Download LATENT MADISONIANISM : BEFORE AND AFTER A PREFACE TO

LATENT MADISONIANISM : BEFORE AND AFTER
A PREFACE TO DEMOCRATIC THEORY
Congress and Foreign Policy . By Robert A. Dahl (1950 ; reprint
ed ., New York : W . W . Norton and Co ., 1964) . Pp . x, 305.
$1 .55 (paper).
A Preface to Democratic Theory. By Robert A . Dahl (1956 ; paper
ed., Chicago : Phoenix Books, 1963) . Pp . vi, 154. $1 .50
(paper).
Who Governs? Democracy and Power in an American City . By
Robert A . Dahl (New Haven : Yale University Press, 1961).
Pp . xii, 355 . $2 .75 (paper).
Modern Political Analysis . By Robert A . Dahl (Englewood Cliffs,
N . J . : Prentice-Hall, Inc ., 1963 ; 2nd ed ., 1970) . Pp . x, 118.
$2 .50 (paper).
After the Revolution? Authority in a Good Society . By Robert A.
Dahl (New Haven : Yale University Press, 1966) . Pp . xix, 458.
$10 .00.
Political Oppositions in Western Democracies. Edited by Robert A.
Dahl (New Haven : Yale University Press, 1970) . Pp . 171.
$2 .45 (paper).
Polyarchy : Participation and Opposition . By Robert A . Dahl (New
Haven : Yale University Press, 1971) . Pp . ix, 257 . $7 .95.
Democracy in the United States : Promises and Performance . By
Robert A . Dahl (2nd ed ., Chicago : Rand McNally and Company, 1972) . Pp . xxii, 453 . $6 .95 (paper).
n 1963, before reaching his fiftieth birthday, Robert A . Dahl
was identified as one of the ten political scientists who had
contributed most to the discipline since World War II .' This influence has been magnified by the impact of his research on political
analysis since that time . Indeed, analysis of Dahl's theoretical position is made somewhat difficult because his new works are con-
I
'Albert Somit and Joseph Tanenhaus, The Development of Political Science:
From Burgess to Behavioralism (Boston, 1967), p . 193.
2Professor Dahl graciously facilitated my task of keeping ahead of his publishing dates by making mimeographed materials and galley proofs available
to me, for which I thank him .
LATENT MADISONIANISM
67
tinually appearing . ' This difficulty is not overwhelming since his
eclecticism in choice of subject matter is easily overcome by the
consistency which continuously underscores the underlying assumptions and themes that unite his works . In spite of this unity, Dahl 's
writings have had tremendous independent impacts on different
subfields of political science.
The importance of Dahl 's works is clear from others ' comments
on and uses of his contributions . He has generated such praise as
having "already shown that it is possible to take propositions in
political theory, translate them into statements of probability, develop operational indices, and test them against empirical data "
from no less distinguished a scholar than Gabriel Almond .' In a
work itself considered a classic in contemporary political analysis,
Almond and Sidney Verba rely on Dahl 's definition of democracy
presented in Preface, as well as his discussion of participation in
Who Governs?4 Even theorists representing very different traditions, such as Amitai Etzioni, heavily cite Dahl 's work while others
identify his analysis as exemplary of scientific distortion of
theoretical interpretation-usually citing as prime example his
propositional analysis of James Madison .' Still others, from positions advocating participatory or radical perspectives, challenge
Dahl ' s conclusions as being affected by presumptions with ideological
import, attributing to him an elitist or pluralist bias . ' Interestingly,
these criticisms seldom attempt to pull together the common threads
of Dahl's diverse works, usually remaining satisfied to condemn his
position on the basis of a single source . Different books serve different
critics as their "straw man ."
3" Introduction : A Functional Approach to Comparative Politics, " The
Politics of the Developing Areas, eds . Gabriel A . Almond and James S . Coleman
(Princeton, N.J ., 1960), p . 59, citing Dahl' s A Preface to Democratic Theory
as the example.
4The Civic Culture : Political Attitudes and Democracy in Five Nations
(Princeton, N .J ., 1963), p . 162 for use of democracy from Preface and p . 484
for use of participation from Who Governs?
Amitai Etzioni, The Active Society : A Theory of Societal and Political
Process (New York, 1968) ; for discussion of misuse of Madison, see George
W . Carey' s comments, "Beyond Parochialism in Political Science," The . PostBehavioral Era : Perspectives on Political Science, eds. George J . Graham, Jr .,
and George W . Carey (New York, 1972), pp . 37-53.
G A few examples are William Connolly, Political Science and Ideology (New
York, 1967), ch . 2 ; Robert Paul Wolff, The Poverty of Liberalism (Boston,
1968), pp . 84-105 ; and the introductions and essays touching on Dahl in Henry
S . Kariel, ed ., Frontiers of Democratic Theory (New York, 1970) .
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The reactions to Dahl's books are unusual because diverse, often
inconsistent charges against him have been generated . To explain
this diversity of " schools" and "counterschools" requires that his
work as a whole be assessed . Rather than introduce " another paradigm " into the literature-as did David Easton and Gabriel Almond'-Dahl introduces, in a most powerful manner, a mood.
This mood is not merely the behavioral approach he so richly
essayed for the Social Science Research Council,' but a scientific
mood that links normative concerns and empirical analysis . This
mood, similar to behavioralism, can be absorbed into the discipline
without replacing traditional concerns and, at least in externalities,
traditional approaches . It is more pervasive than behavioralism in
that the mood Dahl illustrates by example in his several works
makes clear what scientific analysis can contribute to our knowledge-even when the focus is on normative problems . Perhaps the
most important quality of this demonstration, however, is its clarification of the consequences and limitations of constraining analysis
to the scientific mood . The diversity of reactions to Dahl' s works
can be explained by these consequences.
