Download Identification Within: Kenneth Burke`s View of the Unconscious

Identification Within: Kenneth Burke's View of the Unconscious
Author(s): Roy Ambrester
Source: Philosophy & Rhetoric, Vol. 7, No. 4 (Fall, 1974), pp. 205-216
Published by: Penn State University Press
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Identification
Within:
Kenneth
Burke's
Viewof the Unconscious
RoyAmbrester
In Language as Symbolic Action, Kenneth Burke has presented
his view of the unconscious by controverting the Freudian terminology through transposition to the reahn of the symbolic.
Burke's own explanation is sometimes lost in the shuffle of his
penchant for tergiversation, hence Burke's brilliant conceptualization of the unconscious in terms of the "five dogs" is lost to
many who seek compréhension of the phenomenon. Risking
oversimplification this article seeks to explicate the Burkeian concept through an expanded explanation of Burke's "five dogs."
This particular aspect of Burke's writing has been largely
ignored by rhetoricians. Yet within Burke's view of the unconscious rests some of his most intriguing concepts concerning
rhetorical processes, and even though Burke's primary concern
in this area rests in the realm of Symbolic, the realm of Rhetoric
is equally significant as explained by Burke's Student Hugh Duncan. Duncan states:
While Burke places the individuai under the head of
the Symbolic, and thè social under that of Rhetoric, he is
careful to stress that such catégories as "individuai" and
"society" meet in rhetoric when we consider the relationship between thè speaker and his audience.1
It is of utmost importance that the rhetorician understand
Burke's concepts of the unconscious, for they are in essence propaedeutic to compréhension of Burke's rhetorical theory. Burke
makes this clear in the following Statement:
. . . The key term for the 'old' rhetoric was 'persuasion'
and its stress was upon deliberative design. The key term
for the 'new' rhetoric would be identification which can
include a partially 'unconscious' factor in appeal.2
Mr. Ambrester is Chairman of the Department of Oral Communication,
Howard Payne College.
Philosophy 6- Bhetoric, Vol. 7, No. 4 (1974). Published by The Pennsylvania State University Press, University Park, Pa. and London.
205
206
KENNETH BURKE's VIEW OF THE UNCONSCIOUS
In relatìng identification to thè unconscious it is apparent that
Burke's concept inherently must contain identification, for as
Burke points out, "... A second strain of identification is found
in thè individuai as he seeks identification with his own audience
for moralistic or incantatory purposes."3 In other words, Burke's
idea of the unconscious views man as the actor dramatizing his
rôle f unction to himself as a means of justifying whatever courses
of action he chooses in his drama of human expérience.
Burke's major postulation concerning the unconscious résides
in his view of self as a process of "becoming" through identification within. Hence the recurring Burkeian motif of identification
forms the basis through which the processes of the unconscious
are viewed.
Understanding Burke's concept of identification at the level
of self requires examining Burke's view of the self. For Burke,
the self is a dynamic process of becoming - a quest for identity.
At its core the self is both changeless (autonomous) and yet
changing (consubstantial). The self in its quest for identity identifies in a symbolic fashion of making choices. Hence the self
seeks identity through acceptance and rejection of various symbols with which it is confronted, and this constant pattern develops the basis for growth as the self moves toward a unity of
being. Therefore, in this pattern of acceptance and rejection, the
self is in quest of identity within a unitary pattern of expérience.
Yet, at thè same time, thè individuai self, because of the varying
symbolical relationships, manifests itself in a unique manner.
It is this sojourn with which Burke concerns himself in formulating his concept of the self.
