so Russia is still rendering them internationalist aid begun by the Soviet Union.
The banal question of whether or not history teaches anyone anything usually gets answered in the negative. But if we fail to draw important theoretical
and methodological lessons from our past, we will continue to lose the most
valuable of our assets – the lives of Russia’s citizens. Worse, we will lose them
needlessly, just in the name of immediate, allegedly strategic gains and seeming
political expediency that eventually turn into our defeats. And the more proud we
feel today of the “noble” cause we have served, the more bitter will our sense of
disappointment be tomorrow if we lose.
To pay with the lives of one’s soldiers for the gratitude of some people is
much too high a price. Besides, we would do well to remember that many nations
not only never thank their liberators, but actually blame Russia “for occupying
them,” “for encouraging wars by supplying vast amounts of weapons.” Russia
also stands accused for the Soviet Union, which, having imposed on countries
the socialist system, slowed down many political and economic developments
there, thus “wrenching them out” of the common civilization process.
Apart from the qualitative characteristics of historical experience examined
above we should also take into account quantitative ones pertaining to the state’s
ability to wage external wars, conquer new territories, acquire new allies or protect old ones. Allies, typically, have to be kept, that is given all-round assistance.
Frequently the aid is not of the military kind only…. Allies have to be protected
against other, often quite powerful entities active in politics. This kind of struggle takes a lot of resources, both material and otherwise.
All of that makes us think very carefully indeed before we decide to get
involved in some war or major military operation. Russia has had a far richer
experience of waging external wars than any other country in the world.
NOTES:
1. Istoriya Rossiyi. S drevneyshikh vremyon do nachala XXI veka [A History of Russia from
Ancient Times to the 21st Century], Moscow, 2003, Vol. 1, p. 238.
2. Istoriya Rossiyi. S drevneyshikh vremyon do nachala XXI veka, Vol. 1; Voyennaya entsyklopediya [Military Encyclopedia], in eight volumes, Vol. 4; A.V. Kvashnin, Maritskaya bitva
1371 [The Battle of Marica of 1371], Moscow, 1999, pp. 315-317.
3. Istoriya Rossiyi v dvukh tomakh [A History of Russia in two volumes], Vol. 1: L.Ye. Morozova, M.A. Rakhmatullin et al., ed. by A.N. Sakharov, AST Publishers, Astrel Publishers,
Moscow, 2003, p. 563.
24
MILITARY THOUGHT
4. D.A. Milyutin, “…We took the challenge of Western Europe unprepared for the coming
fighting,” Voyenno-istorichesky zhurnal, # 4, 1996, p. 85.
5. Voyennaya entsyklopediya in eight volumes, Vol. 7, pp. 319-321; Sovetskaya voyennaya
entsyklopediya [Soviet Military Encyclopedia], Voyenizdat Publishers, Moscow, 1978, Vol. 7,
pp. 187-188.
6. Istoriya Rossiyi v dvukh tomakh, Vol. 2, p. 17.
7. Voyennaya entsyklopediya v vos’mi tomakh, Vol. 4; A.V. Kvashnin, Op. cit., p. 317.
8. V.I. Lenin, Complete Works, fifth edition, Vol. 31, p. 170.
9. Ibid., p. 166.
10. Pilsudsky protiv Tukhachevskogo [Pilsudski Vs. Tukhachevsky], collection, Voyenizdat
Publishers, Moscow, 1991, p. 13.
11. Ibid., p. 13.
12. Ibid.
13. Vtoraya mirovaya voyna. Kratkaya istoriya [The Second World War, A Concise History],
Nauka Publishers, Moscow, 1985, pp. 27, 84; Rossiya i S.S.S.R. v voynakh XX veka. Poteri
vooruzhonnykh sil: istoriko-statisticheskoye issledovaniye [Russia and the U.S.S.R. in 20th Century Warfare. Armed Forces’ Casualties: a Historical-Statistical Study], second edition, with
addenda, Moscow, 2005, pp. 190, 198; Sovetsko-yaponskiye voyny 1937-1945 [The Soviet-Japanese Wars of 1937-1945], collection, Yauza, Eksmo Publishers, Moscow, 2009, pp. 161, 166.
14. Ibid., pp. 190, 198; pp. 161, 166.
15. Voyenno-istorichesky zhurnal, # 9, 1994, p. 88; G.F. Krivosheyev, “Nakanune [On the
Eve],” Voyenno-istorichesky zhurnal, # 6, 1991; Rossiya i S.S.S.R. v voynakh XX veka. Poteri
vooruzhonnykh sil: istoriko-statisticheskoye issledovaniye, p. 203.