The linkage of this mood to a form of Madisonianism that
hides below its surface will be seen once the assumptions, applications, and themes of Dahl's works are presented . To be sure, the
Madisonianism is latent ; an important theoretical step must be
taken to bring them into line . The step is possible because of the
congruence of Dahl ' s analysis and Madison ' s theory, but it is not
taken because Dahl 's basic commitment to the scientific mood
prevents him from pursuing normative choice from Madison 's larger
perspective . We shall see that the scientific mood separates and
frees ideology from theory, thus allowing it to guide research,
whereas Madisonian analysis makes ideology subserviant to theory.
A Preface to Democratic Theory provides the symbolic treatise that
marks the entry of the new political science into normative analysis
and provides the prologue to empirical democratic theory, with all
7 See the essays by Eugene F . Miller on Easton and Stanley Rothman on
Almond in Vol . I (Fall, 1971) of this review.
8"The Behavioral Approach in Political Science : Epitaph for a Monument
to a Successful Protest," American Political Science Review, LV, No . 4 (December 1961), 763-72 .
LATENT MADISONIANISM
69
of its strengths and weaknesses . ' This approach will be measured
against a Madisonian model.
ASSUMPTIONS
Dahl makes three key assumptions about political theory, candidly placing them before his readers with more clarity than most
writers chance . While often qualifying his claims as reflecting the
necessary limits of a particular research project, the consistency
of these constraints merits raising them to the status of general
assumptions . These assumptions specify what can be incorporated
into any democratic theory qua theory, and what cannot . The
assumptions and their consequences are briefly explored in this
section.
Perhaps the most narrow way of establishing a basic metaphysical presupposition and at the same time avoiding the difficulties
of justification is simply to assume it and accept its limits on all
that follows . Most contemporary political scientists would feel comfortable with this first assumption of Dahl 's scientific mood:
Assumption One : Empirical theory must be developed independent
of evaluation, but can be employed in making evaluative decisions.
Most often Dahl merely states this assumption and proceeds to his
research and analysis of "polyarchy, " though he carefully considers counterarguments in the earlier version of Modern Political
Analysis ."
Dahl's assumption provides several benefits . First, it successfully
begs metaphysical querries in order to get at a specific empirical
or analytical problem . Almost predictably, Dahl introduces major
issues that go beyond his specific goals only to make clear that
such questions carry him past the scope of his present research
°Dahl ' s theoretical interests in a formal statement of democratic theory and
the adaptability of his hypotheses for use in large scale cross-national research
accounts for his ascendency over the late V . O. Key, Jr ., as father of this field.
In addition to Dahl's influence over works already cited, see examples of
recent research in this field collected in Kurt L . Shell, ed ., The Democratic
Process : A Cross-National Reader (Waltham, Mass ., 1969) and Charles F.
Cnudde and Dean E . Neubauer, eds ., Empirical Democratic Theory (Chicago,
1969) . Many of the negative responses to an empirical democratic theory can
also be traced back to Dahl as a stimulus.
"Dahl' s first edition (MPA I) dealt with these arguments extensively (pp.
100-107), but he does not include the materials in the revision (MPA II) .
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and analysis . Second, the assumption clears the deck for an empirical
theory of polyarchy . It frees Dahl from democratic theory-frees
him to pursue his research . In Polyarchy, Dahl' s second chapter
is devoted to demonstrating that polyarchy matters for " even one
who held the extreme position that a shift from hegemony towards
polyarchy is never desirable (p . 31) ." Significance means, quite
clearly, "empirically significant . " Third, it permits his adherence to
the notion of evaluation presented in Modern Political Analysis
(I, pp . 94-100 ; II, pp . 100-103) . The appraisals necessary for
evaluation, according to Dahl, are :
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
The alternatives " open " or " available" to you.
The likely consequences of each alternative.
The value to you of each set of consequences.
Your estimate of the relative probability of the consequences.
Your attitudes toward risk and uncertainty.
These appraisals are partially empirical (1, 2, 4), partially judg mental (3, 4, 5), and partially utility measures (3, 5) . They are all
actor relevant, not systems relevant . Indeed, the much revised
Second Edition moves from a neutral presentation of positions
concerning science and evaluation to a specific avowal of Felix E.
Oppenheim's noncognitivism (p . 106) . Most important is the
fact that Dahl 's position becomes a general model for decision
making as actor or as scientific observer . In Dahl's works, evaluations must be treated as scientific since they are logical and empirical analyses of consequences, not arguments of justification.
Thus, if Easton ' s description of Preface is accepted-" the perpetua tion of democracy as a preferred type of political system has served
as the ethical focus""-the focus must be interpreted as through
special lenses. Dahl's personal preference for democracy is often
stated, but he does not specifically develop a rationale for, or
justify, his ethical focal point . He tells us some objections and justifications one can raise about democracy, but he never makes any . 12
11A Systems Analysis of Political Life (New York, 1965), p . 14.
12For examples : "There is not space to deal adequately with these alternative
judgments (After the Revolution? p . 35)" and Preface, chs . 1 and 2 . In the
latter critiques of Madisonian and populistic models, Dahl does specify objections to the models but does not raise his arguments to normative grounds
for rejecting (or in later chapters of the Preface, for rejecting or accepting)
a particular democratic theory.
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71
The wisdom of accepting Dahl ' s position may be questioned, but
that it is possible to pursue objective analysis of normative consequences is not . 1 3 Those under the spell of the scientific mood often
carry the point further, disclaiming any possible extension to a
more sophisticated form of evaluation . As the "symbol" of the
scientific mood, Dahl plays a central role in outlining what the
orthodoxy means, even when his works are given interpretations he
might not make.
The fact-value disclaimer is not always taken seriously by
Dahl's readers, witness the counter-pluralist reactions to Who Governs? Even with his disclaimer on elitism in the American Political
Science Review," Dahl is recognized as the leading spokesman for
the pluralist model of democracy-at least by the reputational
method . 16 The problem is that Dahl became defender of the faith
(pluralism, especially American pluralism) because his analysis often
fails to divide and discuss both normative issues and empirical issues.
