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3rd FES-MISIS Workshop & Field Trip
Challenges and Perspectives for the Future of
ASEAN - EU Relations
Naypyidaw, 29 September – 6 October, 2007
Report by the FES Delegation
The Joint workshop held by the Friedrich Ebert-Stiftung (FES) and the Myanmar Institute of Strategic
and International Studies (MISIS) in Naypyidaw from 4-5 October 2007 was the third in a series of track
two dialogues, initiated in September 20061. The FES delegation included ten independent scholars from
seven European countries, while the MISIS delegation was made up of a mix of mid-level government
officials and academics. In addition to the main workshop, the European participants held a day of meetings with high-level officials from government ministries, including Information, Foreign Affairs, Home
Affairs, Labour, Health, and the Adjutant General’s Office. They also spent two days in northern Shan
state, with field visits to Shan Special Regions 1 and 5 (ceasefire areas), as well as the border town of
Muse. This report focuses primarily on the workshop discussions in Naypyidaw, which were conducted
under Chatham House Rules.
Rationale for the FES-MISIS Workshops
Since Myanmar became a member of ASEAN in 1997, EU-ASEAN relations have been hampered by
European concerns over democracy and human rights situation in Myanmar, at significant costs to all
sides. At the same time, dialogue between European countries and Myanmar has been very limited, subject to a number of formal constraints, as well as general adversity, alienation, and distrust.
The intention of FES in initiating the dialogue with MISIS has been to seek to break through this impasse, increase mutual understanding, and explore possible areas of common ground. Aside from providing an alternative or complement to government-to-government contacts, track two meetings have several advantages. Given their status as private citizens, participants can interact unconstrained by national
interests and the need to communicate official positions. This can make it easier to build confidence and
achieve a level of frankness in the discussion. It leaves the participants freer to explore the substance of
sensitive issues and contemplate actions that may be “ahead of the curve”. Ultimately, civil society actors can help clarify government positions, shed light on existing problems, and identify possible solutions. They may also provide a stepping stone to official dialogue.
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The 3rd FES-MISIS workshop was planed according to the recommendations of the 2nd workshop in a track 1.5 format.
However, due to the risk that the presence of European officials could be instrumentalised for political purposes as a signal of
normality in EU-Burma/Myanmar relations at a time of severe crisis, the plan was postponed.
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Given the timing of the 3 workshop, which took place after a violent government crackdown against
peaceful protesters in Yangon and other towns, much thought was given beforehand to the possible costs
and benefits of going ahead with the workshop as planned. There was concern on part of the European
participants that the purpose of the proceedings could be misunderstood or politically instrumentalised
by the Myanmar government, and that the confrontational atmosphere would hamper the discussions. It
was decided, however, that if there was ever a time to put to use the confidence built during previous
workshops, this was it. The delegates felt that they would be in a unique position to help clarify and elucidate European perceptions and responses to the evolving situation, and that recommendations to the
Myanmar government coming from independent scholars and communicated through MISIS might receive a “fairer” hearing than official diplomatic demarches and media statements. It is understood that
similar concerns existed, and similar conclusions were reached, on the Myanmar side, thus underscoring
the comparative advantage of track two discussions, perhaps particularly in a crisis situation.
European Perspectives
The European participants took the opportunity in every meeting to express their deep dismay and abhorrence of the use of violence against monks and peaceful protesters. It was emphasised that it had
been a difficult decision to go ahead with the workshop under these circumstances, but that it was hoped
that the two sides by speaking frankly and honestly would be able to begin to explore ways to defuse the
situation and contribute to reconciliation both within Myanmar and between Europe and Myanmar.
As a matter of priority, the FES delegation sought to present and explain as objectively as possible the
official European view of the ongoing events and the likely implications for EU-Myanmar relations depending on future developments. It was stressed that:
o The government crackdown has caused anger and revulsion across Europe, which saw the protests as
a genuine outpouring of legitimate popular grievances. This has created an unprecedented momentum towards stronger sanctions, so far aimed mainly at senior military leaders and the logging and
mining sectors, but with the potential for further action, if Myanmar government repression continues.
o The feeling in Europe now is that the road map cannot simply proceed according to the original plan.
