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3rd FES-MISIS Workshop & Field Trip Challenges and Perspectives for the Future of ASEAN - EU Relations Naypyidaw, 29 September – 6 October, 2007 Report by the FES Delegation The Joint workshop held by the Friedrich Ebert-Stiftung (FES) and the Myanmar Institute of Strategic and International Studies (MISIS) in Naypyidaw from 4-5 October 2007 was the third in a series of track two dialogues, initiated in September 20061. The FES delegation included ten independent scholars from seven European countries, while the MISIS delegation was made up of a mix of mid-level government officials and academics. In addition to the main workshop, the European participants held a day of meetings with high-level officials from government ministries, including Information, Foreign Affairs, Home Affairs, Labour, Health, and the Adjutant General’s Office. They also spent two days in northern Shan state, with field visits to Shan Special Regions 1 and 5 (ceasefire areas), as well as the border town of Muse. This report focuses primarily on the workshop discussions in Naypyidaw, which were conducted under Chatham House Rules. Rationale for the FES-MISIS Workshops Since Myanmar became a member of ASEAN in 1997, EU-ASEAN relations have been hampered by European concerns over democracy and human rights situation in Myanmar, at significant costs to all sides. At the same time, dialogue between European countries and Myanmar has been very limited, subject to a number of formal constraints, as well as general adversity, alienation, and distrust. The intention of FES in initiating the dialogue with MISIS has been to seek to break through this impasse, increase mutual understanding, and explore possible areas of common ground. Aside from providing an alternative or complement to government-to-government contacts, track two meetings have several advantages. Given their status as private citizens, participants can interact unconstrained by national interests and the need to communicate official positions. This can make it easier to build confidence and achieve a level of frankness in the discussion. It leaves the participants freer to explore the substance of sensitive issues and contemplate actions that may be “ahead of the curve”. Ultimately, civil society actors can help clarify government positions, shed light on existing problems, and identify possible solutions. They may also provide a stepping stone to official dialogue. 1 The 3rd FES-MISIS workshop was planed according to the recommendations of the 2nd workshop in a track 1.5 format. However, due to the risk that the presence of European officials could be instrumentalised for political purposes as a signal of normality in EU-Burma/Myanmar relations at a time of severe crisis, the plan was postponed. 2 rd Given the timing of the 3 workshop, which took place after a violent government crackdown against peaceful protesters in Yangon and other towns, much thought was given beforehand to the possible costs and benefits of going ahead with the workshop as planned. There was concern on part of the European participants that the purpose of the proceedings could be misunderstood or politically instrumentalised by the Myanmar government, and that the confrontational atmosphere would hamper the discussions. It was decided, however, that if there was ever a time to put to use the confidence built during previous workshops, this was it. The delegates felt that they would be in a unique position to help clarify and elucidate European perceptions and responses to the evolving situation, and that recommendations to the Myanmar government coming from independent scholars and communicated through MISIS might receive a “fairer” hearing than official diplomatic demarches and media statements. It is understood that similar concerns existed, and similar conclusions were reached, on the Myanmar side, thus underscoring the comparative advantage of track two discussions, perhaps particularly in a crisis situation. European Perspectives The European participants took the opportunity in every meeting to express their deep dismay and abhorrence of the use of violence against monks and peaceful protesters. It was emphasised that it had been a difficult decision to go ahead with the workshop under these circumstances, but that it was hoped that the two sides by speaking frankly and honestly would be able to begin to explore ways to defuse the situation and contribute to reconciliation both within Myanmar and between Europe and Myanmar. As a matter of priority, the FES delegation sought to present and explain as objectively as possible the official European view of the ongoing events and the likely implications for EU-Myanmar relations depending on future developments. It was stressed that: o The government crackdown has caused anger and revulsion across Europe, which saw the protests as a genuine outpouring of legitimate popular grievances. This has created an unprecedented momentum towards stronger sanctions, so far aimed mainly at senior military leaders and the logging and mining sectors, but with the potential for further action, if Myanmar government repression continues. o The feeling in Europe now is that the road map cannot simply proceed according to the original plan. There is an insistence that in order to establish the legitimacy of the constitution and accommodate popular concerns, the political process will have to be opened up again and compromises must be found that can build broader political and popular support for the future steps. o While more sanctions are in the pipeline, European governments have rejected sweeping economic sanctions that could cause further unemployment