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Naval History
The Sixth Symposium
of the
u.S. Naval Academy
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Daniel M. Masterson
General Editor
with
Richard P. Abels
Ted Bogacz
Thomas Brennan
William B. Cogar
Phyllis Culham
Robert W. Love
Don T. Sine
Jack Sweetman
Craig L. Symonds
Philip W. Warken
Roger T. Zeimet
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Public Opinion and the Role of Sea
Power in Athens, 404-322 B.C.
JOSIAH OBER
The Peloponnesian War changed the attitude of the Athenian citizenry toward
sea power. Although most of the citizens of fourth-century Athens looked
back with wistful pride on the victories and tribute lists of the fifth-century
league, they did not rebuild their naval power with an eye to recovering an
Aegean empire. Instead, the fourth-century navy was intended to defend
Athens in three ways: by protecting the routes along which the grain was
imported, by guarding the Attic coastline, and by harassing enemy shipping
in a time of open hostility.
*.****************
The great Peloponnesian War of 431-404 B.C. was a watershed in many
ways, not least in naval history. The outcome of the war demonstrated that
a land power such as Sparta was constrained t.o develop a navy in order to
defeat a sea power such as Athens. The final phase of the struggle proved
that using warships to threaten overseas supply lines was a viable strategy
even against wealthy and powerful states. The aftermath of the war left Sparta
with a great fleet and Athens stripped of its ships and seemingly helpless.
Within a decade,":however, the tables had turned: the Spartan fleet was defeated
by a Persian-financed fleet commanded by an Athenian admiral, and Athens
quickly began rebuilding its navy, which by the 340s was larger than it had
been before the war. To what ends, then, did the Athenians intend to use
their renewed sea power? Was the fourth-century fleet to serve the same ends
as the fifth-century fleet had served, or were the postwar goals of Athenian
naval policy fundamentally different?
Before the Peloponnesian War the Athenian fleet had been used primarily
to guarantee the maintenance of a maritime empire, composed of Aegean
coastal and island states, that had been forced to pay an annual tribute to
Athens. The imperial tribute was a tremendous source of state revenue for
fifth-c~ntury Athens and even helped to finance the great building program
of this period, including the Parthenon. Athens' navy and empire had grown
apace, and Athenians were well aware of the close relationship between naval
power, empire, and revenue. ]
Since naval power and the financial benefits of empire had been inextricable during the fifth century, it is tempting to assume that the growth of
the Athenian navy in the fourth century implied an attempt to rebuild the
lucrative maritime empire as wel1. 2 It also has been suggested that a primary
role of the navy, both in the fifth and fourth centuries, was to protect the
26
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economic interests of Athenian overseas traders. 3 It can be argued, however,
that through most of the fourth century the Athenians intended to use their
fleet neither as a tool of imperialism nor of commercialism. We must remember that in 404 B.C. Athens had suffered the humiliation of surrendering to
hated enemies after a war that had lasted for twenty-seven years, and that
the immediate cause of failure had been the decisive Spartan victory over the
Athenian fleet at Aegospotami in 405. Therefore, it seems that the major roles
of the fourth-century Athenian fleet were first to defend the home territory
against enemy incursions; second, to safeguard the grain route from the Black
Sea to Piraeus; and third, to put pressure on enemy states by attacking their
shipping. In short, the primary impetus for the maintenance of Athenian sea
power in the fourth century was defensive and military rather than imperialistic and commercial.
This thesis can be demonstrated by looking at the speeches touching on
naval matters which were delivered in the Athenian assembly and law courts.
Since the government was a direct democracy and whatever the citizens
decided in assembly was immediately enacted, public opinion was a major
determinant in the formation and implementation of national policy. Therefore, Atheniall orators hoped to persuade citizens to vote one way or the other
and thus took the prejudices of their audience into consideration when delivering their speeches. When the orators, who often disagreed violently on
specific issues, agreed on a given topic, it can be assumed that they were
bowing to the weight of public opinion on the matter. Hence, an analysis of
surviving fourth-century orations should provide a general trend of Athenian
thought on the topic of to what ends Athens' navy .should be used.
There was no doubt in the minds of fourth-century Athenians that the
empire of the fifth century had been a direct outgrowth of naval supremacy.
