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PRESCRIBED SUBJECT 3:
THE MOVE TO GLOBAL WAR
GERMAN AND ITALIAN
EXPANSION
1933-1940
Name
Class
1
THE IMPACT OF FASCISM AND NAZISM ON THE
FOREIGN POLICIES OF ITALY AND GERMANY
From the initial goal of revising the post-1918 territorial settlement to its culmination in the
Second World War, territorial expansion became a defining characteristic of the ideologies and
policies in both Italy and Germany, and played a crucial role in their eventual collapse in 1943-45.
Both countries were highly nationalist, and sought to incorporate territory based on ethnic
identification. An additional feature of the foreign policies of Italy and Germany, related to their
ideologies, was anti-communism.
Italian foreign policy objectives could be said to be based upon expansionary ultra-nationalism but
were limited to desires to gain additional territories in the Balkans and in Northern Africa. German
foreign policy objectives were huge in scope and related to their racially prejudiced attitudes
especially toward Jews and Eastern European Slavs. Foreign policy aims in both Fascist Italy and
Nazi Germany were heavily concerned with revising or rolling back many of the provisions of the
Treaty of Versailles and other major agreements signed in the years following World War I.
ITALY
The rise of fascism in Italy, and the subsequent move towards an imperialistic and
expansionary foreign policy, has roots in the Treaty of Versailles.
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The above image shows the territory that was promised to Italy under the Treaty of
London, an agreement signed in 1915 in which Italy aligned itself with the Triple
Entente (Britain, France, and Russia). According to the terms of this treaty, Italy
would be granted large pieces of territory along the eastern Adriatic and the
Dalmatian Coast. By the end of World War I Italy had mobilized nearly 5 million
troops and had suffered over 600,000 dead. However, despite Italy’s military
contributions and the heavy losses that it experienced, the territory that it was
ultimately granted under the Treaty of Versailles, which nullified the Treaty of
London, was far less than originally promised. The map below describes the lands
that Italy was actually granted:
The Wilson line, seen above, drastically reduced what was given to Italy. Dalmatia
was excluded, as was Fiume; so, too, were any colonial territories in Africa or Asia
and any claim on Albania. Nationalists consequently argued that Italy had been
robbed of its rightful gains. This unhappiness with the results of the Treaty of
Versailles helped set the stage for the fascist rise to power in Italy and in turn helped
shape Italian foreign policy under Benito Mussolini.
Italy's foreign policy under Benito Mussolini had to be strong to show the world how
powerful Italy was under his leadership. As leader of Italy, Mussolini wanted to
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re-establish the greatness of the Roman Empire. Mussolini believed that conquered
foreign territory was the sign of a great nation and a great power.
He believed that Italy should be allowed a sphere of influence in the Mediterranean
Sea as he believed that Italy was the most powerful Mediterranean country. Mussolini
referred to the Mediterranean Sea as Mare Nostrum – the same as the Romans had
done when they dominated Europe. Mare Nostrum translates as "Our Sea".
However, the nation that effectively dominated the Mediterranean was Great Britain
as Britain had strong naval bases in Malta, Gibraltar and Cyprus. Britain also
controlled the Suez Canal, along with the French. Therefore, there was a non-Italian
presence that undermined Italy’s standing in the Mediterranean. Britain could control
the Mediterranean Sea – something Mussolini wished to do. With Italian claims to
Albania and Abyssinia nullified, Mussolini felt trapped because Britain and France
controlled the two major entrances to the Mediterranean – the Straits of Gibraltar and
the Suez Canal. Driven by a fascist desire for expansion and strategic concerns that
Britain and France could cut off Italy from trade and essential materials, Mussolini
adopted a much more aggressive foreign policy.
While Imperialism was always a facet of fascism it was not explicit until 1935. The
need to provide space for Italian emigration was emphasized by the occupation of
Abyssinia (present day Ethiopia) from 1935-36. The excuse for the attack came in an
incident during December 1934 between Italian and Abyssinian troops at the
Wal-Wal oasis on the border between Abyssinia and Italian Somaliland. Mussolini
demanded an apology while also preparing the Italian army to invade. Italy quickly
conquered the underprepared Abyssinians who were vastly outgunned by the Italian
military forces. This push towards more overt imperialism highlights another way that
fascism shaped Italian foreign policy: through strategic alliances, the most important
of which was with Germany.
Mussolini was frankly impressed by German efficiency, and was willing to overlook
competing interests in Austria and the Balkans that might have negatively affected the
relationship between the two countries. In 1936 Mussolini agreed to the Rome-Berlin
Axis, pledging cooperation in central Europe. This marked a distinct shift in Italian
foreign policy as it completely realigned the country away from Britain and France.
Mussolini believed that aligning with Germany was the best way to revise or nullify
the provisions of the Treaty of Versailles. The next year, on November 6, 1937, Italy
joined with Germany and Japan in the Anti-Comintern Pact, an alliance designed to
offset the growing influence of the Soviet Union.
The beginnings of the pact go back to 1935 when Germany was trying to balance its
foreign policy with the country’s historical alliance with Japan. Lack of interest in
China however, ultimately doomed it initially. A year later, in 1936, with the rise of
Japanese military power and the influence of military officials in Japan’s government,
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convinced Hitler to revive aspirations of the pact, this time focusing on Japan. Italy’s
decision to join the pact with Germany and Japan is widely regarded as a response to
collapse of the Stresa Front, a Franco-British initiative that included Italian
participation and was designed to prevent German expansion.
By the time that Italy had formalized its military ties with Germany in the so-called
Pact of Steel in 1939, Mussolini had identified his country's interests with those of
Hitler to the point that Italy had almost become a German satellite. Also known as
The Pact of Friendship and Alliance between Germany and Italy, The Pact of Steel
was the agreement with which Germany and Italy publicly entered into an alliance,
pledging mutual support in war and war production, while requiring that, in the case
of war, one nation could not negotiate for peace without agreement of the other.
Secret clauses in the pact urged both nations to increase the level of cooperation in
war planning and war production and to coordinate propaganda efforts.
The agreement was signed by Count Galeazzo Ciano for Italy and Joachim von
Ribbentrop for Germany, and the signing took place in Berlin, Germany. The
nickname "The Pact of Steel" was coined by Italian leader Benito Mussolini, who
thought the originally proposed nickname of "Pact of Blood" would be poorly
received in Italy. It was this agreement that formally created the Axis Powers, which
would later include Japan.
Discussion Questions
1) Why was Italy so concerned with strengthening its presence in the Mediterranean?
ment?
2) How did the Treaty of Versailles affect Italian foreign policy under the fascist
govern
3) Why did Mussolini realign Italy with Germany?
4) How did anti-communism feature in Italian foreign policy?
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GERMANY
Following the Nazi rise to power, Adolf Hitler's government conducted a foreign
policy based on several key provisions:
- The incorporation of ethnic Germans (Volksdeutsche) living outside German
borders into the Reich.
- German domination of western Europe.
- The acquisition of a vast new empire of "living space" (Lebensraum) in
Eastern Europe.
- Rearmament/remilitarization (FROM WHAT?) which would allow Germany
to achieve their foreign policy objectives.
-
End the restrictions on Germany imposed by the Treaty of Versailles.
Foremost among these factors was the Treaty of Versailles. Prior to the outbreak of
war in 1914 Germany had grown into an advanced industrial and colonial power,
overtaking both Britain and France in terms of productive capacity. The Treaty of
Versailles erased these advances and all of its wartime gains. Germany was stripped
of its global investments and colonies. The Rhineland, a strip of land bordering
France, was demilitarized. Unification with Austria was forbidden and Germany lost
both Silesia and Posen, rich agricultural areas.
Germany was also forbidden to maintain an air force or submarine fleet, with a navy
limited to six battleships and an
army of only 100,000 men.
Perhaps most damaging were the
harsh financial and social penalties
placed on Germany: Germany was
forced to accept full responsibility
for the war and was required to
make reparations totaling over 32
billion dollars, a sum of money that
would be nearly impossible to
repay. Germany was also forced to
accept complete blame for the war
as codified in Article 231 of the
Treaty, now known as “The War
Guilt Clause”.
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These restrictions deeply angered
Article 231, often known as the War Guilt Clause, was the
the German people and created
opening article of the reparations section of the Treaty of
rifts among the other allied powers
Versailles. The article did not use the word "guilt" but it served as
a legal basis to compel Germany to pay reparations. Germans
as well, notably Italy who did not
benefit from the terms of Versailles viewed this as a national humiliation. German politicians were
vocal in their opposition to the article in an attempt to generate
as much as France or Britain,
international sympathy, while German historians worked to
despite having suffered tremendous
undermine the article so they could subvert the entire treaty.
losses in the fighting. For the
German people, resentment over
these terms, and the terrible economic conditions that followed the post-war
settlement, created the conditions that helped Hitler and the Nazi Party achieve
political success and ultimately complete dominance over the German government.
With this ascendance came a German foreign policy based on rolling back or revising
most of the terms in the Treaty of Versailles and reestablishing Germany as the
dominant European power.
Like Italy, Germany followed a revisionist policy from 1933-1938 aimed at
overcoming the restrictions imposed by the Treaty of Versailles and seizing the
diplomatic initiative from Britain and France. Germany withdrew from the League of
Nations; began rapid rearmament; signed a non-aggression pact with Poland;
reacquired the Saar territory through a plebiscite; militarily assisted the supporters of
Francisco Franco in the Spanish Civil War; and remilitarized the Rhineland.
Hitler believed that achieving German dominance of Europe would require war,
especially in Eastern Europe. The "racially inferior" Slavs would be driven east of the
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Urals, turned into slaves, or exterminated. Besides acquiring Lebensraum, Hitler
anticipated that the "drive to the East" would destroy Bolshevism. From 1938-1945
Germany strengthened its ties to Fascist Italy and to Japan by signing the
Anti-Comintern Pact, which aimed to combat international communism, the Pact of
Steel – signed with Italy that would become the basis for the Axis powers and later
included Japan, and the wartime Three-Power Agreement (with Italy and Japan).
In 1938, Germany acquired new territories using the threat of war. In February, Hitler
pressured Austrian chancellor Kurt Schuschnigg into signing the German-Austrian
agreement, which brought Nazis into the Austrian cabinet. The next month, Germany
carried out the Anschluss, the annexation of Austria. After a prolonged period of
intense propaganda inside Austria, German troops entered the country on March 12,
1938, receiving the enthusiastic support of most of the population. Austria was
incorporated into Germany on the following day. In April, this German annexation
was retroactively approved in a plebiscite that was manipulated to indicate that about
99 percent of the Austrian people wanted the union the Anschluss with Germany.
Neither Jews nor Roma (Gypsies) were permitted to vote in the plebiscite.
Hitler then began demanding a solution to the Sudeten crisis, a conflict over the
Sudetenland, a region of Czechoslovakia inhabited largely by ethnic Germans. The
Sudeten Crisis had, in fact, been inflamed by
Hitler himself who had ordered Konrad
Henlein, leader of the Sudeten Germans, to
keep making demands for concessions that the
government in Prague couldn’t possibly grant.
On September 30, 1938, British Prime
Minister Neville Chamberlain, an advocate of
Appeasement, French Premier Edouard
Daladier, Italian Prime Minister Benito
Mussolini, and Hitler signed the Munich
agreement, which ceded the Sudetenland to
Germany. In March 1939, Germany occupied
and dismembered the Czechoslovak state.
Appeasement:
In May, 1937, Neville Chamberlain became
prime minister of Great Britain. His program
for
dealing
with
Hitler
was
one
of
appeasement, that is, of attempting to meet
German demands in hopes of avoiding war.
Hitler took advantage of this policy by
annexing Austria on March 13, 1938. He then
demanded the return to Germany of the
Sudetenland,
inhabited
a
part
largely
of
Czechoslovakia
by
Germans.
Czechoslovakia, assured by various treaties
of the backing of France and the Soviet
Union, prepared for war.
In the 1925 Treaty of Locarno, Germany had recognized both the inviolability of its
borders with France and Belgium and the demilitarization of the Rhineland. On
March 7, 1936, however, Hitler repudiated this agreement and ordered the German
armed forces, or Wehrmacht, into the demilitarized Rhineland. Hitler's action brought
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condemnation from Britain and France, but neither nation intervened.
In August 1939, Ribbentrop signed the German-Soviet Nonaggression Pact. A
temporary change from Germany's normally anti-Communist foreign policy, this
agreement allowed Hitler the freedom to attack Poland on September 1, 1939, without
fear of Soviet intervention. Britain and France, Poland's allies, declared war on
Germany on September 3, 1939. Hitler's aggressive foreign policy resulted in the
outbreak of World War II.
United States Holocaust Memorial Museum
http://www.ushmm.org/wlc/en/article.php?ModuleId=10005203
Weinberg, Gerhard. (1970). The Foreign Policy of Hitler's Germany Diplomatic
Revolution in Europe 1933–36 Chicago: University of Chicago Press. pp. 342–
346. ISBN 0226885097
Eugene K. Keefe. at al Area Handbook for Italy (Washington, D.C.: Foreign Area
Studies of the American University, 1977), pp. 28-33
1. What were the key features of Nazi foreign policy?
2. How did the racist nature of Nazi ideology affect German foreign policy?
3. What do you think the phrase “seize the diplomatic initiative” means?
4. Discuss the similarities between Italian and German foreign policies.
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5. Discuss how the Treaty of Versailles affected international relationships in Europe.
6. How did the foreign policies of Italy and Germany, under fascism and Nazism
respectively, increase political tensions in Europe?
Common Destiny: Dictatorship, Foreign Policy, and War in Fascist Italy and Nazi
Germany MacGregor Knox. Cambridge University Press, Jun 12, 2000
This cartoon of February
1938
by
cartoonist
the
British
David
Low
shows Germany crushing
Austria. Next in line is
Czechoslovakia.
back,
Britain
France,
At the
says
who
to
is
next-to-last: ‘Why should
we take a stand about
someone
pushing
someone else when it’s
all so far away?’