in Myanmar. Rather, the main thrust of EU policy is support for the efforts of the UN Secretary-General and his Special Envoy, Ibrahim Gambari, to find a way through the current crisis, which satisfies the vital and legitimate interests of all sides. o The 27 European member states are united behind this position in a way not seen before, and continued high level of attention and further punitive steps are to be expected if no political progress is seen. Conversely, the EU stands ready to support any genuine political progress, including the rolling back of existing sanctions. It also remains absolutely committed to continuing its humanitarian programmes. In further presentations, European participants sought to “interpret” the evolving European position and estimate what would be required to restore confidence and cooperation between Europe and Myanmar. While all delegates of course did not agree on every issue, it was stressed for example that: 3 o While there is in European governments and societies at large a strong commitment to the basic values of democracy, human rights, and human security, the EU generally does not seek to impose particular institutions. There is a genuine understanding in Europe, which itself is made up of a highly diverse group of countries and cultures, that each country is unique, and that political and socio-economic institutions and policies must be appropriate for that country. o The EU exercises its power mainly through “soft power”. European governments, generally speaking, believe in dialogue and cooperation; they prefer to work through multilateral forums such as the UN; and there is a general acknowledgement that political and economic development goes together, as well as a strong commitment to humanitarian values. This is reflected also in a pronounced reluctance to use economic sanctions to reach political goals, particularly unilateral ones. o In assessing its relations with Myanmar over the coming months and years, the EU and its member states will be looking for progress in four areas: (1) Political reconciliation; (2) nationwide ceasefire and cessation of violence in ethnic minority areas; (3) socio-economic reform; and (4) humanitarian access. Over the past few weeks, the first point – political reconciliation – has moved to the absolute forefront. The EU, however, is not calling for a regime change. The member states accept that the transition will have to be gradual with some form of power-sharing and a continued role for the military in government. They are looking for signs that the government is willing to allow genuine popular participation in governance, and that it understands and is willing to take steps to alleviate the serious socio-economic situation through a process of social and economic reform, including improvements in the general human rights situation which greatly constrains many people’s ability to secure their livelihoods. o While there may be more important things for the Myanmar government than ensuring better relations with the EU and its member states, there are good reasons not to reject European concerns out of hand. First of all, this is not simply a matter of international “interference.” It would be a grave mistake by the Myanmar government to dismiss the recent protests simply as the work of “internal and external destructionist”. There is a real groundswell in the general population, rooted in the deteriorating socio-economic situation and the exclusion of the general population from government decisions which directly affect their lives. Reopening of the road map, thus, is not simply an international or European demand, but will be necessary to build domestic support and ensure that it succeeds. If the government could work with the opposition, and if people were to see a real improvement in their daily lives, then the large majority would probably back the process. This would be the most effective defence against anyone who might try to sabotage it. Secondly, Europe is important to Myanmar. Europe holds the “swing vote” in the international community. The EU is also, on its own, by far the largest donor of development cooperation in the world. And although it has significantly stepped up its aid to Myanmar, its present aid is still insignificant compared to what it might be prepared to give in the future. o The EU position on Myanmar is strong, but it does not put up ultimatums. Many of the issues that European governments are raising are ones about which the military should not feel threatened. The international community has much to offer Myanmar, and this is a time to seek renewed dialogue, however difficult it may be on all sides. 4 Myanmar Perspectives The official Myanmar government line was summed up by the Minister of Information in meetings prior to the main workshop, who argued that: o The recent protests were organised by anti-government groups, supported by Western governments and media, to create instability and sabotage the road map. The majority of the monks and lay people rejected the protests, and are cooperating with the government. The government acted with utmost restraint, but had to take action to prevent a repeat of the anarchy of 1988. o The government will not deviate from its road map. The constitutional deliberations will not be reopened. However, political parties which the government terms as legitimate can register to participate in the elections. o The NLD boycotted the constitutional process; they called for sanctions. So how can we cooperate with them? If they give up their policies and show cooperation, then we are ready to cooperate with them and the relations will become better. On the other hand, if they continue