Arthur Bentley and David Truman are less confronted by counterpluralists partially because their arguments and theories are paradigmatic whereas Dahl, quite rightly, keeps his theory grounded
in research . Had Dahl more specifically distinguished normative
pluralism and empirical pluralism, much of the debate inspired by
Who Governs? might have been more constructive . 16 Although he
cannot be blamed for interpretations made by others, his position
as leading exponent of empirical democratic theory forces upon him
special obligations.
The second assumption of Dahl is perhaps a consequence of the
first, but its implications for both philosophical and empirical
analysis are considerable.
Assumption Two : Important undeniable aspects of Homo Civicus
13 My own Methodological Foundations for Political Analysis (Waltham, Mass .,
1971) accepts this assumption in the context of assessing what science can do.
14 "Further Reflections on `The Elitist Theory of Democracy,' " LX (June
1966), 296-305, which followed immediately Jack L. Walker, "A Critique of the
Elitist Theory of Democracy, " 285-295.
15 Not only by those critical to the mood : see Karl W. Deutsch, Politics and
Government : How People Decide Their Fate (Boston, 1970), p . 53.
16 For still another rehash of the issues, see Raymond E . Wolfinger, " Nondecisions and the Study of Local Politics, " American Political Science Review,
LXV, No . 4 (December 1971), 1063-1080, Frederick W. Frey's "Comment : On
Issues and Nonissues in the Study of Power," 1081-1101, and Wolfinger ' s " Rejoinder to Frey ' s `Comment, ' " 1102-1104.
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and Homo Politicus can be, and can only be, specified and verified
through scientifically based analysis.
The consequences of this assumption are immense because it places
limits on possible normative and empirical theory positions . Dahl
begins Democracy in the United States with the dilemma of man ' s
being a social animal and societies ' having inevitable conflicts (pp.
3-5) . The tone of classical philosophy is underlined with the empirical weight of history :
alongside the inevitable conflicts that are generated whenever human
beings try to live together, as far back into man 's past as one can
pry, there have also been traces of a search for ways by which
human beings can cooperate and conflicts within a community can
be settled without extensive violence and bloodshed, according to
standards of justice, held, at the very least, among those who enforce the rules . We cannot pause to probe the mystery ; but the
evidence is so great that we can safely accept it as a fact (p . 4).
It seems possible, then, to develop several limits to what social
and political man can be.
From the quote and from his several empirical works, it is
possible to set forth several exemplary propositions subsumed under
this assumption.
1.
2.
3.
4.
Men must live together.
Men living together inevitably have conflicts.
'Conflicts are moderated by beliefs about justice.
Leaders' beliefs about justice set rules which, if followers
follow, moderate conflicts . Y7
5. Few individuals are disposed to become homo politicus
(political professionals ; leaders) because of the requirements
of time (and leisure).
6. Most individuals prefer the role of homo civicus. 18
Although many other examples could be presented-especially
propositions related to influence and potential influence-these are
sufficient for grasping the importance of the second assumption.
17 See also the extensive and provocative discussion "The Beliefs of Political
Activists, " ch . 8 of Polyarchy.
18 Although support for these statements can be found in most of Dahl ' s
works, the key discussion is Who Governs? pp . 223-228, 306-325 .
LATENT MADISONIANISM
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All of the propositions are empirical ; they describe the way the
world has been and is . They can easily be translated into " if-then "
laws and verified (or rejected) . This is the positive aspect of the
assumption . But what if a goal of the theorist, for whatever
reason, becomes the countering of the reality? For example, the
goal of increasing participation changes the perspective on the
assumption and must be evaluated by an external standard . Dahl
quite clearly favors this increase,7 fl but he must use science to prescribe how to achieve it without answering why such a prescription
is justified, given men' s present predisposition against the change.
One can agree with Dahl ' s objective while noting he begins to
"use science" for achieving his own utility weightings . His arguments for accepting the principles of democratic authority in After
the Revolution? are based on the reader's prior commitment to
democracy and would be unpersuasive to a Thrasymachus who is
convinced by Dahl ' s empirical works that he can get what he wants
because of points 4, 5, and 6.
The third assumption places limits on the critique just presented . The second assumption is essential for attempting to develop political theory ; the third brings us back to reality-it is
based on the self-corrective nature of science.
Assumption Three : Empirical theory as instrumental knowledge is
possible, but problematic and contextual.
The importance of the fourth appraisal for evaluation is here
seen . It is difficult to test the general propositions because of time
and developmental dimensions . Nonetheless, Dahl has followed his
research plan in Chapter Three of Preface and has contributed
much in Who Governs? and Polyarchy to our empirical understanding of the relationships among polyarchy, norms, actions and
belief . In the process, unlike most theorists, he maintains an awareness and demonstrates the problems of tying theory to reality,
especially when theory is normatively significant . Further, contextual
conditions are recognized as potential limits on employing instrumental knowledge : "Nonetheless, I do not assume that a shift
from hegemony toward polyarchy is invariably desirable . " (Polyarchy, p. 31) Similar to J . S . Mill, conditions affect the desirability
of affecting the change toward political equality.
Beyond the difficulties of measurement and establishing theo19 After the Revolution? ch .
1 ; Polyarchy, p . 31 .
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retical linkages carefully presented throughout Polyarchy, Dahl
also makes clear the difficulty of bringing together accepted norms
in light of empirical consequences . In After the Revolution? the
"Goldilocks Dilemma" is carefully presented (pp . 147-149) ; participation is increased and is more meaningful in small associations,
but affected interest often requires a large association for effective
political settlement . Dahl's recognition of these problems makes
clear that choices based on instrumental knowledge, even when
limited to an actor's utility in evaluation, are uncertain in consequence, always qualified by the context, and seldom successful in
achieving full objectives of the relevant norms.