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With reference its origin and purpose, discuss the values and limitations of the cartoon
for Historians studying the Impact of Fascism and Nazism on the foreign policies of
Italy and Germany in the years 1933-1940 (two values and two limitations).
Origin:
Purpose:
Values:
Limitations:
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THE IMPACT OF DOMESTIC AND ECONOMICAL
ISSUES ON THE FOREIGN POLICIES OF ITALY AND
GERMANY
DOMESTIC AND ECONOMIC ISSUES IN GERMANY
For Germany the humiliation of defeat and the peace settlement that followed World
War I were devastating. In 1918 the price of a loaf of bread in Germany was 0.63
marks (the German currency at the time). By the end of 1923 the price of a loaf of
bread was 201,000,000,000 marks because of hyperinflation. A new currency, the
Rentenmark, replaced the worthless marks on November 16, 1923 and 12 zeros were
cut from prices, prices in the new currency remained stable. Germany's national pride
and economy suffered greatly from the terms of the Treaty of Versailles that she was
forced to sign at end of World War I.
In 1933, when Hitler became Chancellor, the German economy was a mess.
Unemployment peaked at 6 million or nearly 33% of the nation’s working population.
The Nazis introduced a number of policies that brought down the unemployment
figures. Women were no longer included in the statistics so any women who remained
out of work under the Nazi’s rule did not exist as far as the statistics were concerned.
Unemployed people were forced do whatever work was given to them by the
government or they would be labeled "work-shy" and sent to a concentration camp.
Jews lost their citizenship in 1935 and like women, were no longer counted among the
unemployed. 1935 also saw the beginning of conscription which took men out of
unemployment by putting them in the army. This would in turn strengthen the
Germany military and give Hitler the means to later invade and occupy the Rhineland
and later expand German territory beyond her actual borders as set by Versailles (or
the Alt Reich)
Despite the fact that many unemployed people were just relabeled, the Nazi party
claimed they had achieved an “economic miracle” with unemployment all but
disappearing by 1939. This boosted the image of Germany internationally and boosted
the confidence of the German people.
Under the Nazis there was work being created. Public work projects were created by
the National Labor Service. Their work included digging irrigation ditches on farms,
building autobahns (The German highway system), and planting forests. The men of
National Labor Service wore a military style uniforms and lived in camps near where
they were working. They received only pocket money for their work.
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To ‘protect’ workers, the German Labor Front was set up. It was led by Robert Ley.
The GLF took the role of trade unions which had been banned. Ley did not allow
workers to be fired easily, but he also ordered that a worker could not leave his job
without the government’s permission. Only government labor exchanges could
arrange new jobs for people leaving employment. The Labor Front increased the
number of hours worked from 60 to 72 per week (including overtime) by 1939.
Strikes were outlawed.
By early 1934 the focus shifted toward rearmament. By 1935, military expenditures
accounted for 73 per cent of the government's purchases of goods and services. In
1936 the Four Year Plan, a plan to prepare Germany for self-sufficiency in four years
(1936–1940), began. It was intended to speed up the rearmament program. The
Four-Year Plan's four priorities were to increase agricultural production, to retrain key
sectors of the work force, to increase government regulation of imports and exports,
and to achieve self-sufficiency in the production of raw materials. The plan also
emphasized building up the nation's military defenses which was in direct violation of
the restrictions imposed on Germany by the Treaty of Versailles.
The Nazis plan was to reduce imports, reduce unemployment, channel government
spending into a wide range of industries and make trade agreements with other
nations. They wanted Germany to become self-sufficient in all industries so that as a
nation she could survive a war. By 1939, Germany still imported 33% of its required
raw materials. From 1933 to 1939, the Nazi government always spent more than it
earned so that by 1939, government debt stood at over 40 billion Reichsmarks.
1) What was the cost of a loaf of bread in Germany in 1923?
2) What groups of people were not counted as unemployed by the Nazis?
3) Why was the German Labour Front established?
4) How much of Germany's raw materials were imported in 1939?
5) How could a lack of raw materials effect Germany's ambition for war?
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DOMESTIC AND ECONOMIC ISSUES IN ITALY
Benito Mussolini’ had a “thirst for military glory”. Mussolini believed his destiny was
to rule Italy as a modern Caesar and re-create the Roman Empire. Because of these
ambitions much of his early domestic policy was centered to consolidating power and
to making Italy self-sufficient.
At the beginning of Fascist rule economic policy was classical liberal (capitalist).
Several policies were made to attract foreign investment. A 10% tax on investing in
the banking and the industry sectors was repealed. Taxes on the directors of some
companies were cut in half. Taxes on foreign capital were exonerated and luxury taxes
were repealed. By 1921 Mussolini wanted increase the productivity and
self-sufficiency. A series of protective tariffs were levied on foreign imports to lower
competition and aid Italian industry. Up until 1925 Italy enjoyed some growth, but the
country had also experienced increasing inflation.
The Battle for grain was another policy Mussolini implemented to make Italy more
self-sufficient by increasing the production of grains. The Policy offered grants to
farmers to buy tractors and fertilizer. It offered the farmers a guaranteed a high prices
for their grain. Of course this led to production increasing rapidly. Imports of grain
dropped over 70% between 1925 and 1935. This provided Mussolini with fuel for his
huge propaganda machine. Although it helped Italy become more self-sufficient it
cause a decline in the production of crops such as olives and citrus fruits which were
more suitable for land southern Italy and could be exported. With the guaranteed price
of grain, the price of bread would rise for everyday Italians.
The Battle for the Lira, the Italian currency at the time, was a policy implemented in
the late 1920s. The Lira had been declining in value since the early 1920s. This was
actually a positive factor in Italy's economy because it made Italy's exports cheaper
and more competitive. Although this helped the economy it was disliked politically.
Mussolini felt that the declining Lira would make Italy look weak to larger powers in
Europe and the United States. Mussolini announced on August 18, 1926 in a speech in
Pesaro the government would peg the exchange rate 92.46 lira against the British
Pound Sterling. By making the Lira stronger it made imports cheaper and benefited
heavy industry like steel and chemicals. These industries would provide the basis for
an expanded rearmament industry and supported a more active foreign policy.
While Mussolini was consolidating his position in Italy he pursued a peaceful and
restrained foreign policy. He signed the Locarno Pacts in 1925 (by which Germany
accepted her western frontiers and was admitted into the League of Nations), and the
Kellogg-Briand Pact in 1928 (an agreement by which the signatories agreed to outlaw
war as a form of foreign policy – an effort at lasting peace following WWI).
Mussolini dismantled almost all constitutional and conventional restraints on his
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power, in turn building a police state. In 1925 Mussolini's formal title was changed
"president of the Council of Ministers" to "head of the government" (although he was
still commonly referred to as "Prime Minister") and he was no longer responsible to
Parliament and could only be removed by the King. Mussolini had in effect obtained
absolute power. Having gained absolute power, Mussolini’s desire to forge a new
Roman Empire and for future expansion was inevitable.
Mussolini's ambitions of creating an east African empire would lead to the invasion of
Abyssinia (modern day Ethiopia). This would undermine the League of Nations
because of the failed Hoare-Laval Plan that followed. The Hoare–Laval Pact
(proposed in December 1935) was a proposal by British Foreign Secretary Samuel
Hoare and French Prime Minister Pierre Lava to end the war. Under the pact, Italy
would gain parts of Abyssinian and economic influence over all the southern part of
Abyssinia. Abyssinia would have a guaranteed corridor to the sea called a "corridor
for camels" at the port of Assab. Mussolini was ready to agree to the Pact but it was
rejected by opposing parties in Britain and France on moral grounds. The sanctions
against Italy were used by Mussolini as a pretext for an alliance with Germany.
Mussolini’s Domestic Policies 1919-1939
http://ibatpv.org/projects/italy/ned_domestic.html
Denitz, Deidre. Hitler’s Domestic Policy
http://ibatpv.org/projects/3rdreich/3rd_reich_domestic.htm
Benito Mussolini
http://www.history.com/topics/world-war-ii/benito-mussolini
Four Year Plan
http://www.historylearningsite.co.uk/four_year_plan.htm
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1) What policies were made to attract foreign investment?
2) What did Mussolini do to increase productivity and self-sufficiency?
3) How did the Battle for Grain increase the production of grain in Italy?
4) Why did the price of grain rise for everyday Italians?
5) What did the Battle for the Lira do?
6) Why did Mussolini have a restrained foreign policy until the invasion of
Abyssinia?
7) What was used by Mussolini as a pretext to an alliance with Germany?
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CHANGING DIPLOMATIC ALIGNMENTS IN EUROPE
In the years after the First World War, Britain and France were the two most powerful
countries in Europe. Italy, despite being on the winning side in the First World War,
was a far less influential country and Germany was an outcast among the nations – a
pariah state.
The Treaty of Versailles www.missevi.wordpress.com
Germany had been reduced to the lowest of the low by the Treaty of Versailles. The
treaty had stripped Germany of land, much of her military power, and forced to pay
huge amounts in financial reparations to the victors of the First World War – or the
Great War as it was known at the time because there had never been a war like it
before, and nobody expected there to be a war like it ever again.
The Treaty of Versailles had been signed to create a lasting peace, but this backfired
with great irony as the very treaty singed to create a lasting peace, instead helped to
set Europe on the path to another war even greater than the won that had just ended.
The Treaty of Versailles had helped make the Great War not so much the war to end
all wars – as the war to begin all future wars!
The terms of the Treaty of Versailles turned Germany into a perfect breeding ground
for Hitler and the Nazis. Hitler and the Nazis were able to play on the treaty and
exploit the German people’s resentment of it. Hitler promised to rip up the treaty if he
became German Chancellor (equivalent to Prime Minister), and that was a
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vote-winner in the eyes of many Germans. The Nazis’ exploitation of Versailles and
the German people’s resentment of it, along with the promise to make Germany great
again, was one of the key factors in Hitler’s eventual coming to power in Germany. It
was all too well known what path Hitler sent Germany and indeed all Europe on the
road once he had become German Chancellor! If the Treaty of Versailles had not been
so harsh there may very well have been no Adolf Hitler in German politics, the Nazi
party would have remained an obscure fringe party with no influence beyond the
German state of Bavaria, and there may therefore very well have been no Second
World War.
How Europe went from what everyone thought would be a lasting peace with
Germany an outcast among the nations, to a Nazi Germany led by Hitler with plans to
take over Europe is a catalogue of missed opportunities to forestall a major conflict,
mis-judgements by the key European powers of the time, and numerous changes in
attitudes and alignments between nations from Europe and beyond.
1) What is meant by a Pariah state?
2) In what three key ways was Germany hardest-hit by the Treaty of Versailles?
3) Why was the First World War initially known as the ‘Great War’?
4) How was the Treaty of Versailles such an effective political tool for Hitler and the
Nazis?
5) To what extent do you agree that if the Treaty of Versailles had not been so harsh
on Germany, there would have been no Adolf Hitler, no Nazi party in German
national politics, and no Second World War? Why? Does the answer lie just with
the situation in Europe, or also beyond? Why/Why not?
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REALIGNMENTS BY ECONOMICS
Relations between Germany and the rest of Europe did not stay this way permanently.
It was not the case that the post-WWI relations between Germany on one hand and
Britain and France on the other remained the same all the way through to the outbreak
of WWII. In the interwar years there was a change in relations on this front, and there
lay the change in diplomatic alignments in Europe.
Germany started the interwar years as an outcast within Europe, but relations between
Germany and the victors of WWI improved over time and alignments between
European nations evolved for a number of reasons.
With regard to Germany, Britain and France had ulterior motives for eventually
improving their relations with Germany. In the first instance, reparations – ironically
enough - created the first steps to something of a reconciliation. Germany was forced
to pay huge amounts in reparations under the terms of the Versailles Treaty. The
famous Economist J. M. Keynes had warned that the sum of £6600 million which was
set at the Treaty of Versailles was too much to expect from Germany. The amount was
certainly unrealistic and Germany could not possibly pay the full amount – certainly
not without any assistance. In 1923 Germany faltered on her reparations to France and
the French took over the Ruhr Valley (which is situated on the Franco-German
Rhineland border) with a view to taking reparations in coal. The French eventually
withdrew their troops from the Ruhr Valley, but not before the drawing up of the
Dawes Plan.
Cartoon depicting the French taking coal from the Ruhr Valley (BBC Germany 1918
to 1939)
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Cartoon depicting the impoverished state of Germany whilst the French take what
they can get of Germany’s resources (BBC Germany 1918 to 1939)
The Dawes Plan (formed in 1924 and named after Charles Dawes who chaired the
committee that agreed the plan, and became US Vice President the following year)
was basically a payment plan for Germany to make the reparations bill more
manageable. Germany still had to pay the full amount but the new installments made
repayment more realistic and they came with a £40 million loan to help Germany pay.
The payments were phased in steps of £50 million in the first year and building up to
£125 million in the fifth year. The USA’s ulterior motive for this was to get Britain
and France’s re-payments back to her! Britain and France owed the USA money,
which they could not pay without Germany paying them her reparations, and
Germany could not re-pay money it did not have! The Dawes Plan served as a means
to get money back in circulation – and for the USA to finally get her money owed to
her by Britain and France! By way of the Dawes Plan, the USA lent Germany money
with which she could pay her reparations to Britain and France, who could then pay
their debts back to the USA.
There were three significant effects of the Dawes Plan: Firstly the Ruhr Valley was
evacuated by the French in July 1925. Secondly Germany was treated as an equal for
the first time since the end of WWI – as opposed to an entity beneath everyone else.
Thirdly the Dawes Plan helped Germany’s economy improve under her Foreign
Minister Gustav Stresemann.
