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Colombia
2017 Country Review
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Table of Contents
Chapter 1
1
Country Overview
1
Country Overview
2
Key Data
3
Colombia
4
Middle East
5
Chapter 2
7
Political Overview
7
History
8
Political Conditions
48
Political Risk Index
99
Political Stability
113
Freedom Rankings
128
Human Rights
140
Government Functions
143
Government Structure
145
Principal Government Officials
150
Leader Biography
151
Leader Biography
151
Foreign Relations
158
National Security
169
Defense Forces
173
Chapter 3
175
Economic Overview
175
Economic Overview
176
Real GDP and GDP Per Capita
179
Nominal GDP and Components
183
Government Spending and Taxation
185
Money, Prices and Interest Rates
188
Trade and the Exchange Rate
190
The Balance of Payments
191
Real GDP and GDP Per Capita
193
Nominal GDP and Components
196
Government Spending and Taxation
198
Money, Prices and Interest Rates
201
Trade and the Exchange Rate
203
The Balance of Payments
204
Real GDP and GDP Per Capita
206
Nominal GDP and Components
209
Government Spending and Taxation
211
Money, Prices and Interest Rates
214
Trade and the Exchange Rate
216
The Balance of Payments
217
Real GDP and GDP Per Capita
219
Nominal GDP and Components
222
Government Spending and Taxation
224
Money, Prices and Interest Rates
227
Trade and the Exchange Rate
229
The Balance of Payments
230
Economic Performance Index
232
Chapter 4
244
Investment Overview
244
Foreign Investment Climate
245
Foreign Investment Index
250
Corruption Perceptions Index
263
Competitiveness Ranking
274
Taxation
283
Stock Market
284
Partner Links
285
Chapter 5
286
Social Overview
286
People
287
Human Development Index
292
Life Satisfaction Index
296
Happy Planet Index
307
Status of Women
316
Global Gender Gap Index
320
Culture and Arts
329
Etiquette
329
Travel Information
338
Diseases/Health Data
349
Chapter 6
355
Environmental Overview
355
Environmental Issues
356
Environmental Policy
358
Greenhouse Gas Ranking
359
Global Environmental Snapshot
370
Global Environmental Concepts
382
International Environmental Agreements and Associations
396
Appendices
Bibliography
420
421
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Chapter 1
Country Overview
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Country Overview
COLOMBIA
The Spaniards arrived in the area in the early 16th century. In 1717 the Spanish crown established
the Viceroyalty of New Granada, made up of the present-day states of Venezuela, Colombia,
Panama and Ecuador. Following independence in 1813, the Republic of Greater Colombia was
formed in 1819 and included all the former members of the Spanish Viceroyalty. By 1830 Ecuador
and Venezuela had seceded from the republic, followed by Panama in 1903. Despite Colombia's
commitment to democratic institutions, periods of widespread and violent conflict have been
common in the nation's history.
A four-decade long conflict between government forces and anti-government insurgent groups,
principally the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC) heavily funded by the drug trade,
escalated during the 1990s. The insurgents lack the military or popular support necessary to
overthrow the government and violence has decreased since about 2002. But insurgents continued
attacks against civilians and large areas of the countryside are under guerrilla influence or are
contested by security forces. Note that as of 2015, a peace process is on the agenda and
undergoing negotiations between the Colombian government and FARC.
With a population of more than 45 million, Colombia is one of the largest countries in South
America, and is endowed with significant natural resources. It has substantial oil reserves and is a
major producer of gold, silver, emeralds, platinum and coal. But decades-long violent conflict has
had an adverse impact on the economy. Despite strong growth in recent years, about half of the
population still lives below the poverty line.
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Key Data
Key Data
Region:
South America
Population:
47698524
Climate:
Tropical along coast and eastern plains; cooler in highlands.
Languages:
Spanish
Currency:
1 Colombian peso (Col$) = 100 centavos
Holiday:
Independence Day is 20 July (1810), Boyaca Day is 7 August (1819)
Area Total:
1138910
Area Land:
1038700
Coast Line:
3208
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Colombia
Country Map
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Middle East
Regional Map
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Chapter 2
Political Overview
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History
EDITOR'S NOTE
The history of Colombia is divided into two sections. First, "Colombia's History in Brief" is
provided to give the reader a concise and comprehensive understanding of the country's main
historic events and influences. Second, "Colombia's History in Detail" is provided to offer the
reader a more detailed and complex examination of the country's historical legacy.
1. COLOMBIA'S HISTORY IN BRIEF
The first inhabitants of the area that is now Colombia arrived from Mesoamerica around 1200
before the common era, or B.C.E. Centuries later, other indigenous groups arrived from
Mesoamerica, southeastern South America and the Caribbean Islands.
When the Spaniards arrived in the early 16th century, the region was dominated by a group called
the Chibchas, which was divided into two major confederations, the Muisca of the Bogotá region,
and the Tairona of the northern Sierra Nevada de Santa Maria region. The social organization of
the Muisca and the Tairona was centered around the cultivation of corn and potatoes and a
matrilineal hereditary tradition, but primitive hunting and nomadic farming were the livelihood of
many of the region's peoples.
Alonso de Ojeda and Rodrigo de Bastidas were the first Spaniards to explore the northern coast of
the Colombian region in 1499 and 1500, respectively. In 1525, Ba stidas established the first
permanent settlement at Santa Maria, and in 1533, explorer Pedro de Heredia established the
coastal settlement of Cartagena, which became a major port for intercontinental travel. Explorer
Jiménez de Quesada founded the city of Santa Fe de Bogotá while searching the interior for a path
to Peru. The entire area was established as a colony of the Spanish Empire in 1549 with Santa Fe
de Bogotá as its capital.
The colonial economy was based on a system in which the colony was the provider to Spain of
primary materials and the consumer of manufactured goods sent from Spain. In the 1500s, the
basis of the export economy was metals and jewels mining. As precious metals became scarce in
the 1600s, agriculture became more lucrative for the colony, so that by the 1700s, sugar and
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tobacco were the main export commodities.
Social hierarchy in the colony was rigid, with the Spanish-born "penisulares" occu pying the highest
government positions, and the criollos (those of Spanish ancestry born in the colonies) holding the
second-tier positions in government and trade. The "mestizo" majority was limited to positions of
low prestige, and African slaves and "zambo" slaves (those of mixed African and Native American
descent) made up the underclass. The Roman Catholic Church brought Christianity to the
inhabitants of the colony and was responsible for the establishment of Western ideas and
institutions, especially schools and universities.
In 1717, the Spanish crown established the Viceroyalty of New Granada, made up of the presentday states of Venezuela, Colombia, Panama and Ecuador; in 1739 Bogotá was named its capital.
Along with Lima and Mexico City, Bogotá became one of the principal administrative centers of
the Spanish Empire in the New World. Spain began allowing trade between the colonies, in turn
gaining control over markets that had previously e xisted in contraband.
Criollo discontent with royal rule arose and grew throughout the 18th and early 19th centuries due
to heavy taxation by the crown, and ideas of the Enlightenment and the political changes due to the
Napoleonic invasion of Spain led to increasing desires for self-rule.
On July 20, 1810, the citizens of Bogotá created the first representative council made up of only
criollos. Shortly thereafter, other smaller criollo-run councils emerged. The new leaders reduced
economic restrictions on the colony and promoted power sharing among the criollos and the
peninsulares. Soon, individual provinces began declaring independence from Spain.
Total independence was proclaimed in 1813, and as the Spanish army moved to re-conquer the
territory lost, Simón Bolivar emerged as a leader in the War for Independence. In 1819, the
Spanish army was ultimately defeated, and the Republic of Greater Colombia was formed. The
Republic was made up of all of the territory of the former viceroyalty with Simón Bolivar and
Francisco de Paula Santander elected its first president and vice president.
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2. HISTORY OF COLOMBIA IN DETAIL
THE SPANISH CONQUEST
The Pre-Columbian Era
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Long before the arrival of the first Spanish explorers, Indian groups had settled in the area of
present-day Colombia. The Mesoamericans (Indians originally inhabiting Central America), who
arrived in approximately 1200 before the common era (B.C.E.), introduced the cultivation of corn.
They were followed by a second wave of Mesoamericans in 500 B.C.E.
Artifacts from a number of distinct cultures, such as those in the areas around San Agustín (in
present-day Huila Department), Tierra Dentro (Cauca Department), and Tumaco (Nariño
Department), are believed to date from this period. Between 400 and 300 B.C.E., the Chibchas
traveled from Nicaragua and Honduras and reached Colombia, shortly before the Arawaks arrived
from other parts of South America, such as Brazil, Uruguay, and Paraguay. Near the end of the
first millennium in the common era (C.E.), the Caribs migrated from the Caribbean islands. These
warlike newcomers supplanted the Chibchas in the lowlands and forced them to move to higher
elevations.
By the 1500s, the most advanced of the indigenous peoples were the Chibchas, who were divided
into two principal tribes: the Muisca, located in the plateaus of Cundinamarca and Boyacá, and the
Tairona, who settled along the northern spur of the Sierra Nevada de Santa Marta (in present-day
La Guajira Department). The Muisca were the more prominent of the two groups and based their
economy on agriculture, especially the cultivation of corn and potatoes. The Muisca centered their
social organization on the cacicazgo, a hereditary form of leadership following matrilineal
succession. Two large Muisca confederations existed at the time of the Spanish conquest:
Bacatá/Bogotá and Hunsa/Tunja. A chieftain known as a zipa headed Bacatá/Bogotá, whereas a
zaque governed Hunsa/Tunja.
The Tairona formed two groups, one in the Caribbean lowlands and the other in the Andean
highlands. The lowlands Tairona fished and produced salt, which they traded for cotton cloth and
blankets with their counterparts in the highlands. The Tairona of both groups lived in numerous,
well-organized towns connected by stone roads.
Exploration and Conquest
The group of Spaniards that first came to the New World consisted of conquistadors,
administrators, and Roman Catholic clergy. The adventurous conquistadors were risk-taking
entrepreneurs, financing their own expeditions in the expectation of being able to get rich quick.
The administrators were appointed by and represented the crown in the colonies and sought to
maintain the New World colonies as a source of wealth and prestige for the Spanish Empire. The
clergy sought to save the souls of the native Indians, and in the process they acquired land and
wealth for the church. The conquistadors, who felt they owed nothing to the crown, often came
into conflict with the latter's attempts to centralize and strengthen its authority over the colonies.
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In what became present-day Colombia, the conquistadors explored and began to settle the coastal
areas. The first explorers to round the coast of the Guajira Peninsula and enter Colombian territory
were Alonso de Ojeda in 1499 and Rodrigo de Bastidas in 1500. In 1510 Ojeda founded Santa
María la Antigua de Darién (present-day Acandí) on the western side of the Golfo de Urabá.
Bastidas established Santa Marta in 1525 (see fig. 1). In 1533 another explorer, Pedro de Heredia,
organized Cartagena after pacifying the Indians in the area. These coastal cities served as havens
from Indian attacks and as bases for exploratory expeditions into the interior. In addition,
Cartagena linked the colonies with the motherland and became a focal point of intercontinental
travel.
Gonzalo Jiménez de Quesada, Nikolaus Federmann, and Sebastián de Belalcázar figured
prominently in the exploration of the interior. In 1536 Jiménez de Quesada set out in search of a
path to Peru. During the course of his journey, he encountered the Muisca in the Sabana de
Bogotá and in 1538 founded the city of Santa Fe de Bogotá (present-day Bogotá)--the eventual
power center for the colony of New Granada. Federmann explored the eastern plains, crossed the
Cordillera Oriental, and arrived at Bogotá in 1539. Traveling northward from Peru, Belalcázar
established the cities of Popayán and Santiago de Cali (present-day Cali). Other members of his
group traveled northward and founded Cartago and Anserma. In 1539 Belalcázar arrived in
Bogotá, where the three conquistadors negotiated the division of the newly explored territory.
The expeditions that these men led provided the basis for the settlement of the highlands interior
that played a significant role in the future life of the colony. To an even greater extent than in Peru
and New Spain (present-day Mexico), many of the population centers established during the
conquest were located in remote intermontane valleys and plateaus. This contributed to New
Granada's becoming one of the most isolated of all the colonies of the Spanish Empire in the New
World.
COLONIAL SOCIETY, 1550-1810
Colonial society relied on "purity of blood" as a basis for stratification. The elites at the top of the
social pyramid were peninsulares, persons of Spanish descent born in Spain. Peninsulares held
political power and social prestige in the society. Below them were the criollos, those of Spanish
descent born in the colonies. This group had limited access to the higher circles of power and
status. For generations the criollos accepted a position of inferiority to the peninsulares, but in the
late eighteenth century their acquiescence was transformed into a resentment that ultimately led to
their fight for independence. Next in importance and the most numerous were the mestizos,
persons of mixed Spanish and Indian descent who were free but relegated to positions of low
prestige. Most Indians gradually became absorbed linguistically or lost their identity through
mixture with other peoples; by the late 1980s, Indians constituted only 1 percent of the Colombian
population. Black African slaves and zambos, persons of mixed African and Indian descent, were
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at the bottom of the social scale and were important only as a source of labor.
Colonial Administration
The administrative structure paralleled the social pyramid in that peninsulares appointed by the
crown generally controlled the higher jurisdictional levels, and criollos could compete only for the
lower posts. Two councils in Spain presided over the colonies. The House of Trade (Casa de
Contratación) controlled all overseas trade. The Supreme Council of the Indies (Consejo Supremo
de las Indias) centralized the administration of the colonies and had legislative, executive, and
judicial functions. As the king delegated increasingly more authority to this council, it effectively
became the ruler of the colonies.
The viceroyalty, headed by a viceroy, was the highest authority in the colonies. The next level of
jurisdiction was the audiencia, a regional court consisting of various judges and a president. The
Real Audiencia de Santa Fe, which presided over present-day Colombia, was instituted in 1550.
The audiencia had jurisdiction over the governorships, which in turn controlled the cities.
Governors, appointed by the crown, had administrative and judicial functions and, in areas
considered dangerous, military duties. Cities, the lowest jurisdictional level, were run by city
councils, or cabildos.
Cabildos initially were elected by popular vote, but later seats were sold by the crown, and
positions on the council thus lost their democratic character. Despite their low position on the
administrative pyramid, cabildos had the greatest impact on the day-to-day lives of citizens in the
local municipalities.
The cabildos became the first effective agency of civil government, regularizing the processes of
government and tempering the authority of the governor, even though their membership was
composed of his subordinates. They included a varying number of magistrates or aldermen,
depending on the size of the community, and two mayors. The mayors on the cabildo were elected
annually and initially acted as judges in courts of first instance with criminal and civil jurisdiction.
Appeals from their decisions could be taken to the local governor or to a person functioning as his
deputy and finally to the royal court of jurisdiction. During times of crisis, the town citizens of
importance might be invited to sit with the cabildo in what was called the open council. By
increasing criollo participation in government, the open council contributed to the movement
leading to the war for independence.
The royal courts in the colonies, unlike their counterparts in Spain, performed administrative and
political as well as judicial functions. The courts were empowered to limit the arbitrary use of
power by the viceroy or any subordinate official in the New World. Major courts existed in the
higher jurisdictions, such as the viceroyalty; subordinate courts existed at lesser administrative
levels. Under the Supreme Council of the Indies, the viceroys, as the direct representatives of the
sovereign, exercised royal authority in all civil and military affairs, in the secular aspects of church
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affairs, and in the supervision of the administration of justice. Subject to the overall supervision of
peninsular authorities, the executive officers also exercised a degree of legislative power.
Two additional governmental practices designed to oversee the colonial authorities were the
residencia (public judicial inquiry) and the visita (secret investigation). The residencia was
performed at the end of an official's term of office by a judge who went to the chief seat of the
jurisdiction of the official in question to hear anyone who wished to make charges or to offer
testimony concerning the official's performance in office. The visita could take place at any time
without warning during an official's tenure and was performed by an inspector who might, in the
performance of his task, sit with a court in public hearings.
The Colonial Economy
The Spanish system encompassing the audiencia was extractive and exploitative, relying heavily on
cheap native labor. Domestic industry was constrained during the colonial period because the
audiencia was bound to Spain as part of a mercantile system. Under this arrangement, the colony
functioned as the source of primary materials and the consumer of manufactured goods, a trade
pattern that tended to enrich the metropolitan power at the expense of the colony.
Because Spaniards came to the New World in search of quick riches in the form of precious metals
and jewels, mining for these items became the pillar of the economy for much of the colonial
period. Indeed, the extraction of precious metals--such as gold and copper--in the American
colonies formed the basis of the crown's economy.
Spain monopolized trade with the colonies. The crown limited authorization for intercontinental
trade to Veracruz (in present day Mexico), Nombre de Dios (in present-day Panama), and
Cartagena. Direct trade with other colonies was prohibited; as a result, items from one colony had
to be sent to Spain for reshipment to another colony. The crown also established the routes of
transport and the number of ships allowed to trade in the colonies. Merchants involved in
intercontinental trade had to be Spanish nationals. Finally, the crown circumscribed the type of
merchandise that could be traded. The colony could export to Spain only precious metals, gold in
particular, and some agricultural products. In return, Spain exported to the colonies most of the
agricultural and manufactured goods that the colonies needed for survival. Domestic products
supplemented these items only to a minor degree.
Agriculture, which was limited in the 1500s to providing subsistence for colonial settlements and
immediate consumption for workers in the mines, became a dynamic enterprise in the 1600s and
replaced mining as the core of the Colombian economy by the 1700s. By the end of the 1700s,
sugar and tobacco had become important export commodities. The growth in agriculture resulted in
part from the increasing exhaustion of mineral and metal resources in the seventeenth century,
which caused the crown to reorient its economic policy to stimulate the agricultural sector.
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As commercial agriculture became the foundation of the Colombian economy, two dominant forms
of agricultural landholdings emerged--the encomienda and the hacienda. These landholdings were
distinguishable by the manner in which the landholders obtained labor. The encomienda was a
grant of the right to receive the tribute of Indians within a certain boundary. In contrast, the
hacienda functioned through a contract arrangement involving the owner--the hacendado--and
Indian laborers. Under a typical arrangement, Indians tilled the land a specified number of days per
week or per year in exchange for small plots of land.
The encomendero, or recipient of the encomienda, extended privileges to de facto control of the
land designated in his grant. In effect, the encomendero was a deputy charged by the crown with
responsibility for the support of the Indians and their moral and religious welfare. Assuming that
the land and its inhabitants were entirely at its disposal, the monarchy envisioned the encomiendas
as a means of administering humane and constructive policies of the government of Spain and
protecting the welfare of the Indians. The encomenderos, however, sought to employ the Indians
for their own purposes and to maintain their land as hereditary property to be held in perpetuity.
Most encomenderos were private adventurers rather than agents of the empire. The remoteness of
the encomiendas from the center of government made it possible for the encomenderos to do as
they pleased.
Under the influence of church figures such as Bartolomé de las Casas, the crown promulgated the
New Laws in 1542 for the administration of the Spanish Empire in America. Designed to remove
the abuses connected with encomiendas and to improve the general treatment of Indians, the laws
called for strict enforcement of the existing regulations and freedom for the enslaved Indians, who
were placed in the category of free subjects of the crown. They further provided that encomiendas
would be forfeited if the Indians concerned were mistreated; that the tribute paid by Indians being
instructed in religion should be fixed and in no case required in the form of personal service; and
that public officials, congregations, hospitals, and monasteries could not hold encomiendas.
Additional provisions-- especially resented by the encomenderos--prohibited the employment of
Indians in the mines, prevented encomenderos from requiring Indians to carry heavy loads,
forbade the granting of any future encomiendas, ordered a reduction in size of existing
encomiendas, and terminated the rights of wives and children to inherit encomiendas.
Encomenderos opposed the royal government's attempts to enforce these regulations. A formula
was adopted according to which the laws would be "obeyed but not executed." The encomenderos
also had the opportunity to send representatives to Spain to seek modifications of the laws-modifications that the crown eventually granted. The tensions between the royal authority and the
colonists in the new empire were never entirely removed.
The institution of the hacienda with its associated mita (ancient tribute) system of labor began in
the late sixteenth century. After 1590 the crown started to grant titles of landownership to colonists
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who paid the crown for the land and reserved the right to use Indian labor on their haciendas.
Under an agrarian reform in 1592, the crown established resguardos, or reservations, for the
Indians to provide for their subsistence; the resulting concentration of Indians freed up land to be
sold to hacendados. The purchase of land as private real estate from the crown led to the
development of latifundios.
The new hacendados soon came into conflict with the encomenderos because of the ability of the
latter to monopolize Indian labor. The Spanish authorities instituted the mita to resolve this conflict.
After 1595 the crown obliged resguardo Indians to contract themselves to neighboring hacendados
for a maximum of fifteen days per year. The mitayos (Indians contracted to work) also were
contracted for labor as miners in Antioquia, as navigational aides on the Río Magdalena, and as
industrial workers in a few rare cases. Although the mitayos were considered free because they
were paid a nominal salary, the landowners and other employers overworked them to such an
extent that many became seriously ill or died.
Because the mitayos could not survive their working conditions, the crown sought an alternate
source of cheap labor through the African slave trade. The crown sold licenses to individuals
allowing them to import slaves, primarily through the port at Cartagena. Although the crown
initially restricted licenses to Spanish merchants, it eventually opened up the slave trade to
foreigners as demand outstripped supply. The mining industry was the first to rely on black slaves,
who by the seventeenth century had replaced mitayos in the mines. The mining industry continued
to depend on slave labor into the eighteenth century. Despite the decline of the mining industry,
slavery remained the key form of labor; from the second half of the seventeenth century through
the eighteenth century, plantation-style agriculture rose in prominence and raised the demand for
slave labor on sugar plantations and ranches. Minor segments of the economy also supported
slavery and used slaves as artisans, domestic servants, and navigational aides.
Slaves had no legal rights in the colonial system. The crown enacted laws to separate the slaves
from the Indians so that the two groups would not join against the Spanish and criollo ruling
classes. Slaves, however, often revolted against their subhuman living conditions, and many
escaped to form palenques (towns) high in the mountains where they could maintain their African
customs. These palenques separated themselves from colonial society and thus were among the
first towns in Spanish America to be free of Spanish authority. The palenque movement was
strongest in the eighteenth century. At this time, there was a crisis in the institution of slavery as it
existed in the Spanish colonies. By the end of the 1700s, the high price of slaves along with
increasing antislavery sentiment in the colony caused many to view the system as anachronistic;
nonetheless, it was not abolished until after independence was achieved.
The Colonial Church
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The Roman Catholic Church served as both agent and opponent of the colonial government. The
church desired a system, supported by the state, within which it might proselytize; at the same
time, it opposed many of the secular aims of government that appeared to be in conflict with
Christian morality. The church acted to restrain secular excesses and despotism, particularly those
of the early conquistadors.
From the outset, the clergy became a vital element of colonial life. Missionaries and conquistadors
arrived simultaneously in the New World during the late 1400s. From 1520 to 1550, the church
began methodical evangelization among the Indians. The Franciscans, Dominicans, Capuchins
(members of the Order of Mercy), and later the Jesuits and Augustinians were all important in the
country's colonial history. The first two orders arrived in Bogotá with the first judges: the
Franciscans established monasteries in Vélez and Cartagena, and the Dominicans established them
in Bogotá, Pamplona, and Popayán. In 1534 the church established the dioceses of Santa Marta
and Cartagena, and in 1546 it established the diocese of Popayán--the first such dioceses in the
New World. The church organized further between 1550 and 1620, creating the diocese of Bogotá
in 1562. The Tribunal of the Inquisition, installed in Cartagena in 1611, sought to ensure that
African culture did not contaminate Spanish culture in the colonies as a result of the importation of
African slaves. The Jesuits, who formally were allowed to enter the colonies in 1604, sought to
improve the economic standing of the Indians with whom they worked and established selfsufficient villages for Indians in the eastern plains.
In addition to bringing the Christian religion to the Indians, the church spread the ideas and
institutions of Western civilization and had responsibility for establishing and maintaining almost all
of the schools of the colonial period. In 1580 a monastery founded the University of General
Studies, the first in the territory. The Jesuits established two additional universities in 1622 and
1653.
In its role as the patron of education, the church made an unintended but significant contribution to
developing a local spirit of independence among the colonists. Church and state attempted to
control the intellectual life of the New World. Throughout the eighteenth century, the church
engaged in controversy with the country's leading intellectuals, who were influenced by the political
ideas of the Enlightenment in Europe and by the concepts of positivism and empirical scientific
investigation. The education system also fostered opposition to Spain's sovereignty over its
American empire and provided the groundwork for the intellectuals whose activities the church
opposed.
Although the Roman Catholic Church influenced educational and intellectual development in the
colonies, the crown ensured its own influence over the colonial church. Several papal bulls in the
1490s and in the first decade of the 1500s strengthened the ability of the Spanish kings to influence
church affairs in the New World. In addition, the Holy See granted to the Spanish state the papal
rights governing the administration and the personnel of the church and of bishoprics being created
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in the New World. In addition to common economic interests, this closely bound the church to the
state during the colonial period.
Developments Leading to Independence
Throughout the colonial period, events in Spain affected the political, economic, and intellectual
state of the colonies. One such event was the ascension of the Bourbons to the Spanish throne in
1700. Upon the death of Charles II--the last in the line of the Spanish Hapsburgs--the Austrian
Hapsburgs and Charles's nephew Philip of Anjou, a Bourbon and the grandson of French king
Louis XIV as well the designated heir to the Spanish throne, contended for the Spanish throne.
The War of the Spanish Succession (1702-14) ended in the triumph of the Bourbons over the
Austrians, and the Treaty of Utrecht recognized the Bourbon succession in Spain on the condition
that Spain and France would never be united under one crown.
Beginning with Philip of Anjou, now known as King Philip V (reigned 1700-46), the Bourbon
kings placed themselves in more direct control of their colonies, reducing the power of the
Supreme Council of the Indies and abolishing the House of Trade. In 1717 Philip V established the
Viceroyalty of New Granada (present-day Venezuela, Colombia, Panama, and Ecuador), and in
1739 Bogotá became its capital. Other Bourbon kings, particularly Charles III (reigned 1759-88),
tried to improve the profitability of the American colonies by removing restrictions that had
hindered Spain's economic development in the 1500s and 1600s. Such measures included the
liberalization of commerce with the colonies and the establishment of additional authorized ports.
In 1774 the crown allowed free exchange among the colonies of Peru, New Spain, New Granada,
and Guatemala. These reforms allowed the crown control over the de facto trade among the
colonies that previously had been illicit. When Charles III declared war on Britain in 1778, he
levied taxes on the colonies to fund the war. These fiscal decrees affected imports and exports, the
sale of general items--especially tobacco and alcohol--and the production of silver and gold. The
crown demanded tribute from Indians and the church and expected the general population to fund
the naval fleet that patrolled the Spanish American coast. Excessive and increasing taxation in the
late 1700s contributed to the discontent of the criollos with the Spanish administration, which
manifested itself in the Comunero Revolt of 1781, the most serious revolt against Spanish authority
before the war for independence. The rebellion was a spontaneous but diffuse movement involving
many towns. The most important uprising began among artisans and peasants in Socorro (in
present day Santander Department). The imposition of new taxes by the viceroy stimulated the
revolt further.
Almost without exception, the rebels expressed their loyalty to the king and the church while calling
for a repeal of new taxes and a modification of government monopolies. The rebels succeeded in
getting government representatives to abolish the war tax, taxes for the maintenance of the fleet,
customhouse permits, and tobacco and playing-card monopolies; to reduce the tribute paid by the
Indians and the taxes on liquor, commercial transactions, and salt; and to give preference to those
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born in the New World for appointments to certain posts. Later, however, government negotiators
declared that they had acted under duress and that the viceroy would not honor the agreements.
The leaders of the rebellion were subjected to severe punishments, including death for the more
prominent among them. The rebels had not sought independence from Spain, but their revolt
against the king's administration and administrators, despite protestations of loyalty to the king
himself, was not far removed from a fight for independence. In this light, the rebellion was a
prelude to the struggle for freedom.
In the late 1700s, the Enlightenment served as a second major influence in the struggle for
independence. After the Comunero Revolt, the outlook of the local upper-class and middle-class
criollos changed as the ideas of the Enlightenment strengthened their desire to control their own
destiny. This movement criticized the traditional patterns of political, economic, and religious
institutions and as such was a threat to both the central state and the religious authorities. The
North American and French revolutions also contributed intellectual foundations for a new society,
as well as examples of the possibilities for change.
A third major event of the late colonial period that may have led to the struggle for independence
was the Napoleonic invasion of the early 1800s. In 1807 Napoleon Bonaparte made his brother
Joseph the king of Spain, forcing Charles IV to abdicate and his son Ferdinand VII to renounce the
throne. In exile, Ferdinand VII organized royalist supporters under the Central Council Junta
Central) of Seville, later called the Council of the Regency (Consejo de Regencia). This council
constituted a provisional government for Spain and the colonies.
Both Napoleon and the royalists competed for support of Spain's colonists in the New World.
Napoleon wrote a liberal constitution for Spain in which he recognized the colonies as having rights
equal to those of Spain. In competition for the colonies' loyalties, the Central Council offered them
certain privileges, such as participation in Spanish courts. Colonists, however, were not satisfied
with the council's measure because of the larger representation accorded the representatives from
Spain. Despite conflict with the peninsulares holding colonial authority in the viceroyalty, additional
concessions to criollos to win their support resulted in the creation of a criollo governing council in
Bogotá on July 20, 1810. The new local government passed reforms favoring power-sharing by the
criollos and peninsulares and loosened the economic restrictions previously placed on the colony.
Most of the old Spanish laws remained in effect, however. The establishment of other criollo
governing councils laid the basis for the first attempts at independence from Spain.
THE FOUNDING OF THE NATION, 1810-1903
Even with the initial steps to unify against Spanish authority, the colonial elites argued among
themselves. Both before and after the granting of independence, elites disagreed as to whether the
national structure should be federalist or centralist. This crucial disagreement, exacerbated by
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Colombia's extreme regional differences, was the first to separate the political elites into rival
groups. The differing opinions of these groups concerning the appropriate relationship between the
church and state further emphasized the disagreement. The separate groups followed leaders
representing their views and identified with the individuals as much as with the ideologies. By the
time of the new nation's foundation, these two groups had become clearly divided and dominated
the political scene, excluding others from their competition for control of the country. The force of
their ideals carried the nation back and forth between political extremes-- absolute liberty and
repression.
The Independence Movement
Leaders in the various localities that had formed criollo councils sought to unite the colony of New
Granada. From the beginning of their attempts, however, conflict emerged over the form the new
government should take. The provincial councils did not want the centralist, authoritarian type of
government advocated by the Bogotá council, preferring a federal type of government more in
keeping with the liberal principles of the Enlightenment and the example of the North American
revolution. This represented the first ideological split between groups of leading criollos. Federalists
rallied behind Camilo Torres; Centralists rallied behind Antonio Nariño. To avoid a civil war
between the two factions, the provincial councils sent representatives to Bogotá in 1811 to draft a
constitution for the territory. In November 1811, a congress was installed, and the provinces
formed the United Provinces of New Granada. The federal union consisted of autonomous
provinces joined only in common interest; the national army was subordinate to Bogotá.
Starting in 1812, individual provinces began declaring absolute independence from Spain. That
year, Simón Bolívar Palacio, considered the liberator of South America, tried for the first time to
gain independence for New Granada. The absence of united support from the various provinces,
however, frustrated him. Bolívar left New Granada in 1815 and went to Jamaica. The continuing
tension between federalist and centralist forces led to a conflict that left New Granada weak and
vulnerable to Spain's attempts to reconquer the provinces.
At the time of Bolívar's departure, the independence cause in New Granada was desperate.
Ferdinand VII had been restored to the Spanish throne, and Napoleon's forces had withdrawn from
Spain. A pacification expedition led by Pablo Morillo on behalf of the king proceeded from presentday Venezuela to Bogotá, and those who laid down their arms and reaffirmed their loyalty to the
Spanish crown were pardoned. Morillo also granted freedom to slaves who helped in the
reconquest of the colonies. Because of dissension between the upper class and the masses and
inept military leadership, Cartagena fell to the royalists by the end of 1815.
In early 1816, Morillo moved to reconquer New Granada and changed his tactics from pardons to
terror; Bogotá fell within a few months. Morillo repressed antiroyalists (including executing leaders
such as Torres) and installed the Tribunal of Purification, responsible for exiles and prisoners, and
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the Board of Confiscations. The Ecclesiastical Tribunal, in charge of government relations with the
church, imposed military law on priests who were implicated in the subversion. The Spanish
reconquest installed a military regime that ruled with violent repression. Rising discontent
contributed to a greater radicalization of the independence movement, spreading to sectors of the
society, such as the lower classes and slaves, that had not supported the previous attempt at
independence. Thus the ground was laid for Bolívar's return and ultimate triumph.
At the end of 1816, Bolívar returned to New Granada, convinced that the war for independence
was winnable only with the support of the masses. In the earlier attempt at independence, large
segments of the population had been lured to the royalist side by promises such as repartition of
land and abolition of slavery. When the masses saw that the promises were unfulfilled, however,
they changed their allegiance from Spain to the independence movement.
Two significant military encounters led to the movement's success. After having won a number of
victories in a drive from the present-day Venezuelan coast to present-day eastern Colombia via the
Río Orinoco, Bolívar gave Francisco de Paula Santander the mission of liberating the Casanare
region, where he defeated royalist forces in April 1819. After the decisive defeat of royalist forces
at the Battle of Boyacá in August 1819, independence forces entered Bogotá without resistance.
The merchants and landowners who fought against Spain now held political, economic, and social
control over the new country that encompassed present-day Venezuelan, Colombia, and Panana.
The first economic reforms that they passed consolidated their position by liberalizing trade,
thereby allowing merchandise from Britain (New Granada's major trading partner after Spain) freer
entry into the area. As a result, the artisan class and the emerging manufacturing sector, who
previously had held only slight economic and political power, now lost stature.
Gran Colombia
As victory over Spain became increasingly apparent, leaders from present-day Venezuela,
Colombia, and Panama convened a congress in February 1819 in Angostura (present-day Ciudad
Bolívar, Venezuela) and agreed to unite in a republic to be known as Gran Colombia. After Bolívar
was ratified as president in August 1819, he left Santander, his vice president, in charge of Gran
Colombia and traveled south to liberate present-day Ecuador, Peru, and Bolivia. When present-day
Ecuador was liberated in 1822, it also joined Gran Colombia. In 1821 the Cúcuta Congress wrote a
constitution for the new republic. The Cúcuta political arrangement was highly centralized and
provided for a government based on popular representation with a bicameral Congress, a president,
and a Supreme Court consisting of five magistrates. The constitution also guaranteed freedom for
the children of slaves; freedom of the press; the inviolability of homes, persons, and
correspondence; the codification of taxes; protectionist policies toward industry and agriculture;
and the abolition of the mita system of labor.
Nonetheless, political rivalries and regional jealousies progressively weakened the authority of the
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new central state. Venezuelan leaders especially were resentful of being ruled by Santander, a
native of present-day Colombia, in the absence of their president and fellow Venezuelan, Bolívar.
In 1826 General José Antonio Páez led a Venezuelan revolt against Gran Colombia. Outbreaks and
disturbances also occurred elsewhere.
On his return from Peru in 1827, Bolívar was barely able to maintain his personal authority. In
April 1828, a general convention was convened in Ocaña to reform the constitution of Cúcuta, but
the convention broke up as a result of conflicting positions taken by the followers of Santander and
Bolívar. Those backing Santander believed in a liberal, federalist form of government. Bolívar's
followers supported a more authoritarian and centralized government, and many, especially those
in Bogotá, called on Bolívar to assume national authority until he deemed it wise to convoke a new
legislative body to replace Congress.
In August 1828, Bolívar assumed dictatorial powers and attempted to install a constitution that he
had developed for Bolivia and Peru. Unpopular with a large portion of the New Grenadine
populace, this constitution called for increased central authority and a president-for-life who could
also name his own successor. During a constitutional convention held in January 1830, Bolívar
resigned as president, naming José Domingo Caicedo as his successor. That same year, the divisive
forces at work within the republic achieved a major triumph as the Venezuelan and Ecuadorian
portions of the republic seceded.
New Granada
New Granada lay in a depressed state after the dissolution of Gran Colombia. None of the
country's three principal economic bases--agriculture, ranching, and mining--was healthy. The
import trade was limited to a small group, the banking industry was inadequate, and craftsmen and
small manufacturers could supply only enough for local consumption. Despite the desire and need
for change, New Granada retained slavery, the sales tax, and a state monopoly on the production
and trade of tobacco and alcohol. The problems facing the country, the discontent of liberal groups
who saw the constitution as being monarchical, and the military's desire for power culminated in
the fall of the constitutional order and the installation in 1830 of the eight-month dictatorship of
General Rafael Urdaneta. After Bolívar's death in December 1830, however, civilian and military
leaders called for the restoration of legitimate authority. Urdaneta was forced to cede power to
Caicedo as the legitimate president.
In October 1831, Caicedo convened a commission to write a new constitution for New Granada.
Finished in 1832, the new constitution restricted the power of the presidency and expanded the
autonomy of the regional administrative subdivisions known as departments (departamentos).
Santander assumed the presidency in 1832 and was succeeded in 1837 by his vice president, José
Ignacio de Márquez. Personalism and regionalism remained key elements in national politics in a
country with small cities, a weak state, and a semi-feudal population that was bound to the large
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landowners in patron-client relationships.
During the Márquez administration, the political divisions in the country reached a breaking point.
In 1840 the political ambitions of some department governors, the constitutional weakness of the
president, and the suppression of some Roman Catholic monasteries in Pasto combined to ignite a
civil war that ended with the victory of the government forces led by General Pedro Alcántara
Herrán. This triumph brought Herrán to the presidency with the next election in 1841. In 1843 his
administration instituted a new constitution, which stipulated a greater centralization of power.
In 1845 Tomás Ciprianode Mosquera succeeded Herrán. Personalism as an important element in
politics abated during his administration. The Mosquera government also saw the economic and
political ascendancy of merchants, artisans, and small property owners. Mosquera liberalized trade
and set New Granada on the path of exporting primary goods.
The election of General José Hilario López as president in 1849 marked a turning point for
Colombia both economically and politically. Capitalism began to replace the old colonial structure,
and the ideological differences between the established political parties overshadowed the previous
emphasis on personalism. In 1850 the López administration instituted a so called agrarian reform
program and abolished slavery. In order to allow landowners access to more land, the agrarian
reform program lifted the restrictions on the sale of resguardo lands; as a result, Indians became
displaced from the countryside and moved to the cities, where they provided excess labor. In 1851
the government ended the state monopoly on tobacco cultivation and trade and declared an official
separation of church and state. In addition, López took the education system from the hands of the
church and subjected parish priests to popular elections.
Consolidation of Political Divisions
The ideological split dividing the political elite began in 1810 and became solidified by 1850 after
the official establishment of the Liberal Party (Partido Liberal--PL) and the Conservative Party
(Partido Conservador--PC), the two parties that continued to dominate Colombian politics in the
1980s. The Liberals were anti-colonial and wanted to transform New Granada into a modern
nation. Those joining the PL primarily came from the more recently created and ascending classes
and included merchants advocating free trade, manufacturers and artisans anxious to increase
demand for their products, some small landowners and agriculturists endorsing a liberalization of
state monopolies on crops such as tobacco, and slaves seeking their freedom. The Liberals also
sought lessened executive power; separation of church and state; freedom of press, education,
religion, and business; and elimination of the death penalty.
The Conservatives wanted to preserve the Spanish colonial legacy of Roman Catholicism and
authoritarianism. They favored prolonging colonial structures and institutions, upholding the
alliance between church and state, continuing slavery, and defending the authoritarian form of
government that would eliminate what they saw as excesses of freedom. The PC grouped together
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slave owners, the Roman Catholic hierarchy, and large landholders. Campesinos were divided
between the two parties, their loyalties following those of their employers or patrons--often the PC.
In contrast to the unity demonstrated by the PC, the PL developed factions from the start.
Although they had most interests in common, the merchants differed from the artisans and
manufacturers on the question of trade. Merchants favored free trade of imports and were called
golgotas, whereas artisans and manufacturers demanded protectionism to support domestic
industry and were known as draconianos.
The Federalists
Although divided, the PL soon achieved electoral victories. In the election of 1853, General José
María Obando, who had led the revolutionary forces in the 1840 civil war and who was supported
by the draconianos and the army, was elected and inaugurated as president. Congress remained in
the hands of the golgotas. In May of the same year, Congress adopted the constitution of 1853,
which had been written under López. A liberal document, it had significant provisions defining the
separation of church and state and freedom of worship and establishing male suffrage. The new
constitution also mandated the direct election of the president, members of Congress, magistrates,
and governors, and it granted extensive autonomy to the departments.
Despite the victory that the constitution represented for the Liberals, tensions grew between
golgota and draconiano forces. When the draconianos found Obando to be compromising with the
golgotas, General José María Melo led a coup d'état in April 1854, declared himself dictator, and
dissolved Congress. Melo's rule, the only military dictatorship in the nineteenth century, lasted only
eight months because he proved unable to consolidate the interests of the draconianos; he was
deposed by an alliance of golgotas and Conservatives.
In 1857 PC candidate Mariano Ospina Rodríguez was elected president. The next year, his
administration adopted a new constitution, which renamed the country the Grenadine
Confederation, replaced the vice president with three designates elected by Congress, and set the
presidential term at four years. With the draconiano faction disappearing as a political force, the
golgotas took over the PL in opposition to the Conservative Ospina. General Mosquera, the former
president and the governor of the department of Cauca, emerged as the most important Liberal
figure. A strong advocate of federalism, Mosquera threatened the secession of Cauca in the face of
the centralization undertaken by the Conservatives. Mosquera, the golgotas, and their supporters
declared a civil war in 1860, resulting in an almost complete obstruction of government.
Because civil disorder prevented elections from being held as scheduled in 1861, Bartolomé Calvo,
a Conservative in line for the presidency, assumed the office. In July 1861, Mosquera captured
Bogotá, deposed Calvo, and took the title of provisional president of the United States of New
Granada and supreme commander of war. A congress of plenipotentiaries chosen by the civil and
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military leaders of each department met in the capital in September 1861 in response to a call by
the provisional government. Meanwhile, the war continued until Mosquera defeated the
Conservatives and finally subdued the opposition in Antioquia in October 1862.
Shortly after taking power, Mosquera put the church under secular control and expropriated church
lands. The property was not redistributed to the landless, however, but was sold to merchants and
landholders in an effort to improve the national fiscal situation, which had been ruined by the war.
As a result, the amount of land held under latifundios increased.
In February 1863, a Liberal-only government convention met in Rionegro and enacted the
constitution of 1863, which was to last until 1886. The Rionegro constitution renamed the nation
the United States of Colombia. All powers not given to the central government were reserved for
the states, including the right to engage in the commerce of arms and ammunition. The constitution
contained fully defined individual liberties and guarantees as nearly absolute as possible, leaving the
federal authority with little room to regulate society. The constitution also guaranteed Colombians
the right to profess any religion.
The Rionegro constitution brought little peace to the country. After its enactment and before the
next constitutional change, Liberals and Conservatives engaged in some forty local conflicts and
several major military struggles. Contention persisted, moreover, between the moderate Liberals in
the executive branch and the radical Liberals in the legislature; the latter went so far as to enact a
measure prohibiting the central authority from suppressing a revolt against the government of any
state or in any way interfering in state affairs. In 1867 the radical Liberals also executed a coup
against Mosquera, leading to his imprisonment, trial before the Senate, and exile from the country.
With the fall of Mosquera and the entrenchment of radical Liberals in power, Conservatives found
it increasingly difficult to accept the Rionegro constitution. Eventually Conservatives in Tolima and
Antioquia took up arms, initiating another civil conflict in 1876. The Liberal national government
put down the rebellion, but only with difficulty.
Golgotas controlled the presidency until 1884 and defended the Rionegro constitution's provisions
for federalism, absolute liberties, separation of church and state, and the nonintervention of the
state in the economy. Their economic policies emphasized the construction of lines of
communication, especially railroads and improved roads. These projects did not unify the country
and increase internal trade but instead linked the interior with export centers, connecting important
cities with river and maritime ports. By allowing easier access to imports, the projects thus favored
the merchant class over the national industrialists.
Under the golgota policy of completely free trade, exports became a major element of the country's
economy. Three main agricultural exports--tobacco, quinine, and coffee--developed, especially
after 1850 when international markets were more favorable and accessible. Nonetheless, all three
crops suffered from cyclical periods of high and low demand. By the 1880s, it was clear that
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tobacco and quinine would not be reliable exports in the long term because of stiff international
competition. Coffee also faced competition but nevertheless succeeded in dominating the economy
after the 1870s. The coffee merchants used their profits as middlemen to invest in domestic
industries, producing goods such as textiles for domestic consumption, particularly in the Medellín
area. The emergence of coffee as an important export crop and the investment of profits from the
coffee trade into domestic industry were significant steps in the economic development of the
country.
The Nationalists
It became obvious to many Liberals and Conservatives that the lack of governmental authority
stipulated in the Rionegro constitution was allowing the country to run a chaotic course and that the
situation needed to be corrected. The Regeneration movement sought a basic shift in Colombia's
direction. A key leader of the movement was Rafael Núñez, who was elected president in 1879
and held the office until 1882. Liberals and Conservatives who were disenchanted with the golgota
governments joined to form the National Party, a coalition that in February 1884 brought Núñez to
the presidency for a second term. The Nationalists authorized Núñez to take steps urgently
required to improve economic conditions. As leader of the Regeneration movement, he attempted
to reform the constitution with the agreement of all groups. The golgotas, however, were afraid
that constitutional change would favor the Conservatives and dissident Liberals at their expense. In
1884 the golgotas in Santander started an armed rebellion, which spread throughout the country.
Nationalist forces suppressed the revolution by August 1885, at which time Núñez also declared
that the Rionegro constitution had expired.
The most important result of the conflict was the adoption of the Constitution of 1886 by a
national council made up of two delegates from each state. The Nationalist leaders believed that
ultra-liberalism as practiced under the Rionegro constitution was not appropriate to the needs of the
country and that a balance was needed between individual liberties and national order. Based on
this philosophy, the Constitution of 1886 reversed the federalist trend and brought the country
under strong centralist control. The Constitution renamed the country the Republic of Colombia
and, with amendments, remained in effect in the late 1980s. The Constitution provides for a
national rather than confederate system of government in which the president has more power than
the governors, who head departments or two types of national territories known as intendencies
(intendencias) and commissaryships (comisarias).
In 1887 Núñez consolidated the position of the church in the country by signing the Concordat of
1887 with the Holy See. Through the concordat, the church regained its autonomy and its previous
preferential relationship with the republic. The agreement stipulated the obligatory teaching of
Roman Catholicism as part of a child's education and recognized Roman Catholic marriages as the
only valid marriages in the country. It also acknowledged Colombia's debt to the Holy See brought
on by the uncompensated confiscation of church assets under Mosquera in the 1860s.
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Political disorder did not cease with the adoption of the Constitution of 1886. The Nationalists,
who had become an extremist branch of the PC after Núñez was elected, were opposed by the
Historical Conservatives, the moderate faction of the PC that did not agree with the extent of antiliberalism taken by the new government. The bipartisan opposition of Liberals and Historical
Conservatives sought to reform Nationalist economic and political policies through peaceful means.
The Nationalists, however, denied the civil rights and political representation of the Liberals
because differences of opinion concerning trade policy and the role of the state in society created a
gulf between the Nationalists and their opponents. The PL split into Peace and War factions, the
former seeking peaceful reform of economic policies and the latter advocating revolution as the
only way to win political rights. The Peace faction controlled the party in the capital, whereas the
War faction dominated the party in the departments--a response to the violent political exclusion
that was characteristic of rural areas and small towns. The War faction staged unsuccessful revolts
in 1893 and 1895.
In 1898 Nationalist candidate Manuel Antonio Sanclemente was elected president. In ill health,
Sanclemente left much of the governing to his vice president, José Manuel Marroquín. The
Sanclemente/Marroquín presidency faced increasing problems as the world price of coffee fell,
which, because of reduced customs revenues, left the government bankrupt. The fiscal policy of
issuing nonredeemable paper money, which had replaced the gold standard under Núñez, added to
the increasing lack of confidence in the government.
In July 1899, in Santander, Liberals again attempted a revolution, known as the War of a Thousand
Days. Historical Conservatives eventually cast their allegiance with the Nationalists, whereas the
Peace and War factions of the PL remained split, thereby weakening the rebellion. Despite an initial
victory in December 1899, the Liberal forces were outnumbered at Palonegro five months later.
The defeat left the Liberal army decimated and demoralized and with little chance to succeed. The
Liberal army changed its strategy from conventional tactics to guerrilla warfare, thus transforming
the war into a desperate struggle that lasted for two more years.
