Download AUSTRALIA`S SECURITY, 1939-1942s LONDON OR WASHINGTON?

AUSTRALIA'S SECURITY, 1939-1942s
LONDON OR WASHINGTON?
fey
Barbara Rath Barns
A Thesis Sabmitted to the Faealty of the
BEPARTMEiT OF HISTORY
In partial Falfillment of the Requirements
For the Degree of
MASTER OF ARTS
In the Graduate College
THE UNIVERSITY OF ARIZONA
19 6 6
STATEMENT BY AUTHOR
This thesis has been submitted in partial fulfillment of
requirements for an advanced degree at the University of Arizona
and is deposited in the University library to be made available
to borrowers under rules of the Library,
Brief quotations from this thesis are allowable without
special permission, provided, that accurate acknowledgement of
source is made. Requests for permission for extended quotation
from or reproduction of this manuscript in whole or in part may
be granted by the head of the major department or the Bean of
the Graduate College when in his judgment the proposed use of
the material is in the interests of scholarship. In all other
instances, however, permission must be obtained from the author.
SIGNEDi
.A-4/
APPROVAL BY THESIS DIRECTOR
This thesis has been approved on the date shown below?
/>Q2®4(gOj£j1<o
F, LAMMERS \yrnA
Professor of History
^
Bate
FSEFACE
& e purpose of this study is to show the effect that the growth of
sJapamese power durimg the period 1939-1S*^ had oa the security of Austra­
lia 0 Australiaa governmental officials were faced with many agonizing
and perplexing problems, which caused considerable tension between the
Dominion Government and the Waited Kingdom= Finally8 as a result of de­
velopments which will be considered in detail, Australia took the unprecented step of frankly seeking to base her security on American rather than
British foundations„
Wnfertunately, certain official documents, pertaining to the sub­
ject of this thesis, of which the Grown Copyright is legally vested in the
Controller of lis Majesty8s Stationery Office, are unavailable to the pub­
lic at the present time,
These restrictions deprive my study of any claim
to be definitive0 However, it has been ay intention to present the picture
as accurately as possible through the use of all available material.
My trip to Australia, and subsequent visits to the Australian
National Wmiversity in Canberra and the University of Melbourne, proved
invaluable as they afforded me the opportunity to use their extensive
libraries.
Consequently, much of the research for this thesis was carried
out at these two universities, I also received immeasurable help in under­
standing the views of the Australians at the time of World War II from dis-■
tinguished professors serving at the two universities mentioned above,
Without this assistance, this work would have been an impossible task.
„TABLE OF CONTENTS
Page
EREFACE . . . . .
. iii
LIST OF ILLUSTRATIONS..............
v
ABSTRACT . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
I. MENACE OF JAPAN
II.
III.
IV.
.......
..............
....... . . . . . . . .
1
AUSTRALIA9 BRITAIN, AND PACIFIC SECURITT.......... .. .
20
AMERICA, BRITAIN, AND PACIFIC SECURITY . . . . . . . . .
52
PACIFIC SECURITY?
?1
WHOSE RESPONSIBILITY? . . . . . . . .
V. AUSTRALIA, AMERICA, AND PACIFIC SECURITY........
VI.
. vi
CONCLUSION.
.............
LIST OF REFERENCES. . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
iv
106
130
134
IjIST OF ILLUSTRATIONS
Figure
Rage
la
..The Japanese Empire and Its Partition . . . . . . . . . . .
1.9
2.
British Commitments in the Far East . . . . . . . . . . . .
5.1
v
ABSTRACT
In Septembers 1939o Australia as a ©©minion of the British Cemmonwealthg was prepared to follow the traditional role of accepting
guidance9 leadership and military assistance from the United Kingdomo •
However„ the divergence, of interests between Britain and Australia
caused tensions to increase.
Typical of these were:
Britain®s insis­
tence that the European theater take precedence over the Pacific a
Churchill®s unwillingness to grant Australia a major role in policy­
making for the Pacific9 the deaf ear given to Australia8s plea to fur­
ther strengthen Singapore, and the use of Australian troops in the
Middle East while the situation nearer home was rapidly deteriorating,
Added to these was the knowledge of the waning power of Great Britain
and her inability to defend her possessions in the Pacific„ Therefore8
when a Japanese invasion of her homeland seemed possibles Australia
turned for aid to America,
Though this plea may have been unorthodoxp .
it was realistic, Australia®s security was jeopardized; she could not
defend herself unaided.
Nevertheless9 it took many agonizing days before
America responded in what Australia considered a suitable manner.
The
ultimate decision to call on Washingtons rather than Londons and the
events that led up to this decision, comprise the major portion of this
work.
CHAPTER I
THE HENACE OF JAPAN
In September 1939 King George VI, on the advice of the United
Kihgdem government, declared war against Germany on behalf of the
United Kingdom, India, Burma, and the Colonial Empire, Also the king
declared war against Germany on behalf of the self-governing dominions
of Australia9 Canada, South Africa and lew Zealand on separate advise­
ments of these governments, The Prime Minister of Australia, Mr* Menzies,
declared that Australia was at war with Germany by virtue of the king's
statement» There was no hesitation,
Australia would cooperate with
the Imperial Government to the fullest extent „ However, there was a
lack of preparation on the part of all Commonwealth governments.
realized the problems ahead.
Few
Be one anticipated the sacrifices that
would be required.
At the outset of the war, Australia felt reasonably secure as
a part of the British Empire. She looked to the Prime Minister of
Britain for guidance, assistance and leadership.
This had been her
traditional role and it was the path she was prepared to follow.
How*
ever, as the war progressed, the ability of the British to guarantee
security in every part of the globe declined, while differences of in­
terest developed which required impartial and independent consideration.
The truth is that while the Pacific was am area in which the interests
'
\
1
of Britain as a whole were only secondarys though still deemed important,
to Australians it was a sphere of vital interest, of direct, immediate
peril, and. of special responsibility,.
While the world, watched with horror the aggressive actions of
Germany in Europe, Australians watched their neighbor to the north „ As
an island continent of white people in the midst of a sea of Orientals,
Australians had reason to be apprehensive. They had been hearing about
the Yellow Peril (denoting all Orientals) all their lives„ But this ex=
pression, since the 192©8s, pertained only to Japan and carried with it
the picture of a small, overpopulated island that lacked the necessary
natural resources and thus was greedy for the land, and the resources
within it, that Australians cherished0 Australia's fear of Japan did
net date from Pearl Harbor, bat from the day Japan began her aggressive
actions in the 192©8s. The face that Japan was expanding, seemingly un<=
hindered by the great Western powers, indicated that Australia might be
her victim in the near future „ Aware that the rest of the world was
preoccupied by the European situation, Australian governmental officials
implored those powers stronger than she to stop this threat before it
grew toe large to handle„ She offered a variety of alternatives, none
of which she could back up alone. For the most part, Australian sugges­
tions went unheeded„ Bae to her lack of military resources, Australia's
hands were tied as she watched Japan's empire grow larger«
The story of Japan's growth must be told because it has a direct
bearing on Australia's relations with her Mother Country« It is only
natural that since Australia would be endangered by any southward drive
3
on the part of Japang she should be one of the first to send up warnings
to the rest of the world concerning this menace.
She also felt that it
was only natural that Great Britain should see this danger and conse­
quently send aid to her Dominion government.
Within this realm of reason-
lag lies the bulk of the controversy that was later to develop between
Prime Minister Churchill and Prime Minister Curtin.
As the situation
grew more distressing for each prime minister, their apparent inability
to reassure the other successfully caused friction that was unlike any
between Great Britain and Australia before,
The menace of Japan was the decisive factor causing strained rela­
tions between Australia and her Mother Country,
ferences of opinion in the past.
True, there had been dif­
But these were of minor importance in
comparison to the close bond that Australia felt for Great Britain.
Therefore there is a direct correlation between the increasing threat of
Japan and the tone of the messages exchanged between the two prime min­
isters.
Each country was under tremendous pressure and limited in its
responses to conditions throughout the world.
Neither interpreted the
same picture with the same degree of importance.
There was obviously a
divergence of interests and as this became more apparent, relations grew
more tense.
Japan0s entry into the conflict had changed the whole emphasis of
the Second World War for Australians.
Previously they had fought their
wars on the territories of other people; new a war threatened their own
soil.
Previously it had been London or Coventry that was bombed; now it
was Darwin and Broome,
The bulk of the nation0s fighting men, whether
4
seas land ©r air forces, was serving in war theaters thousands of miles
from the Pacific area.
The possibility of Japanese invasion loomed
larger each day, Without help from a stronger power, Japan, by virtue
of her control of the islands, would have Australia at her mercy.
It
was obvious to the Australians that if attacked they would never be able
to defend Australia unaided.
As each hour brought reports of impending
disaster6 Australia called for help.
call?
Bat who would respond to this
Only two powers had adequate strength to stop the Japanese 5
Great Britain and the United States,
struggle should be settled first.
Australia were to remain unscathed.
Each felt that the European
This was clearly impossible if
Lomdonffs reaction to the situation
in the Pacific was quite unsatisfactory, in the eyes of Australians.
Washington, from the Australian viewpoint, seemed unhurried and inde­
cisive . Would help come from these powers in timet
If so, from which
one, or both? Was there any way that Australians could influence
either of these great powers? Australians became dedicated to the cause
of enlisting aid for their country so that they might remain one of the
two "Western" powers in the East,
Before the anxieties of the Australians can be fully appreciated
and viewed in the proper perspective, it is necessary to examine the
growth of Japan6s power. For herein lies the source of Australian
anxieties.
It is necessary to show that Australia .watched this rapid
growth with great apprehension. She could visualize what the conse­
quences might be and she forewarned others of the danger, as she saw it.
However, as will be indicated in successive pages, few recognized the
5
extent ©f the challenge that Japan was flaunting in the Pacific and/or
were able to meet this challenge„
Japanese policy in the 19208s was still tinder the control of
the civilian elements» The government sought to relieve the problem of
overpopulation fcy encouraging emigration, improving farming, and by mak­
ing advancements in industry.
unsolved,
Despite these efforts the problem remained
Japan had always had a tradition of military leadership, and
eventually the Japanese decided on a program of conquest.
Every avail­
able means was used to mobilize the people in the service of the national
goal of expansion.
The population was thoroughly saturated with a steady
barrage of propaganda.
One publication stated that the Japanese were
like
» , ,a;great crowd of people packed into a small and narrow
room, and there are only three doors through which we might es­
cape, namely emigration, advance into world markets and expan­
sion of territory. The first door, emigration, has been barred
to us by the anti-Japanese immigration policies in other coun­
tries, The second doer, advance into world markets, is being
pushed shut by tariff barriers and the abrogation of commercial
treaties » , , , It is quite natural that Japan should rush
upon the last remaining door,'
By 1931 the Japanese were psychologically ready for war.
The de­
cisions that would set the movement into action were made by the imagina­
tive leaders of the military^ and these decisions were readily accepted
■j
Hashimoto Kingori, "The Meed for Emigration and Expansion,"
Japan 1931-19*5» ed. Ivan Morris (Boston? 1, G„ Heath and Go,, 1963),
Hugh Borton, Japan^s Modern Century (lew York: The Ronald Press
Co,, 1955)i) p® 321, ^len" the^apanise pe©ple realized that the military
alone had a plan to solve the economic and international crisis which
faced the nation, they followed this leadership,"
6
by the populace« KDominated by a sense ©f mission, fortified by the
sense of eeonomie grievance, and assured of popular support, the mili­
tary set out to protect what was considered t© be the legitimate in=
terests of the homeland
Japan initiated its scheme by seising Manchuria from China,
This major act of aggression paved the way to the Pacific war.
An ex­
plosion occurred on the tracks of the South Manchurian Hailway near
Mukden on September 18, 1931•
Chang Hsueh-liang, Manchurian war lord,
was blamed for this incident by the Japanese.
This episode started a
chain reaction which enabled the army, under General Honjo, to seize con­
trol of Mukden, Changchun, and Antung. With the fall of Chinehou, on
January 3, 1932, Manchuria came under the complete control of Japan.
The advances of the Kwantumg Army in Manchuria started a reac­
tion in Japan that could only make the people feel that the civilian
element in government was unworthy of their support.
The militarist
faction did its utmost to take advantage of this situation and to
consolidate its control of the government.
On every question of do­
mestic or foreign policy, the militarists attempted to have the final
word.
In order to discredit the policies of the old party government,
the militarists condemned the signing of the Washington Agreement, the
Kellogg Pact, and the London Maval Armaments Pact.
Instead, their ulti­
mate goal was a firm stand in China and an increase in Japanese influence
in new regions and territories.
The long-range aims of the militarist
^Wilfrid J. 0sConnell, ^British-Japanese Relations 1931=1939®
(unpublished Master's thesis. University of Arizona, 1963), p. 6?.
1
faction were described, by Araki Sadao with Japan as the self-styled
leader of the East Asiatic Union,
This plan presupposed the inevitable
emancipation of the entire Far Eastern territory, TShen using such
terms, Araki Sadao meant that those areas including Eastern Siberia,
China, Indo=.China, the South Seas and India would be free only after
they had thrown off the shackles of white oppression by allowing the
Japanese to liberate them.
For, according to Sadao, Japan could net
overlook a single instance of disorder springing up anywhere in Eastern
Asia,
Japan, self-appointed mistress of the Asian peoples, considered
herself the only power representative of her race that was strong enough
and wise enough to rid the area of the evils brought about by the white
race.
The climax of Japan®s dream would be the ^Greater ©o-Frosperity
Sphere,"
Abroad, the world watched Japan®s aggressive actions with a grow­
ing sense of apprehension,
was Great Britain,
One country that felt the increasing pressure
Always concerned with the status quo, because of her
large economic investments in China and her colonial possessions in the
surrounding area. Great Britain had good reason to fear this tighter grip
on Manchuria by the Japanese,
China was even more concerned because she
feared that Japan was using Manchuria simply as a stepping stone to her
front door.
Coincident with this disturbance in the existing conditions
in China were other problems that taxed British ingenuity,^ Either by
k
Ibid,, p, 71o "To be able to afford singleminded attention to
any one solution was impossible. The European economic crisis accom­
panied by the pressure of disarmament and reparations, the failure of the
Credit-Anstalt in Austria spreading financial paralysis throughout
8
chance or by calculating the risks8 the Japanese Army chose this moment
to strike at Manchuria and thus test the league of Nations. On Sep«=
tezaber 19» 1931» the Chinese and Japanese representatives sent messages
informing the Council of the League that a critical situation existed
in Manchuria,
The messages sent during the next few weeks set the tone
for future negotiations, Although Japan continued to use the channels
of diplomatic correspondence„ it appeared that she had no intention of
obeying the League, This was substantiated when Japan refused to remove
her troops from Manchuria as requested by the League, in the form of a
message dated September 22, 1 9 3 1 or later when this request was put in
the form of a resolution passed by the Council on October 24, 1931«
The
troops remained even as the Japanese Government issued another polite
note stating its willingness to negotiate with the Chinese government„
At this point, Britain chose to believe in Japan8s just cause
and to doubt the ability of the Chinese to solve the matter, It was dif­
ficult to deny the validity of Japan's claims„ Her trading rights had
suffered greatly,
Manchuria had been in a state of lawless confusion for
years and in order to stabilize the country Japan declared it was neces­
sary for her to seize it from China,
Great Britain, at this moment, was
in mo position to make a stand on moral rectitude.
She was being forced
off the gold standard and was facing a controversial general election,
Germany, the growth of sentiment favoring an Austre-German customs union,
the strength of the Indian claim to a greater measure of self-government
were a few of the vexations that required the attention of diplomacy,1
1
5
League of Nations, Official Journal, Minutes of the Sixty-Fifth
Session of the Council, 12th year, No. 12, p. 2290.
9
In any ease even Great Britain, though a Far Eastern Power, had
no means of action. The Washington naval treaty gave Japan
local supremacy in the Far East; and successive British govern­
ments confirmed this supremacy mhen they deliberately postponed
the building up of their base in Singapore, What would be
gained if the League of Nations condemned Japan? Merely a dis­
play of moral rectitude which, in so far as it had .any effect,
would set Japan against British trading interests.
The League did net abandon the matter, but instead the entire ease was
turned over to the Lytton
Commission. ?
A decision was reached at about
the same time as the heir to the throne of the old Manehu dynasty, Pu Ti,
ascended to the throne of Manehukuo, which had been granted by the
Japanese Government the status of an independent state.
The Lytton Com­
mission condemned Japan, not as an aggressor, but because she had re­
sorted to force before all peaceful means of redress were exhausted.
On
March 27, 1933s when the Assembly unanimously adopted the resolution to
deny recognition of Manehukuo, Tokoyo gave notice of her withdrawal from
the League,
The Chinese reconciled themselves to their less; and in
1933 peace was restored between Japan and China,
The British Government,
regarding the League as an instrument of conciliation rather than a machine
of security, considered its policy successful when the Manchurian affair
A. J, P. Taylor, The Origins of the Second World War (London:
Winston S. Churchill, The Second World War. Vol. Is The GatherL_ (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Company, 1948), p. 88. “The eonelu.
siens drawn. were plains Manehukuo was the artificial creation, of the
Japanese General Staff, and the wishes of the population had played no
part in the formation of the puppet state. Lord Lytton and his colleagues
in their Report not only analysed the situation, but put forward concrete
proposals for an international solution. These were for the declaration
of an autonomous Manchuria, It would still remain part of China, under
the aegis of the League, and there would be a comprehensive treaty between
China and Japan regulating their interests in Manchuria, The fact that
the League could not follow up these proposals in no way detracts from the
value of the Lytton Report."
had been brought to an end,
The Important thing, to the British, was to
restore peace, even at the cost of Manchuria„ As years went by this
Manchurian incident was to become a source of debate„® According to some
authorities, Japan had, by her actions in Manchuria, showed the real
weakness of the structure of international relations o'*
Despite the moral chastisement implied by the League8s actions,
Japan did not cease in her expansion.
Beginning in lf33 Japan steadily
nibbled at China8s borders north of the Yellow Biver,
“In 1935s the
Japanese Army was heavily entrenched in Manchuria, Inner Mongolia, and
North China „ lone of the Western powers was willing to risk a war by
challenging Japan®s a c t i o n s T h e military leaders of Japan felt that
these aggressive actions were necessary in the light of Japan's need for
natural resources and undeveloped land areas.
They saw the creation of
puppet states on the continent as a necessity in order to exploit the re­
sources in such a manner as to contribute toward a self-sufficient
%aylor, op, cit,, p. 64, “In later years the Manchurian affair
assumed a.mythical importance, It was treated as a milestone on the road
to war, the first decisive 'betrayal8 of the League, especially by the
British government. In reality, the League, under British leadership,
had done what the British thought it was designed to do: it had limited a
conflict and brought it, however unsatisfactorily, to an end,"
^Lord Hankey, Diplomacy By Conference (London? Ernest Benn Lim­
ited, 1946), p, 127o ", * , another difficulty is to impose sanctions on
one's friends, [Britain and Japan were allies during World War I] , , „
That was the real difficulty when the Japanese transgressed the Covenant
in Manchuria and afterwards China, , „ , more so in the ease of Japan be­
cause no country or combination of countries was ready to undertake pres­
sure that might lead to so great a war , , , Another trouble is, namely,
that every time a nation breaks the rules, and is subjected to pressure
of some kind, it usually ceases to be a member of the general interna­
tional organization, , , »"
11
armament industry for Japan.
In this light„ the main events during the
last half of 1935 between Japan and China take on added significance.
The army alone had a plan. It advocated the formation of a
bloc.composed of Japanp Hanchukuo9 and North China to strengthen
the country economically and to protect it from attack from the
Soviet Union. In the absence of anything better and lacking a
liberals non^mdlitary traditions the people followed. . . . ^
In order that Japan be unencumbered in her aggressive actions
it was necessary for her to feel secure from any possible attack from
the Soviet Union.
”Japan was fearful of Russia.
Her military leaders
believed a war with Russia to be all but inevitable.
This feeling
was festered by the repeated clashes along the Amur and the border be­
tween the Russian-protected Outer Mongolia and Manehuka© 9 in addition
to the friction over the fishing rights in the waters off the coast of
Eastern Siberia.
Therefore9 on November 25$> the Sirota government
sponsored the signing of the Anti-Comintern Paeti^
"Although this
single pact was slim protection against a Soviet attack on Manchuria
and Korea8 it gave Japan moral support in'her drive to gain undisputed
1u
control of China."
In mid-1937 hostilities broke out once again in
-■
]_5
the Far East as the Second Sino-Japanese War began.
•^Ibid.c p. 341.
^Kenneth Scott Latourette6 The History of Japan (rev. ed.s New
Yorks The Macmillan Companya 195?)» P° 1§9«
l^Bertoa, on. eit.. p. 348. "The published clauses of the Pact
provided for the collaboration in preventing the spread of Communism
within the borders of the two states and among third powers. The secret
clauses were directed against the Soviet Union."
^Ibidc. p. 341.
•^Gwendolen Garters The British Commonwelath and International
Security (Torontos The Ryerson Press, 194?)s p. 286. "Shortly after the
12
From August 13» to November 9» 1937» the se©pe of Japanese opera­
tions expanded rapidly9 With lightning speed, the Japanese array estab­
lished a blockade from Chingwangta© to Swaton, damaged Shanghai, and
bombed the cities of Canton and N a n k i n g T h i s entire matter came to
the attention of the League and the Brussels Conference; it was dis­
cussed in regard to Japan!scommitment to the Nine-Power Treaty of 1922„
Chiang Kai-shek had resisted the Japanese and also appealed to the League„
However, no practical solution was forthcoming for, even though the con­
flict concerned the League, they could see no way to bring it to a peace­
ful conclusiono
Chinao
Therefore, the Brussels Conference did nothing to help
The British did allow some supplies to reach China over the Burma
Road; but beyond this Great Britain did not feel that she could run the
risk of jeopardising her position with Japan when conditions were growing
so grave in Europe and her position there was being challenged.
She
wished to avoid a crisis in both areas, but, whereas she assumed the role
of a major power in both Europe and the Far East, her actions seemed to
be a feeble reply to the expansion of Germany and Japan, rather than a
projection of an independent policy.
Instead of attempting to solve the
problems existing in Asia and Europe jointly and with equal consideration,
arrival of a squadron of Japanese warships off Shanghai, large-scale hos­
tilities began on August 13, 1937» Despite resistance, the Japanese
pushed ahead rapidly and by the end of the year had acquired control
of the Yangtze River and of Nanking, In comparison with the first SinoJapamese conflict which aimed at cutting off certain provinces from
Chinese control, the war which began,in 1937 appeared directed toward
domination of the whole of China,"
1 < S
-
I, S, Friedman, British Relations with China; 1931-1939 (lew,
Yorks Institute of Pacific^Relatiohs,''
pp
-■-
1
13
Great Britain regarded them, separately9 with the greater amount ©f atten­
tion focused ©n the European situation.
Thus, her maim concern was he
strengthen herself against further difficulties in the Far East. .Great
Britain, who had commitments in both hemispheres* was, attempting to be
both a European and a World Power. The attempt was too much for her.
The difficulties in one sphere held her back whenever she tried to act
in the other.
Therefore, in the absence of any other power with the will
and means to resist, Japan8s aggressions continued to go unchecked.
Gm November 3, If38, Premier Konoye issued his fa.m©us statement
of ®A New ©rder in East Asia® calling for a closer bond between the
newly acquired territories of Manehukuo, Inner Mongolia, North, Central„
and South China with Japan.