The orator Andocides, for example, in his speech On the Peace with Sparta
(3.38f.), explicitly stated that it was sea power that had allowed the Athenians
to take control of the Aegean states. In fact, depending on context the Greek
term arc/zi tis thalattis could be used by a speaker to refer to either the control
of the seas by naval force or to the empire resulting from that control. It is
less clear, however, that fourth-century Athenians considered their former
empire to have been a just or even a desirable possession. Isocrates, in the
Panegyricus (4.72, 21), argued that the fifth-century empire had been acquired
justly, and Demosthenes (3.24) claimed that the subject states had willingly
obeyed Athens. In other speeches, however, Athens' former imperialistic policy was condemned in no uncertain terms. In On the Peace, Isocrates lambasted
fifth-century Athenians who, during the imperial period, manned their shif.s
with the scum of Hellas, made themselves odious to the Greeks (8.79), and
thoroughly corrupted themselves in the process (8. 75ff.).
Some seemingly contradictory statements on the subject of the maritime
empire might be explained by the immediate circumstances of the various
speeches, but in some cases the fifth-century empire was subsequently praised
and berated in the same speech. Aeschines, in On the False Embassy (2.74ff.),
reminded the Athenians of the great evils that followed in the wake of the
imperialistic Sicilian expedition of 415, but later in the speech (2.175) he
recalled the good old days when "a yearly tribute of 1200 talents came in to
28
NAVAL HISTORY
us, we held the Chersonnese, Naxos, and Euboea ... and sent out a host of
colonies."
.
Although Isocrates (8.36, 124-25) referred to unnamed opponents who
favored a return to imperialism, none of the surviving orations made an
unequivocal statement to the effect that the fourth-century navy should or
could be used to build or maintain an empire. As a result of their memories
of the glorious Periclean age, the sufferings of the Peloponnesian War, and
the experience of postwar realities, fourth-century Athenians seem to have
been very ambivalent toward the general subject of the link between empire
and naval power. Even those who, in the first flush of renewed strength in
the 390s, might have dreamed of creating a profitable new empire soon had
their hopes dashed. The system of alliances, which sometimes has been called
the second Athenian empire, was never the paying proposition that the fifthcentury empire had been, and maintaining naval supremacy in the Aegean
cost fourth-century Athenians dearly (Isocrates 8.20f.).4 Although the orators
did mention the use of the fleet in order to collect contributions from their
allies (Isocrates 15.12Iff.), they never suggested that Athens would be enriched
by these collections. Even Andocides' famous assertion (3.37) that the fifthcentury .archi tis thalattis was the "source of good things" for Athens cannot
be construed as a suggestion that a new empire would be equally lucrative
since later in his speech (3.40) he proposed that, if the Athenians made peace
with Sparta, which entailed giving up imperial ambitions, they would regain
the "good things" they had had in the past.
The control of the sea in the fourth century therefore did not bring financial benefits to Athens, and a desire for imperial revenue could hardly have
been the motive for the maintenance of the navy. It appears, then, that
imperialism was not an enduring goal of Athenian sea power. Athenians in
the fourth century, as in the fifth, desired naval supremacy, but, unlike their
ancestors, they did not associate that supremacy diI ectly with the fruits of
empire but rather with the survival of the state.
Even if fourth-century Athenians did not consider empire per se to be
remunerative, it might be argued that, by protecting merchant shipping,
control of the sea would enrich individual Athenians and so, at least indirectly,
benefit the state. The Athenian fleet did work to suppress piracy in the Aegean,
but there is little to suggest that the Athenians considered this to be its primary
role. In fact, the safety of traders was apparently considered secondary to
national prestige, according to a speech by Hegesippus in which he argued
against a Macedonian proposal for a joint antipirate force on the grounds
that to accept such a proposal would be damaging to Athens' status as a sea
power (Pseudo-Demosthenes 7.14).