In July 1900, Historical Conservatives, seeking a political solution to the war, supported Marroquín
in a coup against Sanclemente. Contrary to what his supporters had expected, Marroquín adopted
a hard line against the rebels and refused to negotiate a settlement. In November 1902, the
defeated Liberal army negotiated a peace agreement with the government. The war took more than
100,000 lives and left the country devastated.
The War of a Thousand Days left the country too weak to prevent Panama's secession from the
republic in 1903. The events leading up to Panama's secession were as much international as
domestic. At the turn of the century, the United States recognized the strategic need to have access
to a naval route connecting the Caribbean Sea and the Pacific Ocean, such as a canal in the
isthmus. The HayHerrán Treaty of January 1903, which was to have been the basis for allowing
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the United States canal project to proceed, was rejected by the Colombian Congress. Because the
proposed Panamanian route was preferred over the Nicaraguan alternative, the United States
encouraged the Panamanian separatist movement, militarily assisted Panama in its movement for
independence, and immediately recognized the independent Republic of Panama.
THE PERIOD OF RECONCILIATION, 1903-30
The Reyes Presidency
The devastation that resulted from the War of a Thousand Days discredited the factions of each
party that had instigated the conflict. The moderates who assumed power in each party had similar
economic interests; they recognized the need for the two parties to reconcile their differences and
rule together in peaceful coexistence to ensure the survival of the country and the economy. For
the first time in Colombian history, the Liberals and the Conservatives sought to share power rather
than exclude the opposition party from it. Although Conservatives were nominally in control during
this period, they formed coalition governments incorporating minority Liberals into the cabinet and
other important political bodies. Rejecting the practice of excluding the Liberals from political
participation, as had been done by the Nationalists, the moderate Conservatives removed the key
element that had prompted so much political violence in the past and laid the foundation for
economic progress in the country.
At the end of the civil war, the country needed a leader who was strong enough to rebuild the
nation after the loss of Panama and the ravages of civil strife. General Rafael Reyes, elected
president in 1904 with the support of moderate Conservatives, showed a determination to unify the
republic, renew the nation's economy, and prevent any obstacle--constitutional or otherwise-- from
standing in his way. Reyes's policies were a contradictory combination of political reconciliation
and authoritarianism, which forced minority Liberal representation in government on the elected
Conservative majority in Congress. His economic programs included a protectionist trade policy,
which represented a major intervention of the state into economic activity. This trade policy
encouraged domestic industrial growth, which in turn led to the growth of cities and the need to
develop an urban infrastructure.
To ensure the passage of his economic reforms, Reyes greatly strengthened the executive and
thereby centralized power. He abolished Congress and replaced it with a National Assembly
composed of three representatives from each department, selected by department officials
appointed by Reyes. This action ensured the adequate representation of the Liberal support he
needed in the legislative branch. This extra-constitutional body was designed to approve his decrees
and to pass constitutional amendments. The National Assembly allowed Reyes to implement
policies that sometimes were at odds with orthodox economic theory and therefore would not have
been tolerated by a Conservative Congress. Through these measures, Reyes established a sound
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fiscal administration, stabilized the monetary system, initiated a return to the gold standard,
restored Colombian credit abroad, attracted foreign capital, improved transportation, encouraged
export agriculture, and aided domestic industry. At the same time, however, he aroused a great deal
of political opposition.
Reyes realized that the soundest path to economic development-- based on trade and foreign
investment--required normalized relations with the United States, an unpopular idea at that time. In
1909 Reyes unsuccessfully tried to force legislative approval of the Thompson-Urrutia Treaty with
the United States, which was to reestablish relations with that country and recognize the
independence of Panama. The issue of the treaty's ratification, however, provided a focal point for
opposition against Reyes, even though the treaty was ratified under a subsequent administration. In
June 1909, the Republican Union, a bipartisan group of Liberals and Historical Conservatives who
opposed Reyes, won a majority in the congressional elections held to reestablish the Colombian
Cngress. In acknowledgment of the political current against him, Reyes secretly resigned later that
month and left the country.
Carlos E. Restrepo, a Conservative who had been instrumental in founding the Republican Union,
assumed the presidency after Reyes. The Republican Union represented a transformation in
Colombian politics. The Liberal merchants and Conservative agriculturists found a common
interest in coffee exports, which was quickly beginning to dominate the Colombian economy. Their
mutual economic interest allowed the moderate factions of each party to join in a bipartisan
coalition that gained political control at the end of the civil war. Although Conservatives retained
nominal control of political institutions until 1930, they accepted and applied the principle of
Liberal representation and participation in government. Conservative presidents appointed Liberals
to their bipartisan cabinets and thus included them in political decision making. Although party
conflict and rural unrest remained, the coalitions that the two parties formed provided a basis for
political stability.
Economic and Social Change
As a result of domestic policies and the international situation, the Colombian economy diversified
and developed at the turn of the century. In the early 1900s, the industrial sector became an
increasingly important part of the economy. Between 1900 and 1910, textile industries developed
in Bello and Medellín, pottery plants in Caldas, and breweries in Itagüi and Bogotá. New economic
groups emerged with the development of import substitution industrialization (see Glossary) and of
a larger financial sector.
During the 1910s and 1920s, the Colombian economy became more integrated into the global
financial and commercial markets. Renewed relations with the United States during the
administration of Marco Fidel Suárez (1918-21) opened the door for foreign exchange and
investment. The United States replaced Britain as Colombia's key financial and commercial
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partner. Most of the foreign exchange came from the coffee trade, which at this time represented
nearly 80 percent of exports. Foreign exchange also came in the form of loans and an indemnity
paid by the United States for Colombia's loss of Panama. Money coming into the country was
invested in industry, consumption goods, and public works and enterprises. Public works, such as
building communication networks, accelerated under the Conservative Pedro Nel Ospina
administration (1922-26). Investment in industry came primarily from the private sector, including
foreign interests. By 1929 private foreign investment totaled US$400 million, with some US$45
million having been invested by oil companies. The Nel Ospina administration also oversaw the
reorganization of the banking and financial sectors, creating the Bank of the Republic (Banco de la
República).
The growth in industry and construction, supported by both public and private funds, led to the
emergence of a genuine working class that soon learned to unionize. In 1918 Colombia experienced
its first major strikes. The union movement also came to be influenced by European syndicalism
and socialism; in 1919 the first workers' conference, which was fostered by socialist ideas, was
held. These activities were a backdrop to the launching of the Colombian Socialist Party. During
the 1920s, the union movement expanded and stimulated the growth of socialist-oriented groups.
In 1928 a strike against the United Fruit Company was put down violently by armed forces. In the
following year, Congressman Jorge Eliécer Gaitán criticized the rough handling of the strike and
became a prominent speaker for the working class.
Growing popular discontent with the Conservative governments and divisions within Conservative
ranks eventually resulted in the rise of the PL to power. The growth in the industrial and
construction sectors that fueled the union movement also drained the countryside of agricultural
workers, encouraging rural workers to petition for higher wages. In 1928 the government began
importing food and as a result drew protests from agriculturists. Workers and artisans protested the
rise in inflation that resulted from the influx of foreign loans and protectionist trade policies. Social
tensions increased throughout the Conservative administration of Abadia Méndez (1926-30) and
ultimately led to the fall of the PC after its forty-five years in power. The Liberals gained the upper
hand in the political arena and retained it during the fifteen years (1930-45) of global crisis.
THE REFORMIST PERIOD, 1930-45
The economic modernization of the early 1900s unleashed social forces that resulted in the
emergence of new urban classes. As the traditional elites failed to address the demands made by
the new groups, tension was generated. The growing urban electorate tended to favor those
politicians who advocated social reforms. The Liberals were better able than the Conservatives to
benefit from this development, especially during the first administration of Alfonso López
Pumarejo (1934-38). The populist movement of the 1940s, represented by the progressive faction
of the PL, attracted the most support, however, and represented a threat to the more conservative
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traditional elites. For the first time, non-elites had a voice with which to express their interests.
Although a split in the PC over candidates for the 1930 presidential election aided in the ascension
of the PL to power, both parties were divided into factions. The PC consisted of moderates (led by
Mariano Ospina Pérez and known as ospinistas) who wanted to maintain the status quo and
reactionary conservatives (led by Laureano Gómez Castro and known as laureanistas) who favored
a restructuring of the state along corporatist (see Glossary) lines. The PL also had its moderates
who supported the status quo. The second faction of the PL consisted of reformists, who favored
controlled social change. These factions represented different socioeconomic groups. In general,
reformists included the new financial and capitalist groups. Reactionaries primarily were traditional
latifundistas (owners of latifundios). Moderates of both parties tended to have interests that
incorporated several economic activities and included groups such as export-oriented latifundistas.
As a result of the Liberal victory, many of the privileges that had been afforded to Conservatives
through patronage politics were now denied. Because the president appointed the governors, who
in turn appointed the municipal mayors, the transfer of power from the PC to the PL at the
presidential level was felt at the municipal level. Because of the change in the political affiliation of
the police force, the stricter application of the law was transferred to members of the opposition
party. Clashes resulted between partisan groups among the lower classes, who sought either to gain
or to maintain their privileges. One such clash involved the peasants, who, amidst the confusion,
tried to attain greater control over small plots of land at the expense of members of the opposing
party.
The first Liberal president of the twentieth century, Enrique Olaya Herrera (1930-34), was elected
at a time when the price of coffee had dropped to about one-third of the 1928 price, loans from
United States banks had stopped, and the country was gripped by an economic depression. Olaya
endeavored to hold together the moderate Liberals and the moderate Conservatives, some of
whom had worked for his election. Although Conservative control of the legislature and concern
over the economy constrained Olaya's ability to enact a comprehensive Liberal agenda, he
succeeded in carrying out some reforms, notably in education. Nonetheless, some Liberals,
disappointed by their party's failure to carry out a "revolution," in 1932 organized a movement
called the Revolutionary Leftist National Union (Unión Nacional Izquierdista Revolucionaria-UNIR). The movement came to an end after Gaitán, its leader, returned to the PL in 1935 when
the party adopted many of his proposed reforms and offered him a congressional seat.
International disputes also confronted the Olaya administration, one of the most prominent being a
boundary conflict with Peru. In 1932 Peruvians occupied Leticia, a Colombian outpost on the
Amazon, and hand-to-hand combat ensued between small Colombian and Peruvian forces. The
dispute was settled by direct negotiation in 1934, when Peru recognized Colombian sovereignty
over the port.
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The most important president in the reformist period was Olaya's successor, López Pumarejo.
Believing that the reformist faction of the PL had become strong enough to carry out its program,
the López Pumarejo administration implemented extensive reforms, principally in agriculture,
education, and the tax system. Known as the "Revolution on the March," these reforms included
constitutional amendments that guaranteed the state's role in developing the economy of the
country and diversifying its exports, authorized the national government to expropriate property for
the common good, provided special state protection for labor and the right for labor unions to
strike, and stipulated that public assistance was a function of the state. Additional reforms included
the strict enforcement of progressive income and inheritance taxes, the guarantee of rights granted
to squatters on public and private lands, the reinforcement of credit institutions, and the renewed
separation of church and state.
The reforms put in place by the López Pumarejo administration, combined with import substitution
policies, helped to accelerate the capitalist development of Colombia. During the López Pumarejo
administration, coffee prices and the volume of exports increased. Protectionist measures helped to
increase domestic production and enlarge the domestic market. A surge in industrialization began in
the 1930s, aided by various external and internal factors. The key external factor was the world
economic crisis of the 1930s, which limited the availability of goods to be imported and limited
markets for exports. Internal factors included domestic capital accumulation via the tobacco, gold,
and coffee trade; the increased buying power of large groups, especially coffee growers; the
construction of transportation and communication facilities that unified the internal market; and a
continuation of protectionist policies begun by President Reyes in 1904. The increasing emphasis
on growing and exporting coffee fostered industrial development and allowed a more equitable
distribution of income because more skilled laborers were employed and received higher wages. As
a result, the demand for domestically produced consumer goods increased further.
Reforms instituted under López Pumarejo reflected a variety of influences: the Mexican
Constitution of 1917, which had set forth provisions relating to social welfare, labor, and
government responsibility in education and economics; ideas of change favored by the Peruvian
apristas--members of the American Popular Revolutionary Alliance (Alianza Popular
Revolucionaria Americana-- APRA); and the New Deal policies of United States president Franklin
D. Roosevelt (1933-45). Some Colombian intellectuals had become interested in socialist thought,
and the establishment of a liberal republic in Spain during the early 1930s inspired Colombian
Liberals.
The Liberals, recognizing the social changes that were under way, identified themselves with the
growing demands of the masses. In contrast, the Conservatives favored a minimum of
concessions, the greatest possible influence of the church, and continued control of the country by
a small upper class; they saw López Pumarejo's policies as communistic. Meanwhile, disagreement
over the extent to which Liberal ideology should be applied led to a split between the pro-reform
supporters of López Pumarejo and the pro-status quo followers of fellow Liberal Eduardo Santos,
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owner of the national daily El Tiempo.
In 1938 Santos became president with the support of moderate Liberals and of Conservatives
opposed to López Pumarejo's Revolution on the March. Santos retained some of his predecessor's
policies, such as protectionism, and oriented his policies toward capitalist industrial and agricultural
development. The Santos administration improved the economic capabilities of the country to
invest in industry. It also stimulated capital-intensive agriculture to convert traditional latifundios,
which relied on cheap labor, into capitalist haciendas, which used advanced technology. The
reduced demand for manual labor in the countryside caused many campesinos to migrate to the
cities. This urban growth increased both the supply of labor and the demand for consumer goods,
further contributing to industrial expansion. Santos also reduced taxes on machinery imports that
were needed for industry.
In the later years of his administration, Santos turned his attention to relations with the church and
the United States. In 1942 Santos reformed education by removing it from the control of the
church. In the same year, he concluded a new agreement with the Vatican, requiring that bishops
be Colombian citizens. During World War II, he cooperated with the United States in the defense
of the Panama Canal, ousted German nationals from control of Colombia's national airline, and
broke diplomatic relations with the Axis governments. His administration also strengthened
economic, commercial, and cultural relations with the United States.
Despite opposition from Conservatives, moderate Liberals, and a more progressive Liberal group
led by Gaitán, López Pumarejo was elected president for a second term in 1942. He was not as
successful in the second term in implementing reform, however, because of strong Conservative
opposition and a split in the Liberal organization in Congress. Laureano Gómez exploited the
Liberal division by attacking López Pumarejo's foreign policy, including the declaration of war on
the Axis Powers in 1943. Other effects of World War II were being felt at this time, including an
unbalanced budget, unstable foreign trade, a decline in coffee prices, and an increase in import
prices.
Discontent with López Pumarejo increased. Gómez made personal attacks on López Pumarejo
and his family that were so inflammatory that Gómez was imprisoned in 1944. This triggered
demonstrations and street fighting in Bogotá. In July 1944, during army maneuvers, López
Pumarejo and some of his cabinet members were held prisoner for a few days by officers staging
an abortive military coup in Pasto. Although most of the military supported the constitutional order,
López Pumarejo lost prestige and power. In July 1945, he resigned in favor of his first presidential
designate, Alberto Lleras Camargo, a Liberal who had distinguished himself as a writer and
government official.
López Pumarejo's resignation resulted in part from pressure by the political and economic forces
that he had helped to strengthen through the reforms of his first term. By 1942 a new group of
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industrialists wished to perpetuate their gains and believed that reform should cease. During López
Pumarejo's first term, the interests of industrialists and those of other urban elements frequently
coincided--for example, in reducing the power of the church and large landowners and in
stimulating economic growth. In his second term, however, critics contended that the social
reforms and development policies of the first term no longer were appropriate. Thus, the
industrialists, looking for favorable tax policies and protection against the demands of labor, joined
with the landowners in resisting reforms. Both groups helped block important portions of López
Pumarejo's legislative program, and the reformist trend of the PL was negated by more moderate
elements within the party.
Lleras Camargo, who served as provisional president until August 1946, appointed representatives
of all parties to his cabinet in an effort to establish a "national union." Nonetheless, his coalition
policy was attacked by Gaitán, who had gained considerable support among the masses and among
some intellectuals and industrialists. When Gabriel Turbay, a moderate Liberal, won the party's
nomination for the 1946 presidential election, Gaitán decided to run independently, and his forces
shifted to a more militant stance. This serious split among Liberals resulted in the election of the
Conservative candidate, Mariano Ospina Pérez, by a plurality of 42 percent of the electorate.
COLLAPSE OF THE DEMOCRATIC SYSTEM, 1946-58
The transfer of power in 1946 ignited tensions between the two parties, resulting in violent political
conflict, particularly in rural areas. The loss of peace foreboded the return to competitive and
exclusionary politics, similar to the situation preceding the War of a Thousand Days. In the 1940s
and 1950s, however, violence and exclusion more than threatened the political system; they
ruptured it. A democratically elected administration became repressive and dictatorial, which led to
its overthrow by the sole military coup in the twentieth century. Only by having the reins of power
taken from both of their hands did the traditional elites recognize that the most effective way to
avoid interparty civil wars and possible military dictatorships was to join forces and restrain their
competitive tendencies.
In 1946 Ospina assumed office and was faced with the difficult task of ruling from a minority
position, as Liberals had received the majority of all presidential votes and continued to control
Congress. Ospina tried to confront this situation by incorporating Liberals into a coalition
government. Meanwhile, the level of political rivalry intensified in the countryside, where
Conservatives pursued a course of violence in an attempt to consolidate power after sixteen years
out of office. Liberals retaliated and, under Gaitán's leadership, became highly mobilized in their
demands that the Ospina government confront the social needs of the modernizing and urbanizing
nation.
Gaitanism, the populist social movement led by Gaitán as a faction of the PL, increased
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dramatically between 1946 and 1948. Gaitán supported the democratic rather than the
revolutionary path to reforms. By advocating the passage of more socially liberal policies, he
appealed to the masses and he united urban workers and campesinos. As the movement grew,
observers believed that Gaitán would be elected president, which may have happened had he lived
to see the next election.
Liberal victories in the 1947 congressional elections demonstrated the party's strength among the
electorate. Ospina became increasingly concerned with retaining Conservative control and
provoked Liberals further by resorting frequently to police enforcement of Conservative privileges
in the rural areas. The Liberal appointees in his government resigned in protest in March 1948.
La Violencia
The following month, the inevitable explosion occurred in the form of the most violent and
destructive riot in the country's long history of conflict. On April 9, Gaitán was assassinated at
midday in the heart of Bogotá. An angry mob immediately seized and killed the assassin. In the
ensuing riot, some 2,000 people were killed, and a large portion of downtown Bogotá was
destroyed. The Bogotazo, as the episode came to be called, was an expression of mass social
frustration and grief by a people who had lost the man who represented their only potential link to
the decision-making process.
Although order was restored in Bogotá and Ospina remained in control, the tempo of rural violence
quickened to a state of undeclared civil war, known as la violencia. This phenomenon -- la
violencia -- claimed over 200,000 lives during the next eighteen years, with the bloodiest period
occurring between 1948 and 1958. La violencia spread throughout the country, especially in the
Andes and the llanos (plains), sparing only the southernmost portion of Nariño and parts of the
Caribbean coastal area. An extremely complex phenomenon, la violencia was characterized by both
partisan political rivalry and sheer rural banditry. The basic cause of this protracted period of
internal disorder, however, was the refusal of successive governments to accede to the people's
demands for socioeconomic change.
After the Bogotazo, the Ospina government became more repressive. Ospina banned public
meetings in March 1949 and fired all Liberal governors in May. In November of that year, Ospina
ordered the army to forcibly close Congress. Rural police forces heightened the effort against
belligerents and Liberals, and eventually all Liberals, from the ministerial to the local level, resigned
their posts in protest.
In the 1949 presidential election, the Liberals refused to present a candidate; as a result, Gómez,
the only Conservative candidate, took office in 1950. Gómez, who had opposed the Ospina
administration for its initial complicity with the Liberals, was firmly in control of the party. As
leader of the reactionary faction, he preferred authority, hierarchy, and order and was
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contemptuous of universal suffrage and majority rule. Gómez offered a program that combined
traditional Conservative republicanism with the European corporatism of the time. A neo-fascist
constitution drafted under his guidance in 1953 would have enhanced the autonomy of the
presidency, expanded the powers of departmental governors, and strengthened the official role of
the church in the political system.
Gómez acquired broad powers and curtailed civil liberties in an attempt to confront the mounting
violence and the possibility that the Liberals might regain power. Pro-labor laws passed in the
1930s were canceled by executive decree, independent labor unions were struck down,
congressional elections were held without opposition, the press was censored, courts were
controlled by the executive, and freedom of worship was challenged as mobs attacked Protestant
chapels. Gómez directed his repression in particular against the Liberal opposition, which he
branded as communist. At the height of the violence, the number of deaths reportedly reached
1,000 per month.
Despite the relative prosperity of the economy--owing largely to expansion of the country's export
markets and increased levels of foreign investment--Gómez lost support because of protracted
violence and his attacks on moderate Conservatives and on the military establishment. Because of
illness, in November 1951 Gómez allowed his first presidential designate, Roberto Urdaneta
Arbeláez, to become acting president until Gómez could reassume the presidency. Although
Urdaneta followed Gómez's policies, he refused to dismiss General Gustavo Rojas Pinilla, whom
Gómez suspected of conspiring against the government. When Gómez tried to return to office in
June 1953, a coalition consisting of moderate Conservatives who supported Ospina, the PL, and
the armed forces deposed him and installed a military government. They viewed such action as the
only way to end the violence. Rojas Pinilla, who had led the coup d'état, assumed the presidency.
The Rojas Pinilla Dictatorship
Initial response to the coup was enthusiastic and widespread; only the elements at the two extremes
of the political spectrum protested the action. Rojas Pinilla's first goal was to end the violence, and
to that end he offered amnesty and government aid to those belligerents who would lay down their
arms. Thousands complied with the offer, and there was relative calm for several months after the
coup. Other immediate steps taken by Rojas Pinilla included the transfer of the National Police to
the armed forces in an effort to depoliticize the police, relaxation of press censorship, and release
of political prisoners.
The government also started an extensive series of public works projects to construct
transportation networks and hospitals and improved the system of credit for small farmers. Rojas
Pinilla attempted to respond to demands for social reform through populist measures patterned
after the policies of General Juan Domingo Perón (1946-55) in Argentina. The National Social
Welfare Service, under the direction of his daughter María Eugenia Rojas de Moreno Díaz, was
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created to meet the most pressing needs of the poor, and the public works projects began to
provide jobs for the masses of urban unemployed. The tax system was restructured to place more
of the burden on the elite. Poorly administered, however, these reform programs met with little
success. Rojas Pinilla was unable to restructure Colombian society.
Rojas Pinilla attempted to recruit political support from nontraditional sources. He courted the
military by raising salaries and constructing lavish officers' clubs, and he counted the church by
espousing a "Christian" doctrine as the foundation of his government. Through the creation of a
"third force," Rojas Pinilla attempted to fuse the masses of peasants and urban workers into a
movement that would counter the elite's traditional domination of the country's politics; however,
this served more to anger the elite than to create a populist political base.
Support for the Rojas Pinilla regime faded within the first year. Toward the end of 1953, rural
violence was renewed, and Rojas Pinilla undertook strict measures to counter it. Following a
substantial increase in police and military budgets, the government assumed a dictatorial and
demagogic character. The government reversed its initial social reform measures and relied instead
on repression. It tightened press censorship and closed a number of the country's leading
newspapers, both Liberal and Conservative. Under a new law, anyone who spoke disrespectfully
of the president could be jailed or fined. Many were killed or wounded at the so called Bull Ring
Massacre in February 1956 for failing to cheer Rojas Pinilla sufficiently. The administration
became increasingly corrupt, and graft in government circles was rampant. In addition, economic
deterioration, triggered by a drop in coffee prices and exacerbated by inflationary government
policies, seriously threatened the gains made since World War II. Efforts of government troops to
suppress the widespread violence degenerated into an enforcement of the president's tenuous hold
on power, and their methods became more brutal. Scorched-earth policies were introduced to
confront the 20,000 belligerents estimated to be active in rural areas.
Rojas Pinilla tried to provide a legal facade for his dictatorship. A new constitution (the
Constitution of 1886 was abolished in 1954) created a Legislative Assembly composed of fifty-nine
Conservatives and thirty-three Liberals, twenty of whom were nominated by the president. The
assembly elected Rojas Pinilla to the presidency in 1954 for four years; in 1957 it confirmed him
as president until 1962, an action that consolidated mounting opposition to Rojas Pinilla and
precipitated his subsequent fall from power.
By early 1957, most organized groups opposed Rojas Pinilla. Liberal and Conservative elites, to
whom the populist and
demagogic Rojas Pinilla had become a greater threat than their traditional party adversaries,
decided to stop feuding and to join forces against the president under the banner of the National
Front. Conservative and Liberal leaders had been negotiating an alliance since early 1956. In July
1956, Gómez--in exile in Spain--and Lleras Camargo signed the Declaration of Benidorm, a
document that laid the foundation for the future institutionalization of a coalition government. The
moderate Conservatives, supporting Rojas Pinilla until 1957, did not join in negotiations with the
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Liberals until that time.
Although factionalism between moderates and reactionaries slowed the process, all concerned
parties signed a final agreement in San Carlos in 1957. Based on the Sitges Agreement signed
between the reactionaries and the Liberals in Sitges, Spain, in 1957, the San Carlos Agreement
stipulated that a Conservative, either moderate or reactionary, would be the first president under a
National Front and that he would be elected by a National Congress previously elected by popular
vote. The Sitges and San Carlos agreements, which sought to reduce interparty tensions and
provide a basis for power-sharing between the parties, also called for the following: restoration of
the Constitution of 1886, which had been abolished by Rojas Pinilla; the alternation of the
presidency between the two parties every four years; parity between parties in all legislative bodies;
a required two-thirds majority vote for the passage of legislation; the establishment of an
administrative career service of neutral parties not subject to partisan appointment; women's
suffrage and equal political rights for women; and the devotion of at least 10 percent of the national
budget to education.
As the party leaders laid the basis for a coalition government, the tides of discontent turned against
Rojas Pinilla. When Rojas Pinilla ordered the arrest of Guillermo León Valencia, a Conservative
leader involved in the formation of the National Front, Rojas Pinilla was confronted with student
demonstrations, massive strikes, riots, and finally the declared opposition of the church and the
defection of top-ranking military officers. In May 1957, faced with a multitude of protesters and
top military leaders requesting his resignation, Rojas Pinilla resigned and went into temporary exile
in Spain. Power reverted to a five-man junta led by General Gabriel París, who promised the free
election of a civilian president in August 1958.
In December 1957, Colombians voted overwhelmingly in a national plebiscite to approve the Sitges
and San Carlos agreements as amendments to the Constitution of 1886. Congressional elections
were held soon thereafter, with the result that the reactionary Conservatives emerged as the largest
faction of the Conservative half of Congress. Gómez vetoed the proposed presidential candidacy of
Valencia, who until then had been the strongest Conservative candidate. As a result of this division
within the PC, faction leaders agreed to allow a Liberal to be the first president under the National
Front and to extend the provision of the coalition government from twelve to sixteen years. These
agreements were ratified by Congress as constitutional amendments in 1958. In August of that
year, Lleras Camargo, a Liberal, was elected as the first president under the National Front.
THE NATIONAL FRONT, 1958-74
The National Front agreement to share power between Liberals and Conservatives was a
constructive effort to assuage the interparty strife and distrust that had contributed to both the
violence and the collapse of the democratic system. Its inauguration marked the beginning of a
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gradual decline in the level of confrontation. Nevertheless, the necessity of securing bipartisan
support for any policy or action produced several difficulties--most notably, stalemate and inaction
in the governmental process, voter apathy, and the exacerbation of factionalism within the two
parties--that were to plague National Front administrations.
Instituting the Coalition Government
When Lleras Camargo took office in August 1958, he faced not only the problems of rivalry
between Liberals and Conservatives but also factional controversies within the two parties. He
succeeded, however, in demonstrating that the National Front program could point the way to a
restoration of constitutional government. His administration adopted vigorous measures to reduce
banditry and rural violence.
Lleras Camargo introduced an austerity program to improve economic conditions, with the result
that in 1958 Colombia recorded its most favorable balance of trade in twenty years. The
government cut imports, stabilized the peso (for value of the peso--see Glossary), and established
the National Planning Department. It handled labor troubles with firmness. The Lleras Camargo
government also instituted a series of programs to improve the living conditions of the masses,
including expansion of the water supply, sewers, housing, and education. An agrarian reform law
passed in 1961 provided for a new agency, the Colombian Institute of Agrarian Reform (Instituto
Colombiano de Reforma Agraria--Incora). Lleras Camargo's government made only limited
progress in land reform, however, in the face of opposition from Liberals, who denounced the plan
as inadequate, and from Conservatives, who called it communistic and revolutionary. Nevertheless,
at the end of his term in 1962, despite a difficult political situation, Lleras Camargo had done much
to stabilize the economy, stimulate increased output of industrial and agricultural products, and
bring the people a renewed confidence in the future.
Although he was strongly opposed by Gómez and his supporters among the reactionary
Conservatives, Valencia became the next official Conservative candidate of the National Front and
was elected for the 1962-66 presidential term. Only half the eligible citizens voted, but Valencia
received more than 62 percent of the votes, which perhaps confirmed the voters' belief in the
principle of alternating the presidency between the two leading parties. Valencia took only modest
steps to continue the programs initiated by his predecessor. He ignored, for example, the National
Planning Department and failed to fill vacancies as they occurred. Incora's land reform program
also ran into opposition from large landholders. In addition, Valencia's finance minister, Carlos
Sanz, devalued the peso and proposed new taxes, thereby arousing the hostility of Congress.
Declining economic conditions contributed to growing social unrest. Increasing prices, the printing
of growing quantities of paper money, and a drop in the price of coffee affected the economy
adversely and contributed to increased inflation. Drains on the economy were generated by
contraband trade with neighboring countries. The equivalent of some US$64 million in foreign
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loans promised in 1964 had been withheld, and the government was faced with a serious deficit.
Rumors of plots against the government circulated, students protesting high prices rioted in Bogotá,
and kidnappings occurred frequently. Valencia declared a state of siege in May 1965 and, having
lost additional congressional support, was forced to rule by decree. The war minister, General
Alberto Ruiz Novoa, succeeded in reducing civil disorders; Ruiz was dismissed in January 1965,
however, after he openly criticized the president and made it known that he considered himself a
leader who might bring order out of the confusion that plagued the nation.
In mid-1965 the state of siege enabled Valencia and his new finance minister, Joaquín Vallejo, to
enact reforms by decree. They raised taxes, collected delinquent taxes, limited imports, and applied
other austerity measures. The United States and international lending agencies then agreed to make
loans to Colombia with the understanding that the government would take vigorous action to
improve its financial situation. Inflation leveled off, and rumors of plots to remove the president
died down.
Opposition to the National Front
Despite the constitutional amendment stipulating that only the PL and PC were authorized to
participate in elections, dissident groups opposing the National Front arrangement formed
"movements" to challenge the establishment by presenting candidates under the Liberal and
Conservative labels. In 1959 Liberal dissidents formed the Liberal Recovery Movement
(Movimiento de Recuperación Liberal)- -subsequently renamed the Liberal Revolutionary
Movement (Movimiento Revolucionario Liberal--MRL)--under the leadership of Alfonso López
Michelsen, son of ex-President López Pumarejo. The more serious challenge to the National Front
arrangement came from the populist National Popular Alliance (Alianza Nacional Popular-Anapo), which was founded in 1961 by Rojas Pinilla after his return from exile. The potential
popular support for these dissident movements was manifest in the congressional elections of 1964,
when 70 percent of the voters failed to cast ballots and 10 percent voted against Valencia's
candidates. Congressional victories by Anapo and MRL reduced Valencia's support in the
legislature to a narrow majority.
During the mid-1960s, the embers of la violencia were dying out, but guerrilla activity was
increasing. In 1964, the National Liberation Army (Ejército de Liberación Nacional--ELN) was
formed by students who were disenchanted with the pro-Soviet Communist Party of Colombia
(Partido Comunista de Colombia--PCC) and inspired by the Cuban Revolution. The ELN gained
its greatest notoriety when Father Camilo Torres, a Roman Catholic priest, joined the guerrilla
group in 1966 and was killed in an armed conflict with government forces shortly thereafter. In
1966 another guerrilla movement--the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (Fuerzas
Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia--FARC)--began operating and was officially designated as a
branch of the PCC.
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Carlos Lleras Restrepo, the third president under the National Front, proved to be an effective
leader. He was opposed in the 1966 election by the Liberal Anapo candidate, who won almost 30
percent of the vote. Aided by an especially competent group of cabinet members, Lleras Restrepo
enacted a number of reforms during his tenure in office. He swiftly announced the creation of a
series of presidential task forces to draw up national development plans, which included the
establishment of exchange controls to combat the mounting foreign exchange difficulties; an
increased state role in economic development; and funding for new housing, infrastructure, and
industrial development projects. These proposals drew support from international lending agencies,
which helped ease the fiscal problems that had beset the Valencia administration.
The effectiveness of the government was increased by the sweeping constitutional reforms of
December 1968, which abolished the requirement of a two-thirds majority for Congress to pass
major bills and gave greater authority to the executive in economic decision making. In addition,
the reforms provided for the gradual phasing out of the National Front arrangement during the
coming decade. Having discarded major obstacles that had stalemated previous National Front
administrations, Lleras Restrepo built on the efforts of Lleras Camargo in economic and social
reform. The government revised tax laws and rationalized tax collection through more rigid
enforcement. Wage and price controls helped stabilize the currency, and inflation was held to a
moderate 7 percent per year. The Lleras Restrepo administration improved the balance of
payments situation through a program of export diversification, through which exports other than
coffee more than doubled between 1966 and 1970. The government reorganized the Ministry of
Agriculture and gave it increased resources to finance investments in the agricultural sector. Incora
intensified agrarian reform efforts and issued more than 60,000 land titles to tenants and
sharecroppers in 1968 and 1969 alone. The creation of the Andean Common Market in 1969
further stimulated economic expansion through the integration of the economies of Colombia and
its neighbors.
The policies of the Lleras Restrepo administration resulted in an increased rate of economic
growth. Nevertheless, an explosive population increase continued to add some 200,000 young
Colombians to the labor force each year, and the problems of poverty and unemployment
persisted. A system of family planning was launched, in spite of considerable church opposition, in
an attempt to slow the population growth that was largely nullifying the economic gains.
Unrest in the late 1960s assumed a more urban and more nearly class-oriented base as rural and
interparty violence receded. Rural disorders declined markedly as a consequence of optimism on
the economic front and the capture of some of the most prominent guerrilla leaders. In 1968,
however, a new guerrilla group--the Popular Liberation Army (Ejército Popular de Liberación-EPL)--was formed as the armed branch of the Communist Party of Colombia-- Marxist-Leninist
(Partido Comunista de Colombia--MarxistaLeninista --PCC-ML), a pro-Chinese group. In
December 1968 Lleras Restrepo lifted the state of siege that had been imposed under Valencia in
1965. Sporadic incidents of violence occurred, however, especially among dissident students and
labor union members, and the government reinstated its emergency powers on several occasions.
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Dissidence within the PL was lessened through the reintegration of the MRL and its leader, López
Michelsen, who came to play a valuable role in the Lleras Restrepo government. In the 1968,
congressional elections, those elements of both the PL and PC that supported the National Front
arrangement gained a strong majority in the legislature. Voter apathy persisted, however, and less
than 40 percent of eligible voters participated.
Under the banner of Anapo, Rojas Pinilla continued his appeal to the urban masses and the
peasantry, promising solutions to the problems of unemployment and inflation and advocating free
education and health care for the poor. Anapo challenged the National Front by presenting Rojas
Pinilla as a Conservative candidate for the presidency in 1970. The election took place in an
atmosphere of escalating violence, and the public received with widespread skepticism the official
announcement that the Conservative candidate of the National Front, Misael Pastrana Borrero, had
won by a narrow margin of 65,000 votes. The outpouring of support for Rojas Pinilla indicated
significant voter dissatisfaction with the National Front's response to Colombia's persistent social
and economic problems.
Dismantling the Coalition Apparatus
Pastrana was the last president to be elected under the provisions of the National Front. In 1970
the government began to dismantle the structure of the National Front in accordance with the 1968
constitutional amendments. The parity provision for elective legislative bodies and the exclusion of
nontraditional parties from participation in elections no longer applied on the local level. These
changes also went into effect on the national level in 1974, in time for the election of Pastrana's
successor.
The liberalization of the political system in effect undercut support for the bipartisan movements
that had challenged the traditional parties during the National Front. Although Anapo declared itself
an official party in 1971, it declined in popularity and electoral strength. María Eugenia Rojas--the
Anapo candidate in the 1974 presidential election--received less than 10 percent of the vote. After
General Rojas Pinilla's death in 1975, the party continued to lose strength, eventually allying itself
with other marginal movements that, by themselves, drew insignificant results at the polls.
Pastrana termed his administration the "Social Front" and followed most of the policies of his
predecessor. In two areas of economic policy, however, he differed: land reform and the status of
the construction sector. Pastrana's proposals for land reform included promises of redistribution;
however, the large landowners objected to the government's proposal to base taxation on potential
rather than actual income from the land. In the course of negotiations between the agricultural
interests and the different party factions, productivity replaced redistribution as a priority. The
government granted major concessions to the large agriculturists concerning the bases for assessing
income and real estate taxes. It also guaranteed that new sources of credit be made available for
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modernizing the agricultural sector along capital intensive lines.
In industrial policy, Pastrana selected construction as the "leading sector." The administration
advocated public investment in construction projects as the engine of growth for the economy
because it created employment and increased income and, by extension, increased demand for
domestically produced items. Pastrana also encouraged private investment in the leading sector
through the establishment of the Units of Constant Purchasing Power (Unidades de Poder
Adquisitivo Constante--UPAC), a system by which an investment not only accrued interest but also
was adjusted for inflation. The UPAC system of adjusting for inflation extended to many elements
of the economy, including life insurance, wages, and prices. The combination of the UPAC system
and the huge investment in construction over-stimulated the economy and fueled inflation, which
reached 27 percent by 1974.
Guerrilla activity continued during the Pastrana administration. In 1972 another guerrilla group--the
19th of April Movement (Movimiento 19 de Abril--M-19)--emerged. The M-19 took its name
from the date on which Rojas Pinilla was narrowly and, in their minds, fraudulently, defeated by
Pastrana. Although the M-19 claimed to be the armed branch of Anapo, the Rojas Pinilla
organization disavowed any connection to the guerrilla group.
THE POST-NATIONAL FRONT PERIOD, 1974-82
The Erosion of Partisan Affiliations
The PL and PC were weak, divided into factions, and inadequately organized at the end of the
existence of the National Front. Because the political parties were not eager to engage in intense
competition, Colombia achieved a peaceful transition to an open system. The principle of powersharing was retained, although a president was allowed to select appointees from whatever sources
he chose if the opposition refused to participate in his government.
The experience of the National Front, the lack of organizational efforts by the parties, and the
massive migrations from rural to urban areas weakened party affiliations, which also decreased the
likelihood of interparty violence. This weakening of party identification emerged as an unforeseen
consequence of the nonpartisan structure of the National Front, in which party loyalty was less
important than support for a particular faction. In addition, rapid urbanization and industrialization
eroded the traditional bases of partisan support because Liberal supporters were transplanted to
Conservative communities. The period after the National Front also reflected a growing gap
between the issues and agendas of the political elite and the demands, concerns, and expectations
of the populace.
The erosion of the bond between the elites and the masses also was manifested in the high rates of
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electoral abstentionism, rising levels of mass political apathy and cynicism, the emergence of an
urban swing vote, and widespread distrust of the nation's political institutions and leadership. The
image the masses held of the elite was tarnished by the failure of the elite as a whole to institute
promised reforms and by suspected links between some leaders and the drug trade. The traditional
mechanisms of political control, such as inherited party affiliation, patrimonialism, and clientelism,
lost their effectiveness, especially in the growing urban areas.
The government's failure to accommodate the new social groups and classes that had emerged
during Colombia's modernization generated the increasing alienation of the masses from the
political leadership and caused some elements among the masses to resort to militancy. Thus,
Colombia experienced a radicalization of peasant movements, an increase in urban protests, a
growing restlessness within the urban labor movement, and a surge in rural and urban guerrilla
activity.
Popular discontent with the government's management of the economy continued despite steady
economic growth and high primary export revenues in the mid-1970s. The post-National Front
period began in the midst of inflation and unemployment that fueled social unrest and prompted the
government to institute unpopular anti-inflationary austerity measures. Subsequent moves to
increase employment by raising public spending on construction and infrastructure projects did
more to augment the national debt than to alleviate the unemployment problem. As the coffee
boom receded, growth rates declined steadily through the 1978-82 period. The massive
underground economy, fueled by drug trafficking and marijuana cultivation, undermined the
government's efforts to control inflation and contributed to the rise of a parallel financial market,
placing a large part of the national economy beyond the control of legitimate authority.
The Liberal Tenure
The first president elected in the post-National Front period, López Michelsen (1974-78), faced
difficult situations in three areas: the economy, the guerrilla movement, and the drug trade.
Subsequent governments inherited these same problems. The influx of foreign exchange from the
coffee boom and the illicit drug trade created a glut of money in the financial sector that increased
the rate of inflation. To counteract this, López Michelsen immediately instituted a stabilization
program that included austere measures, such as cutting back on public investment and social
welfare programs and tightening credit and raising the interest rate. By declaring a state of
economic emergency, López Michelsen was able to pass unpopular yet necessary economic
measures without legislative action.
Another key component of López Michelsen's economic policy was designed to improve income
distribution. The cornerstone of this effort was the "To Close the Gap" program. This program
addressed the rural sector by proposing to increase productivity and employment in the countryside
and integrate the rural sector into the monetary market with the support of the Integrated Rural
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Development program.
The "To Close the Gap" plan had its greatest impact, however temporary, in the tax reform of
1974. The tax reform, instituted two months after López Michelsen took office, made changes in
the sales tax, export taxes and incentives, import surcharges, the tax treatment of government
agencies, and personal and corporate income taxes. The reform had four general goals: to make the
tax system more progressive, to reduce the distorting effects of the tax system on resource
allocation, to promote economic stability by increasing revenues on a one-time basis and by
enhancing the built- in response of the tax system to growth in the national income, and to simplify
tax administration and compliance and thereby reduce evasion and increase yields. The
government recorded a short-term fiscal improvement; nevertheless, inflation and a failure to
improve administrative procedures allowed for continued large-scale tax evasion and an ultimate
drop in revenues.
The austerity that the López Michelsen administration forced on the country had unpopular
consequences. Inflation outstripped wage increases, nontraditional exports faced unfavorable trade
conditions, and the industrial sector entered into a slump. Students and labor groups engaged in
periodic protests and strikes. In October 1976, López Michelsen imposed a state of siege following
two months of strikes by social security employees. The continuing discontent with the
government erupted again in September 1977 when the four major labor unions joined in a strike
to protest the high cost of living. Under the state of siege measures still in effect, the administration
declared the strike illegal. Riots following the government's attempt to suppress the strike resulted
in twenty deaths. Several cabinet ministers resigned in protest over the way the strike had been
handled.
Guerrilla activity resurged during the López Michelsen administration, although some groups
actually became less active. The FARC was the most active, operating in rural areas in the
departments of Antioquia, Tolima, Magdalena, Boyacá, Caquetá, and Meta. The M-19 kidnapped
and held more than 400 people for ransom. The ELN, especially active in southern Bolívar
Department, kidnapped several prominent people and ambushed army patrols. The EPL, however,
declined in importance after the death of its founder, Pedro León Arboleda, in 1975.
Although López Michelsen did not view drug trafficking as a serious threat at the beginning of his
administration, by 1978 he recognized the ruinous impact that the drug industry was having on the
political and economic structure of Colombian society. Corruption financed by the drug rings
permeated all levels of the political system. Those in office or campaigning for office who spoke
out against the major drug traffickers rightfully feared for their lives. In some areas, prominent
drug traffickers were so powerful that they were able to get themselves elected to local or state
offices.
Although the narcotics industry contributed to a foreign exchange surplus and generated
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employment, its overall impact was detrimental to the national economy. The influx of dollars
contributed to the increase in the money supply and the creation of a parallel economy that
competed with the official economy for financial resources. The industry created "boom towns" in
rural Colombia that rose and fell within short periods of time. The income provided by the drug
industry was used primarily for conspicuous consumption rather than for productive investment.
The slash-and-burn method of cultivating marijuana destroyed fertile land that could have been
used for legal food production, resulting in both a damaged environment and a national need to
import food. The parallel economy contaminated the official economy through the laundering of
narco-dollars, often through the "side windows" of government banks and the real estate industry.
Drug traffickers also purchased legitimate businesses, such as banks, textile mills, and sports teams.
The drug traffickers' control over a large portion of the illicit economy and a significant amount of
the official economy undercut government efforts at national economic planning. In addition,
government efforts to combat drug trafficking drained funds, which could have been used more
productively elsewhere.
In late 1977, observers mistakenly predicted that the Conservative Belisario Betancur Cuartas
would win the 1978 presidential election because of the division of the PL into rival factions that
supported Lleras Restrepo and Julio César Turbay Ayala. Turbay became the nominee of the PL
after his faction won the most seats in the February 1978 congressional elections. The presidential
campaign was largely personalistic in that neither candidate took specific positions on major issues.
The candidates differed, however, in their reliance on partisan machinery. Turbay stressed the
party connection, whereas Betancur, representing the minority party, claimed to be a candidate of
its National Movement (Movimiento Nacional), which joined together Conservatives, dissident
Liberals, remnants of Anapo, and members of the Christian Social Democratic Party (Partido
Social Democrática Cristiano-- PSDC). Turbay won the presidential election by a narrow margin;
approximately 60 percent of all voters abstained.
The Turbay administration (1978-82) inherited a slightly improved financial situation because the
austerity measures instituted under López Michelsen and declining coffee revenues had produced a
lower rate of inflation by 1978. Turbay focused his economic policy on reducing unemployment
and avoiding an impending recession. A main goal was the decentralization of fiscal resources and
the promotion of regional autonomy, which made public investment in infrastructure a priority. His
National Integration Plan (Plan de Integración Nacional--PIN) of 1979-82 foresaw growth in public
investment to reach 19 percent in real terms. Because government revenues from coffee exports
were declining at this time, Turbay had to finance the growth in public spending by turning to
foreign loans. The increased public spending thus contributed both to a renewed rise in inflation
and to a massive increase in foreign debt. Attempting to avoid a recession, Turbay also encouraged
foreign investment in Colombia and promoted domestic investment in labor-intensive industries to
reduce high urban unemployment. In spite of increased government spending, Colombia
experienced a recession caused by tight credit and high interest rates, a reduction in protectionist
tariffs, grants of import licenses for industrial goods, smuggled imports, and a decreased world
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demand for industrial goods produced in Colombia.
Shortly after taking office, Turbay gave top priority to combating guerrilla activity and narcotics
trafficking. Although designed ostensibly to counteract drug trafficking, the institution of a state of
siege and the National Security Statute of 1978 substantially enhanced the government's ability to
act against guerrillas.
Critics charged that the military and police forces used the security statute to detain indiscriminately
"cultural subversives"- -including prominent journalists, artists, and scholars--who were suspected
of being associated with left-wing elements. Threats to invoke the security statute in nonpolitical
cases, such as protests for a better water supply, suppressed popular unrest. Persons arrested on
political charges alleged that the armed forces had resorted to torture during interrogation.
Although the government claimed that tough measures were needed to counter leftist subversion,
critics asserted that repression resulted from the worsening economic situation. The deteriorating
human rights situation drew criticism from leaders of both parties and from international
organizations such as Amnesty International. Turbay lifted the state of siege and nullified the
security statute in June 1982, shortly before leaving office.
Despite the severe measures taken against leftist subversion, guerrilla activity increased and
reached a peak during the Turbay administration. Although the ELN was less active than during the
López Michelsen administration, the FARC expanded its operations, especially in Cauca and
Caldas departments.
The M-19 emerged as the most active guerrilla group during this period. In January 1979,
members of the M-19 tunneled into a military arsenal in Bogotá and took 5,000 guns. Within a few
weeks, however, most of the weapons were recovered, and many of the participants were arrested.
In October 1979, more than 200 accused M-19 members were brought to trial in Bogotá. The
delay of other military trials of M-19 members probably led to the movement's takeover of the
embassy of the Dominican Republic in February 1980, in which fourteen diplomats, including the
ambassador of the United States, were held hostage. The seizure ended peacefully when the
kidnappers received safe conduct out of the city and a promise that the Inter-American Human
Rights Commission would be permitted to investigate allegations of human rights abuses. By the
end of 1981, the M-19 had shifted from purely urban to mostly rural operations and had formed a
tenuous union with the other three guerrilla groups. In March of that year, Turbay proposed--and
the Senate approved--a limited four-month amnesty for those guerrillas already detained if a
sufficient number in the field were to lay down their arms. A second limited amnesty for those
guerrillas who surrendered peacefully was approved for the period from February to June 1982.