There is an insistence that in order to establish the legitimacy of the constitution and accommodate
popular concerns, the political process will have to be opened up again and compromises must be
found that can build broader political and popular support for the future steps.
o While more sanctions are in the pipeline, European governments have rejected sweeping economic
sanctions that could cause further unemployment in Myanmar. Rather, the main thrust of EU policy
is support for the efforts of the UN Secretary-General and his Special Envoy, Ibrahim Gambari, to
find a way through the current crisis, which satisfies the vital and legitimate interests of all sides.
o The 27 European member states are united behind this position in a way not seen before, and continued high level of attention and further punitive steps are to be expected if no political progress is
seen. Conversely, the EU stands ready to support any genuine political progress, including the rolling back of existing sanctions. It also remains absolutely committed to continuing its humanitarian
programmes.
In further presentations, European participants sought to “interpret” the evolving European position and
estimate what would be required to restore confidence and cooperation between Europe and Myanmar.
While all delegates of course did not agree on every issue, it was stressed for example that:
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o While there is in European governments and societies at large a strong commitment to the basic
values of democracy, human rights, and human security, the EU generally does not seek to impose
particular institutions. There is a genuine understanding in Europe, which itself is made up of a
highly diverse group of countries and cultures, that each country is unique, and that political and
socio-economic institutions and policies must be appropriate for that country.
o The EU exercises its power mainly through “soft power”. European governments, generally speaking, believe in dialogue and cooperation; they prefer to work through multilateral forums such as the
UN; and there is a general acknowledgement that political and economic development goes together,
as well as a strong commitment to humanitarian values. This is reflected also in a pronounced reluctance to use economic sanctions to reach political goals, particularly unilateral ones.
o In assessing its relations with Myanmar over the coming months and years, the EU and its member
states will be looking for progress in four areas:
(1) Political reconciliation;
(2) nationwide ceasefire and cessation of violence in ethnic minority areas;
(3) socio-economic reform; and
(4) humanitarian access.
Over the past few weeks, the first point – political reconciliation – has moved to the absolute forefront. The EU, however, is not calling for a regime change. The member states accept that the transition will have to be gradual with some form of power-sharing and a continued role for the military in
government. They are looking for signs that the government is willing to allow genuine popular participation in governance, and that it understands and is willing to take steps to alleviate the serious
socio-economic situation through a process of social and economic reform, including improvements
in the general human rights situation which greatly constrains many people’s ability to secure their
livelihoods.
o While there may be more important things for the Myanmar government than ensuring better relations with the EU and its member states, there are good reasons not to reject European concerns out
of hand. First of all, this is not simply a matter of international “interference.” It would be a grave
mistake by the Myanmar government to dismiss the recent protests simply as the work of “internal
and external destructionist”. There is a real groundswell in the general population, rooted in the deteriorating socio-economic situation and the exclusion of the general population from government decisions which directly affect their lives. Reopening of the road map, thus, is not simply an international or European demand, but will be necessary to build domestic support and ensure that it succeeds. If the government could work with the opposition, and if people were to see a real improvement in their daily lives, then the large majority would probably back the process. This would be the
most effective defence against anyone who might try to sabotage it. Secondly, Europe is important to
Myanmar. Europe holds the “swing vote” in the international community. The EU is also, on its own,
by far the largest donor of development cooperation in the world. And although it has significantly
stepped up its aid to Myanmar, its present aid is still insignificant compared to what it might be prepared to give in the future.
o The EU position on Myanmar is strong, but it does not put up ultimatums. Many of the issues that
European governments are raising are ones about which the military should not feel threatened. The
international community has much to offer Myanmar, and this is a time to seek renewed dialogue,
however difficult it may be on all sides.
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Myanmar Perspectives
The official Myanmar government line was summed up by the Minister of Information in meetings prior
to the main workshop, who argued that:
o The recent protests were organised by anti-government groups, supported by Western governments
and media, to create instability and sabotage the road map. The majority of the monks and lay people
rejected the protests, and are cooperating with the government. The government acted with utmost
restraint, but had to take action to prevent a repeat of the anarchy of 1988.
o The government will not deviate from its road map. The constitutional deliberations will not be reopened. However, political parties which the government terms as legitimate can register to participate in the elections.
o The NLD boycotted the constitutional process; they called for sanctions. So how can we cooperate
with them? If they give up their policies and show cooperation, then we are ready to cooperate with
them and the relations will become better. On the other hand, if they continue like this, no development can be achieved. These are the terms under which they can compete in the future political
arena. If there are further disturbances, it will only mean that the Road Map to Democracy will be
further delayed.
o We are cooperating fully with the UN.