The individual's deepest means of support in the civic
texture résides in ...
a communicative or cooperative
bond. By it he is "transcendentally"fortified. His personal
solidity dépends upon his allegiance to it.4
The self, then, is in a constant state of transformation and
therefore, "the maturing of thè individuai exposes him to 'climacteric stages' of one sort or another."5 Any change requires
adjustment of the self as Burke points out:
. . . thè mere changing of one's glandular System would
involve him in "new situations." And each change of "situation" (scene), in this purely physical sensé, would require a reorganization of the mind with relation to public,
forensic structure. Similarly a man must be "reborn" in
ROY AMBRESTER
207
orderto fit himself for genuine partnershipwith a woman
- and if partnershipis ended, he must again be "reborn"
in order to take new problemsof identity into account.6
The principle of rebirth is central to Burke'sconcept of the
self for it is throughthe process of symbolic death, burial, and
résurrectionthat the seif is able to adjust to the rigors of the
dramaof human expérience.Just as Burke'srhetoricwould lead
us through"the région of scramble,of insult and injury,bickering, squabbling,malice and the lie. . ."7 so the seif confronts
and is confrontedby a chaotic world. Hence the seif is perpetually in a state of conflictand since such conflictoften precludes
physical action,the self seeks throughthe symbolizationprocess
to achieve a "highersynthesisatop the antithesis."8Within such
a symbolic process thè individuai forms himself through the
development of attitude clusters which unify the various warring factionswithin thè individuai.Each synthesisof the warring
factions within the self is a new, albeit temporary,identity for
the seif in its continuaiquest. As warringfactions exist in society
they are rhetoricallyimposed on the individuai.Hence the individual'ssymbolisticdevelopmentis rhetoricallydetermined.Furthermoresince Burkeallèges that
. . . rhetoricis rooted in the essentialfunction of language
itself, a functionthat is wholly realistic,and is continually
born anew; thè use of language as a symbolic means of
inducing coopérationin beings that by nature respond to
symbols,9
man thereforeultimatelydevelops his personality,créâtes a self
*
image, and seeks the "good life" through corporate and selfimposedrhetoricalstratégies.
Burke'sdynamicview of the self helps illuminatethe concept
of identificationwithin. For further delineation, we might turn
to Burkehimself:
The "ego"with its "id"confrontsthe "superego"much
as an orator would confront a somewhat alien audience,
whose perceptibilitieshe must flatter as a necessary step
toward persuasion.... A man can be his own audience,
insofar as he, even in his secret thoughts, cultivâtes certain ideas or imagesfor thè effect he hopes they may hâve
upon him; he is hère what Mead would cali "an addressingits 'me'";and in this respecthe is being rhetorical
208
KENNETH BURKe's VIEW OF THE UNCONSCIOUS
quite as though he were using pleasant imagery to influence an outside audience rather than one within.10
Burke has interestingly combined Freudian and dramatistic concepts in his explanation of thè nature of thè identification process
within thè individuai.
He first casts thè nature in Freudian terminology with "ego"
with its "id" confronting "superego." To clarify Freud's concept,
we turn to one of Freud's works often cited by Burke, Jokes and
Their Relation to thè Unconscious, for an explanation of thè process. Freud, in speaking of thè tendentious joke, allèges:
... An impulse or urge is présent which seeks to release
pleasure from a particular source and, if it were allowed
free play, would release it. Besides this, another urge is
présent which works against this génération of pleasureinhibits it, that is, or suppresses it. The suppressing current
must, as thè outcome shows, be a certain amount stronger
than thè suppressed one, which, however, is not on that
account abolished. . . .
. . . Expérience with tendentious jokes shows that in
such circumstances thè suppressed purpose can, with thè
assistance of pleasure from thè joke, gain sufficient
strength to overcome thè inhibition, which would otherwise be stronger than it. The insuit takes place, because
thè joke is thus made possible. But it is incomparably
greater. It is so much greater than thè pleasure from thè
joke that we must suppose that thè hitherto suppressed
purpose has succeeded in making its way through, perhaps without any diminution whatever. It is in such circumstances that thè tendentious joke is received with thè
heartiest laughter.11
Viewed from Freud's perspective of thè tendentious joke, thè
"ego" with its "id" has found a tantalizing means of confronting
and ultimately circumventing thè suppression of thè "superego."
The "superego" for Burke opérâtes as a kind of alien audience,
and thè nature of thè identification process involves thè symbolistic manner in which thè process of circumvention takes piace.