Although relations had been strained between Japan and Russia
throughout the tii^e of the war in China, they ipere to worsen during the
summer of lf3f®
For Japan was on the move again.
Feeling her northern
flank was temporarily secure from Soviet attack, Japan occupied the
Hainan Islands in February lf3f and then the nearby Spratly Islands.
By this action on the,south coast of China, Japan defied France, one of
the colonial powers. Then she began to encroach on the British settle­
ment of Tientsin.
Neither France nor Great Britain was in a position
t© defend their claims in the Far East since the situation in Europe
was so grave. The Japanese squeezed concessions out of the British,
who steadily gave way.
to her advantage.
The. European situation then was used by Japan
The Russians viewed the growing strength ©£ Japan with alarm.
Hostilities on a rather large seale had broken out along.the Soviet bor­
der in July 1939•
This grew to larger proportionss until the Japanese
were defeated at loaunhan in August» suffering approximately 18,@0® easualties, A full-scale war with the Soviet Union at this time was the
last thing Japan wanted.
in China,
Such action would only jeopardize her position
Japan had, for some time, hoped that Germany would give her
support against the Soviet Union,
Quite the contrary happened.
From
the moment that Poland became a target of German aggression, the Soviet
Union was transformed into a possible neutral, or even an ally, .Then
came the disquieting news of the Honagression pact signed between Germany
and Russia,
This pact could be interpreted as Russia8s means of gaining
security against any further Japanese outbreaks, Japan8s feeling of
confidence, fostered by her successful dealings at the expense of France
and England, was shattered by the realization that she was in danger of
isolation from the Axis,
, „ , With Hitler*s invasion of Poland on September 1, 1939c and
the outbreak of World War II in Europe, Japan declared that it
would not become involved in the war, but would concentrate on
the settlement of the war in China, At the same time, negotia­
tions were begun in Moscow which settled the Homunhan affair.
For the second time within a year, therefore, a war with Russia
was averted, '
Japan blamed the Western powers for the stubborn resistance of
Chiang Kai-shek and looked for a way of preventing these powers from
giving aid to Chiang,
When France fell in mid-June of 1940, Japan seized
.
15
upon this opportunity to intimidate Great Britain, With no fear of re­
prisals, Japan demanded that Great Britain send no more military supplies:
to the Chinese Nationalists over the Burma Road,
Britain eould only hope
18
to avoid war with Japan by agreeing to close the Road for three months.
Inasmuch as France had already fallen and none of the British Dominions
or India or the Colonies was able to give substantial help. Great Britain
was indeed alone.
Therefore, she had no wish to be drawn into conflict
with Japan,
Throughout this period Hitler had attempted to persuade Japan to
join the Axis,
role.
However, Japan had insisted upon playing an independent
By autumn' of 19^-0 it appeared that an Axis victory was within the
bounds of possibility. Was Japan to gain nothing from the collapse of the
Netherlands, of France, and perhaps even of Britain, with all their vast
possessions in East Asia? With Germany pushing toward an alliance with
her, it appeared as if Japan9s glittering schemes sprang from dreamland
to reality.
Therefore, Japan signed the Tripartite Treaty of Alliance
with Germany and Italy, on September 27, 1940,
,t!The three agreed to as­
sist one another, Japan1'recognizing and respecting the leadership of
Germany and Italy in establishing a new order in Europe, and Germany and
Italy acknowledging the leadership of Japan in bringing into being a 8new
19
order in Greater East Asia,80
They also agreed to assist one another
with all military, economic, and political means if one of them were
18Ibid,, p. 359.
19
Latourette, on, cit,, p, 247,
attacked fey a nation at present not involved in the European War or in the
Chinese-Japanese conflict„
With the security of the Tripartite Treaty of Alliancea Japan be­
gan her expansion to the South.
Just outside the perimeter of the areas
directly controlled by the Japanese were ample supplies of
bauxite,
tin, and rubber. Japan steadily increased her pressure and by September
1940 the demands she had made on Indochina for the use of three airfields
and the right to station troops at each had been conceded.
Feeling more
secure on the northern flank after signing the lonagression Pact with
Russia in April of 1941, the Japanese once more approached the Nether­
lands* East Indies, making demands for oil, rubber, and tin. When the
Netherlands refused to comply, the Japanese Nationalists reasoned that
these supplies would have to be taken by force. When Hitler invaded the
Soviet Union on June 22, 1941, without advising Japan of his plans, the
Third Konoye Cabinet acted with great haste.
The members of the Cabinet
set down the basic principles it would follow to acquire its strategic
materials $
a. Progress southward on Indochina and Siam despite the pos­
sibility of war with Great Britain and the United States.
b. Observance of the Neutrality Pact with Russia.
c. If and when Russia was at the point of being defeated by
Hitler, Japan would enter into the European war. In this way,
Japan would have the opportunity to strengthen her position in
Eastern Asia at the expense of R u s s i a .
Borton, op. eit.. p. 364• "The one great weakness in Japan*s
economic self-sufficiency was a lack of oil, the basic fuel for the Im­
perial Navy and the Air Force. . . . Thus the expansionists argued that,
if the Butch, for example, would not agree to let the Netherlands* Indies
become a member of the Co-Prosperity Sphere, their rich oil fields might
have to be seized."
21 . .
With this program firmly in mind, it was only a matter of time
before the Japanese cabinet "approved of a war plan which included a
simultaneous attack on the naval bases at Pearl Harborg Manilap and
22
Singapore „11■ Feeling that her attention must not be diverted from her
"
conquest of the South Pacific9 and not wanting to fight on two fronts
simultaneously$ Japan decided that she would refuse to go to war with
the Soviet Union8 despite any overtures that might be forthcoming,
.The stage was now being set for the event that would bring the
United States into the war.
While. Cordell Hull, Secretary of State for
the United States, issued an ultimatum,Premier T@j§ had begun the
plan that started the war in the Pacific,
on December 7, 1941,
Japan attacked Pearl Harbor
The declaration of war sent from Japan to the
United States was still in the process of being decoded by the Japanese
Embassy in Washington when the attack took place.
The devastation was immense, Ninety percent of the American
naval and air strength in the Hawaiian Islands was immobilized at one
stroke.
At the same time that Pearl Harbor was being attacked, so too
were the Philippines, Malaya, Guam, Wake and Midway Islands, and the
British strategic outposts at Hong Kong and Singapore,
Viewed from the
Japanese standpoint, these attacks were tremendously successful,
22Ibid,„ p. 368,
23
Ibid, “Secretary Hull insisted that no settlement was pos=
sible, until Japan withdrew its troops from China, adopted a liberal
commercial policy, and gave up its alliance with the Axis,“
18
Baring the next six months the Japanese forces swept southwards1
nearly free from the interference of Great Britain or the United States8
who were virtually defenseless to stop the onslaught« By mid-summer^
Japanese power had expanded to include a gigantic quadrangle encompassing
the entire western Pacific (see map)0 The fear that, at one time, only
Australia felt keenly, was now shared by the entire world»
\
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Figure 1
The Japanese Empire and Its Partition
B O N IN , H U ,
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CHAPTER II
BRITAIN AUSTRALIA All PACIFIC SECURITY
The British Empire had been built aromad, and held together by,
its sea power» World War I had brought an acute awareness to all mem­
bers of the British Commonwealth of the dangers implicit in a far-flung
oceanic empire. Great Britain had possessions in Africa, the Indian
Ocean, Asia, Australia, the Pacific Ocean, North America, South America,
and in the Atlantic Ocean.
power was supreme.
In the nineteenth century British naval
However, this supremacy rested upon the control of
the narrow seas of Europe, such as: the Channel, the Mediterranean Sea,
and the North Sea.
Other strategic points under British command were:
the Cape of Good Hope, the Falkland Islands, Malaya, and Australia (see
map).
World War I indicated that the naval power of Great Britain was
such that she could not easily base a fleet in both the Atlantic and the
Pacific. wIn the light of this experience, the future defense of the
British Empire appeared to depend on a continuation of close relations
with the United States and Japan and/or an expansion of British naval
power to make it possible to protect not only the British Isles and the
North Atlantic but also the Far Eastern parts of the Commonwealth and
X
Empire.11
Since the emphasis after World War I was on disarmament, and
X
Carter, oo.cit.. p. 36.
20
21
considering the enormous losses sustained in the war8 Great Britain had
no choice but to accept the former alternative» namely„ close relations
with the United States and Japan,
As a member of the British Commonwealthg Australian was closely
tied to Great Britain in trade9 finance«, culture8 and politics.
Aus­
tralia’s intimate relation with a great power of world-wide interests and
commitments exposed her to the currents of world history.
Her position
in the Pacific had made her susceptible to the full impact of events in
Asi#.
Australia and Hew Zealand tended to feel their isolation as small
white communities close to the great masses of Oriental peoples as a danger
rather than as a blessing.
Therefore» it is not difficult to understand
why Lord Jellieoe said, in 19199 "naval defense was of particular impor­
tance for Australia’s security.
On June 2®, 1921» at the Imperial Conference of Prime Ministers
of the Empire, several important issues in regard to defense were dis­
cussed.
Of these, the most significant was the renewal of the Angle-
Japanese Alliance.
This Alliance, which had been signed in 1902, was the
first formal admission that Britain’s sea power was on the
no longer had the ability to patrol the Seven Seas.
wane.^
Britain
In British circles,
this alliance was viewed as a way to insure her from an attack on her
Asiatic possessions by sea.
It was hoped that the renewal of this alli­
ance would be advantageous then, not only to Great Britain, but to Japan,
2Ibid.. p. 38.
/A Nicholas Mansergh, Survey of British Commonwealth
1952 (Sew:York; Oxford University Press, 1958), p. 5^.
Australia, and. even to the United States» It was generally agreed by
the Australian House of Representatives that this treaty would promote
peaceo
However, Australian political leaders felt it necessary that a
proviso be inserted concerning the “White Australia" policy.
This prin­
ciple, which had long been the source of antagonism between Japan and
Australia, was designed as the answer to Australian immigration regula­
tions.
In excluding all colored people, even those who were British sub­
jects, from permanent residence in Australia, they hoped to maintain
their high standard of living.
Regardless of the fact that it aimed at
all non-Caucasian people, the Japanese felt particularly slighted.
This
policy hurt Japan*s national pride rather than her national interests and
thus cannot be regarded as a deterrent to the Anglo-Japanese Alliance.
For the "White Australia® policy is believed, by most Australians, to
be a means of preserving Australia's racial uniformity rather than a
policy of negative prejudice against Orientals.
"By the end of the day,
the Anglo-Japanese Alliance has been shelved as the basis for diseusion."^
This was not because of antagonism between Australia and Japan
but because America has voiced opposition to it through the Canadian
representative who referred to the Alliance as a barrier to the growth
of
-American friendship.
In fact, Australian Prime Minister Hughes
made a rather stirring speech in which he said, "I am strongly in favor
of its Cthe Treaty} being renewed. . . . Should we not be in a better
position to exercise greater influence over Eastern policy as an ally
of that great Eastern Power, than as her potential enemy?. . . We
23
m i l do well for the world6s peace==we will do well for China-~we will
5
do well for the Gonmonwealth of British nations to renew this Treatyo"
Regardless of the Australian views of the Alliance8 it was dropped and
thus the security of the Commonwealth in the Pacific was diminishede
Now it became the main concern of Australia, along with New Zealand, to
see that some alternate policy be drawn up to safeguard their position
in the South Pacific,
The Washington Conference was to relieve this
concern®
The three great issues that the Washington Conference was con­
cerned with when it met in December of 1921 were: disarmament, the future
of China, and political arrangements in the Pacific. The first formal
achievement of the Washington Conference was the signing of the Pour™Power
Treaty on December 13* 1921, by the United States, Great Britain, France
and Japan.
It pledged each to respect the rights of the others in rela­
tion to their insular possessions and insular dominions in the Pacific,
to accept mediation in ease of controversy over these possessions, and
to ©pen frank discussions if their rights were threatened by any other
power.
A reservation accompanied the treaty embodying provisions to the
effect that it should not be deemed an assent on the part of the United
States to mandates granted in the Pacific under the Peace Treaty of Ver­
sailles, and that it should not preclude agreements relative to mandated
islands.
This treaty answered the needs of the powers involved by pro­
viding for American participation in Pacific arrangements, and by the
5
-
Berriedale Keith, Speeches and Documents on the British Domin­
ions. 1918-31 (Londons Oxford University Press, 1935)» P. ^9«
2k
pledge of security covering Australia and Sew Zealand,
This treaty was
purposely left vague in order to allow latitude in interpretation and ne­
gotiation among all powers
,fTo Australia and Sew Zealand, with their
isolated position in the South Pacific, the Four-Power Breaty and the
agreement not to fortify further the islands in the western Pacific
7
brought release from the nightmare of Japanese expansion southwards,"
Feeling pleased with the success of the Washington Conference and
secure in the knowledge that the problems that were most likely to cause
tension between Great Britain, the Waited States and Japan had been solved,
the Australasian states gave the growing power of Japan very little attenO
tioa,’ There were several reasons for this: First, and foremost, the
Washington Agreement had stated the'three powers (United States, Great
Britain, Japan) agreed that the status quo at the time of the signing of
the treaty, with regard to fortifications and naval bases, should be main­
tained in their respective territories and possessions.
Under the terms
set down in the Washington Treaty, it was implied that there would be no
new fortifications or naval bases established in the territories of the
Pacific» There also would be no measures taken to increase the existing
naval facilities for the repair and maintenance of naval forces and/or
Z
Thomas A, Bailey, A Diplomatic History of the American People
(lew Torks Appleton-Century^Crofts, Inc., 195®)*' !>«' 695« "Most important
of all, the Four-Power Treaty specifically abrogated the Anglo-Japanese
Alliance, It was the vehicle by which the British were able gracefully,
yet rather obviously, to withdraw from their embarrassing commitments,
Naturally, the Japanese were not altogether happy over the somewhat abrupt
severance of their relationship with Great Britain, , , , The four great
Powers bound themselves mutually to respect one another's insular posses­
sions and dominions in the Pacific.*
Barter-,:, op, pit,, p. 6k
8Ibid,, p. 135.
to increase the coast defense of these areas „ Secondlyj, in the If208s
the focal point of danger appeared to be Barope".^ The problems „ both
economic and political, of Western Emrope absorbed everyone8s attention«
As international difficulties increased during the 19208s Japan fell out=
side of the perimeter of light that focused on the trouble spots of the
world.
Therefore, “few seemed to have- realized at any time during the
first Sino-Japanese dispute 0.931} that what was taking place was not only
a shattering blow to the peace structure which had been set up after the
war8 but also a dangerous undermining of the basis of peace in the Pacific
which rested on all three aspects of the Washington arrangements„“1®
The Sino=Japanese War in 1931 served to renew the underlying fear of
the Japanese which had not quite disappeared from Australian minds after
the incredible termination of the Russo-Japanese War in 1905=
Until
1905 fears of Russian as well as Japanese expansion were widely enter­
tained,
But when Russia8s Far Eastern naval strength was destroyed at
Tsushima, Australia focused her eyes exclusively on Japan,
The Australians
realized even more the blataney of the “White Australia“ slogan which must
have seemed to the Japanese to be directed against themselves, This pol­
icy excludes immigrants of non-European descent even from the Tropical
north,
“Her fAustralia8s) population, the most homogenous in the Common­
wealth, was almost 99 per cent of British Isles e x t r a c t i o n , I n addi­
tion to all this there was cognisance of the precarious position of the
British in the Far East,
Even at heme.* Australians had economic problems.
Still in the
grip of the 1929 depressions the Australians were looking for markets
for their wool and wheat„ "At few points in the inter=w@r period were
12
economic motives so greatly to the fore as in 1931 and during 1932.
Collectively, these factors caused a great deal of caution in Australian
policy toward Japan,
cles,
This viewpoint was echoed in British official cir­
During the Sino-Japanese dispute, fear and reluctance to antag­
onize a valuable customer^ were to be a conditioning factor of Australian
policy (see chart below).
To avoid war became the keynote of Australian policy.
As her anx­
ieties increased, Australia should have been able to appeal for aid to
either the British Commonwealth or the League of Nations,
Australia, as
one of the Dominions, was fortunate in her membership in two world-wide
groups.
The League gave Australia the opportunity of public expression.
This organization with its idealistic aims was supported wholeheartedly
by Australia.
12.
Carter, eg. cit.» p. 137.
S. Department of Commerce, Foreign Commerce Yearbook 1935
(Washington: U. S. Government Printing Office, 1935), p. 318....
Percentage of [Australia8s] Total Trade
General Imports
Country
1930- 1931” 1932- 1933""
1932
1933 1934
1931
Wnited States
18.8
icr^
13.2
France
2.6
2.1
1.6
2.5
Germany
3.2
3=2
3=2
3=3
United Kingdom 38 A
43.5
39; 5.. 41 A
6.2
6.2
Japan
5A
3=9
with Principal Countries
General Exports
1930= 1931- 1932- 19331931 1932
1933 1934
Xe4
2 ©1
2.2
3=3
6.2
4.8
5=8
7=5
4.1
8.4
5=2
5=9
43=9 49=5 47.6 47=3
1,6
12.2 11.8 12.3
2?
Bat when it eame t© a question of seearity for themselves9 none
of the Dominions could, feel that the league was an adequate sub­
stitute for the Commonwealth connection, „ „ , In generalc offi­
cial opinion in Australia tended to feel that it was unrealistic
to attempt to apply the League system to the Pacific area and
that the sooner this was realized and changes made in the League
structure to accord with reality, the better for the League
itself as well as for its members in that area. For behind
.^Australian and British anxiety lurked the fear that the League
might take active measures against Japan which would leave Great
.
Britain and Australia with the responsibility of carrying them ©ut,-L
International tensions increased in magnitude as the inadequacies
of the League became more obvious.
According to Lord Hankey, n„ , , of
all attempts to stop war or nip it in the bud perhaps the most tragic
failure was that, of the League of Nations , , . which achieved no more
than a few minor successes, and never once succeeded in mustering an In­
ternational Force against any of the aggressor states in the troubles
that broke out in every continent between the two great wars.
Many world leaders regarded the League6s endeavors to solve inter­
national problems with, a mixture of hopefulness and optimism.
the memory of the last war was etched painfully on their minds.
For them,
Others
did not see the successes of the League and were quick to predict its
failure, These people pointed to the situation in East Asia to substan­
tiate their claims, Rather than averting a major war, they felt the
League had laid the foundation for future problems by not being able to
force Japan to remove her troops and relinquish her claims on Manchuria,
Other examples of the League8s defeat occurred when the League failed to
stop Italy8s conquest of Ethiopia,
■^Carter, on, eit.„ p. 100,
-L%ankey, op, eit,, p,124
Italy8s defiance of her obligations
to the League coupled with Geraanyfs reoeeupation of the Rhineland and
Britainrs reluctance to act, crippled any action that the League might
have wished to take.
From these two defeats sprang others until8 as
these pessimistic observers were only too happy to point out, a tradi=
tion of failure and defeat clung to the Geneva institution.
"By 1937»
the very frequency with which international crises filled the headlines
had jaded many an appetite for sensation and bred a curious insensibility
1A
to war scares which amounted to boredom."
By reason of the grave situation throughout the world brought
on by the failure of the League* the Imperial Conference of 1937 took on
greater significance. Uppermost in the minds of all Australians was the
security of the Pacific.
With this in view* the Australian Prime Min­
ister* Lyons* introduced the idea of the Pacific Pact.
This pact was to
provide for nonaggression by the countries of the Pacific Ocean area.
Disputes* if they should occur* were to be settled around the peace table*
rather than by armed force.
Lyons8 purpose was probably to make certain
that Japan did not gain control of the Philippines.
The Pacific Pact
failed, to materialize because of Japan’s aggressions against China and
because the pact was labeled vague and unrealistic by Great Britain and
lew Zealand.Although the Imperial Conference started out to be of
little consequence* it grew beyond expectations.
"The Imperial Conference
in 1937 became in fact one of the decisive meetings in the history of the
l^Jaek Shepherd* Australia’s Interests and Policies in the Far-East
(lew Yorks Institute of Pacifie'Relations* 1940)* p. 76.
17carter* op. eit., p. 272.
Commonwealths, not because of any formulation of theoretical principles
; . » but because it united its participants in an awareness of common
danger."^®
The vital question of whether the Dominions could depend on
Great Britain in ease of an unprovoked attack was answered in the affirm­
ative,
Howeverg other questions, equally important, were left unanswered.
The most important of these was how to diminish or eradicate the danger
of an outbreak of general war.
From the fall of .1937 to the spring of 1939» the British govern­
ment, with the tacit and sometimes explicit support of Australian,
Canadian, and South African governments, followed the road of ap­
peasement, The premise on which it was based was that many aims
of the aggressive powers were legitimate. The hope behind it was
that if they were satisfied, the urge to conquest would disappear.
To yield a little to avoid war became the m a x i m , 9
There were many reasons for following this line of thinking.
The
position of Great Britain was relatively much weaker in the years 1936-1939
than from 19U-1914.
With the advent of air power the age-old barrier of
the English Channel could no longer be counted upon.^® Britain8s European
enemies were much stronger at this period than in the early 19@0ss,
In
addition to this, her allies were few in number and weaker than in the
earlier period.
In the Far East the situation was equally grim, if not
more so, for the reason that Japan, in 1936» had denounced the agreements
concerning naval limitations and restrictions on fortifying bases. With
the United States retiring into isolation. Great Britain was greatly han­
dicapped,
Although the Imperial Conference of 1937 served to unite the
Dominions around Great Britain, this was not much solace as conditions
worsened throughout the world.
. An iaerease in armaments prodaetion was evident thromghoat the
overseas Bomimioms and Great Britain.
Behind this build-u.p was the un-=
easiness broaght on by reeent events smeh ass
the See.ond Sin©»»Japanese
War» the XiaXe-Ethiopian eonfliet9 the Leagues intervention into @a@h
and subsequent failure.,.and Germany"s potentially ^aggressive" poliey in
rearmament and remilitarisation*
It was not until lareh of If39 s> with
annexation of Czechoslovakia, that the British Government realised that
her appeasement policy had failed*^
At this time almost all eountries intensified their,programs of
rearmament for their own defense*
Among the overseas Dominions, the two
which might expect to have their safety jeopardized were Australia and lew
Zealand/ Australian defense, according to the Government, was to be„
founded on an efficient and powerful Empire lavy, despite British warnings
to the contrary*
There were some Australians who felt that the primary
needs was to prepare to defend Australia itself rather than its trade ,,
routes* While the Great Powers watched Europe, Australia8s eyes were on
Japan*
She reasoned that Japan, feeling secure with the Anti-Cominfern
Pact and' her successes against China8 would precipitate a war in the Pa«
eifio at the same moment a war started in Europe. Australia8$ anxieties
increased until the event she had hoped t© avoid happened*
2 X
:■ -
1
_
a’ '
Ibid.* p. 285, % e British Government "then undertook a sudden
and startling reversal of traditional policy. Limited liability confined
to Western Europe was replaced by large-scale commitments in Eastern Europe
extended under the view that European peace was indivisible. That these
heroic measures failed ultimately to keep the peace does not indicate that
they were basically unsound but rather that they were undertaken to© late.
The tragedy of the years immediately preceding the outbreak ©f war was that
most public opinion within democratic countries did not become convinced of
fhl© necessity of a firm stand Against the fascist powers until the moment
had passed when a stand could be effective."