MISIS delegates provided further details and interpretation of the government’s transition plan:
o The constitution will be drafted by a committee of constitutional experts. They can modify the language, but only as long as the basic and the detailed principles agreed upon in the National Convention are not changed. (This committee of 52 members has now been appointed.)
o After the constitution is drafted, the government will promulgate a new law for the formation of political parties. The 1988 law was not good; it was full of loopholes. It did not require parties to reveal
sources of campaign finance, for example.
o The government does have a time frame for the next steps, but it cannot disclose it. If it does, antigovernment groups will disrupt it and then accuse the government of not keeping its promises. The
recent protests have delayed the process.
o The constitutional principles do not hinder democratic politics. Since the military will only control
25 per cent of the seats in parliament, it cannot elect the president without support from civilian parties, nor force through its preferred legislation. Even the president does not hold veto power over
legislation.
o In any case, the new constitution is not the end game, just the beginning of a process. Initially, the
military will have 25 per cent of the seats, but this may be reduced over time as confidence in the political parties improves. Military appointees are likely to behave more and more like politicians.
They will become more independent and may no longer vote as a block. It is up to the political parties to encourage this process.
MISIS delegates also sought to elucidate the thinking of the military leadership, urging the international
community to be sensitive to this and to cooperate with the Myanmar government in bringing about
gradual change:
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o There is, several argued, a genuine fear within the leadership of the intentions of the West, rooted in
our country’s troubled past. Our colonial experience was very bitter. We continued to face foreign interference in our insurgencies. Even today, Aung San Suu Kyi has close connections to Britain and
the West, which has instituted sanctions in her name. We have a reason for mistrust.
o The basic constitutional principles are based on objective lessons of history. In the 1950s, democracy
developed into a de facto one-party state. It did not work well. We do not want a big party like the
NLD to dominate politics. Also, the ethnic make-up of our country is very complex. Neither a majority, nor a proportional voting system would serve our needs. We need a strong central government,
which can guarantee stability in outlying areas. The Myanmar military (Military) needs to have a
leading role, to serve as a stabiliser.
o You should look at the institutionalisation of the military’s role in politics as a positive step. In the
past, whenever there was a crisis in the country, the Military leaders had to stage a coup to save it.
Coups are not good for the image of the Military, and not good for democracy either. It is better if
the military can exert influence through legal means.
o Given the complexity of Myanmar politics and the immense work that has been done to reach consensus on the constitutional principles, it is not feasible to reopen that process. If it is reopened, everything will have to be renegotiated and military rule will continue for many years. Those who opted
out can join the political process at future stages. They can express their wishes through the referendum or in the next elections.
o The government is trying to cooperate, but Western countries have never supported our process.
They have never relaxed their position of sanctions. Our leaders might think, whatever we do there
will be no recognition from the outside world. If the West insists on redrawing the road map, there
will be no common ground. If there is too much pressure, our leaders may withdraw into isolation
again. We fear that; we do not want to go back to isolation.
o The West should not only demand human rights and democracy but should also think about how to
help the people of Myanmar. We are a least developed country. Many people live in poor conditions.
We could start cooperating on non-political issues, like health and education. That will be beneficial
for all sides.
Other Issues Explored
In addition to the immediate political situation and issues related to the transition process, which dominated the FES-MISIS workshop, the European participants were briefed by government representatives
on various issues related to human rights and international cooperation, and were able to explore perceived problems on both sides. These included anti-drugs efforts, money laundering, human rights trafficking, forced labour, child soldiers, health programmes, and humanitarian access.
Conclusion and Recommendations
As it turned out, most of the concerns concerning the holding of the workshop proved unwarranted.
While the initial concern of the European participants that the confrontational atmosphere of the political
situation could hamper the discussions during the workshop was not justified, there were, unfortunately,
attempts on the part of the Myanmar government to instrumentalise the visit of the European track two
delegation trough its media coverage. The delegation voiced its explicit disagreement with that procedure to the Myanmar government authorities concerned and regrets the wrong signal that the state media
coverage might have sent to the Myanmar people, particularly those affected by the crackdown.