These three assumptions, then, provide the foundation for Dahl ' s
analysis . They make clear what he can and cannot argue concerning norms as a political scientist . The importance of the assumptions is magnified because they are generally presumed throughout
contemporary political science . The implications to be drawn from
applying them can best be demonstrated by a brief survey of eight
major contributions by Dahl.
FOUR STYLES OF APPLICATION
Although eclectic in flavor, Dahl ' s major works can be divided
into four distinct styles of analysis that identify both the breadth
and omnipresence of the scientific mood . Within each style, Dahl
makes contributions that have significant impacts in specific fields
of research, but most important is the commonality superimposed
by his approach . The scientific mood is clear as early as Congress
and Foreign Policy. Although this continuity gives the styles a
great deal of overlap, the distinct flavor of each deserves recognition.
The styles are (a) formal explication, (b) case study application,
(c) empirical extension and testing of models, and (d) instructional analysis . They demonstrate, in order, logical validity, empirical viability, empirical validity, and personal viability.
Formal Explication
All of Dahl's works include some formal explication, no matter
whether to establish criteria for evaluating Congress-Congress and
Foreign Policy (pp . 3-6)-or to critique the American political
system-Democracy in the United States (pp . 3-53 and 387-440).
The two most significant applications of formal analysis, however,
LATENT MADISONIANISM
75
are A Preface to Democratic Theory and Modern Political Analysis.
Both are directly involved in the scientific mood because, in the
former, specific models of normative theories are explicated and,
in the latter, the relationship of evaluation and science is essayed.
The keys to either analysis are the logical consequences of systematic
analysis of assumptions-consequences presumably comparable to
real world situations.
It should first be noted that the contributions of Preface far
outweigh the specific criticisms of it that have arisen over the years.
It is true that the eight criteria for polyarchy have never been
successfully merged into a single operationally useful conceptthough Polyarchy (pp . 231-249) comes close-and that serious
criticism can be and have been raised concerning Dahl's interpretations of Madisonian democracy and populistic democracy . But
each chapter of Preface deserves consideration as a major interpretation of democratic theory . That is, Dahl is able to present at least
five major theoretical statements in one-hundred and fifty-one pages
because the "scientific mood " presents major issues in a new, systematically clear light . Moreover, the issues are thus presented in
a fashion that such questions as the correct treatment of, and
consequences from, majority rule must be directly confronted-all
cards are dealt face up.
Formal models force the theorist to cut through the complexities
and nuances of verbal arguments to essentials, sometimes providing
a lean framework isomorphic with (but simpler than) empirical
theory, which is itself a simplification of reality . The advantages
are aptly demonstrated by Dahl ' s examples : (a) contradictions
hidden in vague language become obvious, (b) critical assumptions become unambiguously the dominant dimension of the theory,
(c) unsuspected or unexplored consequences can be articulated or
demonstrated logically, and in summary, (d) complications and
weaknesses of thought are magnified for easy viewing.
The chief weakness of formal explication of normative theory
is also illustrated in Preface : a single error of interpretation invalidates an entire model . A falsely attributed or a missed assumption,
an assumed or misstated definition, an oversimplified argument or
a too systematic restatement of an intentionally vague argumentall of these errors can invalidate a model . The importance of such
errors is increased when presented as a fair statement of another ' s
theory . It is not enough to argue that Madisonian democracy
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ranges broader in influence and scope than Madison 's words if the
model is attributed to him (pp . 4-5) . And such questionable positions as Madison ' s not defining "public interest" (p . 25)-when
the institutional arrangements were to make such definition unnecessary-and the failure to recognize fully Madison ' s two forms
of avoidable tyranny (pp . 12-15, 22-25) simply illustrate why Dahl 's
Madison has been so strongly disputed . Similarly, forcing populism 's
complexity down to two rules-equality and majority rule (ch . 2 )distorts the problems of egalitarian democracy. Dahl's own notion
of polyarchy (ch . 3) is close to populism stated with eight rules . 20
One need not deny the possibility of formal explication in order to
recognize that a political theory may necessarily adhere to contrary principles, as Dahl fully recognizes in After the Revolution?
(p.48).
With its strengths and limits adumbrated, Preface remains an
unequalled effort to present systematically normatively significant
theories in a propositional format easily subjected to empirical
research . The resulting theory is empirical . It rests upon " What if?"
analysis rather than normative justification of its assumptions : " If
polyarchy is to be achieved, then . . . . " The value of such theorizing
for contemporary research is obvious . Its utility for normative justification and evaluation beyond an actor 's own standards is neither
asserted nor attempted, thereby conforming to the three assumptions
of the scientific mood . Dahl does demonstrate that democratic
theories have propositions that are based on human behavioral
characteristics (pp . 71-84) and that reality does not conform perfectly with the theories' assumptions (ch . 5. ) . So long as he deals
with polyarchy (real democratic regimes), empirical research will
provide generalizations useful for understanding how, why, and
under what conditions polyarchy flourishes . The resulting theory,
however, cannot demonstrate that it should . Perhaps most important
is the side effect : Dahl illustrates by example that political scientists
can admit to, and pursue, normatively significant topics and not,
20The eight are (Preface, ch . 3) related to procedures for the voting period
(equal votes are cast by everyone and majority rules), the prevoting period
(equal right to insert alternatives and equal information), the postvoting
period (leaders and policies of majority displace alternatives and are enforced),
and the interelection stage (either the previous election controls decisions or the
preceding means are used for making decisions) .
LATENT MADISONIANISM
77
at the same time, be beyond the orthodoxy-a necessary first step
back to normative analysis.