©a September 1, 19399 with, the German invasion of Poland, World
War II was begun.
One hour after the British declaration, on September 3»
the Australian Federal Executive Council approved a proclamation that Aus­
tralia. was in a state of war with Germany.
"The prompt declaration that
Australia was at war was accepted without demur from any significant
quarter in Australia„"22 The statement of war made by the Prime Minister
of Australia, Menaies, was broadcast over the air and then appeared in the
Commonwealth Gazette the night of September 3°
To declare war was a very
real decision rather than just an act of "rubber stamping" the declaration
made by the British
Government,
In World War I, as a member of theBrit­
ish Empire, Australia had been included automatically when King
declared war.
GeorgeV
But some constitutional charges had taken place and Aus­
tralia now had an independent voice „ However, the gravity of the deci­
sion can be judged by virtue of Ireland8s decision to remain neutral.
Consequently, Menaies wanted it known that Australia was in complete agree­
ment with the declaration made by Chamberlain,
He sent a message to
Chamberlain stating that if the Crown was at war, than Australia, as a
©©minion of the British Commonwealth, was also at war.
It was
believed that a decisive show of united strength was likely to
prove important in rallying resistance to the latest German en­
croachment , while to allow delay over constitutional niceties
and to invite arguments as to whether Australia should or should
not go to war would only weaken the number of adherents to a cause
which the great majority of Australians supported, A prompt and
decisive entrance into the war was necessary in order to leave no
doubts at home and to hearten the other allies of the British
Commonwealth,23
32
Australia’s industries were so well-developed at the beginning of
the war in 1939 that it was possible for her to begin the production of
munitionss not only for the Australian Air Force, Wavy, and Array, but also
for the other members of the British Commonwealth of Nations and allieso
The part that Australia was to play in World War II must never be minimized.
Not only did she feed, clothe, and equip her own troops, she "played a very
big part in meeting the requirements of the British and Allied forces in
gk
the Near East, Middle East and Far East,"
At the outbreak of the war in
September, the Australian government agreed to raise a special service
force of 20,@00 men hmd to build an air force of 10,400 pilots, 13,000 air
crews and 20,000 to 30*000 ground staff.
She was destined to supply much
more than this,
Australia had long considered Singapore to be her umbilical cord
to the protection of the Commonwealth, and at the same time her Achilles8
heel.
She felt that as long as Singapore stood, so could she.
By the time of the First World War British expansion to south-east
Asia had reached its maximum extent, Burma, Malaya, Singapore,
North Borneo, Brunei, and Sarawak were under British control whether
as colonies or protected states, and this situation remained un­
changed between the wars until the Japanese onslaught destroyed in
a few months a position which had taken many centuries to build.
The inter-war period therefore represents the climax of Britain’s
eastward expansion, -5
©f these British possessions in southeast Asia, none was more important to
the British than Singapore, the gateway to the Pacific,
As early as 1921
2^1, J, Timperley, Australia And the Australians (New York: Oxford
University Press, 1942), p, 8,
25saul Rose, Britain and Southeast Asia (Londons Ghatto and Windus,
1962), p. Si,
33
the idea of a fleet stationed at Singapore had been considered.
That
year the British Cabinet approved a proposal made by the Committee of
Imperial Defense to establish a base at Singapore capable of maintaining
a battle fleet.
This same idea had been suggested earlier by Admiral
Jellieoe in 1 9 1 9 However, his plans had called for a .powerful naval
force which neither the British Government nor the Dominions were pre­
pared to undertake.
sible naval base.
In 1921 there had been some talk of Sydney as a pos­
Neverthelessa the Board of Admiralty preferred Singapore
because it would serve as a refuelling station between Ceylon and Aus­
tralia.
Singapore was al4.o closer to Burma, India, and the Persian Gulf.
In addition to this, Singapore had a strong natural strategic position
and had long been the focal point for trade.
To stave off any complaint
from other powers, Britain issued the statement that the base was directed
against no one in particular that rather it was simply a matter of in­
creasing the efficiency and economy of the navy.
"The construction of the naval base at Singapore exemplifies many
of the hollow assumptions and narrow outlooks of the makers, of policy in
27
Great Britain between the Wars."
and proved to be unreliable.
Their policy was extremely inconsistent
An example of this is provided by the de­
cision made by the Labor Government in 1924.
In the face of opposition
from Australia tad New lealand, the British government decided to suspend
work on the Singapore project on the grounds of economy and as a contribu­
tion to disarmament.
Again in 1928-29, when the matter came up for
^Robin Hghmam, Armed Forces in Peacetime (Londons G, T„ Foulis
and Company, Limited, 1962), p. ,2?1.
27lbid.
consideration it was resolved by the Conservatives, this time, to suspend
work.
This was justified, in the minds of those making policy, by the as==
sumptien that it was highly unlikely that Britain would be involved in any
armed conflict in the next ten years,
Australian thinking on this matter
was also at fault for ^instead of Canada, New Zealand, and Australia help™
ing to maintain a Far Eastern Fleet of at least 1@ battleships, thus match™
ing Japan*s force, the Royal Navy and its potential partners were busy
mothballing their ships,
Four months after the Japanese invasion of Manehuria (September 18,
I93I 9) riots broke out in Shanghai,
In order to quell these riots, a
Japanese naval force was landed there,
"These actions caught Britain off
guard and she did nothing for fear of provoking a major Far Eastern war,"^
The next blow to the Singapore strategy was administered in 1935 by the
conclusion of the Anglo-Serman Naval Agreement,
“This agreement permitted
German naval building up to 35 per cent of British strength, which meant
that henceforth the greater part of the British fleet would have to be kept
30
in home waters to meet this danger,'*
In the light of the emergence of a
potentially hostile Germany, matters regarding Singapore were being subordi­
nated and Britain6s strategic eyes were now focused on Europe,
As the issue of Singapore became one of controversy and mixed empha­
sis, Australia began to form a foreign policy.
In the 192©8s and 193©ffs
Australia8s policy was not much more than an extension of that of Great
Britain,
True, she sometimes deviated from the set course, but this was
35
not often a determined, act of opposition.
realizations
Australian poliey hung on one
while the Pacific was an area of importance to Great Britain,
it wags only secondarys whereas, to Australians it was an area of vital in­
terest, of direct immediate peril, and of special responsibility. “By
1936 it was still convenient, but no longer accurate, to write of am im­
perial or Commonwealth foreign or defense policy.
There was no longer a
common policy? the Commonwealth was an association of autonomous states
each of whom was separately responsible for making its own policies. It
is true that the United Kingdom remained the predominant partner both in
31 ©f course, the geographical posi­
influence and in actual power? . .
tion of Australia made the decisions of foreign policy rather precarious.
She felt that it was necessary, and indeed it was, for her to have a strong,
dependable naval power behind her.
was Great Britain.
In this case, the power she relied upon
This, in turn, involved the United Kingdom in the issues
of the Pacific as well as Europe. With the conclusion of the Anglo-German
Maval Agreement and in the face of Italian aggressions, Australians real­
ized their extreme vulnerability in the event that Japanese aggression
should coincide with European aggression.
“Widely expressed doubts about
the ability of the Royal Wavy to retain control of the Mediterranean in a
war with Italy served at least to dispel some illusions about the margin of
British resources that would be available in the Pacific should the United
Kingdom become engaged in war against Germany and I t a l y . Th er ef o re , a
foreign policy was, more or less, thrust upon Australia, through circum­
stances rather than intention, as she realised that the primary interests
^Mansergh, op. eit., p. 56.
^Ibid., p. 15?.
of Great Britain and herself were net identical„ .therefore,, in 1936,' dne
to the aforementioned events and the denuneiation of the Washington naval
treaty by Japan (1935) and Japan*s subsequent fortification of her mandated
islands, Amstralian foreign policy became a distinct reality.
Now this
policy was to revolve aromnd the continued Japanese naval superiority in
the western Pacific which made invasion of the Australian mainland a def­
inite threat,
“Its effect was to deepen Australian concern with the safe­
guarding of imperial communications8 to encourage the government to explore
the possibility of some new agreement to maintain peace in the Pacific s and
above all to focus.attention on the need to strengthen imperial defense „l,5^
In 1936, a definite Australian foreign policy, was being formulated.
She
insisted, for instance, on being represented separately at the Montreux
Conference which was called to discuss the stability of the Near East,
From the Australian point of view, the most important accomplishment was
the signing of the Anglo-Egyptiam treaty,
Australia played a positive
role because she was vitally interested in the security of the Empire com­
munications through Suez,
As long as the line of communications remained
open, Australia felt that she would be safe.
It was announced by the Chiefs of Staff in 1937 that if Britain were
faced with a war against. Japan, Germany, and Italy, with her only ally be­
ing France, the security of the Wnited Kingdom and of Singapore would be
the keystones upon which the British Commonwealth of Nations would base
its survival.
Thus, making this decision, they began to determine the
strength.of.Singapore. No longer could Singapore be regarded as a primary
33ibid,
:'
:
./
.
\
37
base for the British fleet a The Admiralty told, the Cabinet that it eould
not defend Singapore unless the Royal Navy were raised to the three-power
standard with eight battleships in the Far Bast.
The policy now became
that of stationing at Singapore, as soon as possible after the beginning
of war with Japan, a fleet strong enough at least to maintain a defensive
position and to serve as a deterrent against any threats to British in­
terests in the Far East.
In Londons, Japan was presumed to be the enemy,
but there was also the supposition that Britain would not be called upon
to fight simultaneously there and in Europe.
Therefore, the main fleet
eould always move to Singapore in time.
However, the possibility of Italy
intervening in the war was acknowledged.
If such a thing occurred, this
would cause conflicting claims on the fleet.
“In that situation, policy
would have to be governed by the principle that no concern for British
interests in the Mediterranean should be allowed to interfere with the
dispatch of a fleet to the Far East. This order of priorities remained
unaltered and unquestioned until 1939=
The Australians received great encouragement and relief when the
announcement came from Prime Minister Chamberlain that if Great Britain
should be engaged in a war with Germany, Italy, and Japan, the British in­
tended to send a fleet to Singapore.
“The size of the fleet would neces­
sarily depend on the moment when Japan entered the war and what losses, if
any, had been previously sustained.
It would, however, be Britain's in­
tention to achieve three main objectives:
1. The prevention of any major operations against Australia, New
Zealand or India.
3^Rose, op. eit.. p. 85.
2<> To keep open Britain*s sea eemmunieations„
3= To prevent the fall of Singapore,,®^
In October of the same year,, i&en World War II had already begmn9 the
First Lord of the Admiralty a Winston Churchill 8 gave the same priority to
the defense of Singapore» These grandiose words of assurance helped to
bolster the confidence of theAustralians in their plight in the Pacific,
However9 it would be well to sum up, at this point, the huge defense eom=
mitments of the United Kingdom,
To begin with, the United Kingdom under­
took the overall defense of the Empire,
In regard to the army commitments
this meant the maintenance of line forces in the principal coloniesg pro­
tectorates, and mandates, thegarrisoning
of focal strategic points
throughout the Empire9 and a huge responsibility for the defense of India,
Britain8s principal commitments in the colonial field involved stationing
forces in Gibraltar, Cyprus, Malta, Jamaica, Bermuda, Mauritius, Ceylon,
Aden, Malaya, and Hong Kong,
ment her forces.
Local volunteers were expected to supple­
Also certain non-British territories were protected by
the United Kingdom (due to treaty or concession rights): the Sudan,
Palestine, Egypt, and Irag in the Middle East, and Shanghai and Tientsin
in the Far East,
more strained.
In regard to naval commitments. Great Britain was even
The loyal Navy was to provide general sea security to the
scattered dominions, to India, and to the Gdlonies,
The dominions con­
tributed toward the defense of many of the most important of the British
naval bases such ass Halifax, Exquimalt, Singapore, Gibraltar, Malta, Hong
Kong and the ports of Ireland,3^
35lbid,
3%ansergh, op, eit,, pp, 75=77
39
When,Germany attacked Poland in If39 there Has a feeling of
unity among, all Australians in their declaration of war against this r
Hitlerite aggression.
The first concern ©f the Australians was to make
certain that home defense measures Here capable of meeting any possible
threat» ®But after the first fortnight of war it was difficult for
either the Government or its critics to find clear evidence that any im­
mediate threat existed« For the moment Japan showed no hostile intention
and the British Mavy and Singapore were still accounted a considerable
force 0 o o «>
Where could Australia act with the most effectiveness?
Could she risk sending troops overseas when the situation in the Far
East was unsettled?
Clearlys during the “twilight war,* Australia could
not see where to fight„^
There was much to confuse Australians but
very little to challenge or inspire them,
"For over 20 years one half of
organized political opinion in Australia had been declaring that there .
must be no participation in a war in Europe,"^
How they were in such a
war and had not decided upon the method or the extent to which Australia
should take part.
The political situation in Australia, at this time, was anything
but stable, The three main political parties represented in the Aus­
tralian Parliament were the United Australian Party (U,A,P,), the
Australian Labour Party (A,L,P0), and the Country Party,
Menzies, a mem­
ber of the U,A,Po, became Prime Minister in April, 1939, on the death of
J, A, Lyons,
This party was founded in If31 by a fusion of a labor group
3?Hasluek, op, eit,„ p, 157,
38lbid,. p, 158,
39ibid,. p. If?,
40
under J„ A» Lyons m t h the Nationalist Party,
Generally speaking9 this
party favored tariff paroteetioa, national development and wage determi­
nation by governmental action.
The W„A,P, won its first election in 1931
but lacked the necessary support to govern alone in the next two elec­
tions,
The 1934- and 1937 election figures made coalition with the Country
Party a necessity.
reins of government.
Page, as leader of the Country Party, thus shared the
With Menzies as Prime Minister, and under the pres­
sure of World War.‘11, a coalition was eventually devised with the Country
Party.
However, this coalition did not work as smoothly as others since
Menzies did not enjoy the same confidence as Lyons.
Consequently, rela­
tions between Menzies and some of his supporters were strained.
The Country Party was founded in 1919 to defend agrarian interests.
The Party has worked for protection for the farmer by means of special aid,
in addition to protection to industry and labor.
Although the Country
Party was critical of certain aspects of the tariff, this had not hampered
the party from cooperating with the W.A.P.
The Opposition Party at this time was the Labour Party, led by
John Curtin.
The largest and most cohesive group that was contending for
power, this party was dedicated to the creation of a society where all
could live the "good life.*
Protection and labor legislation were re­
garded as the means of making this possible.
little part in its thought and activity.
Marxian ideas played but
As the oldest of these three
political groups. Labour was very early articulate and powerful.
The
party, under the direction of John Curtin, who had rebuilt it after its
landslide loss in 1931, was again in the public8s eye.
"Even when the
Labour party is mot in offiee it possesses tremendous influence and is
able to prevent any startling deviations from its policies,
"The fact that a running narrative of Australian political his­
tory contains little reference to clash between rival parties over essen­
tial principle is significant«
As has been indicated, in theory$, a
fundamental difference in basic philosophy between the Labour, the W.A.Pe,
and the Country Party does exists Whereas Labour has: a socialist objec­
tive, to which its parliamentary representatives were pledged, the other
two parties stood "for reasonably free enterprise in a not excessively
.
■ hZ
controlled s o c i e t y 3 h practice,, the approach of any Australian gov­
ernment to any major issue, foreign or domestic, has been more on the
advice of officials and experts who are retained in offiee irrespective
of change of governments than by its party polities.
It is usually.the,:
"swing voters" who decide whether a government will survive or fall,
"More than 40 per cent of voters unshakably vote Labour$ more than 40 per
cent, equally unshakably, vote for the other parties.
It is to the com­
paratively small residue of voters who make up their minds from election
to election that the elaborate apparatus of Australian campaigns is
directed,
Although the existence of a state of war was accepted as a fact.
Parliament now had to deal with the question of how to raise, train, and
Hartley Grattan, "The Australian Political Seesaw," Current
History (January 1933)$, p» 434,.
. ~
,
Gollam, "Australian Party Polities," Australia, ed, C
Hartley Grattan (Los Angeless University of California Press, 1947),
p, 115,
organise the Australian armed forces.
There occurred between Measles
and Gurtin8 as leaders of their respective parties8 heated debates on
these subjects.
Measles felt that it was the role of Australia to help
the British Commonwealth in every way possible* including sending troops
abroad to any theatre suggested by the Prime Minister of Great Britain.
His view had to be tempered* however* by Labour8s opposition to eoaseription and to expeditionary forces.
Curtin would clearly prefer to see
the Aal.F. (Australian Imperial Force) near home with the main body
stationed in the north of Australia.
. . a Curtin8s conception of the great danger to Australia was
that it might find itself involved in a Pacific war unprepared
and unsupported, Knowing full well that the Australian people
would not support defenseless isolation* he declared that over­
seas developments forces Australia to rely more and more upon
its own resources and that therefore air power* founded on Aus­
tralia 8s own industrial resources* offered the only feasible
programme for defense. Ho one in Australia foresaw develop­
ments accurately* but.Curtin was proved by events to have had
the clearest vision.
Another member of the Opposition* Mr. Ward* more outspoken than Curtin*
stated that those who advocated sending troops out of Australia were "either
consciously or unconsciously guilty of a traitorous act.
Against this
type of discord* Measles stated on October 20* 1939s that "it must be made
clear that there is no obligation for service abroad* except in the ease
of a volunteer for such service."^
Curtin and to satisfy the ©pposition.
Grattom
This announcement seemed to appease
A clear distinction was drawn
^Lloyd Ross* "The Sole of Labour*" Australia, ed. C. Hartley
(Berkeley: University of California Press* I#?)* p. 2*9.
43
teetmem the A=I0F» and the militia6 The AoIoF0 consisted of volunteers
tdi© id,sheda and -were qualified9 to fight overseas; whereas the militia
was strictly for home defense and consisted of men fulfilling their obli­
gation to their country at that time.
The Government now made its first
decision on the controversial issue by calling up the entire militia9
which could only serve within Australia.
It was hoped that the militia,
supplemented by volunteers, would meet the goal of
Slowly, the
Mensies8 government, which favored immediate aid to England, won out,
despite criticism of such a policy.
A large body of public opinion was
beginning to realize that the issue of sending forces overseas was rapidly
moving beyond controversy.
These people saw Australian participation in
terms of raising troops to fight at Britain8s side.
necessitate sending troops overseas.
This, then, would
The Labour Party soon realized that
the citizens viewed the A.I.F. with such national pride and patriotism
that it would be impossible to keep it at home when the war raged in
Europe.
A big decision had been made.
the question was, "Where?"
The A.I.F. would go overseas,
low
The debate continued in Parliament as Australia
watched Hitler and tried to guess where he would strike next.
In the back
of Australian minds, the question lingered, "What would happen to the
Netherlands8 Indies if Holland were invaded?” Bather than make any decision
on their own, the Australians seemed to be waiting for Germany's actions
on which to base their conduct.
The news that in Great Britain Chamberlain
had given way to Churchill on May 1©, 1940, was taken less as an indication
of serious state of affairs than as a ground for confidence in more de­
termined allied action.
Australian eyes remained focused in Europe,
"The
rapid German advance through Holland and Belgium into France cheeked eptiaism'bat, day after day, there was still someone or other in Europe to
he reported in the newspapers as saying something or other that sounded
47 •
'' '
yery knowing and very hopeful „ft
, . . ..
"
Within a short time, howevers the situation was anything but hopefule
The decision to plaee the cruisers Perth and Hobart and five de» ,
stroyers at the disposal of the'.Waited Kingdom Government had been made
in Movember, lf3f0 However, the Australian government reserved the .con­
trol of all other ships in the loyal Australian Havy,
of where to send the
But the deeision
was mueh more diffiemlt to arrive at.
It took
several more months of debates in addition to Ghurehill's persuasive words,
to convince Parliament to send the A.I»$V t© the Middle .East,
.
The fall of France on June I? marked a turning point in Australian
thinking. In addition to the emotional effect, the fall of France and the
attacks on Great Britain had other extensive effects on the Australians„
A western front manned by Britain and France had hitherto been the
center of the war8s pattern, „ , «, How the land front in the West
had disappeared; the Allied naval forces had been greatly reducedi
the Mediterranean had become a hazardous sea; Germany had gained
Atlantic ports and with them a better chance of evading the block­
ade and of carrying aggression against Allied convoys; the British
Isles, core of resistance to a conquering Germany,,had lost arms
and equipment in France, was under attack, in daily prospect of
invasion, and discomfited by under-water and over-water raids on
her shippings Uncertainties in the Middle East had been further
complicated by Vichy rule in Syria, while the eountrie s of south­
eastern Europe, where anti-Axis diplomacy had hinged on AngloFrench guarantees, were either seeking friendship with Germany or
were disturbed by great fear of German attack. Italian entry into
the war had brought an enemy into Horth Africa on the borders of
Egypt, and into East Africa; Britain, new depending on her own fleet
. alone, was left with Gibraltar and Malta, marking the way to Alexan­
dria And the Suez Canal as lonely rocks in a hostile sea. Palestine
WHasluck, op, eit., p. 211.
and Egypt were no longer a convenient stage halfway to or from
Europe but outposts„ not a barrier against the AxiggS© much as
an exposed and precarious position to be defended»
For Australians the tone of the war had changed.
In the light
of the events in Europe and the Middle East* Australia„ Butch and French
colonies were cut off from the military aid they had relied upon,
There
was no doubt now that Australia must act* and act in the best interest of
Great Britain,
In answer to the public clamor for action* Menzies de­
clared that the war would be run in an entirely different way.
On June
16* Menzies* in a broadcastg called for ^all-around sacrifice* unremitting
toil and unflinching devotion** He went on t© say that Australia could
not depend on receiving help from Great Britain* but rather Australia
might have to be ready to lend aid to Britain,
He called for the Aus­
tralian Chiefs of Staff to meet to decide important issues.
On August 23*
19W* they issued the report that in light of the assurances given by
Churchill stating that the defense of Singapore remained of primary im­
portance* and considering the recent events* the A,I,F, would be sent to
the Middle East,
It should be noted that this decision was only made after very
careful assessment of the problem, Australian officials reasoned that
Japan would certainly try to take advantage of the recent successes of
the German and Italian forces, While the Chiefs of Staff did not con­
sider war with Japan as necessarily impending* they did recognize that
it must be very tempting to Japan to strike a sudden blow,
"The security
of imperial interests in the Far East depended upon Britain8s ability to
46
eontrol sea eemmuBleations-in the southwest Pacific 9 and that was eondi<=
tional upon the presence of an adequate fleet based on Singapore.
with the French collapse this became impossible„
But
Therefore$ the pos­
sibility of a Japanese invasion could not be overlooked,
Britain, nego­
tiating from a position of extreme weakness, had already agreed to close
the Burma Road for a period of three months, from July 1? to October 18,
1940,
The closing of the Burma Road stemmed from the fear on the part of
Great Britain that refusal might cause a Japanese onslaught on southeast
Asia,
It should be recorded that Churchill had frno greater faith in a
policy of appeasement in the East than he had had earlier in the West,"5®
However, it was a way to buy time until the situation in the West had im­
proved to such an extent that he could deal with Japan,
It was announced
by the Australian Minister for External Affairs, McEwen, that the Aus­
tralian government had been in full consultation with the United Kingdom
government on the subject.