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Gustav Stresemann – German Chancellor in 1923 and German Foreign Minister
1923-29 http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Gustav_Stresemann
In 1929 Stresemann appealed to the USA for further assistance with reparations
payments. Further to the Dawes Plan a committee headed by American Industrialist
Owen Young reduced Germany’s reparations bill to £2000 million (less than a third of
the £6600 originally set at the Treaty of Versailles). The Young Plan (as it is famously
known) also set a time scale of 59 years for the amount to be paid. Under the terms of
the plan payments would start in May 1930 and end in 1988. This was a much more
realistic time scale for paying a much more realistic amount, and as such enabled
better relations between Germany, France, and Britain.
Stresemann’s efforts to achieve a better reparations deal for Germany - along with the
successful outcome helped to achieve stability in Germany (after years of turmoil in
the early years of the Weimar Republic), increased his popularity amongst the German
people and his status as an international leader, and therefore improved Germany’s
standing within Europe from her wretched Pariah status in 1919.
21
This improvement in prospects for Germany, and relations between Germany on one
hand and Britain and France on the other however did not last. Barely had the Young
Plan been agreed when everything was shattered by the Wall Street Crash on 24th
October 1929. The consequent Great Depression spread through much of the world,
and Germany in particular was hard-hit by the Depression. The USA called in all her
loans and Germany was unable to pay anything by 1931-32.
The Dawes Plan and Young Plan had helped improve Germany’s standing after WWI
and improve relations between Germany on and France and Britain on the other, but
the Wall Street Crash shattered all of this. There would be further re-alignments
between Germany and other European nations, but these would be more ideological…
Inter-War Diplomacy
http://www.rpfuller.com/gcse/history/4.html
1) What was the original reparations sum for Germany set at the Treaty of Versailles?
2) Which region did the French occupy when Germany faulted on her reparations
payments in 1923?
3) What was the USA’s ulterior motive for the Dawes Plan in 1924?
4) What were three significant effects of the Dawes Plan?
5) What was Germany’s reparations bill reduced to by the Young Plan in 1929?
6) How many years was Germany given to pay her new reparations bill under the
terms of the Young Plan? When were the payments due to start and end?
22
REALIGNMENTS BY POLITICS
As well as changes in alignments due to economic factors, there were changes also
due to political factors.
Germany’s boundaries had been greatly reduced by the terms of the Versailles. She
had had land taken off her and given to other countries e.g. Alsace-Lorraine to France,
Memel to Belgium, Upper Silesia and West Prussia to Poland, Schleswig Holstein to
Denmark, and the Sudetenland to Czechoslovakia. Poland and Czechoslovakia were
two new countries in Europe that had been created after the end of WWI and were the
product of Wilson’s Fourteen Points. As time progressed various treaties took place to
solidify Germany’s newly set frontiers.
One of the first such treaties to take place was the Locarno Pacts in 1925. Britain,
France, and Germany agreed to meet in Locarno, Switzerland where Germany
accepted her frontiers with France and Belgium and agreed that they should remain
unchanged. Germany further agreed not to change her borders with Poland or
Czechoslovakia without first consulting with France and her ‘Little Entente Partners’
i.e. Czechoslovakia, Romania, and Yugoslavia. This treaty in itself helped improve
relations between France and Germany because France now felt more secure about
her boundaries with Germany and for Germany there was now some hope of
regaining land on her eastern borders that had been taken off her in the Treaty of
Versailles. Furthermore the Locarno Pacts were followed by Germany’s entry into the
League of Nations as a permanent council member in 1926.
Gustav Stresemann for German, Austin Chamberlain for Britain, and Aristide Briand
for France at the Locarno negotiations http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Locarno_Treaties
23
In 1926 Germany signed a Treaty of Neutrality with the USSR, which was a renewal
of the Treaty of Rapallo in 1922 (in which normal relations were re-established
between the two countries, all financial claims against each other were cancelled, and
strengthened the countries’ economic and military ties). The Treaty of Rapallo was
Germany’s first agreement concluded by Germany as an independent party since the
end of WWI. It had angered the Western Allies (i.e. Britain and France) and the Treaty
of Neutrality (which was a renewal of the Treaty of Rapallo) further worried the
French. In light of this the French Prime Minister, Aristide Briand turned to the US
Secretary of State, F B. Kellog for assistance, and in August 1928 a nine power
conference took place in Paris and the end result was the Kellogg-Briand Pact, by
which the 65 signatories agreed to outlaw war except in self-defense. As with the
Locarno Pacts, the Kellog-Briand Pact had significant effects on changes in
alignments in Europe, and Germany’s progress back amongst the other nations of
Europe from her previous pariah status. The USSR was one of the signatories which
gave her some recognition by other powers. Germany signed the pact and this allayed
France’s fears of German aggression. Unfortunately the pact had no means of
preventing war, and this would prove crucial in light of the Great Depression that
would hit Europe within two years of the pact being singed. The Great Depression
would destroy the economic apparatus by which Germany’s standing in Europe had
improved, and pave the way for extremist groups in Germany. In Germany Hitler and
the Nazis were able to use the Great Depression to their advantage and play on the
German people’s anger at the futility of the established Weimar government to deal
with the situation. This culminated in Hitler becoming German Chancellor and that in
turn led to a major change in alignments in Europe…
Inter-War Diplomacy
http://www.rpfuller.com/gcse/history/4.html
Treaty of Rapallo – European History
http://www.britannica.com/EBchecked/topic/491362/Treaty-of-Rapallo
1) Which countries were given territory taken from Germany by the Treaty of
Versailles? Which territory did these countries get?
2) What were the terms of the Locarno Pact? What hope did this giver Germany?
24
3) Which two treaties between which two countries angered the Western Allies and
worried the French?
4) Which Pact allayed France’s worries with the above two treaties?
5) What was the problem with the above pact?
REALIGNMENT BY IDEOLOGY AND AGGRESSION
When Adolf Hitler became German Chancellor, the alignments that had been
established in the ten years following the end of WWI were gone. Hitler’s Nazi
Germany was as yet an unknown entity. Hitler had made it clear however that he
intended to rip up the Treaty of Versailles. He also wanted to reunite all German
speakers (which would entail taking back all German territory taken from her by the
Treaty of Versailles), and taking German-speaking territory which had not belonged to
Germany for hundreds of years. Hitler however would find these aims relatively easy
to achieve in the early stages, as Britain and France embarked on a policy of
Appeasement.
It is wrong to say that Britain and France were determined to avoid another European
war at all costs, but it is true that they both desired peace and still had vivid memories
of the carnage of WWI and would have preferred to avoid a repeat of the carnage.
Moreover it had taken four years for Britain and France to overcome Germany in
WWI, and it had come with the help of the USA – who did not want any further
involvement in European affairs, but rather to pursue a policy of isolationism (so
Britain and France would not be able to count on American support another time).
Connected to this, but at the same time a point in its own right was Britain and
France’s general unpreparedness for war. Britain and France were simply not ready
for another conflict and needed time to prepare. If nothing else, the policy of
Appeasement would but Britain and France time until they were ready for war.
There were other reasons for their Appeasement policy towards Hitler besides the
desire to avoid another war. By the 1930s, both Britain and France felt that they had
been too harsh on Germany with the Treaty of Versailles and as such they were
prepared to make concessions. When Hitler re-took the Rhineland in 1936 there was
no resistance by the British or the French. Neither was there any resistance when
25
Hitler invaded Austria in what was known as Anschluss or ‘reunification’ between the
two countries, who had once both been one and the same country. The alarm bells did
ring during the summer of 1938 when Hitler was looking eastwards to
Czechoslovakia, but here too, Britain, France, and Italy agreed to Hitler having the
Sudetenland area of Czechoslovakia (which had previously been German but was
taken off her in the Treaty of Versailles). By allowing Hitler so much leeway Britain
and France felt that they were making amends for their harsh treatment of German in
the Treaty of Versailles. The Munich Agreement, in which this concession had been
made however, also laid down the condition that Hitler was not to make any further
territorial claims after taking the Sudetenland.
Chamberlain (for Britain), Daladier (for France), Hitler (for Nazi Germany),
Mussolini (for Fascist Italy), and Ciano (Fascist Italian Foreign Minister) at Munich
before the Munich Agreement is signed
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Munich_Agreement
Another reason why Hitler was not stopped sooner was fear of Communism. Nazi
Germany stood between Western Europe and the USSR (which was now ruled by
Stalin). One needed only to look at the USSR to see what communism had done there;
it had destroyed the old order, caused civil war and famine. As a capitalist country,
British leaders did not want to see their positions destroyed and the whole country
turned upside down. Moreover, the Russian Revolution had happened against the
backdrop of WWI. If war meant revolution, then war was best avoided.
Keeping with ideology, Fascism was aggressive but it did not harm non-Jewish
capitalism. Anti-Semitism was not exactly non-existent in Britain so Hitler’s racial
policies – at least in the early years did not “raise too may eyebrows”. Furthermore a
number of Britain’s dominions – many of whom had made great sacrifices with
26
soldiers’ lives in WWI were more interested in an isolationist policy, and some –
including South Africa – even sympathized with Hitler’s racial policies.
Britain had interests and colonies around the world. Quite apart from her questionable
ability to fight the Nazis and their allies combined, Eastern Europe - which Hitler was
threatening by 1938-39 - was therefore considered a far-away region of no interest to
her.
When Hitler signed the Munich Agreement in September 1938, by which he was
allowed the Sudetenland on condition that he made this the last of his territorial
demands, it was thought that Britain and France had prevented another European War.
The British Prime Minister, Neville Chamberlain even proclaimed the document on
which Hitler’s signature was signed gave “peace in our time”! Hitler however was not
fully content and in March 1939, he took the rest of Czechoslovakia – territory that
had never been German, but which Hitler wanted anyway as extra living space for the
German people – or Lebensraum. This was condemned by the ever-futile League of
Nations, but no effective action was taken. Britain and France however promised that
they would come to Poland’s aid if Hitler attacked her.
Chamberlain returns to London for the Munich Conference with the paper that he
claims will give “peace in our time”. http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Munich_Agreement
What followed was the most surprising changes in alignments of them all; the
Nazi-Soviet Pact! Hitler hated Communism, and Stalin hated Fascism, so why did
these two ideological enemies sign a non-aggression pact? Poland had borders with
27
both Nazi Germany and the USSR. Stalin was afraid that the USSR would be
vulnerable to a Nazi Attack when she too was not ready for war, and Hitler was afraid
that an invasion of Poland would trigger war with the USSR, which he was not ready
for. Hitler also hoped that if he signed a non-aggression pact with Stalin, Britain and
France would reconsider their resolve to aid Poland if he attacked her. This latter hope
was not realized however. Britain and France stood by their promise and when the
Nazis invaded Poland, Britain and France declared war on Nazi Germany.
In the space of twenty years, Britain and France had gone from regarding Germany as
an outcast to treating her as an equal to discuss borders with, to allowing her to take
back territory they took off her in 1919, to being back in a state of war with her.
Germany too had additionally gone from hating Communism, to signing a
non-aggression pact with the mother country of that very ideology. The surprise of
such an alignment was not lost on the rest of Europe, where some quarters took a very
cynical view.
Road to War
http://www.historyman.co.uk/road2war/
Stalin and Ribbentrop (Nazi-German Foreign Minister) after signing the Nazi-Soviet
Non-Aggression Pact on 23rd August 1939
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Molotov%E2%80%93Ribbentrop_Pact
28
Cartoon depicting the cynical view that many held of the Nazi-Soviet No-Aggression
Pact www.ssoltanhistory.weebly.com
1) By what two means would Hitler have to unite all German speakers?
2) Other than not wanting a repeat of the carnage and death of WWI, why else were
Britain and France keen to avoid war with Nazi Germany?
3) For what two reasons did Hitler sign a non-aggression pact with Stalin? Did Hitler
achieve his second intended objective with this?
29
It was not just Germany over which there was a change in alignments in Interwar
Europe. Italy too was the center of alignment changes in Europe at the time. Italy had
been on the winning side in WWI, but with little progress in the war on Italy’s part
(but not without much loss of life), Italy did not get very much to show for her efforts
at the Treaty of Versailles, and that caused wide-spread resentment amongst the
Italians. Benito Mussolini was able to exploit this in Italy in much the same way that
Hitler exploited it in Germany.
Mussolini became Italian Prime Minister in 1922 and he had dreams if Italy becoming
a great power in Europe once again. Italy had been the birth-place of the Roman
Empire over 1000 years before, and Mussolini wanted to return Italy to such a status.
Italy was anything but a great power in 1922. She had been given what have been
described as the “crumbs from under the table” at the Treaty of Versailles.
Mussolini had signed the Four Power Pact in 1933 which gave Italy, Germany,
Britain and France equal standing amongst each other in Europe, at the same time as
diminishing the standing of other European countries (and was regarded as the USSR
as an anti-Soviet alliance). It gave Mussolini’s Italy some recognition as a valid
European power. Mussolini claimed from this to have given Europe leadership and a
sense of growing power for Italy as the other countries came to Italy to sign the pact.
The signing of the For Power Pact in 1933 www.corbisimages.com
Mussolini also wanted extra territory, and he got it in Abyssinia (modern-day
Ethiopia). He invaded Abyssinia in 1935 and took it over in a very one-sided conflict
in which Abyssinian forces with pre-WWI weapons were no match for a modern
30
Italian army. The League of Nations condemned this action and imposed sanctions –
including oil. Britain and France took no further actions themselves however as they
feared, in an over-estimation of Italy’s navy, Italian reprisals, and Britain even kept
the Suez Canal open for Italy. Britain and France also agreed, in an attempt to end the
fighting in Abyssinia, to give two large areas in Abyssinia to Italy and a gap in the
middle of the country – the ‘corridor of camels’ - to Abyssinia. This plan, known as
the Hoar-Laval Plan (named after Britain and France’s Foreign Ministers failed and
the fighting continued in Abyssinia. Two member nations of the League of Nations
had negotiated with an aggressing nation forcing its will on a weaker nation, and the
League of Nations’ sanctions had failed. Mussolini had gone against his fellow
Europeans but he had got away with it.