Turbay also took a strong stance against drug traffickers. In 1978 the president gave the army a
key role in the main operation to control drug trafficking and marijuana cultivation in the
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department of La Guajira, including allowing a military occupation of the region. Two years later,
the government transferred responsibility for the antidrug campaign in La Guajira to units of the
National Police. Combined efforts with the United States produced some success; for example, the
joint Operation Tiburón, which began in December 1980, resulted in the seizure of more than
2,700 tons of marijuana. Despite some impressive victories, however, the drug traffickers
continued to wield increasing economic and political power in the country.
In the early 1980s, evidence came to the fore linking some Colombian drug traffickers with both
Cuba and the M-19. In 1982 a federal grand jury in Miami indicted four close aides of Cuban
president Fidel Castro Ruz on charges of smuggling narcotics into the United States. According to
the indictment, the aides assisted the operations of Colombia drug trafficker Jaime Guillot Lara,
who, in turn, funneled arms and money on Cuba's behalf to the M-19.
A contradictory episode in the relationship between the guerrillas and the drug trade was the
December 1981 founding of the right-wing "paramilitary" group Death to Kidnappers (Muerte a
Secuestradores--MAS) by prominent drug lords Carlos Ledher Rivas and Jorge Luis Ochoa
Vásquez. MAS apparently was established to intimidate and punish those guerrilla groups,
especially the M-19, that had engaged in the ransom of key members of the drug community in
order to finance their operations. MAS subsequently became a death squad, targeting left-wing
politicians, students, and party members.
The post-National Front Liberal presidencies proved unable to stem the growth in guerrilla activity
and narcotics trafficking. A divided PL thus lost support and the presidency to the PC, effecting a
peaceful alternation of power between the two parties. In 1982 the PL presented López Michelsen
for reelection, supported by the Turbay faction of the party. Opposing him from the LP was Luis
Carlos Galán Sarmiento, a member of the Lleras Restrepo faction. In 1979 Galán had formed the
New Liberalism Movement (Movimiento Nuevo Liberalismo--MNL) and accused the TurbayLópez Michelsen forces of opportunism, clientelism, and corruption. The PC coalesced again
behind Betancur and his National Movement. López Michelsen employed the partisan campaign
style that Turbay had used in the previous election, counting on the Liberal majority to remain
loyal to the party. Betancur retained his minority strategy of stressing coalition over party affiliation
and received endorsements from Gloria Eliécer Gaitán, daughter of Jorge Gaitán, and from María
Eugenia Rojas. With the voter abstention rate reduced to 54 percent, Betancur won a decisive
victory, receiving support from some traditionally Liberal areas. The election represented the first
peaceful exchange of power between the two parties since the end of the National Front.
Upon taking office, Betancur confronted the economic and social conditions bequeathed by his
predecessors: economic recession, fiscal deficit, foreign debt, inflation, and unemployment. The
parallel economy remained a major concern, as did the growing strength of drug traffickers. On the
social front, Betancur sought to negotiate a peace with the guerrillas, offering them unconditional
amnesty and legitimate participation in the political system.
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SOURCE: Library of Congress: Country Studies Series -- Colombia
Note on History: In certain entries, open source content from the State Department Background
Notes and Country Guides have been used. A full listing of sources is available in the
Bibliography.
Political Conditions
Post-Independence
In 1819, following the establishment of the Republic of Greater Colombia, Simón Bolivar and
Francisco de Paula Santander were elected as president and vice president. The two leaders,
Bolivar and Santander, had conflicting political views and therefore gained the support of different
followers. While Bolivar promoted a strong central government, limited franchise and an alliance
between the state and the Roman Catholic Church, Santander advocated a decentralized
government, widened suffrage, and state control over education and other civil institutions, without
the involvement of the church. Conflicts between the followers of Bolivar and Santander led to the
development of the two political parties that have since dominated Colombian politics, namely the
"Partido Conservativo," also known as the PC, or Conservative Party and the "Partido Liberal,"
also called the PL, or Liberal Party.
The "Partido Conservativo" and the "Partido Liberal" held the presidency for roughly equal periods
of time throughout the 19th and early 20th centuries, and, unlike other Latin American countries,
Colombia maintained a seldom-interrupted tradition of civilian government with regular, free
elections.
In 1830, Venezuela and Ecuador seceded from the republic and the military assumed power, but
civilian rule was restored within a year.
In 1854, PL president José María Obando was overthrown in a coup d'état led by Gen. José María
Melo, who represented an opposing faction of Obando's own "Partido Liberal." Melo declared
himself dictator, but proved unable to consolidate the interests of his faction and was overthrown
and replaced by a civilian president after only eight months in power.
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Despite Colombia's commitment to democratic institutions, periods of widespread, violent conflict
have been common in the nation's history. Bitter rivalry between the "Partid o Conservativo" and
the "Partido Liberal" led to two civil wars, the War of a Thousand Day and "La Violencia," during
which up to 300,000 lives were lost.
A lead actor in reducing the conflict during "La Violencia" was Gen. Gustavo Rojas Pinilla, who
subsequently acquired a great deal of popular support. In 1953, Rojas Pinilla came to power via
military coup. His populist rule eventually triggered the PC and PL elites to unite and form an
alliance against him, which they called the National Front. When Pinilla failed to restore democratic
rule after four years, the military overthrew him with the backing of the PC, the PL and most
organized groups. A provisional government was subsequently installed.
In July 1957, the National Front, led by Liberal Alberto Lleras Camargo, who held the presidency
from 1945-46, and Conservative Laureano Gomez, who served as president from 1950-53, issued
the Declaration of Sitges. In it, they laid the foundations for a coalition government, whereby the
presidency would alternate between the two parties every four years through regular elections. The
parties would also have parity in all other elective and appointive offices. The agreement was a
constructive effort to pacify the inter-party strife and distrust that had contributed to violence and
the collapse of the democratic system.
In the end, the National Front did bring "La Violencia" to an end, in addition to instituting farreaching economic and social reforms. From 1961 to 1974, Colombia received funding for reforms
through an inter-American program of economic assistance called the Alliance for Progress, which
had major financial backing by the United States. The Alliance for Progress made strides in cutting
government expenses, while simultaneously working to resolve problems of inflation,
unemployment and inequitable income distribution.
The Emergence of Insurgent Groups
The National Front broke up in 1974. By that time, its nonpartisan structure, in addition to massive
rural to urban migration, had weakened party affiliations. Political parties had become fragile,
divided into factions, and reluctant to engage in competition. Nevertheless, the National Front
period reflected a growing gap between the issues and agendas of the political elite and the
demands, concerns and expectations of the general population. As a result of the "Partido
Conservativo" and "Partido Liberal" political dominance, social and economic policies favored a
small segment of the population. (One-third of the Colombian population earned 70 percent of the
income and only two percent of the population owned 70 percent of the land.) With the process of
modernization, new social groups and classes had emerged, which the government failed to
accommodate. Political parties other than the PL and the PC were excluded from the government,
and the populace became increasingly cynic al and distrustful of political institutions and leadership.
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This prompted the emergence of various armed groups, influenced by several forms of
communism. These insurgents were forced to the periphery in the 1950s during "La Violencia," but
by 1964, the "liberals comunes" and the communists joined forces to form the Revolutionary
Armed Forces of Colombia , also known as FARC. In 1965, the National Liberation Army, or
ELN, a guerrilla group based on the Cuban model, was formed. This was followed by the 1966
formation of the Maoist-inspired Popular Liberation Army, also called EPL. These three groups
occasionally worked in conjunction with one another (Note: In 1987 they organized the Simón
Bolivar Guerrilla Coordination.)
Thus, Colombia experienced a radicalization of peasant movements, an increase in urban protests,
a growing restlessness within the urban labor movement, and a surge in rural and urban guerrilla
activity. The country became immersed in a violent civil war that would last into the 21st century.
Colombians were extremely dissatisfied with the government's mismanagement of the economy,
and a massive underground economy emerged, fueled by drug trafficking and marijuana and
cultivation. The rise of this parallel financial market placed a large portion of the national economy
beyond the control of legitimate authority.
To date, the major threats to regional integration and security in Colombia have been the guerrilla
and paramilitary groups. In order to fully understand the present guerrilla and paramilitary situation,
it is necessary to examine the various players involved:
1. The FARC is the oldest, largest and most organized insurgent group in Colombia and in the
Americas. It has widespread operations throughout Colombia and occasionally on the borders of
neighboring countries such as Peru, Ecuador, Venezuela and Brazil. The FARC's main leaders,
Manuel Marulanda and Jose Briceño , receive support from all segments of the population, but
mostly at the rural level. The FARC relies primarily on kidnapping high-profile people for ransom
money and overseeing drug operations as a means of income. It is estimated that 60 percent of its
income is derived from taxing the drug trade. Drug cultivation and production occur in southern
Colombia where the FARC is based, and drug traffickers essentially control the industry while the
FARC protects it. The two groups are separate and strive to attain different goals. The FARC
ultimately seeks to gain political power and thereby revise the government's current economic,
social and political policies to suit their ideology. They advocate democracy, agrarian reform and
state control. Methods of retaliation against the government (security forces and politicians) and
foreigners include bombing and killing. The FARC is well equipped and trained to fight the
Colombian army.
2. The ELN is a pro-Soviet group of rebels led by Nicolas Rodriguez. They are mostly rurally
based, with a primary concentration in the northeast bordering Venezuela. The ELN employs
similar tactics as the FARC, such as kidnapping for ransom money, to sustain their operations.
They are opposed to privatization and foreign investment, as exemplified by the bombing of
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electricity pylons and oil pipelines. Essentially, the ELN activities are aimed at achieving political
status; the group ultimately envisions a socialist government.
3. Originally a Maoist group of rebels, the EPL traditionally resorted to violence for political
achievement but they now use peaceful methods. Since making peace with the government they
have enjoyed some political representation. They are often subject to attacks from other guerrilla
groups and paramilitary groups.
4. The primary paramilitary group, is the United Self-Defense Groups of Colombia, or AUC. The
group originated in northern Colombia with operations currently spanning 550 municipalities.
Paramilitary groups were originally created in the 1980s by the government to combat guerrilla
activities. However, due to rampant activities that the AUC performed against the civilian
population, the government declared the group illegal in 1989. The AUC is often criticized for
indiscriminate sprees that kill guerrilla sympathizers. Although the government formally severed its
ties with the paramilitaries, it is widely known that certain army members and politicians are
actively involved in AUC operations. In addition, the AUC receives most of its funding and support
from drug barons, right-wing landowners and businessmen. Carlos Castaño, leader of the AUC,
publicly admitted to receiving funds from drug traffickers.
Events in the 1980s
In 1984, President Belisario Betancur, a conservative who won 47 percent of the popular vote,
negotiated a cease-fire that included the release of many guerrillas imprisoned during the effort to
overpower the insurgents. The cease-fire began to unravel when Democratic Alliance/M-19
(AD/M-19) guerrillas resumed fighting in 1985.
A vicious attack on the Palace of Justice in Bogotá by the AD/M-19 on Nov. 6-7, 1985, shocked
Colombia and the entire world. Of the 115 people killed, 11 were Supreme Court justices.
Although the government and the FARC, the largest guerrilla group, renewed their truce in March
1986, peace with the AD/M-19 and dissident factions of other guerrilla groups seemed remote as
Betancur left office.
The next administrations had to contend with both guerrillas and narcotics traffickers, who
operated with relative impunity within Colombia. Narco-terrorists assassinated three presidential
candidates before Cesar Gaviria Trujillo was elected in 1990. With the death of the Medellín drug
cartel leader, Pablo Escobar, in December 1993, indiscriminate acts of violence associated with that
organization abated.
Events in the 1990s
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President Ernesto Samper assumed office in August 1994. Samper vowed to continue many of the
economic and foreign policy goals of the Gaviria administration, while also placing greater
emphasis on addressing social inequities and eliminating poverty. Samper's political crisis (relating
to contributions from drug traffickers to his 1994 presidential campaign) diverted attention away
from these social programs, however, thus slowing, and in some cases, halting progress. His vice
president, Humberto de la Calle Lombana, resigned in September 1996 in protest of the president's
mismanagement of the government and narco-links. De la Calle was replaced by Carlos Lemos
Simmonds.
By 1996, economic growth had slowed and unemployment increased in Colombia as a result of an
overvalued currency, excessive public spending, and the impact of global financial instability.
Presidential elections were held once again in 1998, and constitutional law prohibited Samper from
seeking re-election. The main candidates were Andrés Pastrana of the Social Conservative Party,
Horacio Serpa of the "Partido Liberal," and independents Noemi Sanin and Harold Bedoya. In the
first round, held on May 31, Pastrana received 34.4 percent of the vote, Serpa took 34.6 percent,
Sanin received 26.9 percent, and Bedoya gained 1.9 percent. Sanin's record gain jolted Colombia's
two-party system, as hers was the first independent candidacy to seriously challenge the Liberal
and Conservative parties' power monopoly. In the run-off election, held on June 18, Pastrana
defeated Serpa with 52 percent of the vote to Serpa's 48 percent.
On Aug. 7, 1998, Andrés Pastrana was sworn in as president of Colombia. He inherited a host of
problems centered around the ongoing 34-year civil war between guerrilla operations by leftist rebel
groups and right-wing paramilitary groups, as well as the ever-growing illicit drug trade and a failing
economy. The Pastrana administration concentrated its resources in four areas: promoting regional
integration and security, expanding economic growth, strengthening counter-narcotics operations
and restoring damaged relations with the United States.
At the time of Pastrana's administration, the government's security forces nvolved in the fighting
were the army and police; they cooperated to form a drug-fighting unit. The air force and navy
also assisted, but their role was limited. However, all security force divisions were revised and
trained, especially the army, which has been known to sympathize with the AUC. In several
reported instances, the army sent troops to help the paramilitary combat guerrilla forces.
An average of 3,000 people per year are killed in Colombia as a result of the civil war. When he
was functioning as president-elect, Andrés Pastrana took several steps toward addressing the
guerrilla issues. Following a historic secret meeting with FARC head Manuel Marulanda in July
1998, Pastrana announced plans to begin peace talks within 90 days of his inauguration. The
announcement came just before a meeting in Germany between Colombian delegates and leaders
of the FARC. While committed to strengthening his security forces, Pastrana was determined to
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solve the guerrilla problem via peace talks. The Center for Strategic Studies was created to
facilitate dialogue between civilians and the military.
In the weeks after his Aug. 7, 1998, inauguration, President Pastrana visited United States
President Bill Clinton. He expressed his hopes for bringing about a peaceful resolution to
Colombia's long-standing civil conflict and conveyed his commitment to cooperating fully with the
United States in combating trafficking in illegal drugs.
Severe countrywide guerrilla attacks carried out on Aug. 3, 4 and 5, 1998, by the FARC and ELN,
which left at least 135 dead and more than 180 soldiers and police taken prisoner, highlighted the
difficulties faced by President Pastrana.
In November 1998, President Pastrana complied with FARC demands to pull government troops
out of a so-called demilitarized zone in southern Colombia. The FARC had insisted on the
withdrawal as a prerequisite to peace talks with the government. Despite the military withdrawal,
formal peace talks set for Jan. 7, 1999, were postponed until April 2 because the FARC alleged the
government was involved in a surge of paramilitary attacks. During the ensuing months, the FARC
retained full control of the demilitarized zone and created a Marxist mini-state the size of
Switzerland.
Peace talks commenced in January 1999, but a cease-fire was not reached. In February 1999, the
government extended the FARC's right to their stronghold. In a speech given at Rice University's
Baker Institute in the United States, President Pastrana suggested that these concessions were all
part of a peace process that would require time and patience. Nevertheless, the ramifications of this
decision were significant in three ways: several government officials resigned, the ELN increased
their activities, and the AUC retaliated.
The ELN convened with government officials to discuss peace, but talks were short-lived as the
government refused to grant ELN their own demilitarized zone. In April and May 1999, ELN
kidnappings, which were meant to pressure the government into creating an ELN stronghold,
significantly increased. The first event in this series of kidnappings was the hijacking of a plane,
followed by the kidnapping of church worshippers and the kidnapping of fishermen. Throughout
the year, the ELN also bombed oil pipelines and electricity pylons.
Despite the Pastrana administration's efforts to curb insurgent groups and narcotics trafficking, and
despite meetings between Pastrana and FARC leader Manuel Marulanda, FARC-related activities
continued to spread throughout Colombia, causing concern amongst the population at large.
Municipalities that surround FARC headquarters were slowly succumbing to FARC control, and
police forces in the area were frequently invaded. Mayors in the area had been slain, and the
FARC continued to threaten politicians who opposed their political agenda.
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On May 26, 1999, a key member of the Pastrana government, Minister of Defense Rodrigo
Lloreda, resigned, citing his disagreement with the withdrawal and asserting that the president was
making too many concessions to the rebels while getting nothing in return. Nearly half of
Colombia's generals and some 200 other officers also resigned. The sentiment of "too many
concessions, not enough in return" was widely felt by Colombians.
Economic Woes
The security crisis notwithstanding, Colombia was also suffering from an economic crisis. The
severity of Colombia's economic crisis was comparable to the economic slump of the 1930s. While
some improvements were realized, the Pastrana administration was faced with significant
unemployment (20 percent in urban areas), a fiscal deficit, public spending of US$4.4 billion. It
also faced a five percent contraction in GDP, a price slump in coffee and oil exports, and a crisis in
the banking system. In an effort to help the export sector, the government devalued the peso.
In late May 1999, President Pastrana launched a plan to increase foreign investment in Colombia
and pull the country out of its worst recession in 50 years. The president promised to allow some
private investment in infrastructure projects and fully privatize state-owned mining, telephone and
utility companies.
The Pastrana administration also created Plan Colombia to address the following issues: the
economy, democracy, the peace process, drug trafficking and social reform. The cost of the plan
was US$7 billion, of which Colombia would contribute US$4 billion and the international
community was expected to fund the remaining US$3 billion. President Pastrana spent several
weeks in the latter part of 1999 visiting with heads of state in North America and Europe to
promote funding for Plan Colombia.
In September 1999, the United States Congress formulated a US$1.7 billion assistance package for
Colombia. The Clinton administration publicly supported Plan Colombia, which would make the
country the third largest recipient of United States aid. Funding would span two years in the form
of goods and services such as the creation of counter-drug units and the supply of weapons and
helicopters. The premise of the package was to eradicate drug production, mostly in Colombia but
also in other Andean countries.
Meanwhile, several members of the Colombia's two houses of Congress were charged with fraud.
Throughout 1999, more than US$3 million worth of contracts were approved, the majority of
which were for "maintenance" purposes. A closer investigation of the accounts revealed that only
20 percent of the funds were actually used for repairs, leaving the remaining 80 percent
unaccounted for. This prompted President Pastrana to dismiss several key Congress members. In
addition, two senior officials were arrested on corruption charges. Shortly afterwards, President
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Pastrana proposed an anti-corruption referendum, which would replace the current Congress.
The minister of the interior resigned, citing his disapproval of the president's request to revoke the
Congress. As well, Congress members reacted to the proposed referendum by blocking the
government's key economic legislation required to comply with an economic plan proposed by the
International Monetary Fund. Amid growing political uncertainty, President Pastrana canceled the
referendum on May 26, 2000. He appointed Humberto de la Calle, a Pastrana sympathizer, to the
Ministry of the Interior, and proceeded in modifying ministerial positions in an effort to obtain
more support.
By January 2000, Colombia witnessed a significant increase in oil contracts with Canadian,
Brazilian and American companies. Still, foreign investment in the form of oil pipelines and
electricity pylons began to decrease given the deteriorating security.
Events in 2000
In March 2000, the United States House of Representatives approved a bill that included the
US$1.7 billion aid package. Release of the funds, however, was contingent on the approval of the
United States Senate, and was stalled for several months. Advocates of the aid package utilized
Bolivia and Peru as examples of countries where drug eradication had successfully decreased drug
production, while opponents of the plan noted that the drug production had just shifted from
Bolivia and Peru to Colombia. In 2000, Colombia supplied 75 percent of the world's cocaine and
was becoming a leading supplier of heroin. Many view the drug trade as inherent with the guerrilla
and paramilitary, since both groups derive the bulk of their income by taxing drug operations.
Consequently, United States funding was inevitably expected to go towards fighting insurgent
groups, leading many to believe that the United States would be mired in an ongoing civil war that
had already claimed thousands of lives.
In retaliation for the pending United States aid package, the FARC revealed plans on April 25,
2000, to levy a peace tax on all Colombians and or businesses with assets worth US$1 million or
more. In addition, the FARC intended to administer justice throughout the 130 FARC-controlled
municipalities. Shortly afterwards, the FARC announced the formation of its political party known
as the Bolivarian Movement for a New Colombia. These activities left many Colombians doubting
the possibility of an imminent cease-fire. Colombia's principal peace negotiator resigned and was
replaced.
President Pastrana abruptly cancelled peace talks scheduled for May 29, 2000, in reaction to the
brutal slaying of 53-year-old Elvia Cortés, a rancher and mother of four. A bomb placed around
her neck detonated when she failed to pay US$7,000 worth of ransom money. International
observers were appalled by the incident. The government blamed the FARC, who in turn denied
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responsibility. Later evidence, indeed, suggested that the FARC was not involved. Regardless of
the true identity of those responsible, at the time, Colombia had a higher rate of kidnapping
incidents than any other nation in the world. While peace talks between FARC and the government
progressed slowly, peace talks with the ELN were advancing at a more rapid pace.
In April 2000, the ELN began releasing hostages, and the government agreed to peace talks. The
government stated the possibility of creating a 2,900-square-kilometer demilitarized zone for the
ELN in the northeastern state of Bolivar, if, in return, the ELN will permit international observers
and allow government officials, such as judges and police, to continue working. These concessions
provoked the paramilitaries and the people living in the area to set up roadblocks.
On June 22, 2000, the United States Senate finally approved a modified version of an aid package
worth just under $US1 billion for Plan Colombia, about $US700 million less than the package the
United States lower house approved in March, and additional United States funds for Plan
Colombia were approved in the following weeks. Human rights activists around the world were
skeptical of the aid package, contending that its militaristic approach would result in the death of
more innocent civilians and prolong the armed conflict. Still, President Pastrana and former United
States President Bill Clinton were pleased that the package was approved.
Another round of peace talks between the government and the FARC were held on July 3, 2000,
but the United States aid package provided another obstacle to a cease-fire being reached. Peace
talks between FARC and the government were then suspended in November 2000. The FARC said
that the government should take more aggressive action against right-wing paramilitary groups,
which it claims to be an organ of the state used to terrorize civilians. The government refused to
admit the AUC to the peace talks, but many officials said its inclusion would be essential for the
achievement of peace.
Events in 2001
Talks resumed in February 2001, when President Pastrana paid a visit to the demilitarized zone to
meet with FARC leader Manuel Marulanda. Pastrana and Marulanda composed a new agreement
called the "Los Pozos Accord" in which they proposed to accelerate the talks, hold regular
meetings between FARC leaders and foreign diplomats, begin organizing a ceasefire, establish a
committee dedicated to easing the intensity of the conflict, and create a mechanism for the
government to check that the demilitarized zone was not being abused. The FARC demanded a
stop to military attacks and neo-liberal politics, and the government called for an end to FARC's
practices of kidnapping and blackmail. The general Colombian public continued to distrust the
process, however, and the FARC's aims remained completely unaligned with those of the
government. FARC leaders continued to profess that their goal was to do away with the current
state, and if political means did not work, they would continue using force. Violence persisted in
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the following months.
As if to create more distance between the gove rnment and FARC, the AUC and other
paramilitaries embarked on the killing of hundreds of people in dozens of incidents in the early
months of 2001. One of the main focuses of their attacks was the ELN, with the aim of preventing
the creation of the demilitarized zone for the second-largest guerrilla group. The ELN suspended
talks on March 8, 2001, but negotiations were resumed later that month. Whether the plan for the
demilitarized zone would come to fruition remained to be seen.
Pastrana visited Washington D.C. in February 2001 to meet with newly-inaugurated United States
President George W. Bush. The Colombian president was successful in obtaining United States
support for the implementation of Plan Colombia and the increase of bilateral trade, but he failed to
convince the United States to act as an observer in peace talks with guerrilla groups.
In May 2001, both the government and civilians were alarmed when bombs were set off in the
cities of Bogota, Cali, and a suburb of Medillin, killing and injuring hundreds. Prior to these events
most of the country's violence had taken place in rural areas, not in the cities where 70 percent of
the population resides, so the urban attacks were seen as an escalation in the level of gravity of the
guerrilla violence. FARC was suspected of being the perpetrator of the Bogota and Cali bombings,
and the AUC of the Medillin bombing. The right and left rebel armies, had been divided up a great
deal of the countryside between them, were now threatening to take their war to the cities.
Also in mid-2001, under foreign pressure and following several brutal civilian massacres by the
AUC, the government initiated firmer action against the right-wing paramilitaries. Officials arrested
dozens of AUC members and leaders, and investigated several ranch homes in the AUC's
stronghold in the department of Cordoba. With this and the fact that the FARC had re-entered
AUC-controlled areas of Cordoba in early and mid-2001, committing attacks, it appeared that the
AUC was faltering somewhat. In late May, its leader Carlos Castaño resigned.
On June 2, 2001, after weeks of deadlock due to legal concerns of the armed forces and political
sectors, the government and FARC reached a humanitarian accord through which FARC released
42 imprisoned police officers and soldiers in exchange for the government's release of 15 ill guerilla
prisoners. Although it was only a minor step in the grand scheme of things, the accord was the first
tangible result reached through the peace talks. The government saw it as an exhibition of the
validity of the peace talks, since FARC had backed down considerably on its demands for the
exchange. FARC claimed that the exchange was a display of its aim for peace. However, three
weeks later, FARC bombings and attacks in southern Bogota produced the heaviest casualties on
the armed forces in years. In fact, a factor that FARC leaders had probably take n into
consideration while negotiating the agreement was that freeing prisoners would free up more of its
own soldiers for combat. According to the authorities, over 500 troops and policemen are in the
hands of the FARC.
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Meanwhile, Plan Colombia was up and running, and opposition to its measures involving the
spraying of weed-killers on coca fields mounted in 2001. On July 27, a judge ruled in favor of a
group of Amazonian Indians who complained of the government's failure to examine the effect of
the chemicals on health and the environment. The judge later modified his ruling so that it applied
only to certain indigenous reserves, and the police continued to spray in all other areas. Opponents
to the spraying, including six department governors, claimed that the spraying was extremely
hazardous to human health. Some of them lobbied to the United States Congress, and the United
Nations Drug-Control Program called for international monitoring of the spraying.
As time passed, the probability that peace talks would produce an accord looked bleak, an all-out
war seemed more and more likely. In June, FARC rejected suggestions that a constituent assembly
be formed to reform Colombia's constitution, reiterating that its demand was for a direct role in
government. In July, FARC guerrillas kidnapped three German aid workers and seized a provincial
governor from a United Nations car, thus antagonizing European governments who had supported
the peace talks. In August, the government broke off talks with the ELN about arranging for peace
talks between the two entities. It was expected that the FARC and ELN would increase their use of
military force in the months preceding the May 2002 presidential elections.
In 2001, reforms that would serve to boost the economy were pending in the arenas of proposed
pension restructuring, tax increases, and cuts to public-sector wages and local government running
costs. Many feared that in the face of internal war, high unemployment, a weak financial system,
and Colombia's credit shortage, fiscal austerity would be difficult to implement, and the fiscal
deficit would be uncontrollable. Oil, coffee, and coal were Colombia's three highest foreign
exchange earners, and their prospects looked good, but private foreign investment was slow in
picking up after the deep 1999 recession. The violence and disorder that remained rampant in
Colombia were a severe detriment to investors' confidence in the country's future.
President Pastrana's goal had been to enter a peace agreement with FARC before the end of his
term in 2002. At the very least, he hoped to advance in the process to the point that it became
irreversible, so that the talks and the forging of ties between FARC and foreign diplomats would
convince the FARC to demand less, accept representative democracy, and account for its actions.
By September 2001, however, popular support for the armed forces was on the rise. With the aid
of Plan Colombia, the armed forces were gaining a great deal of strength, having benefited from
the training of troops, more sophisticated American equipment, and better intelligence. While
Pastrana and the United Nations continued to advocate for peace talks, and the United States
continued its strategy of coca eradication, the Colombian army was engaged in a great deal of
combat and apparently believed itself to be capable of defeating its opponents. Many Colombians
believed that it would take being devastated on the battlefield for the guerillas to begin negotiating
seriously for peace.
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Events in 2002
On Sunday, Jan. 13, 2002, Colombia's President, Andres Pastrana, and leaders of the
Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC) called off their three-year peace negotiations.
FARC was instructed to evacuate the demilitarized zone in the south of the country by the
afternoon of January 15. While FARC agreed to evacuate five towns in this region, the Colombian
military was prepared to use force to evacuate FARC members that remained in the jungle. FARC
threatened retaliatory action against the government.
On Monday, Jan. 14, 2002, with the intervention of international diplomats from a special United
Nations convoy, last-minute peace talks were resumed between Colombian President Andres
Pastrana, and the rebel militant group, FARC. As a result, FARC continued to maintain the
demilitarized zone while peace negotiations were being discussed.
On Feb. 21, 2002, the Colombian government broke off peace talks with FARC and began
bombing the country's southern rebel-held demilitarized zone. President Pastrana declared an end
to the peace process after FARC militants hijacked an airplane carrying Senator Jorge Gechem
Turbay, the president of the Colombian Senate's peace commission. When the plan landed in the
southern Colombia, rebels took the Senator to an unknown location, but freed the remaining
passengers who were left unharmed. A few years prior, Turbay's cousin, a congressman, was also
kidnapped and subsequently murdered. Several government officials in Colombia have been
kidnapped and murdered by either FARC or paramilitary groups.
In early March 2002, parliamentary elections were held. Results showed that despite some rather
heavy electoral losses, the Colombian Liberal Party (54 of 161 seats) and the Colombian
Conservative Party (21 of 161 seats) remained the two largest parties in the country.
Two months later, the presidential election ensued in Colombia. The election was free of violence
and chaos, thanks to the presence of over 200,000 police and soldiers at polling stations throughout
the country. There was, however, relatively low turnout.
Alvaro Uribe, an independent candidate and lawyer aligned with outgoing President Pastrana, won
the first round of the presidential election. His victory was won with 53 percent of the votes cast.
In this way, Uribe secured a definite majority of the votes cast against the other 10 candidates and
precluded the need for a second round of voting. Uribe's closest opponent, Horacio Serpa, the
leader of the Liberal Party, garnered 31percent of the vote. Serpa promptly resigned as leader of
the Liberal Party following the election. Outgoing President Pastrana was constitutionally barred
from running for an additional term and his Conservative Party was ensconced in such turmoil that
it did not offer a Conservative candidate to contest the election. Meanwhile, the Revolutionary
Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC), the primary left-wing rebel group, boycotted the election.
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The newly-elected president called upon both the United States and the United Nations to offer
assistance to Colombia in dealing with its ongoing civil war. Specifically, Uribe asked for military
aid to combat narcotics trafficking and to prevent the transference of arms to rebel groups.
Assistance in negotiating with left-wing rebels, such as FARC, as well as right-wing paramilitaries,
such as the United Self-Defense Forces of Colombia (AUC), was also requested.
Uribe's landslide victory was viewed as a tremendous show of support for increased military
spending. Although Uribe promised an agenda of peace and security, critics suggested that he
would give preferentiality to right-wing paramilitaries, in contrast to left-wing rebels. However,
Uribe asserted his intent to take a hard-line approach with both groups. Despite this assertion, the
AUC conveyed its congratulations to Uribe.
Uribe's proposed policies and programs included a plan to return Colombia's extensive coca fields
back to their natural tropical forest, commercial loans for the unemployed to establish new
businesses, and the reduction of the number of parliamentarians by half, as well as a salary cut for
remai ning parliamentarians.
Meanwhile, the death toll in Colombia's ongoing political farrago continued to mount with no
decisive or absolute guarantee of peace in the near future. Indeed, by August 2002, Colombia's
new president declared a national state of emergency following several days of violence that came
on the heels of his inauguration. Using the powers provided by the constitution of Colombia, Uribe
led an emergency cabinet meeting that resulted in the suspension of civil liberties in the face of
threats to the country's security. The wave of violence began with attacks at a military barracks
and at the presidential palace. The violence continued with a death toll exceeding 100 people in a
short period of time.
In accordance with the constitution, the state of emergency could endure for as many as 90 days
and if required, it could be extended for two 90-day periods. In addition to the state of emergency,
Uribe also established an emergency tax which would allow the government to direct approximately
$778 million toward military expenditures. Intensified military action was deemed necessary to deal
with FARC, the left-wing guerrilla group reportedly responsible for the spate of violence.
Events in 2003
Another spate of violence plagued Colombia in early 2003. A plane with four Americans and one
Colombian crashed in a part of Colombia controlled by FARC. Two of the survivors -- one of the
Americans and the sole Colombian -- were assassinated "execution style," presumably by the leftist
rebels. The remaining three individuals were seemingly taken hostage. The crash followed just
after another plane crash in which Juan Luis Londono, a Colombian cabinet minister, was one of
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the victims. That plane also went down in rebel-held territory but no cause of the crash has yet
been determined. Efforts to retrieve the bodies of government personnel on the aircraft were
hampered by gunfire from FARC activists in the region.
In addition to the plane crashes, two car bombs exploded at an exclusive club in Bogota frequented
by diplomatic staff and the country's elite. The blasts killed 35 people, including six children. The
rebel group FARC was again implicated in these incidences. Only a few days prior, another bomb
exploded. That time, the blast took place in a western town called Neiva. Seventeen people died
and over 30 people were injured in the bomb blast, which appeared to have originated in a house
that was planted with explosives. Once again, the primary suspects were the members of FARC.
In August 2003, a year after President Uribe was inaugurated, three separate bomb attacks took
place, killing six people and injuring several others. One attack took place in San Martin, about 125
miles (200 kilometers) south of the Colombian capital of Bogota. An earlier car bomb exploded on
a highway just sou th of Bogota, while the first in the spate of bombings took place in Arauca.
FARC was reported to have been responsible for the latest attacks.
Then, in October 2003, Marco Aurelio Buendia, of the Revolutionary Armed forces of Colombia
(FARC), was killed in fighting just north-east of the Colombian capital city of Bogota. The
Colombian army stated that the senior rebel commander, as well as nine other guerillas, had been
killed in the violent clashes. The army also declared the death of Buendia to be one of the most
important victories in the fight against the rebel insurgency movement since President Alvaro Uribe
came to power in 2002.
Since coming to power, Colombian President Alvaro Uribe promised to deal with the leftist rebels,
as well as the right-wing paramilitaries, in order to bring some semblance of peace to the country.
Uribe had campaigned on a platform of tough and unrelenting action against all rebel forces,
however, a year into his presidency, it was apparent that his efforts had garnered little results.
Some analysts said that the tough stances by Uribe to crush the rebels seemed to compel them to
take stronger actions against the government. Still, Uribe successfully managed to survive more
than half a dozen assassination attempts.
With pressure mounting, President Uribe revealed his plan to end his country's state of civil war in
June 2003. The plan included measures to resist the country's narcotics trading industry, which
fueled the war between the government, Marxist rebels and right-wing paramilitaries, for close to
four decades. Part of the program included the systematic destruction of all drug crops across the
country. The aggressive plan was not intended to lessen the violent conflict, but rather, to end the
war completely. As such, the plan was focused on achieving the permanent presence of democratic
authority across the country, 40 percent of which was controlled by either Marxist rebels or
paramilitaries. Its provisions included strikes against these two factions and the establishment of
security presences throughout Colombia, particularly in areas currently controlled by nonColombia Review 2017
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government forces. One of the objectives of the security impetus was the cessation of
kidnappings. In 2003, there was approximately one abduction reported every four hours.
Although President Uribe's approach was supported by 60 percent of the public, it remained
challenged by a lack of funding, and the fact that Uribe's presidential mandate would last only until
2006. Uribe was constitutionally barred from running for office for another term. Over the course
of 40 years, rebels and paramilitaries had seen several presidents come and go. As such, some
skeptics suggested that although they would be stymied by Uribe's efforts in the remaining years of
his time in office, they would likely wait out the duration of his tenure and reconstitute their efforts
when he was gone from office.
President Uribe faced a political setback in October 2003 when a referendum aimed at garnering
support for a number of structural reforms to the political system failed. The inability to secure
sufficient support for the 15 reforms - ranging from congressional voting to funding for government
projects - was blamed on poor voter turnout, confusion caused by the questions and fears of
violence.
In November 2003, Fernando Londono, who held both the justice and interior portfolios in
President Alvaro Uribe's government, stepped down. Relations between the minister and the
president had been tense as a result of Londono's criticism of Uribe for failing to make progress of
political reforms. Soon thereafter, Defense Minister Martha Lucia Ramirez resigned. No reason
was given for the sudden decision on her part.
Also in November 2003, explosions at two nightclubs in the Colombian capit al city of Bogota left
one person dead and at least 72 injured. The attacks occurred within seconds of each other in the
Zona Rosa district, which is the venue of several popular nightclubs and bars, and is often
frequented by foreigners. According to police reports, the explosions were caused by either bombs
or grenades and one suspect was arrested. Early reports suggested that FARC may be responsible.
Such incidences suggested that FARC was expanding its campaign of attacks to metropolitan areas.
Events in 2004
In 2004, Colombia took an extraordinary step toward mitigating the four-decade civil war in its
country. It offered a prisoner exchange to major rebel groups. The government would go on to
try to carve out amnesty and peace plans with rebel groups, particularly right-wing paramilitaries, in
order to deal with the security situation ravaging parts of the country.
The year 2004 marked several advances for the government in its war against the paramilitaries
and rebels. In May 2004, Ricardo Palmera, a senior member of FARC was captured and
subsequently imprisoned for 35 years. In July 2004, the government commenced talks with the
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right-wing paramilitary group, AUC, even leading to an address by AUC leaders in Congress. By
the close of 2004, based on progress of the peace process, the AUC agreed to demobilize 450 of
its fighters.
Events in 2005
In early 2005 bilateral relations took center stage. Venezuelans demonstrated in the streets of their
capital city of Caracas to reaffirm the country's sovereignty and to protest Colombia's alleged
encroachment into its territory. The demonstration was the latest development in a growing
diplomatic crisis.
The imbroglio between the two countries was spurred by the arrest of a leading member of the
leftist rebel group FARC. Venezuela charged that the arrest allegedly took place in its territory and
as such, there was a violation of its sovereign space. In this regard, Venezuelan President Hugo
Chavez demanded an apology from Colombian President Alvaro Uribe. For its part, however,
Colombia denied that the incident took place in Venezuelan territory and no apology from
Colombia was forthcoming. Venezuela thusly recalled its ambassador from Colombia in order to
register its displeasure with the situation.
While Venezuelan President Hugo Chavez has had to deal with accusations that he has been
sympathetic to Colombia's leftist rebels, Colombian President Alvaro Uribe has had to contend
with the revelation that his government allegedly paid Venezuelan police for assistance in the arrest
of the FARC rebel member. The diplomatic crisis between Venezuela and Colombia eventually
came to an end after six weeks of bilateral tension. Rapprochement was reached when Colombia
submitted a statement stating that such incidences would not be repeated.
In April 2005, the peace process between the Colombian government and the leadership of the
right-wing paramilitaries was disintegrating due to opposition to the terms of a proposed amnesty
law. For its part, the leaders of AUC said that the legislative framework of the proposed law was
too severe because it would leave them vulnerable to extradition to other countries on drug
trafficking charges. Meanwhile, countries such as the United States, and international bodies like
the United Nations, took the opposite view and criticized the law for being far too lenient.
Also in April 2005, conflict within the Colombian military over reforms led to the decision by
President Uribe to sack four top army generals. The decision came at a time when Marxist FARC
rebels increased attacks in the south-west of the country. Still, soldiers were able to seize control
of the town Tacueyo where some FARC rebels had been camping. The town, largely inhabited by
indigenous people, was being used as a command center for attacks on other towns close by.
In May 2005, Colombian army chief said that recent attacks by Colombia's Marxist rebels (FARC),
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was using techniques acquired through training by Irish militants, specifically the Irish Republican
Army (IRA). Earlier, in late 2004, three men of Irish descent were convicted and sentenced to 17
years imprisonment for assisting FARC rebels in training on explosives techniques. Their verdict
and sentences came after an appeal court reversed their earlier acquittal. The men, however, were
not in custody; it was believed that they had fled the country while out on bail. Grenades that
were similar to those manufactured by the Provisional IRA had been uncovered by the military.
Also in May 2005, Diego Murillo, a leader from AUC, turned himself in following a three-day
manhunt in Colombia. Murillo, who also used the name Don Berna, was arrested for suspected
involvement in the murder of a politician. Colombian and United States experts believe that he has
also been involved in drug trafficking.
In June 2005, Colombian President Alvaro Uribe flew to a south-western province to meet
military officials for crisis talks. The meeting on June 27, 2005, was with army commanders who
were launching a massive counterattack against leftist FARC rebels. The trip came just after two
attacks by rebels which left 25 Colombian soldiers dead – the worst losses suffered by the military
since Uribe had been in office. The Colombian leader promised no compromise in the aftermath
of the attacks.
In late November 2005, Colombian President Alvaro Uribe officially announced that he would
contest the next presidential elections, scheduled for May 2006, in a bid to secure another term in
office. His announcement came after a ruling by the country's constitutional court, which stated
that presidents were able to seek a second consecutive term in office. Uribe's campaign platform
was to focus on poverty alleviation and stamping out corruption. He had already staked out
ground as a hard-liner on security issues. Uribe's high approval ratings placed him in a position of
being a favorite to win in 2006.
Developments in Early 2006
In early 2006, Colombia's main rebel group, the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia
(FARC) dismissed the idea of an exchange of prisoners with the government of President Alvaro
Uribe. A statement on the group's website stated that President Uribe lacked the political will to
agree such an arrangement. The statement also acknowledged the "good offices" of France, Spain
and Switzerland, which had collectively put forward the idea of establishing a demilitarized zone
where the two sides could negotiate the terms of a prisoner exchange program. It has been
estimated that FARC has about 60 hostages, including a former politician and foreigners.
There was no immediate response from President Uribe's government. That said, in a New Year's
Eve speech, the Colombian leader said that such an exchange program was unlikely to occur in the
immediate future. In the speech, he also condemned FARC for its attack on a military camp in
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southern Colombia, which left about 30 soldiers dead. The assault was regarded as the bloodiest
attack by rebels on the army since Uribe had come to office. Authorities also blamed FARC for
the destruction of several oil wells and an electricity pylon, which had also occurred around the
same period of late 2005 and early 2006.
For his part, President Uribe had taken a hardline stance against rebels. Still, in anticipation of
presidential and congressional elections set to take place later in 2006, some analysts predicted that
he might be interested in securing the release of some hostages in order to build on his political
capital.
Congressional elections in Colombia ensued in March 2006 amidst fears that Marxist guerrillas
might disrupt voting while right-wing paramilitaries intimidated voters. These anxieties increased
following a spate of violence carried out by Marxist guerillas in early 2006. Meanwhile, although
the paramilitaries were officially demobilized, they warned of their intention to increase their
political influence.
The congressional elections were expected to function as something of a forecast for the
presidential election scheduled for May 2006. If President Uribe could command a majority in the
Colombian Congress, then it was believed he could be victorious at the executive level as well.
Certainly, a congressional win would advance Uribe's agenda by allowing him to have a working
majority for the first time. In the background was the political reality: Political groups on the left
were hampered by infighting and a lack of unity, while conservatives linked their political survival
with Uribe and, as such, moved to support him.
After the votes were counted, election results showed that the political parties aligned with
President Uribe won an overwhelming victory. In the Senate, the governing coalition won control
of 61 of the 102 seats contested, while in the lower house, those aligned with Uribe took 91 of
166 seats contested. As intimated above, the congressional win foreshadowed a pending victory for
Uribe in the upcoming presidential elections.
Meanwhile, the Liberal Party's candidate for the presidential election, Horacio Serpa, was also
selected at the time of the congressional elections. Serpa, who unsuccessfully contested two
previous presidential contests, was expected to be Uribe's main challenger.
In April 2006, left-wing Colombian rebels ambushed a team of security forces. The incident left
17 soldiers and secret police officers dead in what was called one of the most violent attacks in the
first half of the year. The incident occurred when the rebels opened fire and detonated bombs just
as the security forces drove through a mountainous area close to the border with Venezuela. The
commander of the Colombian army, Mario Montoya, placed the blame for the attacks on two
groups -- the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC) and the People's Liberation Army.
There were fears that rebel groups would increase such attacks ahead of the presidential election
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set for May 2006.
In May 2006, Colombia was getting ready for its presidential elections in which center-right
President Alvaro Uribe was expected to win a second term in office.
Elections of 2006
Presidential elections were held in Colombia on May 28, 2006. Hundreds of thousands of security
forces were stationed across the country to ensure that the election took place without incident.
Generally-speaking, there were few anxieties regarding the security situation since Marxist FARC
rebels had already said that they would not cause problems on election day. Sticking with this
commitment, FARC was not a factor and election day in Colombia ensued peacefully, without
incident, including any known polling irregularities, for the first time in over a decade.
Once the polls closed and ballots were counted, incumbent President Alvaro Uribe had been reelected in a landslide election victory with 62 percent of the votes cast. According to the results of
Colombia's Electoral Commission, Uribe's wide margin of victory -- handily over the 50 percent
threshold -- avoided the need for a runoff election. His closest challenger, left-leaning Senator
Carlos Gaviria, garnered 22 percent of the vote share. There were four other candidates contesting
the election.
Known for his hard-line stance against both left-wing rebels and right-wing paramilitaries, his tough
policies aimed at combating narcotics production and trafficking, as well as his good relationship
with the United States, President Uribe had been favored to win another term in office (as
discussed above). His new term in office offered him the opportunity to follow up with his
proposal to hold peace talks with rebels, so long as they moved forward with good faith. For
decades, the Colombian government has been ensconced in a bloody war with Marxist rebels.
For his part, the second-place presidential candidate, Senator Gaviria, graciously accepted his
defeat saying, "We're very happy with the results. For the first time in the country's history the
main opposition party will be comprised of the democratic left." Senator Gaviria also said
resolving Colombia's state of instability and climate of rampant violence had to involve alleviating
poverty and inequality.
Overall, Uribe's victory was a validation of his record and policies, which have not easily fit into
the traditional liberal/conservative dichotomy. His approach to dealing with Colombia's incidence
of violence successfully cut the country's high murder and kidnapping rates significantly. His
disarmament pact with the right-wing paramilitaries, and his pledge to forge a similar agreement
with left-wing rebels have made his goals of peace clear. Nevertheless, his critics have argued that
in his efforts to curb violence and drugs, he neglected socio-economic considerations.
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Other Developments in 2006
Rebels from the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC) said in June 2006 that it was
declaring war on the smaller guerrilla group, the National Liberation Army (ELN). To this
end, FARC released a statement that said, "We have tried on several occasions to give them the
benefit of the doubt as fellow revolutionaries, but we have not received a response that helped to
build fraternal relations, and for this reason have decided to punish those responsible."
At issue was the territory in the province of Arauca, located close to the Venezuelan border,
where FARC and the ELN have been ensconced in a conflict over sources of income. While they
have not expressly worked together, the two groups have typically been thought of as being
somewhat allied. The competition for resources at Arauca, where the ELN has normally operated,
led to attacks by that group on FARC's eastern bloc. The result has been this declaration of war
by FARC.
In late June 2006, Colombia's left-wing guerrillas, FARC said that they wanted to negotiate with
the government. It was a sharp reversal from previous statements by the left-wing rebels in which
they rejected any suggestions of formal negotiations.
That said, the overture was not without qualifications. FARC said that it would engage in talks
with President Alvaro Uribe only if he ended United States-backed operations against them. The
group also demanded the demilitarization of jungle areas that they traverse. For its part, the group
said that it was prepared to carry out a prisoner exchange. To date, FARC has held about 60
hostages captive. Among those kidnapped has been former presidential candidate Ingrid
Betancourt, as well as several other politicians, soldiers and police. Three Americans were also
thought to be among the hostages held by the left-wing rebels. FARC spokesman, Raul Reyes,
said in a media interview that his group had "the political will" to allow an exchange of hostages,
however, sitting at the negotiating table could only occur on its own terms.
In response, President Uribe emphasized that he would not agree to FARC's terms. In the same
period, he also repeatedly said that he would not stop operations against rebels and narcotics
traffickers. He additionally warned that he no intention to withdraw security forces from rebeldominated areas. A government spokesman noted that the president's position remained
unchanged.
In the backdrop of that development, Colombia's other main armed group, the ELN, was
reportedly engaging in preliminary peace talks with the Colombian government.
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eastern Colombia. No claim of responsibility was made, however, the ambush occurred in Norte
de Santander where FARC has been known to operate. On the same day, a bomb explosion in
Bogota left one individual dead.