As if to answer the nervousness of the Australian people, Churchill
wrote another of his encouraging messages on August 11, 1940,
In this one
he told the Prime Ministers of Australia and lew Zealand that, ttIf , „ ,
contrary to prudence and self-interest Japan set about invading Australia
and New Zealand on a large scale, I have the explicit authority of the
Cabinet to assure you that we should then cut our losses in the Mediter­
ranean and sacrifice every interest, except only the defense and feeding
of this I slan d, Al t ho ug h this no doubt gave the Australians great
49
^Mansergh, on. cit., p. 85,
Ibid.. p. 87.
51Ibid.. p. 86.
4?
confidence g GMrehill^s Chiefs of Staff did not see the picture in the same
lighto
They felt that, above all* it was necessary to keep sufficient
naval forces in European waters to match both the Italian and German fleets.
It was impossible to do this and send a fleet to the Far East also,
Churchill now summed up the position as he saw it.
There was no sign at this moment of any hostile action or in­
tent upon the part of Japan, The main preoccupation of Japan was
naturally America, It did-not seem possible to me that the United
States could sit passive and watch a- general assault by Japan upon
all European establishments in the Far Easts even if they them­
selves were not for the moment involved. In this case we should
gain far more from the entry of the United States8 perhaps only
against Japan, if that were possible, than we should, suffer from
the hostility of Japan, vexatious though it would be. On no ac­
count must anything which threatened in the Far East divert us
from our prime objectives in Europe, We could not protect our
interests and possessions in the Yellow Sea from Japanese attack.
The fartherest point we could defend if Japan came in would be the
fortress of Singapore, Singapore must hold out until the Mediter­
ranean was safe and the Italian Fleet liquidated, 52
Churchill went on to state his optimism that Singapore, provided that it
was adequately garrisoned and supplied with food and ammunition, would be
able to hold out for six months.
In which ease this would be enough time
to enable the British Fleet to reach Singapore and reinforce it.
Therefore,
on this basis, Churchill assumed that as long as the British Havy remained
undefeated, and Singapore remained in British hands, no invasion of Aus­
tralia And Hew Zealand by Japan would be possible,
Churchill and Menzies did not see the threat of Japan in the same
perspective, Churchill assured Menzies that any attack from Japan would
be in the nature of raids and seaborne air attacks against ports. However,
-^Churchill, op. eit,, pp. 416-417.
48
the Australians reasoned that one© the Japanese had gained possession of
the Netherlands1 East Indies, seized control of the air bases in IndoChina and Thailand, and captured Singapore they would be free to wage a
heavy attack on Australia» Again, the defense problem hinged on the ab­
sence or presence of the British fleet at Singapore = Although Churchill® s
messages relieved some of the anxiety of a possible Japanese attack, the
defense of Singapore still remained of primary importance» Regardless,
there was no great desire to send troops to Singapore to await a prospec­
tive foe, rather the Australians wished to be of assistance to the entire
cause. Thus, a message was sent to which the United Kingdom replied,
that the major immediate threat to the Empire, outside the United
Kingdom, was the Middle East and, after balancing the risks between
the Middle East and Far East, the United Kingdom considered that
the needs of the situation would be best met if the Seventh Division,
equipped from local Australian resources on a modified scale, were
sent direct to the Middle East, where it could complete its training
more quickly than in Malaya, The War Cabinet readily approved this
new proposal, , „ ,53
With the Burma Road closed, the balance tilting progressively
against Singapore, and with Australian troops being sent to the Middle
East Benzie's decided the situation was critical enough to warrant separate
action on the part of the Australian government„ On the 18th of August,
Sir John Latham was appointed as first Australian Minister to Japan.
This
did not indicate a difference in attitudes of the two. governments toward
Japan but rather a desire on the part of Australia to have first-hand
knowledge of Japanese actions, News from the Far East had always gone
through the diplomatic channels of Great Britain before being sent to
-^lasluek, op. eit., p. 225.
Australia„ This process was very slow and. often led to misunderstandings
when British and Australian views did not entirely coincide. In an effort
to coordinate Australian and American policies a minister was also named
to the United States» The Australian government sent messages to all con­
cerned that these two appointments were not to be misconstrued in any way
(as) to imply a disassoeiation of Australian from United Kingdom policy.
According to lasluek, the appointment of Sir John Latham was the action
of a government that still fervently hoped for peace with Japan and be­
lieved in the possibility.-^
With the reeleetion of Menzies to the Prime Ministership in Sep­
tember 19^0 came a continuation of the Government's policy.
Menzies ap­
pointed a delegation to assess the position of Singapore and on November
25* 194-0» he informed the Advisory War Council of "the alarming position
in regard to the defense of Singapore.
The Burma Bead had already been
reopened by the British (October 18) and now, mere than a month later,
Australians stepped up their requests for British reinforcements in Singa­
pore.
There was general agreement among the top officials that Menzies
should go to London to talk about this and other matters with Mr. Churchill.
On December 1st the Australian government cabled the Dominions Office
urging that immediate steps be taken to remedy the deficiencies in
the army and air forces at Singapore in view of the inadequacy of
the naval forces available. . . . On December 2nd the Australian War
Cabinet agreed that Mr. Menzies should communicate with London about
the possibility of basing three or four capital ships at Singapore
as a deterrent to Japanese action in this region.56
But the ships and weapons that were requested simply were not available.
The lack of urgency and lack of adequate defense measures on the part of
^Ibid., p. 228.
3%&psergh, op. pit., p. 89.
56%bid.
Britain served to heighten anxieties in Australia„ These anxieties can
be seen in the increased number of visits by Menzies to London as.he at­
tempted to gain a larger role in making policy decisions involving the
Far East,
With impending danger so near the Australian government hoped
for the closest collaboration mt h Great Britain,
But as John Curtin
stated, “collaboration meant something very much more than being informed
about developments,"^ Complaints to London increased as Australia felt
handicapped when not consulted on decisions that involved her security.
As conditions worsened in Europe, the strategic importance of Singapore
touched bottom in Churchill’s thinking, Australia, aware of the fading
power of the British Commonwealth in the East, was even more conscious of
the great superiority of the sea power of the Japanese,
Her policy was
one of trying to tiptoe past danger and thus avoid the ugly events that
might be waiting around the corner.
57lbid,
u.
s.
s
OUTER
.
M 0 N C 0 L I A
MANCHURIA
'
Nonkinq
FOUMOSA
P H I L I P P I N E
^
»
EAST"'! N D I E S
THE E A R EAST
200
600
.E Q l i A T O P
/ ZpV
NETHERLANDS
O
IS
Darwin
1200 MIIES
©C ASSELL A CO LTD l» 6 1
' British Possessions
Figure 2
British Commitments in the Far East
CHAPTER .111
AMERICA, BRITAIN, AND PACIFIC SECURITY
The war raged, on in Europe, yet the Ameriean people refused to
consider any proposals for action in the defense of the European democraci.eso
This policy of isolationism had been in existence for a consid­
erable'length of time.
in European affairs.
The Americans simply did not want to get involved
They were aware that Fascism and Nazism were
growing, Regardless, Americans, beguiled by the arguments of many re­
spected public figures, believed that the best way to deal with the
aggressors was to stay away from them and concentrate on the problems
within their own country,
"The idealism which had once made Americans
eager to save the world now made them turn their backs on it.
The Dem­
ocratic majority in Congress carried a series of measures which made it
impossible for the United States to play any part in world affairs? and
President Roosevelt accepted these measures without any sign of disagreement,"
To understand this feeling that had developed in the
American mind, it is necessary to go'back to 1935=
"By 1937, public opinion polls indicated that a large majority
of Americans believed our participation in the First World War had been
■^Taylor,
op, elt., p. 66.
52
a mistake» The prevalent aversion to foreign involvement and the determined opposition to any form of politieal or military eommitment fomnd
their most eloquent expression in the effort to insure the United States
against being dram into another eonfliet,, that is, in the extraordinary
neutrality legislation of the years of 1935=1937 %hich represented a
startling break from the traditional adherence to established interna­
tional
l
a
w
.
There is no finer example of this than the response of the
American people to President Roosevelt$s Quarantine Speech given October
5» 1937s la Chicagoo
The President, realizing the American sympathy for
the Chinese and aware of Japan^s violation of international agreements,
called for collective security» But the response to his speech was
not as he anticipated.
For a #strong and country-wide protest, among
Democrats as among Republicans,^ was heard.
This speech was such a
complete departure from isolationism that it could be said that the
Americans were not ready for it.
spreading.
Said Roosevelt, *Wbrld lawlessness is
When an epidemic of physical disease starts to spread, the
community. . , . joins in a quarantine of the patients in order to protect
the health of the community.^
In the face of such disapproval, Presi­
dent Roosevelt shelved his plans for the moment, although he was convinced
that America could not stand completely aloof from the world problems,
2w, hanger and S, Gleason,
Harper Brothers, 1952) p. 14.
A
The Challenge of Isolation, (lew York
.
54
few months after the Quarantine Speech9 Americans were awakened to the
realization of the explosive nature of international affairs„ In De­
cember, 1937» the UoSoSo Panay was attacked by the Japanese» This event
served as an ominous warning that even the American people a despite
their isolationist policy., might be drawn into world affairs e
In the wake of the uneasiness that continued to increase* the
President* on October 11* 1938* announced an increase in the budget of
$300*000*00# for the purpose of national defense„ It became his objec­
tive* from this date forward* to build a huge air force and develop*
more fully* plane-production facilities« Still* the Japanese persisted
and the Americans did nothing„ Under our existing neutrality laws* there
was nothing to prevent foreign powers from buying munitions from the
United States as long as they paid cash*
However* once the President
recognized a power as a belligerent* the sale of such materials was for­
bidden*
Therefore* at the time of Hitler8s march on Czechoslovakia * in
mid-March* 1939» our neutrality laws were unchanged.
However* the dramatic
feature was the attitude on the part of Americans of the ^continuous and
almost unanimous opposition to any involvement in another war,w^
Regardless whbther the United States wanted to become involved
in a war or not*.she was being drawn closer to it each day.
So far*
however* the State Department issued verbal disapproval and held back
from taking more drastic steps.
The verbal protests were lodged against
the Japanese in their occupation of the Spratly Islands (March 31» 1939)
5lbid,. p, 51o
and their bombings of American properties in China„ Then, as Hitler8s ag­
gression increased, in defiance of Roosevelt8s message,
the President,
on April 15s 1939$ ordered the Fleet, which had been centralised in the
Atlantic for maneuvers, to return, t© San Diego, its regular base.
This
move was in direct response to the increasingly critical world situation.
The Americans hoped that a major conflict could be avoided, still refus. ing to admit to themselves that such a conflict might include them.
But,
whereas they were not willing to fight overseas, they were willing to
accept any measures thought essential for national or hemisphere defense.
This was indicated "when President Roosevelt called for a half a billion
dollar military bill on April 26, 1939 «■ One month later, he called for
a naval supply bill of three-quarters of a billion dollars.
were voted through promptly and by big margins.
Beth bills
The public was in com­
plete agreement with the President that "the Western Hemisphere should
6
remain a strong citadel wherein civilization might flourish unimpaired.®
The American Fleet was becoming a subject of considerable inter­
est throughout the world.
As it lay off the coast of San Diego, much
conjecture from many quarters was heard.
Lord Halifax, British Foreign
Secretary, had suggested on March 21, 1939$ that if the Fleet were called
back to home base, Australia^ anxieties would be somewhat diminished for
the time being.
But with the Italian occupation of Albania,
Government became extremely anxious.
the French
For at this moment, the British let
their alleged intention be known; that is, to send part of their Fleet to
56
the Far Easts therefore cutting down the number of ships in the Mediter­
ranean,,
Then Roosevelt decided that the United States Fleet would be sent
to the Pacific for the purpose of lightening the pressure upon the British.
Since the President and his military advisers shared in the view that it
was more important to hold the Mediterranean than to strengthen the
defenses of the Far East, this agreement was very satisfactory to both
parties®
The appearance of the United States Fleet in the Pacific, in all
probability, made a deeper impression on the Tokyo Government than all the
dispatches, notes, and protests of the preceding months.?
The United States War Department had regarded the Philippines as
a military liability since Japan had acquired Germany *s Pacific islands in
1919«> Until the mandated islands were reduced, the United States was in no
position to fight a war in the Far East,
Therefore, the War Department
was in complete agreement with the patient and cautious policy of the
State Department toward Japan, Even a cautious buildup in a place like
Guam might be misinterpreted by the Japanese.
Just as the United States
was careful to avoid upsetting Japan, the latter seemed desirous of improv­
ing relations with the United States in mid-May of 1939°
The United States
was not the only power that hoped for friendly relations with Japan,
Both Great Britain and France felt that with war likely to erupt in
Europe, it was beyond consideration for them to accept Japan*s challenge
in the Far East.
Public clamor went up from all sides as the Japanese assaults
7lbid., p. 10*.
continued, and we were still trading with Japan.
fi!It is impossible to
emphasize to© foreefmlly that Japan was dependent on the. United States
for the great hulk of its vital imports notably of scrap iron and petro=
leuflu There .was no way in which Japan,, if deprived of this trade, could
Q
long continue military operations, even in China.*® Considering this
fact, it was not unreasonable to ask why the United States was continu­
ing to aid the Japanese onslaught against the Chinese and Europeans.
Some Americans regarded the policy of their own government as immoral,
while others supposed it was pressured by heartless business interests„9
In reaction to the events in the Far East, Mr, Hull, United States
Secretary of State, issued warnings to the Tokyo Government concerning
the situation in Tientsin and the Japanese bombings of Chung-king,
However, the warnings had very little effect on the Japanese.
Finally,
the step was taken that satisfied, to a large degree, the American
people 0 On July 26, 1939, President Roosevelt announced that he was
giving six monthsr notice that the Japanese treaty would be revoked and
economic sanctions would be imposed if the Japanese actions continued.
This statement was cheered in many quarters. Public opinion was satis­
fied,
The British and Chinese were bound to be encouraged.
And, most
important, it served notice to the Tokyo Government that America had no
intention of weakening. As ever, the American people were much more
willing to take a strong position against Japan than against Germany.
Then the M g news eame«
On August
23$ 1939$ the
Paet was announced„ This pact necessarily
started a new
Hazi-Soviet
phase in
Japanese policy$ her present one having been completely upset by the
Paet0 It should be remembered that Russia was Japan8s traditional
enemy and by September, 1939, they were engaged in what could be called
undeclared war on the Manchurian b o r d e r H o w e v e r 9 for
the moment9-
all eyes were focused on Europe „ When war
President made
broke out the
it clear that he was in favor of the sale to the Allies of anything and
everything they needed in their war effort „ within the bounds of the
neutrality legislations
According to the Gallup polls of October 23,
1939, about 62# of the population favored all possible assistance to the
Allies short of war."^" The President$ his advisors, and the majority of
Americans were in agreements
At this juncture, the Japanese announced that they would eoneentrate on settling the "China Incidents"
The new Abe Cabinet seemed
to put forth a concerted effort to clear up the entire matter of China,
As long as the Japanese armies were occupied in China, the chances of
their expanding to the north or south were extremely unlikely.
In fact,
the question in the minds of those in charge of the Japanese Government
was not possible conquests beyond China, but how to ward off the threat
of economic sanctions by America which could come due January, 19#,
Attempts to settle the problem were suggested by the British, who felt
IGlbid,, p, 293e
11Ibid., p, 288,
that concessions should be made by both China and Japan,
However» the
United States Government stated that any agreement that gave Japan a
special, military or oeonomie position would be completely "eat of the
question,
Welles insisted ffon equality of opportunity for all nations
in Chinao"T? Herein a precarious situation developed. The United
States remained firm and in doing so created a definite problem.
For
the Japanese Cabinet never considered giving up their dream of a Greater
East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere and even if they had considered such an
idea, they probably could not have stopped the army. Whereas the prin­
ciples set up by the United States were unacceptable„ the Japanese did
feel the threat of economic sanctions,
*It was a formidable threat
indeed; and it may safely be assumed that if, in the autumn of 1939» the
8phony war8 in Europe was not followed by real war in the Far East, the
firm position of the American Government more than anything else served
as an effective deterrent,0^
The situation in the Far East was momentarily forgotten as
Hitler8s armies swept through the Low Countries (in the spring of 194-®).
The shock experienced by the Americans was tremendous.
Previous military
plans were fast becoming obsolete as the German victories mounted up.
So
far. Hitler was doing all the scoring and the Allies could only be given
half a chance of victory.
This
«, o obei%% the ease 9 it is obviems that the United States was not
in a position to act effectively even if forced to defend itself
against unprovoked attack« Though he ^Roosevelt} had long talked
of the need for building thousands of planes and.of greatly expands
ing airplane production facilities9 it appeared likely that what
he had had in mind was for the United States to supply Britain
and France with the planes needed to cheek Nasi aggression without
actually involving the United States in the struggle. In general
one must conclude that he overrated the capabilities of Britain
and France . . .
In l^##, two themes were of extraordinary importance^, thus over­
shadowing all others.
Number one was to put the national defenses in
order as quickly as was possible.
Number two was to do everything with­
in our limits to save France and Britain from destruction.
In connection
with the first theme 9 it was felt the navy was equal to the immediate
task and in much better condition than the army. With the feeling of
reliance on the navy, eyes turned toward the question of the air program.
The program was found lacking and consequently it was doubled and *3@0@
additional fighter planes were ordered at once, to encourage the construc­
tion of new plants.”3-5 The role of the army was even more complex due to
so many demands on it
However 9 it was decided that the army8s program
was to be confined to the defense of the nation for one year.
In addi­
tion to this would be the defense of the Western Hemisphere with the
possibility of protective occupation of European possessions in the
l^Ibid.. Po 471.
15lbid., p.
l^Ibid., p; 4?5. "’Great concern was expressed about a possible
Nazi-inspired revolution in Brazil, disorders in Mexico, Japanese aggres­
sion against the United States, and the likelihood of a German victory
over Britain and France, followed by a Nazi attack on the Western Hemi­
sphere. It would be patently impossible to send American forces to the
Far East, South America and Europe simultaneously, or even to two of the
three areas, without seriously dividing the forces.%
61
Western Hemisphere if the situation demanded it. When it came to draw­
ing the line behind which the United States would stand, it was decided
that America could not afford to get involved with Japan or extend her­
self beyond the 180^ meridian, but that she should expend her efforts
on the situation in South America.
The second theme caused great anxiety in the American public
when it became apparent that Britain and France were in grave danger.
There was no doubt in anyonefs mind that Britain and France were in >
truth the first line of defense between Hitler and America.
It seemed
logical that the line of effective defense was to support the Allies
so that they could hold out. This theme began to merge with the first
theme, that of national defense.
The clamor for preparedness reached
a fever pitch as the Allies met defeat after defeat,
Eyen the unpree-
edentedly large appropriations by Congress did not quiet the public.
The President8s program of a step-up in national defense was warmly
received.
If he was criticized at all, it came from those who felt he
was not moving swiftly enough.
On May 15, 19#, Ambassador Kennedy, after a long meeting
with Churchill, reported to President Roosevelt that the Prime Minister
was convinced that England would be attacked within a month. Therefore,
the need for American aid was immense. Kennedy, however, advised the
President that if aid was given to England that "the United States would
be left holding the bag in a war in which the Allies expected a beating."
Kennedy asked Churchill to state what kind of aid he expected since the
United States Fleet was in the Pacific, the Army was quite unprepared,
62
and the United States didn8t have enough planes for„her own requirements.
Ohmrehill8s response was for thirty or forty destroyers and aigr planes
that could be spared.
that iss
He then offered the best assurance he could give„
England would never give up (as long as he remained in power)
and if necessary would move to Canada and take the British Fleet and
fight on.
He ended his message by stating that he looked to the United
States to keep the Japanese quiet„ So the President knew the grave
situation from the very beginning, Churchill had asked a great deal of
him and the United States. Not only were they to give as well as sell
planes9 destroyersg and other supplies but the United States was asked
to take the full responsibility of containing the Japanese.
At this
moments being so short of military supplies, there was very little
the Americans could do.
However, the public sensed that if the United
States were not moving toward a war, most surely the war was moving
toward the United States,
It became increasingly difficult for Americans to remain
neutral as the news reached them of more Nazi victories. The French
were now thinking of ways to ease out of the scrape ,as best they could.
The British, throughout May, were putting the pressure on the United
States for aid.
The President was very disturbed by these events, but
his hands were tied.
All he could do was to issue statements, most of
them directed toward Mussolini in the vain hope of dissuading him from
taking action.
But Mussolini was not listening. After many meetings a
change of policy was enacted.
c o o Prior to Maya 1940a the Wnited States Governmeat had
made n© eeimaitmenti had provided Be official assistamee. The
decision to do so was taken only in the latter part of May,
1940, and then only in a small way and almost casually. The
. question at that time was whether the War and lavy Departments
should make available to the Allies a limited number ©f planes,
and a- certain amount of artillery and ammunition. A list of
surplus items had been drawn up and approved by the President.
Thereby a principle had been established, which in the sequel
was not further debated ©r. seriously challenged. But the
commitment was a yet a narrow, specific one, altogether too
insignificant to serve as the basis for a general policy.
Actually, nothing of these transactions was revealed to the
public. It still remained for the President to secure popular
approval and support before the individual instance could be
generalized as accepted policy.1?
In the light of European events in late May and early June
'
.
'
.
.
;
(Evacuation of Dunkirk-May 26^June 3, Italian declaration of war June
10, and the Fall of France):the American people were willing to back
the President in any move to support the Allies, short of war.
As
early as June 1, 194©, President Roosevelt had sent orders to the War
and Navy Departments to draw up a list of those supplies that could be
spared for Britain.
“By the end of the week more than six hundred
heavily loaded freight ears were rolling toward the Army docks at Raritan,
New Jersey, up the river from Srayesend Bay.
Ry June 11 a dozen British
merchant ships moved into the bay and anchored, and loading from light­
ers began. “3-8 Churchill had nothing but praise for Roosevelt for his
actions in this hour of need.
Says Churchill ”. . . at that time it
was a supreme act of faith and leadership for the Waited States to
17lbid., n. #3.
ISWinston S. Churchill„ Memoirs of the Second World War
(Bostons Houghton Mifflin,
64
deprive themselves ©f this very considerable mass ©f arms for the sake
of a country which many deemed already beaten. "^9 For the United States
had left for herself the minimum requirement of equipment as stipulated
by the American Army8s mobilization plan, that is, equipment for only
1,800,©00 men.
From April through July of 1940, European happenings commanded
the attention of the Americans. In contrast, the Japanese activities
almost paled into a forgotten war.
luckily the situation was relative­
ly quiescent in Asia during the first half of 1940.
Most Americans
favored the termination of the commercial treaty with Japan and aid to
Nationalist China.
By the spring of 194© the policy of supporting
Chiang Kai-shek8s Nationalist Government had been established in prin­
ciple . However, the difficulties in carrying out this program were
extraordinarily great8 But, on March 7® 194©o a loan was made to China
by the Export-Import Bank to the tune.of $20,000,000 which was to be
repaid by the export of tin to the United States.
On March 30, 1940,
the Tokyo Government made the announcement establishing the Nanking
Government„ Certainly the Japanese must have feared reprisals on the
part of the United States.
But none came.