Italian forces in Abyssinia in 1936
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Second_Italo-Ethiopian_War
Despite the failure of the League of Nations’ sanctions, Mussolini brought Italy out of
the League of Nations in 1937, and over time grew closer to Hitler and Nazi Germany.
This was out of fear, as when Hitler became German Chancellor in 1933, Mussolini
saw him as a threat – given He had publicly stated his desire for a reunion – or
Anschluss with Austria – with which Italy had a common border. If Hitler became an
enemy this could spell bad news for Italy. Mussolini and Hitler were further brought
together by similar foreign policy aims e.g. territorial gains. They both supported
Franco in the Spanish Civil War for which they both sent their own ‘volunteers’ to
fight on his side.
A formal alliance was signed between Fascist Italy and Nazi Germany on 21st
October 1936. This became known as the Rome-Berlin Axis. They were now bound to
both follow a common foreign policy. In September 1937 Mussolini visited Hitler in
Berlin, during which Hitler gave Mussolini a fine military display, by which he was
31
greatly impressed. Hitler had gone up in Mussolini’s ratings by a long way from the
‘silly little monkey’ as which Mussolini had dismissed him in 1933. Mussolini had
become convinced that Nazi Germany was the country to side with and not Britain or
France. Hitler had originally looked upon Mussolini as his role model. By 1937
however the shoe was on the other foot! Nazi Germany was the dominant power in
Europe now and Mussolini knew it! Mussolini therefore aimed to side with Nazi
Germany to bolster Italy’s own standing in Europe.
Mussolini and Hitler in Berlin
http://www.pacificwar.org.au/historicalbackground/HitlerfindsAlly.html
In 1938 Hitler took Austria (the Anschluss) without warning Mussolini. Mussolini
was powerless to do anything. It was clear that Fascist Italy was the junior partner in
the Hitler-Mussolini partnership.
In the summer of 1938 Europe was faced with war over the Sudetenland crises (the
Sudetenland was the territory taken off Germany by the Treaty of Versailles that was
given to Czechoslovakia). It was Mussolini who, against this backdrop, suggested a
meeting in Munich to settle the crises. This meeting ended in the Munich Agreement
which British Prime Minister, Neville Chamberlain prematurely claimed brought
“peace in our time”. Mussolini got the credit for this and it put him at the peak of his
popularity. In the eyes of many it made him Europe’s savior, which in turn Mussolini
assumed made him Europe’s premier statesman.
When Hitler violated the terms of the Munich Agreement and invaded the rest of
Czechoslovakia in March 1939 Mussolini was angered. Hitler was clearly carving an
empire for himself when Mussolini was not! Mussolini made up for this by taking
Albania on Good Friday 1939, whereupon King Victor Emmanuel of Italy was offered
32
the title of King of Albania. To Mussolini this was a sign of Italy’s expanding power
in Europe, although this was not much a triumph considering that Albania had been
under Italian influence for years before then. Mussolini also let it be known to Hitler
that he wanted a sphere of influence in the Adriatic.
Hitler and Mussolini’s alliance was cemented by the Pact of Steel in May 1939. Both
countries were hereby committed to support each other if one or the other went to war.
The Italian Foreign Minister, Galleazo Ciano (who was also Mussolini’s son-in-law)
saw that this pact was potentially highly damaging for Italy but Mussolini was more
interested in the prestige of allying with Europe’s most dominant power rather than
the politics of it. He felt very committed to the pact and as such, he felt that the
Nazi-Soviet Non-Aggression Pact applied just as much to him as to Hitler – even
though Italy did not sign it!
Hitler and Mussolini sign the Pact of Steel in May 1939.
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Pact_of_Steel#/media/File:Patto-acciaio.jpg
Mussolini was very fickle in his alignments. He wanted to be on the side that would
enable him to realize his goal of a great Italy. He first sided with Britain, France, and
Germany in the Four Power Pact, having got little from them at Versailles in 1919. He
then sided specifically with Germany out of fear following Germany’s Anschluss with
Austria in 1938, and also out of realization that Nazi Germany was the big European
power by 1938-399. Despite this, Mussolini did not bring Italy into WWII until June
1940 when it looked like Nazi Germany would indeed win and she had taken all of
Western Europe. Mussolini was clearly out for himself and he would change alliances
as many times as it took to get Italy where he wanted her in the world.
Italy and Germany 1936 to 1940
http://www.historylearningsite.co.uk/modern-world-history-1918-to-1980/italy-1900-t
o-1939/italy-and-germany-1936-to-1940/
33
1) What was the Four-Power Pact?
2) Why was Mussolini’s invasion of Abyssinia such a one-sided conflict?
3) What was the Hoare-Laval Plan?
4) What was the Rome-Berlin Axis?
5) What were the terms of the Pact of Steel?
6) How was Mussolini fickle in his alignments?
34
RENDEZVOUS
HITLER: “THE SCUM OF THE EARTH I BELIEVE?”
STALIN: “THE BLOODY ASSISSIN OF THE WORKERS I PRESUME?”
Cartoon by David Lowe published in the Evening Standard (a British Newspaper) on
20th September 1939.
russiasperiphery.blogs.wm.edu
35
With reference its origin and purpose, discuss the values and limitations of the cartoon
for Historians studying the changes in alignments in Europe in the years 1933-1940
(two values and two limitations).
Origin:
Purpose:
Values:
Limitations:
36
GERMAN CHALLENGES TO THE POST-WAR
SETTLEMENTS (1933-1938)
BACKGROUND OF GERMAN OPPOSITION TO THE POSTWAR
TREATIES
After the devastation of World War I, western powers imposed a series of harsh
treaties upon the defeated nations. These treaties stripped the Central Powers
(Germany and Austria-Hungary, joined by Ottoman Turkey and Bulgaria) of much
territory and forced them to pay large amounts of money in reparations.
The Treaty of Versailles, presented for German leaders to sign on May 7, 1919, forced
Germany to concede territories to Belgium, Czechoslovakia, and Poland . Alsace and
Lorraine, annexed in 1871 after the Franco-Prussian War, returned to France. All
German overseas colonies became League of Nation Mandates, and the city of Danzig,
with its large German population, became a Free City. The treaty demanded
demilitarization and occupation of the Rhineland
As a direct result of war, the German, Austro-Hungarian, Russian, and Ottoman
Empires ceased to exist. The Treaty of Saint-Germain-en-Laye of September 10, 1919,
established the Republic of Austria, consisting of most of the German-speaking
regions of the Habsburg state and prevented unification with Germany, a goal long
desired by "Pan-Germanists" and an active aim of Austrian-born Adolf Hitler and his
National Socialist (Nazi) Party.
37
When German leaders signed the armistice, many of them believed that President
Woodrow Wilson’s Fourteen Points would form the basis of the future peace treaty,
but when the heads of the
governments of the United
States, Great Britain, France,
and Italy met in Paris to
discuss treaty terms, the
European contingent of the
"Big Four" had another plan
altogether. Viewing Germany
as the country mainly
responsible for the war, the
European Allied Powers
imposed very strict treaty
obligations upon the defeated
Germany.
Map images online, courtesy GCSE History.
PD
Probably the most humiliating
part of the treaty for Germany
was Article 231, commonly
known as the "War Guilt
Clause," which forced
Germany to accept complete
responsibility for initiating
World War I. Germany was
made responsible for all
material damages, and
France's premier Georges
Clemenceau particularly
insisted on imposing heavy
reparation payments. Aware
that Germany would probably
not be able to pay such a towering debt, Clemenceau and the French nevertheless
greatly feared rapid German recovery and a new war against France. Hence, the
French sought in the postwar treaty system to limit Germany's efforts to regain its
economic superiority and to rearm.
38
The German army was to be limited to 100,000 men, and conscription proscribed. The
treaty restricted the Navy to vessels under 100,000 tons, with a ban on the acquisition
or maintenance of a submarine fleet. Moreover, Germany was forbidden to maintain
an air force. Germany was required to conduct war crimes proceedings against the
Kaiser and other leaders for waging aggressive war; the Leipzig Trial, without the
Kaiser or other significant national leaders in the dock, resulted mainly in acquittals
and was widely perceived as a sham, even in Germany.
Wilson’s Fourteen Points
Wilson presented his fourteen points to a joint
session of Congress on January 8, 1918. Eight of
the fourteen points dealt with territorial issues.
Five of the other six concerned general
principles
for
a
peaceful
world:
open
diplomacy; freedom of the seas; free trade;
reduction of armaments; and adjustment of
colonial claims based on self-determination.
The fourteenth point proposed what was to
become the League of Nations These points
were later taken as the basis for peace
negotiations at the end of the war.
Image via:
http://webpages.scu.edu/ftp/jgiedt/Images/hwv
-e-ww.jpg
The newly formed German
democratic government saw the
Versailles Treaty as a "dictated peace"
(Diktat). Although France, which had
suffered more materially than the
other parties in the "Big Four," had insisted upon harsh terms, the peace treaty did not
ultimately help to settle the international disputes which had initiated World War I.
On the contrary, it tended to hinder inter-European cooperation and make more
fractious the underlying issues which had caused the war in the first place. The
dreadful sacrifices of war and tremendous loss of life, suffered on all sides, weighed
heavily not only upon the losers of the conflict, but also upon those combatants on the
winning side, like Italy, whose postwar spoils seemed unequal to the terrible price its
nation had paid in blood and material goods.
For the populations of the defeated powers—Germany, Austria, Hungary, and
Bulgaria—the respective peace treaties appeared an unfair punishment. Their
governments, whether democratic as in Germany or Austria, or authoritarian, in the
case of Hungary and, intermittently, in Bulgaria, quickly resorted to violating the
military and financial terms of the accords. Efforts to revise and defy the more
burdensome provisions of the peace became a key element in their respective foreign
policies and proved a destabilizing element in international politics. For example, the
39
war guilt clause, its reparation payments, and the limitations on
the German military were particularly harsh in the minds of most
Germans. Revision of the Versailles Treaty represented one of the
platforms that gave radical right wing parties in Germany,
including Hitler's Nazi Party, such credibility to mainstream
voters in the early 1920s and early 1930s.
Promises to rearm, to reclaim German territory, particularly in the
East, to remilitarize the Rhineland, and regain prominence again
among the European and world powers after such a humiliating
defeat and peace, stoked ultranationalist sentiment and helped
average voters to often overlook the more radical tenets of Nazi
ideology. In fact, it was the punitive nature of post war treaties
that helped give rise to the Nazi party in Germany and set the
stage for their takeover of the government. Once successfully in
power, Hitler and the Nazi government began a systematic
program to challenge and revise the post-World War I
agreements, in many cases seeking out conflict and forcing other
European governments to either take action or allow Germany to
continue with its actions.
During the remilitarization of the
Rhineland, German civilians salute German
forces crossing the Rhine River in open
violation of the Treaty of Versailles. Mainz,
Germany, March 7, 1936.
At the Lausanne Conference of 1932, Germany, Britain, and
- US Holocaust Museum
France agreed to the formal suspension of reparations payments
imposed on the defeated countries after World War I. Thus, when Adolf Hitler
became chancellor of Germany in January 1933, the financial provisions of the Treaty
of Versailles (the post-World War I peace agreement) had already been revised. Hitler
was determined to overturn the remaining military and territorial provisions of the
treaty and include ethnic Germans in the Reich as a step toward the creation of a
German empire in Europe. The German armed forces engaged in secret rearmament
even before the Nazi takeover of power. Thereafter, the Nazis supported rearmament
and rapidly expanded arms production. Military conscription was reintroduced on
March 16, 1935, in open violation of the Treaty of Versailles. At the same time, Hitler
announced the expansion of the German army to more than 500,000 men.
In the 1925 Treaty of Locarno, Germany had recognized both the inviolability of its
borders with France and Belgium and the demilitarization of the Rhineland. On
March 7, 1936, however, Hitler repudiated this agreement and ordered the German
armed forces into the demilitarized Rhineland. Hitler's action brought condemnation
from Britain and France, but neither nation intervened.
40
After a prolonged period of intense propaganda inside Austria, German troops entered
the country on March 12, 1938, receiving the enthusiastic support of most of the
population. Austria was incorporated into Germany on the following day. In April,
this German annexation was retroactively approved in a plebiscite that was
manipulated to indicate that about 99 percent of the Austrian people wanted the union
(known as the "Anschluss") with Germany. Neither Jews nor Roma (Gypsies) were
permitted to vote in the plebiscite.
GERMANY AND THE KELLOGG-BRIAND PACT
The Kellogg–Briand Pact was a 1928 international agreement in which party states
promised not to use war to resolve "disputes or conflicts of whatever nature or of
whatever origin
they may be,
which may arise
among them. "
Parties failing to
abide by this
promise "should
be denied the
benefits furnished
by this treaty." It
was signed by
Germany, France,
Frank Kellogg (left) and Aristide Briand (right), the authors of the
and the United
Kellogg-Briand Act. Image from Instructional Resources Corporation
States on August
27, 1928, and by
most other nations soon after. Sponsored by France and the United States, the Pact
renounced the use of war, promoted peaceful settlement of disputes, and called for
collective force to prevent aggression. It was named after its authors: United States
Secretary of State Frank B. Kellogg and French foreign minister Aristide Briand.