Developments in 2007
The year 2007 began with the escape of a former Development Minister in the Colombian cabinet
after six years in captivity. Fernando Araujo had been kidnapped by the left-wing guerrilla group,
Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC), in December 2000. At the time, he had been
serving in the administration of former President Andres Pastrana.
Araujo was one of many well-known hostages abducted and held by FARC over the years. Such
hostages were often used to negotiate prisoner exchanges with the government. In Araujo's case,
the government orchestrated a military operation aimed at releasing him from captivity. While the
military battled FARC rebels at a camp in the northern part of the country, Araujo was able to flee
the site.
The government said that Araujo was in good health and was set to be re-united with family and
friends in his home town of Cartegena. The military said that the offensive in the department of
Bolivar was ongoing.
On February 19, 2007, Colombia's Foreign Minister Maria Consuelo Araujo (no relation to former
hostage Fernando Araujo discussed just above) announced her resignation from office. Her
resignation came after the country's Supreme Court ordered the arrest of five legislators, including
Araujo's brother, Senator Alvaro Araujo. All five legislators were said to be under investigation for
alleged links with the right-wing paramilitary group, United Self-Defense Forces of Colombia
(AUC). As well, prosecutors requested that an investigation be launched against Araujo's father, a
former agriculture minister and governor of Cesar state, for his alleged role in a kidnapping by the
AUC.
A day later, President Alvaro Uribe named Fernando Araujo (no relation to Maria Consuelo
Araujo) as the new foreign minister. The new position for Fernando Araujo came only weeks
following his escape from the hands of the left-wing Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia
(FARC), as discussed above.
In the wake of the resignation of the Colombian foreign minister for her family's ties to right-wing
militias, the country's former intelligence chief was arrested and charged with murder and
collaboration with right-wing militias.
Jorge Noguera, the head of the Administrative Security Department (DAS), had resigned in the fall
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of 2006 even as he denied charges. Nevertheless, months later at the close of February 2007, he
was questioned about supplying the names of unionists and human rights workers to right-wing
militias. Those names appeared to be consistent with an alleged "hit list" of individuals who were
later murdered. Of particular interest was the murder of a university professor who was
scrutinizing the displacement of peasants. On the basis of this evidence, as well as testimony from
a former Noguera aide, Rafael Garcia, and some data found on a laptop linked to a top paramilitary
operative, he was arrested and charged as noted just above.
In the background of these developments was the jailing of several members of President Alvaro
Uribe's coalition on the basis of their support for drug-running militias.
In April 2007, FARC released a videotape showing a number of hostages, including 12 politicians -all former members of a provincial assembly, who had been abducted in 2002 in Cali to the southwest of Bogota. Among the hostages was the former assembly president, Juan Carlos Narvaez,
who warned against the government's strategy of staging a rescue mission. He said that such
action would inevitably end in bloodshed.
In mid-2007, one month after 11 kidnapped politicians were reported to have died in captivity,
Colombian authorities said that their deaths appeared to be accidental. The politicians had been
abducted by the Rebels from the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC) and were
apparently shot only after FARC commanders mistakenly believed that security forces were
approaching and, thus, ordered the hostages be killed rather than be rescued. For its part, FARC
has maintained that the politicians were killed in the crossfire of bullets between their own forces
and another rebel group.
November 2007 marked the freezing of bilateral ties between Venezuela and Colombia over
disagreements in dealing with the ongoing hostage crisis. At issue was Venezuelan President Hugo
Chavez' role in freeing the many hostages kidnapped by Colombia's Marxist terror group, FARC,
during the years of civil war between that group and the Colombian authorities.
President Chavez said that he would place his country's bilateral ties with neighboring Colombia on
hold in response to Colombian President Alvaro Uribe’s decision to end Chavez's role as a hostage
negotiator with Colombia's Farc rebels. There have been several attempts over the years to free
the many hostages held in captivity by FARC in Colombia, but the situation moved in a productive
direction when Chavez offered to act as a mediator between the leftist extremist rebels and the
hard line government of Colombian President Alvaro Uribe.
That productive direction stalled when a proposal was put forth for FARC to release 45 hostages in
exchange for the release of 500 FARC members imprisoned by the Colombian authorities. Uribe
first expressed skepticism about the plan, saying that in trying to forge an agreement with FARC,
that group could also advance its own interests. As well, Uribe was reported to have been upset
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with Chavez for flaunting the proprieties of diplomacy by appearing in a photograph with a FARC
commander, and also revealing what Uribe said was a confidential conversation about a possible
meeting with FARC leader, Manuel Marulanda. Uribe then decided to end Chavez' mediator role
in the hostage crisis, charging that Venezuela's president wanted Colombia to be victimized by
FARC. On the other side of the equation, Chavez reacted to the decision by calling it "a spit in the
face" and accusing Uribe of being a liar.
Relatives of hostages held by FARC reacted to the news with shock and dismay and began to
protest outside the presidential palace. They appeared to have held out hopes that Chavez' role as
mediator would have eventually yielded positive results, pointing to the fact that Chavez had made
significant progress in his mediating role. To that end, one man whose nephew was abducted by
FARC, Jose Uriel Perez, said in an interview with Associated Press, "We thought it was very brave
what President Chavez did in three months compared to what the government has failed to do in
10 years."
Reactions were strong outside South America as well. In France, President Nicolas Sarkozy called
on Uribe to reconsider his decision, saying that Chavez was the best person to negotiate the
release of the hostages. The French government entered into the fray because one of the most
well-known hostages held by FARC had been Ingrid Betancourt, who holds dual Colombian and
French citizenship.
Developments in 2008
In early 2008, Venezuelan President Hugo Chavez returned to the objective of brokering the
release of hostages held by FARC rebels in Colombia. This mission saw some success with the
release of two hostages -- Clara Rojas and Consuelo Gonzalez. Up to 700 people remained in
captivity -- among them close to 50 high profile individuals including French-Colombian politician
Ingrid Betancourt.
Chavez called on the international community to stop referring to FARC as a terrorist enclave, but
at the same time noting that he did not support the group's tactics. To that end, he called on FARC
to stop opposing the Colombian government by taking hostages, saying, "I don't believe in
kidnapping and I don't believe in armed struggle." His Colombian counterpart, President Alvaro
Uribe, stayed distant from the hostage release efforts. Uribe also criticized Chavez for holding
talks with FARC, and emphatically stated that he viewed FARC rebels as terrorists.
The start of March 2008 saw relations devolve between Colombia and two of its neighbors -Venezuela and Ecuador. A Colombian military offensive aimed against Marxist rebels, FARC,
resulted in an incursion into Ecuadorian territory. The operation left more than 20 people
dead and recriminations from Colombia's two neighbors -- Ecuador and Venezuela -- about
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overzealous military actions that infringed upon their sovereignty. While Colombian authorities
hailed this action as a success due to the death of a leading FARC rebel, Ecuadorian President
Rafael Correa condemned the Colombian government in Bogota for violating its sovereignty and
lodged a formal protest.
Meanwhile, Venezuelan President Hugo Chavez, who had been negotiating with FARC for the
release of hostages held by the leftist rebels (as discussed above), railed against Colombian
President Alvaro Uribe for invading Ecuador, even going so far as to characterize him as "a
criminal." Chavez also called for the Venezuelan embassy in Bogota to be closed and withdrew
embassy personnel from Colombia. Moreover, he ordered Venezuela's military to take up positions
along the border with Colombia, presumably as a warning to its neighbor that it would not tolerate
a similar violation of its own sovereignty. The move marked a significant escalation of tensions in
the region.
But a week later, relations between Venezuela and Colombia were somewhat soothed after a
summit between the leaders of those two countries. At the summit, the leaders of both the
countries agreed to a 20-point declaration forged by the Organization of American States (OAS),
which included a commitment by Colombian President Uribe ensuring that his military forces
would not violate borders with neighbors in the future. Venezuela then said it would restore its
diplomatic relations with Colombia. The Venezuelan Foreign Ministry issued a statement noting
that the meeting was "a victory for peace and sovereignty... and demonstrated the importance of
Latin American unity in overcoming conflicts."
Colombia's relations with Ecuador remained strained, with Ecuador noting that more time was
needed to resolve the situation, which involved a violation of its sovereignty.
The ongoing diplomatic imbroglio between Colombia and Ecuador re-ignited in late March 2008.
At issue was Colombia's violation of Ecuador's sovereignty in an anti-terrorism offensive, as
discussed above. To recapitulate -- that action ultimately led both Quito and Caracas to break off
diplomatic contact with Bogota. Tensions with Caracas were somewhat assuaged when Colombian
President Alvarao Uribe issued an apology about the matter. However, relations with Quito
continued to be terribly strained and were further exacerbated in the latter part of the month when
it was confirmed that an Ecuadorean was killed by Colombian troops in the aforementioned antiterrorism raid on the FARC camp.
In June 2008, Venezuelan President Hugo Chavez urged Colombia's Revolutionary Armed Forces
of Colombia (FARC) rebels to end their four-decade struggle and release all their hostages. The
Venezuelan leader, who had negotiated controversial talks with FARC aimed at releasing its
hostages, characterized the extremist leftist militants as "out of step." Chavez also said, "The
guerrilla war is history. At this moment in Latin America, an armed guerrilla movement is out of
place." The call came a month after long-serving FARC leader, Manuel Marulanda, died and
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Alfonso Cano was named as his replacement. Perhaps believing that he might have an impact on
the new leadership, Chavez said in his televised address, "This is my message for you, Cano:
'Come on, let all these people go.' There are old folk, women, sick people, soldiers who have been
prisoners in the mountain for 10 years."
As noted above, Chavez' role in mediating the release of hostages has been regarded as
controversial by some interests. Indeed, Colombian President Alvaro Uribe terminated his official
role in these negotiations. But many of the Colombian victims' families welcomed Chavez' interest
in the matter, and applauded his efforts when he successfully negotiated the release of two
hostages, Clara Rojas and Consuelo Gonzalez.
Special Entry:
Colombian military successfully carries out rescue mission; Betancourt, three U.S. defense
contractors, and 11 others freed from FARC captivity
In late March 2008, a French aircraft and medical personnel were placed on stand by in French
Guiana, in the event that kidnapped politician Ingrid Betancourt was released. For several years,
Betancourt, who holds dual citizenship in Colombia and France, has been held hostage by the
Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC) in Colombia. While there was no conclusive
evidence that FARC intended to free Betancourt, the French government, led by President Nicolas
Sarkozy, noted it had decided to be prepared in case her release was secured. Betancourt was only
one of many hostages held by FARC, although she has been one of the most well-known. A
fellow hostage who had been recently released said that Betancourt was gravely ill and had urged
the Colombian government to work toward her release. The development came at a time when the
Colombian government put forth a deal by which it would offer prisoner amnesties in exchange
for the release of hostages; the deal also involved sending the FARC prisoners into exile in
France.
By April 2008, Betancourt had not been released. The French government was demanding that
she be freed while people took to the streets in France to call for her release. But the period was
also marked by the French government's decision to call off the medical mission.
On July 2, 2008, French-Colombian politician Ingrid Betancourt, along with three United States
defense contractors -- Marc Gonsalves, Thomas Howes and Keith Stansell -- and 11 Colombian
security officers, were rescued by the Colombian military after several years in captivity. All of the
rescued hostages had been held by the Colombian rebel group, known as the Revolutionary
Armed Forces of Colombia or FARC.
The rescue took place in the southern province of Guaviare and military coordinators said that all
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of the released hostages were released were in good shape. Colombian media reported that the
rescue mission had been set in motion several weeks prior. Reports stated that intelligence agents
had infiltrated the FARC ranks and managed to convince the local commander in charge of the
hostages of fictitious plans in the offing. As such, military personnel masquerading as members of
a non-governmental organization were able to carry out a ruse and get the hostages onto a
helicopter. Once airborne, they subdued the FARC leader who accompanied the hostages,
announced that the helicopter was under the control of the Colombian military, and explained that
the captives were now free. Colombian Defense Minister Juan Manuel Santos explained, "The
helicopters, which in reality were from the army, picked up the hostages in Guaviare and flew them
to freedom." Colombian authorities were especially pleased that the mission was executed
successfully and without one shot being fired.
Betancourt, as a politician with dual citizenship, had been the highest profile hostage; her apparent
poor health contributed to the fact that the French government was actively seeking her release.
Indeed, a previous French medical evacuation mission ended unsuccessfully some months earlier,
as noted above. Venezuelan President Hugo Chavez had also been active in negotiations to free
hostages held by FARC, as aforementioned. To that end, two hostages -- Clara Rojas and
Consuelo Gonzalez -- were released by FARC in early 2008. However, zealous efforts by the
Colombian government to squash FARC has, at times, led to tensions with its neighbors, Venezuela
and Ecuador over violations of sovereign borders. See above for details.
In the afternoon of July 2, 2008, only moments after disembarking from the aircraft that carried
her from captivity, Betancourt made a public address, thanking the authorities for their assistance
in carrying out "a miracle." She said, "God, this is a miracle... There is no historical precedent for
such a perfect operation." Betancourt also urged that those who had died in captivity be
remembered and called for the possibility of peace. Betancourt's children reacted joyfully to the
news of their mother's release and were said to be flying from France to Colombia to be reunited
with their mother.
At 11:19 pm CST, a United States military aircraft touched down on American soil at Lackland Air
force Base carrying the three former hostages, Marc Gonsalves, Thomas Howes and Keith
Stansell. All three were then transported to Brooke Army Hospital in San Antonio, Texas, for
treatment. Media reports noted that they were likely to be reunited with their families in the
following days, although they were also expected to go through medical treatment and possible
reintegration counseling.
A week after the rescue, the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia, or FARC, broke its silence
on the matter. In a communique dated July 5, 2008, FARC said that two of its own rebel fighters
had betrayed their "revolutionary principles," thus leading to the successful rescue by the
Colombian military forces. Those two rebels were themselves captured by Colombian soldiers
during the dramatic rescue mission and were expected to face trial, as well as possible extradition to
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the United States. FARC also said it intended to go forward with negotiations oriented toward the
release of other captives.
FARC says that it will release some hostages
The Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC) said in December 2008 that it would soon
release six hostages. Those to be released included two politicians (a former governor and a
former congressman), three police officers and one soldier, who were held hostage by FARC for
several years. In a statement, FARC said that its actions were intended to be an overture aimed at
opening up a prisoner exchange program with the Colombian government.
Note: In mid-2008, five hostages, including former Colombian presidential candidate Ingrid
Betancourt, were freed in a military operation. In October 2008, former-Congressman Oscar Tulio
Lizcano escaped captivity after being held hostage for eight years.
After being held by the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC) for two years, four
hostages were released and collected by Colombian security forces at a pre-arranged location at the
start of 2009. The release had been brokered by left-wing politician, Senator Piedad Cordoba.
FARC also announced that it would soon release two high profile political hostages as well. These
two hostages have been identified as former parliamentarian Sigifredo Lopez and former Governor
Alan Jara. Analysts have speculated that these moves by FARC may be oriented towards reopening negotiations with Colombian government.
Recent Developments (2009 - 2010)
In the third week of July 2009, Ecuadorian President Rafael Correa denied that the Colombian
insurgent group, the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC), contributed funds to his
2006 presidential campaign. President Correa also called on the country's civil commission to
investigate the allegation, saying that the inquiry would make his innocence clear. Correa recalled
accusations from his political opponents claiming that he had received money from Venezuelan
President Hugo Chavez as well as the drug cartels. "They just don't know what else to say,"
Correa said. "It is up to you to decide who to believe: the same people as usual or those who
endanger their lives to save the country." At issue was a Colombian media broadcast, apparently
showing FARC leader, Víctor Julio Suarez Rojas, also known as Mono Jojoy, saying that his group
donated money to Correa's campaign. The situation was expected to raise already-strained
relations between Colombia and Ecuador.
In August 2009, Colombia and the United States concluded negotiations on a military cooperation
agreement, which would provide for United States troops to access Colombian military bases for
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the purpose of combating terrorism and fighting the trafficking of narcotics in the region.
Responding to this plan for a sustained United States military presence in Colombia, Venezuela
announced on August 17, 2009 that it would construct 70 "peace bases" along the border with
Colombia. Francisco Arias Cardenas, Venezuelan Vice Foreign Minister for Latin America and the
Caribbean, said that the plan was part of Venezuela's initiative to promote peace and prevent
conflict. But it was clear that the move was a defensive one, aimed at responding to the presence
of United States troops in a neighboring country, when Foreign Minister Arias explained at a news
conference, "Each Venezuelan has to be a soldier to defend Venezuela."
The agreement between the United States and Colombia has already caused a diplomatic
contretemps in the region, resulting in late July 2009 with indications from Venezuela that it
would freeze its diplomatic ties with Colombia. Then, on September 1, 2009, Venezuelan
President Hugo Chavez confirmed his country would end formal diplomatic relations with
Colombia. President Chavez said the move was being made in response to Colombia's decision to
allow United States forces to have greater access to its military bases. Both Colombia and the
United States have insisted that the deal would pose no threat to neighboring countries, and had
been forged simply to improve efforts against anti-narcotics trafficking. However, regional powers,
including Venezuela , have reacted with concern to the move.
Tense relations between Colombia and Venezuela devolved in November 2009 when Colombia
detained four members of the Venezuelan national guard on Colombian territory. Colombian
authorities said the four were detained along a river in the border province of Vichada. The
situation was not expected to last long since Colombian President Alvaro Uribe said they would be
released and returned to Venezuela. Perhaps with an eye on calming the heightened tensions
between the two countries, President Uribe said there was "unbreakable affection" between his
country of Colombia and neighboring Venezuela. The incident came a week after Venezuelan
President Hugo Chavez sent troops to the border region in an apparent response to an agreement
forged between Colombia and the United States that would allow the American military to use
Colombian bases in its anti-narcotics trafficking efforts. Venezuelan President Chavez has decried
the move, charging that the agreement was part of the United States' agenda to ultimately invade
his country. This claim has been strongly denied by the United States.
Meanwhile, on the domestic front,Colombia's lower house of Congress passed legislation that
could pave the way for President Alvaro Uribe to run for a third term. Legislators overwhelmingly
voted in favor of a referendum on whether to make constitutional changes that would allow
presidents to contest re-election twice. The legislation had already passed the Senate and its fate
was now in the hands of Colombia's Constitutional Court. The constitution was already modified
once to let Uribe run for a second four-year term in 2006, and so, if the new constitutional
changes are made, Uribe could theoretically contest another election battle in 2010. While Uribe
has enjoyed strong popularity at home thanks to a mixture of conservative security and economic
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policies, this move to allow his three consecutive terms has been met with some resistance.
Indeed, other attempts to make constitutional changes that would facilitate extended power in the
region have resulted in condemnation about the erosion of democracy. See below for more
information related to the constitutional change and the 2010 presidential election.
At the start of 2010, Colombian forces carried out an offensive against the Revolutionary Armed
Forces of Colombia (FARC). The government reportedly moved to carry out the offensive after
Luis Francisco Cuellar -- the governor of the southern province of Caqueta who had been taken
hostage -- was found dead. He had apparently been assassinated. The air strike killed at least 18
FARC rebels while they were celebrating the New Year at a jungle camp. Another 13 FARC rebels
surrendered when Colombian forces raided a jungle base in Meta province, which is known to be a
center in the production of cocaine.
On July 11, 2010, Colombian army commandos launched a surprise raid on a rebel base of the
Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC). According to reports from the ground, 12
bodyguards of FARC rebel leader Guillermo Saenz died in the assault in the Tolima mountains in
the central region of the country. Colombian authorities said that the operation dealt a deadly
blow to the FARC rebel movement. For his part, outgoing Colombian President Alvaro Uribe
congratulated the commandos for their efforts. He also confirmed reports that Magaly Grannobles
-- a female confidante to a FARC leader, Saenz -- was among those killed saying, "I can confirm
that one of the guerrillas killed in the operation was a woman named Magaly. She was responsible
for the deaths of at least 70 soldiers and police officers." However, in news less positive for the
Colombian authorities, six soldiers died during clashes with FARC rebels on the same day in the
northeastern part of the country.
Briefing on 2010 Presidential Election in Colombia
In February 2010, the Colombian constitutional court voted 7-2 against a parliamentary proposal to
convene a referendum, which could have potentially changed the constitution to allow President
Alvaro Uribe to contest the presidency for a third term. Lead justice Mauricio Gonzalez explained
the ruling by observing that the proposed referendum included "substantial violations to the
democratic principle." The ruling was not subject to appeal.
For his part, President Uribe said he respected the court's decision. Nevertheless, he made clear
that any future successor should continue his security policies against the Marxist rebel group,
Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC), saying, "Those policies have to be re-elected
whatever the decision of the court. We cannot change direction, we cannot have a change of
guard."
With Uribe now unable to stand for the presidency for a third term, former Defense Minister Juan
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Manuel Santos said that he would run for the presidency, in order to ensure that gains made against
FARC under Uribe's tenure were not reversed. To this end, Santos said, "What we need to do now
is work to ensure his [Uribe's] legacy of security and progress is not lost." Santos appeared to be
an early favorite for the presidential election to be held on May 30, 2010. However, independent
candidate Sergio Fajardo was gaining strength thanks to his reputation as mayor of Medellin.
It should be noted that despite President Uribe's strong public approval ratings, his tenure has had
to deal with criticisms in recent years over human rights abuses by troops, as well as the illegal
wiretapping of political opponents by the national intelligence agency. Adding to these criticisms
was the arrest of former senator Mario Uribe Escobar -- the cousin and political ally of President
Uribe -- in an ongoing investigation into alleged connections between politicians and right-wing
paramilitary groups.
Colombia held elections to both houses of the Congress on March 14, 2010. Results showed that
the parties aligned with President Alvaro Uribe -- the Colombian Conservative Party and the
Colombian Conservative Party or PC and the Social National Unity Party or U Party -- captured
the most seats and held on to their dominance in the legislative body. The main opposition party,
the Liberal Party, retained its vote share and number of seats. Radical Change, which was once
supportive of President Uribe before moving against him, lost seats in the Senate. Likewise, the
Alternative Democratic Pole, suffered some loss of seats in the Senate.
As of May 2010, with the presidential election set for the close of the month (May 30, 2010),
measures were being taken to ensure the secure conduct of the vote. To that end, 350,000 military
and police personnel were deployed across the country. The main presidential candidates were as
follows: Former Defense Minister Juan Manuel Santos, an Uribist from the outgoing president's
party, Germán Vargas Lleras of the Radical Change party, Noemí Sanín of the Conservative Party,
Rafael Pardo of Liberal Party, Gustavo Petro of the Alternative Democratic Pole and Antanas
Mockus of the newly-formed Green Party. As well, Álvaro Leyva Durán was seeking the
presidential nomination by the Conservative Party. Apart from Santos who promised to follow the
Uribe mold, Lleras and Sanin have been cast as pro-Uribist in orientation as well. On the other side
of the equation, Pardo, Petro, were viewed as alternate options, while Duran and Mockus were
viewed as anti-Uribist in orientation.
A month ahead of the election, there appeared to be a clear ideological "right versus left" battle at
stake in Colombia with polls showing Santos and Mockus running neck and neck against one
another, possibly headed for a run-off election.
On election day, after the votes were counted, Santos had won the first round of Colombia's
presidential election with 47 percent of the vote -- just short of an outright majority. His main rival,
Mockus, garnered 21 percent. Santos' clear domination at the polls was something of a surprise
since polling data indicated a far closer race. That said, both men would contest the run-off
election set for June 20, 2010.
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Until then, Santos was expected to continue to highlight his national security-dominated campaign
platform, and would tout his desire to continue the policies of highly popular outgoing President
Uribe. Mockus was expected to draw attention to his campaign agenda issues of anti-corruption
and education, as well as his record of improved quality of life and successful public works
projects during his time as mayor of Bogota. That said, with third place candidate Lleras saying
that he would back Santos in the second round, the advantage would certainly reside with the proUribe former defense minister on June 20, 2010.
On the day of the second round -- June 20, 2010, as expected, Santos won an overwhelming 69
percent of the vote, propelling him into position of President-elect of Colombia. With a clear sign
that he would continue outgoing President Uribe's hardline security policies, President-Elect Santos
said during his victory speech that Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia's (FARC's) "time had
run out" and foreclosed the possibility of negotiations. He also declared that he would not rest until
they had secured every inch of the country.
Ironically, the election was itself marked by violence between government forces and FARC;
clashes led to the deaths of at least 10 policemen and soldiers from the Army of Colombia, and six
FARC guerrillas. Still Colombian authorities hailed a more positive development in the days ahead
of the election when three police officers and a soldier who had been held captive by FARC for 12
years were rescued. On the other end of the equation, however, two soldiers were sentenced to 28
years in jail for extrajudicial killings. Those two cases were examples of the security challenge
posed by right-wing militants in Colombia.
In the first week of August 2010, Juan Manuel Santos was sworn into office as Colombia's new
president. During his inaugural speech, President Santos noted that among his priorities would be
improved relations with neighboring countries of Ecuador and Venezuela. As well, he aimed to
decrease the unemployment rate, reduce poverty, and deal with corruption. President Santos also
said he would continue the efforts against militant rebel and terror groups, including the
Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC); however, he also said that he would not
foreclose the possibility of dialogue with FARC if they renounced their campaign of violence.
Post-Election Update; Relations with FARC (2010-2012)
On September 23, 2010, the Colombian military announced that it had eliminated the deputy
leader and top military strategist from Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia, or FARC. The
news of the death of Jorge Briceno, also known as Mono Jojoy, was a significant setback for
FARC, which has seen in insurgency weakened in recent times due to a relentless offensive by
government forces. Newly-elected President Juan Manuel Santos characterized the killing of
Briceno as "the most crushing blow against the FARC in its entire history." In addition to Briceno,
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20 other rebels were also killed, including a number of other senior insurgents. The operation by
the Colombian military commenced on September 20, 2010 with bombing raids using warplanes
and helicopters.
On May 12, 2011, Ecuadorean President Rafael Correa rejected prevailing accusations of a
connection to the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (also known as Fuerzas Armadas
Revolucionarias de Colombia or FARC). During a news conference, President Correa insisted
that he did not accept any funds from FARC, which has been responsible for terrorist attacks in
Colombia, saying: "My hands are clean." He also asserted that he was ready to prove his
innocence saying, "I'll take a lie detector test to prove I never received funds from the FARC." At
issue have been allegations that the left-wing Ecuadorean leader's election campaign received
financing from the Marxist guerrilla enclave. These allegations have been based on an extensive
report by the International Institute for Strategic Studies, which carried out a two-year long study
and relied on communication uncovered during a raid by Colombian forces on a FARC
encampment in Ecuador in 2008.
On Nov. 5, 2011, the government of Colombian announced that military troops had killed the top
commander of the rebel Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC) -- Guillermo Leon
Saenz Vargas, also known by the alias Alfonso Cano. According to officials, police and army
troops bombed a FARC hideout in the jungles near Suarez city of the southwestern Cauca
province, and then carried out a ground operation, which left Cano dead in the ensuing gun battle.
Cano became the leader of FARC in 2008 after the death of former FARC's commander and
founder Pedro Nel Marin, alias "Manuel Marulanda." Cano was then elevated to being the highest
value target of Colombia's military and police forces. After news of Cano's death broke,
Colombian authorities released photograph's of the country's most wanted man, presumably in an
effort to foreclose doubt about his death. To that end, Cano's corpse reported underwent several
fingerprints tests, which allowed the complete identification.
Defense Minister Juan Carlos Pinzon hailed the death of Cano as "very important news for
Colombia and its people" during a news conference. Only a month prior, another key member of
FARC, Jose Neftali Umenza, died in an explosion in the Buenaventura port city in southwestern
Colombia. Umenza was responsible for most of the FARC's drug-trafficking business in the
Pacific region. In a speech broadcast nationally in Colombia, President Juan Manuel Santos
described Cano's death as "the most devastating blow that this group has suffered in its history."
The Colombian leader also urged other militant entities to lay down their arms before they end up
"in jails or in tombs." President Santos additionally called on his government and the military to
turn their attention toward achieving a peaceful and prosperous future for Colombia.
On Feb. 26, 2012, the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC) -- the country's largest
rebel group -- said that it intended release 10 remaining military hostages. FARC also said that it
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intended to abandon its practice of kidnapping civilians for extortion. The announcement was
made via the Anncol news website. In its statement, FARC declared, "From today on we ban the
practice" of "the retention of people ... in order to finance our struggle." FARC stopped just short
of ending its armed war with the Colombian government, promising instead to utilize "other forms
of funding and political pressure." Colombian President Juan Manuel Santos responded via the
social media mechanism, Twitter, to note that FARC's move was "a step in the right direction."
On April 3, 2012, the Colombian rebel group, the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia
(known by the acronym, FARC), released 10 government officials that had been held hostage for
more than a decade. International Red Cross representatives confirmed that FARC turned the ten
individuals over to the care of the humanitarian agency, in keeping with a vow made two months
prior. Once in the care of the Red Cross, the hostages were reunited with family members in the
city of Villavicencia.
In February 2012, the country's largest rebel group said it intended release 10 remaining hostages.
FARC also said at that time that it intended to abandon its practice of kidnapping civilians for
extortion. The announcement in February 2012 was made via the Anncol news website. In its
statement, FARC declared, "From today on we ban the practice" of "the retention of people ... in
order to finance our struggle." FARC stopped just short of ending its armed war with the
Colombian government, promising instead to utilize "other forms of funding and political
pressure." At the time, Colombian President Juan Manuel Santos responded via the social media
mechanism, Twitter, to note that FARC's move was "a step in the right direction."
In April 2012, with the release of these ten remaining government hostages, only civilians remain
held by FARC. There were suggestions that the recent moves by FARC were oriented toward
revitalizing peace talks.
On May 22, 2012, an explosives device was discovered at the Gran Rex Theatre in the Argentine
capital of Buenos Aires -- the venue where former Colombian President Alvaro Uribe was
expected to offer a speech the next day. According to Argentine authorities, the bomb was hidden
in a lamp and was intended to be detonated by a mobile phone. It was discovered during a routine
security sweep. Police evacuated the building and cordoned off the streets around the venue after
finding the bomb. It should be noted that a week earlier, a bomb attack in Bogota (the Colombian
capital) targeted Fernando Londono, a former justice and interior minister who served in the
previous Uribe administration. Londono's security guard and driver both died in that attack.
Taken together, the two incidents suggest that the former Uribe administration may be in the crosshairs of some entity. Whether or not that entity was the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia
(FARC) was yet to be seen.
Around the same period, FARC reportedly killed about a dozen Colombian soldiers in an ambush
close to the border with neighboring Venezuela. According to military officials, the troops were
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attacked during a routine patrol in a remote part of the country inhabited mostly by indigenous
people. On the Venezuelan side of the border, the Chavez government said that it would increase
security in the region and urged that its territory not be used in the fight between the Colombian
government and FARC. President Hugo Chavez himself said on state television: "We maintain our
position, that we will no permit incursions of any armed force, whatever its type might be, into
Venezuelan territory...This conflict is not ours. We defend peace and insist that our territory is not
used by either side in the conflict."
Primer on Colombia's 2014 parliamentary elections
Parliamentary elections were set to be held in Colombia on March 9, 2014. At stake was the
composition of the bicameral "Congreso" (Congress), which consists of the "Senado de la
República" (Senate of the Republic) and the "Cámara de Representantes" (House of
Representatives). In the "Senado de la República" (Senate of the Republic), there are 102 seats;
members are elected by popular vote to serve four-year terms. In the "Cámara de Representantes"
(House of Representatives), there are 166 seats; members are elected by popular vote to serve
four-year terms.
The last elections were held in March 2010 and were won by the parties aligned with thenPresident Alvaro Uribe. Indeed, the Party of U and the Conservative Party or PC won the most
seats. It was to be seen if they would see that level of success in 2014. Other parties likely to
contest these elections included the main opposition party, the Liberal Party, the Green Party, and
Radical Change or CR. These 2014 elections were being viewed as a referendum on the ongoing
peace process between the government and the Marxist group, the Revolutionary Armed Forces of
Colombia (FARC).
In the Senate, the Party of the U (Partido de la U) garnered 16 percent and 21 seats; the
Democratic Center (Centro Democrático) had 14 percent and 19 seats; the Colombian
Conservative Party (Partido Conservador Colombiano) took 14 percent and 19 seats; the
Colombian Liberal Party (Partido Liberal Colombiano) secured 16 percent and 17 seats; Radical
Change (Cambio Radical) acquired eight percent and nine seats; Green Party (Partido Verde) had
four percent and five seats; the rest of the Senate went to other parties,
In the Chamber of Representatives, the Party of the U (Partido de la U) won 16 percent and 39
seats; the Colombian Liberal Party (Partido Liberal Colombiano) garnered 14 percent and 37 seats;
the Colombian Conservative Party (Partido Conservador Colombiano) took 13 percent and 27
seats; Radical Change (Cambio Radical) carried 8 percent and 15 seats; Democratic Center
(Centro Democrático) acquired 9.5 percent and 12 seats; Green Party (Partido Verde) had four
percent and six seats; the rest of the seats were won by other parties.
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Primer on 2014 presidential election
A presidential election was set to take place in Colombia on May 25, 2014. In Colombia, the
president is both the chief of state and head of government; the president is elected by popular vote
for a four-year term and is eligible for a second term. The previous presidential election was won
by incumbent President Juan Manuel Santos Calderon following polling rounds in 2010. He
would be up for re-election in 2014.
Pre-election polling data has indicated that President Santos was positioned for a clear victory in
May 2014. According to a poll publicized by the broadcaster, Caracol, Santos would garner 32.5
percent of votes in the first round. Santos would have to secure a top two performance in that
initial round to make it to the run-off or second round, which he would then have to win with an
outright majority. Still, Santos was significantly leading his closest rival, Oscar Ivan Zuluaga from
the Centro Democratico party, with as many as 17 percentage points. Other polls by Gallup and
Ipsos Napoleon Franco showed Santos with the clear advantage. Of course, it should be voted that
a poll by Centro Nacional de Consultoria predicted a somewhat less certain fortune for Santos.
According to its data, in a second round, Santos could lose to former Bogota Mayor Enrique
Penalosa, of the Green Alliance, who would finish behind Santos in the first ballot but go on to
beat him in the run-off. Other polls showed Zuluaga as Santos' main competition; however, at least
one other pollster, Cifras y Conceptos, showed Zuluaga relinquishing his "main rival" position to
Penalosa. At the close of April 2014, with a month to go until election day, a Gallup poll
confirmed Santos' lead, and command of 32 percent of the vote share. The poll also showed
Zulaga as Santos' main rival with command over 20.5 percent. In the second round, Santos was
on track to win 46 percent of the vote share and Zulaga would have 34 percent. Clearly, according
to Gallup, the presidential contest would be between Santos and Zulaga. Penalosa had lost support
in the run-up to the election, and was now battling to hold onto a third place position against the
Conservative Party candidate, Marta Lucia Ramirez. At the start of May 2014, Santos was
holding a clear lead in the intentions of the voters, although Zuluaga was gaining steam. According
to pollster Cifras y Conceptos, Santos would win 27 percent of the vote and Zuluaga would take
19 percent. In a second round, the contest would be much closer although would beat Zuluaga 34
to 31 percent. With less than two weeks to go until election day, the race had tightened and now
Santos was in a dead heat with Zuluaga; both men held 29 percent support.
Note: Center-right Santos, was the candidate of the National Unity alliance, which was composed
of the Social Party of National Unity ("Party of the U"), the Colombian Liberal Party, and Radical
Change. He has banked on his presidential ambitions on the effort to end the war with Colombia's
Marxist guerilla group, the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (Fuerzas Armadas
Revolucionarias de Colombia in Spanish, or FARC), and has engaged in peace talks with them.
Right-wing Zuluaga represents the Centro Democratico party, which was formed by former
President Alvaro Uribe who has vociferously opposed the peace negotiations with FARC. CenterColombia Review 2017
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left Penalosa of the Green Alliance was attracting support from leftists, ecologists, and
independents. With Zuluaga as the designated choice of former President Uribe who has opposed
the peace process with FARC, and with Santos advancing that peace process, it was evident that
the election would come down to being a referendum of sorts on the question of war and peace
with FARC.
After the votes were tallied on May 25, 2014, it was clear that President Santos would be headed
to a runoff against Zuluaga, who actually finished in first place after the first round. Zuluaga had 29
percent of the votes, compared to 25.5 percent for Santos.
Zuluaga's strong performance -- effectively beating Santos -- was deemed to be due to support
from former President Uribe who has been an opponent of Santos' pursuit of peace with FARC.
Clearly, the electorate shared that stance. However, Zuluaga's political standing could be
negatively affected in the second round by salacious accusations that a computer expert from his
campaign hacked into the emails of the president and FARC negotiators. Meanwhile, Zuluaga was
also looking to soften his image by suggesting that although he was against appeasing FARC, he
would not immediately end peace negotiations with the Marxist guerilla group, as he had previously
indicated.
At the start of June 2014, with two weeks to go until the second election round, polling data
showed Santos and Zuluaga running neck and neck in a competitive race to the finish. The
researcher group, Cifras y Conceptos, showed Santos with a tiny narrow lead of only percentage
point over Zuluaga. Clearly, the 2014 presidential contest would be the closest election in
Colombia in recent memory. With leftists and peace process supporters more likely to back Santos
than Zuluaga, Santos was hoping to eke out victory. However, with the majority of Colombia's
electorate having more center-right tendencies, it was not guaranteed that Santos would garner
enough support to hold Zuluaga off at the finish.
Note that Colombians went to the polls to vote in the second round on a day the Colombian
national football team was played a match at the 2014 World Cup. There were fears that the
national attention on the world's biggest sport would deter people from voting in high numbers.
Nevertheless, the second round of the election went off as planned. Despite the closeness of the
race between Santos and Zuluaga, it was the incumbent president who won the election with 51
percent of the vote share; Zuluaga took 45 percent. The election victory for Santos was also a
victory for the peace process with FARC, essentially leaving that pathway open.
For his part, President Santos promised to bring peace to Colombia and noted that his re-election
victory was a ratification of his peace push. In his victory speech to supporters, President Santos
also noted that Colombians delivered the message that they wanted an end to five decades of war.
He said, "This is the end of more than 50 years of violence and the start of a new Colombia."
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Special Report
The Push for a Peace Agreement
Colombian President Santos wins Nobel Peace Prize as encouragement to
continue stymied peace effort with FARC; extends ceasefire to end of year
Introduction
In August 2016, the landmark peace process in Colombia -- ongoing since
2013 -- moved forward as the government and Revolutionary Armed Forces
of Colombia (Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia in Spanish, or
FARC) found concurrence on a peace accord aimed at ending one of the
Western Hemisphere's longest-running conflicts. As August 2016 came to a
close, Colombian President Juan Manuel Santos sent the text of the peace
accord to Congress for approval while also officially declaring a ceasefire. The
peace agreement would be officially approved by the Colombian government
in September 2016. The final step would be for the accord to be ratified via a
referendum set for Oct. 2, 2016. But on that day, Colombians narrowly
rejected the peace agreement with FARC, effectively pushing the country into
a state of limbo on the issue. Both the Santos government and FARC indicated
that they would return to the peace process although the outcome remained
undetermined at the time of writing. However, the peace process received a
boost when in October 2016 President Santos received the Nobel Peace Prize
as encouragement to continue the stymied peace effort with FARC.
In detail
In September 2015, a major breakthrough was announced in the Cubanbrokered peace talks between the Colombian government and Revolutionary
Armed Forces of Colombia (Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia in
Spanish, or FARC) regarding justice and accountability for those who
committed human right abuses during the many years of the conflict. With
the human rights abuses issue presenting the most significant obstacle to
successful peace negotiations between the two sides, the concurrence on
justice and accountability was regarded as a breakthrough. Indeed, with that
hurdle cleared, the two sides were announcing a March 2016 deadline for the
promulgation of a final peace accord.
Going back to 2011, the leadership of FARC suggested that it was ready to
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enter peace negotiations with the Colombian government. By the start of
2012, FARC said it intended to abandon its practice of kidnapping civilians for
extortion. However, FARC was simultaneously carrying out attacks in
Colombia, including the violent ambush of a dozen Colombian soldiers close to
the border with neighboring Venezuela in mid-2012. Meanwhile, the Colombian
military continued its efforts against FARC, and enjoyed significant successes
including the death of a top FARC commander -- Guillermo Leon Saenz Vargas,
also known by the alias Alfonso Cano.
In 2012, with most of its leadership eliminated or detained, FARC said it was
abandoning some of its practices, such as abductions. Recent events
(discussed here) would indicate that FARC had not actually rejected the use of
violence in achieving its agenda.
By late August 2012, Colombian President Juan Manuel Santos announced that
his government was convening exploratory talks with the Revolutionary
Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC) -- the country's oldest, largest, and most
organized insurgent group. In a national address, President Santos said that it
was his "duty to seek peace." Media reports indicated that the two sides -- the
Colombian government and FARC -- signed a preliminary agreement in Cuba,
and a first round of negotiations was expected to be held in October in Norway.
In the latter part of November 2012, peace talks between the Colombian
government and the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC) were
renewed in the Cuban capital city of Havana. Delegates from both the
Colombian government and FARC were at the negotiating table in Cuba. The
meeting was aimed at ending five decades of conflict between the two sides
and forging a sustainable peace deal. The discussions ensued in closed door
meetings at the Palace of Conventions in Havana, making it difficult to
determine the level of progress. That being said, the stated agenda for the
meetings included issues as diverse as political participation, narcotics
trafficking, agricultural development, the care of war victims, and an end to
the war.
In mid-January 2013, a new round of peace talks commenced in Cuba
between a delegation from the Colombian government and representatives of
FARC. This time, there was some indication of the progress with the chief
government negotiator, Humberto de la Calle, saying that the government had
"all the will to advance" but that peace talks and negotiations "could not be
prolonged indefinitely in time." To that latter end, the government said it
hoped to forge a peace deal by a deadline of November 2013. For its part,
negotiators from FARC seemed to have a more fluid understanding of the
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process. In a statement, FARC said: "We cannot allow ... the electoral hurry of
the [government to go] above the interests of all the Colombians. Putting a
deadline is not only unrealistic, it is a criminal behavior." Political observers
hoped that the rhetoric of "criminal behavior" did not taint the peace process.
Still, as January 2013 entered its final week, it was clear that peace talks were
not seeing much progress as both sides were taking increasingly concretized
positions. One major issue of contention between the two sides has been land
rights. FARC has called for increased land rights for the country's poor and
working class population; the Santos government, on the other hand, was
interested in currying favor with Colombia's wealthy land owners and business
class. It was clear that they were on a collision course ideologically on this
issue, making the matter of war and peace appear all the more illusive.
To that latter end, FARC was now announcing an end to its unilateral cease-fire
and continuing to dismiss the government's call for a deadline to negotiations.
Meanwhile, the government of President Juan Manuel Santos was making it
clear that the ceasefire was never really in effect as FARC kept attacking
government and public targets throughout. The president himself entered the
fray saying that if a peace deal was reached, it would have to be ratified in a
public referendum; he also foreclosed an end to military operations against
FARC until a peace deal was signed. These two conditions suggested that the
security landscape in Colombia continued on as before, even as these peace
negotiations were ongoing.
As May 2013 came to a close, the peace process saw some progress as the
Colombian government and FARC were able to forge a land reform agreement
-- a central issue in the peace negotiations, as noted above. Provisions of the
deal included an economic and social development plan for rural areas, the
establishment of a land bank responsible for the reallocation of land, and the
disbursement of plots of land to poor farmers. A joint statement on the deal
read as follows: "This agreement will be the start of a radical transformation of
rural Colombia." The practical aspect of the rural development plan aside, the
land reform agreement effectively breathed new life into the peace process
between Colombian government and FARC. As stated by Colombian President
Juan Manuel Santos via the social media venue, Twitter: "We celebrate, really,
this fundamental step ... to end half a century of conflict."
The peace talks were set to resume in June 2013 -- this time with a focus on
including FARC rebels in the political life of Colombia. Progress on this front
has been cautious but relatively productive with the latest meetings focused on
how FARC could enter the mainstream political field in Colombia. The
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elimination of the major leaders of the leftist extremist movement helped
persuade FARC that continuing its insurgent campaign might not be the most
practical endeavor.
It should be noted that another leftist insurgent entity -- the National
Liberation Army (Ejército de Liberación Nacional in Spanish, or ELN) -- was not
part of the peace process, but has indicated an interest in also entering the
new social and political terrain that might characterize Colombia in the future.
Accordingly, at the start of July 2013, FARC and ELN were considering joining
forces and engaging in a "unification process."
By mid-July 2013, the ELN had actually surrendered and agreed to lay down
its arms following a meeting with Colombian President Juan Manuel Santos.
The president hailed the development, calling it "a great step towards peace."
He said, "This is what the [peace] process is about. So every member of the
ELN and the FARC follows their path fighting for their ideals, but without
violence and without arms."
Earlier, on July 10, 2013, FARC's political party -- the Patriotic Union -regained its legal status. Accordingly, it would be positioned to contest the
2014 elections. The Patriotic Union lost its status when it failed to put forth
candidates in the 2002 elections. However, a Colombian court ruled there
were extenuating circumstances at play in 2002 that severely affected the
Patriotic Union's ability to contest those polls. Indeed, the court noted that as
many as 3,000 of its members, including several presidential candidates, had
been murdered by right-wing paramilitaries and drug traffickers. Analysts
have drawn attention to the fact that the government acted in complicity with
those paramilitaries, thus reinforcing the message to FARC rebels that they
were not welcome on Colombia's political field and thus, essentially pushing
them along the path of rebellion.
Meanwhile, the peace talks between the Colombian government and FARC
were ongoing, although the two sides were unable to reach an agreement on
the issue of political participation. Further negotiations on this matter were in
the offing between the government and FARC later in July 2013, with the
government hoping that a peace deal could be signed by a deadline of
November 2013.
The chief negotiator for FARC, Ivan Marquez, noted that the five-year long
conflict with the government was coming to an end. However, in response to
the government's goal of signing a peace accord by November 2013, he
warned against rushing through an agreement. In an interview with Colombia
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media, Marquez said, "It is possible [to reach an agreement by November].
But to achieve peace you need time. A bad peace deal is worse than war."
It should be noted that even amidst the peace negotiations, the conflict
between FARC and the Colombian government was ongoing. An ambush by
more than 70 FARC rebels on two dozen soldiers at an oil pipeline in Arauca
left 15 soldiers and six militants dead. A separate attack in southwestern
Colombia left four soldiers and several FARC militants dead. President Santos
made clear that the military would continue its offensive operations against
FARC, even as the peace process was ongoing, and despite FARC's call for a
ceasefire.
In August 2013, negotiators for the Colombian government and FARC reported
progress in their ongoing peace talks, and specifically on the matter of FARC's
future participation in the political process in Colombia. The level of progress
was hitherto unseen and so there were high hopes that a peace deal could,
actually, be reached by the target date of November 2013. The government
and FARC went so far as to issue a joint statement in which they noted that
both sides "started working on agreements" dealing with FARC's future
participation in the political process in Colombia. The issuance of the
statement, along with the substance contained within it, marked an
unprecedented development in Colombia after decades of insurgency. As
noted by a government negotiator, Humberto de la Calle, peace negotiations
with FARC in the past "have never come this far." He continued by saying that
he hoped that FARC would indeed integrate into mainstream Colombian
society -- including the political sphere. To this end, De La Calle said, "This
isn't just about guarantees because we hope that, at the signing of the pact,
they lay down their weapons, demobilize and incorporate themselves in
society."
It should be noted that as August 2013 entered its final week, the peace
process hit a snag. At issue was the decision by FARC to announce a "pause"
in the negotiating process. At issue for FARC was the proposal that the
emerging peace deal be ratified via a referendum in 2014. FARC
representatives determined that this notion deserved further study, with a
leading FARC negotiator, Pablo Catatumbo, saying: "Under the new
circumstances… the FARC's peace delegation has decided to make a pause in
the discussions to focus exclusively on the analysis of the government
proposal." Colombian authorities immediately responded by recalling
government negotiators while President Juan Manuel Santos saying that talks
would resume only "when we deem it appropriate." The president continued,
"In this process it is not FARC who will dictate pauses and impose conditions.
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That negotiating "pause" was temporary and negotiations resumed with
further rounds of talks in Cuba. By November 2013, the government and
FARC reached an agreement on yet another key sticking point -- the
integration of FARC in the future political structure of Colombia. According to
a key FARC leader and negotiator, Ivan Marquez, in an interview with Reuters
News: "We are completely satisfied with what we have agreed on the point of
political participation. We are doing well; in no other peace process have we
advanced as much as we have here in Havana. We have taken an important
step in the right direction to end the conflict and to achieve a real democracy
in Colombia."
In mid-November 2013, the government of Colombia said it had uncovered a
plot by FARC to assassinate former President Alvaro Uribe.