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The discussions with mid-level government officials and academics during the FES-MISIS workshop
itself were fruitful and provided a good example of the opportunities and benefits of dialogue with
Myanmar within the track two framework even in a crisis situation. Indeed, the urgency of the political
situation seemed to help focus and sharpen the discussions. Perhaps because of the sense of crisis, the
level of frankness was even greater than before. Clearly, major divergences of view remain. Many
Myanmar participants felt Europe lacks understanding of their country’s complex politics and history,
that it only focuses on the negative and fails to appreciate the progress that is being made. Still, there
was a surprising and growing willingness to discuss problems and seek solutions and the workshop took
place in a frank and productive atmosphere. While it is difficult to trace any direct impact on the wider
political situation, both sides learned much about the perspectives of the other. FES was thus confirmed
in its long-standing view that dialogue is vital, and that track two provides an important complement to
official contacts.
The crisis situation in Myanmar still implies both opportunities and threats. Due to the indicators of
change in the country, there are individuals and groups within the country including in the army trying to
ensure their position even in a post-authoritarian Myanmar. This opens up opportunities of broadening
the democracy process by opening up the dialogue with the NLD and ASSK, and with the Ethnic Nationalities including non-ceasefire groups.
This does not mean that there are signals of disunity in the administration or in the army. The government is not about to collapse in disagreement. Neither does it mean that the situation would be open for
direct foreign facilitation of conflict resolution between the government and the opposition. Yet, the influence of the more progressive forces inside the Myanmar government could become more visible, and
progressive tendencies could be supported from outside.
Europe should intensify its communication and try to seek ways and means for communication even
with the highest levels of government. In addition to intensification of diplomatic communication,
Europe should activate and encourage coordinated second track efforts to facilitate communication at
this time of threats and opportunities.
Europe should also be prepared to utilize its rewarding and punitive instruments in a rapid and flexible
manner, in order to be able to quickly react and participate in support of democratisation and conflict
resolution. Flexibility is also needed in order to avoid, on the one hand, punishing progress, or, on the
other hand, discrediting progressive forces by supporting them in a subversive or intrusive manner. At
the moment Europe needs sharper instruments than before. Therefore, it needs to develop more sophisticated tools to support positive development and to condemn deviations from the democratic path.
Thus, the EU should make contingency plans for prompt implementation of some of the sanction measures if the situation changes to the worse. On the other hand, in order to support the process of democracy, the EU should be prepared to reward steps towards democracy rather than waiting for perfect democracy before lifting all the sanctions at once.
Finally, the humanitarian progress needs to be kept separate from the political process and humanitarian
aid should not be used as a political bargaining leverage: the Burmese people need help for health, education and eradication of poverty, regardless of how their government is oriented to democracy and human rights. The current crisis situation is also a reflection of the dire humanitarian conditions. Europe
should react to this and intensify its effort for humanitarian relief.
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List of Participants of the Delegation from European Participants
3rd FES-MISIS Workshop & Field Trip
Challenges and Perspectives for the Future of
ASEAN - EU Relations
Naypyidaw, 29 September – 6 October, 2007
1. Dr. P. Christian HAUSWEDELL, Former Director Asia & Pacific (2002-2006), German Foreign
Ministry, Germany
2. Prof. Robert H. TAYLOR, Prof. of Political Science, Expert on Europe-Myanmar Relations, Research Fellow at the Institute of South East Asian Studies, Singapore, Great Britain
3. Dr. Timo KIVIMÄKI, Expert in European Interest in Asian Security Policies, Senior Researcher,
Nordic Institute of Asian Studies, Copenhagen, Finland
4. Dr. Morten B. PEDERSON, Expert on Europe-Myanmar Relations, Research Fellow, Peace and
Governance, United Nations University, Tokyo, Denmark
5. Carmen Sofia Rodrigues Silva FONSECA, Political Scientist, Portuguese Institute of International
Relations, Portugal
6. Jasmin LORCH, Political Scientist and Expert on South East Asia, PhD candidate, University of
Freiburg, Germany
7. Sylwia GIL, Specialist on South East Asia and Theravada Buddhism, Guest Lecturer at College of
Economy and International Finance in Warsaw, Poland
8. Sami Harald LAHDENSUO, Advisor to President Ahtisaari in his role as Chairman of ASEM Education Hub Network, Finland
9. Dr. Paul PASCH, Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung, Representative to Malaysia and Myanmar, Germany
10. Marina KRAMER, Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung, Junior Expert, Croatia
Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung, C/o Asia-Pacific Institute for Broadcasting Development, P.O.Box 1137, 59700 Kuala Lumpur,
Malaysia, Phone: +60-3-22822489, Fax: +60-3-22822757, www.fes.de