The significance of Modern Political Analysis is difficult to
capsulate in a few words . The book was originally directed "to
equip you with a small number of basic concepts, ideas, and analytic tools-ancient or recent, whichever seem the better-so that
you can proceed afterward with more competence toward what
should be, in a democracy, a life-long vocation : the analysis of
politics (I, p . viii) . " The book has provided basic definitions of
concepts not only for its original audiences in undergraduate introductory courses, but also for graduate students and colleagues . Both
editions emphasize power and influence (how it develops, how
it becomes legitimate, who has the resources, and how and why
people participate) . A second general theme is the dichotomy of
peaceful adjustment and coercion, though the new edition more
clearly emphasizes the positive relationship of peaceful adjustment
and polyarchy (pp . 62-66) . The new edition also relies more
heavily upon supportive data, while the earlier one, without the
availability of supportive data, was more analytic-definitional in
style . Both editions provide a basic vocabulary for scientific political
analysis and offer a brief survey of propositions concerning power,
influence, authority, participation, and polyarchy . Though written
as a text, it has served as a model for analytic political theory in
Dahl's scientific mood.
The final chapter of each edition deserves special attention,
though the key points were discussed in the preceding section . Dahl's
presentation in MPA I (Modern Political Analysis) can be attributed to his being faced with pre-behavioral challenges to
scientific analysis ' s utility in evaluation . Especially in discussing
whether political analysis should be neutral (pp . 104-107), his arguments are defensive . Except for his criteria for appraisal (preserved
in MPA II), the remainder of the chapter is defensive or neutral.
The second edition drops this defensive position . Although Dahl ' s
neutrality concerning basic normative issues is, as always, carefully
preserved in form, he openly admits an affinity to value noncognitivism (p . 106n) and seems strained to admit that a " pure
science " is just as compatible with other positions : " But the idea
of a pure science of politics is not necessarily opposed by those who
adhere to positions of naturalism or intuitionism (p . 108) . " Interestingly, the citations to Arnold Brecht, Leo Strauss, Herbert J .
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Storing, and Eric Voegelin do not appear in the new edition, indicating a change of stance both within the discipline and in his
approach to evaluation.
The formal model for political theory in Modern Political Analysis serves as a general framework for Preface . Power and influence
are applicable to all systems, as are participation measures, indicators of peaceful adjustment, and of coercion . Though both
Preface and MPA provide logical frameworks to be filled in by
empirical research, the latter work seems to provide the real link
to empirical theory . It provides, especially in its revision, a framework for researching what leads to or away from stable polyarchy,
what are the consequences (macro or micro) of polyarchy, and
what conditions are requisite for its achievement . By formal explication, both books clarify logical validity for theories, a first critical
step in any theoretical development.
Case Study Application
This second style of analysis can be presented briefly . In Congress
and Foreign Policy and in the classic Who Governs?, Dahl uses
single case studies to demonstrate the empirical viability of his
more general approach. In both books, the findings could have been
presented without reference to democratic theory . This would deny
the relevance of the scientific mood since the research, in both
cases, bears heavily on significant issues and problems in democratic
theory . Dahl ' s approach makes it possible to evaluate certain institutions or political systems according to their proximity to democracy,
in the former pre-Preface work, and polyarchy in the latter.
The criteria vary, but the key to the style is demonstration that
empirical political analysis can inform evaluation and that norma tively significant criteria can be applied systematically . The scientific
mood is shown to have viability or feasibility by this approach.
Understanding New Haven's pluralism in light of polyarchy and
empirical context permits us also to understand polyarchy-ingeneral better . Most important, empirical referents for normatively
meaningful concepts are established . In Who Governs?, Dahl generalizes from the case study to a general empirical model of stable
democracy on the basis of the plausibility of the case study's implications. " Because my data on New Haven are not wholly adequate for the task at hand, the theory I shall sketch out might
properly be regarded more as reflections on the process of creating
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consensus than as a testing of theory by a hard examination of the
facts in New Haven (p . 312) ."
Similarly, Dahl ' s analysis of Congress and Foreign Policy focuses
on the conflict of efficiency and democracy . His three criteria for
evaluating methods of democratic public policy formation (in this
case, foreign policy) are (pp . 4-5) :
1. To what extent does the decision-making process provide for
responsible leadership? [Majority Rule]
2. To what extent does the decision-making process facilitate
agreement among the citizens of the community? [Discussion/
Deliberation]
3. To what extent does the method of decision-making lead to
rational policies-to policies, that is to say, best designed to
achieve purposes agreed on? [Expertness]
After careful perusal of factors affecting legislative-executive relationships on foreign policy, with special attention to constraints on
Congressional action, he ends with a general analysis of democracy
and foreign policy that covers characteristics requisite for planning
and the conditions leading to the dilemma originally found in his
criteria . One could develop his case independent of his data, or
interpret his data without his criteria . It is to Dahl's credit that
even in his early work, he draws together both dimensions of the
scientific mood in isolating a problem that today, in his own framework, is even more critical to polyarchy.
Empirical Extension
This style of analysis leads to the verification of propositions
generated by the previous two . Propositions from logical analysis
and case studies are extended into an empirical theory of polyarchy
and tested . The criteria for polyarchy or for evaluating policy,
however, can at best be treated as defining characteristics for concepts to be used in empirical research . Dahl's hypotheses and research must be focused on the development of an instrumental
theory of polyarchy. Two books provide the framework for the
theory, though forthcoming works on small European democracies
and on regimes and oppositions add extensively to our empirical
understanding of democracy .L1
21 An early draft of "Size and Democracy, " by Dahl and Edward Tufte,
promises that this contribution to a book on smaller European democracies, to
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The empirical extension is necessarily comparative . Only by
contrasting polyarchies and hegemonies (Dahl 's term for nonpolyarchies, for exclusive, uncontested regimes) can a theory explaining the conditions for acquiring and maintaining polyarchy be
established . The first major comparative work is a comprehensive
anthology, Political Oppositions in Western Democracies . Guided by
Dahl's analytic preface, the book is completed by two theoretical
chapters and an epilogue that follow Dahl ' s reconstruction of empirical democratic theory . The more recent volume, Polyarchy,
attempts to answer the question:
Given a regime in which the opponents of the government cannot
openly and legally organize into political parties in order to oppose
the government in free and fair elections, what conditions favor
or impede a transformation into a regime in which they can? (p . 1)
In these two volumes, and in others already underway, it becomes
apparent that Dahl 's theory will finally receive empirical support;
that is, his theories are made operational-within technical limitsand subjected to at least tentative examination . The results may
lead to revisions, but they do not prove or disprove the normative
worth of polyarchy. They do make clear what conditions are conducive to its development and survival.