According to Defense Minister Juan Carlos Pinzon, the assassination was
intended to be executed by a rebel faction with a stronghold in central
Colombia. Defense Minister Pinzon said that the assassination plot was
orchestrated by FARC's Teofilo Forero Mobile Column, led by a commander
commonly known as Paisa. Defense Minister Pizon -- a known critic of the
unfolding peace agreement with FARC -- assured the Colombian people that
the authorities were doing their best to ensure the safety of the country's
former head of state. Pinzon noted he had personally met with former
President Uribe to let him know of the threat against his life; Pinzon added that
security had been increased for the former head of state.
It should be noted that President Uribe was likely viewed by FARC as a
particularly attractive target. During his time in office from 2002 to 2010,
some of the most significant assaults against FARC took place, ultimately
resulting in the weakening of Colombia's oldest, largest, and most organized
insurgent group. Also of note was the face that former President Uribe's own
father was killed by FARC in 1983 during a failed kidnapping attempt.
Clearly, for both Uribe and FARC, there was a history of acrimony.
At the broader level, this revelation about a plot to kill former President Uribe
was certain to have national implications. Peace negotiations between the
government and FARC have been going on since late 2012, with significant
peace negotiations taking place in the Cuban capital city of Havana. They
have, at times, been met with snags but have issues have been largely
resolved over time, with significant agreements made on controversial issues
from land reformation to the integration of FARC into the mainstream political
process. As noted by a government negotiator, Humberto de la Calle, peace
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negotiations with FARC in the past "have never come this far."
That being said, the citizenry of Colombia has been largely ambivalent about
the peace process and have accused the government of acceding too much to
the demands of a group that terrorized the country for decades. While the
peace process could very well pave the way for the hoped-for peace
agreement, there was also a climate of suspicion about FARC's real agenda.
Throughout the negotiations process, FARC has not consistently relinquished its
campaign of violence.
Many Colombians expressed outrage over photographs surfaced depicting
FARC leaders on a boat in Cuba enjoying cigars even as their militant wing
continued to carry out violent attacks in the homeland. The contrast between
the FARC leadership in a "holiday" mode as they negotiated a peace deal on
the one hand, and a continuing campaign of violence in real practice on the
other hand, raised the ire of ordinary Colombians. As such, public support for
the protracted peace process was waning, with people wondering about the
price the Colombian government was willing to pay for peace with FARC. The
agreement on political integration, for example, provided fodder for
speculation. Ordinary citizens wanted FARC to pay some price for their acts of
terror, rather than be rewarded with representation and offices in a branch of
government. The news of a plot to assassinate former President Uribe was
sure to exacerbate suspicions and possibly derail the peace process entirely.
By the first week of December 2013, FARC announced a 30-day-long ceasefire
starting on Dec. 15, 2013. The announcement was regarded with skepticism
from the government of Colombia since in the same period, FARC carried out
a car bombing at a police station. That attack left five soldiers, one police
officer, and three civilians dead. That skepticism was bolstered by the
knowledge that FARC has announced such ceasefire moves in the past, only to
abandon them a short while later. For its part, the government of Colombia
made it clear that it would not ease up on its offensive against FARC rebels
until a final peace agreement is signed into existence.
Note that as of 2014, when parliamentary and presidential elections were
scheduled to take place, the peace process quickly became the core election
issue. The re-election of Santos as president (as discussed above) was
regarded as a public ratification of the push for peace.
In late November 2014, Colombian General Ruben Dario Alzate was released
from abduction by rebels of the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia
(Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia in Spanish, or FARC).
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Weeks earlier, General Alzate and two other individuals -- Corporal Jorge
Rodriguez and a lawyer identified as Gloria Urregowere -- were kidnapped by
FARC rebels. The abduction of the three individuals spurred Colombia
President Juan Manuel Santos to suspend peace talks with the leftist rebel
movement that has been ongoing since 2013. But as the month of November
2014 drew to a close, FARC rebels handed over the three captives to an
International Red Cross humanitarian mission in an isolated area of the Choco
province; Alzate, Rodriguez, and Urregowere were then transferred to a
military base.
Representatives of FARC said they took the action because President Santos
had continued military operations against them even as peace talks were
ongoing in Cuba. However, the abductions only served to derail the peace
process. While there was no date set for the resumption of peace
negotiations, President Santos issued an encouraging statement following the
release of Alzate, Rodriguez, and Urregowere in which he said, "It is obvious
that this decision helps to create a favorable atmosphere for the continuation
of the talks."
In December 2014, the government of Colombia and FARC agreed to resume
the suspended peace talks. As the year 2014 drew to a close, FARC announced
an indefinite unilateral ceasefire. A statement by FARC read as follows: "We
have resolved to declare a unilateral ceasefire and to end hostilities for an
indefinite time." FARC noted it would resume hostilities if Colombian forces
attacked them.
By the first part of 2015, peace talks between the Colombian authorities and
FARC had resumed, and in March 2015, the two sides reached a significant
milestone when high-ranking Colombian military officers sat at the
negotiating table across from leftist rebel commanders. The historic meeting
took place in the Cuban capital of Havana where peace talks have been
ongoing for some time. The meetings appeared to have seen success with
agreements being reached on matters such as political participation, land
reform, and an end to the illegal drugs trade. The latest issues items on the
agenda have resulted in an agreement between both sides to dismantle land
mines and explosive traps laid in rural parts of the country.
The chief negotiator for the Colombian government, Humberto de la Calle,
hailed the latest development, saying, "The proposal for de-mining is a first
step, but a giant step toward making peace." For his part, President Juan
Manuel Santos lauded the progress in the peace process, declaring, "I would
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like to congratulate our negotiating team and acknowledge FARC... because
this is bringing us closer to the shared objective of reaching peace in
Colombia."
A new step in the direction of peace was achieved in the second week of March
2015 when the Colombian military said it would temporarily halt its bombing
campaign against FARC for a period of one month. The cessation in hostilities,
according to President Santos, was because (1) FARC had demonstrated its
commitment to its self-declared ceasefire, and (2) the ceasefire was clearly
holding. For these two reasons, his government was responding with its own
good faith move. In a national address, President Santos said, "In regard to
the indefinite, unilateral ceasefire declared by the Farc on December 18, we
must recognize that they have fulfilled it." He continued, "In order to start the
de-escalation of the conflict, I have decided to order the minister of defense
and armed forces commanders to stop bombing raids on FARC camps for a
month."
In April 2015, the peace process was challenged when FARC rebels attacked
and killed approximately a dozen Colombian soldiers and injured 20 others.
Both sides had different explanations for the incident. The leadership of FARC
said that the outbreak of violence was for self-defense purposes when
government troops advanced on its positions. On the other side of the
equation, the government of Colombia accused FARC of carrying out the
attack against government troops as they were conducting an anti-narcotics
operation.
In the aftermath of the fracas, FARC called for an independent investigation
into the incident, recommitted itself to the self-declared unilateral ceasefire,
and insisted that peace negotiations should carry on. For his part, Colombian
President Juan Manuel Santos responded by saying that the peace process
should continue even as certain rival political factions demanded an end to the
peace process. Speaking on behalf of President Santos, chief negotiator
Humberto de la Calle observed that FARC had lost credibility as a result of the
outbreak of violence, but emphasized the priority of ending the long-running
war once and for all. De la Calle excoriated FARC's credibility, declaring, "The
greatest damage as been to the FARC's credibility. A ceasefire of this type
must be serious, it must be verifiable and it has to be agreed at the table as
part of the general agreement." Nevertheless, he emphasized the importance
of the diplomatic process, as he said, "Ending the war is more imperative than
ever."
In July 2015, after months marked by unfortunate eruptions of violence, the
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peace process saw a boost as both sides took measures to de-escalate
tensions and accentuate good faith. On one side of the equation, FARC
announced a month-long ceasefire. Ivan Marquez, FARC's chief negotiator,
said he hoped the ceasefire would set the path for an official truce. On the
other side of the equation, Colombian President Juan Manuel Santos ordered
the government's military forces to suspend air strikes on FARC camps in nonurban areas. Speaking from the Colombian city of Cartagena, President
Santos said, "I have issued the order to stop, as of today, bombing raids
against camps where there are members of that group." He added, "From
now on, this type of bombing will only be done by explicit order of the
president."
In September 2015, a major breakthrough was announced in the Cubanbrokered peace talks between the Colombian government and FARC regarding
justice and accountability for those who committed human right abuses during
the many years of the conflict. Specifically, special courts and peace tribunals
would be established to address alleged abuses committed during the
conflict. Those courts and tribunals would be administered by Colombian
magistrates and foreign jurists. All relevant participants in the conflict -- from
members of FARC to members of the security forces -- would face justice for
their crimes although there would be some provisions of amnesty for acts
committed during combat. The real focus would be on war crimes and crimes
against humanity. Meanwhile punitive measures would range from
conventional jailing to public service, reparations, and special detainment.
With the human rights abuses issue presenting the most significant obstacle to
successful peace negotiations between the two sides, the concurrence on
justice and accountability was regarded as a breakthrough. Indeed, with that
hurdle cleared, the two sides were announcing a March 2016 deadline for the
promulgation of a final peace accord.
Critics of the deal have condemned the proposed measures to address human
rights abuses as an affront to the notion of justice, and have said that
perpetrators will be gifted with impunity. Former President Alvaro Uribe, a
strident opponent of the peace process, said via the social media outlet,
Twitter, "It's not peace that's near, it's the surrender to FARC!" For his part,
President Santos acknowledged that the justice and accountability provisions
would not please everyone. Nevertheless, he insisted that the focus should be
on the goals of peace and stability for Colombia.
Heralding the peace process as a success, Colombian President Santos said,
"We're not going to fail! This is the chance for peace!" He added, "On 23 March
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2016 we will be bidding farewell to the longest-running conflict in the
Americas." Via the social media outlet, Twitter, FARC leader, Timochenko,
urged sympathizers to support the peace deal as follows: "Let's join efforts to
achieve peace."
At the start of October 2015, it was clear that the push for peace was yielding
results as the leader of FARC rebels ordered a halt to combat training of the
group's fighters. Rodrigo Londono called for FARC's fighters to end their
military activities and turn their attention to political and cultural pursuits
instead. Via the social media outlet, Twitter, Londono (known as Timochenko)
also declared: "Let's go for peace." Colombian President Santos applauded
the move and noted that it would facilitate the kind of lasting ceasefire that
would be needed to complete the peace negotiations process.
In August 2016, the landmark peace process in Colombia -- ongoing since
2013 -- moved forward as the government and Revolutionary Armed Forces
of Colombia (Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia in Spanish, or
FARC) agreed on a demobilization plan. The proposal finding concurrence
included a United Nations-supervised security protocol, a timetable, and
provisions aimed at disarming the estimated 9,000 remaining FARC rebels.
Under the terms of the agreement, FARC rebels could go to any of 26
locations across the country to relinquish their arms; they would be able to do
so for up to six months after the final peace agreement went into effect. As
noted by Humberto de la Calle, the Colombian government's chief negotiator,
"The FARC will have handed in all their arms to the United Nations within 180
days."
It should be noted that opponents of the peace agreement have argued that
FARC rebels received amnesty for crimes for which they should face justice.
Those voices had support in the public sphere although there were
countervailing voices weary of war and favoring stability and an end to
prevailing hostilities.
As August 2016 came to a close, Colombian President Juan Manuel Santos sent
the text of the peace accord to Congress for approval. Members of the
Colombian Congress would have a month to examine the agreement.
President Santos also officially declared a ceasefire. He additionally heralded
the peace offered by the accord, saying, "Peace is always better than war. It
will remove the fear we have all grown up with after so many years. Peace
offers opportunities that most Colombians never had."
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With this element settled, the Colombian government and FARC were closer
than ever to signing a final peace accord that would bring a close to the
longest running war in the Americas.
The peace agreement was officially approved by the Colombian government in
September 2016. Later, as September 2016 came to a close, FARC voted
unanimously to approve a peace deal with the Colombian government. The
vote took place at a FARC congress on the southern Yari Plains of Colombia.
The vote of approval effectively set in motion a plan for FARC to be
transformed into a political party, where it would continue its effort to
advocate for social and political change -- but within the system of
governance.
In a statement to media, FARC commander Ivan Marquez, said: "We inform
the country and the government and the governments and people of the world
that the rebel delegates of the congress have given unanimous backing to the
final accord." He added, "The war is over, long live Colombia, long live
peace."
Days later, the head of the government of Colombia, President Juan Manuel
Santos, and the rebel leader of FARC, Rodrigo Londono, known by the nom de
guerre "Timochenko," signed the peace deal officially ending the war that had
gone on for half a century and left a quarter of a million people dead.
In tears, President Santos said of what would undoubtedly become his
greatest political legacy, "The horrible night of violence that has covered us
with its shadow for more than half a century is over. We open our hearts to a
new dawn, to a brilliant sun full of possibilities that has appeared in the
Colombian sky."
The final step would be for the accord to be ratified via a referendum set for
Oct. 2, 2016. As stated by President Santos, "We are giving the final word to
the people." The question to be put forth to the people of Colombia on Oct. 2,
2016, would be: "Do you support the accord that puts an end to armed conflict
and constructs a stable and durable nation?" President Santos characterized
the referendum question as follows: "It's a clear and simple question that
leaves no room for any confusion."
On Oct. 2, 2016, Colombians went to the polls to decide whether or not to
ratify the landmark peace deal. Once the votes were counted, the result was
something as a shock with Colombians opting narrowly to reject the peace
accord with FARC. It appeared that the vituperative "no" vote campaign, led
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by former Colombian President Alvaro Uribe was successful as 50.2 percent of
voters chose to reject the agreement over 49.8 percent voted to ratify it. Part
of the problem may have been the low voter turnout with only 38 percent of
eligible persons casting votes in the referendum.
There was also a regional divide shown in the result with persons in outer
provinces voting in favor of the peace deal and persons in the Colombian
capital of Bogota voting against it. Of note was the fact that persons living in
areas hardest hit by the violence from the long-running conflict -- for
example, those in Choco province -- tended to vote overwhelming in favor of
the deal.
The take-away from that piece of data was that those who intimately
experienced the effects of years of war were the most eager for peace. On
the other side of the equation, those voting heavily against the deal -- from
example, those from former President Uribe's stronghold -- expressed the
view that the agreement allowed FARC rebels effective amnesty. Indeed, they
were not keen about the notion of immunity from normal jail sentences for
FARC leadership. Some were particularly outraged over the provision to pay
demobilized FARC rebels a stipend and to provide them with assistance in
starting a business. There were also objections to measures that would allow
FARC to enter the political process. The goal of those provisions was, of
course, to encourage the rebels to stay on the path of peace and not return to
a life of violence. But for some Colombians, these "perks" were being viewed
as rewards for a life of violence, kidnapping and murder.
In the aftermath of the referendum, President Santos made clear that the
bilateral ceasefire between the government and FARC would remain in place.
He also made clear that there would be a return to the peace negotiating
process, with the ultimate goal of facilitating a sustainable peace for
Colombia. To these ends, President Santos said, "I won't give up," and
adding, "I am the guarantor of Colombia's stability." For his part, FARC leader,
Timochenko, struck a similar tone as he said that the rebel group also would
continue on the path of securing an end to the conflict. He said. "The FARC
reiterates its disposition to use only words as a weapon to build toward the
future." He added, "Count on us, peace will triumph."
By Oct. 4, 2016, two of the key government negotiators, Humberto de la Calle
and Sergio Jaramillo, were in Cuba meeting with their counterparts from
FARC, exploring options for moving forward.
Note that by mid-October 2016, Colombian President Santos extended his
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ceasefire with \FARC rebels through the end of the year . This move was
intended to provide breathing room for the peace accord to be ameliorated.
In a national address, Santos said, "One of the students reminded me, that in
the army and in the guerrilla ranks, there are young people waiting to see
what happens, hoping that they don't need to fire another shot. For that
reason, and at the request of the students, I have taken the decision to extend
the ceasefire until Dec. 31."
The peace process received a boost when in the second week of October 2016
President Santos received the Nobel Peace Prize as encouragement to continue
the stymied peace effort with FARC. The Norwegian Nobel Committee said
they were awarding Santos for his efforts in bringing one of the world's
longest wars in modern history closer to a peaceful resolution. In its
announcement, the Nobel Committee acknowledged that the collapse of the
peace process was still possible. It said, "There is a real danger that the
peace process will come to a halt and that civil war will flare up again. This
makes it even more important that the parties ... continue to respect the
ceasefire."
For his part, President Santos accepted the honor saying, "I infinitely
appreciate from all of my heart this honorable distinction, not in my name, but
the name of all Colombians, and especially the millions of victims that have
been left by the conflict we have suffered for more than 50 years." He added,
"Thank God peace is close. Peace is possible."
Editor's Note on FARC:
The Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (Fuerzas Armadas
Revolucionarias de Colombia in Spanish, or FARC) is the oldest, largest, and
most organized insurgent group in Colombia. It has widespread operations
throughout Colombia and occasionally on the borders of neighboring countries
such as Peru, Ecuador, Venezuela and Brazil.
A leftist military organization seeking political power and economic reform,
FARC receives support from all segments of the population, but mostly at the
rural level. FARC relies primarily on kidnapping high-profile people for ransom
money and overseeing drug operations as a means of income. FARC is only
one of a number of left-wing rebels and right-wing paramilitaries, which have
been in conflict with the Colombian authorities for decades.
The July 2, 2008, rescue of former presidential candidate Ingrid Betancourt
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and three United States defense contractors meant that FARC had lost its most
high-profile hostages and indicated possible fractures in its operations, perhaps
partially due to the deaths of key leaders of the rebel group. The October 2008
escape of a former congressman only served to reinforce this perception.
Since then, the elimination of key members of the FARC leadership has
suggested a further weakening of FARC. Nevertheless, hundreds of people
remain in captivity at the hands of FARC. In more recent times, FARC said it
was releasing its hostages and abandoning its practice of kidnapping civilians
for extortion. However, even with most of its leadership eliminated or
detained, there was not a clear indication that FARC had rejected the use of
violence in achieving its agenda.
Since 2013, there were cautious hopes for a peace deal between the
Colombian government and FARC as delegates from both sides convened
peace negotiations in Cuba. The news in November 2013 of a plot by FARC to
assassinate former President Uribe, as well as the abduction of three
individuals including a general in November 2014 by FARC, together placed the
peace process in peril. Indeed, President Santos moved to suspend peace
negotiations with FARC following the 2014 abductions. The release of the
hostages, however, followed by the declaration of a unilateral ceasefire by
FARC in late 2014 eased tensions. As such, the government of Colombia and
FARC soon announced that they would resume peace talks.
Progress in negotiations was reported in 2015, with a final peace accord taking
shape in 2016. That final peace accord was signed by both the Colombian
government and FARC in September 2016. However, at the start of October
2016, Colombians narrowly rejected the peace agreement with FARC during a
national referendum, effectively pushing the country into a state of limbo.
Both the Santos government and FARC indicated that they would return to the
peace process although the outcome remained undetermined at the time of
writing. The peace process received a boost when in October 2016 President
Santos received the Nobel Peace Prize as encouragement to continue the
stymied peace effort with FARC. The ultimate aim was to bring a close to the
longest running war of the Americans in recent times -- lasting more than 50
years -- with a death toll of approximately 225,000, and millions more
displaced.
-- November 2016
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Written by Dr. Denise Youngblood Coleman, Editor in Chief, www.countrywatch.com. Research
sources listed in Bibliography.
Political Risk Index
Political Risk Index
The Political Risk Index is a proprietary index measuring the level of risk posed to governments,
corporations, and investors, based on a myriad of political and economic factors. The Political Risk
Index is calculated using an established methodology by CountryWatch's Editor-in-Chief and is
based on varied criteria* including the following consideration: political stability, political
representation, democratic accountability, freedom of expression, security and crime, risk of
conflict, human development, jurisprudence and regulatory transparency, economic risk, foreign
investment considerations, possibility of sovereign default, and corruption. Scores are assigned
from 0-10 using the aforementioned criteria. A score of 0 marks the highest political risk, while a
score of 10 marks the lowest political risk. Stated differently, countries with the lowest scores pose
the greatest political risk. A score of 0 marks the most dire level of political risk and an ultimate
nadir, while a score of 10 marks the lowest possible level of political risk, according to this
proprietary index. Rarely will there be scores of 0 or 10 due to the reality that countries contain
complex landscapes; as such, the index offers a range of possibilities ranging from lesser to greater
risk.
Colombia Review 2017
Country
Assessment
Afghanistan
2
Albania
4
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Algeria
6
Andorra
9
Angola
4
Antigua
8
Argentina
4
Armenia
4-5
Australia
9.5
Austria
9.5
Azerbaijan
4
Bahamas
8.5
Bahrain
6
Bangladesh
3.5
Barbados
8.5-9
Belarus
3
Belgium
9
Belize
8
Benin
5
Bhutan
5
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Bolivia
5
Bosnia-Herzegovina
4
Botswana
7
Brazil
7
Brunei
7
Bulgaria
6
Burkina Faso
4
Burma (Myanmar)
4.5
Burundi
3
Cambodia
4
Cameroon
5
Canada
9.5
Cape Verde
6
Central African Republic
3
Chad
4
Chile
9
China
7
China: Hong Kong
8
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China: Taiwan
8
Colombia
7
Comoros
5
Congo DRC
3
Congo RC
4
Costa Rica
8
Cote d'Ivoire
4.5
Croatia
7
Cuba
4-4.5
Cyprus
5
Czech Republic
8
Denmark
9.5
Djibouti
4.5
Dominica
7
Dominican Republic
6
East Timor
5
Ecuador
6
Egypt
5
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El Salvador
7
Equatorial Guinea
4
Eritrea
3
Estonia
8
Ethiopia
4
Fiji
5
Finland
9
Fr.YugoslavRep.Macedonia
5
France
9
Gabon
5
Gambia
4
Georgia
5
Germany
9.5
Ghana
6
Greece
4.5-5
Grenada
8
Guatemala
6
Guinea
3.5
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Guinea-Bissau
3.5
Guyana
4.5
Haiti
3.5
Holy See (Vatican)
9
Honduras
4.5-5
Hungary
7
Iceland
8.5-9
India
7.5-8
Indonesia
6
Iran
3.5-4
Iraq
2.5-3
Ireland
8-8.5
Israel
8
Italy
7.5
Jamaica
6.5-7
Japan
9
Jordan
6.5
Kazakhstan
6
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Kenya
5
Kiribati
7
Korea, North
1
Korea, South
8
Kosovo
4
Kuwait
7
Kyrgyzstan
4.5
Laos
4.5
Latvia
7
Lebanon
5.5
Lesotho
6
Liberia
3.5
Libya
2
Liechtenstein
9
Lithuania
7.5
Luxembourg
9
Madagascar
4
Malawi
4
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Malaysia
8
Maldives
4.5
Mali
4
Malta
8
Marshall Islands
6
Mauritania
4.5-5
Mauritius
7
Mexico
6.5
Micronesia
7
Moldova
5
Monaco
9
Mongolia
5
Montenegro
6
Morocco
6.5
Mozambique
4.5-5
Namibia
6.5-7
Nauru
6
Nepal
4
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Netherlands
9.5
New Zealand
9.5
Nicaragua
5
Niger
4
Nigeria
4.5
Norway
9.5
Oman
7
Pakistan
3.5
Palau
7
Panama
7.5
Papua New Guinea
5
Paraguay
6.5-7
Peru
7
Philippines
6
Poland
8
Portugal
7.5
Qatar
7.5
Romania
5.5
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Russia
5.5
Rwanda
5
Saint Kitts and Nevis
8
Saint Lucia
8
Saint Vincent and Grenadines
8
Samoa
7
San Marino
9
Sao Tome and Principe
5.5
Saudi Arabia
6
Senegal
6
Serbia
5
Seychelles
7
Sierra Leone
4.5
Singapore
9
Slovak Republic (Slovakia)
8
Slovenia
8
Solomon Islands
6
Somalia
2
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South Africa
7
Spain
7.5
Sri Lanka
5
Sudan
3.5
Suriname
5
Swaziland
5
Sweden
9.5
Switzerland
9.5
Syria
2
Tajikistan
4.5
Tanzania
6
Thailand
6.5
Togo
4.5
Tonga
7
Trinidad and Tobago
8
Tunisia
6
Turkey
7
Turkmenistan
4.5
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Tuvalu
7
Uganda
6
Ukraine
3.5-4
United Arab Emirates
7
United Kingdom
9
United States
9.5
Uruguay
8
Uzbekistan
4
Vanuatu
7
Venezuela
4
Vietnam
5
Yemen
3
Zambia
4.5
Zimbabwe
3
*Methodology
The Political Risk Index is calculated by CountryWatch's Editor-in-Chief and is based on the
combined scoring of varied criteria as follows -1. political stability (record of peaceful transitions of power, ability of government to stay in office
and carry out policies as a result of productive executive-legislative relationship, perhaps with
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popular support vis a vis risk of government collapse)
2. political representation (right of suffrage, free and fair elections, multi-party participation, and
influence of foreign powers)
3. democratic accountability (record of respect for political rights, human rights, and civil liberties,
backed by constitutional protections)
4. freedom of expression (media freedom and freedom of expression, right to dissent or express
political opposition, backed by constitutional protections)
5. security and crime (the degree to which a country has security mechanisms that ensures safety
of citizens and ensures law and order, without resorting to extra-judicial measures)
6. risk of conflict (the presence of conflict; record of coups or civil disturbances; threat of war;
threats posed by internal or external tensions; threat or record of terrorism or insurgencies)
7. human development (quality of life; access to education; socio-economic conditions; systemic
concern for the status of women and children)
8. jurisprudence and regulatory transparency (the impartiality of the legal system, the degree of
transparency within the regulatory system of a country and the durability of that structure)
9. economic conditions (economic stability, investment climate, degree of nationalization of
industries, property rights, labor force development)
10. corruption ( the degree of corruption in a country and/or efforts by the government to address
graft and other irregularities)
Editor's Note:
As of 2015, the current climate of upheaval internationally -- both politically and economically -has affected the ratings for several countries across the world.
North Korea, Afghanistan, Somalia, and Zimbabwe -- retain their low rankings.
Several Middle Eastern and North African countries, such as Tunisia, Egypt, Libya, Syria, Iraq
and Yemen were downgraded in recent years due to political instability occurring in the "season of
unrest" sweeping the region since 2011 and continuing today. The worst downgrades affected
Syria where civil war is at play, along with the rampage of terror being carried out by Islamist
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terrorists who have also seized control over part of Syrian territory. Iraq has been further
downgraded due to the rampage of Islamist terrorists and their takeover of wide swaths of Iraqi
territory. Libya has also been downgraded further due to its slippage into failed state status; at
issue in Libya have been an ongoing power struggle between rival militias. Yemen continues to
hold steady with a poor ranking due to continued unrest at the hands of Houthi rebels,
secessinionists, al-Qaida in the Arabian Peninsula, and Islamic State. Its landscape has been
further complicated by the fact that it is now the site of a proxy war between Iran and Saudi
Arabia. Conversely, Tunisia and Egypt have seen slight upgrades as these countries stabilize.
In Africa, Zimbabwe continues to be one of the bleak spots of the world with the Mugabe regime
effectively destroying the country's once vibrant economy, and miring Zimbabwe with an
exceedingly high rate of inflation, debilitating unemployment, devolving public services, and critical
food shortages; rampant crime and political oppression round out the landscape. Somalia also
sports a poor ranking due to the continuing influence of the terror group, al-Shabab, which was not
operating across the border in Kenya. On the upside, Nigeria, which was ineffectively dealing with
the threat posed by the terror group, Boko Haram, was making some strides on the national
security front with its new president at the helm. Mali was slightly upgraded due to its efforts to
return to constitutional order following the 2012 coup and to neutralize the threat of separatists and
Islamists. But the Central African Republic was downgraded due to the takeover of the
government by Muslim Seleka rebels and a continued state of lawlessness in that country. South
Sudan -- the world's newest nation state -- has not been officially included in this assessment;
however, it can be unofficially assessed to be in the vicinity of "3" due to its manifold political and
economic challenges. Burkina Faso, Burundi and Guinea have been downgraded due to political
unrest, with Guinea also having to deal with the burgeoning Ebola crisis.
In Europe, Ukraine was downgraded due to the unrest facing that country following its Maidan
revolution that triggered a pro-Russian uprising in the eastern part of the country. Russia was also
implicated in the Ukrainian crisis due to its intervention on behalf of pro-Russian separatists, as
well as its annexation of the Ukrainian territory of Crimea. Strains on the infrastructure of
southern and eastern European countries, such as Serbia, Croatia, and Hungary, due to an influx of
refugees was expected to pose social and economic challenges, and slight downgrades were made
accordingly. So too, a corruption crisis for the Romanian prime minister has affected the ranking
of that country. Meanwhile, the rankings for Spain, Portugal, Ireland, and Italy were maintained
due to debt woes and the concomitant effect on the euro zone. Greece, another euro zone nation,
was earlier downgraded due to its sovereign debt crisis; however, no further downgrade was added
since the country was able to successfully forge a bailout rescue deal with creditor institutions.
Cyprus' exposure to Greek banks yielded a downgrade in its case.
In Asia, Nepal was downgraded in response to continuous political instability and a constitutional
crisis that prevails well after landmark elections were held. Both India and China retain their
rankings; India holds a slightly higher ranking than China due to its record of democratic
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representation and accountability. Increasing violence and political instability in Pakistan resulted in
a downgrade for this country's already low rating. Meanwhile, Singapore retained its strong
rankings due to its continued effective stewardship of the economy and political stability.
In the Americas, ongoing political and economic woes, as well as crime and corruption have
affected the rankings for Mexico , Guatemala, and Brazil. Argentina was downgraded due to its
default on debt following the failure of talks with bond holders. Venezuela was downgraded due to
its mix of market unfriendly policies and political oppression. For the moment, the United States
maintains a strong ranking along with Canada, and most of the English-speaking countries of the
Caribbean; however, a renewed debt ceiling crisis could cause the United States to be downgraded
in a future edition. Finally, a small but significant upgrade was attributed to Cuba due to its recent
pro-business reforms and its normalization of ties with the Unitd States.
Source:
Dr. Denise Youngblood Coleman, Editor in Chief, CountryWatch Inc. www.countrywatch.com
Updated:
2015
Political Stability
Political Stability
The Political Stability Index is a proprietary index measuring a country's level of stability,
standard of good governance, record of constitutional order, respect for human rights, and overall
strength of democracy. The Political StabilityIndex is calculated using an established methodology*
by CountryWatch's Editor-in-Chief and is based on a given country's record of peaceful
transitions of power, ability of a government to stay in office and carry out its policies vis a vis risk
credible risks of government collapse. Threats include coups, domestic violence and instability,
terrorism, etc. This index measures the dynamic between the quality of a country's government
and the threats that can compromise and undermine stability. Scores are assigned from 0-10 using
the aforementioned criteria. A score of 0 marks the lowest level of political stability and an
ultimate nadir, while a score of 10 marks the highest level of political stability possible, according to
this proprietary index. Rarely will there be scores of 0 or 10 due to the reality that countries
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contain complex landscapes; as such, the index offers a range of possibilities ranging from lesser to
greater stability.
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Country
Assessment
Afghanistan
2
Albania
4.5-5
Algeria
5
Andorra
9.5
Angola
4.5-5
Antigua
8.5-9
Argentina
7
Armenia
5.5
Australia
9.5
Austria
9.5
Azerbaijan
5
Bahamas
9
Bahrain
6
Bangladesh
4.5
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Barbados
9
Belarus
4
Belgium
9
Belize
8
Benin
5
Bhutan
5
Bolivia
6
Bosnia-Herzegovina
5
Botswana
8.5
Brazil
7
Brunei
8
Bulgaria
7.5
Burkina Faso
4
Burma (Myanmar)
4.5
Burundi
4
Cambodia
4.5-5
Cameroon
6
Canada
9.5
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Cape Verde
6
Central African Republic
3
Chad
4.5
Chile
9
China
7
China: Hong Kong
8
China: Taiwan
8
Colombia
7.5
Comoros
5
Congo DRC
3
Congo RC
5
Costa Rica
9.5
Cote d'Ivoire
3.5
Croatia
7.5
Cuba
4.5
Cyprus
8
Czech Republic
8.5
Denmark
9.5
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Djibouti
5
Dominica
8.5
Dominican Republic
7
East Timor
5
Ecuador
7
Egypt
4.5-5
El Salvador
7.5-8
Equatorial Guinea
4.5
Eritrea
4
Estonia
9
Ethiopia
4.5
Fiji
5
Finland
9
Fr.YugoslavRep.Macedonia
6.5
France
9
Gabon
5
Gambia
4.5
Georgia
5
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Germany
9.5
Ghana
7
Greece
6
Grenada
8.5
Guatemala
7
Guinea
3.5-4
Guinea-Bissau
4
Guyana
6
Haiti
3.5-4
Holy See (Vatican)
9.5
Honduras
6
Hungary
7.5
Iceland
9
India
8
Indonesia
7
Iran
3.5
Iraq
2.5
Ireland
9.5
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Israel
8
Italy
8.5-9
Jamaica
8
Japan
9
Jordan
6
Kazakhstan
6
Kenya
5
Kiribati
8
Korea, North
2
Korea, South
8.5
Kosovo
5.5
Kuwait
7
Kyrgyzstan
5
Laos
5
Latvia
8.5
Lebanon
5.5
Lesotho
5
Liberia
3.5-4
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Libya
2
Liechtenstein
9
Lithuania
9
Luxembourg
9.5
Madagascar
4
Malawi
5
Malaysia
8
Maldives
4.5-5
Mali
4.5-5
Malta
9
Marshall Islands
8
Mauritania
6
Mauritius
8
Mexico
6.5-7
Micronesia
8
Moldova
5.5
Monaco
9.5
Mongolia
6.5-7
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Montenegro
8
Morocco
7
Mozambique
5
Namibia
8.5
Nauru
8
Nepal
4.5
Netherlands
9.5
New Zealand
9.5
Nicaragua
6
Niger
4.5
Nigeria
4.5
Norway
9.5
Oman
7
Pakistan
3
Palau
8
Panama
8.5
Papua New Guinea
6
Paraguay
8
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Peru
7.5
Philippines
6
Poland
9
Portugal
9
Qatar
7
Romania
7
Russia
6
Rwanda
5
Saint Kitts and Nevis
9
Saint Lucia
9
Saint Vincent and Grenadines
9
Samoa
8
San Marino
9.5
Sao Tome and Principe
7
Saudi Arabia
6
Senegal
7.5
Serbia
6.5
Seychelles
8
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Sierra Leone
4.5
Singapore
9.5
Slovak Republic (Slovakia)
8.5
Slovenia
9
Solomon Islands
6.5-7
Somalia
2
South Africa
7.5
Spain
9
Sri Lanka
5
Sudan
3
Suriname
5
Swaziland
5
Sweden
9.5
Switzerland
9.5
Syria
2
Tajikistan
4.5
Tanzania
6
Thailand
6
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Togo
5
Tonga
7
Trinidad and Tobago
8
Tunisia
5
Turkey
7.5
Turkmenistan
5
Tuvalu
8.5
Uganda
6
Ukraine
3.5-4
United Arab Emirates
7
United Kingdom
9
United States
9
Uruguay
8.5
Uzbekistan
4
Vanuatu
8.5
Venezuela
4.5-5
Vietnam
4.5
Yemen
2.5
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Zambia
5
Zimbabwe
3
*Methodology
The Political Stability Index is calculated by CountryWatch's Editor-in-Chief and is based on the
combined scoring of varied criteria as follows -1. record of peaceful transitions of power ( free and fair elections; adherence to political accords)
2. record of democratic representation, presence of instruments of democracy; systemic
accountability
3. respect for human rights; respect for civil rights
4. strength of the system of jurisprudence, adherence to constitutional order, and good governance
5. ability of a government to stay in office and carry out its policies vis a vis risk credible risks of
government collapse (i.e. government stability versus a country being deemed "ungovernable")
6. threat of coups, insurgencies, and insurrection
7. level of unchecked crime and corruption
8. risk of terrorism and other threats to national security
9. relationship with regional powers and international community; record of bilateral or multilateral
cooperation
10. degree of economic strife (i.e. economic and financial challenges)
Editor's Note:
As of 2015, the current climate of upheaval internationally -- both politically and economically -has affected the ratings for several countries across the world. The usual suspects -- North Korea,
Afghanistan, and Somalia -- retain their low rankings. The reclusive and ultra-dictatorial North
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Korean regime, which has terrified the world with its nuclear threats, has exhibited internal
instability. Of note was a cut-throat purge of hundreds of high ranking officials deemed to be a
threat to Kim Jung-un. Despite their attempts to recover from years of lawlessness, war, and
warlordism, both Afghanistan and Somalia continue to be beset by terrorism and turmoil. In
Afghanistan, while international forces have seen success in the effort against the terror group, alQaida, the other Islamist extremist group, the Taliban, continues to carry out a vicious insurgency
using terrorism. In Somalia, while the government attempts to do the nation's business, the terror
group, al-Shabab continues to make its presence known not only in Somalia, but across the border
into Kenya with devastating results/ Also in this category is Iraq, which continues to be rocked
by horrific violence and terrorism at the hands of Islamic State, which has taken over wide swaths
of Iraqi territory.
Syria, Libya, and Yemen have been added to this unfortunate echelon of the world's most
politically unstable countries. Syria has been mired by the twin hazards of 1. a civil war as rebels
oppose the Assad regime; and 2. the rampage of terror being carried out by Islamic State, which
also seized control over vast portions of Syrian territory. Meanwhile, the post-Qaddhafi landscape
of Libya has devolved into chaos as rival militias battle for control -- the elected government of the
country notwithstanding. Rounding out this grim triad is Yemen, which was dealing with a Houthi
rebellion, secesionists in the south, as well as the threat of terrorism from al-Qaida in the Arabian
Peninsula as well as Islamic State, while also being the site of a proxy war between Shi'a Iran and
Sunni Saudi Arabia.
Meanwhile, several Middle Eastern and North African countries, such as Tunisia, Egypt, and
Bahrain were downgraded in recent years due to political instability occurring in the "season of
unrest" sweeping the region since 2011 and continuing today. All three of these countries have
stabilized in recent years and have been upgraded accordingly. In Bahrain, the landscape had
calmed. In Egypt, the secular military-backed government has generated criticism for its
crackdown on the Muslim Brotherhood; however, the country had ratified the presidency via
democratic elections and were on track to hold parliamentary elections as the country moved along
the path of democratization. Perhaps the most impressive story was coming out of Tunisia -- the
country whose Jasmine Revolution sparked the entire Arab Spring -- and where after a few years
of strife, a new progressive constitution was passed into law and a secular government had been
elected to power. Tunisia, Egypt, and Bahrain have seen slight upgrades as these countries
stabilize.
In Africa, the Central African Republic was downgraded the previous year due to the takeover of
the government by Muslim Seleka rebels. Although the country has been trying to emerge from
this crisis, the fact of the matter was that it was difficult to halt the precipitous decline into
lawlessness in that country. Zimbabwe has maintained its consistently poor ranking due to the
dictatorial regime of Mugabe, who continues to hold a tight grip on power, intimidates the
opposition, squashes dissent, and oppresses the white farmer population of the country. Moving in
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a slightly improved direction is Nigeria, which has sported abysmal ratings due to the government's
fecklessness in dealing with the threat posed by the Islamist terror group, Boko Haram. Under its
newly-elected government, there appears to be more of a concerted effort to make national
security a priority action item. Mali was also slightly upgraded due to its efforts to return to
constitutional order following the 2012 coup and to neutralize the threat of separatists and
Islamists. Political instability has visited Burkina Faso and Burundi as the leaders of those
countries attempted to side-step constitutional limits to hold onto power. In Burundi, an attempted
coup ensued but quelled, and the president won a (questionable) new term in office; unrest has
since punctuated the landscape. In Burkina Faso, the political climate has turned stormy as a result
of a successful coup that ended the rule of the president, and then a putsch against the transitional
government. These two African countries have been downgraded as a result.
It should be noted that the African country of South Sudan -- the world's newest nation state -- has
not been officially included in this assessment; however, it can be unofficially assessed to be in the
vicinity of "3" due to its manifold political and economic challenges. Guinea has endured poor
rankings throughout, but was slightly downgraded further over fears of social unrest and the Ebola
heath crisis.
In Europe, Ukraine was downgraded due to the unrest facing that country following its Maidan
revolution that triggered a pro-Russian uprising in the eastern part of the country. Russia was also
implicated in the Ukrainian crisis due to its intervention on behalf of pro-Russian separatists, as
well as its annexation of the Ukrainian territory of Crimea. Serbia and Albania were slightly
downgraded due to eruptions of unrest, while Romania was slightly downgraded on the basis of
corruption charges against the prime minister. Spain, Portugal, Ireland, and Italy were downgraded
due to debt woes and the concomitant effect on the euro zone. Greece, another euro zone nation,
was downgraded the previous year due to its sovereign debt crisis; however, the country
successfully forged a rescue deal with international creditors and stayed within the Euro zone.
Greek voters rewarded the hitherto unknown upstart party at the polls for these efforts. As a
result, Greece was actually upgraded slightly as it proved to the world that it could endure the
political and economic storms. Meanwhile, Germany, France, Switzerland, the United Kingdom,
the Netherlands, and the Scandinavian countries continue to post impressive ranking consistent
with these countries' strong records of democracy, freedom, and peaceful transfers of power.
In Asia, Nepal was downgraded in response to continuous political instability well after landmark
elections that prevails today. Cambodia was very slighly downgraded due to post-election
instability that has resulted in occasional flares of violence. Despite the "trifecta of tragedy" in
Japan in 2011 -- the earthquake, the ensuing tsunami, and the resulting nuclear crisis -- and the
appreciable destabilization of the economic and political terrain therein, this country has only
slightly been downgraded. Japan's challenges have been assessed to be transient, the government
remains accountable, and there is little risk of default. Both India and China retain their rankings;
India holds a slightly higher ranking than China due to its record of democratic representation and
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accountability. Increasing violence and political instability in Pakistan resulted in a downgrade for
this country's already low rating.
In the Americas, Haiti retained its downgraded status due to ongoing political and economic woes.
Mexico was downgraded due to its alarming rate of crime. Guatemala was downgraded due to
charges of corruption, the arrest of the president, and uncertainty over the outcome of elections.
Brazil was downgraded due to the corruption charges erupting on the political landscape, the
stalling of the economy, and the increasingly loud calls for the impeachment of President
Rousseff. Argentina was downgraded due to its default on debt following the failure of talks with
bond holders. Venezuela was downgraded due to the fact that the country's post-Chavez
government is every bit as autocratic and nationalistic, but even more inclined to oppress its
political opponents. Colombia was upgraded slightly due to efforts aimed at securing a peace deal
with the FARC insurgents. A small but significant upgrade was attributed to Cuba due to its recent
pro-business reforms and its normalization of ties with the Unitd States. Meanwhile, the United
States, Canada, Costa Rica, Panama, and most of the English-speaking countries of the Caribbean
retain their strong rankings due to their records of stability and peaceful transfers of power.
In the Pacific, Fiji was upgraded due to its return to constitutional order and democracy with the
holding of the first elections in eight years.
In Oceania, Maldives has been slightly downgraded due to the government's continued and rather
relentless persecution of the country's former pro-democracy leader - former President Nasheed.
Source:
Dr. Denise Youngblood Coleman, Editor in Chief, CountryWatch Inc. www.countrywatch.com
Updated:
2015
Freedom Rankings
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Freedom Rankings
Freedom in the World
Editor's Note: This ranking by Freedom House quantifies political freedom and civil liberties into a
single combined index on each sovereign country's level of freedom and liberty. The initials "PR"
and "CL" stand for Political Rights and Civil Liberties, respectively. The number 1 represents the
most free countries and the number 7 represents the least free. Several countries fall in the
continuum in between. The freedom ratings reflect an overall judgment based on survey results.
Country
Afghanistan
PR
6?
CL
Freedom Status
6
Not Free
Albania*
3
3
Partly Free
Algeria
6
5
Not Free
Andorra*
1
1
Free
Angola
6
5
Not Free
2
Free
Antigua and Barbuda*
3?
Argentina*
2
2
Free
Armenia
6
4
Partly Free
Australia*
1
1
Free
Austria*
1
1
Free
Azerbaijan
6
5
Not Free
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Bahamas*
Pending
1
1
Free
Bahrain
6?
5
Not Free ?
Bangladesh*
3?
4
Partly Free
Barbados*
1
1
Free
Belarus
7
6
Not Free
Belgium*
1
1
Free
Belize*
1
2
Free
Benin*
2
2
Free
Bhutan
4
5
Partly Free
Bolivia*
3
3
Partly Free
Bosnia-Herzegovina*
4
3
Partly Free
2
Free
Botswana*
3?
Brazil*
2
2
Free
Brunei
6
5
Not Free
Bulgaria*
2
2
Free
Burkina Faso
5
3
Partly Free
Burma
7
7
Not Free
Burundi*
4
5
Partly Free
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⇑
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⇓
Cambodia
6
5
Not Free
Cameroon
6
6
Not Free
Canada*
1
1
Free
Cape Verde*
1
1
Free
Central African Republic
5
5
Partly Free
Chad
7
6
Not Free
Chile*
1
1
Free
China
7
6
Not Free
Colombia*
3
4
Partly Free
Comoros*
3
4
Partly Free
Congo (Brazzaville )
6
5
Not Free
⇓
Congo (Kinshasa)
6
6
Not Free
⇓
Costa Rica*
1
1
Free
Cote d’Ivoire
6
5
Not Free
2
Free
Croatia*
1?
Cuba
7
6
Not Free
Cyprus*
1
1
Free
Czech Republic*
1
1
Free
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Denmark*
1
1
Free
Djibouti
5
5
Partly Free
Dominica*
1
1
Free
Dominican Republic*
2
2
Free
East Timor*
3
4
Partly Free
Ecuador*
3
3
Partly Free
Egypt
6
5
Not Free
El Salvador*
2
3
Free
Equatorial Guinea
7
7
Not Free
Eritrea
7
7?
Not Free
Estonia*
1
1
Free
Ethiopia
5
5
Partly Free
Fiji
6
4
Partly Free
Finland*
1
1
Free
France*
1
1
Free
Gabon
6
5?
The Gambia
5
5?
Partly Free
Georgia
4
4
Partly Free
Colombia Review 2017
⇓
⇓
Not Free ?
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Germany*
1
1
Free
Ghana*
1
2
Free
Greece*
1
2
Free
Grenada*
1
2
Free
4?
4
Partly Free
Guinea
7
6?
Guinea-Bissau*
4
4
Partly Free
Guyana*
2
3
Free
Haiti*
4
5
Partly Free
Honduras
4?
4?
Partly Free
Hungary*
1
1
Free
Iceland*
1
1
Free
India*
2
3
Free
Indonesia*
2
3
Free
Iran
6
6
Not Free
Iraq
5?
6
Not Free
Ireland*
1
1
Free
Israel*
1
2
Free
Guatemala*
Colombia Review 2017
Not Free
⇓
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Italy*
1
2
Free
Jamaica*
2
3
Free
Japan*
1
2
Free
Jordan
6?
5
Not Free ?
Kazakhstan
6
5
Not Free
Kenya
4
4?
Kiribati*
1
1
Kosovo
5?
4?
Partly Free ?
Kuwait
4
4
Partly Free
6?
5?
Not Free ?
Laos
7
6
Not Free
Latvia*
2
1
Free
Lebanon
5
3?
Partly Free
Lesotho*
3?
3
Partly Free ?
Liberia*
3
4
Partly Free
Libya
7
7
Not Free
Liechtenstein*
1
1
Free
Lithuania*
1
1
Free
Kyrgyzstan
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Partly Free
Free
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Luxembourg*
1
1
Free
Macedonia*
3
3
Partly Free
Madagascar
6?
4?
Partly Free
Malawi*
3?
4
Partly Free
Malaysia
4
4
Partly Free
Maldives*
3?
4
Partly Free
Mali*
2
3
Free
Malta*
1
1
Free
Marshall Islands*
1
1
Free
Mauritania
6
5
Not Free
Mauritius*
1
2
Free
Mexico*
2
3
Free
Micronesia*
1
1
Free
Moldova*
3?
4
Partly Free
Monaco*
2
1
Free
Mongolia*
2
2
Free
Montenegro*
3
2?
Free ?
Morocco
5
4
Colombia Review 2017
Partly Free
⇑
⇓
⇑
⇓
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Mozambique
Pending
4?
3
Partly Free
Namibia*
2
2
Free
Nauru*
1
1
Free
Nepal
4
4
Partly Free
Netherlands*
1
1
Free
New Zealand*
1
1
Free
Nicaragua*
4
4?
Partly Free
5?