As a practical matter, the Kellogg–Briand Pact did not live up to its aim of ending war,
and in this sense it made no immediate contribution to international peace and proved
to be ineffective in the years to come. Moreover, the pact erased the legal distinction
between war and peace since the signatories, having renounced the use of war began
to wage wars without declaring them. Nevertheless, the pact is an important
multilateral treaty because it bound the particular nations that signed it. It has also
served as one of the legal bases establishing international norms that threat or use
41
military force in contravention of international law, as well as the territory gained
from it, is against the law. Notably, the pact served as the legal basis for the creation
of the notion of crime against peace.
Germany’s most direct challenges to the Kellogg-Briand Act came during its
occupation of Austria, its support for Italy during the fighting in Abyssinia, the
extension of support to General Franco during the Spanish Civil War, and, in 1938,
during the Sudeten Crisis and the partition of Czechoslovakia.
THE FOUR POWER PACT
On March 19, 1933 Benito Mussolini called for the creation of the Four-Power Pact
as a better means of insuring international security. Under this plan, smaller nations
would have less of a voice in Great Power politics. Representatives of Britain, France,
Germany, and Italy signed a diluted version of Premier Benito Mussolini's
Four-Power Pact proposal. The treaty reaffirmed each country's adherence to the
Covenant of the League of Nations, the Locarno Treaties, and the Kellogg-Briand
Pact. Mussolini’s chief motive in suggesting the pact was the wish for closer
Franco-Italian relations. If Mussolini’s purpose of the pact was to calm Europe’s
nerves, he achieved the opposite result.
Rather than allay suspicions and bring the stability the pact instead opened a rift
between France and its allies in eastern Europe, which increased their susceptibility to
German pressure. Furthermore, Germany’s involvement in the negotiations, which
took place in Rome, provided Hitler a number of ways to continue with his goals of
revising post-war settlements: it provided Germany with a conciliatory and diplomatic
veneer. Hitler, realizing that the big European powers were wary of Germany’s aims,
used the negotiations during the Four Power Pact as a way to continue the rearmament
program and to consolidate his plans for expansion while simultaneously appearing
diplomatic and conciliatory. The pact also aided German foreign policy by weakening
the network of alliances between Europe’s most powerful countries – Britain, France,
and Italy – and their relationship to the bloc of less powerful nations, the fractious
environment ensured that no clear consensus would emerge later to deal with German
actions. German withdrawal from the League of Nations, subsequent to signing the
treaty put the Pact on hold. Throughout the next six years Britain made vain attempts
to make it work at nearly any cost, but the failure of the Four-Power Pact served as a
warning of Germany's continued withdrawal from diplomatic relations with France
and Britain in the buildup to the Second World War.
42
THE MUNICH AGREEMENT AND THE PARTITION OF
CZECHOSLOVAKIA
Having secured Anschluss with Austria, Hitler turned his attention to the Sudetenland,
a western region of Czechoslovakia inhabited mostly by German-speakers. In 1938,
Hitler threatened to unleash a European war unless the Sudetenland was returned to
Germany. This area, ethnically German, had been stripped from Germany in the
aftermath of World War I and given to Czechoslovakia, itself a new nation, carved out
of the old Austro-Hungarian Empire and Germany by the Treaty of St Germain
(September 1919). But Hitler had no respect for this treaty or for Czechoslovakian
sovereignty. He began claiming ethnic Germans in the Sudetenland were being
persecuted by Prague. A small but vocal pro-Nazi group in the Sudetenland, led by
Konrad Henlein, echoed these grievances, though most were exaggerated or
fabricated. In April 1938 Henlein’s party demanded political autonomy for the
Sudetenland. Through mid-1938 they organised terrorist attacks against
Czechoslovakian government troops and facilities. Hitler, in an ominous speech in
Berlin, promised to protect the Germans in western Czechoslovakia.
The leaders of Britain, France, Italy, and Germany held a conference in Munich,
Germany, on September 29-30, 1938. At the first of these meetings, on September
15th, Chamberlain agreed to Hitler’s demands; Britain subsequently urged
Czechoslovakia to concede the Sudetenland to Germany. The two leaders met again a
week later and Hitler’s position had hardened: he demanded German forces be
granted immediate access to the Sudeten region. On September 29th Hitler,
Chamberlain, Benito Mussolini (Italy) and Edouard Daladier (France) met in Munich
to resolve the crisis. They signed an agreement approving the Nazi annexation of the
Sudetenland, provided Hitler proceed no further into Czechoslovakia. The
Czechoslovak leader Benes was told he could submit to the occupation of the
Sudetenland or resist the Nazis alone; he chose the former. Chamberlain returned to
Britain where he famously – and incorrectly – said the Munich agreement had secured
“peace for our time”. German troops rolled into the Sudetenland two days later. In
December 1938, elections there returned a 97.3 per cent vote for the Nazi Party.
Czechoslovakia, which was not a party to the Munich negotiations, agreed under
pressure from Britain and France.
On March 15, 1939, Hitler violated the Munich agreement and moved against the
Czechoslovak state. The Czech provinces of Bohemia and Moravia were proclaimed a
German protectorate and were occupied by German forces. Slovakia became an
43
independent state, closely allied with Germany. Hungary, which had annexed territory
in southern Slovakia after the Munich conference, seized the Transcarpathian Ukraine.
Czechoslovakia ceased to exist. Little more than a week later, on March 23, 1939,
German troops suddenly occupied Memel. Memel, also known as Klaipeda, was a
port city located in Lithuania. Prior to the Treaty of Versailles, Memel had been a part
of the Prussian and German empires and contained a large ethnic German population.
From 1919-1923 the city and surrounding area had been governed by a French
commission then from 1923-1938 Lithuanian troops had occupied and overseen the
area.
In Mar 1938,
the
relationship
between
Lithuania
and Poland
deteriorated,
and Germany,
which
desired the
region,
mobilized for
an
occupation if
a war started
between
Lithuania
and Poland,
but to
Adolf
Hitler's disappointment the two countries de-escalated diplomatically. Unable to find
an excuse or create an incident, German Foreign Minister Joachim von Ribbentrop
image via: http://wps.ablongman.com/wps/media/objects/419/429222/illustrations/WALL5295900.gif
simply demanded it on 20 Mar 1939, citing the ethnic German population in the city
as the reason for its unification with Germany. The German Navy steamed toward
Memel, with Adolf Hitler aboard the battleship Deutschland, to back up Ribbentrop's
demands with force. After failing to secure support from other European powers,
President Antanas Smetona submitted to German demands in the early hours of 23
Mar. Later on the same day, Hitler gave a passionate speech from a theater balcony,
announcing the bloodless reconquest of the city. It was to be the last of such bloodless
44
conquests for Germany.
In this map of pre-war German territorial expansion from 1933-1939 Lithuania can be seen at the top right.
Memel, or Klaipeda, is a city on the coast on Lithuania located in the small red area indicating German
occupation. This provided Germany with a strategic port city and additional access to the Baltic Sea.
Image credit: The History Place
With no support from other European powers, and with inferior forces, Lithuania was
unable to prevent this occupation. Hitler also raised territorial demands on Poland in
the spring of 1939. He demanded the annexation of the Free City of Danzig to
Germany and extraterritorial access for Germany through the so-called Polish
Corridor to East Prussia. Convinced that Hitler would not negotiate in good faith,
Britain and France guaranteed the integrity of Polish territory against German
aggression. With Hitler determined to attack Poland, Europe was on the brink of war
in late summer 1939.
Boundless. “The Kellogg-Briand Pact.” Boundless U.S. History Boundless, 19 Jun.
2015. Retrieved 23 Jun. 2015
https://www.boundless.com/u-s-history/textbooks/boundless-u-s-history-textbook/fro
m-isolation-to-world-war-ii-1930-1943-26/non-interventionism-200/the-kellogg-brian
d-pact-1101-9025/
Nazi Germany – The road to war
http://alphahistory.com/nazigermany/the-road-to-war/
45
United States Holocaust History Museum http://www.ushmm.org/wlc/en/article.php?ModuleId=10005439
Jarausch, Konrad Hugo: "The Four-Power Pact, 1933" The American Historical
Review
1) Why do you think the demilitarization of the Rhineland was such an important
issue for major European powers after World War I?
2) How and why did France seek to contain Germany after the war?
3) Discuss the ways in which the Treaty of Versailles acted as a destabilizing force in
European and world affairs.
4) What was the Kellogg-Briand pact? What impact did it have on German
expansion from 1933-1938?
5) What strategy did Germany use to expand eastward into Czechoslovakia?
6) Why was Memel important to Germany?
7) What major weaknesses in the post-war agreements, if any, allowed Germany to
expand so quickly?
8) What changes could European nations have made to contain Germany?
46
ITALIAN EXPANSION: ABYSSINIA (1935-1936),
ALBANIA, ENTRY INTO THE SECOND WORLD WAR
One of Benito Mussolini's goals was
to restore Italy to the glory of the
Roman Empire. Even before
Mussolini, Italian leaders believed
Italy deserved an overseas empire
similar to those of other European
powers. Italy had arrived late in the
colonial race, so Italy would forge
their Empire during the Scramble for
Africa. Because of Italy's relative
weakness in international affairs it
depended on Britain, France and
Germany's compliance towards her
empire-building. In the 1880s Italy
would make various treaties with
other European powers to create the An Ethiopian painting commemorating the First Italo-Abyssian
War
colony of Italian Somaliland.
On May 2, 1889 Italy signed the the Treaty of Wuchale with King Menekik II, the
Emperor of Abyssinia (modern Day Ethiopia). The treaty gave Eritrea to the Italians
and provided Abyssinia with financial assistance and military supplies. The treaty was
written in two languages Italian and Amharic (the Ethiopian language). The versions
of the treaty did not only
differ in language. The
Italian version Italian
and Amharic versions
differed in the amount of
autonomy Abyssinia
held due to a
mistranslation. Because
of the Ethiopian refusal
to abide by the Italian
version of the treaty the
Italian government
decided on a military
solution to force
Italian soldiers recruited in 1935 in Montevarchi to fight the
Ethiopia to abide by the
Second Italo-Abyssinian War.
Italian version of the
treaty. The First
47
Italian-Abyssinian War broke out and would end as an embarrassing defeat for the
new Italian Empire. The control of Abyssinia would be fought over by the two sides
once again almost 40 years later.
In the late 1920s, imperial expansion became a favorite theme of Mussolini's speeches.
He argued that colonial settlements were a demographic and economic necessity for a
country like Italy. Mussolini said that he would make Italy become a true empire,
equivalent in power to the Roman Empire.
In 1928 the Italo-Abyssinia Treaty was signed between the two countries. The treaty
settled the location of the border between Italian Somaliland and Abyssinia. In 1930
the Italians built a fort at the Walwal oasis in the Ogaden desert well beyond this
border. The fort was garrisoned it with Somali troops commanded by Italian officers.
In November of 1934, 1000 Abyssinian territorial troops protested the Walwal fort as
a form of incursion and asked the 60 soldiers to withdraw. The Italian force refused
and alerted Italian troops in the nearby garrison of Uarder. The next day the Italian
troops arrived. A British-Abyssinian border commission also arrived. The British
officers protested, but they withdrew to avoid an international incident. The Italian
and Abyssinian troops remained encamped in close proximity. In early December, the
tensions erupted in a clash that left 150 Abyssinians and 50 Italians dead. This
resulted in the Abyssinia Crisis at the League of Nations.
Italy soon began to build up its forces on the borders of Abyssinia in Eritrea and
Italian Somaliland. With an attack appearing inevitable, Emperor Haile Selassie of
Abyssinia ordered a general mobilization. The Abyssinian armies were poorly
equipped. His new recruits consisted of around 500,000 men, many of whom were
armed with nothing more than spears and bows. Other soldiers carried more modern
weapons, including rifles, but many of these were from before 1900 and were badly
outdated. Only about 25% of the Abyssinian had any military training. They had
outdated artillery and a few World War I era tanks. The Italian forces where much
more equipped. The Italians had tons of ammunition, food, and other necessary
supplies. The Italians also had vehicles to move supplies and troops while the
Ethiopians carried supplies in horse drawn carts.
1) What colony would Italy create through treaties with other European counties in
the 1880s?
2) Who won the First Italian-Abyssinian War?
48
3) What did the Italian-Abyssinia Treaty settle?
Three Albanian soldiers are shown here in an unidentified
location fleeing North with peasants towards Yugoslavia
April 12, 1939.
Mussolini dreamed of
sending millions of
Italian settlers to Italian
East Africa, and Italians
had high hopes of turning
the area into an economic
asset. On October 3,
1935, Marshal Emilio De
Bono advanced into
Abyssinia from Eritrea
without a declaration of
War. De Bono had a force
of 100,000 Italian soldiers
and 25,000 Eritrean
soldiers under his command. A smaller force of Italians, Somalis, and Libyans, under
the command of General Rodolfo Graziani, advanced into Abyssinia from Italian
Somaliland.
Italy was able to launch its invasion without interference primarily due to the United
Kingdom and France placing a high priority on retaining Italy as an ally in case
hostilities broke out with Germany. By overrunning Abyssinia, a member of the
League of Nations, Italy attracted widespread international hostility. The invasion was
condemned by the League of Nations, although it was unable to take any remedial
action. It also breached the Kellogg-Briand Pact on non-aggression, of which Italy
was a signatory.
Italy annexed Abyssinia on May 7. King Victor Emmanuel III of Italy was proclaimed
emperor on May 9. Italy merged Eritrea, Abyssinian, and Somaliland into a single
state known as Italian East Africa. The war would be the crowning achievement of
Mussolini bringing him prestige at home and internationally, and emboldening him
for further conquest.
As Germany annexed Austria and conquered Czechoslovakia, Mussolini decided to
proceed to annex Albania to extend his own empire. Although King Victor Emmanuel
III did not approve Mussolini offered King Zog I of Albania an ultimatum in the form
of money in exchange for full colonization of his country. King Zog refused. As news
of an Italian invasion reached Albanian citizens Protests broke out in the streets of
49
Albania demanding that the country be defended at all cost. Mussolini prepared the
attack.