Political Oppositions is founded on the assumption that a governing group will use coercion if compliance is probable and if the
gains exceed the costs (p . xii), much as Madison assumes tyranny
will develop if unchecked . Dahl reverses the assumption to identify
conditions conducive to oppositions . The volume does not present
an analytic scheme, but rather leads toward Dahl ' s conclusions
concerning oppositions that account for the reports on oppositions
in Great Britain, the United States, Norway, Sweden, Belgium, the
Netherlands, Germany, Austria, France and Italy by a distinguished
set of coauthors . The patterns Dahl identifies permit him to identify
six important differences among oppositions (p . 332f .) :
1 . The organizational cohesion or concentration of opponents.
be published by Stanford University Press, will provide us with an unmatched
linkage of data and hypotheses about democracy . The introduction to Dahl' s
forthcoming Regimes and Oppositions (also kindly provided by Dahl) promises
another major comparative work .
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81
2. The competitiveness of opposition.
3. The site or setting for the encounter between opposition and
those who control the government.
4. The distinctiveness or identifiability of the opposition.
5. The goals of the opposition.
6. The strategies of opposition.
His assessment of these differences (ch . 11) and of potential single
factor explanations of them even within contexts (ch . 12) lead to
the important but difficult conclusion that theory explaining oppositions and, to the appropriate extent, democracy will be complex
and contextual . This, of course, fits Assumption Three, but it also
focuses attention on the fact that any theory of polyarchy, at least
in the near future, will be concatenated ; that is, will be a set of
propositions linked together by common reference to polyarchy
rather than by a logically or empirically integrated set of laws.
Moreover, Dahl's criteria for evaluation presented in "Epilogue"
are admittedly in "conflict with one another (p . 388) . 7 '
The effort to develop theory of polyarchy is most successfully
illustrated in Polyarchy : Participation and Opposition . This volume
provides an excellent example of the scientific mood at its best.
In a deceptively simple manner, Dahl distinguishes four extreme
types for comparing hegemonic and polyarchal rule . Regimes can
be high in both participation and legitimate opposition (polyarchy)
or low in both (hegemony) . But they can also be high in one
factor and low in the other ; inclusive hegemonies have high participation ; competitive oligarchies have high contestation . These
four types permit comparison of regime characteristics that allow
Dahl to assess properties conducive to the development of polyarchies . In addition to assessment of possible routes to polyarchy
(ch . 3), Dahl explores whether the costs-benefits of coercion-toleration will affect the acceptance of opposition both on the dimension
of concentration of resources (ch . 4) and on the dimension of level
of development (ch . 5) . He goes on to explore the relationships
between social and economic inequalities and political equality
(ch . 6), the effects of subcultures (including the interesting development of the concept subcultural pluralism that is reminiscent
of The Federalist arguments for federalism-pp . 111-123), the impact of beliefs on political activity (ch . 8), and a rather crisp
manual for foreign policy externalities and polyarchy (ch . 9) . A
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candid assessment of how much : real empirical support . for his
arguments exists is followed by a postscript identifying the practical
difficulties of applying the instrumental knowledge to political
reality.
Although the next section deals more specifically with how
Dahl's propositions fit Madisonian democracy, it should be noted
that many of the specific claims in his concatenated theory of
polyarchy fit well with Madison's propositions-indeed, Political
Oppositions and Polyarchy seem to reassert the significance of institutions close to the position for which Dahl criticized Madison in
Preface . The important point is that the scientific mood, with its
norm of self-correction, has given political science these important
studies . These books, and especially the forthcoming work on small
democracies (see preceding footnote), demonstrate how science can
provide tests for (or against) important propositions about democracy and can give evidence relevant to meaningful assessment of
political possibilities . Polyarchy begins to demonstrate what Preface
had suggested.
Instructional Analysis
If empirical extension is the scientific mood at its best, instructional analysis is its weakest style . This is not to say the, arguments developed are weak, but rather are made theoretically impotent by the mood 's assumptions . If one adheres to a noncognitivist position, the value of a theory of polyarchy is its rhetorical
worth-it can draw others in by appealing to shared norms . Insofar
as, this is a proper goal, After the Revolution? and the " instructional" aspects of Democracy in the United . States are successful.
That is, the instructional analysis-the arguments designed to entice the reader into accepting standards of authority or the norms
of majoritarian, egalitarian democracy-is designed to establish the
third appraisal in evaluation as set forth by Dahl.
The two books that most clearly perform in this style differ in
substance (one discusses authority in a good society ; the other;
American government), but share the basic quality of being designed for undergraduates . After the Revolution? is an assessment
of democracies becoming more democratic, of improving the extent
of democratic control within polyarchies including subnational gov ernmental and economic levels . He begins with an analysis of three
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83
criteria for authority similar to those listed above from Congress
and Foreign Policy:
1. Personal Choice (pp . 8-28 )
2. Competence (pp . 28-40)
3. Economy (pp . 40-56)
He concludes the lead essay with logical and empirical considerations as to which criteria best fit a given setting and recognition
of the problematic character of dealing with multiple, often
conflicting criteria . In the process the reader is assumed to have
seen the value of the criteria in his own evaluation efforts.