4
Partly Free
Nigeria
5
4
Partly Free
⇓
North Korea
7
7
Not Free
⇓
Norway*
1
1
Free
Oman
6
5
Not Free
Pakistan
4
5
Partly Free
Palau*
1
1
Free
Panama*
1
2
Free
Papua New Guinea*
4
3
Partly Free
Paraguay*
3
3
Partly Free
Peru*
2
3
Free
Niger
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Philippines
4
3
Partly Free
Poland*
1
1
Free
Portugal*
1
1
Free
Qatar
6
5
Not Free
Romania*
2
2
Free
Russia
6
5
Not Free
Rwanda
6
5
Not Free
Saint Kitts and Nevis*
1
1
Free
Saint Lucia*
1
1
Free
Saint Vincent and
Grenadines*
2
1
Free
Samoa*
2
2
Free
San Marino*
1
1
Free
Sao Tome and Principe*
2
2
Free
Saudi Arabia
7
6
Not Free
Senegal*
3
3
Partly Free
Serbia*
2?
2
Free
Seychelles*
3
3
Partly Free
Sierra Leone*
3
3
Partly Free
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⇓
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Singapore
5
4
Partly Free
Slovakia*
1
1
Free
Slovenia*
1
1
Free
Solomon Islands
4
3
Partly Free
Somalia
7
7
Not Free
South Africa*
2
2
Free
South Korea*
1
2
Free
Spain*
1
1
Free
Sri Lanka*
4
4
Partly Free
Sudan
7
7
Not Free
Suriname*
2
2
Free
Swaziland
7
5
Not Free
Sweden*
1
1
Free
Switzerland*
1
1
Free
Syria
7
6
Not Free
Taiwan*
1?
2?
Tajikistan
6
5
Not Free
Tanzania
4
3
Partly Free
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⇓
Free
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Thailand
5
4
Partly Free
Togo
5
4?
Partly Free
Tonga
5
3
Partly Free
Trinidad and Tobago*
2
2
Free
Tunisia
7
5
Not Free
Turkey*
3
3
Partly Free
Turkmenistan
7
7
Not Free
Tuvalu*
1
1
Free
Uganda
5
4
Partly Free
Ukraine*
3
2
Free
United Arab Emirates
6
5
Not Free
United Kingdom*
1
1
Free
United States*
1
1
Free
Uruguay*
1
1
Free
Uzbekistan
7
7
Not Free
Vanuatu*
2
2
Free
Venezuela
5?
4
Partly Free
7
5
Not Free
Vietnam
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Yemen
Zambia*
Zimbabwe
Pending
6?
5
3
4?
6?
6
Not Free ?
Partly Free
Not Free
Methodology:
PR and CL stand for political rights and civil liberties, respectively; 1 represents the most free and
7 the least free rating. The ratings reflect an overall judgment based on survey results.
? ? up or down indicates a change in political rights, civil liberties, or status since the last survey.
⇑ ⇓ up or down indicates a trend of positive or negative changes that took place but that were
not sufficient to result in a change in political rights or civil liberties ratings of 1-7.
* indicates a country’s status as an electoral democracy.
Source:
This data is derived from the latest edition of Freedom House’s Freedom in the World 2010
edition.
Available at URL: http://www.freedomhouse.org
Updated:
Reviewed in 2015
Human Rights
Overview of Human Rights in Colombia
Colombia is a constitutional, multiparty democracy. Serious human rights problems remain
although the government is working to improve its record. However, there are still major obstacles
hindering their ability to do so.
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A forty year armed conflict continues between the government and the Revolutionary Armed
Forces of Colombia (FARC), the National Liberation Army (ELN), and certain parts of the United
Self-Defense Forces of Colombia (AUC). This situation does not allow for high levels of certainty
and security in and about the nation. While the government is responsible for some of the human
rights violations, the majority are being committed by FARC, AUC and ELN.
Political killings, killings of teachers and union leaders, torture, forced displacement, intimidation of
judges, witnesses and lawyers, recruitment of child soldiers, and restrictions on the freedom of
movement, are among the abuses being committed on a daily basis by the paramilitary groups.
For those persons who are internally displaced, there are concerns about unhygienic conditions at
displacement camps, and limited access to the basic necessities of life.
Child abuse, labor, prostitution and trafficking for the purpose of forced sexual labor are also areas
of concern. Corruption, harassment of journalists, arbitrary arrest, and societal discrimination
against minorities and indigenous people are also daily problems in Colombia.
Note: See Political Conditions of this Country Review for more details about the political battle
between the government and militants in Colombia.
Human Development Index (HDI) Rank:
See full listing of the Human Development Index located in the Social Overview of this report for
this country's current rank.
Human Poverty Index Rank:
8th out of 103
Gini Index:
53.8
Life Expectancy at Birth (years):
72.27 years
Unemployment Rate:
10.2%
Population living on $1 a day (%):
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8.2%
Population living on $2 a day (%):
22.6%
Population living beneath the Poverty Line (%):
49.2%
Internally Displaced People:
1,575,000-3,410,000
Note-38,000 refugees currently seeking asylum in Colombia
Total Crime Rate (%):
54.6%
Health Expenditure (% of GDP):
Public: 5.7%
% of GDP Spent on Education:
5.2%
Human Rights Conventions Party to:
• International Convention on the Prevention and Punishment and Punishment of the Crime of
Genocide
• International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination
• International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights
• International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights
• Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women
• Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment
• Conventions on the Rights of the Child
• Convention relating to the Status of Refugees
• International Convention on the Protection of All Migrants and Members of Their Families
• Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court
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*Human Development Index (HDI) is a composite index that measures the level of well-being in
177 nations in the world. It uses factors such as poverty, literacy, life-expectancy, education, gross
domestic product, and purchasing power parity to assess the average achievements in each nation.
It has been used in the United Nation’s Human Development Report since 1993.
*Human Poverty Index Ranking is based on certain indicators used to calculate the Human
Poverty Index. Probability at birth of not surviving to age 40, adult literacy rate, population without
sustainable access to an improved water source, and population below income poverty line are the
indicators assessed in this measure.
*The Gini Index measures inequality based on the distribution of family income or consumption. A
value of 0 represents perfect equality (income being distributed equally), and a value of 100 perfect
inequality (income all going to one individual).
*The calculation of the total crime rate is the % of the total population which has been effected by
property crime, robbery, sexual assault, assault, or bribery (corruption) related occurrences.
Government Functions
Constitution
Colombia's constitution, enacted on July 5, 1991, strengthened the administration of justice with
the introduction of an accusatorial system that replaced the previous Napoleonic Code system.
Other significant reforms under the new constitution provide for civil divorce, dual nationality, the
election of a vice president and the election of departmental governors. The constitution expanded
citizens' basic rights, including that of "tutela," under which an immediate court action can be
requested by an individual if he feels his constitutional rights are being violated and if there is no
other legal recourse.
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Note: The national government has separate executive, legislative and judicial branches as
discussed following.
Executive Authority
The president is both the chief of state and head of government. The president is elected for a
four-year term and is eligible for a second term.* The 1991 constitution re-established the position
of vice-president, elected on the same ticket as the president. By law, the vice-president will
succeed in the event of the president's resignation, illness or death.
Legislative Authority
Colombia's bicameral Congress or Congreso consists of the Senate or Senado (102 seats; members
are elected by popular vote to serve four-year terms) and the House of Representatives or Camara
de Representantes (166 seats; members are elected by popular vote to serve four-year terms).
Judicial Authority
At the judicial level, there are four roughly coequal, supreme judicial organs; Supreme Court of
Justice or Corte Suprema de Justicia (highest court of criminal law; judges are selected by their
peers from the nominees of the Superior Judicial Council for eight-year terms); Council of State
(highest court of administrative law; judges are selected from the nominees of the Superior Judicial
Council for eight-year terms); Constitutional Court (guards integrity and supremacy of the constitu
tion; rules on constitutionality of laws, amendments to the constitution, and international treaties);
Superior Judicial Council (administers and disciplines the civilian judiciary; resolves jurisdictional
conflicts arising between other courts; members are elected by three sister courts and Congress for
eight-year terms).
Legal System
The legal system is based on Spanish law. A new criminal code modeled after United States
procedures was enacted into law in 2004 and is gradually being implemented.
***
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* In 2009, Colombia's lower house of Congress passed legislation that could pave the way for
President Alvaro Uribe to run for a third term. Legislators overwhelmingly voted in favor of a
referendum on whether to make constitutional changes that would allow presidents to contest reelection twice. The legislation had already passed the Senate and its fate was now in the hands of
Colombia's Constitutional Court.
The constitution was already modified once to let Uribe run for a second four-year term in 2006,
and so, if the new constitutional changes are made, Uribe could theoretically contest another
election battle in 2010. While Uribe has enjoyed strong popularity at home thanks to a mixture of
conservative security and economic policies, this move to allow his three consecutive terms has
been met with some resistance. Indeed, other attempts to make constitutional changes that would
facilitate extended power in the region have resulted in condemnation about the erosion of
democracy.
Government Structure
Names:
conventional long form:
Republic of Colombia
conventional short form:
Colombia
local long form:
Republica de Colombia
local short form:
Colombia
Type:
Republic; executive branch dominates government
Executive Branch:
Chief of state and head of government:
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President Juan Manuel SANTOS Calderon (since August 7, 2010 -- see 2010 Elections Note;
fresh elections held in 2014 resulting in re-election for Santos-- see 2014 Elections Primer); the
president is both the chief of state and head of government; elected by popular vote for a four-year
term (eligible for a second term)
Note on chief of state and head of government:
President Juan Manuel Santos won the elections after two polling rounds.
Primer on 2014 presidential election:
First round May 25, 2014; second round in June 2014 -A presidential election was set to take place in Colombia on May 25, 2014. In Colombia, the
president is both the chief of state and head of government; the president is elected by popular vote
for a four-year term and is eligible for a second term. The previous presidential election was won
by incumbent President Juan Manuel Santos Calderon following polling rounds in 2010. He
would be up for re-election in 2014.
Pre-election polling data has indicated that President Santos was positioned for a clear victory in
May 2014. According to a poll publicized by the broadcaster, Caracol, Santos would garner 32.5
percent of votes in the first round. Santos would have to secure a top two performance in that
initial round to make it to the run-off or second round, which he would then have to win with an
outright majority. Still, Santos was significantly leading his closest rival, Oscar Ivan Zuluaga from
the Centro Democratico party, with as many as 17 percentage points. Other polls by Gallup and
Ipsos Napoleon Franco showed Santos with the clear advantage. Of course, it should be voted that
a poll by Centro Nacional de Consultoria predicted a somewhat less certain fortune for Santos.
According to its data, in a second round, Santos could lose to former Bogota Mayor Enrique
Penalosa, of the Green Alliance, who would finish behind Santos in the first ballot but go on to
beat him in the run-off. Other polls showed Zuluaga as Santos' main competition; however, at least
one other pollster, Cifras y Conceptos, showed Zuluaga relinquishing his "main rival" position to
Penalosa. At the close of April 2014, with a month to go until election day, a Gallup poll
confirmed Santos' lead, and command of 32 percent of the vote share. The poll also showed
Zulaga as Santos' main rival with command over 20.5 percent. In the second round, Santos was
on track to win 46 percent of the vote share and Zulaga would have 34 percent. Clearly, according
to Gallup, the presidential contest would be between Santos and Zulaga. Penalosa had lost support
in the run-up to the election, and was now battling to hold onto a third place position against the
Conservative Party candidate, Marta Lucia Ramirez. At the start of May 2014, Santos was
holding a clear lead in the intentions of the voters, although Zuluaga was gaining steam. According
to pollster Cifras y Conceptos, Santos would win 27 percent of the vote and Zuluaga would take
19 percent. In a second round, the contest would be much closer although would beat Zuluaga 34
to 31 percent. With less than two weeks to go until election day, the race had tightened and now
Santos was in a dead heat with Zuluaga; both men held 29 percent support.
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Note: Center-right Santos, was the candidate of the National Unity alliance, which was composed
of the Social Party of National Unity ("Party of the U"), the Colombian Liberal Party, and Radical
Change. He has banked on his presidential ambitions on the effort to end the war with Colombia's
Marxist guerilla group, the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (Fuerzas Armadas
Revolucionarias de Colombia in Spanish, or FARC), and has engaged in peace talks with them.
Right-wing Zuluaga represents the Centro Democratico party, which was formed by former
President Alvaro Uribe who has vociferously opposed the peace negotiations with FARC. Centerleft Penalosa of the Green Alliance was attracting support from leftists, ecologists, and
independents. With Zuluaga as the designated choice of former President Uribe who has opposed
the peace process with FARC, and with Santos advancing that peace process, it was evident that
the election would come down to being a referendum of sorts on the question of war and peace
with FARC.
After the votes were tallied on May 25, 2014, it was clear that President Santos would be headed
to a runoff against Zuluaga, who actually finished in first place after the first round. Zuluaga had 29
percent of the votes, compared to 25.5 percent for Santos.
Zuluaga's strong performance -- effectively beating Santos -- was deemed to be due to support
from former President Uribe who has been an opponent of Santos' pursuit of peace with FARC.
Clearly, the electorate shared that stance. However, Zuluaga's political standing could be
negatively affected in the second round by salacious accusations that a computer expert from his
campaign hacked into the emails of the president and FARC negotiators. Meanwhile, Zuluaga was
also looking to soften his image by suggesting that although he was against appeasing FARC, he
would not immediately end peace negotiations with the Marxist guerilla group, as he had previously
indicated.
At the start of June 2014, with two weeks to go until the second election round, polling data
showed Santos and Zuluaga running neck and neck in a competitive race to the finish. The
researcher group, Cifras y Conceptos, showed Santos with a tiny narrow lead of only percentage
point over Zuluaga. Clearly, the 2014 presidential contest would be the closest election in
Colombia in recent memory. With leftists and peace process supporters more likely to back Santos
than Zuluaga, Santos was hoping to eke out victory. However, with the majority of Colombia's
electorate having more center-right tendencies, it was not guaranteed that Santos would garner
enough support to hold Zuluaga off at the finish.
Note that Colombians went to the polls to vote in the second round on a day the Colombian
national football team was played a match at the 2014 World Cup. There were fears that the
national attention on the world's biggest sport would deter people from voting in high numbers.
Nevertheless, the second round of the election went off as planned. Despite the closeness of the
race between Santos and Zuluaga, it was the incumbent president who won the election with 51
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percent of the vote share; Zuluaga took 45 percent. The election victory for Santos was also a
victory for the peace process with FARC, essentially leaving that pathway open.
For his part, President Santos promised to bring peace to Colombia and noted that his re-election
victory was a ratification of his peace push. In his victory speech to supporters, President Santos
also noted that Colombians delivered the message that they wanted an end to five decades of war.
He said, "This is the end of more than 50 years of violence and the start of a new Colombia."
Cabinet:
Chosen by the president
Legislative Branch:
Bicameral "Congreso" (Congress):
Consists of the "Senado de la República" (Senate of the Republic) and the "Cámara de
Representantes" (House of Representatives)
"Senado de la República" (Senate of the Republic):
102 seats; members are elected by popular vote to serve four-year terms
"Cámara de Representantes" (House of Representatives):
166 seats; members are elected by popular vote to serve four-year term
Primer on Colombia's 2014 parliamentary elections
March 9, 2014 -Parliamentary elections were set to be held in Colombia on March 9, 2014. At stake was the
composition of the bicameral "Congreso" (Congress), which consists of the "Senado de la
República" (Senate of the Republic) and the "Cámara de Representantes" (House of
Representatives). In the "Senado de la República" (Senate of the Republic), there are 102 seats;
members are elected by popular vote to serve four-year terms. In the "Cámara de Representantes"
(House of Representatives), there are 166 seats; members are elected by popular vote to serve
four-year terms.
The last elections were held in March 2010 and were won by the parties aligned with thenPresident Alvaro Uribe. Indeed, the Party of U and the Conservative Party or PC won the most
seats. It was to be seen if they would see that level of success in 2014. Other parties likely to
contest these elections included the main opposition party, the Liberal Party, the Green Party, and
Radical Change or CR. These 2014 elections were being viewed as a referendum on the ongoing
peace process between the government and the Marxist group, the Revolutionary Armed Forces of
Colombia (FARC).
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In the Senate, the Party of the U (Partido de la U) garnered 16 percent and 21 seats; the
Democratic Center (Centro Democrático) had 14 percent and 19 seats; the Colombian
Conservative Party (Partido Conservador Colombiano) took 14 percent and 19 seats; the
Colombian Liberal Party (Partido Liberal Colombiano) secured 16 percent and 17 seats; Radical
Change (Cambio Radical) acquired eight percent and nine seats; Green Party (Partido Verde) had
four percent and five seats; the rest of the Senate went to other parties,
In the Chamber of Representatives, the Party of the U (Partido de la U) won 16 percent and 39
seats; the Colombian Liberal Party (Partido Liberal Colombiano) garnered 14 percent and 37 seats;
the Colombian Conservative Party (Partido Conservador Colombiano) took 13 percent and 27
seats; Radical Change (Cambio Radical) carried 8 percent and 15 seats; Democratic Center
(Centro Democrático) acquired 9.5 percent and 12 seats; Green Party (Partido Verde) had four
percent and six seats; the rest of the seats were won by other parties.
Judicial Branch:
Four roughly coequal, supreme judicial organs; Supreme Court of Justice or Corte Suprema de
Justicia (highest court of criminal law; judges are selected by their peers from the nominees of the
Superior Judicial Council for eight-year terms); Council of State (highest court of administrative
law; judges are selected from the nominees of the Superior Judicial Council for eight-year terms);
Constitutional Court (guards integrity and supremacy of the constitution; rules on constitutionality
of laws, amendments to the constitution, and international treaties); Superior Judicial Council
(administers and disciplines the civilian judiciary; resolves jurisdictional conflicts arising between
other courts; members are elected by three sister courts and Congress for eight-year terms)
Constitution:
July 5, 1991; amended many times
Legal System:
Based on Spanish law; a new criminal code modeled after U.S. procedures was enacted in 199293; judicial review of executive and legislative acts; accepts compulsory ICJ jurisdiction with
reservations.
Political Parties and Leaders:
Alternative Democratic Pole or PDA [Clara LOPEZ]
Conservative Party or PC [David BARGUIL]
Democratic Center Party or CD [Alvaro URIBE Velez, Oscar Ivan ZULUAGA]
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Green Alliance [Jorge LONDONO, Antonio SANGUINO, Luis AVELLANEDA, Camilo
ROMERO]
Liberal Party or PL [Horacio SERPA]
Citizens Option (Opcion Ciudadana) or OC (formerly known as the National Integration Party or
PIN) [Angel ALIRIO Moreno]
Radical Change or CR [Carlos Fernando GALAN]
Social National Unity Party or U Party [Roy BARRERAS, Jose David NAME]
Note:
Colombia has eight major political parties, and numerous smaller movements
Political Pressure Groups:
The two largest insurgent groups active in Colombia are Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia
or FARC and National Liberation Army or ELN
Suffrage:
18 years of age; universal and compulsory
Administrative Divisions:
32 departments (departamentos, singular - departamento) and 1 capital district* (distrito capital);
Amazonas, Antioquia, Arauca, Atlantico, Distrito Capital de Bogota*, Bolivar, Boyaca, Caldas,
Caqueta, Casanare, Cauca, Cesar, Choco, Cordoba, Cundinamarca, Guainia, Guaviare, Huila, La
Guajira, Magdalena, Meta, Narino, Norte de Santander, Putumayo, Quindio, Risaralda, San
Andres y Providencia, Santander, Sucre, Tolima, Valle del Cauca, Vaupes, Vichada
Principal Government Officials
Government of Colombia
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Pres. Juan Manuel SANTOS Calderon
Vice Pres. German VARGAS Lleras
Min. of Agriculture & Rural Development Aurelio IRAGORRI Valencia
Min. of Commerce, Industry, & Tourism Cecilia ALVAREZ-CORREA Glen
Min. of Culture Mariana GARCES Cordoba
Min. of Defense Luis Carlos VILLEGAS Echeverri
Min. of Education Gina Maria PARODY
Min. of Energy & Mines Tomas GONZALEZ Estrada
Min. of the Environment & Sustainable Development Gabriel VALLEJO Lopez
Min. of Finance & Public Credit Mauricio CARDENAS Santa Maria
Min. of Foreign Relations Maria Angela HOLGUIN Cuellar
Min. of Health & Social Protection Alejandro GAVIRIA Uribe
Min. of Housing & Territorial Development Luis Felipe HENAO Cardona
Min. of Information Technology & Communication David LUNA
Min. of Interior Juan Fernando CRISTO Bustos
Min. of Justice & Law Yesid REYES Alvarado
Min. of Labor Luis Eduardo GARZON
Min. of Transportation Natalie ABELLO
Dir., Dept. of National Planning Simon GAVIRIA Munoz
Prosecutor Gen. Eduardo MONTEALEGRE Lynett
Pres., Bank of the Republic Jose Dario URIBE Escobar
Ambassador to the US Juan Carlos PINZON Bueno
Permanent Representative to the UN, New York Maria Emma MEJIA Velez
Leader Biography
Leader Biography
President of Colombia
Santos comes to power -Colombia Review 2017
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The presidential election in Colombia was scheduled for May 30, 2010. The main presidential
candidates contesting the election to succeed outgoing President Alvaro Uribe were as follows:
Former Defense Minister Juan Manuel Santos, an Uribist from the outgoing president's party,
Germán Vargas Lleras of the Radical Change party, Noemí Sanín of the Conservative Party, Rafael
Pardo of Liberal Party, Gustavo Petro of the Alternative Democratic Pole and Antanas Mockus of
the newly-formed Green Party. As well, Álvaro Leyva Durán was seeking the presidential
nomination by the Conservative Party. Apart from Santos who promised to follow the Uribe mold,
Lleras and Sanin have been cast as pro-Uribist in orientation as well. On the other side of the
equation, Pardo, Petro, were viewed as alternate options, while Duran and Mockus were viewed
as anti-Uribist in orientation.
A month ahead of the election, there appeared to be a clear ideological "right versus left" battle at
stake in Colombia with polls showing Santos and Mockus running neck and neck against one
another, possibly headed for a run-off election.
On election day, after the votes were counted, Santos had won the first round of Colombia's
presidential election with 47 percent of the vote -- just short of an outright majority. His main rival,
Mockus, garnered 21 percent. Santos' clear domination at the polls was something of a surprise
since polling data indicated a far closer race. That said, both men would contest the run-off
election set for June 20, 2010.
Until then, Santos was expected to continue to highlight his national security-dominated campaign
platform, and would tout his desire to continue the policies of highly popular outgoing President
Uribe. Mockus was expected to draw attention to his campaign agenda issues of anti-corruption
and education, as well as his record of improved quality of life and successful public works
projects during his time as mayor of Bogota. That said, with third place candidate Lleras saying
that he would back Santos in the second round, the advantage would certainly reside with the proUribe former defense minister on June 20, 2010.
On the day of the second round -- June 20, 2010, as expected, Santos won an overwhelming 69
percent of the vote, propelling him into position of President-elect of Colombia. With a clear sign
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that he would continue outgoing President Uribe's hardline security policies, President-Elect Santos
said during his victory speech that Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia's (FARC's) "time had
run out" and foreclosed the possibility of negotiations. He also declared that he would not rest until
they had secured every inch of the country.
In the first week of August 2010, Juan Manuel Santos was sworn into office as Colombia's new
president. During his inaugural speech, President Santos noted that among his priorities would be
improved relations with neighboring countries of Ecuador and Venezuela. As well, he aimed to
decrease the unemployment rate, reduce poverty, and deal with corruption. President Santos also
said he would continue the efforts against militant rebel and terror groups, including the
Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC); however, he also said that he would not
foreclose the possibility of dialogue with FARC if they renounced their campaign of violence.
CountryWatch News Wire Biography on Incoming President Santos -BOGOTA, May 28 (Xinhua) -- Juan Manuel Santos, a former defense
minister, is the frontrunner in the 2010 Colombian presidential
election slated for Sunday.
A staunch ally of Alvaro Uribe, Colombia's immensely popular
outgoing president, Santos is the presidential candidate of the
ruling Social National Unity Party.
During his campaign, Santos has pledged to continue and improve
Uribe's security- and market-friendly policies.
He vows to make continuous efforts to strengthen security,
eradicate poverty and fight drug trafficking and illegal armed
groups in the country.
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He plans to boost foreign investment through more trade
agreements and diversifying exports to Latin America, Europe and
Asia.
Santos also promises to encourage the return of 3.3 million
Colombians displaced due to armed conflicts to their places of
origin, and to make Colombia an internationally renowned tourist
destination.
Santos, 58, comes from a family of influential politicians and
journalists. His great-uncle Eduardo Santos was Colombia's
president during 1938-1942 and the owner of El Tiempo, the most
influential newspaper in the country.
He started his university education at the University of Kansas
in the United States, where he studied economy and business
administration.
Later, Santos got a master's degree in the same field at the
London School of Economics and at Harvard University.
Santos worked in the National Federation of Coffee Growers of
Colombia and was the sub-director of El Tiempo until 1991, when he
launched his political career as Colombia's minister of foreign
trade and then treasury minister.
He also founded the Social National Unity Party.
In July 2006, Santos became Colombia's minister of defense.
During his tenure, Santos dealt a harsh blow to guerillas and
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paramilitaries in the country. His efforts led to the capture of
"Simon Trinidad," one of the leaders of the Revolutionary Armed
Forces of Colombia (FARC), the death of "Raul Reyes," FARC's No.2
commander, and the rescue of former presidential candidate Ingrid
Betancourt and 14 other hostages.
Primer on 2014 Presidential Elections
First round May 25, 2014; second round in June 2014 --
A presidential election was set to take place in Colombia on May 25, 2014. In Colombia, the
president is both the chief of state and head of government; the president is elected by popular vote
for a four-year term and is eligible for a second term. The previous presidential election was won
by incumbent President Juan Manuel Santos Calderon following polling rounds in 2010. He
would be up for re-election in 2014.
Pre-election polling data has indicated that President Santos was positioned for a clear victory in
May 2014. According to a poll publicized by the broadcaster, Caracol, Santos would garner 32.5
percent of votes in the first round. Santos would have to secure a top two performance in that
initial round to make it to the run-off or second round, which he would then have to win with an
outright majority. Still, Santos was significantly leading his closest rival, Oscar Ivan Zuluaga from
the Centro Democratico party, with as many as 17 percentage points. Other polls by Gallup and
Ipsos Napoleon Franco showed Santos with the clear advantage. Of course, it should be voted that
a poll by Centro Nacional de Consultoria predicted a somewhat less certain fortune for Santos.
According to its data, in a second round, Santos could lose to former Bogota Mayor Enrique
Penalosa, of the Green Alliance, who would finish behind Santos in the first ballot but go on to
beat him in the run-off. Other polls showed Zuluaga as Santos' main competition; however, at least
one other pollster, Cifras y Conceptos, showed Zuluaga relinquishing his "main rival" position to
Penalosa. At the close of April 2014, with a month to go until election day, a Gallup poll
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confirmed Santos' lead, and command of 32 percent of the vote share. The poll also showed
Zulaga as Santos' main rival with command over 20.5 percent. In the second round, Santos was
on track to win 46 percent of the vote share and Zulaga would have 34 percent. Clearly, according
to Gallup, the presidential contest would be between Santos and Zulaga. Penalosa had lost support
in the run-up to the election, and was now battling to hold onto a third place position against the
Conservative Party candidate, Marta Lucia Ramirez. At the start of May 2014, Santos was
holding a clear lead in the intentions of the voters, although Zuluaga was gaining steam. According
to pollster Cifras y Conceptos, Santos would win 27 percent of the vote and Zuluaga would take
19 percent. In a second round, the contest would be much closer although would beat Zuluaga 34
to 31 percent. With less than two weeks to go until election day, the race had tightened and now
Santos was in a dead heat with Zuluaga; both men held 29 percent support.
Note: Center-right Santos, was the candidate of the National Unity alliance, which was composed
of the Social Party of National Unity ("Party of the U"), the Colombian Liberal Party, and Radical
Change. He has banked on his presidential ambitions on the effort to end the war with Colombia's
Marxist guerilla group, the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (Fuerzas Armadas
Revolucionarias de Colombia in Spanish, or FARC), and has engaged in peace talks with them.
Right-wing Zuluaga represents the Centro Democratico party, which was formed by former
President Alvaro Uribe who has vociferously opposed the peace negotiations with FARC. Centerleft Penalosa of the Green Alliance was attracting support from leftists, ecologists, and
independents. With Zuluaga as the designated choice of former President Uribe who has opposed
the peace process with FARC, and with Santos advancing that peace process, it was evident that
the election would come down to being a referendum of sorts on the question of war and peace
with FARC.
After the votes were tallied on May 25, 2014, it was clear that President Santos would be headed
to a runoff against Zuluaga, who actually finished in first place after the first round. Zuluaga had 29
percent of the votes, compared to 25.5 percent for Santos.
Zuluaga's strong performance -- effectively beating Santos -- was deemed to be due to support
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from former President Uribe who has been an opponent of Santos' pursuit of peace with FARC.
Clearly, the electorate shared that stance. However, Zuluaga's political standing could be
negatively affected in the second round by salacious accusations that a computer expert from his
campaign hacked into the emails of the president and FARC negotiators. Meanwhile, Zuluaga was
also looking to soften his image by suggesting that although he was against appeasing FARC, he
would not immediately end peace negotiations with the Marxist guerilla group, as he had previously
indicated.
At the start of June 2014, with two weeks to go until the second election round, polling data
showed Santos and Zuluaga running neck and neck in a competitive race to the finish. The
researcher group, Cifras y Conceptos, showed Santos with a tiny narrow lead of only percentage
point over Zuluaga. Clearly, the 2014 presidential contest would be the closest election in
Colombia in recent memory. With leftists and peace process supporters more likely to back Santos
than Zuluaga, Santos was hoping to eke out victory. However, with the majority of Colombia's
electorate having more center-right tendencies, it was not guaranteed that Santos would garner
enough support to hold Zuluaga off at the finish.
Note that Colombians went to the polls to vote in the second round on a day the Colombian
national football team was played a match at the 2014 World Cup. There were fears that the
national attention on the world's biggest sport would deter people from voting in high numbers.
Nevertheless, the second round of the election went off as planned. Despite the closeness of the
race between Santos and Zuluaga, it was the incumbent president who won the election with 51
percent of the vote share; Zuluaga took 45 percent. The election victory for Santos was also a
victory for the peace process with FARC, essentially leaving that pathway open.
For his part, President Santos promised to bring peace to Colombia and noted that his re-election
victory was a ratification of his peace push. In his victory speech to supporters, President Santos
also noted that Colombians delivered the message that they wanted an end to five decades of war.
He said, "This is the end of more than 50 years of violence and the start of a new Colombia."
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Foreign Relations
General Relations
Colombia seeks diplomatic and commercial relations with all countries, regardless of their
ideologies or political or economic systems. In 1969, it formed what is now the Andean
Community along with Bolivia, Chile, Ecuador and Peru (Venezuela joined in 1973 and Chile left
in 1976). In the 1980s, Colombia broadened its bilateral and multilateral relations, joining the
Contadora Group, the Group of Eight (now the Rio Group), and the Non-Aligned Movement,
which it chaired from 1994 until September 1998. In addition, it has signed free trade agreements
with Chile, Mexico and Venezuela.
Colombia has traditionally played an active role in the United Nations (U.N.), the Organization of
American States (O.A.S.) and their subsidiary agencies. Former President Gaviria became
Secretary General of the OAS in September 1994. Colombia was a participant in the December
1994 and April 1998 Summits of the Americas and followed up on initiatives developed at the
summit by hosting two post-summit, ministerial-level meetings on trade and science and
technology.
Regional Relations
Colombia regularly participates in international forums, including CICAD, the Organization of
American States' body on money laundering, chemical controls and drug abuse prevention.
Although the Colombian government ratified the 1988 U.N. convention on narcotics in 1994 -- the
last of the Andean governments to do so -- it did so with important reservations, notably to the
anti-money laundering measures, asset forfeiture and confiscation provisions, maritime interdiction
and extradition clauses. Colombia subsequently withdrew some of these reservations, most notably
that on extradition.
Colombia is the world's leading supplier of refined cocaine and a growing supplier of heroin,
especially to the United States. Colombia also has the largest area under coca cultivation. Despite
the death of Medellín cartel drug lord Pablo Escobar in 1993 and the arrests of major Cali cartel
kingpins in 1995 and 1996, the Colombian drug cartels remain among the most sophisticated
criminal organizations in the world. They control cocaine processing, international wholesale
distribution chains and markets.
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Corruption and intimidation by traffickers complicate the drug-control efforts of many institutions
of government. Colombia passed a revised criminal procedure code in 1993, which permits
traffickers to surrender and negotiate lenient sentences in return for cooperating with prosecutors.
In December 1996 and February 1997, however, the Colombian Congress passed legislation to
toughen sentencing, with money laundering penalties and provisions for asset forfeiture.
Implementation, however, is still lagging.
In November 1997, the Colombian Congress amended the constitution to permit the extradition of
Colombian nationals, albeit not retroactively, which could have the effect of shielding major
traffickers from justice in the United States (U.S.) and other countries where they committed their
crimes. (The Colombian government permits extradition of foreigners resident in Colombia). The
amendment was under review until Oct. 5, 1998, when the Constitutional Court ruled that a
proposed constitutional amendment permitting extradition without retroactivity was valid.
Colombia is currently engaged in a broad range of narcotics control activities. Through aerial
spraying of herbicide and manual eradication, Colombia has attempted to keep coca, opium poppy
and cannabis cultivation from expanding. The government has committed itself to the eradication
of all illicit crops, interdiction of drug shipments, and financial controls to prevent money
laundering. However, these have proved to be daunting tasks given th at rebel and paramilitary
groups protect the majority of drug operations.
In general regional relations have suffered due to the increased guerrilla and paramilitary activity
along Colombia's borders. In light of the circumstances, many neighboring countries such as
Panama, Venezuela, Ecuador and Peru have expressed concerns over the region's overall stability.
In November 1999, Honduras ratified the Caribbean Sea Maritime Limits Treaty with Colombia.
According to Nicaragua, the treaty deprived Nicaragua of 130,000 square kilometers of maritime
space in the Caribbean Sea and dishonored a Central American Court of Justice verdict.
Consequently relations between Colombia and Nicaragua suffered. In March 2000, Colombia met
with Venezuela to discuss increasing bilateral trade and investments. On May 29, 2000, Costa Rica
and Colombia agreed to combat illicit sea trading.
The 12th Andean Presidential Summit, held June 9-10, 2000, discussed ways to increase regional
integration. The Andean community strives to promote a common foreign and economic policy.
Presidents from all five Andean nations signed the Lima Agreement to promote democracy and
human rights.
In 2002, Colombian President-elect Alvaro Uribe called upon Ecuador to seal its border with
Colombia, in order to prevent incursions by Colombian rebel groups. In the fight against guerilla
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and paramilitary groups, Uribe also noted that the Manta air base in western Ecuador, site of a
U.S. operations center for fighting drug trafficking, could be a strategic location for operations. As
such, it was anticipated that relations between the two countries would become increasingly
collaborative in this regard.
In 2005, Colombia and Venezuela were embroiled in a diplomatic imbroglio over the arrest of a
leading member of a leftist rebel group. Venezuela charged that the arrest allegedly took place in its
territory and as such, there was a violation of its sovereign space. For its part, however, Colombia
denied that the incident took place in Venezuelan territory. The incident set off a a diplomatic crisis
which eventually came to an end after six weeks of bilateral tension. Rapprochement was reached
when Colombia submitted a statement stating that such incidences would not be repeated.
November 2007 marked the freezing of bilateral ties between Venezuela and Colombia over
disagreements in dealing with the ongoing hostage crisis. At issue was Venezuelan President Hugo
Chavez' role in freeing the many hostages kidnapped by Colombia's Marxist terror group, known
as Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia or FARC, during the years of civil war between that
group and the Colombian authorities.
President Chavez said he would place his country's bilateral ties with neighboring Colombia on
hold in response to Colombian President Alvaro Uribe’s decision to end Chavez's role as a hostage
negotiator with Colombia's FARC rebels. There have been several attempts over the years to free
the many hostages held in captivity by FARC in Colombia, but the situation moved in a productive
direction when Chavez offered to act as a mediator between the leftist extremist rebels and the
hard line government of Colombian President Alvaro Uribe.
That productive direction stalled when a proposal was put forth for FARC to release 45 hostages in
exchange for the release of 500 FARC members imprisoned by the Colombian authorities. Uribe
first expressed skepticism about the plan, saying that in trying to forge an agreement with FARC,
that group could also advance its interests. As well, Uribe was reported to have been upset with
Chavez for flaunting the proprieties of diplomacy by appearing in a photograph with a FARC
commander, and also revealing what Uribe said was a confidential conversation about a possible
meeting with FARC leader Manuel Marulanda. Uribe then decided to end Chavez' mediator role in
the hostage crisis, charging Venezuela's president wanted Colombia to be victimized by FARC. On
the other side of the equation, Chavez reacted to the decision by calling it "a spit in the face" and
accusing Uribe of being a liar.
Relatives of hostages held by FARC reacted to the news with shock and dismay and began to
protest outside the presidential palace. They appeared to have held out hopes that Chavez' role as
mediator would have eventually yielded positive results, pointing to the fact that Chavez had made
significant progress in his mediating role. To that end, one man whose nephew was abducted by
FARC, Jose Uriel Perez, said in an interview with Associated Press, "We thought it was very brave
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what President Chavez did in three months compared to what the government has failed to do in
10 years."
Reactions were strong outside South America as well. In France, President Nicolas Sarkozy called
on Uribe to reconsider his decision, saying that Chavez was the best person to negotiate the
release of the hostages. The French government entered into the fray because one of the most
well-known hostages held by FARC has been the famed politician, Ingrid Betancourt, who holds
joint Colombian and French citizenship.
In early 2008, Venezuelan President Hugo Chavez returned to the objective of brokering the
release of hostages held by FARC rebels in Colombia. This mission saw some success with the
release of two hostages -- Clara Rojas and Consuelo Gonzalez. Up to 700 people remained in
captivity -- among them, close to 50 high-profile individuals including the French-Colombian
politician Ingrid Betancourt.
Chavez called on the international community to stop referring to FARC as a terrorist enclave, but
at the same time noting that he did not support their tactics. To that end, he called on FARC to
stop opposing the Colombian government by taking hostages, saying, "I don't believe in kidnapping
and I don't believe in armed struggle." His Colombian counterpart, President Alvaro Uribe, had
stayed distant from the hostage release efforts. Uribe also criticized Chavez for holding talks with
FARC, and emphatically stated that he viewed FARC rebels as terrorists.
The start of March 2008 saw relations devolve between Colombia and two of its neighbors -Venezuela and Ecuador. A Colombian military offensive aimed against Marxist rebels, FARC,
resulted in an incursion into Ecuadorian territory. The operation left more than 20 people
dead and recriminations from Colombia's two neighbors -- Ecuador and Venezuela -- about
overzealous military actions that infringed upon their sovereignty. While Colombian authorities
hailed the action as a success due to the death of a leading FARC rebel, Ecuadorian President
Rafael Correa condemned the Colombian government in Bogota for violating its sovereignty and
lodged a formal protest.
Meanwhile, Venezuelan President Hugo Chavez, who had been negotiating with FARC for the
release of hostages held by the leftist rebels (as discussed above), railed against Colombian
President Alvarao Uribe for invading Ecuador, even going so far as to characterize him as "a
criminal." Chavez also called for the Venezuelan embassy in Bogota to be closed and withdrew
embassy personnel from Colombia. Moreover, he ordered Venezuela's military to take up positions
along the border with Colombia, presumably as a warning to its neighbor that it would not tolerate
a similar violation of its own sovereignty. The move marked a significant escalation of tensions in
the region.
But a week later, relations between Venezuela and Colombia were somewhat soothed after a
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summit between the leaders of those two countries. At the summit, the leaders of both the
countries agreed to a 20-point declaration forged by the Organization of American States (OAS),
which included a commitment by Colombian President Uribe ensuring that his military forces
would not violate borders with neighbors in the future. Venezuela then said that it would restore its
diplomatic relations with Colombia. The Venezuelan Foreign Ministry issued a statement noting
that the meeting was "a victory for peace and sovereignty... and demonstrated the importance of
Latin American unity in overcoming conflicts."
In June 2008, Venezuelan President Hugo Chavez urged Colombia's Revolutionary Armed Forces
of Colombia (FARC) rebels to end their four-decade struggle and release all their hostages. The
Venezuelan leader, who had negotiated controversial talks with FARC aimed at releasing its
hostages, characterized the extremist leftist militants as "out of step." Chavez also said, "The
guerrilla war is history. At this moment in Latin America, an armed guerrilla movement is out of
place." The call came a month after long-serving FARC leader, Manuel Marulanda, died and
Alfonso Cano was named as his replacement. Perhaps believing that he might have an impact on
the new leadership, Chavez said in his televised address, "This is my message for you, Cano:
'Come on, let all these people go.' There are old folk, women, sick people, soldiers who have been
prisoners in the mountain for 10 years."
As noted above, Chavez' role in mediating the release of hostages has been regarded as
controversial by some interests. Indeed, Colombian President Alvaro Uribe terminated his official
role in these negotiations. But many of the Colombian victims' families welcomed Chavez' interest
in the matter, and applauded his efforts when he successfully negotiated the release of two
hostages, Clara Rojas and Consuelo Gonzalez.
In August 2009, Colombia and the United States concluded negotiations on a military cooperation
agreement, which would provide for United States troops to access Colombian military bases for
the purpose of combating terrorism and fighting the trafficking of narcotics in the region. Venezuela
announced on August 17, 2009 that it would construct 70 "peace bases" along the border with
Colombia in response.
The agreement between the United States and Colombia had already caused a problematic
diplomatic consideration for the region in late July 2009 when Venezuela threated to freeze its
diplomatic ties with Colombia. Months later, Venezuelan President Hugo Chavez confirmed his
country intended to end formal diplomatic relations with Colombia due to that country's decision to
allow United States forces to have greater access to its military bases.
Bilateral relations between Colombia and Venezuela devolved further in November 2009 when
Colombia detained four members of the Venezuelan national guard along a river in the border
province of Vichada. The situation was not expected to last long since Colombian President Alvaro
Uribe said they would be released and returned to Venezuela. Perhaps with an eye on calming the
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heightened tensions between the two countries, President Uribe said there was "unbreakable
affection" between his country of Colombia and neighboring Venezuela. The incident came a week
after Venezuelan President Hugo Chavez sent troops to the border region in an apparent response
to an agreement forged between Colombia and the United States that would allow the American
military to use Colombian bases in its anti-narcotics trafficking efforts. Venezuelan President
Chavez has decried the move, charging that the agreement was part of the United States' agenda to
ultimately invade his country. This claim has been strongly denied by the United States.
Meanwhile, Colombia's relations with Ecuador remained strained, with Ecuador noting that more
time was needed to resolve the situation, which involved a violation of its sovereignty.
The ongoing diplomatic imbroglio between Colombia and Ecuador re-ignited in late March 2008.
At issue was Colombia's violation of Ecuador's sovereignty in an anti-terrorism offensive, as
discussed above. To recapitulate -- that action ultimately led both Quito and Caracas to break off
diplomatic contact with Bogota. Tensions with Caracas were somewhat assuaged when Colombian
President Alvaro Uribe issued an apology on the matter. However, relations with Quito continued
to be terribly strained and were further exacerbated in the latter part of the month when it was
confirmed that an Ecuadorean was killed by Colombian troops in the aforementioned antiterrorism raid on the FARC camp.
In July 2009, Ecuadorian President Rafael Correa denied that the Colombian insurgent group, the
Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC), contributed funds to his 2006 presidential
campaign. President Correa also called on the country's civil commission to investigate the
allegation, saying that the inquiry would make his innocence clear. Correa recalled accusations
from his political opponents claiming that he had received money from Venezuelan President Hugo
Chavez as well as the drug cartels. "They just don't know what else to say," Correa said. "It is up
to you to decide who to believe: the same people as usual or those who endanger their lives to save
the country." At issue was a Colombian media broadcast, apparently showing FARC leader, Víctor
Julio Suarez Rojas, also known as Mono Jojoy, saying that his group donated money to Correa's
campaign.
In May 2011, Ecuadorean President Rafael Correa rejected prevailing accusations of a connection
to the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (also known as Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias
de Colombia or FARC). During a news conference, President Correa insisted that he did not
accept any funds from FARC, which has been responsible for terrorist attacks in Colombia, saying:
"My hands are clean." He also asserted that he was ready to prove his innocence saying, "I'll take
a lie detector test to prove I never received funds from the FARC." At issue have been allegations
that the left-wing Ecuadorean leader's election campaign received financing from the Marxist
guerrilla enclave. These allegations have been based on an extensive report by the International
Institute for Strategic Studies, which carried out a two-year long study and relied on
communication uncovered during a raid by Colombian forces on a FARC encampment in Ecuador
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in 2008.
Note: Earlier in 2007, Uribe accompanied his Peruvian counterpart, President Garcia, to survey
the damage done by a devastating earthquake.
Note that in 2014, as unrest rocked Venezuela, newly-elected President Nicolas Maduro placed the
blame on external players, including the United States and Colombia, while blaming Panama and
the Organization of American States for intervening into sovereign affairs by trying to help resolve
the chaos.
Other Significant Relations
In 1822, the United States became one of the first countries to recognize the new republic and to
establish a resident diplomatic mission. Today, about 25,000 United States citizens live in
Colombia, most of them dual nationals. From October 1997 to September 1998, more than
158,000 Americans visited Colombia. Currently 250 private American businesses are registered in
Colombia.
In 1996 and a gain in 1997, President Clinton decided that Colombia was not fully cooperating
with the United States or taking adequate steps on its own to meet the objective of the 1988 United
Nations convention on drugs. The de-certification of Colombia's international drug control program
resulted in the denial of most United States aid, including new funding commitments from the
United States Export-Import Bank, the Overseas Private Investment Corporation, and the Trade
Development Agency.
The de-certification announcement on March 1, 1996, occurred during the midst of a major
political scandal in Colombia, linking President Samper with contributions by drug traffickers to his
1994 presidential campaign. The United States concluded that President Samper had undermined
Colombian counter-narcotics efforts, and revoked Samper's United States tourist visa on July 11,
1996, in accordance with U.S. Immigration and Nationality Act provisions on narcotics trafficking.
President Samper retained his diplomatic visa, which is not subject to the same INA regulations.
Despite the strain that de-certification and related issues placed on bilateral relations during the
Samper Administration, the U.S. and Colombian governments continued to cooperate and consult.
In 1995 and 1996, the United States and Colombia signed important agreements on environmental
protection and civil aviation. The two countries have signed agreements on asset sharing and
chemical control. In 1997, the United States and Colombia signed an important maritime shipboarding agreement to allow for search of suspected drug-running vessels. During the period 19881996, the United States provided approximately US$765 million in assistance to Colombia. In
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1998, U.S. assistance was in excess of US$100 million. This funding supports Colombia's counternarcotics efforts, such as arresting drug traffickers, seizing drugs and illegal processing faciliti es,
and eradicating coca and opium poppy.
On Feb. 26, 1998, President Clinton determined that the vital national interests of the United States
require United States assistance to Colombia to meet the increasing challenges posed to counternarcotics efforts in Colombia. The president granted Colombia a national interests certification (a
partial certification), which waives the restrictions of de-certification and allows for broader United
States engagement with Colombia in the fight against illegal narcotics. Suspended United States
programs resumed operations as of April 1, 1998. Colombia and other drug producing and drug
transit countries will be reviewed annually by March 1 for counter-narcotics performance.
In May 1998, the Overseas Private Investment Corporation announced it was helping United
States companies initiate projects in Colombia worth about US$830 million (including some
electricity and petrochemical companies). The inauguration of President Pastrana in August 1998
raised expectations of continued improved relations with the United States, Colombia's largest
trading partner and foreign investor.
The advent of President Pastrana has produced a transformation toward better relations with the
United States after four years of strain during the Samper administration. Bilateral relations reached
a new high with President Pastrana's October 1998 state visit to Washington and full United States
certification of Colombia for narcotics cooperation in March 1999. Pastrana has actively sought
United States support for the fight against drugs.
On Jan. 11, 1999, the Clinton administration announced an aid package worth US$1.7 billion that
would help fuel Pastrana's Plan Colombia. Colombia currently supplies the United States with an
estimated 90 percent of its cocaine supply and 65 percent of its heroin. Therefore, Pla n
Colombia's premise is to eradicate drug production by destroying the crop and fighting drug
traffickers and guerrillas. Skeptics argued that such a package would inevitably draw the United
States into the Colombian civil war, and further that the plan is too narrow in its approach, failing
to fully address intrinsically related issues such as human rights or the ailing Colombian economy.
The United States House of Representatives approved the package in March 2000, but the
package was stalled for several months in the United States Senate.
On June 23, 2000, the United States Senate approved a modified aid package worth nearly US$1
billion. The two-year package will primarily focus on strengthening the security forces by providing
special counter-narcotics training and equipment: counter-narcotic battalions, radar, aircraft (30
Black Hawks and 33 Huey helicopters), and improved intelligence. In addition a smaller portion of
this package will b e distributed to other Andean nations. The United States Congress was pressing
for additional funds to be released.