Freud's tendentious joke is particularly applicable in this case
as it demonstrates thè workings of thè identification process
within thè individuai who finds thè means through symbols of
circumventing his own suppressing mechanism.
ROY AMBRESTER
209
Hence, Burke'sdramatisticpoint of view becomes apparentin
his interprétationof the process of confrontationbetween the
"ego" and the "superego"as a process of symbolic action in
which identificationis employed to transcend the symbolical
estrangementwhile the autonomy of the two entities remains
symbolisticallyintact. This process is illustratedof course in the
preceding example from Freud's own writing.
Burke'suse of Freudian imagery would suffer an injustice,
however,if furtherclarificationof the nature of the unconscious
were omitted. In speakingof the "ego"and "superego,"Burke is
utilizing Freud's terminology,while entertaininghis own ideas
about the levels of the unconscious.12
In assessingthe natureof the unconsciousBurke states:
According to the Freudian nomenclature,the "unconscious"process of "repression"involves the fact that the
thou-shalt-not'sof the "superego"would negate the desires of the "id,"that portion of the unconscious which
knows no Negation (or, more resonantly,"knowsno No").
And "symbolic"or "symptomatic"
kinds of action are said
to result from unconsciousattempts to elude the répressions imposed by the tyrannyof the "superego.".. .
. . . But whereas the Freudian negative is identified
solely with the process of "repression"in the "unconscious,"the dramatisticnegativemust focus attentionupon
the negative as a peculiarsourceof "symbolSystems."18
Burke,therefore,in an effort to place the concept of the "unconscious"into a dramatisticperspective,enlarges upon Freud's
basic concerns.To clarify his point Burkeuses the illustrationof
the Five Dogs as follows:
Animalistically,there are many species of dogs. But
dramatistically,these reduce to five (not a single one of
which might meet the requirementsof a dog-fancier- or
shouldwe say a dogman?).
For a finish, I would propose this other eut across our
subject:
First, along psychoanalyticlines, there is the "primai"
dog, the first dog you knew, or loved, or were frightened
by, or lost. It secretly ties in with what the anthropologist Malinowski would cali "context of situation."For
210
KENNETH BURKE's VIEW OF THE UNCONSCIOUS
though many or ali of thè détails that are associated with
that dog may have been forgotten (and thus become "unconscious"), we now know that they are stili there within
you somehow (and can be disclosed by drugs, hypnosis or
psychoanalysis).
Next, there's thè "jingle" dog. It concerns thè sheerly
accidential nature of thè "word" "dog," what it rhymes
with in English as distinct from what thè corresponding
word rhymes with in other languages, and above ali, in
English, we might well keep in mind Cummings' undeniable observation that thè jingle dog is "God spelled
backwards." (Or did he say it thè other way round?)
Third comes thè lexical" dog. This is thè one defined
in thè dictionary, "by genus and differentia." It is thè most
public, normal, and rational of all dogs- and thè emptiest
of ali, as regards thè attitude of either poets or neurotics.
If that great, good, sound, healthy, public meaning for
"dog" were ali we had, I can confidently assure you that
thè world would be completely clear of poetry. This is
thè only définition that wholly makes sense, if thè world
is to be kept going. But along with thè fact that this
définition of "dog" is tremendously necessary, there's also
thè fact that "dog" as so conceived is totally inane. You
know what I mean. But if you want documentation besides, just track down all of thè références to dogs in
Aeschylus' Oresteia ( or see thè pages on "dog" in William
Empson's The Structure of Complex Words).
Fourth, there's an "entelechial dog." This is thè "perfect" dog "towards which" one might aspire. I might give
a round-about example of this sort: Beginning with thè
material substance, "bread,"let us next move to thè "word"
"bread." Once we have that "word," through sheerly verbal manipulations we can arrive at a term for "perfect
bread." Having got to that point, we find two quite différent kinds of resources open to us. (1) We may feel disillusioned about "reality" because thè "thing" bread falls
so tragically short of thè idea that flits about our "word'*
for "perfect" bread. Or (2) we might be graced with thè
opportunity to discern, ali around us, évidences of ways
whereby even thè worst of bread embodies, however
finitely, thè "principle"of an infinitely and absolutely "per-
ROY AMBRESTER
211
fect" bread. Dogs endowed with "personalities" in animal
stories would be a fictional variant of such an "entelechial"
motive. In their way, they are "perfect" embodiments of
certain traits. Lassie has been thè Machinery's prime exhibit, as regards thè entelechial dog.