With the exception of Hegesippus' speech, all orators' references to actions
against pirates (for example, Demosthenes 23.166ff., 58.53ff.) are casual
remarks made in the course of a speech on a larger issue. Nowhere in the
orations is there found a clear statement to the effect that safe sea trade would
financially benefit the state. This is perhaps not surprising since most overseas
merchants operating out of Athens were apparently resident aliens rather
than Athenian citizens. 5 The citizens tended to vote for measures that benefited themselves more directly. The expeditions sent against the pirates were
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intended _to protect the strategic grain routes from the Black Sea and Egypt,
not to ensure merchants' profits. In a speech delivered in 359 or 358, Apollodorus described how he captained a trireme in the Athenian fleet, which
convoyed grain ships through the northern Aegean, and claimed that this
action was undertaken specifically to guarantee that there would not be a
shortage of grain in the city (Pseudo-Demosthenes 50.58f.). In the fourth
century, Athens imported approximately three-quarters of the grain consumed by residents of the state. Its citizens voted to send the fleet north to
guard the grain ships in order to avoid starvation; their concern with the
protection of shipping had little or nothing to do with motives of commercial
profit.
On the other hand, the Athenian fleet. was sometimes used to interfere
with the trade of other states. Demosthenes (59.36) described the trials and
tribulations of a prostitute in the city of Megara who had a hard time finding
customers, owing to the scarcity of foreigners there during the 370s "on
account of the war and because the Megarians favored the Spartan side while
you [Athenians] were in control of the sea." Obviously the Athenian fleet
had made it difficult for merchants to sail to hostile Megara. Elsewhere,
Demosthenes (18.145f.) contended that Athens was able to cut off imports
and exports from Macedonia in the years before the Battle of Chaeronea in
338. In these cases and others (Demosthenes 4.34, 18.241), interference with
other states' trade was undertaken to further a specifically military strategy.
The orators never suggested that the navy could be used to create a commercial monopoly for Athenian merchants. In sum, there is little to suggest
that the orators, or the Athenian people, considered the relationship between
sea power and commerCial profit to be particularly important. They did,
however, recognize the great importance of the navy as a military, and specifically defensive, force.
The navy and war were very closely associated in the Athenian mind in
the fourth century. Demosthenes (8.74) mentioned that his contemporary,
Timotheus, advocated war with Thebes by asking the citi.~ens: "Will you not
cover the seas with your triremes, 0 men of Athens? Will you not rise up at
once and march down to the Piraeus and drag them down the slips?" (Demosthenes 19.291; Xenophon Hellenica 5.4.34). The defense of the state, however,
was the primary military mission of the Athenian fleet, and several orators'
statements attest to this fact. In his Areopagiticus (7.1) of 357, Isocrates found
it necessary to explain to his audience that he was speaking on the subject
of public safety, despite the fact that Athens had more than 200 triremes and
control of the sea. The implication was that the Athenians might not believe
that the state could be in serious danger while holding the naval supremacy.
Later, in his Panathenaicus (12.114), Isocrates claimed that fifth-century Athenians had needed control of the sea "to fend off the plots of the Spartans
and the strength of the united Peloponnesians."
Perhaps the clearest statement on the military importance of sea power
came in 355 from Demosthenes' speech in Against Androtion (22.12): "I suppose
that no one would deny that all that has happened to our city, in the past
or the present, whether good or otherwise ... has resurted in the one case
from the possession and in the other from the lack, of war-ships." According
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NAVAL HISTORY
to Demosthenes, war trophies and victories were gained by the possession of
a fleet (22.13f.); disaster attended its loss (22.15). The navy made Athens
powerful and allowed it to maintain that power (22.16). Finally, he proclaimed
that the safety of the state was directly dependent on the triremes (22.16; ~
Xenophon Hellenica 7.1.6; Pseudo-Demosthenes 17.25). Demosthenes (24.91)
reiterated his view in 353 when he stated that the city owed its safety to the
armed forces, both the navy (mentioned first) and the army. The Athenians
realized that their state was dependent on the navy for its physical security,
and the orators therefore often linked the destruction of the fleet, especially
at Aegospotami, with the fall of the city. Demosthenes, for example, wrote
that "though many serious disasters befell our city, she did not succumb until
her fleet was destroyed" (22.15; I\Lysias 2.59, 26.23, 13.46; Isocrates 12.59,
18.59; Andocides 1.73, 3.21; Pseudo-Demades frag. 45).