The remainder of the book isolates problems of assessing what
democracy means when appiled to the real world (who are the
people, which form of democracy best fits an organization, "Perhaps the greatest error in thinking about democratic authority is to
believe that ideas about democracy and authority are simple and
must lead to simple prescriptions ."-p . 95) and of improving
polyarchies . Although some particulars could be challenged-the
simple egalitarian view of Rousseau throughout only recognizes one
side of Rousseau's notion of freedom22 -the volume uses logic, fact,
and theory to instruct the reader in two ways : (a) polyarchies can
and should be improved ; but (b) improvement is not assured by
an automatic ideological prescription :
To assert that democratization must always require primary
democracy is a perfect strategy for preventing large numbers of
people from governing themselves effectively . Yet to believe that
democratization always requires polyarchy is equally fatuous (pp.
96-97).
The instructional analysis in Democracy in the United States is
less comprehensive and overt, but it is the key to the import of
the book . As in most "point of view texts," Dahl's perspective on
the American polyarchy provides the reader with an interpretation
as well as a description of the government . The first seven chapters
introduce discussion of the basic issues of polyarchy, successfully
22 Dahl's view of Rousseau should be contrasted with George J . Graham, Jr .,
"Rousseau's Concept of Consensus," Political Science Quarterly, LXXXV, No . 1,
(March 1970), 80-98 .
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integrating most of Dahl's previous works . The final three chapters
are evaluative in tone, first introducing prospects for successful
participation, then discussing possible strategies for change and
their strengths and weaknesses, and finally an evaluation of the
performance of the American system . Though some disagreements
will surely arise over the significance (or accuracy) of the four
types of inequalities Dahl finds in the American polyarchy-institutional, wealth, educational, and discretionary authority (pp . 431440) -each would result in some support for his conclusions if
polyarchy as majoritarian democracy were accepted as the standard
for evaluation . Thus, since most readers already accept this standard
as valuable, Dahl's appraisals are instructive because they tell what
to do given shared assumptions favoring majority rule and equality.
And beyond his often repeated criticisms of racial inequality and
the Southern hegemonic rule, Dahl provides positive evaluation for
most other aspects of American polyarchy.
On points of ideology and aspirations for democracy, it is difficult to object to Dahl's opinions . But, and this is the crucial point,
the instructional analysis of the scientific mood is simply rhetorical.
It does not justify assumptions about democracy . Instrumental
knowledge cannot lead one further unless external evaluation standards are developed, standards with which we can evaluate the
assumptions of democracy . Admittedly, Dahl touches on some of
the questions concerning external standards, especially when, in
After the Revolution? he opens the question of competence (pp.
28-40) . But then, as his noncognitivist position requires, he prefaces his italicized democratic response to classical contentions : "If
you believe, a s I do . . . (p . 35) ." He goes on to approach the
counterargument : " But if you believe . . . . " Dahl ' s arguments are
stronger than his profession of mere belief indicates, but the qualification is required by the scientific mood . The importance of this
point is emphasized by the parallels of "hard" statements and assumptions in Dahl's theory of polyarchy and in Madisonian democracy.
THEMES OF POLYARCHY AND MADISONIANISM
The identification of "polyarchy" with "democracy" is perhaps
less appropriate than equating it with "republic ." In the much revised and retitled Second Edition of Dahl's American government
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85
text, Dahl actually substitutes " polyarchy" where he earlier used the
term "republic" in describing the American system : "The men at
the Constitutional Convention did not create a republic [polyarchy].
They helped one to emerge ." 23 This point is of no small significance
because it indicates that a republican form of rule is the proper
empirical equivalent of polyarchy-thus providing a less abstract
model for evaluating democracies than the eight criteria provided
in Preface . The arguments favoring participation in After the
Revolution? are at least tempered by the complex reality of large
political systems . More important, empirical conditions force Dahlas-theorist to view republican rule as the regime form that actualizes
democracy-a position in common with Madison. Empirical political theory informs the norms and sets limits on meaningful interpretation and application of them . This link of polyarchy and
the republican form of rule sets the context for a brief survey of
affinities between Dahl ' s empirical theory and Madisonian democracy.
In addition to the several parallels already noted, Dahl ' s research seems to have moderated the grounds for his condemnation
of Madison in Preface . Just as Madison assumed that governments
must be structured on the assumption that men will seek their own
interests (Federalist 10), Dahl ' s arguments in Political Oppositions
(p . xii) treat this assumption as an axiom . Although Madison ' s
emphasis on institutional checks and balances was critiqued by
Dahl in Preface (p . 82), the role of formal institutions is more
fully recognized in Political Oppositions (pp . 349-352) and Polyarchy (pp . 223-224) . Polyarchy's methods definition, especially
when reinforced by Dahl's noncognitivism, leaves open all discussion of "permanent and aggregate interests of the community, " a
point central to Dahl ' s arguments against Madison's use of tyranny
(Preface, pp . 22-30) . Madison intended to leave the definition of
public interest open, to permit the nation to define it by appropriate
republican means . Nowhere does Dahl himself get beyond this
methods definition . Indeed, his commitments to expand freedom of
opposition and political participation are themselves related to
methods definitions . Not one of his eight conditions of polyarchy
23The earlier version was titled Pluralist Democracy in the United States:
Conflict and Consent (Chicago, 1967) . Compare it p . 26 and Democracy in the
United States, p. 58 .
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is not directly related to the method of making democratic decisions
(Preface, pp . 67-71) ; they make operational an ideal populistic
democracy (ibid., pp. 34-62) in a fashion that can be used to
evaluate the democratic practices-not goals-of countries . This
helps us understand why those groups radically concerned with
goals in the non-method sense do not find Dahl 's analysis to their
tastes.