16. Vtoraya mirovaya voyna…, pp. 27-28; G.F. Krivosheyev, Op. cit.; Rossiya i S.S.S.R v voynakh XX veka, p. 210; “Khalkhin-Gol. 1939 god: krakh yaponskoy avantyury [The Khalkhin
Gol, 1939; the Crash of Japanese Adventurism],” Voyenno-istorichesky zhurnal, # 1, 1999,
pp. 10-13.
17. Rossiya (S.S.S.R.) v lokal’nykh voynakh i vooruzhonnykh konfliktakh vtoroy poloviny XX
veka [Russia (the U.S.S.R.) in Local Wars and Armed Conflicts of the Second Half of the 20th
Century], Kuchkovo pole, Poligrafresursy Publishers, Moscow, 2000, pp. 62-67.
18. Ibid., pp. 67-75.
19. V.A. Gavrilov, N.Ya. Shelova, “Tsep’ tyazhkikh oshibok [A Chain of Gross Mistakes],”
Nezavisimaya gazeta, June 6, 2003; “Gazeta Neues Deutschland razoblachayet inostrannykh
naymitov [The Neues Deutschland Daily Unmasks Foreign Hirelings],” Pravda, June 19, 1953;
“Osuzhdeniye fashistskikh provokatorov [Censure of nazi instigators],” Pravda, June 22, 1953;
“Popytki snyat’ s sebya otvetstvennost’ [Attempts to Disclaim Responsibility],” Pravda,
June 20, 1953; “Proval avantyury inostrannykh naymitov v Berline [The Failure of the Foreign
Hirelings’ Adventurism in Berlin],” Pravda, June 18, 1953; Trud, June 27, 1953; A. Filatov,
Z. Vodopyanova, “Pochemu Semyonov zhaleyet patrony? Volneniya v Berline v iyune 1953
goda [Why Does Semyonov Grudge Ammunition? Unrest in Berlin in June 1953],” Rodina,
# 10, 2002.
20. “Vengersky myatezh 1956: yubiley [The Hungarian Mutiny of 1956: Anniversary],”
Novaya ekonomika, ## 9-10, 2006; Voyenno-istorichesky zhurnal, ## 6-7, 1992; Kratkaya
istoriya Vengriyi: s drevneyshikh vremyon do nashikh dney [A Concise History of Hungary:
from the Ancient Times to This Day], Moscow, 1991; Ye.I. Malashenko, “Osoby korpus v ogne
Budapeshta [The Special Corps in the Flames of Budapest],” Voyenno-istorichesky zhurnal,
## 10, 11, 1993; # 1, 1994; Rossiya i S.S.S.R. v voynakh XX veka, p. 608; Rossiya (S.S.S.R.) v
voynakh vtoroy poloviny XX veka [Russia (the U.S.S.R.) in the Wars of the Second Half of the
State Ideology and External Wars: Four Centuries of Russian Experience
25
20th Century], the Institute of Military History, RF MoD, Triada-Farm Publishers, Moscow,
2002, pp. 221-330; Sovetsky Soyuz i vengersky krizis 1956 goda [The Soviet Union and the
Hungarian Crisis of 1956), ROSSPEN Publishers, Moscow, 1998; A.V. Shishov, Voyenniye
konflikty XX veka. Ot Yuzhnoy Afriki do Chechni [The Military Conflicts of the 20th Century:
from South Africa to Chechnya], Veche Publishers, Moscow, 2006, pp. 358-361.
21. Rossiya (S.S.S.R.) v lokal’nykh voynakh i vooruzhonnykh konfliktakh vtoroy poloviny
XX veka, p. 172.
22. Voyennaya entsyklopediya v vos’mi tomakh, Vol. 1, Voyenizdat Publishers, Moscow, 1977,
pp. 168-169.
23. Ibid., p. 177.
24. Ibid.
25. A.I. Gribkov, “Karibsky krizis [The Caribbean Crisis],” Voyenno-istorichesky zhurnal,
## 10, 11, 12, 1992; # 1, 1993; Rossiya i S.S.S.R. v voynakh XX veka…, p. 603; Rossiya
(S.S.S.R.) v voynakh vtoroy poloviny XX veka, pp. 359-392.
26. A. Mineyev, “Nashi na Vietnamskoy voyne [Our Guys at the Vietnam War],” Ekho planety, # 35, 1991, p. 29; website of the Interregional Public Organization of Vietnam War Veterans. www.nhat-nam.ru
27. Rossiya (S.S.S.R.) v lokal’nykh voynakh i vooruzhonnykh konfliktakh vtoroy poloviny
XX veka, p. 100.
28. Ibid.
29. Rossiya i S.S.S.R. v voynakh XX veka…, p. 601; Rossiya (S.S.S.R.) v voynakh vtoroy
poloviny XX veka, pp. 193-211.