The Japanese had taken a
calculated risk and been correct. By exploiting the European situation
to push their own aims in Asia, the conflict between Japan and the
United States remained a battle of words. As the 'Dutch and French
went down in defeat, the possibility of the Japanese taking over
19Ibid.
the Batch Indies and French Indo-Ghina began te prey ©n the minds ©f
the American leaders 0 By the end of May, "it wi.s believed in Washing­
ton that the Germans and Italians had given the Japanese a free hand in
the Batch Indies and that the Japanese might be tempted to act „
entire situation was Sraught with danger.
The
If the Japanese succeeded in
occupying the Indies and thus gained control of her products, Japan
would almost be independent of American supplies needed for the comple­
tion of the conquest of China.
Therefore, the threat of the termination
of the commercial treaty would be nonexistent.
In addition to this,
and probably just as important, if net more so, was the real reliance of
the United States on the products of the Indies.
Since the United States
depended on the Indies for rubber and agricultural products, Japanese
occupation would be a severe blow to their potential as a military power.
At the same time, Tokyo had reason to be afraid of the Allies occupying
pi
the Indies,
With the developments in Europe close to disaster. Washing
ton felt it necessary to avoid any conflict with the Japanese.
There­
fore, a plea for talks on the situation in the Far East seemed advanta­
geous.
It does not seem likely that Roosevelt or Hull had any illusions
that these would lead to concrete results.
Contrary to this, the view
was that any time gained by talk would be very valuable.
As was supposed, the gap between the Japanese and the American
20Langer and Gleason, op. eit., p. j88.
23-Ibid., p. 590. "Tokyo had reasons to fear, especially after
the allied action in Curacao and Aruba, that the Allies might occupy the
Dutch possessions and thus jeopardize the flow of vital materials to
Japan."
Governments proved impossible t©'bridge.
The United States was not
even willing t© consider the terms of Japan« Such terms included$
1®
Some definite trade arrangement9 even if temporary,
2,
Gessation of American aid t© China so that they could settle
the China Incident.
Even as the talks continued% Roosevelt and Hull realised that the Yenai
Government had gotten themselves in an uncomfortable position.
Either
they would have to act 9 and act with great speed, or they would be
swept away by another government.
They chose to act.
On June 1®, 19^®>
the Japanese settled the dispute between themselves and the Soviets.
On
June 11* I9W 9 Japan advised the British, French, and Italian Governments
to withdraw their troops
started on Chungking,
from China.
Atthe same time, air attacks were
On June 1? or 18, the crisis was further height­
ened uhen
. . . the Japanese Eireetor of Military Intelligence summoned
the British Military Attache in Tokyo and made, the following
brutally frank statements the Japanese people would be cow­
ardly if they failed to take advantage of the opportunities
presented by the disasters suffered by the French and British.
Nothing could stop Japan from Seizing French Indo-China, the
Netherlands8 Indies or Hong Kong— any one or all of them.
The United States was in mo position to prevent Japan from
taking whatever action it liked in the Western Pacific. . The
only way in which Britain could avoid war would be by immedi­
ately closing the Burma Road and Hong Kong frontier, and by
prompt withdrawal ofBritish troops from Shanghai. This, he
added in conclusion, was the view ofthe Japanese fighting
forces and of the Japanese people. The British would simply
deceive themselves if they put trust in the soothing words
of the Tokyo Foreign Office® As if to reinforce these
threats the American Intelligence Services were receiving
reports which suggested the possibility of a Japanese raid
on Hawaii, , General Marshall for a moment feared that Japan
and Russia might act was. a team* in the Far East to hold our
ships in the Pacific „ So acute.seemed the threat that the
forces at Hawaii and Panama were promptly
<,22
a
l e
r t e
d
With the swift turn of events in both Asia and Europeg the
■British Government conferred with the American Government in order to
establish a policy that would be advantageous to both.
In these crowded
daysg it was difficult for America to decide what to do beyond issuing
warnings to Japan about upsetting the status quo and assuring Britain
that we would keep our Fleet at Hawaii,
The United States was being
extremely careful to avoid hasty involvement„ ’"Quite apart from the
fact that the War and Navy Departments did not have supplies that could
be sent to Inde-GMna, the Administration was determined to Avoid com­
plications in the Pacific if humanly possible.
This meant that for the
time being nothing could be done to check Japanese encroachment in Indo=
China or elsewhere in the Far
East,
*23
it
was hoped that the decision
to leave the Fleet in the Pacific would deter the Japanese from aggres­
sion against Indo-China or the Butch Indies,
It was recognized that
some minor Japanese successes were inevitable and had to be accepted„
If the position of the United States was precarious9 the posi­
tion of Britain was even more so,
Britain advocated a strong stand against
Japanese aggression, but in her present position she could not fight a
war in the Far East singlehanded.
She, therefore, offered two alternatives
68
to the United States,
Very simply„ the first was for the United States
to bring pressure on Japan by imposing a full embargo on exports to
Japan or by sending naval forees to Singapore, This was made in the
full realization that if Japan did not maintain the status quo, it very
well might lead to war.
This line was what the British preferred and
would baek up in every way.
this.
However, Hull was not at all in favor of
The second alternative„ oftrying to effect a peace settlement
between Japan and China, did not meet with favor from Hull either. He
reiterated previous attempts at the peace settlements and said America
could do no more, although he had no objection to Britain making an
effort.
Since the British and French could mot possibly offer effective
resistance and the United States would not, the Japanese had their way
for the present.
By mid-July 1940, there was a complete change in the Japanese
Government, Former Premier Yonai was replaced by Konoye who then
appointed General Tojo as Minister' of War,
The closing of the Burma
Road was effected on July 12, since the British could find no way to
avoid it.
The events in Asia hada direct
made by Congress in July,
By the National
bearing on the decisions
Defense Act passed by Congress
on July 2, 1940, all strategic materials, machine tools and a great many
other products were now subjected to a rigid licensing system.
It
seemed very likely, as July wore on, that the long-debated embargo on
the export of oil and scrap iron might be imposed.
favor of it, as were many in Congress,
The public was in
The debate was ended and action
was taken when the War Department announced that agents of the Japanese
were building up a eerner in aviation gasoline.
The meaning was clear,
the market wotid be exhausted and thus the United States Army and Havy
would not be able to acquire large quantities, of oil if an emergency
should arise, ,©n July 25, l?^©, President Roosevelt' signed an order
putting petroleum products, iron, tetraethyl lead, and steel serap under
the licensing system.
It looked as if the die had been cast.
But such
was not the ease, Welles, being convinced that such action would pro­
voke Japan into attacking the Indies and perhaps British possessions,
persuaded the President to backtrack.
unchanged.
Thus the situation remained
The Administration seemed unwilling to do any more than send
warning statements to the Japanese,
The desire to.support the British
in the Far East was sincere but the President and lull felt that the
real menace was Hitler and it would be foolish for America to become
deeply committed in the Far East,
On the eve of the national elections, Roosevelt sent a message
to Congress and then said' at a press conference that the final arrange­
ments had been made for the sending of 5® destroyers to Halifax where
they would be taken over by British crews , .,*He , , , declared the
agreement 8met inconsistent in any sense with our status of peace, It
is am epochal and far-reaching act of. preparation for continental de™
fense in the face of grave danger,8 It was, he asserted, ^probably the
most important thing that has come for American defense since the
Louisiana P u r c h a s e , T h i s announcement was enthusiastically received
^Ibid,, p, 770,
70
by the American public» By these actions„ the United States had departed
from their policy of neutrality and entered upon a status of limited war.
In September, 1940, the Americans still held on to the hope that
by sending aid to Britain, they could avoid participating in the war.
But gone was the old isolationism.
Some Americans did subscribe to non-
interventions however, most realized that their survival depended on
victory by the British.
The Americans were now committed to the defeat
of Hitler and his allies as they east their lot in support of Great
Britain.
CHAPTER IV
PACIFIC SECURITYi
WHOSE RESPONSIBILITY?
Throughout the period 1935-19^6» the policy adopted by the United
States Government was of vital interest to Australians. Needless to say,
the months of May-September9 19409 were filled with apprehension for the
Australians9 as they watched Japan grow more bold while America grew more
cautiouso
The Australian Government had taken a chance in respect to the
growing hostility of Japan, inasmuch as the Australians neither strength­
ened their home defenses nor reinforced Singapore„ Knowing that they
could not defend themselves unaided against the Japanese, it was only
natural that they look for a champion to save them.
In early July, the
Australian Department of External Affairs issued a statement that every
indication seemed t© point to the conclusion that if Japan attacked
Australia, the United States would hot come into the war,**" In early
August of 1940, the United Kingdom Government and the Australian Govern­
ment conferred and agreed that should Japan attack the Netherlands Indies
and the Dutch resist, then most assuredly Britain and Australia would
find themselves at war with Japan,
During the closing months of 1940,
while the war raged on in Europe, the Australian Government was plagued
with a number of decisions to make.
The Menzies Government had. won in
^Hasluck, op, pit,, p, 226,
71
72
the gest-ra). election in September $ but the victory was mot a substantial
one.
The fear that Germany might invade the British Isles had subsided
by Octobers but there were still air raids and submarine and surface
attacks which took a heavy toll of British convoys,,
Hearer to Australia
there were reports that ships had been sunk on or near the Australian
coaste The Japanese situation in the Pacific had not changed since they
signed the Axis Pact in September, but the Australians were under no
illusionso
They knew that the moment the British Commonwealth weakened,
Japan would strike» However, for the moment the real peril centered on
the Battle of Britain and the Battle of the Atlantic.
were Germany and Italy.
The active foes
The prospective foe was Japan.
Appreciating the fact that Japan was only waiting for the right
moment to attack, a conference was called for October 22, 19%0, to dis­
cuss the Far East Defenses.
Questions concerning the defense require­
ments of India and Burma were raised.
The United Kingdom view was that Singapore was the key to the
British Commonwealth8s defensive position, and that Australia
and Hew Zealand and the British possessions in the Far East
would best be defended by an adequate concentration of forces
in Malaya. The possibility of a major expedition against Aus­
tralia and Hew Zealand initially was ruled out, but heme
defenses against raids and forces for convoy and other duties
had necessarily to be maintained.^
This conference having ended on October 31, 1940, Menzies appointed a
group to investigate the Singapore position.
By the end of Hovember, their
findings were ready, and he went to London to take up these matters with
^Mamsergh, op. eit., p. 88,
73
Churchill„ Although the conference had. revealed the weaknesses of
Singapore„ no substantial aetion was taken to repair the weaknesses.
However» as has been pointed out previously8 the weapons9 equipment e
and supplies needed in the defense of Singapore simply did not exist.
Henee it was not lack of will but lack of material that determined the
British response.
The attempts to insure seourity against Japan also brought Aus­
tralia into a new role in international polities,
@For the greater part
of her history sinee Federation Australia had had no foreign poliey of
her own.
As part of the British Empire 8 Australia was the object of
decisions made elsewhere,Baring this time she was not always a
willing object.
Sir Alan Watt has pointed out that Australia had no for­
eign poliey^ ffshe could only reflect a policy and this was British
Professor Bruce Hiller has stated thats
Between 1939=42 there were practically no diplomatic peopleonly those in Great Britain, Japan and the Waited States,
The Committee of External Affairs had been started in 1935=
Foreign poliey was more of a personal view of practical poli­
ticians , Almost everything that came in was British in
natureo The Prime Minister was the front communication, sinee
he was the first to receive the British line. The Minister of
External Affairs was a relatively insignificant post. The
%ugo Wolfsohn, ffForeign, Policy,m Australian Civilization, (Melbourne$
F, W, Cheshire^-102')'»» p, 225,
^Interview with Sir Alan Watt, Head of the Department of International
Relations at Australian National University, Canberra, Australia, July 10,
1964,
74
number ©£ senior civil servants m s small„ Service officers
(army9 navy, etc.) were able to put forth mere pressure than
the civil servants
But as the Japanese threat grew mere grave $ Australians could net deny
to themselves that while the British were fighting for their life in
Europe9 British interests in the Far East was only marginalWhile
Henzies was Prime Minister9 he was the voice of foreign policy9 and as
such was simply a reflection of British policy,
Curtin, head of the
Opposition, leader of the labour Party, urged a more independent policy.
He emphasized the need for the development of more air power in the
event that Singapore could not be reinforced,^ However, while Menzies
was: in office, very little along these lines was done,
Unwillingly at
first, but with increasing zest, the Australian Government began to
mold a foreign policy of its own.
Whereas the birth of Australian foreign policy occurred because
of the growth of the Japanese menace, it was also conditioned by Euro­
pean affairs,
1941 brought with it a continuation of old problems and
a deluge of new ones.
To the Australians the main concern was still
^Interview with Professor Bruce Miller, Member of the Interna­
tional Relations faculty of the Pacific Studies Department at the Aus­
tralian National University, Canberra, Australia, July 11, 1964,
^Interview with Professor Partridge, member of the Political
Science Department at the Australian National University, Canberra,
Australia, July 1§, 1964,
7Sir Frederick Eggleston, ^Foreign policy,^ Australia, ed. G„
Hartley Grattan, (Los Angeles 1 University of California Presq,) 1947)!,
p, 142,
the Far last.
They had. little appreciation for what was taking.,place
in the Balkans „ It certainly appeared that the hard-won victories of the
Greeks against the Italians wemld earns® Hitler to give assistance to
Italy,
If this were so. Great Britain would certainly need extra troops
to help establish a Balkan Front „ Could Britain abandon the opportunity
of creating a Balkan front by sending troops to the Far East?
Churchill thought the danger of Japan going to war with the
British Empire had lessened and that the growing naval and
military advantages in the Mediterranean would also have
their effect on Japanese conduct, It would be quite impos­
sible for the British fleet to leave the Mediterranean at the
present juncture without throwing away irretrivably all that
had been gained there and all prospects for the future.
However, as discouraging as this news might be to the Australians 8
Churchill went on to say, in the latter part of his message, that if Aus­
tralia were ever seriously threatened by an invasion, the British
would not hesitate to sacrifice the Mediterranean position in order
to help Australia,
In the wave of the news concerning the weak­
nesses of Singapore and the growing nervousness of the Australian people,
it was decided that the best course would be to send Menzies to London
to see that Australian interests were being considered in their proper
magnitude, Leaving Australia on January 21, 1941, after many conferences
with leading personalities there, he visited Australian forces in the
Middle East on his way to London, When he left Australia, as has already
been noticed, his main concern and that of his War Cabinet, was the
situation in the Far East.
In fact, there was absolutely no question
concerning policy in the Balkans brought up in the Australian Cabinet.
When Menzies arrived in London, Churchill was. talking about using Austra­
lian and New Zealand troops that were fighting in Africa to establish a
^ Balkan front. This was a difficult decision to make, for the Australian
Government found it hard to believe Britain would give up a successful
campaign in Africa to try to establish a second front.
It cannot be
stressed enough that here was a real weakness of the United Kingdom Gov­
ernment.
For she should have consulted with the Dominion Governments
when an enterprise of this nature was being considered.
At no time did
Churchill or his representatives pose the problem to the Australian Gov­
ernment, until it was too late.
rather peculiar situation.
Therefore, Menzies found himself in a
He had left Australia fully confident that he
knew the sentiments and wishes of the Australian Cabinet, only to be
faced with a problem that they had not discussed.
It was not until late
February, 1941, that the Australian War Cabinet received a telegram from
Menzies asking his colleagues to agree with the decision to send two of
the Australian divisions to Greece from North Africa.
with reservations.
They did so, but
Mr. Fadden, acting Prime Minister in Menzies1 absence,
cabled that the concurrence was "conditional on plans having been com­
pleted before hand to ensure that evacuation, if necessitated, will be
successfully undertaken and that shipping and other essential services
will be available for this purpose if required.nl'
The point of all this was.that the Wnited Kingdeitt was tardy in
informing its Dominion Governments,
ilthoagh Dominion troops might well be
committed to a dangerous role„ the approval of the Government involved was
not always semght in advance. .Frequently, the result was that major decisions in both military and political departments i&dLeh should have been
made after, were being made before, any consultation with the Commonwealth
Governments involved.
More than once, Churchill was called on to explain
why Australia and other Dominions were not informed.
Churchill explained
that in times of war it is not always possible to keep everyone informed.
He went on to explain that, at times, the situation called for a decision
only he eould make, since he was the only one that possessed full dat# con­
cerning the situation.
war.
Secrecy, speed, and action had to be the keynotes in
Although there was a great deal of wisdom and truth in this line of
reasoning, Australia still felt that better communications could and should
be set up between Great Britain and her Dominion Governments.
However, the
Australian Government was learning quickly from its experiences. The contro­
versy .surrounding the Greek campaign and its subsequent failure had some im­
portance.
From this point on, the Australian Government was absolutely insis
tent on being informed.
Haen the Syrian campaign, occurred, following after
the Greek and Crete campaign# the Australians were informed.
critics were still not satisfied.
and inadequate.
However, the
They stated that information was late
The fact that the Syrian campaign was a success did not
assuage the Australian critics who charged that the decision had been taken
^without effective Australian participation.^
l®Ibid.» p.■102,
78
The Australians were t© be disappointed time and again ©n this
matter.
While in London, there was at least one occasion on which
Menzies was very disappointed in his share of making policy.
From
January to March, secret Anglo-American staff talks were going on.
Henzies knew this, as did the Australian Government at home. But when
the agreements were made public» they were wholly unexpected and eer*
tainly net to the liking of the Australians.
For Roosevelt agreed with
Churchill that the vital theater was Europe. Thus both favored a hold­
ing war in the Far East. What was even more startling was the decision
that, if the United States should become involved in the war, Britain
would send six capital ships to Singapore and the United States Navy
would aid the Royal Navy in the Atlantic.
To the Australians, the im­
portance of the United States Navy in the Pacific cannot be overempha­
sized.
For she saw it as the main deterrent to Japanese aggression.
The Australian Government
could not help but feel apprehension that, at
a time when her armed forces were being used overseas, security arrange­
ments in the Pacific were being changed with only tardy reference to
Australia. After the Roosevelt-Halifax talks (Feb. 8, 1941)a Australian
hopes dwindled in regard to substantial support from the United States
in the Pacific.
The visit to London and subsequent participation in making
policy in the War Cabinet there left a lasting impression on Menzies.
He became convinced that it was necessary for a representative of the
Australian War Cabinet to be present at all meetings of the Imperial
War Council.
He felt that such representation simplified and accelerated
the process of eeasaltation,'espeeiallj in regard to the ia.se of deaihioB
forces.
A representative in London also lessened Australian anxieties
in relation to the defense of the Paeifie.
Menzies also found that he
was able to enter into the discussions and make Australian wishes felt,
although not to the extent he would have wished.
Although Churchill
expressed the opinion that Menzies8 visit was %ost valuable,®^ he did
not seem to appreciate the strain he was putting on Australia by insist­
ing that the Prime Minister, and only the Prime Minister, of a Dominion
be allowed a voice in the United Kingdom War Cabinet. As Prime Minister
of Australia, Menzies felt his place was at home inspiring and leading
his people who felt that they were in direct danger.
Yet it was this
danger that prompted the Australian Cabinet to permit Menzies to visit .
London when his political position was so shaky.
In the 19^0 election,
Labour had come within ®a hairs8 breadth from complete success . .
Despite the fact that Menzies had left his office in the good hands of
Fadden, and his mission to London could be used to his political advan­
tage, he knew he should be back home gaining supporters.
This problem
of representation in the United Kingdom War Cabinet was to grow to
greater proportions and plague Australians through the war.
No sooner had Menzies left his country for London (Jan. 21,
194-1) than Australian newspapers carried headlines of the impending
danger in the Far East.
Word had come that Japan was attempting to sign
peace treaties with Batavia and the Batch and exbend her influence into
Thailand and Ind©=>Ghinae This news stimulated discussion in the Austra­
lian War Cabinet„ Baring these discussions;, Curtin» as leader of the
Opposition* had a great deal to say. He favored issuing statements con­
cerning the danger to Australia in order to awaken the public to the
need of a great war effort and to calm the industrial unrest.
When he
had sized up the military situation* he was inclined to advocate rein­
forcement of the Australian Naval Squadron* although he admitted that
this was not practicable due to the situation in the main theaters of
war* that is.* the Mediterranean* North Africa and the. Atlantic. When
dSSbiderimg the possibility of a war in the Far East, Curtin advocated
that Australia reinforce Singapore instead of dispatching more troops to
the Middle East.
Curtin also felt that the transfer of the United States
Navy from the Pacific would be disastrous to Australia.
Therefore* if
Australia were drawn into a Pacific war, she would have to stand alone,
for awhile at least.
Even if America did intervene, said Curtin, iimned-
ate assistance would not be available.
Therefore, he stressed again the
importance of reinforcing Singapore and the use of the Australian air
force to counter any air attack from Japan.^
Throughout the early part of April, Australian newspapers carried
articles that were intended to renew the confidence of the people.
examples
For
"The confident belief is expressed that Japan will not at
present launch any excursions in the South Pacific., since events have
distinctly minimized the possibilities of an Axis 'victory.
were reiterated again on April 10.
Assurances
fi'If a balloon goes up in the Pacific 9
we will get powerful naval reinforcements and get them quickly9 regard­
less of whether the United (states
comes in with us9" said Vice Admiral
X
Sir Geoffrey Layton.
. . In the event of an emergencyg however, units
would come quickly enough and in sufficient strength to permit effective
defensive action 9 while a full fleet could reach Singapore in two months.
Just as the Australians were beginning to feel comfortable due to these
British assurances„ an event occurred that aroused anxieties again.
These are best expressed by an exerpt from an article.in the Sydney
Whatever interpretations may be given to the Russo-Japanese
Pact signed last Sunday9 there is not the slightest doubt
that it places the problems of the Pacific basin in a new
and dangerous perspective if only because it greatly increases the possibility of a Japanese expansionist movement
southwards by force of arms
The threat is at the very
gates of Singapore 9 and at the back door of Australia itself .^-5
Articles of this nature filled the papers on April 16 and for the next
week, alerting the public to the fresh danger.
To the Australians9 the
Russo-Japanese Pact had special significance. The Australians viewed
this pact with alarm since they recognized that now Japan could focus
her entire attention on the south because there was no fear of a Soviet
attack.
As the newspapers pointed out, ,fM©t one comfortable illusion
^Sydney Morning Herald. April 4, 1941, p. 9
15lbid0. April 10, 1941, p. 10.
16"Japan8s Southward Drive. =Sydney Morning Herald. April 16,
1941, p. 10o
about the remoteness of this eenfliet is now left to us.”17
It was at this time, while Menzies was in London (April, 1941)
that he decided to press the issue of an Australian representation to the
Imperial War Council.
He was slowly coming to the realization that a
change was needed in the higher-level conferences on the war effort.
He
felt that this could be best accomplished by the formation of an Imperial
War Cabinet containing representatives of each of the four self-governing
dominions (i.e., Australia, Canada, South Africa, and Hew Zealand).
How­
ever, when Henzies consulted the other three involved (i.e., Mr. Mackenzie
King, General Smuts, and Mr. Fraser, respectively) none of them favored
the change.
When Churchill was approached on the matter, he expressed the
view that such a proposal would destroy the basis of the coalition govern­
ment, since he was not willing t© increase the membership of the War
Cabinet fearing that it would become too large to conduct business
efficiently.
In reality, the question put before Churchill by Menzies
was much simpler than it appears.
The other three Dominions expressed
disapproval of Menzies8 idea and stated that they were completely satis­
fied with the Imperial War Cabinet as it stood.
the fears that Australia did.
None of these three had
In matters of geography, they felt secure,
whereas Australia felt herself isolated and threatened by an attack from
the Japanese.