The Athenian orators loved lists, and no orator's list of the factors contributing to the military strength of a state was complete without a reference
to the navy; incteed, triremes often headed the list. In a speech delivered in
354, Demosthenes (14.49) commented that the prerequisites for fighting a
war were triremes, money, and strong positions. Thirteen years later he claimed
that the modern Athenians had surpassed their ancestors in each of the various
respects by which the power of states could be measured: triremes, number
of men, and lnaterial (9.40).6
Judging by the orators' speeches, the military, and specifically defensive,
role of the fleet apparently concerned the Athenians far more than did the
prospect of using the navy to build a new empire or to further the interests
of merchants. The Peloponnesian War and its aftermath had tqe effect of
radically reordering Athenian priorities on the subject of state defense. This
is hot the place in which to discuss land warfare in detail, but it is worth
mentioning in passing that during the fourth century the Athenians built a
major system of fortresses and watchtowers on their borders which served to
guard all land routes into Athenian territory. Some of the fortresses, notably
Aegosthena and Rhamnous, were built on the coasts and served as naval
bases as well as road control stations. Furthermore, some of the towers on
the hills near the coast (for example, the ones on Kerata, M~llia Psatha, and
Stavrokoraki) have fine views out to sea. 7 Perhaps the Athenians intended
their fleet to complement the fortification system by guarding the sea frontier.
Both the fortification program and the rebuilding of the navy can be regarded
therefore as part and parcel of a comprehensive program of defense designed
to protect Athenian territory and citizens from the ravages they had suffered
during the Peloponnesian War. The orators' obvious interest in the military
and defensive role of the fleet is a direct reflection of the fourth-century
citizens' concern with state defense, a concern that was a major determinant
of Athenian policy in the years 404-322 B.C. 8
NOTES
1. Sec, for example, Pseudo-Xenophon The Constitution of the Athenians 1.14-2.16; and Thucydides
2.62, 1.4. See also the comments of W. R. Connor, Thucydides (Princeton, 1984), 24-25. All works by
anCl
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SEA POWER IN ATHENS
31
ancient authors cited in this paper may be conveniently consulted in the Loeb ClaHical Library (Cambrid,l?;e,
MA).
2. See S. Perlman, "Athenian Democracy and the Revival of Imperialistic Expansion at the Beginning
of the Fourth Century B.C.," ClaHical Philology 58 (1968): 257-67; R. Sealey, "IG II' 1609 and the
Transformation of the Second Athenian Sea-League," Phoenix II (1957): 95-111; and G. T. Griffith,
"Athens in the Fourth Century," in P. D. A. Garnsey and C. R. Whittaker, eds., Imperialism in the Ancient
World (Cambridge, 1978), 127-44.
3. See, for example, R.J. Hopper, Trade and Industry in ClaHical Gretct (London, 1979), 196-97.
4. J. Cargill, in The Second Ilthenian League (Berkeley, 1981), passim, has argued convincingly that
there never was a "second empire." On the cost of maintaining the naval confederation see S. Accame,
La Lega Ateniese del Serolo IV a.C. (Rome, 1941), 134ff.; and F. E. Robbins, "The Cost to Athens of Her
Second Empire," ClaHical Philology 13 (1918): 361-88.
5. SeeJ. Hasebroek, Trade and Politics in Ancient Gretct (London, 1933), 26ff.; and P. Millet, "Maritime
Loans and the Structure of Credit in Fourth-Century Athens," in P. D. A. Garnsey, K. Hopkins, and
C. R. Whittaker, cds., Trade in the Ancient Economy (Berkeley, 1983), 36-52.
6. Similar lists are in Demosthenes 4.66, 10.19,20.162,24.216, 18.311, 19.266; Aeschines 3.136,
3.163; Andocides I. 74; Lysias 31.26; Lycurgus Against Leocrates 150; and Dinarchus 3.9f.
7. The fortification system is described in detail in J. Ober, Fortress Allica: Difense oj the Athenian Land
Frontier, 404-322 B.C.; Mnemosyne, suppl. 84 (Leiden, 1984), passim.
8. For further discussion of sea power in Athenian thought see A. Momigliano, "Sea Power in Greek
Thought," Classical Review 58 (1944): 1-7; and J. Oher, "Views of Sea Power in the Fourth-Century Attic
Orators," Ancient World I (1978): 119-30, in which some of the ideas in this paper were presented in an
earlier form.