like this, no development can be achieved. These are the terms under which they can compete in the future political arena. If there are further disturbances, it will only mean that the Road Map to Democracy will be further delayed. o We are cooperating fully with the UN. MISIS delegates provided further details and interpretation of the government’s transition plan: o The constitution will be drafted by a committee of constitutional experts. They can modify the language, but only as long as the basic and the detailed principles agreed upon in the National Convention are not changed. (This committee of 52 members has now been appointed.) o After the constitution is drafted, the government will promulgate a new law for the formation of political parties. The 1988 law was not good; it was full of loopholes. It did not require parties to reveal sources of campaign finance, for example. o The government does have a time frame for the next steps, but it cannot disclose it. If it does, antigovernment groups will disrupt it and then accuse the government of not keeping its promises. The recent protests have delayed the process. o The constitutional principles do not hinder democratic politics. Since the military will only control 25 per cent of the seats in parliament, it cannot elect the president without support from civilian parties, nor force through its preferred legislation. Even the president does not hold veto power over legislation. o In any case, the new constitution is not the end game, just the beginning of a process. Initially, the military will have 25 per cent of the seats, but this may be reduced over time as confidence in the political parties improves. Military appointees are likely to behave more and more like politicians. They will become more independent and may no longer vote as a block. It is up to the political parties to encourage this process. MISIS delegates also sought to elucidate the thinking of the military leadership, urging the international community to be sensitive to this and to cooperate with the Myanmar government in bringing about gradual change: 5 o There is, several argued, a genuine fear within the leadership of the intentions of the West, rooted in our country’s troubled past. Our colonial experience was very bitter. We continued to face foreign interference in our insurgencies. Even today, Aung San Suu Kyi has close connections to Britain and the West, which has instituted sanctions in her name. We have a reason for mistrust. o The basic constitutional principles are based on objective lessons of history. In the 1950s, democracy developed into a de facto one-party state. It did not work well. We do not want a big party like the NLD to dominate politics. Also, the ethnic make-up of our country is very complex. Neither a majority, nor a proportional voting system would serve our needs. We need a strong central government, which can guarantee stability in outlying areas. The Myanmar military (Military) needs to have a leading role, to serve as a stabiliser. o You should look at the institutionalisation of the military’s role in politics as a positive step. In the past, whenever there was a crisis in the country, the Military leaders had to stage a coup to save it. Coups are not good for the image of the Military, and not good for democracy either. It is better if the military can exert influence through legal means. o Given the complexity of Myanmar politics and the immense work that has been done to reach consensus on the constitutional principles, it is not feasible to reopen that process. If it is reopened, everything will have to be renegotiated and military rule will continue for many years. Those who opted out can join the political process at future stages. They can express their wishes through the referendum or in the next elections. o The government is trying to cooperate, but Western countries have never supported our process. They have never relaxed their position of sanctions. Our leaders might think, whatever we do there will be no recognition from the outside world. If the West insists on redrawing the road map, there will be no common ground. If there is too much pressure, our leaders may withdraw into isolation again. We fear that; we do not want to go back to isolation. o The West should not only demand human rights and democracy but should also think about how to help the people of Myanmar. We are a least developed country. Many people live in poor conditions. We could start cooperating on non-political issues, like health and education. That will be beneficial for all sides. Other Issues Explored In addition to the immediate political situation and issues related to the transition process, which dominated the FES-MISIS workshop, the European participants were briefed by government representatives on various issues related to human rights and international cooperation, and were able to explore perceived problems on both sides. These included anti-drugs efforts, money laundering, human rights trafficking, forced labour, child soldiers, health programmes, and humanitarian access. Conclusion and Recommendations As it turned out, most of the concerns concerning the holding of the workshop proved unwarranted. While the initial concern of the European participants that the confrontational atmosphere of the political situation could hamper the discussions during the workshop was not justified, there were, unfortunately, attempts on the part of the Myanmar government to instrumentalise the visit of the European track two delegation trough its media coverage. The delegation voiced its explicit disagreement with that procedure to the Myanmar government authorities concerned and regrets the wrong signal that the state media coverage might have sent to the Myanmar people, particularly those affected by the crackdown. 