Finally, there is the "tautological" dog. We here have
in mind the fact that a dog involves a particular set of
associations which, in a sense, reproduce his spirit. For
instance: kennel, dog food, master, the hunt, cat, protection, loyalty, slavishness, the place where the dog was
killed, and so on. When I was young, I always had a dog,
and I always thought of lions as big dogs. It was quite a
blow to me when I first learned that lions are really big
cats. Looking back, I incline to believe that I had a "cycle" or "ladder" of terms, running from dog, to boy, to
father, to lion, to king (or generally, ruler or authority), to
God. Here would be a "tautological" terminology in the
sense I now have in mind.14
Burke's catégories of the unconscious, though somewhat
oblique and difficult to discern, nevertheless, provide additional
insight into thè nature of the identification process within the
individuai.
To clarify the processes to which Burke makes référence, we
turn to the "primai dog," which roughly corresponds to Burke's
concept of scene within his pentad format. It représente "the
context of the situation" and serves as an ontological symbolthe embodiment of the past in the présent. This particular "dog"
(or symbolic System, if you will) includes the Symbols rooted in
the context of the situation which, for Burke, would include all
symbolic root motives, both "repressed" and "non-repressed."
This "dog" includes the symbolistic attitude clusters that comprise the symbolic portion of the unconscious.
Burke's second "dog," the "jingle dog," corresponds to some
degree with Freud's concept of word-play in jokes. The "dog" is
onomatopoetic to the extent that it is composed of the pure
sound System of the symbol itself . This "dog" might be conceived
as corresponding with the act-agency ratio in the pentad format,
for its concern rests with the language as an instrument in the
attainment of a goal including those areas of the unconscious
which incorporate word-play as a substitute for child-like responses to given situations. In other words, language becomes
212
KENNETH BURKE'SVIEW OF THE UNCONSCIOUS
an instrumentwhereby man can attain his ultimate objective
through thè mere manipulationof that instrument.Therefore,
Cummings'word-playwith thè word dog as "Godspelled backwards"becomes a play on words which reflects a purgativeredemptivebypassingof the "superego."
The 'lexical dog"is clearly, as Burkepoints out, "the emptiest
of ail as regardsthe attitudesof either poets or neurotics."15This
"dog"category is a highly abstractcategory which tends on the
one hand to explain its importanceand on the other to testify
to its vacuousness.As a symbol it manifesteitself in man's unconscious abstractingprocess for purposesof differentiationand
classification.Any lexical symbol is "public,normal,and rational"
because it bases its movement away from the particular,on
logicai processes which allow for common catégories of terms.
Yet, as thèse terms develop and become more public in nature,
they likewise become more inane in the sensé of being empty of
content. Viewed from the perspective of the act-agency ratio,
this process differs from the "jingle dog" in the sensé that in
"jingle"man moves upward within the language, whereas with
"lexical"man moves upwardwith the language.
The concept of the "entelechialdog" embodies the character
of the act-purposeratio,for it is this type of symbolizationwhich
allows for the légitimation of conduct. Burke's own statement
should help to clarify the concept. He says:
. . . Hère . . . is what we hâve called the "entelechial"
mode of thought,thè feeling that the principleof a genus
is representedby its "highest"potentialités. When such
a mode of thought is translatedinto terms of social rank,
it makes the prince, or highest rung of the social ladder,
represent thè generai principle of such hiérarchieorder.