Albania had long been of considerable strategic importance to Italy. The port of Vlore
and the island of Sazan were strategically located at the entrance in the Bay of Vlore
and gave Italy control of the entrance to the Adriatic Sea. The region of modern-day
Albania had been an early part of the Roman Empire which made it fit in to
Mussolini's narrative of a new Roman Empire. Italy had retained strong links with the
Albanian leadership and considered it firmly within its sphere of influence. Also,
Albania provided a launching ground for an eventual invasion of Greece, which was
on Mussolini's agenda.
On April 7 Mussolini's force of 100,000
men 137 navel units and 400 airplanes led
by General Alfredo Guzzoni invaded
Albania, attacking all Albanian ports
simultaneously. The Albanian army had
15,000 poorly equipped troops who had
been trained by Italian officers. By 1:30
pm all Albanian ports were in Italian hands.
King Zog and his family fled to Greece
taking with them the Albanian gold
reserves. On April 12, the Albanian
parliament voted to depose Zog and unite
the nation with Italy "in personal union" by
offering the Albanian crown to Victor
Invading Italian soldiers entering an Albanian city.
Emmanuel III. A fascist government was
established under Shefqet Verlaci. The Albanian armed forces were merged into
Italian military. Resistance to the Italian occupation grew in the mountainous regions.
By the 1943 most of the interior of Albania was controlled by resistance fighters.
By the outbreak of World War II Mussolini was already aligned with Adolf Hitler.
Mussolini had ambitions of an Empire that would consist of parts of northern Africa,
Greece, parts of Eastern Europe, and the Balkan region. Following the German
conquest of Poland Mussolini hesitated to enter the war. On June 10, 1940, as the
French government fled to Bordeaux during the German invasion Mussolini felt the
conflict would soon end and declared war on Britain and France. Both countries had
been at war with Germany since September of 1939 following the invasion of Poland.
Mussolini believed if he invaded France he would be granted a seat at the peace
conference. After initial success, the Italian offensive into southern France stalled at
the Alpine Line (the part of the Maginot Line that defended southern France). France
would soon surrender to Germany, but now Italy was an active participate in World
War II.
50
Italian Empire
http://www.newworldencyclopedia.org/entry/Italian_Empire
Italian invasion of Albania 1939
https://www.onwar.com/aced/chrono/c1900s/yr30/fitalyalbania1939.htm
Albania's Reemergence after World War I
http://countrystudies.us/albania/25.htm
Zog’s Kingdom
http://countrystudies.us/albania/29.htm
H, Jim. Invasion of Albania (1939)
http://www.comandosupremo.com/albania.html
1) What did Italy merge Eritrea, Abyssinian, and Somaliland into?
2) What action by Germany prompted Mussolini to annex Albania?
3) When were all Albanian ports were in Italian hands?
4) What happened to the Albanian military?
5) When did Italy finally join World War II?
51
THE
INTERNATIONAL RESPONSE
TO
GERMAN
AGGRRESSION (1933-1939)
BACKGROUND: THE GREAT DEPRESSION AND HITLER’S RISE
TO POWER
The Great Depression marked a turning point in inter-war history. Not only did it
weaken the economic and social stability of the world’s major powers, but it also dealt
a blow to the progress made since 1924 towards creating a new framework for
peaceful international cooperation.
It had a huge international impact. To a great extent the economic recovery in Europe
after 1924 had been dependent on short-term US loans, of which $4 billion went to
Germany. After the Wall Street stock exchange crash, US investors abruptly
terminated these loans and no more were forthcoming. This was a devastating blow to
the European and world economies. Between 1929 and 1932 the volume of world
trade fell by 70 per cent. Unemployment rose to 13 million in the USA, to six million
in Germany and to three million in Britain.
The Depression’s long-term impact on the politics of the three democracies – Britain,
France and USA – was equally disastrous. It delayed their rearmament programs and
created an international climate in which they suspected each other of causing the
financial and economic difficulties. It thus prevented any effective collaboration
between them at a time when it was important to deter the aggressive nationalism of
Japan and Germany and to deal with the global economic crisis.
As international trade collapsed, the Great Powers attempted to make themselves
economically self-sufficient. The British and the French with their huge empires had a
decisive advantage over the Germans, Italians and Japanese, who increasingly began
to assert their right to carve out their own empires, spheres of interest.
In Germany, the depression helped the Nazis take control of the government and the
tempo of the German campaign against Versailles quickened once Hitler came to
power in 1933, although for two years, at least, he appeared to pursue the same policy
as his three predecessors.
Hitler’s immediate priorities
In 1933 Hitler’s first priority was to consolidate the Nazi takeover of power and to
rebuild Germany’s military strength. This would eventually put him in a position to
destroy what remained of the Versailles system. However, while rearming, he had to
52
be careful not to provoke an international backlash. He followed a cautious policy of
avoiding risks and defusing potential opposition, while gradually withdrawing
Germany from many commitments, such as being a member of the League of Nations,
which might prevent him from pursuing an independent policy. He hoped to isolate
France by negotiating alliances
with Britain and Italy.
Hitler’s immediate aim was to
extricate Germany from the World
Disarmament Conference, but he
was careful to wait until the
autumn of 1933 before he risked
withdrawing from both the
conference and the League of
Nations. He had first skillfully
reassured Britain and Italy of his
peaceful intentions by signing in
June 1933 the Four Power Pact,
proposed by Mussolini, which
aimed at revising Versailles
through joint agreement of the
Great Powers. Although on the face
of it this seemed to limit Germany’s Benito Mussolini Signs the Four Power Pact in Rome, Italy, on July
freedom of action, Hitler calculated, 25, 1933. Germany’s accession to this agreement provided Hitler’s
correctly as it turned out, that the government more time to consolidate their expansionary plans.
Image
credit:
Corbis
Images,
French would never ratify it.
Germany did begin to rearm as http://www.corbisimages.com/stock-photo/rights-managed/BE065942
soon as Hitler seized power. In /mussolini-signing-four-power-pact
February, Hitler announced a long-term plan for increases in the armed forces.
Ultimately his intention was to mobilize the whole German economy and society for
war. In July 1933 the decision was taken to create an independent air force and a year
later the July program was unveiled, which envisaged the construction of some 17,000
airplanes. The majority of these were training planes to familiarize future pilots with
flying so that the air force could be greatly increased in size in the near future.
On 18 December 1933 the Defense Ministry unveiled a new program that aimed to
create a peacetime army of 300,000 men. In March 1935 Hitler announced the
reintroduction of conscription, despite the fears of his advisers that this would lead to
French intervention.
53
THE REACTION OF THE GREAT POWERS TO NAZI GERMANY
1933-1945
For the Great Powers 1933–5 was a period in which they had to come to terms with
the reality of Nazi Germany. In 1933, even though Germany was only just beginning
to rearm, its strength was potentially far greater than in 1914, as it was enhanced by a
ring of weak states which had been created in 1919 out of the ruins of the Austrian
and Russian Empires around its eastern and southern frontiers.
France
France’s economy had been belatedly hit by the Depression and its social cohesion
threatened by a wave of rioting sparked off in February 1934 by the exposure of a
series of financial scandals. French society was deeply divided as the right wanted to
negotiate with Hitler and Mussolini, while the left wanted to fight fascism and looked
to Russia as an ally.
Even if France had still possessed the will to intervene militarily in Germany, the
Locarno Treaties prevented it from reoccupying the Rhineland. Neither could it rely
on Poland after the German–Polish Non-aggression Pact of January 1934. France’s
response to the new Nazi Germany was therefore hesitant and sometimes
contradictory. The French sought to contain Germany, as they had done since 1919,
through a network of alliances and pacts but, like the British, they also tried to
negotiate with Hitler.
Although ultimately Britain remained France’s major European partner, it was not
ready in 1935 to commit itself to an alliance with France. The French therefore
attempted to strengthen the Little Entente, an alliance formed in 1920 and 1921 by
Czechoslovakia, Romania and Yugoslavia with the purpose of common defense
against Hungarian revision of Versailles, and negotiate agreements with Italy and
Russia. However, this was by no means an easy task as in 1933 its relations with both
powers were strained.
- Franco-Italian negotiations and the Rome Agreement
 In its attempts to negotiate an Italian alliance, France was greatly assisted
by the abortive Nazi coup in Vienna, which more than anything convinced
Mussolini that a military agreement with France was essential.
 In January 1935 both countries signed the Rome Agreement by which they
undertook not to meddle in the affairs of their Balkan neighbors and to act
together in the event of German rearmament or another threat to Austrian
independence. In June direct Franco-Italian military staff talks started to
discuss joint action in the event of a German attack on Austria, Italy or
France.
54
-
Franco-Russian negotiations
 Parallel with these negotiations, talks were proceeding between the French
and the Russians. Paris did not show the same enthusiasm for a Russian
alliance as it did for one with Italy. This was partly because Soviet Russia
had been regarded as scarcely less of a threat to the West than Germany
and partly because it no longer had a common border with Germany.
 The French intended to enmesh Soviet Russia in an elaborate treaty of
regional assistance or, in other words, an eastern European version of the
Locarno Treaty, which would be signed not only by Russia but also by
Germany, Poland, Czechoslovakia and the Baltic States. This was to be
strengthened by a separate Franco-Russian agreement which would
associate Russia with the Locarno Agreements in western Europe and
France with the proposed eastern pact.
 But the whole plan came to nothing as both Germany and Poland refused
to join. The Poles were more suspicious of the Russians than of the
Germans. France had therefore little option but to pursue a mutual
assistance pact with Soviet Russia alone. By May, the Franco-Soviet
Treaty of Mutual Assistance had been signed, but Paris refused to follow
up the treaty with detailed military staff talks between the two armies. The
main aim of the pact was to restrain Russia from moving closer to
Germany.
Great Britain
Like France, Britain’s reaction to Nazi Germany was conditioned by its military,
economic and strategic vulnerability. In 1933 it faced a growing threat not only from
Germany in Europe, but also from Japan in the Far East. Consequently, the main aim
of British policy
towards Germany was
to blunt Hitler’s
aggression by
continuing to modify
the Treaty of Versailles
peacefully while
simultaneously drawing
Germany back into the
League where it could
Foreign Minister Pierre Laval of France, Prime Minister Benito
Mussolini of Italy, and Prime Minister Ramsay MacDonald of
Great Britain (l to r) at the Stresa Conference, where the three
nations offered a united front against German intransigence
on the Treaty of Versailles.
55
Image Credit: Corbis Images,
http://www.corbisimages.com/stock-photo/rights-managed/B
E027261/premiers-at-close-of-stresa-conference
be tied down in
multilateral agreements
on security.
Britain also worked
hard for an overall
settlement with Germany. Despite the reintroduction of German conscription in
March, Simon went to Berlin later in the month to explore the possibility of a
comprehensive settlement with Germany involving German recognition of Austrian
independence, its participation in an ‘eastern Locarno’ and return to the League.
British ministers attended the Stresa meeting on 8 April, but they were determined at
that stage not to join any alliances or pacts directed against Germany as they was
convinced that the pre-1914 alliance system had been a major cause of the very war it
was aimed to prevent. In June this policy seemed to be rewarded with success when
the Anglo-German Naval Agreement was signed.
Italy
Mussolini, who had extensive territorial aims in the Balkans and North Africa, at first
attempted to maintain a special position as negotiator between Germany and Britain
and France, hoping that would bring him concessions from both sides. However, the
increasing German threat to Austria began to convert Mussolini from a critic and
potential revisionist of the Treaty of Versailles to a supporter of the territorial status
quo. As early as August 1933 Mussolini met Engelbert Dollfuss, the Austrian
Chancellor, and discussed arrangements for Italian military support in case of German
intervention in Austria.
Mussolini’s conversion to a defender of the existing territorial settlement was
accelerated by the abortive Nazi putsch in Vienna in July 1934 and by the German
announcement of conscription the following March. By the spring of 1935 Italy
appeared to have aligned itself firmly with Britain and France in their desire to
preserve what was left of the Versailles settlement.
Soviet Russia
Stalin, like the other European leaders, reacted cautiously to the Nazi takeover of
power. His distrust of the West was at least as great as his fear of Nazi Germany.
Consequently, even though he negotiated a defensive agreement with the French and
sought collective security by joining the League of Nations in September 1934, he
also attempted to maintain good relations with Germany.
The Soviet negotiations with the French in the spring of 1935 were also accompanied
by a series of secret talks with the Germans, which mirrored the French tactics of
trying for a settlement with Hitler in the summer of 1935 as an alternative to the
Nazi–Soviet Pact. Soviet–Nazi talks continued intermittently right up to February
1936. Only with the ratification of the Franco Soviet Treaty of Mutual Assistance by
the French parliament were they broken off, but were renewed in the summer of 1939.
The USA
In 1933 there was considerable sympathy in the USA for the economic hardships that
Germany was suffering as a result of the Depression, while both Britain and France
were viewed with some suspicion on account of their huge colonial empires. However,
with the coming to power of Hitler and beginning of the persecution of the Jews,
public opinion in the USA began to become more hostile to Germany, but
56
nevertheless US foreign policy remained firmly isolationist. Indeed, the Temporary
Neutrality Act of 1935, by empowering President Roosevelt to ban the supply of arms
to all belligerents – whether aggressors or victims of aggression – in the event of the
outbreak of war, strengthened the US policy of non-involvement.
THE CONSEQUENCES OF THE ABYSSINIAN WAR - 1935
The Italian invasion of Abyssinia in 1935 eventually led to a strategic realignments in
Europe. The crisis was a crucial turning point in the 1930s. Not only did it irreparably
weaken the League and provide Hitler with an ideal opportunity for the illegal
remilitarization of the Rhineland , but it also effectively destroyed the Franco-Italian
friendship and ultimately replaced it with the Rome–Berlin ‘Axis’. This eventually
enabled Hitler in 1938 to absorb Austria without Italian opposition. The ‘Axis’ was
also to threaten vital British and French lines of communication in the Mediterranean
with the possibility of hostile naval action and thus seriously weaken their potential
response to future German aggression.