Menzies reasoned that if the other three had rejected his
proposal, then Churchill8s decision was not one of overweighting his
cabinet, but rather of simply including one representative from Australia.
83
Tims» Australia would be assured that her unique position was being put
before the Cabinet and Menzies would be free to go back to Australia,
Howevera Churehill did not see it that way and stood firm on his decision
not to enlarge the Cabinet„ not even by one,
Menzies8 failure in this
matter was a terrible disappointment to him,
Churehill8s suggestion
that Menzies revisit London soon shewed his indifference to the uncer­
tainties that were mounting in Australian domestic politics,
Despite this disappointment, Menzies returned home at the end of
May ready to give leadership and inspiration to his country.
He and his
staff brought back with them very complete reports on the many aspects of
the war effort,
FfEjy the middle of July, instead of leading the nation to
greater efforts, he was grappling with dissention in his own party and
©pen hostility from some of its members. Instead of proceeding with the
great administration tasks he had set for himself and the nation, he was
struggling ©nee again for sufficient political stability „ . „
In­
stead of uniting and inspiring the public„ he found himself being attacked
by the Opposition,
The newspapers had, for the past month or so, been
carrying articles criticizing the Empire8s policy in the Balkans„ Curtin
had let it be known that he was very critical about Australian troops
being sent there, He felt that Australian troops should be used closer
to home.
Encouraged by.the results of the September (1940) election and
the increase of Labour members in the House of Representatives, he sought
l%ansergh, op,cit,, p, 116-115,
l^Hasluok, op,clt,, p, 491,
to make his wishes known.
The real control of the House did not lay with
the U.A.P. or Labours but "with a couple of independents whose views were
unaseertainable."2® Curtin continued to talk long and hard in criticism
of the D.A.Po and the way it was handling the war situation.
By the
first week of July (1941), the newspapers were widely reporting the dis­
sensions within the U.A.P.
Henzies* party was wrecking itself, and al­
ready the public had begun to predict when the Opposition or Labour Party
would take over the reins of the Government. All that the Government
could do was to stay in office and hope for the best.
Competing with the domestic political situation for attention
were the swiftly moving events on the international scene. During the
month of May, the people were informed on the buildup of defenses in
Malaya.
. . further strong Navy, Army, and Air Force reinforcements
had arrived yesterday evening. The forces which arrived from Britain
.0 0 were part of the policy of steadily increasing forces in Malaya
21
which had been going on for some time.®
Almost two weeks later the
same paper reported President Roosevelt8s proclamation "that a state of
unlimited national emergency existed in the United States.
He thus assumes
virtually war-time power, and the nation is placed on war footing „ ...
Plans for co-operation with Australia and Britain in the Pacific will now
proceed to the point of commitments, if they have not already done so.
2®G©llan, op. cit., p. 144.
American Naval forces can now be expected to be based at S i n g a p o r e . .
Within a month, the Australians found out their expectations were jus­
tified as the newspapers carried stories of the arrival of Catalina
flying boats at Singapore.
Attention shifted from the Far Eastern theater of war as the
next bit of news was reported.
Germany had finally performed the act
that Churchill had been trying to alert the Russians to for quite some
time.
At k A.M. on June 229 1941, Germany attacked Russia.
That night,
Churchill broadcast over the B.B.C. network that:
. . o E-have to declare the decision of His Majesty® s Govern­
ment-—and I feel sure it is a decision in which the great
Dominions will in due course concur— for we must speak out
now at once, without a day8s delay. I have to make the dec­
laration, but can you doubt what our policy will be? We
have but one aim and one single, irrevocable purpose. We
are resolved to destroy Hitler and every vestige of the
Nazi regime. From this, nothing will turn us— nothing . . .
Any man or state who fights on against Nazidom will have our
aid. Any man or state who marches with Hitler is our foe®
. . . That is our policy and that is our declaration. . ..23
The Dominion Governments once again had not been consulted or informed,
before Churchill made his statement public.
However, this time, Menzies
said the statement was completely accepted by the Australian Government.
In less than a month, Churchill announced that an Anglo-Russian Agree­
ment had been signed, with the full consent of all the Dominions, for
the united action of the British Commonwealth and Russia against Nazi
Germany.
The newspapers, once again, project the Australian feelings
22Ibdd., May 29, 1941, p. 7.
23Winston Churchill, The Second World War, Vol. 3, The Grand
Alliance. (Bostons Houghton Mifflin Company, 1950),p. 371-373°
in regard t© the events just mentioned. For example?
"Diplomats here
know that German "s' attack on Russia same as a oomplete surprise to the
Japanese, , , Japan is -expected new to wait mere patiently than eyer
before moving against the Indies."
ok
Japan was not only surprised by the aetions of Germany, but
also by the restrictions.put on her by America*
The Japanese demand
for bases in Freneh Inde«=Ghina became known on July 23, 1941,
ing day, Japanese warships were sighted off Camraak Bay,
©n the follow­
On July 25th
and 26th, all Japanese assets were frozen in the United States and the
United Kingdom and Dominions,
All treaties between Japan and Great Bri­
tain were denounced by the latter.
reciprocal one bn the part of Japan.
This aetion was followed by a
Japanese troops landed in Indo­
china on July 28th and by the 29th, the Viehy Government had signed a
paet giving Japan the use of eight airdromes there.
The press followed
each of these aetions with ©onsiderable interest and extensive coverage.
An article appeared quoting U. S. Umder-Seeretary of State, Mr. Sumner
Welles, as sayings
'"The occupation of Indo-China or the establishment
of further military bases there will endanger the peaceful use by
peaceful nations of the Pacific. . , .It will also jeopardize Ameri­
can sources of vital defense materials such as tin and rubber, and also
25
endanger other areas, including the Phillpimes."
The same paper
reported that "Eeohoraie strictures applied by the United States, the
24
25
Morning Herald, July 31, 1941, p. 7
British Empire, and the Netherlands' East Indies against Japan are be­
lieved only preliminary . . . Stronger measures, which will increase
the economic pressure, will be taken if Japan retaliates vigorously,
or if it is seen that territorial occupations obviously presage further
26
expansion„K
Needless to say, the Australians were very impressed and
relieved by the strong economic restrictions put on. Japan by America.
But their newspapers carried no illusions that America might declare war
on Japan„ In fact, they stated the contrary, that is, a complete break
with Japan was not expected in Washington.
On August 6, Prime Minister Henzies went before the
Council and
stated the objectives that he felt the Government should attempt to
carry out 1
1.. The maintenance of Anglo-American cooperation in economic
measures against Japan.
2. Obtain U. S. cooperation in issuing a warning against Japan.
3. Answer a request made by Thailand toknow the attitude of
Great Britain and the United States in the event of a
Japanese attack.^7
In citing the objectives, Menzies made it clear that he was aware of the
inability of Great Britain and the disinclination of the United States
to aid Thailand materially.
into the lap of Japan.
He stressed that this could throw Thailand
At the same time, Menzies stressed the need of
keeping in line with the United States.
At no time did Menzies regard,
the war with Japan as ^inevitable.'1 Quite to the contrary, he was
88
always working against that supposition in the Australian mind,
Menzies1 political position at home was growing more shaky each
day,, Curtin offered more opposition at each meeting of Parliament„ yet
he did not seem to want to overthrow the government„ although he was en­
couraged to do so by his party.
During the past year, Curtin had been
very critical of the Government8s defense policy and the sending of
forces to the Middle East,
nThe fact that the Labour Party was in no
way associated with the decision to send the Australian division to
Greece gave to the subsequent controversy a touch of party acrimony
which it might not otherwise have acquired.%28 At this same meeting,
Curtin said that if a war with Japan was considered inevitable, Australia
should “bring pressure to bear on the United States of America to knock
Japan out
now,
“^9 However, he did not specify what type of pressure
would bring the United States in.
Menzies8 objectives (as cited above) were given much considera­
tion in the newspapers.
It was rather obvious that number one would not
be difficult to carry out.
The second objective, that of a warning, was
a rather long time in coming, and when it was issued by Roosevelt, it
was not as strong as the Australian Government had hoped.
The third and
fourth objectives seemed to be covered by an article in the Sydney Mornin;
Herald, statings
2%ansergh, op. eit., p. 100.
^Hasluek, op. eit,, p. 529«
.
It would- fee too optimistie to expeet the United States t© take
military aetlott if Japam moves against $hailand„ , . ♦ Any
Japanese move frem Thailand further south, however, would be
a different matter$.because it would be taken to mean that
Japan had designs on the Dutch East Indies; and AmOriean pub­
lic opinion would then back up military resistance e e » .
Many Australians in London believe that unless a stronger
policy is formed in London, Australia will begin to look to
Peafl. Harbor rather than to Singapore for aid, , . , Aus•
tralia has not had reason to expeet that either "Whitehall or
the White House intends to draw a deadline for Japan at any
point north of the southern boundary of Thailand.3©
A few days later, the following piece appeared in the newspaper:
.
. . . Any threat to a British possession is a threat to the
whole Empire and should such a threat be implemented by mili­
tary action, the whole Empire will resist it. Whether a
Japanese movement into Thailand will be construed as an act
of war depends upon the attitude of the United States, and
that has by no means been clearly stated. Indeed the U.S.A.
has thus far been satisfied with half-measures. . . . It can
do so only if the threat in Thailand is of such a nature
that an attack on Singapore will develop out of it as a
matter of course. In that ease— considering the measures
that Washington has taken against Japan and influenced the
Empire into taking and considering that the Anglo-Japanese
alliance was abandoned because the Americans objected— it
will have a plear right to call for a full measure of
American support, » .. Throughout the war there has been
too little consultation of Parliament in matters that vitally
concern Parliament and the nation.31
:
The press offered the people no pretty illusions during July and August,
If41.
It had become obvious that if Japan attacked Thailand, the British
Empire, and therefore Australia, would declare war against Japan, and
consequently Australia might very well find herself isolated in the
Pacific,
Being aware of this, lemzies told Evatt (Minister of External
3®Sydney Morning Herald, August ,% IfAl,-p. 11.
33-Bulletin (Sydney), August 13, If41, p. S,
Affairs) that there was still the hmge task of eonvineing the United.
Kingdom. Government9 and Churchill as much as anyone9 of the necessity
©f holding Singapore«,
Throughout these past few weeks9 Menzies had been campaigning
throughout the capital of each state.
At the same time, as the situa­
tion in the Far East grew more tense, there were repeated pleas to.
Churchill from Menzies for membership in the Imperial War Cabinet.
Stating that he was needed in Australia, Menzies requested that Churchill
. accepta net the representative of Australia that you would choose
but the representative of Australia which the Australian Government may
choose.^2
The idea was still not acceptable to Churchill.
The situa­
tion was growing so critical in the Far East that Menzies cancelled his
tour and returned to Canberra on August 11, 1941.
The same question
was asked repeatedly by Australians9 flWhat about America?” This ques­
tion was discussed in the following articles
As usual9 Hr. Churchill8s broadcast account of his foregather­
ing with Mr. Roosevelt$ heard in Australia on August 25,
sounded magnificent over the air. Cablegrams mentioned that
British newspapers had summed up its message as (l) '^Britain
and America will fight together if there is war” with Japan5
(2) ffFull aid without barriers” will be given Russia 1 (3) ”To
the conquered nations $ Have faith and hope. Deliverance is
sure.” . . . It made the stopping of Japan Uncle Sam$s
special pigeon, with Britain pledged to come in and help.
Hitherto it has been accepted that Britain must always be
first to take the plunge, with Uncle Sam helping, though
without coming in.
On the evidence of a wide range of American press utter­
ances, the U.S.A. would seem to be cool— down to freezing
32nansergh, op. cit,, p. 112.
91
point-- on the question of any participation on the European
side; but there is nothing like that feeling noticeable in
regard to the idea of war with J a p a n . 33
Seldom has a newspaper reported so accurately the situation existing
at that moment.
Churchill was making sure that hewas not going to be
left fighting a war in the Far East alone, if he could
any way.
avoid itin
He let Roosevelt know that he would give him all his support
but America must initiate the action.
The Australians and the British
were aware that it was a difficult position for Roosevelt to be in
since the Democratic platform on which he was elected had stated that
the United States would not participate in any foreign wars nor send
her troops to any foreign lands unless attacked.
But, although they
appreciated his position, they felt that words had lifted hopes so
often that now only actions could have any weight.
One thing, gave
them confidence, that is, that American public opinion was much more
receptive to a strong stand in the Far East than in Europe.
The Aus­
tralians knew this, yet it was only a slender hope to cling to.
Throughout August, the political situationwas anything but
stable.
Finally, on August 29th, Menzies lost his office.
In the
faint hope of remedying the critical political situation, Menzies had
selected as his successor Fadden, the new Country Party leader.
was almost apologetic upon receiving the news.
Fadden
In a public statement,
he said he had not sought this arrangement but had been asked to accept
33|«Britain, U.S.A. and Japan,® Bulletin (Sydney), August 26,
1941, p. 7.
92
it by the UoAoP, Fadden$s position was just as insecure as Menzies8
had been.
Each had only a majority of one in the House of Represen­
tatives’. Curtin, although he had not sought the position of Prime
Minister, was very critical of the choice that had been made.
that the appointment of Fadden was only a face-lifting device.
newspapers were also skeptical about the change.
He said
The
They called it the
"Fadden makeshift1* and stated that what Australia needed was a Govern­
ment that would govern and they did not think the Fadden Government was
that sort of government.
Even Churchill expressed his regrets that the
Australian people saw fit to change Prime Ministers.
In early September, 1941, the situation in the Far East had
eased considerably.
On September 1, Churchill informed Fadden that the
situation in the Far East was "not only more favorable but less tense."34
The public still clamored for action from the Government, especially on
the issue of representation on the Imperial War Council.
Under pressure,
Fadden persuaded Churchill to allow him to appoint a special envoy to
London who would sit on the War Cabinet.
It was obvious, even to
Churchill, that Fadden would not be able to come to London, due to his
unstable political position.
The exact powers that this envoy was to
have were not discussed at length at this time.
Due to the tenuous
majority in the House, Fadden had great difficulty selecting an envoy.
Before Fadden8s choice could reach London, his Government had fallen.
Thus, the solution designed to appease the Australian public had not
34Hasluek, op. eit.„ p. 534.
93
solved the problem.
The Australians became even more interested in the American
position in these early days of September.
Constant speculation as to
the course the Americans would take was being voiced by the newspapers.
The negotiations between the U.S.A. and Japan have not
proceeded as well as had been expected. . . . President
Roosevelt is willing to meet Prince Konoye, but he proposed
certain basic conditions for the conference. These have not
been acceptable to Japan, and a gloomy view of the prospect
of negotiations is, therefore, taken in Washington. ^5
On September 15th, the same paper ran another article concerning Roosevelt
Washington is finally convinced that President Roosevelt
is in earnest and that the attempt to win the war without
fighting has been abandoned, according to the political ob­
server of the <fHew York Times.n He adds that the general
feeling now is.that America is at war . . . all factions agree
that we have reached the <fblood and tears" phase of war.. Many
regret that since we must have blood and tears, we cannot have
unity. . . . There are excellent reasons to believe that the
Germans timed their challenge to coincide with the conversa­
tions between America and Japan fThe Montana was just reported
sunk in the Atlantic], . . . Thus Germany undertook to prove
to Japan that the President1s.firmness was a bluff by sinking
a few American ships. . . . The President did not waver. Hitler
found out.3®
Two days later, the Bulletin reported that America, by President Roose­
velt *s broadcast on September 16 stating his firm stand, was now one
step closer to war,
Hews of this nature could not help but give encour­
agement to the Australians, who lay isolated as the Japanese menace
poised to strike.
It appeared to tisaa despite Churchill's periodic
assurances, that they might be doomed before anyone could rescue them.
35Sydney Morning Herald, September 4, 1941, p. 9«
36ibid., September 15, 1941, p. 1?.
94
Governzaeat officials of Australia were all too aware that Churchill was
Taeginnimg to think the situation in the Middle East and Egypt was more
important than the security of
Singapore
,57 As the importance of Singa­
pore went down in the Prime Minister6s eyes, the Australians had no
recourse but to look for encouragement elsewhere.
Their greatest hope
lay in a decision by America to go to war before it was too late— to©
late in this ease being after Australia was attacked.
At the time that these articles were appearing, a very much
different drama was unfolding between Fadden and Churchill,
The Aus­
tralian Cabinet had become convinced that with the threat of Japan only
momentarily stalled, their troops overseas in campaigns they considered
doomed (their ©pinion based on the outcome of the Greek campaign), the
only course was to recall their divisions,
pressing these wishes,
Fadden sent telegrams ex­
Ghurehill sums up the case very wells
, , , The new Government, under hard pressure from its oppo­
nents, was much concerned about the position of the Australian
division in Tobruk, They desired to collect their troops in
the Middle East into one force in order to give them an oppor­
tunity for refreshment, restoration of discipline and re-equip-
3%ansergh, op, cit,, p, 117, ^Marshall Sir John Dill, posi­
tively reasserted in May, 1941, as an accepted principle of imperial
strategy that 9in the last resort the security of Singapore comes be­
fore that of Egypt,9 This was a view which the United States military
advisors also entertained. But Mr, Churchill strongly dissented, , . .
Said Churchill, 5I would not tolerate the idea of abandoning the
struggle for Egypt, and was resigned to pay whatever forfeits were
exacted in Malaya, , „ ,8 And in such matters Mr, Churchill8s view was
apt to prevail. Of this the Australian Government was only too well
aware, and the knowledge brought it no reassurances, ,
95
meat, and to satisfy pmblie ©pinion in Australia„ . „ .
They therefore demanded their immediate relief by other forces„
Auehinleek protested strongly against this change. . =3“
Churchill felt that if he sent a message to Fadden furnishing all the
details on the importance of holding Tobruk, Fadden would certainly .
change his request.
This did net prove to be the ease, however.
In a
further attempt to make Fadden understand his situation, Churchill
(on Sept. 11$ 19%) sent him another dispatch along with General
Aueinieek's telegram stressing the physical impossibility of removing
the Australian troops so soon— (meaning in September and October since
relief was hoped for by November). Churchill went on to says
. . . If however you insist that the Australian troops must be
withdrawn, orders will be issued accordingly irrespective of
the cost entailed and the injury to future prospects. I trust
that you will weigh very carefully the immense responsibility
which you would assume before history by depriving Australia
of the glory of holding Tobruk till victory was won, which
otherwise, by &©d8s help, will be theirs f o r e v e r .39
But Fadden was not persuaded to change his request.
Thus Churchill sent
him a telegram on Sept. 15th reading s ^Orders will at ©nee be given in
accordance with your decision.
The maintenance of secrecy for the
hQ
present is of the highest consequence to all.*8
A much longer tele­
gram to Auehinleek from Churchill shows Churehill9s depth of under­
standing of Australian polities and his wish to keep unity with all
Commonwealth Governments ?
3^Churchill, op.eit.. p. 411.
39lbid., p. 413.
^Ibid.
96
I am grieved at Australian attitude, but I have long fear­
ed the dangerous reactions on Australian and world opinion of
our seeming to fight all our battles in the Middle East only
with Dominions troops. . . . 1 trust the Australian withdrawal
will not further delay your offensive. The situation has
already worsened. .
General Auehinleck was so deeply offended by the Australian decision that
he wanted to tender his resignation on grounds that he did not have the
confidence of the Government of Australia.
His resignation was turned
down by Churchill who then tried to ease the situation by having Oliver
Lyttelton, Minister of State, write to Auehinleck.
Lyttelton assured
Auehinleck of Australian confidence in his work and went on to say that,
I was astounded at Australian Government8s decision, being .
sure it would be repudiated by Australia if the facts could
be made known. Allowances must be made for a Government with
a majority only of one faced by a bitter Opposition, parts of
which at least are isolationist in outlook. ^
Thus, the second big conflict had been waged between the Aus­
tralian Government and Churchill.
The first had been Measles.* request
for permanent Australian membership on the Imperial War Council, other
than the Prime Minister.
This had been denied by Churchill.
However,
after Menzies8 resignation, Churchill did suggest an envoy be sent to
London.
This was not the answer the Australian Government wanted.
this envoy would not be a principal.
For
As Churchill stated, . . . Khe
would not be, could not be, a responsible partner in the daily work of
^Ibid. .
^Ibid., p. 414.
97
our Government„
Thereforea the problem had mot been solved.to the
satisfaction of the Australian Government.
It remained a constant
source of irritation to the Australian Government that their troops
should be used and the Government not be informed until after the deci­
sion was made.
Australian officials wantfd to be on the talks at the
planning level.
This inadequate system was to plague the Government
for the duration of the war and cause a great deal of hard feelings.
The second conflict, much more intenses was eventually solved to the
satisfaction of the Government, in that the Australian troops were
removed from Tobruk,
Underlying both of these conflicts was one feature,
the security of. Singapore.
No one was more aware than the Australians,
that the importance of Singapore had touched bottom with Churchill.
They had no illusions that it was impregnable.
Now that Japan had been
deprived of her overseas oil supplies, she might decide to attack the
defenseless Malaya at any moment.
Since America8s policy was puzzling,
to say the least, and her actions could not be predicted with any assur­
ance, and since Churchill did not seem disposed to see the seriousness
of the situation in the Far East, the Australian Government, going
through many domestic crises, felt that their security was in having
their troops where they could offer the best defense.
The attitude of
Churchill and Roosevelt to knock out Germany first and then turn to
Japan did not help much.
The domestic political crises never ceased to command the atten-
^.3ibid,, p. 845.
98
tion ef the Australian public throughout August, September and October.
What so many had hoped for finally ©eeured.
Fadden was forced to
resign on October 4ths not on the question of foreign affairs but on
its budget request.
On this occasion, both independents (Coles and
Wilson) overthrew the existing government by voting with Labour.
Curtin
was selected as the new Prime Minister and took office on October 15th.
Curtin8s new government was to be anything faut rfa face-lifting device."
He was ready to step in and lead the country down a new path.
The
change to a Labour Government came at a time of rising hope in the pos­
sibility of averting war with Japan.
There had been perhaps some inat­
tention to foreign affairs, by the public, during the political skirmishes,
but the Australian optimism was not simply a failure by Australia to read
the portents.
It also reflected news from elseiahere, inasmuch as a hope­
ful picture was being presented to the Australian Government by the United
States and the United Kingdom.
All that was needed to complete the pic­
ture and bring more confidence were assurances that Australian troops
were being removed from Tobruk.
Upon assuming his office, Curtin assured the people that there
would be no change in the war effort— it would continue at the maximum.
He still considered it a prime objective that the Australian voice be
heard effectively in the making of political and strategic decisions in
London.
He felt that the main point was not membership in the War
Cabinet.but the presence of a Minister in London to press constantly
the Australian viewpoint.
In this ease, it meant a Minister in London
stressing the need for capital ships at Singapore.
Curtih went so far
99
\
as to say that the Australian war effort was contingent on this fact„
If capital ships were sent to Singapore, then he would feel inclined to
have Australian troops fight overseas.
At the same time, Curtin em­
phasized that war expenditures would have to be stepped up.
He had been
in office less than half a month when he made a broadcast appeal on be­
half of the amount of $100,000,000 war lean he had brought before
Parliament.
According to Professor Partridge„ this was ftan enormous
step in a budget which had otherwise been p e a n u t s . I n this meas­
ure, Curtin had the backing of Fadden, the leader of the Opposition
Party.