The complexity of society (After the Revolution? pp . 100-103),
pluralism (Polyarchy, pp . 105-121), tyranny of the majority (ibid .,
p . 116 ; After the Revolution? p . 17), and federalism (Political
Oppositions, pp . 350-351) are all themes of Madison that appear
in recent studies as significant empirical aspects of polyarchy . This
should not be surprising when the arguments of Who Governs?
and the latter portions of Preface are recalled . Dahl's critique of
the Madisonian system is its weakness " as political science rather
than as ideology" (Preface, p. 31) . This seems somewhat off base
since the justification for Madisonian democracy is its empirical
foundation . Republican rule is best because, given men's wants
and self-interest, it can be structured to minimize tyranny . Empirical
considerations describe what can be done to avoid tyranny from
either a self-interested majority or minority-real, not logical,
threats as Dahl ' s later works recognize . The theory describes why
certain means satisfy human needs in light of human characteristics.
What Madison does that Dahl does not is treat the selection of
norms as a consequence of resolving political settlements within
a given context . Dahl 's empirical findings support Madison 's contentions, but the scientific mood limits his interpretations and
permits him to assert independently his value preferences . Dahl's
ideology-maximizing polyarchy-guides his research ; Madison 's
is the consequence of his . Should man's lack of interest in participation, so adequately demonstrated by Dahl, become a fact to be
changed or a fact to be incorporated into our understanding of why
democracies are possible? Should willingness to accept an elected leader
as representative be a fact to be changed or a fact to be incorporated
into our understanding of why representative democracies are possible?
In both cases, tyranny (hegemony) is countered if rule is in the
public interest freely defined by the public . Science can be the
starting point for normative analysis both because it can uncover
human qualities and because it can establish the consequences of
institutional and behavioral patterns . It might demonstrate un-
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desirable consequences for certain "norms ." Political reality can
become a testing ground for evaluating norms within real contexts;
e.g., toleration may be the only possible settlement of potential
conflicts over religious norms . The answer depends upon context
rather than upon the theorist's views.
The same methods of analysis can be used for instrumental
purposes, such as maximizing polyarchy, but this changes the relationship between science and evaluation . Evaluation is only an
individual preference . The preference can then be maximizedusing knowledge for prescribing action, but never in justifying the
prescription . Dahl seems divided . His empirical arguments provide
rather strong support for Madisonian democracy, but his personal
preference remains the maximization of populistic goals . Although
his theory is congruent with Madisonian democracy, his ideology is
not. The scientific mood permits his acceptance of this dilemma.
THE PRINCIPAL ISSUE
The central criticism of the scientific mood, and the principal
issue facing political science, is the relationship between empirical
theory and normative evaluation . To search for a concatenated
theory with polyarchy as its focus has prescriptive worth for a majoritarian democratic motif in the tradition of the policy sciences
now over a score of years old . 24 Indeed, the lessons generated in
Polyarchy seem to be exactly this policy science orientation with a
stronger recognition of the limits of reality . But focusing on a
concatenated theory of polyarchy, as did the earlier policy sciences,
limits the attention given to larger questions concerning why polyarchy
(or democracy) , ought to be justified . Can theory provide answers to
these questions? Or are we intellectually confined to the limits of
the scientific mood? I think the contemporary answer depends a
great deal on the reversal of perspective we have from that of
Madison . We possess values and compare them with reality whereas
the constitution writer must construct interpretations of values that
are congruent with the empirical context-including existing beliefs
24Daniel Lerner and Harold D . Lasswell, eds ., The Policy Sciences : Recent
Developments in Scope and Method (Stanford, Calif ., 1951) .
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and aspirations of those who will be ruled by the government once
it is established . This accounts for the difference between Rousseau' s
writings on the origin of inequality and those on establishing constitutions for Corsica and Poland.
The reversal focuses analysis beyond the limits of the fact-value
dichotomy, but the distance need not be far . Questions can be
asked about empirical prerequisites for any norms or any regime
forms . Are there certain prerequisites for maintaining political
order ; or conversely, can certain norms make it impossible for a
minimum political order? Such questions are unpopular todayespecially in the university community-because their answers might
limit the idealism of youth . Scientific research into such questions
is nonetheless essential . Other questions might lead to certain empirical, albeit abstract, propositions that will link polyarchy and
other ideologies in lawful statements . For example, the nine generalizations presented in Preface (pp . 75-81) could be applied to any
set of beliefs . If general knowledge of politics is possible, then the
knowledge must affect meaningful selection of norms for given
political contexts . Public knowledge-knowledge that is intersubjectively transmissible-must become private knowledge as well.
The issue can be presented as simple reversals of questions . Is
mutual trust to be valued because it leads to polyarchy (Polyarchy,
p . 151) or polyarchy to be valued because it leads to mutual trust
(Bertrand de Jouvenel) ? Is participation to be valued because it
is a requisite for polyarchy or polyarchy to be valued because it
leads to individual development through the experience of participation (J. S . Mill) ? The important question is how best to satisfy
human needs in the context of the necessity of politics . Regime
forms designed to permit public definition of the public interest, of
how men can make peaceful adjustments, can be studied with the
hope of selecting the best form (s) for fulfilling human needs-the
best possible, given specific contexts . This use of science in evaluation is not the same as that of the scientific mood.
Lest this point be misconstrued as blaming Dahl for our discipline' s problems, a balancing point must be made . The principal
issue is directed at his works because he has carried research into
the gray area between science and evaluation more clearly, more
openly, and I believe more fruitfully than others . He has already
done enough, but because he has, it is important to point toward
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problems he has clarified . The use of data and laws distinguishes
his efforts from less rigorous forays into the gray area, and leads
to the hope that someday he will present us Democratic Theory:
Beyond Polyarchy .
GEORGE J . GRAHAM, JR.
Vanderbilt University