Then, if one conceives his own motives in terms of the
dévotion paid to princes, it follows that one conceives of
oneself rhetorically, in terms of courting and being
courted.1*
Within our unconscious symbolical strivings we seek a means
wherebywe can conceptualizethat which is perfect, whereupon
we can therefore"discover"the essence of perfectionat ail levels
within the symbolizationprocess. Hence, since the highest perfection of animalismis man, we "endow"our animaiswith human
traitstherebyplacing the essence of the animalwithin the framework of humanperfectibility.Such "endowments,"therefore,are
ROY AMBRESTER
213
Symbols of the unconscious entelechial motive operative in
human endeavor.
If one should attempt to scratch the fifth and final "tautological dog," he might find himself bleeding profusely, for it is this
symbolic System which embraces the unconscious strivings of the
act-agent ratio. Burke views the "tautological" process as a
cycle through which humans begin with lower level abstractions related to themselves, move them upward to an ultimate
extension and can move them up and down at will in an unendingly circuitous fashion. Hence, équations would involve such
identificatory Symbols as running from: "dog, to boy, to father,
to lion, to king, . . . to God."17 Therefore, "tautological" symbolization involves a process of movement toward highest authority,
and the révélation of such a symbol for authority is a révélation
of the actor who created the symbol. In other words, man's highest révélations of the "good life" serve as traces which ultimately
reveal the nature of the man who created the symbol.
After viewing thè basic "meaning" of Burke's dogs, our quest
nécessitâtes turning to this interprétation in terms of Burke's
expansion of the Freudian concept.
The basic Freudian concept may be seen by viewing the ego,
not as a hypostasized "thing" but as a symbol-oriented, dynamic
process. The same is true of the superego in the sense that while
Burke retains thè basic tenets of thè "screening" élément, he
moves away from the introjected value System of the superego
toward a superego as a symbolistic censor. The relation between
the ego and the superego is largely rhetorical, and this may be
seen more clearly by reviewing Burke's five dogs.
In turning to the first, the "primai dog," we discover that in
this rhetorical context the "ego" is a part of a primordial attitude
system which includes ail symbols making up the "context of the
situation" and therefore the context of thè individuai. There is
an identification factor working at the level of first-order symbols which constitutes the initial reaction to the symbol itself.
There is the symbolistic negative superego which acts as an alien
audience in the sense of branding the sub-articulatory processes
"unworthy"of conscious articulation. Hence, the process of confrontation which would allow conscious articulation of sub-articulated identifications is revealed only under hypnosis, drugs,
psychoanalysis, and in dreams (and one might include poetic
"insight" and neurotic-psychotic "révélation"). Within this symbolic system, then, there is an underlying first-order set of identi-
214
KENNETH BURKE's VIEW OF THE UNCONSCIOUS
ficatìons, there is identification in thè process of confrontation
with thè superego, and there is identification in thè synthesis
which émerges from thè confrontation.
The "jingle dog" offers an expansion of thè concept of "ego"
in thè sensé that it représente thè self as a dynamic child-symbol
("ali children" might be more accurate) and thè superego as a
dynamic parent-symbol. Hence, thè word-play employed by thè
ego becomes a kind of rhetoric of courtship through which thè
child-like symbols lull thè parent-symbols into submission without jeopardizing thè autonomy of thè symbolistic structures.
There is an identification process operative in thè sélection of
thè child-play symbols which will permit identification with thè
suppressed symbols and identification will ultimately lead to an
extension of thè "seif' in thè symbols chosen.
The 'lexical dog" affords another means of viewing thè "ego"
and "superego" in thè process of identification. Rather than
acting as a repressing censor, grounded societally, thè superego
on this level acts as a kind of reflexive alien symbol to guard
against thè classifying tendencies within thè self. There is an
almost "automatic" identification which occurs at this level in
thè sense that thè differentiating and classifying aspects of thè
symbol-using animai form identifications which allow for such
classification. Although thè System is somewhat automatic, thè
symbols chosen in thè process of abstracting must somehow
pacify this reflexive superego with a type of identification that
allows for an et cetera.