THE REMILITARIZATION OF THE RINELAND - 1936
The remilitarization of the Rhineland marked an important stage in Hitler’s plans for
rebuilding German power. The construction of strong fortifications there would
enable him to stop any French attempts to invade Germany. Hitler had originally
planned to reoccupy the Rhineland in 1937, but a combination of the favorable
diplomatic situation created by the Abyssinian crisis and the need to distract domestic
attention from German economic problems brought about by the speed of the
rearmament program persuaded him to act in March 1936.
A banner headline in this newspaper illustrates how
seriously the world took Hitler’s actions.
In violation of the Treaty of Versailles and the spirit of
the Locarno Pact, Nazi Germany remilitarized the
Rhineland on Saturday, March 7, 1936. France could
not act due to political instability at the time.
Hitler took a risk when he sent his troops to the
Rhineland. He told them to 'turn back and not to
resist' if they were stopped by the French Army. The
French did not try to stop them because they were
currently holding elections and no president wanted
to start a war with Germany.
Image Credit: Timothy Hughes Rare Newspapers
http://www.rarenewspapers.com/view/547928
Crucial to the success of his plan was the attitude of Italy. Mussolini, isolated from the
other Stresa Powers because of his Abyssinian policy, had little option but to reassure
Germany that he would not co-operate with the British and French to enforce Locarno
57
if German troops entered the Rhineland. German troops marched into the Rhineland
on 7 March 1936.
In order to reassure France that they did not intend to violate the Franco-German
frontier they were initially, at any rate, few in number and lightly equipped. So why
did the French army not immediately intervene? The French general staff refused to
invade the Rhineland unless they had full backing from the British. The most the
British government was ready to do was to promise France that, in the event of an
unprovoked German attack on French territory, it would send two divisions of troops
across the Channel.
THE ARMS RACE: BRITAIN, FRANCE, AND GERMANY –
1936-1939
It was not until 1935 that the scale of German rearmament became clear. Inevitably
this triggered an arms race with Britain and France. Unlike in 1914, there was no calm
assumption that the next war would be soon over. All three countries, learning from
the First World War, expected a long struggle. Even though the tank and airplane had
restored mobility to the battlefield, most military experts still thought in terms of First
World War tactics. The French built the Maginot line, which was an enormous series
of concrete fortifications along their frontier with Germany, while the Germans built
the Westwall along the east bank of the Rhine.
The German rearmament program would not be completed until the mid-1940s. This
would not, however, stop Hitler from waging a limited war against Czechoslovakia or
Poland if he believed that Britain and France would stand aside. The British and
French programs, on the other hand, were planned to be ready by 1939–40. Neither
Britain nor France wanted war, and both were ready to seek agreement with Nazi
Germany to prevent it, but if there was no option but war, then 1939–40 was the best
possible date for it to occur. Beyond that date both countries would find it
increasingly difficult to maintain the spending that their armament programs
demanded.
58
GERMAN AGGRESSION AND THE INTERNATIONAL RESPONSE:
MARCH 1938 – MARCH 1939
In March 1938
Germany moved
again. By pressure
and bullying tactics,
Hitler succeeded in
bringing a Nazi to
power in Austria and
obtaining an
invitation for
Germany to occupy
the nation. German
troops marched in
without resistance,
and the forbidden
Anschluss took
place as Austria
unified in violation of the Treaty of Versailles.Image source:
became a province
http://www.historyonthenet.com/nazi_germany/anschluss.htm
of Germany. Once
again, the French
and British did nothing but protest. In late 1938 Hitler demanded that Czechoslovakia
cede what Hitler called the Sudetenland to Germany. This Czech territory, which
bordered on Germany and the former Austrian Republic, consisted primarily of ethnic
Germans. But the area had been a part of the former Austro-Hungarian Empire and
not of Germany.
In March of 1938 Nazi troops entered Austria and the two countries were
On September 15 and again on September 22, the British prime minister, Neville
Chamberlain, flew to Germany to see Hitler and try to avert an international crisis.
After his first meeting, Chamberlain wrote to his sister, “In spite of the hardness and
ruthlessness I thought I saw in his face, I got the impression that here was a man who
could be relied upon when he had given his word.” On September 29 Chamberlain
returned to Germany, where at Munich he and Hitler were joined by Mussolini and
the French premier, Edouard Daladier. Czechoslovakia was not invited to participate
in the conference; neither was the Soviet Union, which had pledged to come to the aid
of Czechoslovakia in case of aggression, providing France did so first.
France, on the other hand, although it had a defensive alliance with Czechoslovakia,
agreed with Britain and Italy that the Sudetenland was to be given to Germany.
Neither France nor Great Britain had kept up with the German rearmament, and their
intelligence services depicted Germany as even more powerful than it really was.
Neither was yet ready to risk war. French military thinking was symbolized by the
59
Maginot Line, a long series of defensive fortifications built on France’s eastern front
between 1929 and 1934; such defensive-mindedness ill prepared France to come to
the aid of its Czechoslovakian ally.
The signatories of the Munich Agreement had promised to guarantee what remained
of Czechoslovakia against aggression. In March 1939, however, Hitler took over most
of what was left of that unfortunate nation except for an eastern portion, Ruthenia,
that he allowed Hungary to add to its previous gains. A little later that month,
Lithuania, faced with an ultimatum, allowed Germany to annex its Germanic city of
Memel. Hitler then began putting pressure on Poland for return of the city of Danzig,
with its overwhelmingly German population, while also demanding special rail and
road rights across the Polish Corridor separating East Prussia from the rest of
Germany.
By this time, however, the British and French governments had finally seen the light.
Despite continuing doubts about their countries’ military readiness, public opinion,
especially in Great Britain, had been awakened by the events of March 1939.
Appeasement was not working; Hitler always came back for more. On the last day of
March, Chamberlain announced that he and the French leaders had agreed to back
Poland fully if it was threatened.
THE UNITED STATES REMAINS NEUTRAL
Like Great Britain and France, the United States had great difficulty creating an
effective response to Hitler’s and Mussolini’s aggressive actions in Europe. The U.S.
public viewed the upheavals in Europe with mixed emotions. On the one hand, there
was some concern about the persecution of Jews in Germany and some fear of
Hitler’s threat to European democracy and to the United States. On the other hand,
some Americans, like many Europeans, regarded a strong Germany as a barrier
against Soviet Communism. Many New Deal liberals feared that involvement in
European conflicts would distract energy and money from domestic reforms. An even
larger number of Americans simply believed that intervention in World War I had
been a mistake, and they opposed any actions that would involve the United States in
another war.
Americans were thus mainly isolationists, and when Congress passed a series of
Neutrality Acts, 1935–1937, it reflected public opinion. In this legislation, Congress
prohibited U.S. vessels from transporting war material to belligerents, prohibited
loans to belligerents, declared the United States neutral in the Spanish civil war, and
forbade U.S. citizens to travel on belligerent ships. By such actions, Congress hoped
to prevent U.S. trade from dragging the United States into war, as had happened in
World War I. Roosevelt and his administration went along with Congress reluctantly,
although the effect of the Neutrality Acts was to strengthen Germany.
60
As aggression in Europe mounted, the United States, distracted by Japanese advances
in China and in hopes of preserving peace in Europe, pursued a policy of appeasement
similar to that of Great Britain and France. Roosevelt raised little or no objection to
Hitler’s advances in the Rhineland, Austria, and the Sudetenland. However, Hitler’s
seizure of the rest of Czechoslovakia and Mussolini’s conquest of Albania shocked
Americans and began to bring them around to the belief that aggression in Europe
should be stopped. Roosevelt appealed to Hitler to refrain from attacking a list of
European nations, but Hitler viewed the United States as degenerate and incompetent
and ridiculed Roosevelt’s appeal. Despite Roosevelt’s change of position, Congress
refused to repeal the neutrality legislation, and the United States remained a spectator.
Bell, P. M. H. The Origins of the Second World War in Europe 1986.
Boyce, Robert, and Joseph Maiolo, eds. The Origins of World War Two: The Debate
Continues
Watt, Donald Cameron. How War Came: The Immediate Origins of the Second World
War, 1938–1939. 1989
United States Holocaust Memorial Museum
http://www.ushmm.org/wlc/en/article.php?ModuleId=10005203
American Isolationism in the 1930’s
https://history.state.gov/milestones/1937-1945/american-isolationism
From Appeasement to War
http://www.kpsdschools.org/cms/lib02/NJ01001889/Centricity/Domain/425/9th%20G
rade%20World%20History%20Textbook/17%20Chapter%2017.1.pdf
61
1. Compare and contrast the different international responses. Which do you think
were the most effective? Which do you think were least effective?
2. To what extent do you think the strategy of appeasement was responsible for
causing World War II? What other strategy do you think might have been more
effective?
3. How did the redrawing of boundaries after World War I influence the later
ambitions of Hitler?
4. What role did Italy play in trying to contain German aggression? How did this role
change over time?
5. France attempted repeatedly to balance the growing strength and aggression of
Germany. Why do you think its efforts failed?
6. Which country do you think is most responsible for allowing Germany to become
an increasingly belligerent power?
7. Discuss the effect of prevailing economic conditions on the international response
to German aggression.
8. What role did the United States play in European politics during this time? How
did US involvement, or non-involvement, affect the outcome of the post-war
order?
62
INTERNATIONAL RESPONSE TO ITALIAN
AGRESSION (1935-1936)
The crisis in Abyssinia from 1935 to 1936 brought international tension to Europe. It
also drove Nazi Germany and Fascist Italy together. The affair highlighted the
weakness of the League of Nations.
On January 3 1935, Abyssinia appealed to the League of Nations for arbitration of the
dispute arising from the Walwal incident. But the league's response was inconclusive.
A subsequent analysis by an arbitration committee of the League of Nations absolved
both parties of any culpability for what had happened.
On January 7 1935, a meeting between Ministry of Foreign Affairs Pierre Laval and
Mussolini resulted in the "Franco-Italian Agreement". This treaty gave Italy parts of
French Somaliland, redefined the official status of Italians in French-held Tunisia, and
essentially gave the Italians a free hand
in dealing with Abyssinia. In exchange,
France hoped for Italian support against
German aggression.
In October 1935, the Italian army
invaded Abyssinia. The Abyssinians
could not hope to stand up to a modern
army. They were equipped with
pre-World War One rifles and little else.
The Italians used armored vehicles and
even mustard gas in their attack. The
capital, Addis Ababa, fell in May 1936
and Haile Selassie was removed from the
throne and replaced by the king of Italy,
Victor Emmanuel. Somaliland, Eritrea
and Abyssinia were all united under the
name Italian East Africa.
When the Italians had invaded in
October 1935, the Abyssinians had
appealed to the League of Nations for
help. On June 30, Haile Selassie made a
powerful speech before the League of
Nations in Geneva in which he set forth
two choices--support for collective
Cover
of Time magazine, 3 November 1930 Haile Selassie
63
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Haile_Selassie#/media/File:Sela
ssie_on_Time_Magazine_cover_1930.jpg
security or international lawlessness. The emperor stirred the conscience of many and
was thereafter regarded as a major international figure. The League condemned the
attack and all League members ordered to impose economic sanctions on Italy. It took
six weeks for the sanctions to be organized and they did not include vital materials
such as oil. Italy could cover the sanctions imposed on gold and textiles, but a ban on
oil could have had a major impact on Italy’s war machine. The argument put forward
for not banning oil, was that Italy would simply get her oil from America a
non-League country.
1) What crisis in 1934-35 brought tension to Europe?
2) What was the League of Nations response to the Walwal incedent?
3) Who made a powerful speech to the United Nations on June 30, 1935?
Britain and France, however, soon recognized Italy's control of Abyssinia. Among the
major powers, the United States and the Soviet Union refused to do so. Britain and
France were concerned about provoking Mussolini in
the Mediterranean Sea where Britain had two large
naval bases in Gibraltar and Malta. The Italian navy
was vastly overestimated by both the British and the
French, but it was this overestimation (and fear)
which lead Britain to allow the Italians to use the
Suez Canal. If this route had been cut, then Italy
would have had extreme difficulties supplying her
armed forces in the region during the conflict.
Britain and France considered the war too far away
to be of any importance to them. They were not
prepared to risk their naval power in the
Mediterranean for the sake of a country barely
anybody in either France or Britain had heard of.
In an effort to end the war, the British Foreign
Secretary Samuel Hoare and the French Prime
64
Pierre laval (1883-1945).
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Pierre_Laval#/m
edia/File:Pierre_Laval_a_Meurisse_1931.jpg
Minister Pierre Laval met in December 1935. They came up with the Hoare-Laval
Plan. This gave two large areas of Abyssinia to Italy and a gap in the middle of the
country – the “corridor of camels” – to the Abyssinians. The south of the country
would be reserved for Italian businesses. In return for this land, the Italians would
have to stop the war.
Mussolini accepted the plan but in Britain there was a huge national outcry. It was
believed that Samuel Hoare had betrayed the people of Abyssinia. The protests caused
Hoare to resign and the plan was dropped. Mussolini continued with the invasion.
This plan had indicated was that the two major European League members were
prepared to negotiate with a nation that had used aggression to enforce its will on a
weaker nation. The sanctions also failed.
The League’s involvement in this event was a disaster. It showed nations that its
sanctions were half-hearted even when they were enforced and that member states
were prepared to negotiate with aggressor nations to the extent of effectively giving in
to them. The actions by the League, even if they were a failure, lead to Italy leaving
the league.