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President Pastrana visited Washington D.C. in February 2001 to meet with United States President
George W. Bush. The Colombian was successful in obtaining United States support for the
implementation of Plan Colombia and the increase of bilateral trade, but he failed to convince the
United States to act as an observer in peace talks with guerrilla groups.
The Sept. 11, 2001, terrorist attacks in the New York and Washington D.C. hurt Colombian
exports, as the United States is the primary consumer of Colombian products. The consequences
for Colombia of a potential armed international conflict remain unpredictable.
In 2007, Colombia and the United States were working together to deal with coca production and
drug trafficking; they were also cooperating in the global war against the threat of terrorism.
Note on free trade with the United States
In 2006, the United States (U.S.) and Colombia signed a trade deal following two year's of
negotiations. The agreement was one of the most significant in the Western Hemisphere since
the passage of the North American Free Trade Agreement (Nafta) in 1994. It was hailed
by Colombia as a potential boon to that country's economy and overall security. The Bush
administration in the U.S. viewed the agreement an an opportunity for U.S. businesses,
manufacturers, farmers and other exporters.
For his part, U.S. President George W. Bush was hoping to have the free trade deal quickly
approved by Congress. But the now-Democratic led Congress in the U.S. (as of November
2006) was deeply skeptical of the deal and warned that its passage would not be easily achieved.
At issue for the Democratic-led Congress has been the fact that the free trade agreement did not
protect internationally agreed worker rights, such as the abolition of child labor, protection against
discrimination, as well as freedom and protection for unions. Compounding the matter was also
the claim that the free trade deal would leave U.S. companies vulnerable to unfair trade practices.
In 2008, Colombian President Uribe thanked U.S. President Bush for sending the free trade
agreement to the U.S. Congress for passage, and anxiously awaited ratification. Such an end,
however, was not expected to be easily reached. Indeed, the matter had become a key
consideration in the presidential race in the U.S. since an advisor to Hillary Clinton -- who was a
Democratic presidential contender at the time -- was found to be lobbying for the Colombian
government in favor of the deal, even as Clinton expressed criticism about free trade. The matter
led to a deepening of the free trade debate in the U.S., and hinted at the posisbility that ratification
was even further off than before. The situation took a more dramatic turn when in April of that
year, U.S. House Speaker Nancy Pelosi moved to change procedural rules in Congress, which
would ultimately block the deal from being addresed in the immediate future.
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Note on relations with France, as regards the case of Ingrid Betancourt
In 2008, a French aircraft and medical personnel were placed on stand by in French Guiana, in the
event that kidnapped politician Ingrid Betancourt was released. For several years, Betancourt,
who holds dual citizenship in Colombia and France, has been held hostage by the Revolutionary
Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC) in Colombia. While there was no conclusive evidence that
FARC intended to free Betancourt, the French government, led by President Nicolas Sarkozy,
noted that it had decided to be prepared in case her release was secured. Betancourt was only one
of many hostages held by FARC, although she has been one of the most well-known. A fellow
hostage who was recently released said that Betancourt was gravely ill and had urged the
Colombian government to work toward her release. The development came at a time when the
Colombian government put forth a deal by which it would offer prisoner amnesties in exchange
for the release of hostages; the deal also involved sending the FARC prisoners into exile in France.
By early April 2008, Betancourt had not been released. The French government was demanding
that she be freed while people took to the streets in France to call for her release. But the period
was also marked by the French government's decision to call off the medical mission.
Special Entry on release of Ingrid Betancourt:
On July 2, 2008, French-Colombian politician Ingrid Betancourt, along with three United States
defense contractors -- Marc Gonsalves, Thomas Howes and Keith Stansell -- and 11 Colombian
security officers, were rescued by the Colombian military after several years in captivity. All of the
rescued hostages had been held by the Colombian rebel group, known as the Revolutionary
Armed Forces of Colombia or FARC.
The rescue took place in the southern province of Guaviare and military coordinators said that all
of the released hostages were released were in good shape. Colombian media reported that the
rescue mission had been set in motion several weeks prior. Reports stated that intelligence agents
had infiltrated the FARC ranks and managed to convince the local commander in charge of the
hostages of fictitious plans in the offing. As such, military personnel masquerading as members of
a non-governmental organization were able to carry out a ruse and get the hostages onto a
helicopter. Once airborne, they subdued the FARC leader who accompanied the hostages,
announced that the helicopter was under the control of the Colombian military, and explained that
the captives were now free. Colombian Defense Minister Juan Manuel Santos explained, "The
helicopters, which in reality were from the army, picked up the hostages in Guaviare and flew them
to freedom." Colombian authorities were especially pleased that the mission was executed
successfully and without one shot being fired.
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Betancourt, as a politician with dual citizenship, had been the highest profile hostage; her apparent
poor health contributed to the fact that the French government was actively seeking her release.
Indeed, a previous French medical evacuation mission ended unsuccessfully some months earlier,
as noted above. Venezuelan President Hugo Chavez had also been active in negotiations to free
hostages held by FARC, as aforementioned. To that end, two hostages -- Clara Rojas and
Consuelo Gonzalez -- were released by FARC in early 2008. However, zealous efforts by the
Colombian government to squash FARC has, at times, led to tensions with its neighbors, Venezuela
and Ecuador over violations of sovereign borders. See above for details.
In the afternoon of July 2, 2008, only moments after disembarking from the aircraft that carried
her from captivity, Betancourt made a public address, thanking the authorities for their assistance
in carrying out "a miracle." She said, "God, this is a miracle... There is no historical precedent for
such a perfect operation." Betancourt also urged that those who had died in captivity be
remembered and called for the possibility of peace. Betancourt's children reacted joyfully to the
news of their mother's release and were said to be flying from France to Colombia to be reunited
with their mother.
At 11:19 pm CST, a United States military aircraft touched down on American soil at Lackland Air
force Base carrying the three former hostages, Marc Gonsalves, Thomas Howes and Keith
Stansell. All three were then transported to Brooke Army Hospital in San Antonio, Texas, for
treatment. Media reports noted that they were likely to be reunited with their families in the
following days, although they were also expected to go through medical treatment and possible
reintegration counseling.
Note on U.S.-Colombian military cooperation deal and regional consequences
In August 2009, Colombia and the United States concluded negotiations on a military cooperation
agreement, which would provide for United States troops to access Colombian military bases for
the purpose of combating terrorism and fighting the trafficking of narcotics in the region.
Responding to this plan for a sustained United States military presence in Colombia, Venezuela
announced on August 17, 2009 that it would construct 70 "peace bases" along the border with
Colombia. Francisco Arias Cardenas, Venezuelan Vice Foreign Minister for Latin America and the
Caribbean, said that the plan was part of Venezuela's initiative to promote peace and prevent
conflict. But it was clear that the move was a defensive one, aimed at responding to the presence
of United States troops in a neighboring country, when Foreign Minister Arias explained at a news
conference, "Each Venezuelan has to be a soldier to defend Venezuela."
The agreement between the United States and Colombia has already caused a diplomatic
contretemps in the region, resulting in late July 2009 with indications from Venezuela that it
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would freeze its diplomatic ties with Colombia. Then, on September 1, 2009, Venezuelan
President Hugo Chavez confirmed his country would end formal diplomatic relations with
Colombia. President Chavez said the move was being made in response to Colombia's decision to
allow United States forces to have greater access to its military bases. Both Colombia and the
United States have insisted that the deal would pose no threat to neighboring countries, and had
been forged simply to improve efforts against anti-narcotics trafficking. However, regional powers,
including Venezuela , have reacted with concern to the move.
Written by Dr. Denise Youngblood Coleman, Editor in Chief at CountryWatch.com. See
Bibliography for general research sources.
National Security
External Threats
While no foreign nation poses an immediate threat to Colombia, it is involved in several territorial
disputes with neighboring countries. Nicaragua, Honduras, and Venezuela dispute their maritime
boundaries with Colombia.
Another source of concern forColombiais their organized illegal narcotics, guerrilla, and
paramilitary activities. These actions have crossed into their neighbor’s borders and have created a
huge refugee endemic. In recent years, over 300,000 persons have fledColombiagoing into her
neighboring states. This is causing some tensions between the nations involved.
Crime
Criminal activity is rampant in Colombia. In addition to globally-linked criminal organizations,
Colombiaplays host to two major insurgent movements. Both entities are involved in range of illicit
activities, including drug trafficking, kidnapping for ransom, and extortion. Colombiaranks as the
largest exporter in the world of cocaine. It also has the highest incidence of abductions. Based upon
statistics compiled by the Colombian government in recent years, the murder rate there was
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roughly nine times as high as that of the United States. Criminal and guerilla elements contribute
heavily to a Colombia's culture of violence. Common criminals are responsible for approximately
75 percent of the homicides there, however. Rampant corruption and a generally weak judicial
system have served to exacerbate unlawful behavior there.
Insurgencies
Two domestic insurgent organizations continue to pose a major threat to Colombia: the National
Liberation Army (ELN) and the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC). Both emerged
in the 1960s as Marxist-oriented guerilla movements aimed at the overthrow of Colombia's central
government. Both have become progressively less driven by communist ideology, and more so by
financial gain. In addition to doing battle with regular Colombian forces, FARC and ELN are
heavily involved in drug trafficking, extortion and kidnapping for ransom. Both organizations have
made liberal use of terrorism to further their political agendas and to facilitate their range of illicit
enterprises. The United States (U.S.) Department of State estimates FARC's total membership at
between 9,000 and 12,000 combatants and several thousand more supporters, located
predominately in rural zones of the country. ELN is believed to be comparatively smaller, with
approximately 3,000 active combatants and an unknown quantity of supporters, also based
predominately in rural areas.
*See "Editor's Update" below for latest details as regards insurgent organizations.
Terrorism
Colombia's two major domestic insurgent organizations - the National Liberation Army (ELN) and
the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC) - have used terrorism as a means to further
their political agendas and to facilitate their range of illicit enterprises. The United
Statesgovernment has declared ELN and FARC Designated Foreign Terrorist Organizations.
Colombiahas been active in the fight against global and domestic terrorism. Its partners in this fight
include the U.S., Spain, Venezuela, and other nations in Latin America. In 2000, The United States
(U.S.) and Colombia embarked on Plan Colombia, a U.S.-backed regional anti-drug and antiterrorism initiative but this is expected to soon end. Washingtonhad funded $3.3 billion since 2000
in order to advance this initiative. The Colombian government is still an active ally in the war
against terror.
Note on Narcotics and Terrorism
The United States Drug Enforcement Administration estimates that more than 80 percent of the
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worldwide cocaine supply and as much as 90 percent of the cocaine smuggled into the United
States is produced in Colombia.
The Colombian Government is committed to the eradication of all illicit crops, interdiction of illegal
drug shipments and financial controls to prevent money laundering. Between 2004 and 2007,
Colombian security forces interdicted almost 700 metric tons of cocaine, coca base, and heroin.
Coca cultivation decreased by 10% from 2001 to 2007, while opium poppy cultivation decreased
by 67 percent from 2001 to 2007. Terrorist groups in Colombia are actively engaged in narcotics
production and trafficking. The FARC is believed responsible for more than half of the cocaine
entering the United States.
*Editor's Update
From late 2012 through the first part of 2013, the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia
(Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia in Spanish, or FARC) -- the largest and most
organized insurgent group in Colombia -- has been in peace negotiations with the government of
Colombia. Progress on this front has been cautious but relatively productive with the latest
meetings focused on land reform and how FARC could enter the mainstream political field in
Colombia. The elimination of the major leaders of the leftist extremist movement helped persuade
FARC that continuing its insurgent campaign might not be the most practical endeavor.
It should be noted that another leftist insurgent entity -- the National Liberation Army (Ejército de
Liberación Nacional in Spanish, or ELN) -- was not part of the peace process, but has indicated an
interest in also entering the new social and political terrain that might characterize Colombia in the
future. Accordingly, at the start of July 2013, FARC and ELN were considering joining forces and
engaging in a "unification process."
By mid-July 2013, the ELN had actually surrendered and agreed to lay down its arms following a
meeting with Colombian President Juan Manuel Santos. The president hailed the development,
calling it "a great step towards peace." He said, "This is what the [peace] process is about. So
every member of the ELN and the FARC follows their path fighting for their ideals, but without
violence and without arms."
Meanwhile, on July 10, 2013, FARC's political party -- the Patriotic Union -- regained its legal
status. Accordingly, it would be positioned to contest the 2014 elections. The Patriotic Union lost
its status when it failed to put forth candidates in the 2002 elections. However, a Colombian court
ruled there were extenuating circumstances at play in 2002 that severely affected the Patriotic
Union's ability to contest those polls. Indeed, the court noted that as many as 3,000 of its
members, including several presidential candidates, had been murdered by right-wing
paramilitaries and drug traffickers. Analysts have drawn attention to the fact that the government
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acted in complicity with those paramilitaries, thus reinforcing the message to FARC rebels that they
were not welcome on Colombia's political field and thus, essentially pushing them along the path of
rebellion.
Meanwhile, the peace talks between the Colombian government and FARC were ongoing,
although the two sides were unable to reach an agreement on the issue of political participation.
Further negotiations on this matter were in the offing between the government and FARC later in
July 2013, with the government hoping that a peace deal could be signed by a deadline of
November 2013.
The chief negotiator for FARC, Ivan Marquez, noted that the five-year long conflict with the
government was coming to an end. However, in response to the government's goal of signing a
peace accord by November 2013, he warned against rushing through an agreement. In an
interview with Colombia media, Marquez said, "It is possible [to reach an agreement by
November]. But to achieve peace you need time. A bad peace deal is worse than war."
It should be noted that even amidst the peace negotiations, the conflict between FARC and the
Colombian government was ongoing. An ambush by more than 70 FARC rebels on two dozen
soldiers at an oil pipeline in Arauca left 15 soldiers and six militants dead. A separate attack in
southwestern Colombia left four soldiers and several FARC militants dead. President Santos made
clear that the military would continue its offensive operations against FARC, even as the peace
process was ongoing, and despite FARC's call for a ceasefire.
Editor's Note on FARC:
The Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia in
Spanish, or FARC) is the oldest, largest, and most organized insurgent group in Colombia. It has
widespread operations throughout Colombia and occasionally on the borders of neighboring
countries such as Peru, Ecuador, Venezuela and Brazil. A leftist military organization seeking
political power and economic reform, FARC receives support from all segments of the population,
but mostly at the rural level. FARC relies primarily on kidnapping high-profile people for ransom
money and overseeing drug operations as a means of income. FARC is only one of a number of
left-wing rebels and right-wing paramilitaries, which have been in conflict with the Colombian
authorities for decades. The July 2, 2008, rescue of former presidential candidate Ingrid
Betancourt and three United States defense contractors meant that FARC had lost its most highprofile hostages and indicated possible fractures in its operations, perhaps partially due to the
deaths of key leaders of the rebel group. The October 2008 escape of a former congressman only
served to reinforce this perception. Since then, the elimination of key members of the FARC
leadership has suggested a further weakening of FARC. Nevertheless, hundreds of people remain
in captivity at the hands of FARC. In more recent times, FARC said it was releasing its hostages
and abandoning its practice of kidnapping civilians for extortion. However, even with most of its
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leadership eliminated or detained, there was not a clear indication that FARC had rejected the use
of violence in achieving its agenda. Since 2013, there were cautious hopes for a peace deal
between the Colombian government and FARC as delegates from both sides convened peace
negotiations in Cuba. The news in November 2013 of a plot by FARC to assassinate former
President Uribe, as well as the abduction of three individuals including a general in November 2014
by FARC, together placed the peace process in peril. Indeed, President Santos moved to suspend
peace negotiations with FARC following the 2014 abductions. The release of the hostages,
however, eased tensions and the government of Colombia and FARC soon announced that they
would resume peace talks.
See "Political Conditions" for more detailed information related to FARC's activities.
Defense Forces
Military Branches:
National Army (Ejercito Nacional), Republic of Colombia Navy (Armada Republica de Colombia,
ARC, includes Naval Aviation, Naval Infantry (Infanteria de Marina, IM), and Coast Guard),
Colombian Air Force (Fuerza Aerea de Colombia, FAC)
Eligible age to enter service:
18
Mandatory Service Terms:
18 months
Manpower in general population-fit for military service:
males age 16-49: 9,150,400
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females age 16-49: 9,861,760
Manpower reaching eligible age annually:
males: 430,634
females: 413,974
Military Expenditures-Percent of GDP:
3.28%
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Chapter 3
Economic Overview
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Economic Overview
Overview
One of the largest countries in South America, Colombia is endowed with significant natural
resources. It has substantial oil reserves and is a major producer of gold, silver, emeralds, platinum
and coal. While coffee has been a mainstay of Colombia's export sector for nearly a century, the
country is also a large oil producer and its newly privatized coal industry remains a major exporter
as well. Colombia’s advantageous geographical location facing both the Pacific and the Atlantic
Ocean has also helped by providing low cost sea access to North and South American markets.
But it has also been ravaged by a decades-long violent conflict involving outlawed armed groups,
drug cartels and violations of human rights. Despite strong growth in recent years, about half of the
population still lives below the poverty line.
In 1998, a weakening Colombian economy, struggling with a growing fiscal deficit and political
instability associated with the civil war and a weak peso, was hit by turmoil in the international
financial markets. A tight monetary policy resulting from an attempt to keep the peso within its
targeted peg range also contributed to the weakening economy. These factors were compounded
by the Asian and Russian financial crises and collapsing world commodity prices, which affected
coffee and oil -- both important Colombian exports. As a result, economic growth suffered
stagnation from 1999 to 2002. Since 1999, with support of the IMF, Colombia's economic policies
aimed to place the country on a path of sustainable growth, with a strategy focusing on fiscal
reforms and consolidation, policies to reduce inflation, and measures to strengthen the financial
system. In September 1999, Colombia abandoned its policy of pegging the peso to the U.S. dollar
and allowed it to float, which resulted in a substantial reduction in interest rates.
During the last decade, Colombia has achieved very strong macroeconomic performance,
underpinned by solid institutional and policy frameworks, including its flexible exchange rate, the
inflation-targeting regime, medium-term fiscal framework, and prudent debt management. All these
have helped reduce balance sheet vulnerabilities, while strong supervision and regulation have kept
the financial system sound. As of late, Colombia’s economy has been adversely affected by the
global economic crisis as weak external demand has led to a contraction of exports and a
considerable slowdown in economic activity. But the country’s very strong economic fundamentals
have allowed the government to adopt prudently expansionary macroeconomic policies to support
domestic demand and mitigate the impact of the crisis. With the countercyclical policies taking
effect along with improved external conditions, economic growth was expected to pick up
moderately in 2010 following a sharp slowdown in 2008-2009. In late 2010, Colombia saw its
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most severe flooding in decades, with damages topping an estimated $6 billion. In 2011,
Colombia’s central bank purchased billions of dollars in the foreign exchange market through its
pre-announced intervention program of purchasing at least US$20 million per day over a specified
time horizon. Then, in October 2011, the US-Colombia Free Trade Agreement was ratified by the
U.S. Congress and pending implementation in 2012. Colombia also approved the export of natural
gas to Panama and other countries in the Caribbean, expanding an export market that had been
limited to Venezuela and the United States in order to ensure domestic supply. Colombia has signed
or is negotiating FTAs with a number of other countries, including Canada, Chile, Mexico,
Switzerland, the EU, Venezuela, South Korea, Turkey, Japan, and Israel. Foreign direct investment
- notably in the oil sector - reached a record $10 billion in 2008 but dropped to $7.2 billion in 2009,
before beginning to recover in 2010, and appearing to have reached a record high $13 billion in
2011.
Colombia's oil and coal production has boomed in recent years, thanks to increased security and an
economy left relatively undamaged by the global financial crisis. But the country’s major oil
companies were hit with protests in 2011 - by citizens demanding more local jobs and social
investment - which the industry saw as more of a threat than the rebels still plaguing the Andean
nation. The unemployment rate of 10.8 percent in 2011 remained one of Latin America's highest.
Still, real GDP grew nearly 6 percent in 2011 and inflation ended 2011 at 3.7 percent, continuing
almost a decade of strong economic performance. All three major ratings agencies had upgraded
Colombia's investment grade.
Meanwhile, the unemployment rate of 10.3 percent in 2012 remained one of Latin America's
highest. The Santos administration's foreign policy has focused on bolstering Colombia's
commercial ties and boosting investment at home. The US-Colombia Free Trade Agreement (FTA)
was ratified by the US Congress in October 2011 and implemented in 2012. Colombia has signed
or is negotiating FTAs with a number of other countries, including Canada, Chile, Mexico,
Switzerland, the EU, Venezuela, South Korea, Turkey, Japan, China, Costa Rica, Panama, and
Israel. Foreign direct investment - notably in the oil and gas sectors - reached a record $10 billion
in 2008 but dropped to $7.2 billion in 2009, before beginning to recover in 2010, and reached a
record high of nearly $16 billion in 2012. Colombia is the third largest Latin American exporter of
oil to the United States, and the United States' largest source of imported coal. Inequality,
underemployment, and narcotrafficking remain significant challenges, and Colombia's
infrastructure requires major improvements to sustain economic expansion.
In October 2013, the board of Colombia’s central bank voted to hold the lending rate at 3.25
percent for a seventh straight month to stimulate the economy as consumer prices remained at the
bottom end of the bank’s target range of 2 percent to 4 percent. Then, in November 2013, Carlos
Gustavo Cano - Colombia's central bank board member - said he expected to hold its benchmark
lending rate steady through at least mid-2014 as prolonged low inflation prompted concerns about
installed capacity. The country's unemployment rate of 9.7 percent in 2013 was still one of Latin
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America's highest.
In 2013, Colombia began its ascension process to the OECD. The annual level of foreign direct
investment - notably in the oil and gas sectors - reached a record high of $16.8 billion in 2013, an
increase of 7 percent over 2012. Overall, Colombia’s economic performance in 2013 was robust
with low inflation. Real GDP growth was projected to converge to potential (about 4.5 percent) in
2014, with inflation remaining within the 2 to 4 percent target range. Economic growth remained
unexpectedly strong in the first quarter of 2014 followed by a period of monetary tightening to
ward off inflationary pressure. But things slowed down in the second quarter.
The country’s central bank began a tightening cycle in April 2014, lifting the benchmark interest
rate from 3.25 percent, where it had remained for nearly one year. The rate was held steady at 4.5
percent for a second month in September 2014. Meanwhile, policymakers were worried about
Colombia's revenue stream as crude output began to decline and the oil boom waned. With a drop
and global oil prices and damaged pipelines as a result of attacks by Marxist rebels, the Colombian
government in October 2014 unveiled tax reform in an effort to bolster revenue.
All three major ratings agencies had upgraded Colombia's government debt to investment grade,
which helped to attract record levels of investment in 2013 and 2014, mostly in the hydrocarbons
sector. The unemployment rate of 9.2 percent in 2014, however, was still one of Latin America's
highest. In 2014, Colombia passed a tax reform bill to offset the lost revenue from the global drop
in oil prices. The Santos administration was also using tax reform to help finance implementation of
a peace deal, in the event FARC and the government reached an agreement in 2015. Colombian
officials estimated that a peace deal may bolster economic growth by almost 2 percent.
In June 2015, it was reported that the Colombian economy had grown 2.8 percent in the first
quarter compared to a year earlier. While the performance was in line with analysts' expectations, it
represented the slowest quarterly growth in two and a half years mainly due to lower oil prices.
Then in late September 2015, Colombia's central bank increased its benchmark interest rate by a
quarter point for the first time in a year. The move was an effort to stem inflation, which had
picked up as drought and persistent currency devaluation boosted prices despite the slowing
economy, according to Reuters.
Meanwhile, Finance Minister Mauricio Cardenas, who represents the government on the board,
revised down the economic growth forecast for 2015 to 3.3 percent, from 3.6 percent previously.
The peso was down 56 percent over the past year.
Real GDP growth declined in 2015, pressured by declining oil revenues. Standard & Poor’s
downgraded its long-term outlook from stable to negative on Colombia in early 2016. The change,
due largely to falling government revenues, had the potential to cause Colombia to lose its
investment-grade bond status.
Colombia Review 2017
Page 178 of 433 pages
Country OverView
Pending
Colombia's August 2016 historic peace agreement with FARC rebels was not expected to give the
country's struggling economy an immediate boost, according to investors. They cited sluggish
commodities prices as the country’s most pressing issue.
In August 2016, Colombia's central bank said it was "very likely" that growth would fall below its
2.3 percent projection for the year. The central bank then held its benchmark interest rate steady at
7.75 percent on Aug. 31, the first time in a year, as the board continued to struggle with a sluggish
economy and rising consumer prices that put their 2017 inflation target at risk.
Updated in 2016
Supplementary Sources: International Monetary Fund and Reuters
Real GDP and GDP Per Capita
Real GDP and GDP Per Capita
Name
Unit
Year
Value
Real Gross Domestic Product (LCU billions 2005
base)
Col$
billions
2008
401744.000000
Real Gross Domestic Product (LCU billions 2005
base)
Col$
billions
2009
408379.000000
Real Gross Domestic Product (LCU billions 2005
base)
Col$
billions
2010
424599.000000
Real Gross Domestic Product (LCU billions 2005
base)
Col$
billions
2011
451324.353840
Real Gross Domestic Product (LCU billions 2005
base)
Col$
billions
2012
470714.958933
Real GDP Growth Rate (%)
%
2008
3.546804
Colombia Review 2017
Page 179 of 433 pages
Country OverView
Pending
Name
Unit
Year
Value
Real GDP Growth Rate (%)
%
2009
1.651549
Real GDP Growth Rate (%)
%
2010
3.971800
Real GDP Growth Rate (%)
%
2011
6.294669
Real GDP Growth Rate (%)
%
2012
4.296379
Consumption (LCU billions)
Col$
billions
2008
305272.890000
Consumption (LCU billions)
Col$
billions
2009
320836.470000
Consumption (LCU billions)
Col$
billions
2010
342073.000000
Consumption (LCU billions)
Col$
billions
2011
379532.000000
Consumption (LCU billions)
Col$
billions
2012
406842.000000
Government Expenditure (LCU billions)
Col$
billions
2008
73459.220000
Government Expenditure (LCU billions)
Col$
billions
2009
80486.060000
Government Expenditure (LCU billions)
Col$
billions
2010
92247.000000
Government Expenditure (LCU billions)
Col$
billions
2011
99772.000000
Colombia Review 2017
Page 180 of 433 pages
Country OverView
Pending
Name
Unit
Year
Value
Government Expenditure (LCU billions)
Col$
billions
2012
110774.000000
Gross Capital Formation (LCU billions)
Col$
billions
2008
109068.870000
Gross Capital Formation (LCU billions)
Col$
billions
2009
113766.590000
Gross Capital Formation (LCU billions)
Col$
billions
2010
120570.000000
Gross Capital Formation (LCU billions)
Col$
billions
2011
148008.000000
Gross Capital Formation (LCU billions)
Col$
billions
2012
158438.000000
Exports ($US billions)
Col$
billions
2008
86688.410000
Exports ($US billions)
Col$
billions
2009
82034.850000
Exports ($US billions)
Col$
billions
2010
45.736423
Exports ($US billions)
Col$
billions
2011
63.022454
Exports ($US billions)
Col$
billions
2012
67.477080
Imports ($US billions)
Col$
billions
2008
97516.910000
Colombia Review 2017
Page 181 of 433 pages
Country OverView
Pending
Name
Unit
Year
Value
Imports ($US billions)
Col$
billions
2009
92455.510000
Imports ($US billions)
Col$
billions
2010
50.985322
Imports ($US billions)
Col$
billions
2011
67.047634
Imports ($US billions)
Col$
billions
2012
74.049978
Colombia Review 2017
Page 182 of 433 pages
Country OverView
Pending
Nominal GDP and Components
Nominal GDP and Components
Name
Unit
Year
Value
Nominal GDP (LCU billions)
Col$ billions
2008
481037.000000
Nominal GDP (LCU billions)
Col$ billions
2009
508532.000000
Nominal GDP (LCU billions)
Col$ billions
2010
544924.000000
Nominal GDP (LCU billions)
Col$ billions
2011
619894.000000
Nominal GDP (LCU billions)
Col$ billions
2012
664240.000000
Nominal GDP Growth Rate (%)
%
2008
11.590871
Nominal GDP Growth Rate (%)
%
2009
5.715776
Nominal GDP Growth Rate (%)
%
2010
7.981222
Nominal GDP Growth Rate (%)
%
2011
13.757881
Nominal GDP Growth Rate (%)
%
2012
7.153803
Population, total (million)
Millions
2008
45.010000
Population, total (million)
Millions
2009
45.660000
Population, total (million)
Millions
2010
46.444798
Population, total (million)
Millions
2011
46.045000
Colombia Review 2017
Page 183 of 433 pages
Country OverView
Pending
Name
Unit
Year
Value
Population, total (million)
Millions
2012
46.582000
Population growth (%)
%
2008
1.462579
Population growth (%)
%
2009
1.430121
Population growth (%)
%
2010
1.402185
Population growth (%)
%
2011
1.175565
Population growth (%)
%
2012
1.166250
Nominal GDP per Capita (LCU 1000s)
Col$ thousands
2008
10688.340000
Nominal GDP per Capita (LCU 1000s)
Col$ thousands
2009
11138.820000
Nominal GDP per Capita (LCU 1000s)
Col$ thousands
2010
6.179399
Nominal GDP per Capita (LCU 1000s)
Col$ thousands
2011
13462786.404604
Nominal GDP per Capita (LCU 1000s)
Col$ thousands
2012
14259585.247520
Nominal GDP Per Capita Growth Rate
%
2008
Nominal GDP Per Capita Growth Rate
%
2009
Nominal GDP Per Capita Growth Rate
%
2010
Nominal GDP Per Capita Growth Rate
%
2011
Nominal GDP Per Capita Growth Rate
%
2012
Colombia Review 2017
Page 184 of 433 pages
Country OverView
Pending
Government Spending and Taxation
Government Spending and Taxation
Name
Unit
Year
Value
Government Expenditure (LCU billions)
Col$
billions
2008
73459.220000
Government Expenditure (LCU billions)
Col$
billions
2009
80486.060000
Government Expenditure (LCU billions)
Col$
billions
2010
92247.000000
Government Expenditure (LCU billions)
Col$
billions
2011
99772.000000
Government Expenditure (LCU billions)
Col$
billions
2012
110774.000000
Government Expenditure Growth Rate (%)
%
2008
-11.993884
Government Expenditure Growth Rate (%)
%
2009
1.708510
Government Expenditure Growth Rate (%)
%
2010
5.363939
Government Expenditure Growth Rate (%)
%
2011
11.143410
Government Expenditure Growth Rate (%)
%
2012
5.474520
National Tax Rate Net of Transfers (%)
%
2008
15.332337
National Tax Rate Net of Transfers (%)
%
2009
16.908162
Colombia Review 2017
Page 185 of 433 pages
Country OverView
Pending
Name
Unit
Year
Value
National Tax Rate Net of Transfers (%)
%
2010
12.375527
National Tax Rate Net of Transfers (%)
%
2011
26.728792
National Tax Rate Net of Transfers (%)
%
2012
28.349953
Government Revenues Net of Transfers (LCU
billions)
2008
73754.220000
Government Revenues Net of Transfers (LCU
billions)
2009
85983.420000
Government Revenues Net of Transfers (LCU
billions)
2010
67437.221000
Government Revenues Net of Transfers (LCU
billions)
2011
165690.182000
Government Revenues Net of Transfers (LCU
billions)
2012
188311.730000
Government Surplus(-) Deficit(+) (LCU billions)
Col$
billions
2008
-32471.420000
Government Surplus(-) Deficit(+) (LCU billions)
Col$
billions
2009
-20291.310000
Government Surplus(-) Deficit(+) (LCU billions)
Col$
billions
2010
24809.779000
Government Surplus(-) Deficit(+) (LCU billions)
Col$
billions
2011
-12336.941000
Government Surplus(-) Deficit(+) (LCU billions)
Col$
billions
2012
538.475000
Colombia Review 2017
Page 186 of 433 pages
Country OverView
Pending
Name
Unit
Year
Value
Government Surplus(+) Deficit(-) (%GDP)
%
2008
4.635000
Government Surplus(+) Deficit(-) (%GDP)
%
2009
3.538000
Government Surplus(+) Deficit(-) (%GDP)
%
2010
-4.552887
Government Surplus(+) Deficit(-) (%GDP)
%
2011
-1.990169
Government Surplus(+) Deficit(-) (%GDP)
%
2012
0.081066
Colombia Review 2017
Page 187 of 433 pages
Country OverView
Pending
Money, Prices and Interest Rates
Money, Prices and Interest Rates
Name
Unit
Year
Value
Money and Quasi-Money (M2) (LCU billions)
Col$ billions
2008
171375.940000
Money and Quasi-Money (M2) (LCU billions)
Col$ billions
2009
185181.790000
Money and Quasi-Money (M2) (LCU billions)
Col$ billions
2010
206399.294189
Money and Quasi-Money (M2) (LCU billions)
Col$ billions
2011
245457.918998
Money and Quasi-Money (M2) (LCU billions)
Col$ billions
2012
284906.953722
Money Supply Growth Rate (%)
%
2008
18.481979
Money Supply Growth Rate (%)
%
2009
8.055885
Money Supply Growth Rate (%)
%
2010
11.457662
Money Supply Growth Rate (%)
%
2011
18.923817
Money Supply Growth Rate (%)
%
2012
16.071608
Inflation, GDP Deflator (%)
%
2008
0.022113
Inflation, GDP Deflator (%)
%
2009
0.010634
Inflation, GDP Deflator (%)
%
2010
3.856258
Inflation, GDP Deflator (%)
%
2011
7.021248
Colombia Review 2017
Page 188 of 433 pages
Country OverView
Pending
Name
Unit
Year
Value
Inflation, GDP Deflator (%)
%
2012
2.739716
Lending Interest Rate (%)
%
2008
17.175623
Lending Interest Rate (%)
%
2009
13.008074
Lending Interest Rate (%)
%
2010
9.381489
Lending Interest Rate (%)
%
2011
11.219918
Lending Interest Rate (%)
%
2012
12.585040
Unemployment Rate (%)
%
2008
13.199999
Unemployment Rate (%)
%
2009
12.000000
Unemployment Rate (%)
%
2010
11.600000
Unemployment Rate (%)
%
2011
10.850000
Unemployment Rate (%)
%
2012
10.392000
Colombia Review 2017
Page 189 of 433 pages
Country OverView
Pending
Trade and the Exchange Rate
Trade and the Exchange Rate
Name
Unit
Year
Value
Official Exchange Rate (LCU/$US)
Col$/$
2008
1967.720000
Official Exchange Rate (LCU/$US)
Col$/$
2009
2158.260000
Official Exchange Rate (LCU/$US)
Col$/$
2010
1898.683671
Official Exchange Rate (LCU/$US)
Col$/$
2011
1842.898721
Official Exchange Rate (LCU/$US)
Col$/$
2012
1797.380668
Trade Balance NIPA ($US billions)
$US Millions
2008
-10828.500000
Trade Balance NIPA ($US billions)
$US Millions
2009
-10420.670000
Trade Balance NIPA ($US billions)
$US Millions
2010
-5.248899
Trade Balance NIPA ($US billions)
$US Millions
2011
-4.025180
Trade Balance NIPA ($US billions)
$US Millions
2012
-6.572898
Colombia Review 2017
Page 190 of 433 pages
Country OverView
Pending
The Balance of Payments
The Balance of Payments
Name
Unit
Year
Value
Current Account
$US Billions
2008
-6.750000
Current Account
$US Billions
2009
-4.970000
Current Account
$US Billions
2010
-8.760000
Current Account
$US Billions
2011
-9.980000
Current Account
$US Billions
2012
-3.960000
Capital and Financial Account
$US Billions
2008
9.460000
Capital and Financial Account
$US Billions
2009
6.230000
Capital and Financial Account
$US Billions
2010
11.780000
Capital and Financial Account
$US Billions
2011
13.600000
Capital and Financial Account
$US Billions
2012
5.120000
Overall Balance
$US Billions
2008
2.720000
Overall Balance
$US Billions
2009
1.270000
Overall Balance
$US Billions
2010
3.020000
Overall Balance
$US Billions
2011
3.620000
Colombia Review 2017
Page 191 of 433 pages
Country OverView
Pending
Name
Unit
Year
Value
Overall Balance
$US Billions
2012
1.170000
Total Foreign Exchange Reserves ($US billions)
$US Billions
2008
23.480000
Total Foreign Exchange Reserves ($US billions)
$US Billions
2009
24.750000
Total Foreign Exchange Reserves ($US billions)
$US Billions
2010
28.076151
Total Foreign Exchange Reserves ($US billions)
$US Billions
2011
31.895551
Total Foreign Exchange Reserves ($US billions)
$US Billions
2012
36.997795
Current Account (% of GDP)
%
2008
0.000000
Current Account (% of GDP)
%
2009
0.000000
Current Account (% of GDP)
%
2010
0.000000
Current Account (% of GDP)
%
2011
0.000000
Current Account (% of GDP)
%
2012
-0.000590
Colombia Review 2017
Page 192 of 433 pages
Country OverView
Pending
Real GDP and GDP Per Capita
Real GDP and GDP Per Capita
Name
Unit
Year
Value
Real Gross Domestic Product (LCU billions 2005
base)
Col$
billions
2008
401744.000000
Real Gross Domestic Product (LCU billions 2005
base)
Col$
billions
2009
408379.000000
Real Gross Domestic Product (LCU billions 2005
base)
Col$
billions
2010
424599.000000
Real Gross Domestic Product (LCU billions 2005
base)
Col$
billions
2011
451324.353840
Real Gross Domestic Product (LCU billions 2005
base)
Col$
billions
2012
470714.958933
Real GDP Growth Rate (%)
%
2008
3.546804
Real GDP Growth Rate (%)
%
2009
1.651549
Real GDP Growth Rate (%)
%
2010
3.971800
Real GDP Growth Rate (%)
%
2011
6.294669
Real GDP Growth Rate (%)
%
2012
4.296379
Consumption (LCU billions)
Col$
billions
2008
305272.890000
Colombia Review 2017
Page 193 of 433 pages
Country OverView
Pending
Name
Unit
Year
Value
Consumption (LCU billions)
Col$
billions
2009
320836.470000
Consumption (LCU billions)
Col$
billions
2010
342073.000000
Consumption (LCU billions)
Col$
billions
2011
379532.000000
Consumption (LCU billions)
Col$
billions
2012
406842.000000
Government Expenditure (LCU billions)
Col$
billions
2008
73459.220000
Government Expenditure (LCU billions)
Col$
billions
2009
80486.060000
Government Expenditure (LCU billions)
Col$
billions
2010
92247.000000
Government Expenditure (LCU billions)
Col$
billions
2011
99772.000000
Government Expenditure (LCU billions)
Col$
billions
2012
110774.000000
Gross Capital Formation (LCU billions)
Col$
billions
2008
109068.870000
Gross Capital Formation (LCU billions)
Col$
billions
2009
113766.590000
Gross Capital Formation (LCU billions)
Col$
billions
2010
120570.000000
Colombia Review 2017
Page 194 of 433 pages
Country OverView
Pending
Name
Unit
Year
Value
Gross Capital Formation (LCU billions)
Col$
billions
2011
148008.000000
Gross Capital Formation (LCU billions)
Col$
billions
2012
158438.000000
Exports ($US billions)
Col$
billions
2008
86688.410000
Exports ($US billions)
Col$
billions
2009
82034.850000
Exports ($US billions)
Col$
billions
2010
45.736423
Exports ($US billions)
Col$
billions
2011
63.022454
Exports ($US billions)
Col$
billions
2012
67.477080
Imports ($US billions)
Col$
billions
2008
97516.910000
Imports ($US billions)
Col$
billions
2009
92455.510000
Imports ($US billions)
Col$
billions
2010
50.985322
Imports ($US billions)
Col$
billions
2011
67.047634
Imports ($US billions)
Col$
billions
2012
74.049978
Colombia Review 2017
Page 195 of 433 pages
Country OverView
Pending
Nominal GDP and Components
Nominal GDP and Components
Name
Unit
Year
Value
Nominal GDP (LCU billions)
Col$ billions
2008
481037.000000
Nominal GDP (LCU billions)
Col$ billions
2009
508532.000000
Nominal GDP (LCU billions)
Col$ billions
2010
544924.000000
Nominal GDP (LCU billions)
Col$ billions
2011
619894.000000
Nominal GDP (LCU billions)
Col$ billions
2012
664240.000000
Nominal GDP Growth Rate (%)
%
2008
11.590871
Nominal GDP Growth Rate (%)
%
2009
5.715776
Nominal GDP Growth Rate (%)
%
2010
7.981222
Nominal GDP Growth Rate (%)
%
2011
13.757881
Nominal GDP Growth Rate (%)
%
2012
7.153803
Population, total (million)
Millions
2008
45.010000
Population, total (million)
Millions
2009
45.660000
Population, total (million)
Millions
2010
46.444798
Population, total (million)
Millions
2011
46.045000
Colombia Review 2017
Page 196 of 433 pages
Country OverView
Pending
Name
Unit
Year
Value
Population, total (million)
Millions
2012
46.582000
Population growth (%)
%
2008
1.462579
Population growth (%)
%
2009
1.430121
Population growth (%)
%
2010
1.402185
Population growth (%)
%
2011
1.175565
Population growth (%)
%
2012
1.166250
Nominal GDP per Capita (LCU 1000s)
Col$ thousands
2008
10688.340000
Nominal GDP per Capita (LCU 1000s)
Col$ thousands
2009
11138.820000
Nominal GDP per Capita (LCU 1000s)
Col$ thousands
2010
6.179399
Nominal GDP per Capita (LCU 1000s)
Col$ thousands
2011
13462786.404604
Nominal GDP per Capita (LCU 1000s)
Col$ thousands
2012
14259585.247520
Nominal GDP Per Capita Growth Rate
%
2008
Nominal GDP Per Capita Growth Rate
%
2009
Nominal GDP Per Capita Growth Rate
%
2010
Nominal GDP Per Capita Growth Rate
%
2011
Nominal GDP Per Capita Growth Rate
%
2012
Colombia Review 2017
Page 197 of 433 pages
Country OverView
Pending
Government Spending and Taxation
Government Spending and Taxation
Name
Unit
Year
Value
Government Expenditure (LCU billions)
Col$
billions
2008
73459.220000
Government Expenditure (LCU billions)
Col$
billions
2009
80486.060000
Government Expenditure (LCU billions)
Col$
billions
2010
92247.000000
Government Expenditure (LCU billions)
Col$
billions
2011
99772.000000
Government Expenditure (LCU billions)
Col$
billions
2012
110774.000000
Government Expenditure Growth Rate (%)
%
2008
-11.993884
Government Expenditure Growth Rate (%)
%
2009
1.708510
Government Expenditure Growth Rate (%)
%
2010
5.363939
Government Expenditure Growth Rate (%)
%
2011
11.143410
Government Expenditure Growth Rate (%)
%
2012
5.474520
National Tax Rate Net of Transfers (%)
%