The new Prime Minister also was in me way ready to acquiesce in
the prevailing Anglo-American view of the war situation, that is, the
Atlantic first, the Pacific second.
emphasized until later.
This view, however, would not be
With Curtin came the birth of an obvious Aus­
tralian foreign policy.
Churchill seized upon the opportunity of a new prime minister
to contact Curtin concerning the withdrawal of troops. On October 14th,
he sent this telegram to Curbing
I feel it right to ask you to reconsider once again the
issue raised in my telegram to your predecessor. I have heard
again from General Auehimleck that he would be very greatly
helped and eonvenieneed if the remaining Australian troops
could stay in Tobruk until the result of the approaching
battle is decided. I will not repeat the arguments which I
have already used, but I will only add that if you felt able
to consent, it would not expose your troops to any undue or
invidious risks, and would at the same time be taken very
kindly as an act of comradeship in the present struggle. 5
^Partridge s
^Churchill,
p. hl6.
100
Inasmuch as Curtin8s Government did not desire to reverse his predecessor8s
decision, Churchill was forced to inform the General that the Australian
troops were to be relieved„
Disquieting news reached the Australian people that in the midst
of Japanese=Ameriean talks the Japanese Government suffered a shake-up
and General iBjo had become Premier on October l?th.
The newspapers con­
veyed this event to the people. "Fears in the Democracies that Japan
intends to make some warlike move grew during the weekend following the
announcement of the personnel and policy of the new Army-controlled
Cabinet in Tokyo, , ,
Die Australian newspapers throughout the end
of October reported that it appeared certain that although Americans did
not want war, war was surely moving toward them.
Curtin received a bit of encouraging news from Sir Earle Page,
Australia8s Envoy Extraordinary, who had dropped off for a visit to the
United States, on his way to London,
Page had learned in Washington
of the reinforcement of the Phillipines and the planned military buildup
which was to reach completion by early 194-2, He reported to Curtin that
General Marshall had said that such a buildup would be such a serious
menace to Japan that she would be forced to withdraw from the Axis,
A
few days later, Curtin received another telegram from an entirely dif­
ferent source that was even more encouraging, On Oct, 26th, Churchill
telegraphed that he was sending the Prince ttf Wales to join the Repulse
in the Indian Ocean to further deter Japan,
He also mentioned that four
Herald, October 20, 194-1, p» 1,
101
more battleships would be sent as soon as they were ready,
Churchill
went ©n to say that it was his ©pinion, and that of his advisors, that
Japan realized that she had overextended herself and after the five
years ©f war with China would not risk further war unless or until
Russia had been decisively broken.
In another telegram ©n quite another
matter, Churchill wrotes
Our new fast minelayer, Latona, was sunk and the destroy­
er Hero damaged by air attack last night in going to fetch
the last twelve hundred Australians remaining in Tobruk,
Providentially, your men were not on board. I do not know
our casualties. Admiral Cunningham reports that it will not
be possible to move these twelve hundred men till the next,
dark period, in November. Everything in human power has been
done to comply with your wishes .^7
Taking everything into consideration, the situation had brightened
considerably for Australia.
By the middle of November, Page had reached London and the War
Cabinet was considering his strongly prepared ease for the further
strengthening of Singapore,
Churchill used this occasion to express
his view that “the correct strategy was to move armed strength from
theatre to theatre as the situation changed, and that consequently it
would be an error to move forces to the Far East . . . where they might
remain inactive for a year
He further went on to say that if
Japanese aggression should take place, it would be British policy, even
if it meant sacrifices, to wait until President Roosevelt took action.
^7Churehill, op. eit,, p. 4-1?.
^®Hansergh, op. eit., p. 122.
102
Then Churchill would, act "not within the hoar, but within the minute.”
One thing was certain, Churchill was not going to be caught fighting
a war in the Far East without American assistance.
On this subject,
the Australian Government took exception to Churchill8s view.
For
they believed that the British nations should act as one, with or with- .
out American assistance.
Although this was a patriotic stand for the
Australian Government, Churchill did not regard it as sane, To begin
fighting the Japanese alone in the Pacific was clearly out of the realm
of physical possibility.
But to the Australians, who wanted to hear
that Britain would defend them, Churchill8s words rang with insincerity
and suggested reluctance to protect part of the British Commonwealth.
As Churchill6s feelings became known to the Australian people,
they could not help but turn elsewhere for encouragement and reassurance.
He was no longer their shining hero offering promises of an impregnable
Singapore that would be able to hold the Japanese menace until the
British Fleet arrived.
Instead, he was the war leader of Great Britain
#io had a huge task on his shoulders and seemingly did not appreciate
the fear of attack felt by the defenseless Australians.
His assurance
that it was not within Japan's power to invade Australia did not help
a frightened people. His attitude that the Allies might have to suffer
losses until Britain found the opportunity to send troops only reawakened
the Australians to the fact that Britain was extremely weak in the Pacific.
This was expeeially true when one considers that the losses could
very well be Australian lives.
% late November and early December,
Australians were beginning to see the situation more starkly,
A sense
103
of iapendiag danger settled over the country,
"Where to turn?”
"What would happen when war came?” were questions echoed throughout the
country.
It appeared that Churchill could not or would not give satis­
faction to the Australians, It still was difficult to rely on the
United States when their actions were so unpredictable and a champion
was needed immediately.
But what to do?
In the wake of this distress
Curtin made a broadcast, "The dangers in the Pacific are very.great,
Nobody in Australia knows the hour at which we may be called upon to
defend ourselves , ,
On November 29th» "Curtin » , , said he passed from that hope
to a consideration of the impending war and revealed the core of Aus­
tralian anxiety, , „ „ There seemed to him to be a grave danger of
further armed aggression by Japan without any arms intervention by
the United States,"5©
That evening his worst suspicions were realized
when the news reached him that Japan was about to attack Thailand,
Curtin9s immediate reaction was to ask what Britain intended to. do
about it, It is at this point that there, was a complete divergence
of view between the Australian Government and Churchill,
51
Churchill8s
answer to Curtin's question was completely unsatisfactory as far as
Curtin was concerned.
According to Churchill* the British attitude was
I
^Bulletin (Sydney)* November 26* 1941* p, 6.
5%asluek* op, oit,, p. 548,
53-Ibld,, p, 554,
104
to "march In line with the United States of A m e r i c a . I n the event
of a Japanese attack, Britain would immediately declare war on Japan,
but otherwise she would wait for America.
The Australian view was still
that the British Commonwealth should act with or without American assis­
tance.
Aware of Churchill"s views, Curtin's objective was to align
Australia with the United States in every way he could and encourage
the United States to enter the war in the event of an attack on Thailand.
In this regard, the Ministerial Statement issued by Dr. Evatt, Minister
of External Affairs on November 2?th takes on added significances
. . . At the outset I take the opportunity of stating that the
recent change of government in this country does not imply any
vital change in Australia's foreign policy. Indeed, through
the instrumentality of the Advisory Mar Council, continuity in
external policy is assured to a substantial degree. .’. .
Australia has a supreme and special interest in preventing
forcible aggression in the Pacific. . . . At this difficult
time in our history, Australia is fortunate in having the
friendship and cooperation of the President and the people of
the United States of America. The policy of that country has
been governed in the main by her determination to safeguard
against all forms of aggression the Western Hemisphere and her
important Pacific territories. . . Thus the objectives of
the United States and of Britain are similar.53
As the "Yellow Peril" moved southward, Australia could only
helplessly count her defenses.
"At home Australia had one armoured
division with very little armour and seven semi-equipped and semi­
trained militia divisions.
She had a numerically large air force but
52Ibid.
5%. V. Evatt, Foreign Policy of Australia. (Sydneys
Robertson LTD, 1945), p. 1.
Angus and
105
it was .chiefly a training organization* » .
It was obvious to
Curtin that New Zealand and Australia would not be able to defend the
Southwest Pacific alone, "Whatever the reasons„ it was plain that Churchill
did not intend to defend the area any more than he had already done until
the United States took action.
The only course of action left ©pen to
Curtin was to appeal to Roosevelt,
i^Sir Frederick Eggleston,
p. 395°
CHAPTER V
Australian , American / A ©
pacific security
Australian governmental officials were keenly aware that Great
Britain8s power in the Pacific had declined tremendously since 1939°
Aware also that Australia8s power was not sufficient to stop any Japan­
ese onslaught— indeed 8 she did not even assume she could hold her own
country— Australians looked feverishly for someone to fill the vacuum
created by Britain8s decline„ Australia had been trying to wake America
from her complacency so that America might assume the leadership in the
Pacifico
She had not had much success„ But at no time, thus far, had
she put America first and Great Britain second in her thoughts of Pacific
security.
The practice had always been to look to. Great Britain for
leadership, attempting always to make the Australian viewpoint known to
the Prime Minister,
In the ease of impending invasion of Thailand, for
example, Curtin asked Churchill what he was going to do if the invasion
took place,
When Churchill replied that he was going to declare war on
Japan and then wait for America to take action, Curtin8s reaction was that the British Commonwealth should act together and not wait for America
The reason for this was rather obvious, Australia wanted Great Britain
to commit herself in the Pacific and consequently come to the defense of
Australia,
Despite the fact that she had been terribly disappointed in
Great Britain in the past, Australia still had faith in the mother country
Australians had a hard time understanding the policy of America„
They felt that war was drawing closer to the United States with each day,
hut were unsure whether America would be in the war before Australia's
position was jeopardized.
This question plagued the Australians who now
became committed wholeheartedly to the task of trying to awaken America
to her responsibility in the Pacific.
Instrumental in presenting the Australian viewpoint was E. G.
Casey, Australian Ambassador to America.
Casey was the first diplomatic
representative appointed by Australia to a foreign country.
The reason
for this appointment, which occurred in If39$ was stated very adequately
by Caseys
. . . We recognized that it had become unreasonable and inap­
propriate to continue to ask the United Kingdom to watch all
•ease, interests throughout the world, and that we should new
shoulder some of this burden ourselves. Moreover, we had
reached a state where Australia had problems of its own which
could not be properly handled except by Australians.^
Casey considered it part of his job in the United States to make Australia
as widely known as possible with as much speed as possible.
Upon his
arrival in the United States, early in If^O, he got right to the business
at hand.
When asked what the attitude of the United States was, Presi­
dent Roosevelt replied, in very diplomatic terms, that the element of
distance denoted a declining interest on the part of the United States.
Throughout If40, Casey made himself known to those people who made and/or
3-Casey, R. G., Friends and Neighbors. (East Lansing:
State College Press, 1955)‘$ pV lo...
The Michigan
IQS
molded American public opinion.
It had been stressed earlier by Cordell
Hull that with the presidential election coming soon,, the President had
to be careful not to get. too far ahead of public opinion.
As Casey saw
it
There was no doubt that President Roosevelt and Cordell Hull
were convinced that Britain was fighting America8s war, and
the United States would have to take her proper place beside
us in due course, but to achieve this, they were dependent
on American public opinion being convinced that American
interests were really and demonstrably at stake, and in 1940
this was not the case.2
As the months flew by while Casey was representing Australia in
Washington, the American view toward the war changed.
Casey reported
each of these changes, however slight they might have been, to the Aus­
tralian Prime Minister.
At the same time, he recorded in his diary$
"Eighteen months in Washington impressed bn me the usefulness of an
Australian diplomatic post in the United States. . . . Umitbd Kingdom
representatives are naturally so engrossed in their own problems that
'Dominion problems tend to be overlooked or insufficiently appreciated.
By November of 1941, Casey was able to record the noticeable effect of
his presence in Washington.
"Since Lend-Lease has been in operation, we
have been getting American requisitions approved and orders placed two
or three times more quickly, relatively, than other countries, including
the United Kingdom .C a se y 8s importance to Australia in Washington
2Ibid.„ p. 40
%b i d ., p. 68
should never fee minimized.
Through his endeavors, a country that was a
great distance away was brought closer so that when, the time for action
cames the bonds of friendship were already tightly tied.
In addition to Casey8s appointment, Sir John Latham had been
appointed First Australian Minister to Japan on August 18, 1940.
For
some time previously9 Australia had been complaining of the lack of
communication between Britain and the other members of the British
Commonwealth. lews about Japan was slow in coming and many times was
slanted to the viewpoint of the home government.
Australia felt a
strong need to know what was currently happening in Japan.
Beside this
desire to be well informed about the movements of the Japanese govern­
ment was the wish to avoid a war with Japans if at all possible.
There­
fore 9 the appointment of Latham had a dual purpose and was designed to
promote peace between the two countries.
Despite the fact that Casey kept Australia informed on America’s
reactions* Australians did not understand that American leaders were not
seeing the same series of events in the same light.
Curtin never did
quite understand that Roosevelt agreed with Churchill that the danger in
the Atlantic was the chief danger.
Recognizing that Great Britain was
occupied elsewhere and that the Pacific was not of vital importance to
her, Curtin began looking to the United States for diplomatic leadership
in the Pacific.
Even so, Australia hastened to inform the American
Government that
» , . defensive measures to deter Japan from aggression
Should not close the door to an understanding with Japan so
long as no vital interests were sacrificed during the course
of any discussions and therefore that any warning to Japan
110
sfeomld reiterate the willingness and desire of the British
Commonwealth fand America] to seek a general settlement in
the Pacific: whieh proteeted the rights of all parties „5
Australia clearly was net willing to face a showdown alone against a
strong powero
And Americans policy did not encourage the expectation
of American troops rushing to Australia8s defense„
But 8'as each day passed in early December and the news of the
impending attack on Thailand filled the paperst Australians grew more
apprehensive, Churchill tried to relieve these apprehensions by issu­
ing encouraging reports that the prospect of a Japanese attack seemed
very unlikely» More than words were needed to satisfy the Australians„
Churchill.knew this and had already sent the Prince of Wales and the
Repulse to Singapore, where they arrived on December 2 9 1941.
On
December 4a The Sydney Morning: Herald was filled with a number of
articles concerning the arrival of these ships. One article said;
•Australia can be comforted from the knowledge that such powerful units
are so near her in the event of trouble
Another stated;
••The arrival
of a British Fleet at Singapore is hailed . „ „ as Britain8s answer to
Japanese threats of a thrust from Indo-China against T h a i l a n d T h e
Australians were greatly encouraged by this show of strength from the
mother country.
Churchill had sent these ships to Singapore ‘•to exercise that
SHasluekg Paul,
op. eit., p. 546.
^Sydney Morning Herald. December 4, 1941» p. 9.
?Ibid.s p. 2.
Ill
kind of vague menace which capital ships of the highest quality whose
whereabouts is unknown can impose upon all hostile naval calculations.”8
A tremendous importance was placed on these two ships by both Churchill
and Curtin,
Still another effort to restore confidence to the Australians
was being accomplished.
This effort, the evacuation of Australian troops,
was still very much against Churchill’s advice.
carried out and at a considerable loss.
However, it was being
Although done in secret, it
gave Australian officials a safe feeling to know that soon they would
be defended by their own troops.
'As encouraging as the previously cited articles may have been,
another article in the same paper on the same date offered consolation
to them from another quarters
"The ’Hew York Herald Tribune8 sayss
’The United States of America must now be prepared to accept war in the
Far East at the moment Japan chooses to take the colossal risk.
This
does not mean that the U.S.A. is ready to fight for Singapore, Burma,
or the Indiesj but for its own security in a civilized future.8
As
grim and foreboding as this may have sounded, the Australians could only
read it with hope. Hope that America would soon, be in the war.
Each day brought fresh reports of the movements of the Japanese.
Some were hearsay, others were fact.
fears of Australia were realized.
On December 7, 1941, the worst
In one night, with one deadly blow,
Japan secured virtual command of the Pacific.
^Churchill, on. cit., p. 615.
^Sydney Horning Herald, op. pit.
Australia’s trained
112
divisions.were still overseas, her aircraft were almost nonexistent, and.
her long coastlines were indefensible.
Curtin announced over the radio
and in the newspapers s ,sWe are at war with Japan.
That has happened
because in the first instance, Japanese naval and air forces launched an
unprovoked attack on British and United States territory. . . . This is
our darkest heur,*^®
come.
Curtin was mistaken, their darkest hour was yet to
The “Yellow Peril® was going to move much closer than Pearl Harbor.
The world was shocked by this event.
Churchille upon hearing the
report over the wireless, called President Roosevelt immediately. When
he was able to reach him, the Presidents comment was, "It's quite true.
They have attacked us at Pearl Harbor.
now.
We are all in the same boat
Mot only were the Allies shocked by this momentous Japanese
attack, but so was Hitler.
The attack on Pearl Harbor was a striking
example of the disunity of the Axis Powers.
The major effort of Germany and Italy in the West was spent
before the Japanese ally irrupted in the East. . . . Far from
strengthening the non-interventionists in the United States,
as Ribbentrop hoped, the Japanese by their attack on the
American Fleet had done the one thing necessary to unite
popular sentiment behind an interventionist President.
When the Japanese struck at Pearl Harbor, Australia began to
face the reality that, for the first time in her century and a half of
existence, her own country might become a battlefield.
lOlbid., December 9» 1 # 1 , p. 7.
Uchurchill, ©p. elt.. p. S@5*
•^Mansergh, op. eit., pp. 126=27.
Unlike the
113
Americans9 who panieked on the West Coast of America, the Australians
faced the situation with stiff resolve„ After Pearl Harbor enlistment
figures jumped sharply.
Curtin had promised he would not put a selec­
tive service act in, and he did not at this time.
The danger became so
obvious, as did the need for home forces, that it is estimated that five
out of six Australian adult males were under arms, or engaged in war
13
industry of some kind after December 7, 19^1.
The situation was to
get much worse and, as it did, Australia braced herself for the supreme
crisis— the invasion of her homeland.
The welcoming news that America had entered the war was almost
stifled by the news of her losses at Pearl Harbor. As Roosevelt related
this tragic news to his people, Churchill was calling a meeting to review
the naval position in the Pacific. On December 9th, this is how he saw
its
. „ . We tried to measure the consequences of this fundamental
change in our war position against Japan. We had lost the
command of every ocean except the Atlantic. Australia and New
Zealand and all the vital islands in their sphere were open to
attack. We had only one key weapon in our hands. % e Prince
of Wales and the Repulse had arrived at Singapore. 1$
'
Churchill further stated that he toyed with the idea of sending the two
British ships to join those American ships left in the Pacific.
would have been a grand, heroic, and symbolic gesture.
It
However, on the
next day, Churchill heard that the decision of how best to use The Prince
T3Timperley, H.J., Australia and the Australians. New .Yorks
Oxford University Press, 19%, p. 29. >
l^Churchill, op. clt.„ p. 615.
114
of Wales and the Bepulse had been taken out of his hands»
To the horror and dismay of the British and Australians alike 8
the Japanese had sunk the two British battleships in the Gulf of Siam
on December 109 1941.
These two ships that had brought so much hope to
the British Dominions in the Pacific were completely destroyed by
Japanese bombers<, Churchill records his reaction to the news thus:
o » , So I put the telephone down. I was thankful to be
alone. In all the war I never received a more direct shock.
The reader of these pages will realize how many efforts,
hopes, and plans foundered with these two ships. . « »
There were no British or American capital ships in the
Indian Ocean or the Pacific except the American survivors
of Pearl Harbor, who were hastening back to California.
Over all this vast expanse of waters Japan was supreme,
and we everywhere weak and n a k e d . 5
The combination of naval losses suffered by the Americans and British
gave the Japanese full command of the Pacific.
They how could attack
at any point in the Far East with any force. Fortunately, the area was
so vast that to expand too far southward would cause them to overextend
themselves.
But, how many countries would go down before this point
was reached?
Newspapers and radios blared the reports of the Japanese successes
in the Pacific.
However, it was not until December 16, 1941, that the
full news was made official in a statement by Dr. Evatt to the Australian
House of Representatives. Evatt chose this moment to sum up Australia $s
reaction to the Japanese victories in the Pacific and in Southeast Asia.
l^lbid., p. 620.
115
»
. % the extension of the war to: the Pacific j, the Com­
monwealth has been placed in a situation of special danger»
Before war came into the Pacific„ we had entered into com­
mitments to the best of our abilitya Our airmen are fight­
ing in England, They are training in Canada, Our sailors
have fought their ships in many of the seven seas„ Our
soldiers have fought with indomitable courage on distant
shores in Europej, in Africa, in Asia*
.
But what of the defense of these shores? The Govern­
ment has been stocktaking» It has inherited a situation in which* for one reason or another* the defense of our country
has been treated as a subordinate and subsidiary part of the
distant war. From now onwards we shall be thrown back more
and more upon our own resources» . „ » So far as we are con­
cerned, we shall continue our efforts to assist in the pro­
curement of a full alliance between Russia and all the
enemies of Japan to the end that these engaged against the
three Axis Powers shall form a solid and impregnable
,
barrier against those whose will it is to dominate the world. °
The fact"that America had
the Allies could not erase the
fact that the Japanese were having their way in the Pacific „ Host
Australians agreed with the views stated in the Bulletin on December
17$
fFTn the long run, it will be shown that the Japanese lost more
than they gained when they attacked Hawaii „ , . . Divided, the British
Empire and the United States— behind which stand most of the LatinAmerican Republics— are conquerable. United, they can and will conquer
.
.*17. But, meanwhile, the chain of victories of Pearl Harbor, Guam,
Sarawak, and Tarakan revealed unsuspected Japanese strength and gave
initial weaknesses on the part of the Allies,
A dominant diplomatic
aim of Australia always had been to prevent a situation in which
Japan would be at war with Australia without the United States being
l%vatt» op» cit o, p, 75»
^-^Bulletin (Sydney), December 17, 1941, p.
8.
at war -with.Japan at the same time.
This had been achieved» but certainly
net in a manner that Australia had foreseen.
America had declared war on
Japan, but she was so crippled by her losses that, no one could estimate
how long it would take her to recover.- In the meantime9 Australians
were clamoring for aid.
Each day seemed to bring bad news t© the Aus­
tralians. : On December 24th, Wake fell.
Crown colony on Hong Kong fell.
On December 25th, the British
During these last few weeks, the air
and naval forces of the Netherlands East Indies and the United States
had done appreciable damage to Japanese warships and transports, but,
in comparison with the Japanese conquests, these damages were meager.
As the days went by, the Japanese war machine rolled on.
Telegrams between Churchill and Curtin increased in frequency.
They exemplify the inability of each to appreciate the situation as seen
by the other.
Churchill had to make decisions that involved the entire
war effort and, although he sympathized with the Australians, he felt he
could net jeopardize Britain8s position in the other theaters by send­
ing the aid that Curtin requested to the Pacific.
Curtin, on the other
hand, saw, the situation grow more alarming with each day and continually
felt that Churchill was not giving enough urgency to the matter,
. . . The Australian Government lacked full confidence, not only
in Britain8s appreciation of Pacific perils, but also in her
readiness to help within her range of active comprehension, be­
cause of the strategic preconceptions her government entertained.
So it was that in the face of military and naval disasters which
seemed daily to bring,nearer.the prospect of Japanese invasion,
many Australians concluded that Britain had deliberately neglected
the Pacific in an understandable if mistaken concentration on
the European and Middle Eastern theatres of war, and mere ser­
iously, that her strategy was determined by an incorrect and
complacent underestimate of Japanese power
11?
Within the telegrams sent t© Ghortiaill from Gurtin tms invariably
the message stressing the need for reinforcements for Singapore. .Cmrtin
was fully aware that the reinforcements that he requested would have to
some from the Middle East and he said"so.