In 1934 Mussolini and Hitler's relationship would hit a strain. Mussolini supported the
independence of Austria. Austrian Nazis assassinated Chancellor of Austria Engelbert
Dollfuss in a failed coup. Mussolini also mobilized a part of the Italian army on the
Austrian border and threatened Hitler with war in the event of a German invasion of
Austria. Relations between Germany and Italy recovered however, due to Hitler's
support of Italy's invasion of Ethiopia in 1935, while other countries condemned the
invasion and advocated sanctions against Italy.
Sir Samuel Hoare
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Samuel_Hoare,_1st_Viscount_Templewood#/media/File:
Sir_Samuel_Hoare_GGBain.jpg
65
Chancellor Dollfuss in Geneva, 1933
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Engelbert_Dollfuss#/media/File:DollfussEnGinebra193
3.jpeg
Trueman, C. N. “Abyssinia 1935 to 1936” Abyssinia
http://www.historylearningsite.co.uk/modern-world-history-1918-to-1980/italy-1900-t
o-1939/abyssinia/
Haile Selassie, Emperor of Ethiopia, warns the League of Nations that he is going to
mobilise his forces after threats of invasion by Italy
http://www.sahistory.org.za/dated-event/haile-selassie-emperor-ethiopia-warns-league
-nations-he-going-mobilise-his-forces-after
1) What did the League of Nations do in response to the invasion of Abyssinia?
2) Why did the British reject the Hoare-Laval Plan?
3) Which Austrian leader was killed in 1934?
66
INTERNATIONAL RESPONSE TO GERMAN AND
ITALIAN AGGRESSION (1940)
By 1940, Britain was at war with Nazi Germany and Fascist Italy. Britain and France
declared war on Nazi Germany on 3rd September 1939 after the Nazis invaded Poland.
By doing this they were honoring a promise they had made to Poland that they would
come to aid if Nazi Germany attacked her. This amounted to little more than a gesture
of moral support however, because Britain and France were unable to carry out any
effective counter-attack against Germany in Poland’s aid. Neither France nor Britain
could attack Germany across the Siegfried line (a fortified defense line across the
Franco-German border). There was also the fear of an aerial attack on London and
Paris by the German air force (or Luftwaffe). Even if Britain and France had launched
an attack it is doubtful that Poland could have been saved in time. What followed was
a lull for Britain as she entered a ‘phony war’ i.e. no real fighting appeared to take
place from Britain even though a state of war officially existed between Britain and
Nazi Germany.
By the terms of the Pact of Steel, Fascist Italy should immediately have declared war
on Britain and France in support of Nazi Germany, but Mussolini instead waited on
the sidelines to ensure that doing so would be beneficial to him. Only on 10th June
1940, when it looked like Britain was on the brink of surrender, and Germany would
surely win the war in Europe, did Mussolini enter the war on the side of Nazi
Germany. Mussolini’s first act of aggression once Fascist Italy had declared war on
Britain was to ordered an invasion of Southern France on 17th June 1940, the date that
France surrendered to the Nazis. Needless to say therefore the Italian invasion never
happened! Once again, Mussolini acted only when he thought it was safe to do so and
he thought he needed to in order to get a good seat at the victors’ table!
THE USSR
It is well known that eventually the USSR entered the war on the side of the Allies
after she was invaded by the Nazis in 1941, but prior to this of course she was in a
neutral alliance with Nazi Germany after the two ideologically opposed powers had
signed a mutual non-aggression pact in August 1939! The world was shocked by this
sudden pact between two such ideologically opposed powers – including Britain and
France (although it was in part because the USSR had been unable to come to a
collective security agreement with Britain and France that Stalin agreed to a
non-aggression pact with Hitler. It is widely assumed that Hitler and Stalin signed the
Non-Aggression Pact for the most cynical of reasons. They were both planning to turn
on each other when they saw the time was right for them to do so, and certainly they
were under no illusion about each other. Nevertheless the two leaders (Hitler and
67
Stalin) meant to make the most of this most unlikely partnership and exploit it as
much as they could for as long as they could. As such there was no condemnation
from the USSR over the Nazi invasion of Poland – especially when the USSR and
Nazi Germany had secretly agreed between them as part of the Non-Aggression Pact
to divide Poland between them – indeed both powers aided each other over Poland
and the consequent war in general. For obvious reasons the USSR liked to keep quiet
about this aspect of her part in WWII (i.e. collaboration with the Nazis) – preferring
instead to be remembered for her role in defeating the Nazis!
THE USA
In 1940, the USA was pursuing a policy of isolationism. President F. D. Roosevelt had
promised the USA that she would never again be dragged into another foreign conflict.
With Poland overran by the Nazis and the USSR however, Hitler turned his attention
westwards. He needed to defeat Britain and France, and he wanted control over the
North Sea and an easy passage of German warships and submarines into the Atlantic.
Hitler easily overran the Netherlands and Belgium (jointly known as the “Low
Countries”), en route to invading France. At this point many in the US administration
saw that the Nazis could conquer and rule all of Europe. What would this mean for
the USA? Would the Nazis next try to conquer the USA? Even of the Nazis did not try
to conquer the USA, could the US economy effectively compete in a Nazi
German-dominated world? It was questions like these that made the US re-think its
strategy. The USA could not officially enter the war but she could send aid to Britain
in the war against Nazi Germany. As an aside this raises questions as to whether the
USA foresaw the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor in 1941 with a view to this being
her excuse to enter the war in Europe – a war which maybe she was fighting for her
own ulterior motives!
German-Soviet Nonaggression Pact: Germany-Union of Soviet Socialist Republics
[1939]
http://www.britannica.com/event/German-Soviet-Nonaggression-Pact
From Neutrality to War: The United States and Europe 1929-1941: Lesson 3: U.S.
Neutrality and the War in Europe, 1939-1940
http://edsitement.neh.gov/lesson-plan/us-neutrality-and-war-europe-1939-1940#sect-b
ackground
Trueman, C. N. The Invasion Of Norway 1940
http://www.historylearningsite.co.uk/world-war-two/world-war-two-in-western-europ
e/the-attack-on-western-europe/the-invasion-of-norway-1940/
68
Rossi, A. “(Chapter VI) German – Soviet Collaboration during the ‘Phoney War’”
The Russo-German Alliance: August 1939 – June 1941
https://www.marxists.org/history/ussr/great-patriotic-war/soviet-german-pact/tasca/ch
6.htm
Roberts, Andrew Britain at War: The Phoney War and the Fall of France
http://www.telegraph.co.uk/history/britain-at-war/3153329/Britain-at-War-The-Phone
y-War-and-the-Fall-of-France.html
Motyl, Alexander. J Soviet-Nazi Collaboration and World War II
http://www.worldaffairsjournal.org/blog/alexander-j-motyl/soviet-nazi-collaboration-a
nd-world-war-ii
1) Why was Britain and France’s declaration of war on Nazi Germany little more
than an act of moral support?
2) What did Britain and France both fear if they had attacked Nazi Germany in
support of Poland?
3) What is meant by the term “Phony War”
4) What was Mussolini’s characteristic behavior in his support of Hitler in the Pact
of Steel?
5) For what role in WWII would the USSR want to be remembered less for?
6) Why was the USA not prepared to enter WWII as soon as Britain and France did?
What could she do instead and why did it suit her to do this? What questions does
this bring about concerning Imperial Japan’s attack on Pearl Harbor in 1941?
69
THE FALL OF NORWAY, EXITCHAMBERLAIN, AND ENTER
CHURCHILL
The Nazis wanted control over the North Sea and during the winter of 1940 they
imported iron ore from Sweden via the Norwegian port of Narvik. Britain responded
to this by laying mines along the Norwegian coast. On April 9th 1940, Nazi Germany
launched a full invasion of neutral Norway and in a series of surprise attacks they
took the Norwegian capital, Oslo, and Norway’s main ports. Attempted Allied
intervention was a failure, but the Nazi invasion was costly for the Nazi German Navy
(the Nazi German Navy’s new cruiser Blücher, was sunk by Norwegian coastal guns
at Oslo, and scattered German ships were vulnerable to counter attacks by the British
Royal Navy, (which scored a notable victory at Narvik). There were further losses and
damage to Germany’s few modern warships inflicted by Allied submarines and
aircraft. On land however, troops were poorly equipped, out-numbered, and
out-gunned. Most had been evacuated by 2nd May but fighting went on in Narvik until
the Nazis invaded Belgium and France and the remaining 24,000 Allied troops were
needed elsewhere.
The attempted Allied intervention had been a failure and this was just one factor to go
against Neville Chamberlain. His Appeasement policy had failed, his handling of the
war had not been successful and had been criticized all round. Finally, in May 1040
Chamberlain was accused of having been in office too long and doing too little to
have been of any good to anyone, and in a debate in the House of Commons, was told
by an MP “In the name of God, go!” Chamberlain got the message and resigned on
10th May 1940. He was succeeded by fellow Conservative and Lord of the Admiralty,
Winston Churchill. Churchill’s warning about Hitler in the 1930s had been ignored,
but now, in May 1940, Churchill had been proven right all along in his suspicions of
Hitler and now he had everyone’s ear. Churchill said in his war memoirs that he felt
that his whole life had been a preparation for this hour.
Hewitt, Nick How Neutral Norway Fell To The German Blitzkrieg In 1940
http://www.iwm.org.uk/history/how-neutral-norway-fell-to-the-german-blitzkrieg-in-1
940
70
Neville Chamberlain - British Prime Minister 1937-39
www.npg.org
Winston Churchill – Britain’s Wartime Prime Minister - www.otrcat.com
71
1) For whom was the Nazi invasion of Norway costly?
2) What was the name of the Nazi German Navy’s new cruiser which was sunk by
Norwegian coastal guns?
3) Until when did fighting continue in Narvik?
4) In which month and year did Neville Chamberlain resign as British Prime
Minister?
5) In which role did Churchill serve before succeeding Churchill as British Prime
Minister?
THE FALL OF FRANCE
By June 1940, France was defeated and under Nazi occupation. The Nazis invaded
France on 10th May 1940 and by 17th France had fallen to Nazi Germany. France was
officially ruled thereafter by a Nazi satellite government; the Vichy regime led by
French WWI veteran Marshal Philippe Petain, whose capital lay at Vichy in central
France. Not all the French took Nazi-directed Vichy France lying down however. A
number of resistance groups were formed at the risk of severe reprisals by the
occupying Nazis. General Charles de Gaulle, another veteran and indeed hero of
WWI, set up a Free French army and government in exile from London, where he
remained until the Allied liberation of Paris from the Nazis in August 1944.
BBC History – The Fall of France (by Dr. Gary Sheffield)
http://www.bbc.co.uk/history/worldwars/wwtwo/fall_france_01.shtml
72
Marshall Petain – Leader of Nazi-collaborating Vichy France
www.conter-currents.com
General Charles de Gaulle – Leader of the Free French
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Charles_de_Gaulle
1) On which date did the Nazis invade France and on which date did France fall to
the Nazis?
2) What was the name of the pro-Nazi collaborating regime in France and who was
its leader?
3) Who led the Free French and from where did he lead this?
4) In what month and year was Paris finally liberated from Nazi occupation?
73
THE BATTLE OF BRITIAN
With France under Nazi occupation, Britain was left to stand alone against the Nazis,
but under the leadership of the new British Prime Minister, Winston Churchill, Britain
stood her ground and refused to go down. The scene was set for the Battle of Britain,
the outcome of which would determine Britain’s fate against the Nazis just 21 miles
across the channel from Britain in a nearly fully Nazi-occupied Europe. Although
Britain was – at its narrowest – just 21 miles across the English Channel from
mainland Europe, this nevertheless meant that Hitler required air superiority over the
English Channel to successfully invade Britain, and that meant a battle with Britain’s
Royal Air Force (or RAF). The RAF did not have strength in numbers of planes,
pilots, or of experience – that fell with the Nazi German air force or Luftwaffe. The
RAF did have the edge however in shorter distance and radar with which to detect
pending attacks by the Luftwaffe. The RAF continued to fight off Luftwaffe attacks
on airfields and radar bases, as well as on their own fighter planes. Despite the
Luftwaffe’s superior numbers, it was clear by September 1940 that the Luftwaffe
could not achieve air superiority over Britain, and so Hitler postponed his planned
invasion of Britain (code-named ‘Operation Sea Lion’) and turned again to the East –
and this time to the USSR – in an act that would ultimately change the course of WWI.
Britain had been saved from invasion by the Nazis. She was indebted to the RAF,
whose members included not only British pilots but French and Polish pilots as well.
As Churchill himself said of the RAF when the Nazi invasion of Britain was called
off by Hitler; “Never in the field of human conflict was so much owed by so many to
so few.”
BBC History – The Battle of Britain - http://www.bbc.co.uk/history/battle_of_britain
74
Portrait of British fighter planes in the Battle of Britain (not the fallen German plane
in the foreground)
www.forwallpaper.com
Commemorative poster of the Battle of Britain
www.togsplace.blogshot.com
75
1) What did Hitler need before he could invade Britain?
2) What advantage did the Luftwaffe have over the RAF?
3) What advantage did the RAF have over the Luftwaffe?
4) What was the code-name for Hitler’s planned invasion of Britain?
5) Where did Hitler turn his attention after calling off his planned invasion of Britain?
Which country did this include?
BRITIAN’S RELIANCE ON THE USA
As well as having saved herself from immediate invasion from the Nazis, she was
also being kept afloat in the long-term by the USA, who although not in a position to
declare war on Nazi Germany (remember that President F. D. Roosevelt had promised
American citizens that he would not bring the USA into another conflict), could still
send vital supplies to Britain to keep her in the war until the USA herself was brought
into the war by the Imperial Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor. The USA’s own interests
were also at stake over the war between Britain and Nazi Germany…
1) How could the USA help Britain in the war against Nazi Germany? How could
she not help Britain and why?
2) Why was the USA helping Britain at this stage of the war at all?
76