6 The discussions with mid-level government officials and academics during the FES-MISIS workshop itself were fruitful and provided a good example of the opportunities and benefits of dialogue with Myanmar within the track two framework even in a crisis situation. Indeed, the urgency of the political situation seemed to help focus and sharpen the discussions. Perhaps because of the sense of crisis, the level of frankness was even greater than before. Clearly, major divergences of view remain. Many Myanmar participants felt Europe lacks understanding of their country’s complex politics and history, that it only focuses on the negative and fails to appreciate the progress that is being made. Still, there was a surprising and growing willingness to discuss problems and seek solutions and the workshop took place in a frank and productive atmosphere. While it is difficult to trace any direct impact on the wider political situation, both sides learned much about the perspectives of the other. FES was thus confirmed in its long-standing view that dialogue is vital, and that track two provides an important complement to official contacts. The crisis situation in Myanmar still implies both opportunities and threats. Due to the indicators of change in the country, there are individuals and groups within the country including in the army trying to ensure their position even in a post-authoritarian Myanmar. This opens up opportunities of broadening the democracy process by opening up the dialogue with the NLD and ASSK, and with the Ethnic Nationalities including non-ceasefire groups. This does not mean that there are signals of disunity in the administration or in the army. The government is not about to collapse in disagreement. Neither does it mean that the situation would be open for direct foreign facilitation of conflict resolution between the government and the opposition. Yet, the influence of the more progressive forces inside the Myanmar government could become more visible, and progressive tendencies could be supported from outside. Europe should intensify its communication and try to seek ways and means for communication even with the highest levels of government. In addition to intensification of diplomatic communication, Europe should activate and encourage coordinated second track efforts to facilitate communication at this time of threats and opportunities. Europe should also be prepared to utilize its rewarding and punitive instruments in a rapid and flexible manner, in order to be able to quickly react and participate in support of democratisation and conflict resolution. Flexibility is also needed in order to avoid, on the one hand, punishing progress, or, on the other hand, discrediting progressive forces by supporting them in a subversive or intrusive manner. At the moment Europe needs sharper instruments than before. Therefore, it needs to develop more sophisticated tools to support positive development and to condemn deviations from the democratic path. Thus, the EU should make contingency plans for prompt implementation of some of the sanction measures if the situation changes to the worse. On the other hand, in order to support the process of democracy, the EU should be prepared to reward steps towards democracy rather than waiting for perfect democracy before lifting all the sanctions at once. Finally, the humanitarian progress needs to be kept separate from the political process and humanitarian aid should not be used as a political bargaining leverage: the Burmese people need help for health, education and eradication of poverty, regardless of how their government is oriented to democracy and human rights. The current crisis situation is also a reflection of the dire humanitarian conditions. Europe should react to this and intensify its effort for humanitarian relief. 7 List of Participants of the Delegation from European Participants 3rd FES-MISIS Workshop & Field Trip Challenges and Perspectives for the Future of ASEAN - EU Relations Naypyidaw, 29 September – 6 October, 2007 1. Dr. P. Christian HAUSWEDELL, Former Director Asia & Pacific (2002-2006), German Foreign Ministry, Germany 2. Prof. Robert H. TAYLOR, Prof. of Political Science, Expert on Europe-Myanmar Relations, Research Fellow at the Institute of South East Asian Studies, Singapore, Great Britain 3. Dr. Timo KIVIMÄKI, Expert in European Interest in Asian Security Policies, Senior Researcher, Nordic Institute of Asian Studies, Copenhagen, Finland 4. Dr. Morten B. PEDERSON, Expert on Europe-Myanmar Relations, Research Fellow, Peace and Governance, United Nations University, Tokyo, Denmark 5. Carmen Sofia Rodrigues Silva FONSECA, Political Scientist, Portuguese Institute of International Relations, Portugal 6. Jasmin LORCH, Political Scientist and Expert on South East Asia, PhD candidate, University of Freiburg, Germany 7. Sylwia GIL, Specialist on South East Asia and Theravada Buddhism, Guest Lecturer at College of Economy and International Finance in Warsaw, Poland 8. Sami Harald LAHDENSUO, Advisor to President Ahtisaari in his role as Chairman of ASEM Education Hub Network, Finland 9. Dr. Paul PASCH, Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung, Representative to Malaysia and Myanmar, Germany 10. Marina KRAMER, Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung, Junior Expert, Croatia Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung, C/o Asia-Pacific Institute for Broadcasting Development, P.O.Box 1137, 59700 Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia, Phone: +60-3-22822489, Fax: +60-3-22822757, www.fes.de