He also let it be known that
if Malaya was to be saved,'the deeisions and action had to be taken
immediately.
He reiterated the promises made by the United Kingdom
Government of an impregnable Singapore.
Upon these promises had been .
based all of Australia8® defense plans.
Australia had dispatched troops
overseas in the light of assurances regarding Singapore. As the Yellow
.
.
'
4 ■ ■■
,
..
Peril swept southward j, Gmrtirn did not feel that Churchill was doing all
in his power to help in the Pacific. The Australian Government became
even more outspoken in their criticisms of the Imperial Government.
One consequence of the American entry into World War IX was that
attention shifted from exclusively Gommomwealth organisations to Anglo- .
American cooperation.
In the. Pacific, it certainly appeared that the
United States was going to have to take the lead in stopping the
Japanese.
At least this is the way Ourtin saw the picture.
As Prime '
Minister of Australia during Australia's most trying period of existence,
Curtin had never gotten along to© well with Churchill.
aware of this than Churchill when he saidt
No one was more
"At this moment however, when
pressures from all sides were so fierce, I was too conscious of the depth
and number of the differences in outlook that divided us, . .
It .
became Curtin's objective to stir the great power ©f America into action
Churchill, Winston, The Second World War. Vol. A, Hinge of
Fate. (Bostons ,.Houghton Mifflin Company1
1
^ ifli")' p. 5®
118
in the Paeifie8 especially since he was not having tmieh .success with
Churchill „
Oa December 2?» 19^1» Curtin delivered the most controversial
speech of his career» Published first in the Melbourne Herald and later
carried by the other major papers, Curtin said, in parts
We refuse to accept the dictum that the Pacific struggle
must be treated as a subordinate segment of the general con­
flict „ %- that it is not meant that any one of the other
theatres of war is of less importance than the Pacific, but
that Australia asks for a concerted plan evoking the great­
est strength at the Democracies8 disposal, determined upon
hurling Japan back.
The Australian Government therefore regards the Pacific
struggle as primarily one in which the United States and
Australia must have the fullest say in the direction of the
Democracies8 fighting plan.
Without any inhibitions of any kind, I make it quite
clear that Australia looks to America, free of any pangs as
to our traditional links with the United Kingdom,
We know the problems that the United Kingdom faces„ We
know the constant thredt of invasion. We know the dangers of
dispersal of strength. But we know too that Australia can go,
and Britain can still hold on.
We are therefore determined that Australia shall notgo,
and we shall exert all our energies toward the shaping ofa
plan, with the United States as its keystone, which will give
to our country some confidence of being able to hold out
until the tide of battle swings against the enemy.
Summed up, Australian external policy will be shaped
toward" obtaining. Russian aid, and working out ,with the
United States, as the major factor, a plan of Pacific
strategy, along with British, Chinese, and Dutch forces. ^0
Behind this speech lay many grievances.
Regardless of the
encouraging words of Churchill, Curtin felt that they were no more
than that, words, Although Churchill,assured Curtin he was doing
everything possible, he did not feel that it would be wise to remove
forces from the Middle East, where victory was so near.
2QIbid.. p. 8.
To Curtin,
119
■she eduld not or would not see the whole picture, Churchill8s promises
were not enough.
The faet that Australia still did not have what she
considered her rightful role in the Imperial War Council added more
fuel to the fire.
The Australian Government was keenly aware that she
lay naked in the wake of Japanese aggression as a result of her troops
serving in the Middle East,
The naval power, on which she had so long
relied for her protection, had been swept away, if only temporarily.
Her coastline, where all her cities were located, would be impossible
to. defend,
pected,
A reaction due to the aforementioned conditions, was ex­
But few in Australia or abroad, were ready for Curtin’s dec­
laration,
Curtin’s speech was received with varying degrees of feeling
from the people he represented.
meant.
Some frankly wondered exactly what he
Others said that even though theirjPrime Minister had been
undiplomatic, he had hit the nail on the head,
that British power had collapsed.
"For it appeared obvious
The only question was, could America
21
fill the vacuum?1
1
In some circles, the opinion was voiced that "the
22
Pacific was now an American responsibility,"
Whether Curtin intended
his speech to be so or not, it was "in essence a challenge to the AngloAmerican strategic policy which gave priority to the European theatre.
23-Professor Partrodge, on, eit.
9?
Professor Miller,
120
Chmrehill was extremely critical ©f Curtin8s speech» He felt
sure that it did. net represent Australian feeling.
He contacted several
high officials who supported this view, and then went to the task of
replying to Curtin®s declaration.
and forth,
The telegrams once again flew back
Churchill explained again and again his motives concerning
the war effort and offered Curtin more reassurances, Curtin, in answer,
reminded Churchill of their agreement to relieve the 6th and 7th Aus­
tralian Divisions from the Middle East and continued to stress the
importance of Singapore, and the need for further .reinforcements due to
the absence of a main fleet.
It is possible that it is only a coinci­
dence that, after Curtin®s public declaration, Churchill saw fit to ful­
fill those demands that Curtin had been making for some time. Within a
few days. Prime Minister Churchill had agreed to the request that a
representative of the Australian Government be appointed to the War
Cabinet who would have a part in the formulation and direction of policy.
It was regarded as a great advantage to the Australian Government to have
someone in the Cabinet when arguments were shaped and tentative decisions
made,
Curtin was also able to secure the withdrawal of her troops from
the Middle East to the Pacific theater, a movement that had been a long
time in being carried out.
Later, Curtin was to be successful in
getting Australian representation on the Pacific War Council and the
appointment of General MaeArthur®s headquarters to Melbourne,
Meanwhile, the utterances from abroad, in reaction to Curtin®s
speech of December 27th, were such that he found it necessary to follow
up with another speech.
In this speechs dated December
30thg Curtin
assured the public that “Australia was steadfast in loyalty to the
British way of living and that Australians intended to preserve their
country as part of the British Commonwealth. . . 11
It was hoped that
this would placate those who had misinterpreted Curtin8s first article
as a denouncement of the British Commonwealth,
It had not been his
intention to break with the British Commonwealth.
Bor did he say in
his speech that the Pacific theater was the only theater of danger.
His appeal to America, though unorthodox, was realistic.
He was striv­
ing to announce to the one power that could help Australia put of what
appeared to be a hopeless situation that Australia looked to them for
military assistance.
In effect9 Curtin was saying the Australians
were ready to receive orders from America rather than from Great Britain,
who was powerless to help Australia.
Unfortunately, Curtin8s speech was
misread and misinterpreted by many, and caused rather difficult rela­
tions between Churchill and Curtin for the next few months.
Throughout January of 19^2, the
sula was being waged.
of British defenses.
battle for the Malayan Penin­
It took only a few weeks to reveal the weakness
Japan, with her superior air force, precise pre­
war study of the conditions in Malaya, infiltration of agents, superior
strength in land forces which were adept in jungle warfare, had every
advantage.
The British Commonwealth troops were forced to continuously
retreat.
The strategy "was to fight the battle for Singapore in Johore,
but to delay the enemy8s approach thereto as much as possible."^5 ihe
battles were exhausting to the British due to the Japanese successes
and the availability of fresh Japanese troops.
By the middle of Janaury9
General Wavell (who became Supreme Commander of the A.B.D.A. nations in
the Southwestern Pacific within a. few days) made it know to Churchill
that he had grave doubts of the ability of the British to maintain a
prolonged defense of Singapore.
Churchill, however, still believed that
Singapore would be able to hold out at least two months, thus giving
the British precious time.
Unfortunately, Churchill had not been com­
pletely informed on the status of the defenses of Singapore, as the
telegram from General Wavell was to prove.
Churchill wrotes
I must confess to being staggered by Wavell1s telegram of
the l6th and other telegrams on the same subject. It never
occurred to me for a moment . . that the gorge of the fort­
ress of Singapore, with its splendid moat half a mile to a
mile wide, was not entirely fortified against an attack from
the northward. . .2®
As the situation becameimre?idtear to Churchill, it began to take on a
nightmare quality.
He ordered the situation rectified, stating that
defenses should be built while troops fought to defend the northern
part of Johore.
As Wavell sent messages daily on the deteriorating
situation in Malaya, Churchill began to ponder the advisability of
diverting the reinforcements on their way to Singapore to Rangoon.
25churehill, on. eit., p. 42.
123
It appeared to Churchill that Singapore was doomed„ and if this were
trueg it was certainly not worth losing all those reinforcements and
aircrafto
However, the decision was not Churchill8s alone, since he
turned the matter over to the Chiefs of Staff who, in turn, gave the
responsibility to General Wavell, Allied Supreme. Commander„
The surprising outcome of the meeting of. the War Cabinet was
not the difficulty in solving a complicated problem, but that Curtin
was informed of the details of the meeting. Sir Earle Page, the Aus­
tralian representative, who had not been invited to the meeting, was
shown a copy of the minutes and consequently telegraphed Curtin of their
contents.
Curtin8s reply to Churchill dated January 23, 194-2, was in
the form of a severe reproach.
. . . Page has reported that the Defense Committee has been
considering the evacuation of Malaya and Singapore. After
all the assurances we have been given, the evacuation of
Singapore would be regarded here and elsewhere as an inex­
cusable betrayal. Singapore is a central fortress in the
system of the Empire and local defense. . . . We under­
stood it was to be made impregnable, and in any event it
was to be capable of holding out for a prolonged period
until the arrival of the main fleet. . . .
On the faith of the proposed flow of reinforcements,
we have acted and carried out our part of the bargain.
We expect you not to frustrate the whole purpose by evacua­
tion.
The trend of the situation in Malaya and the attack on
Rabaul are giving rise to a public feeling of grave uneasi­
ness at Allied impotence to do anything to stem the Japan­
ese advance, . . . ^7
Churchill was disturbed by Curtin8s telegram, especially the expression
libido, pp. 57-58
124
“’inexcusable betrayal,85 He felt that it was used unjustly.
He explains
that he was simply entertaining a variety of plans designed to avoid a
disaster that was sure to come if the present course was followed.
After due consideration, it was decided that all efforts should be
made to reinforce Singapore and maintain its defense„ Churchill makes
it abundantly clear that this decision was not due to Curtin8s message„
It was becoming apparent to him that the overwhelming opinion was
against the abandonment of what was known to be the focal point of
British defense in the Far East,
Added to this feeling, was the realiza­
tion of. the effect it would have on the Americans as they fought on so
stubbornly at Corregidor,
Soit was decided
mot to evacuate Singapore,
but rather to defend it as best they could.
In early Janaury, ithad been assumed that Singapore would be
able to withstand a siege for at least eight to ten weeks.
By mid-
January, with all things being considered, this view was no longer valid.
But no one was prepared for “the worst disaster, and largest capitula­
tion of British history,fr^® In any event, Singapore fell on February
15, 1942, one week after the Japanese began their assault.
The British
losses were tremendous, including "the loss of two-thirds of the 8th
Australian D i v i s i o n , B y Sunday, February 15th, there was only a few
days of food reserves left for the military, there was practically no
28Ibid,, p. 92.
2%etherimgton, John,
1954) p, 129 o
Blarney, (Melbourne 1 F, ¥, Cheshire,
125
gasoline left for vehicles, gun ammunition was very short, and the water
supply was not expected to last more than twenty-four hours.
Under these
conditions9 General Percival saw fit to surrender unconditionally to the
Japanese.
It was indeed a dark moment, filled with reeriminationas,
second thoughts, and anxiety.
Criticism from many circles was hurled at Churchill and the
Chiefs of Staff.
It seemed impossible that this British bastion of
defense could fall so quickly.
Prom one source came the statement;
The ease of the impregnable fortress of, Singapore is
a prime example of ill-thought-out and badly pursued
strategy. . . . Its loss stemmed from a compound of. mis­
takes starting. . . in 1921.*. . . In the end it turned
out to be not much better defended than by the paper
upon which politicians had printed the label "impregnable."
In 19^2 it was virtually given to the invaders who were
most grateful to acquire its useful facilities.3"
Others accused the Prime Minister of Britain of being so interested in
affairs elsewhere that he had not given the necessary attention and aid
to the Pacific.
Accusations continued, but they dissipated in the wake
of the continued Japanese aggression.
To Curtin, the man who had consistently begged for a reassess­
ment of the Singapore situation, the task of informing his people of
this latest catastrophe must have seemed dreadful.
In his statement,
over the radio, he referred to the fall of Singapore as Australia’s
Dunkirk.
He expressed the view that Australia was now in a battle
to save Australia.
Foulis
Australians were told that their worst fears
3°Highman, Robin. Armed Forces in Peacetime.
And Company LTD, 1962) p. 277.
*”
(London;
G.T.
126
seemed possible, a Japanese attack on their homeland appeared imminent.
Curtin, and later Evatt, told their listeners that in the light of recent
events it was necessary that they re-organize all their manpower and all
their physical resources, with great speed, in order to resist invasion.
Certainly events were proving that Curtin's message of forebod­
ing might be accurate.
In a scant five months all the bastions of
Western power in the East had been toppled.
The whole of the vast area
and riches of these islands had fallen under Japanese control.
On
February 19th* just four days after Singapore had fallen„ the Japanese
sent their bombers over Darwin, Broome and Wyndham and left these three
towns devastated.
„ . .The Japanese air raid on Port Darwin. . . was carried out
by a strong force of bombers and dive bombers. There was much
damage and many casualties and the raid was above all a remin­
der of the inability of Australia to defend her long coastline
without the return of her own forces or their equivalent and
additional assistance as well. The obstinacy of the Australian
Government, therefore, in insisting on the return to Australia
as soon as opportunity allowed of all the trained Australian
divisions overseas, and the unforgettable welcome accorded to
the first United States forces to land at Melbourne at the end
of February, 1942, alike stemmed from this realization. Aus­
tralians needed reassurance that their island continent was
not in fact destined to be left 'the orphan of the Pacific'
at the mercy of a Japanese invader possessing so many of the
dreadful attributes of legendary Yellow Peril.^
When Churchill asked the permission of Curtin to divert the Australian
division returning home to Rangoon, he was met with a flat negative.
Churchill went on to stress that without such reinforcement, Burma
^Mansergh, op. eit., p. 140.
12?
womM surely falls ,-No one was more aware of the situation in Southeast
Asia than Curtin„ However9 he felt that if one division were diverted,
other Australian reinforeements would be required*
The Australian
division was returned to Australia by way of Colombo.
Thus, tensions
continued to increase between the two prime ministers.
On Bareh 8th, the Japanese invaded Hew Guinea.
Australians saw
the attempts to gain Hew Guinea and the nearby islands of Hew Britain,
Hew Ireland, and the Solomons as the first step in the strategy of the
Japanese to launch an attack on their homeland.
tralia would have to fight or perish.
It appeared that Aus­
The fearful invasion never took
place, but that does not alter the fact that the threat was real and
grave.
Three attacks on the outwork of Port Moresby failed.
The threat
was to continue, with varying degrees of gravity, until the end of
September.
Meanwhile, conditions worsened in other areas of the Pacific,
By May of 1942, Rangoon, Java, Burma, and Corregidor had fallen.
Almost
the entire area-of Southeast Asia lay in the hands of the Japanese.
The only bright spot, in an otherwise gloomy picture, was the arrival
of General MaeArthur in Melbourne on March 17, 1942.
Added to this was
the Allied victory in the Battle of the Coral Sea waged May 4-8.
By
July, the Japanese were at the height of their power, having defeated
Great Britain, United States and the Motherlands.
The series of British defeats in the Far Easts the loss of Hong
Kong, Malaya, Singapore, and Burma, served to lower the prestige of
128
Britain in the eyes ©f the Australians» This British Dominion passed
into a partienlarly eritieal phase of sentiment0 Australians spoke
of ineffective military leadership^ ©f weaknesses in the Colonial struc­
ture and of the lack of appreciation for the Australian position in
the Pacific„ The speeches of Curtin and Evatt during the months of
March and April rang with accusations of the complacency of the United
Kingdom to the developments in the Pacific.
enough or in great enough numbers.
Kingdom had gone.
Aid was not coming fast
Their old reliance on the United
Australia now turned even more to the United States.
Therefores the speeches made in March and April took .on a dual purpose.
The second purpose9 and the more important8 of these speeches
was to stress the need for more efficient coordinated machinery in the
war effort in the Pacific. The broadcast of March lAth delivered by
Curtin was leveled directly at theUnited States„ as he said;
00 .We never regarded the Pacific asa segment of the greater
struggle. We did not insist that it was a primary theatre of
war9 but we did say and eventshave so far* unhappily, proved
us right,, that the loss of thePacific can be disastrous. , . .
Britain cannot, with all her commitments at the same time,
go all out in the Pacific. The responsibility falls on we fsie]
Australians. . . . I pledge you my word we will not fail. You,
as I have said, must be our leader. We will pull knee to knee
with you for every ounce of our weight.
. . . It is a matter of some regret to us that, even now, after
95 days, of Japan’s staggering advance south,, ever south, we.
have not obtained first-hand contact with America. Therefore,
we propose sending to you our Minister of External Affairs
Dr. H. V. Evatt , who is no stranger to your country, so that
we may benefit from his discussions with your authorities. . . .
It is now "work or fight" for everyone in Australia. . . . For
the first time in the history of this country, a complete call
up, or draft, as you refer to it in America, has been made. . . .
But I give you this warning; Australia is the last bastion
129
between the West Coast ©f America and the Japanese a If
Australia goesg the Americas are wide open e .
With the appointment of Dr. Evattg Australia ©nee again had
a representative in Washington.
Casey had been requested by Churchill
to serve as British Minister of State in the Middle East.
Evatt*s
messages to the U.S. House of Representatives stressed the need for
Australian=Ameriean cooperation, warned of the danger of underestimating
the strength of Japan, and entreated America to act quickly and decisive­
ly in the Pacific.
quality.
By September of 1942, Evatt8s speeches took on a new
By this time, the tide had turned.
The Japanese advance was
halted by Allied offensives launched in the Solomons and Hew Guinea.
Although Evatt continued to stress the necessity of coordinated action,
it is clear that he was pleased with the quantity and quality of the aid
received by Australia from America.
The situation in the Pacific was
indeed brighter as the Japanese suffered reverses in the Coral Sea,
Midway and the Solomons.
Thereafter, the Allies regained many of the
islands and also invaded such Japanese possessions as Gilbert, Marshall
and Marianas Islands, as well as Two Jima and Okinawa.
The war was not
over, but clearly the danger to the homeland of Australia had receded.
As the danger receded and the cooperation between America and Australia
increased, a sigh, of relief could be heard.
Australia had finally found
a power strong enough to protect her island continent.
CHAPTER H
QOICLFSIOH
As the tide of battle turned and the immediate danger to their
homeland subsided8 Australians began to re-evaluate the pieture. The
invasion that they had expected never materialized» But the effect
that the possibility of such an attack had on their countrymen would
not be easily erased» Australia would never be the same.
She emerged
from World War II with a new resolve that had been shaped by her
perilous isolation in 1941=2e lever would she forget her helplessness at that time.
The awareness that the United Kingdom was more interested in
Europe tha% in Asia* and hence had been so complacent about developments
in the Pacific that she had definitely underestimated the power of Japan*
caused great misgivings on the part, of Australians,
This* coupled with
Australia8s minor role in the making of Pacific strategy when she was
likely to be the victim of any miscalculation* served further to widen
the gap between Mother Country and Dominion Government,
Australians
emerged from World War II with a determination to secure for themselves a
position in the inner circle where Britain8s policies were made.
No more
would they quietly acquiesce in British dicta when those views, were contrary
to those of Australia,
weight,
She must be heard and her opinions must carry seme
Australia could not be satisfied as a mere.echo of United Kingdom
foreign policy,
The fact that she had turned to the United States in
131
her hear of need did not alter her desire to he an effective member
of the British Commonwealth.
Instrumental in molding Australian publie opinion along these
lines was the Prime Minister of Australia9 Curtin« He was an Australian
nationalist with a strong will to keep the identity of the country frora
being submerged in a wider imperial unity0 His aim was to safeguard \
Australiae To do so, he felt it necessary that his country have a
bigger role in the making of British policy.
He was loud in his pro™
tests, and at times, rather undiplomatic„ But he had learned through the
force of events that the easy security that Australia had once enjoyed ,,
because she was a member of the British Empire was gone,
Curtin told,
his people that the place which Australia would occupy in the Pacific after
the war could never be the same as it was up to 1939•
He stressed that
Australia, along with New Zealand, should be able to initiate and for~a
mulate Pacific policies, rather than just be heard.
This became a.
recurrent theme in the speeches of Australian leaders.
It was further
proposed that Australia receive the support of all the United Kingdom
so that she could carry out this role effectively,
Curtin emphasized _
that he saw Australia as the power that would stand for democracy in .
the South Pacific,
But to do so effectively meant that not only Great .,
Britain but also the dominions, each in respect of its own area, should
have a greater share in making and carrying out policies.
The fact
that his views were supported by a majority of his countrymen was
132
indicated by the election results of 19^3 which returned him to office
by a substantial margin.
Curtin* then* was indeed expressing the views
of his people.
The events from 1939-1942 had forced Australia to mature rapidly.
Among other things„ she was compelled to formulate a foreign policy of
her own.
True* she did not have the adequate strength to enforce it
alone. However* she had found a new champion who now assured her that
the leadership of the Pacific would be placed back in the hands of a
Western power.
This champion was the United States.
They alone had
proved that they had the adequate strength to handle the situation.
Moreoverg the United States of America had the interests and ties in
the Pacific and this definitely was to the advantage of Australia. In
the years to come, Australia began to shape her foreign policy regarding
the Pacific so that it would be compatible with that of the United States.
This is not imply a complete acceptance of all details of American
policy, but rather shows a recognition that, in the last resort, the
security of Australia is closely tied to that of the United States.
Experiences in 1941-42 had impressed upon all those in Australia
and New Zealand the need for solid guarantees for the future of their
countries, Aware that the United States had interests in the Pacific
but also fully realizing that they lay on the perimeter of the United
States8 defensive system, Australia and New Zealand sought further
reassurances.
Fear that they might be expendable in the eyes of Wash­
ington, due to so many American commitments in other parts of the world.
133
eaused them t© seek guarantees.
This goal was realized when the Pacific
Security Agreement was signed by Australia and New Zealand with the
United States.
The war in Europe had begun on September 3» 1939» and ended on
May 8, 19^5»
The war in the Pacific had begun on December ?» 1941, and
ended on August 15, 1945«
At the outset, the countries of the British
Commonwealth were not prepared for a war of survival.
Ejy 1945, their
resources- were geared to the waging of a war on a scale hitherto uncon­
templated when Hitler8s armies began their march.
Australians anxieties
and consequent resolution to remain an independent democratic nation are
but part of the story of those years.
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Company, 1955.
The Ronald Press
Garter, Gwendolen. The British Commonwealth and International Seeurity.
■ Torontos The Ryerson Press, 19^7« '• 1
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Casey, Lord. Personal Experience 1939«1946. Londons
CompanFm^CTrBl27^~^~
Constable and
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Shepherd, Jack. Australia9s Interests and Policies in the Far East.
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Articles and Periodicals
Bulletin (Sydney)» 1940=1941
Grattan9 C e Hartley. IFThe Australian Political Seesaw, ^
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08Donnell, Wilfrid J. *British-Japanese Relations 1931-1939."
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Other Sourees
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. Interview with Professor Partridge, Head of Political
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University of Melbourne, Melbourne, Australia. Interviews with the
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