30. Rossiya (S.S.S.R.) v lokal’nykh voynakh…, p. 158.
31. Voyennaya entsyklopediya v vos’mi tomakh, Vol. 3, p. 316.
32. Rossiya (S.S.S.R.) v lokal’nykh voynakh i vooruzhonnykh konfliktakh vtoroy poloviny
XX veka, p. 185.
33. Ibid., p. 190.
34. Ibid., pp. 190-191.
35. Ibid, p. 197.
36. Ibid., p. 198.
37. Voyennaya entsyklopediya v vos’mi tomakh, Vol. 1, p. 203.
38. Rossiya (S.S.S.R.) v lokalnykh voynakh…, p. 201.
39. Ibid.
40. Ibid.
41. Ibid., p. 203.
42. P. Weil, “V avguste 68 goda [In August ’68]”, Rossiyskaya gazeta, August 20, 2008; “Vvod
sovetskikh voysk i voysk stran OVD v Chekhoslovakiyu [Introduction of Soviet Troops and the
Troops of the Warsaw Pact Countries in Czechoslovakia],” Rossiya (S.S.S.R.) v voynakh vtoroy
poloviny XX veka, Triada-Farm Publishers, 2002; S.M. Zolotov, “Shli na pomoshch druzyam
[We Were Coming to Our Friends’ Rescue],” Voyenno-istorichesky zhurnal, # 4, 1994, pp. 1423; A.M. Mayorov, Vtorzheniye [Invasion], 1998; “My gotovilis’ udarit’ vo flang voyskam
NATO [We Were Going to Attack NATO Flank],” Interview with Lieutenant General A. Gaponenko (Ret.) by V. Volodin, Vremya novostey, # 143, August 8, 2008; I.G. Pavlovsky, “Vospominaniya o vvode sovetskikh voysk v Chekhoslovakiyu v avguste 1968 goda [Reminiscences
about the Introduction of Soviet Troops in Czechoslovakia in August 1968],” Izvestiya,
August 19, 1989; Rossiya (S.S.S.R.) v lokal’nykh voynakh i vooruzhonnykh konfliktakh vtoroy
poloviny XX veka, pp. 148-156; Rossiya i S.S.S.R. v voynakh XX veka…, p. 609.
43. Ibid.
26
MILITARY THOUGHT
44. Rossiya (S.S.S.R.) v lokal’nykh voynakh i vooruzhonnykh konfliktakh vtoroy poloviny
XX veka, pp. 100-104.
45. Rossiya i S.S.S.R. v voynkakh XX veka…, p. 620; Rossiya (S.S.S.R.) v voynakh vtoroy
poloviny XX veka, pp. 414-437.
46. Rossiya (S.S.S.R.) v lokal’nykh voynakh i vooruzhonnykh konfliktakh vtoroy poloviny
XX veka, pp. 109-110.
47. Ibid., p. 109.
48. Ibid., p. 116.
49. Ibid., pp. 106-110.
50. Ibid., pp. 108, 110.
51. Rossiya (S.S.S.R.) v lokal’nykh voynakh i vooruzhonnykh konfliktakh vtoroy poloviny
XX veka, p. 115; Rossiya (S.S.S.R.) v voynakh vtoroy poloviny XX veka, pp. 438-446; Rossiya i
S.S.S.R. v voynakh XX veka…, p. 607.
52. “Afganistan: uroki i vyvody. Kak prinimalos’ resheniye” [Afghanistan: Lessons and Conclusions. How the Decision Was Taken],” materials prepared on the decision of the U.S.S.R.
MoD in 1989 by the group under General of the Army V.I. Varennikov, Voyenno-istorichesky
zhurnal, # 7, 1991, pp. 40-52; Mikhail Gorbachev’s interview to the Ekho Moskvy radio, February 15, 2009; A.V. Kukushkin, “Kak byl vzyat Kabul [How Kabul Was Taken],” Voyennoistorichesky zhurnal, # 6, 1995, pp. 56-63; V.G. Kulikov, “Voyna, ne imevshaya chyotkoy tseli
i konkretnogo zamysla [The War without a Clear Objective and Specific Conception],” Voyenno-istorichesky zhurnal, # 6, 1999; R.A. Medvedev, “ ‘Pod kontrolem naroda.’ Vvod sovetskikh voysk v Afganistan diktovalsya geopoliticheskimi realiyami [‘Under Public Control.’
The Introduction of Soviet Troops in Afghanistan Was Dictated by Geopolitical Reality],”
Voyenno-istorichesky zhurnal, # 2, 1999, pp. 62-73; Rossiya i S.S.S.R. v voynakh XX veka…,
pp. 613-617.
53. Ibid.