The "entelechial dog" embodies an "ego" concerned with perfection and therefore is composed of symbols rooted in a quest
for essences. The "superego" on thè other hand is concerned
with normative symbols and therefore resists thè movement
toward perfectibility. Obviously, then, thè "ego" formulâtes symbols constituting perfection and thè "superego" seeks to diminish thè significance of thè nature of perfectibility. From this
vantage point then, thè "ego" must develop symbols based upon
essences which allow for identification with thè concept of perfection, develop identification with thè "superego" in récognition
of thè imperfectibility in normative symbols, and ultimately arrive at a synthesis atop thè antithesis.
The "tautological dog" places thè "ego" in thè realm of selfimage as thè self strives for identifications in a hierarchal movement toward thè ultimate. The "superego" acts as a "reality" or
"scientism" symbol which would reduce symbols to signais and
ROYAMBRESTER
215
thereby thwart the identificatoryprogression.Thus the "superego" would keep the "ego"in its "place"with remindersthat
"lionsare not big dogs."Yet, mans quest for the "spirit"would
demandthat he develop symbolswhich will allow him symbolistically to "kill"the superego and be reborn to a symbolistic
spirituallife on "the other side." This death, burial, and résurrectionin symbolsdépendstotally upon the identificationprocess
and recurs again and again.
One further observation needs to be made about Burke's
"dogs."While it is obvious that Burke has expanded Freud's
conceptualizationof "ego"and "superego"and placed identification at the roots of the processes,it should be noted that these
catégories are not "fixed."As Burke points out, they overlap,
which rather than being a hindrance is in effect an asset, for
such overlappingallows for furtherexpansionof the concept.
Viewed from the expanded Freudian perspective, the nature
of identificationis relatively clear. On the level of "ego,"identificationacts as a means of achievingthe synthesisfrom within.
At the level of the "superego"identificationbecomes a means of
achieving a consubstantialrelationshipthrough rétention of the
autonomousnature of both entities. Finally, identificatorymeans
and ends merge: identificationbecomes a synthesisin the quest
for ultimate synthesis.
In partially essentializing Burke's concept of identification
within thè individuaiwe hâve discoveredthat: (1) identification
is an inhérentpart of the developmentof "self"in that it allows
thè individuai to transcend the confines of his autonomous
nature while at the same time enabling him to retain his autonomy; (2) identificationcréâtes the basis for transcendencewhich
is basic to thought; (3) identificationis a means of achieving
attitude clusters within the unconscious;(4) identificationis a
symbolistic device employed (in various stances) in the ego's
confrontationwith the superego;(5) identificationis the primary
means in one's efforts to transcend conflict between formative
and conservativeforces within the self, and at the same time;
(6) identificationis the achievementof this transcendence.
NOTES
1 Hugh D. Duncan, Communicationb- Social Order (New York: Bedminster Press, 1962), p. 165.
2 Kenneth Burke, "Rhetoric- Old and New," The Journal of General
Education, V (April, 1951), p. 203.
216
KENNETH BURKE'SVIEW OF THE UNCONSCIOUS
3 Statementsby Kenneth Burke, personal interview, Jan. 22, 1972.
4 Burke, Permanence and Change (New York: New Republic, Inc.,
1935), p. 302.
Burke, Attitudes Toward History, II (New York: New Republic, Inc.,
1937), p. 98.
Ibid., pp. 215-216.
7 Burke, A Rhetoric of Motives (Berkeley: University of California
Press, 1969).
8 Burke, Attitudes Toward History, I (New York: New Republic, Inc.,
1937).
9 Burke,A Rhetoricof Motives, op. cit., p. 43.
i° Burke, A Bhetoric of Motives, op. cit., p. 38.
11 Sigmund Freud, Jokes and their Relation to the Unconscious, trans.
James Strachy (New York: W. V. Norton and Company, Inc., 1960), pp.
135-136.
12 Burke, interview, op. cit.
13 Burke, "Mind, Body & the Unconscious,"Language as Symoblic Action (Berkeley: University of CaliforniaPress, 1966), pp. 65-66.
14 ibid., pp. 73-74.
15 Ibid., p. 73.
ie Burke, A Rhetoric of Motives, op. cit., p. 148.
17 Burke, "Mind, Body & the Unconscious,"op. cit., p. 74.