2008
15.332337
National Tax Rate Net of Transfers (%)
%
2009
16.908162
Colombia Review 2017
Page 198 of 433 pages
Country OverView
Pending
Name
Unit
Year
Value
National Tax Rate Net of Transfers (%)
%
2010
12.375527
National Tax Rate Net of Transfers (%)
%
2011
26.728792
National Tax Rate Net of Transfers (%)
%
2012
28.349953
Government Revenues Net of Transfers (LCU
billions)
2008
73754.220000
Government Revenues Net of Transfers (LCU
billions)
2009
85983.420000
Government Revenues Net of Transfers (LCU
billions)
2010
67437.221000
Government Revenues Net of Transfers (LCU
billions)
2011
165690.182000
Government Revenues Net of Transfers (LCU
billions)
2012
188311.730000
Government Surplus(-) Deficit(+) (LCU billions)
Col$
billions
2008
-32471.420000
Government Surplus(-) Deficit(+) (LCU billions)
Col$
billions
2009
-20291.310000
Government Surplus(-) Deficit(+) (LCU billions)
Col$
billions
2010
24809.779000
Government Surplus(-) Deficit(+) (LCU billions)
Col$
billions
2011
-12336.941000
Government Surplus(-) Deficit(+) (LCU billions)
Col$
billions
2012
538.475000
Colombia Review 2017
Page 199 of 433 pages
Country OverView
Pending
Name
Unit
Year
Value
Government Surplus(+) Deficit(-) (%GDP)
%
2008
4.635000
Government Surplus(+) Deficit(-) (%GDP)
%
2009
3.538000
Government Surplus(+) Deficit(-) (%GDP)
%
2010
-4.552887
Government Surplus(+) Deficit(-) (%GDP)
%
2011
-1.990169
Government Surplus(+) Deficit(-) (%GDP)
%
2012
0.081066
Colombia Review 2017
Page 200 of 433 pages
Country OverView
Pending
Money, Prices and Interest Rates
Money, Prices and Interest Rates
Name
Unit
Year
Value
Money and Quasi-Money (M2) (LCU billions)
Col$ billions
2008
171375.940000
Money and Quasi-Money (M2) (LCU billions)
Col$ billions
2009
185181.790000
Money and Quasi-Money (M2) (LCU billions)
Col$ billions
2010
206399.294189
Money and Quasi-Money (M2) (LCU billions)
Col$ billions
2011
245457.918998
Money and Quasi-Money (M2) (LCU billions)
Col$ billions
2012
284906.953722
Money Supply Growth Rate (%)
%
2008
18.481979
Money Supply Growth Rate (%)
%
2009
8.055885
Money Supply Growth Rate (%)
%
2010
11.457662
Money Supply Growth Rate (%)
%
2011
18.923817
Money Supply Growth Rate (%)
%
2012
16.071608
Inflation, GDP Deflator (%)
%
2008
0.022113
Inflation, GDP Deflator (%)
%
2009
0.010634
Inflation, GDP Deflator (%)
%
2010
3.856258
Inflation, GDP Deflator (%)
%
2011
7.021248
Colombia Review 2017
Page 201 of 433 pages
Country OverView
Pending
Name
Unit
Year
Value
Inflation, GDP Deflator (%)
%
2012
2.739716
Lending Interest Rate (%)
%
2008
17.175623
Lending Interest Rate (%)
%
2009
13.008074
Lending Interest Rate (%)
%
2010
9.381489
Lending Interest Rate (%)
%
2011
11.219918
Lending Interest Rate (%)
%
2012
12.585040
Unemployment Rate (%)
%
2008
13.199999
Unemployment Rate (%)
%
2009
12.000000
Unemployment Rate (%)
%
2010
11.600000
Unemployment Rate (%)
%
2011
10.850000
Unemployment Rate (%)
%
2012
10.392000
Colombia Review 2017
Page 202 of 433 pages
Country OverView
Pending
Trade and the Exchange Rate
Trade and the Exchange Rate
Name
Unit
Year
Value
Official Exchange Rate (LCU/$US)
Col$/$
2008
1967.720000
Official Exchange Rate (LCU/$US)
Col$/$
2009
2158.260000
Official Exchange Rate (LCU/$US)
Col$/$
2010
1898.683671
Official Exchange Rate (LCU/$US)
Col$/$
2011
1842.898721
Official Exchange Rate (LCU/$US)
Col$/$
2012
1797.380668
Trade Balance NIPA ($US billions)
$US Millions
2008
-10828.500000
Trade Balance NIPA ($US billions)
$US Millions
2009
-10420.670000
Trade Balance NIPA ($US billions)
$US Millions
2010
-5.248899
Trade Balance NIPA ($US billions)
$US Millions
2011
-4.025180
Trade Balance NIPA ($US billions)
$US Millions
2012
-6.572898
Colombia Review 2017
Page 203 of 433 pages
Country OverView
Pending
The Balance of Payments
The Balance of Payments
Name
Unit
Year
Value
Current Account
$US Billions
2008
-6.750000
Current Account
$US Billions
2009
-4.970000
Current Account
$US Billions
2010
-8.760000
Current Account
$US Billions
2011
-9.980000
Current Account
$US Billions
2012
-3.960000
Capital and Financial Account
$US Billions
2008
9.460000
Capital and Financial Account
$US Billions
2009
6.230000
Capital and Financial Account
$US Billions
2010
11.780000
Capital and Financial Account
$US Billions
2011
13.600000
Capital and Financial Account
$US Billions
2012
5.120000
Overall Balance
$US Billions
2008
2.720000
Overall Balance
$US Billions
2009
1.270000
Overall Balance
$US Billions
2010
3.020000
Overall Balance
$US Billions
2011
3.620000
Colombia Review 2017
Page 204 of 433 pages
Country OverView
Pending
Name
Unit
Year
Value
Overall Balance
$US Billions
2012
1.170000
Total Foreign Exchange Reserves ($US billions)
$US Billions
2008
23.480000
Total Foreign Exchange Reserves ($US billions)
$US Billions
2009
24.750000
Total Foreign Exchange Reserves ($US billions)
$US Billions
2010
28.076151
Total Foreign Exchange Reserves ($US billions)
$US Billions
2011
31.895551
Total Foreign Exchange Reserves ($US billions)
$US Billions
2012
36.997795
Current Account (% of GDP)
%
2008
0.000000
Current Account (% of GDP)
%
2009
0.000000
Current Account (% of GDP)
%
2010
0.000000
Current Account (% of GDP)
%
2011
0.000000
Current Account (% of GDP)
%
2012
-0.000590
Colombia Review 2017
Page 205 of 433 pages
Country OverView
Pending
Real GDP and GDP Per Capita
Real GDP and GDP Per Capita
Name
Unit
Year
Value
Real Gross Domestic Product (LCU billions 2005
base)
Col$
billions
2008
401744.000000
Real Gross Domestic Product (LCU billions 2005
base)
Col$
billions
2009
408379.000000
Real Gross Domestic Product (LCU billions 2005
base)
Col$
billions
2010
424599.000000
Real Gross Domestic Product (LCU billions 2005
base)
Col$
billions
2011
451324.353840
Real Gross Domestic Product (LCU billions 2005
base)
Col$
billions
2012
470714.958933
Real GDP Growth Rate (%)
%
2008
3.546804
Real GDP Growth Rate (%)
%
2009
1.651549
Real GDP Growth Rate (%)
%
2010
3.971800
Real GDP Growth Rate (%)
%
2011
6.294669
Real GDP Growth Rate (%)
%
2012
4.296379
Consumption (LCU billions)
Col$
billions
2008
305272.890000
Colombia Review 2017
Page 206 of 433 pages
Country OverView
Pending
Name
Unit
Year
Value
Consumption (LCU billions)
Col$
billions
2009
320836.470000
Consumption (LCU billions)
Col$
billions
2010
342073.000000
Consumption (LCU billions)
Col$
billions
2011
379532.000000
Consumption (LCU billions)
Col$
billions
2012
406842.000000
Government Expenditure (LCU billions)
Col$
billions
2008
73459.220000
Government Expenditure (LCU billions)
Col$
billions
2009
80486.060000
Government Expenditure (LCU billions)
Col$
billions
2010
92247.000000
Government Expenditure (LCU billions)
Col$
billions
2011
99772.000000
Government Expenditure (LCU billions)
Col$
billions
2012
110774.000000
Gross Capital Formation (LCU billions)
Col$
billions
2008
109068.870000
Gross Capital Formation (LCU billions)
Col$
billions
2009
113766.590000
Gross Capital Formation (LCU billions)
Col$
billions
2010
120570.000000
Colombia Review 2017
Page 207 of 433 pages
Country OverView
Pending
Name
Unit
Year
Value
Gross Capital Formation (LCU billions)
Col$
billions
2011
148008.000000
Gross Capital Formation (LCU billions)
Col$
billions
2012
158438.000000
Exports ($US billions)
Col$
billions
2008
86688.410000
Exports ($US billions)
Col$
billions
2009
82034.850000
Exports ($US billions)
Col$
billions
2010
45.736423
Exports ($US billions)
Col$
billions
2011
63.022454
Exports ($US billions)
Col$
billions
2012
67.477080
Imports ($US billions)
Col$
billions
2008
97516.910000
Imports ($US billions)
Col$
billions
2009
92455.510000
Imports ($US billions)
Col$
billions
2010
50.985322
Imports ($US billions)
Col$
billions
2011
67.047634
Imports ($US billions)
Col$
billions
2012
74.049978
Colombia Review 2017
Page 208 of 433 pages
Country OverView
Pending
Nominal GDP and Components
Nominal GDP and Components
Name
Unit
Year
Value
Nominal GDP (LCU billions)
Col$ billions
2008
481037.000000
Nominal GDP (LCU billions)
Col$ billions
2009
508532.000000
Nominal GDP (LCU billions)
Col$ billions
2010
544924.000000
Nominal GDP (LCU billions)
Col$ billions
2011
619894.000000
Nominal GDP (LCU billions)
Col$ billions
2012
664240.000000
Nominal GDP Growth Rate (%)
%
2008
11.590871
Nominal GDP Growth Rate (%)
%
2009
5.715776
Nominal GDP Growth Rate (%)
%
2010
7.981222
Nominal GDP Growth Rate (%)
%
2011
13.757881
Nominal GDP Growth Rate (%)
%
2012
7.153803
Population, total (million)
Millions
2008
45.010000
Population, total (million)
Millions
2009
45.660000
Population, total (million)
Millions
2010
46.444798
Population, total (million)
Millions
2011
46.045000
Colombia Review 2017
Page 209 of 433 pages
Country OverView
Pending
Name
Unit
Year
Value
Population, total (million)
Millions
2012
46.582000
Population growth (%)
%
2008
1.462579
Population growth (%)
%
2009
1.430121
Population growth (%)
%
2010
1.402185
Population growth (%)
%
2011
1.175565
Population growth (%)
%
2012
1.166250
Nominal GDP per Capita (LCU 1000s)
Col$ thousands
2008
10688.340000
Nominal GDP per Capita (LCU 1000s)
Col$ thousands
2009
11138.820000
Nominal GDP per Capita (LCU 1000s)
Col$ thousands
2010
6.179399
Nominal GDP per Capita (LCU 1000s)
Col$ thousands
2011
13462786.404604
Nominal GDP per Capita (LCU 1000s)
Col$ thousands
2012
14259585.247520
Nominal GDP Per Capita Growth Rate
%
2008
Nominal GDP Per Capita Growth Rate
%
2009
Nominal GDP Per Capita Growth Rate
%
2010
Nominal GDP Per Capita Growth Rate
%
2011
Nominal GDP Per Capita Growth Rate
%
2012
Colombia Review 2017
Page 210 of 433 pages
Country OverView
Pending
Government Spending and Taxation
Government Spending and Taxation
Name
Unit
Year
Value
Government Expenditure (LCU billions)
Col$
billions
2008
73459.220000
Government Expenditure (LCU billions)
Col$
billions
2009
80486.060000
Government Expenditure (LCU billions)
Col$
billions
2010
92247.000000
Government Expenditure (LCU billions)
Col$
billions
2011
99772.000000
Government Expenditure (LCU billions)
Col$
billions
2012
110774.000000
Government Expenditure Growth Rate (%)
%
2008
-11.993884
Government Expenditure Growth Rate (%)
%
2009
1.708510
Government Expenditure Growth Rate (%)
%
2010
5.363939
Government Expenditure Growth Rate (%)
%
2011
11.143410
Government Expenditure Growth Rate (%)
%
2012
5.474520
National Tax Rate Net of Transfers (%)
%
2008
15.332337
National Tax Rate Net of Transfers (%)
%
2009
16.908162
Colombia Review 2017
Page 211 of 433 pages
Country OverView
Pending
Name
Unit
Year
Value
National Tax Rate Net of Transfers (%)
%
2010
12.375527
National Tax Rate Net of Transfers (%)
%
2011
26.728792
National Tax Rate Net of Transfers (%)
%
2012
28.349953
Government Revenues Net of Transfers (LCU
billions)
2008
73754.220000
Government Revenues Net of Transfers (LCU
billions)
2009
85983.420000
Government Revenues Net of Transfers (LCU
billions)
2010
67437.221000
Government Revenues Net of Transfers (LCU
billions)
2011
165690.182000
Government Revenues Net of Transfers (LCU
billions)
2012
188311.730000
Government Surplus(-) Deficit(+) (LCU billions)
Col$
billions
2008
-32471.420000
Government Surplus(-) Deficit(+) (LCU billions)
Col$
billions
2009
-20291.310000
Government Surplus(-) Deficit(+) (LCU billions)
Col$
billions
2010
24809.779000
Government Surplus(-) Deficit(+) (LCU billions)
Col$
billions
2011
-12336.941000
Government Surplus(-) Deficit(+) (LCU billions)
Col$
billions
2012
538.475000
Colombia Review 2017
Page 212 of 433 pages
Country OverView
Pending
Name
Unit
Year
Value
Government Surplus(+) Deficit(-) (%GDP)
%
2008
4.635000
Government Surplus(+) Deficit(-) (%GDP)
%
2009
3.538000
Government Surplus(+) Deficit(-) (%GDP)
%
2010
-4.552887
Government Surplus(+) Deficit(-) (%GDP)
%
2011
-1.990169
Government Surplus(+) Deficit(-) (%GDP)
%
2012
0.081066
Colombia Review 2017
Page 213 of 433 pages
Country OverView
Pending
Money, Prices and Interest Rates
Money, Prices and Interest Rates
Name
Unit
Year
Value
Money and Quasi-Money (M2) (LCU billions)
Col$ billions
2008
171375.940000
Money and Quasi-Money (M2) (LCU billions)
Col$ billions
2009
185181.790000
Money and Quasi-Money (M2) (LCU billions)
Col$ billions
2010
206399.294189
Money and Quasi-Money (M2) (LCU billions)
Col$ billions
2011
245457.918998
Money and Quasi-Money (M2) (LCU billions)
Col$ billions
2012
284906.953722
Money Supply Growth Rate (%)
%
2008
18.481979
Money Supply Growth Rate (%)
%
2009
8.055885
Money Supply Growth Rate (%)
%
2010
11.457662
Money Supply Growth Rate (%)
%
2011
18.923817
Money Supply Growth Rate (%)
%
2012
16.071608
Inflation, GDP Deflator (%)
%
2008
0.022113
Inflation, GDP Deflator (%)
%
2009
0.010634
Inflation, GDP Deflator (%)
%
2010
3.856258
Inflation, GDP Deflator (%)
%
2011
7.021248
Colombia Review 2017
Page 214 of 433 pages
Country OverView
Pending
Name
Unit
Year
Value
Inflation, GDP Deflator (%)
%
2012
2.739716
Lending Interest Rate (%)
%
2008
17.175623
Lending Interest Rate (%)
%
2009
13.008074
Lending Interest Rate (%)
%
2010
9.381489
Lending Interest Rate (%)
%
2011
11.219918
Lending Interest Rate (%)
%
2012
12.585040
Unemployment Rate (%)
%
2008
13.199999
Unemployment Rate (%)
%
2009
12.000000
Unemployment Rate (%)
%
2010
11.600000
Unemployment Rate (%)
%
2011
10.850000
Unemployment Rate (%)
%
2012
10.392000
Colombia Review 2017
Page 215 of 433 pages
Country OverView
Pending
Trade and the Exchange Rate
Trade and the Exchange Rate
Name
Unit
Year
Value
Official Exchange Rate (LCU/$US)
Col$/$
2008
1967.720000
Official Exchange Rate (LCU/$US)
Col$/$
2009
2158.260000
Official Exchange Rate (LCU/$US)
Col$/$
2010
1898.683671
Official Exchange Rate (LCU/$US)
Col$/$
2011
1842.898721
Official Exchange Rate (LCU/$US)
Col$/$
2012
1797.380668
Trade Balance NIPA ($US billions)
$US Millions
2008
-10828.500000
Trade Balance NIPA ($US billions)
$US Millions
2009
-10420.670000
Trade Balance NIPA ($US billions)
$US Millions
2010
-5.248899
Trade Balance NIPA ($US billions)
$US Millions
2011
-4.025180
Trade Balance NIPA ($US billions)
$US Millions
2012
-6.572898
Colombia Review 2017
Page 216 of 433 pages
Country OverView
Pending
The Balance of Payments
The Balance of Payments
Name
Unit
Year
Value
Current Account
$US Billions
2008
-6.750000
Current Account
$US Billions
2009
-4.970000
Current Account
$US Billions
2010
-8.760000
Current Account
$US Billions
2011
-9.980000
Current Account
$US Billions
2012
-3.960000
Capital and Financial Account
$US Billions
2008
9.460000
Capital and Financial Account
$US Billions
2009
6.230000
Capital and Financial Account
$US Billions
2010
11.780000
Capital and Financial Account
$US Billions
2011
13.600000
Capital and Financial Account
$US Billions
2012
5.120000
Overall Balance
$US Billions
2008
2.720000
Overall Balance
$US Billions
2009
1.270000
Overall Balance
$US Billions
2010
3.020000
Overall Balance
$US Billions
2011
3.620000
Colombia Review 2017
Page 217 of 433 pages
Country OverView
Pending
Name
Unit
Year
Value
Overall Balance
$US Billions
2012
1.170000
Total Foreign Exchange Reserves ($US billions)
$US Billions
2008
23.480000
Total Foreign Exchange Reserves ($US billions)
$US Billions
2009
24.750000
Total Foreign Exchange Reserves ($US billions)
$US Billions
2010
28.076151
Total Foreign Exchange Reserves ($US billions)
$US Billions
2011
31.895551
Total Foreign Exchange Reserves ($US billions)
$US Billions
2012
36.997795
Current Account (% of GDP)
%
2008
0.000000
Current Account (% of GDP)
%
2009
0.000000
Current Account (% of GDP)
%
2010
0.000000
Current Account (% of GDP)
%
2011
0.000000
Current Account (% of GDP)
%
2012
-0.000590
Colombia Review 2017
Page 218 of 433 pages
Country OverView
Pending
Real GDP and GDP Per Capita
Real GDP and GDP Per Capita
Name
Unit
Year
Value
Real Gross Domestic Product (LCU billions 2005
base)
Col$
billions
2008
401744.000000
Real Gross Domestic Product (LCU billions 2005
base)
Col$
billions
2009
408379.000000
Real Gross Domestic Product (LCU billions 2005
base)
Col$
billions
2010
424599.000000
Real Gross Domestic Product (LCU billions 2005
base)
Col$
billions
2011
451324.353840
Real Gross Domestic Product (LCU billions 2005
base)
Col$
billions
2012
470714.958933
Real GDP Growth Rate (%)
%
2008
3.546804
Real GDP Growth Rate (%)
%
2009
1.651549
Real GDP Growth Rate (%)
%
2010
3.971800
Real GDP Growth Rate (%)
%
2011
6.294669
Real GDP Growth Rate (%)
%
2012
4.296379
Consumption (LCU billions)
Col$
billions
2008
305272.890000
Colombia Review 2017
Page 219 of 433 pages
Country OverView
Pending
Name
Unit
Year
Value
Consumption (LCU billions)
Col$
billions
2009
320836.470000
Consumption (LCU billions)
Col$
billions
2010
342073.000000
Consumption (LCU billions)
Col$
billions
2011
379532.000000
Consumption (LCU billions)
Col$
billions
2012
406842.000000
Government Expenditure (LCU billions)
Col$
billions
2008
73459.220000
Government Expenditure (LCU billions)
Col$
billions
2009
80486.060000
Government Expenditure (LCU billions)
Col$
billions
2010
92247.000000
Government Expenditure (LCU billions)
Col$
billions
2011
99772.000000
Government Expenditure (LCU billions)
Col$
billions
2012
110774.000000
Gross Capital Formation (LCU billions)
Col$
billions
2008
109068.870000
Gross Capital Formation (LCU billions)
Col$
billions
2009
113766.590000
Gross Capital Formation (LCU billions)
Col$
billions
2010
120570.000000
Colombia Review 2017
Page 220 of 433 pages
Country OverView
Pending
Name
Unit
Year
Value
Gross Capital Formation (LCU billions)
Col$
billions
2011
148008.000000
Gross Capital Formation (LCU billions)
Col$
billions
2012
158438.000000
Exports ($US billions)
Col$
billions
2008
86688.410000
Exports ($US billions)
Col$
billions
2009
82034.850000
Exports ($US billions)
Col$
billions
2010
45.736423
Exports ($US billions)
Col$
billions
2011
63.022454
Exports ($US billions)
Col$
billions
2012
67.477080
Imports ($US billions)
Col$
billions
2008
97516.910000
Imports ($US billions)
Col$
billions
2009
92455.510000
Imports ($US billions)
Col$
billions
2010
50.985322
Imports ($US billions)
Col$
billions
2011
67.047634
Imports ($US billions)
Col$
billions
2012
74.049978
Colombia Review 2017
Page 221 of 433 pages
Country OverView
Pending
Nominal GDP and Components
Nominal GDP and Components
Name
Unit
Year
Value
Nominal GDP (LCU billions)
Col$ billions
2008
481037.000000
Nominal GDP (LCU billions)
Col$ billions
2009
508532.000000
Nominal GDP (LCU billions)
Col$ billions
2010
544924.000000
Nominal GDP (LCU billions)
Col$ billions
2011
619894.000000
Nominal GDP (LCU billions)
Col$ billions
2012
664240.000000
Nominal GDP Growth Rate (%)
%
2008
11.590871
Nominal GDP Growth Rate (%)
%
2009
5.715776
Nominal GDP Growth Rate (%)
%
2010
7.981222
Nominal GDP Growth Rate (%)
%
2011
13.757881
Nominal GDP Growth Rate (%)
%
2012
7.153803
Population, total (million)
Millions
2008
45.010000
Population, total (million)
Millions
2009
45.660000
Population, total (million)
Millions
2010
46.444798
Population, total (million)
Millions
2011
46.045000
Colombia Review 2017
Page 222 of 433 pages
Country OverView
Pending
Name
Unit
Year
Value
Population, total (million)
Millions
2012
46.582000
Population growth (%)
%
2008
1.462579
Population growth (%)
%
2009
1.430121
Population growth (%)
%
2010
1.402185
Population growth (%)
%
2011
1.175565
Population growth (%)
%
2012
1.166250
Nominal GDP per Capita (LCU 1000s)
Col$ thousands
2008
10688.340000
Nominal GDP per Capita (LCU 1000s)
Col$ thousands
2009
11138.820000
Nominal GDP per Capita (LCU 1000s)
Col$ thousands
2010
6.179399
Nominal GDP per Capita (LCU 1000s)
Col$ thousands
2011
13462786.404604
Nominal GDP per Capita (LCU 1000s)
Col$ thousands
2012
14259585.247520
Nominal GDP Per Capita Growth Rate
%
2008
Nominal GDP Per Capita Growth Rate
%
2009
Nominal GDP Per Capita Growth Rate
%
2010
Nominal GDP Per Capita Growth Rate
%
2011
Nominal GDP Per Capita Growth Rate
%
2012
Colombia Review 2017
Page 223 of 433 pages
Country OverView
Pending
Government Spending and Taxation
Government Spending and Taxation
Name
Unit
Year
Value
Government Expenditure (LCU billions)
Col$
billions
2008
73459.220000
Government Expenditure (LCU billions)
Col$
billions
2009
80486.060000
Government Expenditure (LCU billions)
Col$
billions
2010
92247.000000
Government Expenditure (LCU billions)
Col$
billions
2011
99772.000000
Government Expenditure (LCU billions)
Col$
billions
2012
110774.000000
Government Expenditure Growth Rate (%)
%
2008
-11.993884
Government Expenditure Growth Rate (%)
%
2009
1.708510
Government Expenditure Growth Rate (%)
%
2010
5.363939
Government Expenditure Growth Rate (%)
%
2011
11.143410
Government Expenditure Growth Rate (%)
%
2012
5.474520
National Tax Rate Net of Transfers (%)
%
2008
15.332337
National Tax Rate Net of Transfers (%)
%
2009
16.908162
Colombia Review 2017
Page 224 of 433 pages
Country OverView
Pending
Name
Unit
Year
Value
National Tax Rate Net of Transfers (%)
%
2010
12.375527
National Tax Rate Net of Transfers (%)
%
2011
26.728792
National Tax Rate Net of Transfers (%)
%
2012
28.349953
Government Revenues Net of Transfers (LCU
billions)
2008
73754.220000
Government Revenues Net of Transfers (LCU
billions)
2009
85983.420000
Government Revenues Net of Transfers (LCU
billions)
2010
67437.221000
Government Revenues Net of Transfers (LCU
billions)
2011
165690.182000
Government Revenues Net of Transfers (LCU
billions)
2012
188311.730000
Government Surplus(-) Deficit(+) (LCU billions)
Col$
billions
2008
-32471.420000
Government Surplus(-) Deficit(+) (LCU billions)
Col$
billions
2009
-20291.310000
Government Surplus(-) Deficit(+) (LCU billions)
Col$
billions
2010
24809.779000
Government Surplus(-) Deficit(+) (LCU billions)
Col$
billions
2011
-12336.941000
Government Surplus(-) Deficit(+) (LCU billions)
Col$
billions
2012
538.475000
Colombia Review 2017
Page 225 of 433 pages
Country OverView
Pending
Name
Unit
Year
Value
Government Surplus(+) Deficit(-) (%GDP)
%
2008
4.635000
Government Surplus(+) Deficit(-) (%GDP)
%
2009
3.538000
Government Surplus(+) Deficit(-) (%GDP)
%
2010
-4.552887
Government Surplus(+) Deficit(-) (%GDP)
%
2011
-1.990169
Government Surplus(+) Deficit(-) (%GDP)
%
2012
0.081066
Colombia Review 2017
Page 226 of 433 pages
Country OverView
Pending
Money, Prices and Interest Rates
Money, Prices and Interest Rates
Name
Unit
Year
Value
Money and Quasi-Money (M2) (LCU billions)
Col$ billions
2008
171375.940000
Money and Quasi-Money (M2) (LCU billions)
Col$ billions
2009
185181.790000
Money and Quasi-Money (M2) (LCU billions)
Col$ billions
2010
206399.294189
Money and Quasi-Money (M2) (LCU billions)
Col$ billions
2011
245457.918998
Money and Quasi-Money (M2) (LCU billions)
Col$ billions
2012
284906.953722
Money Supply Growth Rate (%)
%
2008
18.481979
Money Supply Growth Rate (%)
%
2009
8.055885
Money Supply Growth Rate (%)
%
2010
11.457662
Money Supply Growth Rate (%)
%
2011
18.923817
Money Supply Growth Rate (%)
%
2012
16.071608
Inflation, GDP Deflator (%)
%
2008
0.022113
Inflation, GDP Deflator (%)
%
2009
0.010634
Inflation, GDP Deflator (%)
%
2010
3.856258
Inflation, GDP Deflator (%)
%
2011
7.021248
Colombia Review 2017
Page 227 of 433 pages
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Pending
Name
Unit
Year
Value
Inflation, GDP Deflator (%)
%
2012
2.739716
Lending Interest Rate (%)
%
2008
17.175623
Lending Interest Rate (%)
%
2009
13.008074
Lending Interest Rate (%)
%
2010
9.381489
Lending Interest Rate (%)
%
2011
11.219918
Lending Interest Rate (%)
%
2012
12.585040
Unemployment Rate (%)
%
2008
13.199999
Unemployment Rate (%)
%
2009
12.000000
Unemployment Rate (%)
%
2010
11.600000
Unemployment Rate (%)
%
2011
10.850000
Unemployment Rate (%)
%
2012
10.392000
Colombia Review 2017
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Pending
Trade and the Exchange Rate
Trade and the Exchange Rate
Name
Unit
Year
Value
Official Exchange Rate (LCU/$US)
Col$/$
2008
1967.720000
Official Exchange Rate (LCU/$US)
Col$/$
2009
2158.260000
Official Exchange Rate (LCU/$US)
Col$/$
2010
1898.683671
Official Exchange Rate (LCU/$US)
Col$/$
2011
1842.898721
Official Exchange Rate (LCU/$US)
Col$/$
2012
1797.380668
Trade Balance NIPA ($US billions)
$US Millions
2008
-10828.500000
Trade Balance NIPA ($US billions)
$US Millions
2009
-10420.670000
Trade Balance NIPA ($US billions)
$US Millions
2010
-5.248899
Trade Balance NIPA ($US billions)
$US Millions
2011
-4.025180
Trade Balance NIPA ($US billions)
$US Millions
2012
-6.572898
Colombia Review 2017
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The Balance of Payments
The Balance of Payments
Name
Unit
Year
Value
Current Account
$US Billions
2008
-6.750000
Current Account
$US Billions
2009
-4.970000
Current Account
$US Billions
2010
-8.760000
Current Account
$US Billions
2011
-9.980000
Current Account
$US Billions
2012
-3.960000
Capital and Financial Account
$US Billions
2008
9.460000
Capital and Financial Account
$US Billions
2009
6.230000
Capital and Financial Account
$US Billions
2010
11.780000
Capital and Financial Account
$US Billions
2011
13.600000
Capital and Financial Account
$US Billions
2012
5.120000
Overall Balance
$US Billions
2008
2.720000
Overall Balance
$US Billions
2009
1.270000
Overall Balance
$US Billions
2010
3.020000
Overall Balance
$US Billions
2011
3.620000
Colombia Review 2017
Page 230 of 433 pages
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Pending
Name
Unit
Year
Value
Overall Balance
$US Billions
2012
1.170000
Total Foreign Exchange Reserves ($US billions)
$US Billions
2008
23.480000
Total Foreign Exchange Reserves ($US billions)
$US Billions
2009
24.750000
Total Foreign Exchange Reserves ($US billions)
$US Billions
2010
28.076151
Total Foreign Exchange Reserves ($US billions)
$US Billions
2011
31.895551
Total Foreign Exchange Reserves ($US billions)
$US Billions
2012
36.997795
Current Account (% of GDP)
%
2008
0.000000
Current Account (% of GDP)
%
2009
0.000000
Current Account (% of GDP)
%
2010
0.000000
Current Account (% of GDP)
%
2011
0.000000
Current Account (% of GDP)
%
2012
-0.000590
Colombia Review 2017
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Economic Performance Index
Economic Performance Index
The Economic Performance rankings are calculated by CountryWatch's editorial team, and are
based on criteria including sustained economic growth, monetary stability, current account deficits,
budget surplus, unemployment and structural imbalances. Scores are assessed from 0 to 100 using
this aforementioned criteria as well as CountryWatch's proprietary economic research data and
models.
Bank
stability
risk
Monetary/
Currency
stability
Government
Finances
Empl./
Unempl.
Econ.GNP
growth or
decline/
forecast
0 - 100
0 - 100
0 - 100
0 - 100
%
North Americas
Canada
92
69
35
38
3.14%
United States
94
76
4
29
3.01%
Austria
90
27
30
63
1.33%
Belgium
88
27
19
23
1.15%
Cyprus
81
91
16
80
-0.69%
Denmark
97
70
45
78
1.20%
Finland
89
27
41
33
1.25%
Western Europe
Colombia Review 2017
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Pending
France
87
27
18
27
1.52%
Germany
86
27
22
21
1.25%
Greece
79
27
5
24
-2.00%
Iceland
90
17
2
34
-3.04%
Italy
85
27
37
24
0.84%
Ireland
92
27
11
10
-1.55%
Luxembourg
99
27
28
66
2.08%
Malta
77
27
41
51
0.54%
Netherlands
91
27
26
74
1.30%
Norway
98
44
10
76
1.08%
Portugal
77
27
13
20
0.29%
Spain
83
27
9
3
-0.41%
Sweden
94
72
54
32
1.23%
Switzerland
97
86
55
77
1.53%
United Kingdom
85
12
9
37
1.34%
Albania
44
60
33
6
2.30%
Armenia
45
59
49
30
1.80%
Central and
Eastern Europe
Colombia Review 2017
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Pending
Azerbaijan
56
4
84
99
2.68%
Belarus
59
21
83
98
2.41%
Bosnia and
Herzegovina
34
68
69
N/A
0.50%
Bulgaria
58
75
88
49
0.20%
Croatia
69
68
94
9
0.18%
Czech Republic
80
89
29
70
1.67%
Estonia
72
90
66
92
0.80%
Georgia
36
60
53
56
2.00%
Hungary
70
66
26
54
-0.16%
Latvia
67
100
65
44
-3.97%
Lithuania
65
91
87
79
-1.65%
Macedonia (FYR)
53
69
56
2
2.03%
Moldova
23
36
81
67
2.50%
Poland
74
74
38
12
2.72%
Romania
62
56
70
62
0.75%
Russia
73
18
90
8
4.00%
Serbia
48
49
52
5
1.97%
Colombia Review 2017
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Pending
Montenegro
39
27
73
1
-1.70%
Slovak Republic
80
62
30
14
4.06%
Slovenia
81
27
36
65
1.12%
Ukraine
41
11
57
N/A
3.68%
Algeria
57
18
96
7
4.55%
Angola
49
1
97
N/A
7.05%
Benin
19
91
20
N/A
3.22%
Botswana
68
58
76
N/A
6.33%
Burkina Faso
16
91
13
N/A
4.41%
Burundi
2
91
6
N/A
3.85%
Cameroon
26
91
91
N/A
2.58%
Cape Verde
52
87
4
N/A
4.96%
Central African
Republic
9
91
32
N/A
3.18%
Chad
22
91
89
N/A
4.42%
Congo
52
87
87
N/A
12.13%
Côte d’Ivoire
25
91
82
28
2.98%
Africa
Dem. Republic
Colombia Review 2017
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Pending
Congo
4
91
47
N/A
5.44%
Djibouti
31
76
50
N/A
4.47%
Egypt
37
20
24
69
5.01%
Equatorial Guinea
82
91
85
N/A
0.94%
Eritrea
1
3
1
18
1.81%
Ethiopia
6
45
8
N/A
6.96%
Gabon
64
91
96
N/A
5.36%
Gambia
8
48
86
N/A
4.82%
Ghana
9
11
69
N/A
4.50%
Guinea
10
7
91
N/A
3.03%
Guinea-Bissau
5
91
46
N/A
3.47%
Kenya
20
41
59
N/A
4.11%
Lesotho
13
40
12
N/A
2.98%
Liberia
12
73
74
N/A
5.92%
Libya
73
2
94
N/A
5.22%
Madagascar
4
22
24
N/A
-1.02%
Malawi
7
25
55
N/A
5.96%
Mali
20
91
82
N/A
5.12%
Mauritania
15
13
93
N/A
4.58%
Colombia Review 2017
Page 236 of 433 pages
Country OverView
Pending
Mauritania
15
13
93
N/A
4.58%
Mauritius
65
52
56
55
4.10%
Morocco
37
72
48
26
3.23%
Mozambique
12
23
71
N/A
6.45%
Namibia
40
39
62
N/A
1.70%
Niger
10
91
21
N/A
4.41%
Nigeria
30
6
61
N/A
6.98%
Rwanda
21
40
68
N/A
5.39%
Sao Tome &
Principe
1
61
100
N/A
3.40%
Senegal
24
91
63
N/A
3.44%
Seychelles
60
67
97
N/A
4.01%
Sierra Leone
5
10
39
N/A
4.77%
Somalia
2
38
59
N/A
3.19%
South Africa
61
37
70
N/A
2.59%
Sudan
16
5
73
N/A
5.52%
Swaziland
32
44
79
N/A
1.09%
Tanzania
15
45
32
N/A
6.17%
Togo
8
91
92
N/A
2.56%
Colombia Review 2017
Page 237 of 433 pages
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Pending
Tunisia
50
61
44
39
4.00%
Uganda
11
17
54
N/A
5.59%
Zambia
29
20
49
N/A
5.84%
Zimbabwe
0
8
16
N/A
2.24%
Argentina
66
3
80
36
3.50%
Belize
47
76
80
N/A
1.00%
Bolivia
32
51
61
81
3.99%
Brazil
71
47
78
11
5.50%
Chile
78
25
92
73
4.72%
Columbia
47
52
34
47
2.25%
Costa Rica
60
42
39
57
3.45%
Ecuador
43
76
75
64
2.51%
El Salvador
35
76
67
N/A
1.04%
Guatemala
46
59
58
N/A
2.52%
Honduras
27
47
58
N/A
2.00%
Mexico
69
42
52
61
4.07%
Nicaragua
23
49
42
N/A
1.75%
South and
Central America
Colombia Review 2017
Page 238 of 433 pages
Country OverView
Pending
Panama
66
76
72
45
5.00%
Paraguay
35
46
66
16
5.27%
Peru
59
66
75
22
6.33%
Suriname
58
26
81
59
4.02%
Uruguay
70
26
27
N/A
5.71%
Venezuela
55
1
28
13
-2.63%
Antigua & Barbuda
72
76
15
N/A
-2.01%
Bahamas
74
76
45
87
-0.50%
Barbados
67
76
33
15
-0.50%
Caribbean
Bermuda
N/A
N/A
N/A
N/A
N/A
Cuba
45
76
18
95
0.25%
Dominica
53
76
65
N/A
1.40%
Dominican Republic
54
39
43
4
3.50%
Grenada
63
76
48
N/A
0.80%
Guyana
28
56
17
N/A
4.36%
Haiti
11
27
89
N/A
-8.50%
Jamaica
42
9
85
19
-0.28%
Colombia Review 2017
Page 239 of 433 pages
Country OverView
Pending
St Lucia
55
76
67
N/A
1.14%
St Vincent &
Grenadines
49
76
95
N/A
0.50%
Trinidad & Tobago
82
37
77
72
2.13%
Bahrain
84
76
62
91
3.48%
Iran
51
19
40
58
3.01%
Iraq
48
9
8
N/A
7.27%
Israel
87
62
12
48
3.20%
Jordan
41
51
3
N/A
4.10%
Kuwait
96
4
99
N/A
3.10%
Lebanon
63
54
2
N/A
6.00%
Oman
76
16
88
N/A
4.71%
Qatar
99
16
83
N/A
18.54%
Saudi Arabia
76
8
98
N/A
3.70%
Syria
61
24
40
N/A
5.00%
Turkey
75
23
27
60
5.20%
United Arab
Emirates
96
24
98
94
1.29%
Middle East
Colombia Review 2017
Page 240 of 433 pages
Country OverView
Yemen
Pending
28
2
78
N/A
7.78%
Afghanistan
17
70
74
N/A
8.64%
Bangladesh
13
43
25
N/A
5.38%
Bhutan
24
55
5
N/A
6.85%
Brunei
78
19
99
75
0.48%
Cambodia
18
67
42
N/A
4.77%
China
54
90
19
68
11.03%
Hong Kong
89
76
14
82
5.02%
India
31
38
34
35
8.78%
Indonesia
42
46
37
31
6.00%
Japan
88
89
6
71
1.90%
Kazakhstan
62
13
76
42
2.40%
Korea North
18
65
23
N/A
1.50%
Korea South
83
63
22
85
4.44%
Kyrgyz Republic
24
15
84
88
4.61%
Laos
17
54
7
N/A
7.22%
Macao
91
76
14
82
3.00%
Asia
Colombia Review 2017
Page 241 of 433 pages
Country OverView
Pending
Malaysia
68
65
44
90
4.72%
Maldives
44
55
17
N/A
3.45%
Mongolia
33
5
77
93
7.22%
Myanmar
3
41
72
N/A
5.26%
Nepal
3
14
25
N/A
2.97%
Pakistan
19
15
31
41
3.00%
Papua New Guinea
75
50
11
N/A
7.96%
Philippines
30
48
53
43
3.63%
Singapore
93
75
63
40
5.68%
Sri Lanka
38
22
10
N/A
5.50%
Taiwan
84
88
35
89
6.50%
Tajikistan
6
6
60
97
4.00%
Thailand
56
64
90
96
5.46%
Turkmenistan
51
53
68
N/A
12.00%
Uzbekistan
40
10
60
100
8.00%
Vietnam
25
12
20
N/A
6.04%
96
63
31
46
2.96%
Pacific
Australia
Colombia Review 2017
Page 242 of 433 pages
Country OverView
Pending
Fiji
46
53
3
N/A
2.06%
Marshall Islands
27
76
46
N/A
1.08%
Micronesia (Fed.
States)
N/A
N/A
N/A
N/A
N/A
New Caledonia
96
73
51
52
2.00%
New Zealand
98
73
51
52
2.00%
Samoa
34
88
64
N/A
-2.77%
Solomon Islands
14
71
1
N/A
3.36%
Tonga
26
57
38
N/A
0.60%
Vanuatu
33
58
47
N/A
3.80%
Source:
CountryWatch Inc. www.countrywatch.com
Updated:
This material was produced in 2010; it is subject to updating in 2012.
Colombia Review 2017
Page 243 of 433 pages
Country OverView
Pending
div style='margin-top:40%;padding-top:40%'>
Chapter 4
Investment Overview
Colombia Review 2017
Page 244 of 433 pages
Country OverView
Pending
Foreign Investment Climate
Infrastructure
Ports and Harbors
Bahia de Portete, Barranquilla, Buenaventura, Cartagena, Leticia, Puerto Bolivar, San Andres,
Santa Marta, Tumaco, Turbo
Telephone System
modern system in many respects; country code: 57
Internet Use
2,732,200
Labor Force
20.34 million; agriculture 30%, industry 24%, services 46%
Judicial System
Based on Spanish law, Colombia’s legal system is generally weak.
Background
Colombia's economy has experienced positive growth over the last few years years, in part, due to
an improving security situation. The economy continues to improve in part because of austere
government budgets, focused efforts to reduce public debt levels, an export-oriented growth
strategy, rising commodity prices, and to the government's pro-market economic policies. These
pro-business reforms have included the oil and gas sectors with export-led growth fueled mainly
by the Andean Trade Promotion and Drug Eradication Act. Inequality, underemployment, and
narcotrafficking remain significant challenges, and Colombia's infrastructure requires major
improvements to sustain economic expansion.
Colombia Review 2017
Page 245 of 433 pages
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Because of the global financial crisis of 2008 and weakening demand for Colombia's exports,
Colombia's economy saw limited growth that year and even some minor contraction into 2009. In
response, the governmentcut capital controls, arranged for emergency credit lines from multilateral
institutions, and promoted investment incentives, such as Colombia's modernized free trade zone
mechanism, legal stability contracts, and new bilateral investment treaties and trade agreements.
The government also encouraged exporters to diversify their customer base beyond the United
States and Venezuela, traditionally Colombia's largest trading partners.
Today, the government is pursuing free trade agreements with European and Asian partners and
awaits the approval of a Canadian trade accord by Canada's parliament. In 2009, China replaced
Venezuela as Colombia's number two trading partner, largely because of Venezuela's decision to
limit the entry of Colombian products.
Overall, the security strategy implemented by the Colombian government and the signing of a free
trade agreement with the United States have engendered a growing sense of confidence in the
economy, particularly within the business sector.
Economy and Investment
Colombia is a free market economy with major commercial and investment ties to the United
States (U.S.). Transition from a highly regulated economy has been underway for more than 15
years. In 1990, the administration of President Cesar Gaviria (1990-94) initiated economic
liberalization or "apertura," with tariff reductions, financial deregulation, privatization of stateowned enterprises and adoption of a more liberal foreign exchange rate. These policies eased
import restrictions and opened most sectors to foreign investment, although agricultural products
remained protected.
The Uribe administration seeks to maintain prudent fiscal policies and has pursued tough economic
reforms including tax, pension and budget reforms. A U.S. Agency for International Development
(USAID) study shows that Colombian tax rates (both personal and corporate) are among the
highest in Latin America.
The sustained growth of the Colombian economy can be attributed to an increase in domestic
security, the policies of keeping inflation low and maintaining a stable currency (the Colombian
peso), petroleum price increases and an increase in exports to neighboring countries and the United
States (Y.S.) as a result of trade liberalization. The Andean Trade Preference Act, which was
extended recently, also plays a pivotal role in Colombia's economic growth. The signing of a trade
promotion agreement with the U.S. provides further opportunity for growth once it is approved by
the U.S. Congress and implemented.
Colombia Review 2017
Page 246 of 433 pages
Country OverView
Pending
Trade
In 2006, Colombia was the United States' fifth-largest export market in the Western Hemisphere
behind Canada, Mexico, Brazil, and Venezuela and the largest agricultural export market in the
hemisphere after the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) countries. U.S. exports to
Colombia in 2006 were U.S. $6.9 billion, up 13.2% from the previous year. U.S. imports from
Colombia were U.S. $9.6 billion, up 4%. Colombia's major exports are petroleum, coffee, coal,
nickel, and nontraditional exports (e.g., cut flowers, gold, bananas, semiprecious stones, sugar, and
tropical fruits). The United States is Colombia's largest trading partner, representing about 40% of
Colombia's exports and 26.6% of its imports.
Colombia has improved protection of intellectual property rights overall, but the United States
remains concerned over deficiencies in licensing and copyright protection.
Imports and Exports
Import Climate:
Colombia has signed several multilateral and bilateral free trade agreements. According to
BuyUSA's report for Colombia, the most important of these are: a) the Andean Community
(ANCOM) with Venezuela, Ecuador, and Bolivia (Peru withdrew in April 1997); b) the Latin
American Integration Association (LAIA) with Argentina, Brazil, Mexico, Chile, Paraguay,
Uruguay, El Salvador, Costa Rica, Guatemala, Nicaragua, Honduras and Cuba, which was later
renegotiated country by country on a bilateral basis; c) the G-3 (Colombia, Mexico, and
Venezuela); and d) the Colombia-Chile bilateral agreements. Full implementation of these
agreemements is not expected for several years. Once achieved, though, they would give
Colombia access to a free market of over 200 million people. Colombia has also requested
admission to NAFTA.
Import Commodities
industrial equipment, transportation equipment, consumer goods, chemicals, paper products, fuels,
electricity
Import Partners
US 29.6%, Brazil 5.5%, Mexico 5.4%, Venezuela 5.2%, China 5%, Japan 4.6%, Germany 4.4%
Export Commodities
Colombia Review 2017
Page 247 of 433 pages
Country OverView
Pending
petroleum, coffee, coal, apparel, bananas, cut flowers
Export Partners
US 47.1%, Ecuador 6%, Venezuela 5.3%
Key Sectors
Industries
textiles, food processing, oil, clothing and footwear, beverages, chemicals, cement; gold, coal,
emeralds
Note on Industry and Agriculture
The most industrially diverse member of the five-nation Andean Community, Colombia has four
major industrial centers--Bogota, Medellin, Cali, and Barranquilla--each located in a distinct
geographical region. Colombia's industries include textiles and clothing, leather products, processed
foods and beverages, paper and paper products, chemicals and petrochemicals, cement,
construction, iron and steel products and metalworking.
Colombia's diverse climate and topography permit the cultivation of a wide variety of crops. In
addition, all regions yield forest products, ranging from tropical hardwoods in the lowlands, to pine
and eucalyptus in the colder areas. Cacao, sugarcane, coconuts, bananas, plantains, rice, cotton,
tobacco, cassava and most of the nation's beef cattle are produced in the hot regions from sea level
to 1,000 meters elevation. The temperate regions--between 1,000 and 2,000 meters--are better
suited for coffee, flowers, corn and other vegetables, pears, pineapples, and tomatoes. The cooler
elevations--between 2,000 and 3,000 meters--produce wheat, barley, potatoes, cold-climate
vegetables, flowers, dairy cattle and poultry.
Mining and Energy
Colombia has considerable mineral and energy resources, especially coal and natural gas reserves.
New security measures and increased drilling activity have slowed the drop in petroleum
production, allowing Colombia to continue to export through 2011, given current production
estimates. In 2006, gas reserves totaled 7,349 billion cubic feet. Gas production totaled 680 million
cubic feet per day. The country's current refining capacity is 299,200 barrels per day. Mining and
energy related investments have grown because of higher oil prices, increased demand and
improved output. Colombia has significantly liberalized its petroleum sector, leading to an increase
in exploration and production contracts from both large and small hydrocarbon industries.
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Colombia is presently the 16th-greatest coal producing country, accounting for about 1% of the
world's total annual coal production, and the largest producer in Latin America (65.8 million tons in
2006). Colombia has proven recoverable coal reserves of about 7.4 billion short tons, the majority
of which are located in the north of the country. Colombia historically has been the world's leading
producer of emeralds, although production has fallen in recent years. Emerald production fell from
116.3 million carats in 2005 to 112.7 million carats in 2006. Colombia is also a significant producer
of gold, silver, and platinum.
Foreign Investment
Note on Foreign Investment
The United States is the largest source of new foreign direct investment (FDI) in Colombia,
particularly in the areas of coal and petroleum. In 2007, new FDI totaled U.S. $7.5 billion, more
than triple the amount in 2002. The bulk of the new investment is in the manufacturing, mining,
and energy sectors. The only activities closed to foreign direct investment are defense and national
security, and disposal of hazardous wastes. Capital controls have been implemented to reduce
currency speculation and to keep foreign investment in-country for at least a year. In order to
encourage investment in Colombia, Congress approved a law in 2005 to protect FDI.
Foreign Investment Assessment
While Colombia’s government generally encourages foreign investment, rampant instability serves
as a major deterrent.
Other Investment Considerations
Corruption Perception Ranking
See full list, as reported by Transparency International, elsewhere in this Country Review.
Cultural Considerations
Colombian society is governed by the same basic rules of etiquette that apply throughout the rest
of South America.
For More Information
Country Website
Colombia Review 2017
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www.colombiaemb.org
Foreign Investment Index
Foreign Investment Index
The Foreign Investment Index is a proprietary index measuring attractiveness to international
investment flows. The Foreign Investment Index is calculated using an established methodology by
CountryWatch's Editor-in-Chief and is based on a given country's economic stability (sustained
economic growth, monetary stability, current account deficits, budget surplus), economic risk (risk
of non-servicing of payments for goods or services, loans and trade-related finance, risk of
sovereign default), business and investment climate (property rights, labor force and laws,
regulatory transparency, openness to foreign investment, market conditions, and stability of
government). Scores are assigned from 0-10 using the aforementioned criteria. A score of 0 marks
the lowest level of foreign investment viability, while a score of 10 marks the highest level of
foreign investment viability, according to this proprietary index.
Colombia Review 2017
Country
Assessment
Afghanistan
2
Albania
4.5
Algeria
6
Andorra
9
Angola
4.5-5
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Antigua
8.5
Argentina
5
Armenia
5
Australia
9.5
Austria
9-9.5
Azerbaijan
5
Bahamas
9
Bahrain
7.5
Bangladesh
4.5
Barbados
9
Belarus
4
Belgium
9
Belize
7.5
Benin
5.5
Bhutan
4.5
Bolivia
4.5
Bosnia-Herzegovina
5
Botswana
7.5-8
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Pending
Brazil
8
Brunei
7
Bulgaria
5.5
Burkina Faso
4
Burma (Myanmar)
4.5
Burundi
4
Cambodia
4.5
Cameroon
5
Canada
9.5
Cape Verde
6
Central African Republic
3
Chad
4
Chile
9
China
7.5
China: Hong Kong
8.5
China: Taiwan
8.5
Colombia
7
Comoros
4
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Congo DRC
4
Congo RC
5
Costa Rica
8
Cote d'Ivoire
4.5
Croatia
7
Cuba
4.5
Cyprus
7
Czech Republic
8.5
Denmark
9.5
Djibouti
4.5
Dominica
6
Dominican Republic
6.5
East Timor
4.5
Ecuador
5.5
Egypt
4.5-5
El Salvador
6
Equatorial Guinea
4.5
Eritrea
3.5
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Estonia
8
Ethiopia
4.5
Fiji
5
Finland
9
Former Yugoslav Rep. of Macedonia
5
France
9-9.5
Gabon
5.5
Gambia
5
Georgia
5
Germany
9-9.5
Ghana
5.5
Greece
5
Grenada
7.5
Guatemala
5.5
Guinea
3.5
Guinea-Bissau
3.5
Guyana
4.5
Haiti
4
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Holy See (Vatican)
n/a
Hong Kong (China)
8.5
Honduras
5.5
Hungary
8
Iceland
8-8.5
India
8
Indonesia
5.5
Iran
4
Iraq
3
Ireland
8
Israel
8.5
Italy
8
Jamaica
5.5
Japan
9.5
Jordan
6
Kazakhstan
6
Kenya
5
Kiribati
5.5
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Korea, North
1
Korea, South
9
Kosovo
4.5
Kuwait
8.5
Kyrgyzstan
4.5
Laos
4
Latvia
7
Lebanon
5
Lesotho
5.5
Liberia
3.5
Libya
3
Liechtenstein
9
Lithuania
7.5
Luxembourg
9-9.5
Madagascar
4.5
Malawi
4.5
Malaysia
8.5
Maldives
6.5
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Mali
5
Malta
9
Marshall Islands
5
Mauritania
4.5
Mauritius
7.5-8
Mexico
6.5-7
Micronesia
5
Moldova
4.5-5
Monaco
9
Mongolia
5
Montenegro
5.5
Morocco
7.5
Mozambique
5
Namibia
7.5
Nauru
4.5
Nepal
4
Netherlands
9-9.5
New Zealand
9.5
Nicaragua
5
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Nicaragua
5
Niger
4.5
Nigeria
4.5
Norway
9-9.5
Oman
8
Pakistan
4
Palau
4.5-5
Panama
7
Papua New Guinea
5
Paraguay
6
Peru
6
Philippines
6
Poland
8
Portugal
7.5-8
Qatar
9
Romania
6-6.5
Russia
6
Rwanda
4
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Saint Kitts and Nevis
8
Saint Lucia
8
Saint Vincent and Grenadines
7
Samoa
7
San Marino
8.5
Sao Tome and Principe
4.5-5
Saudi Arabia
7
Senegal
6
Serbia
6
Seychelles
5
Sierra Leone
4
Singapore
9.5
Slovak Republic (Slovakia)
8.5
Slovenia
8.5-9
Solomon Islands
5
Somalia
2
South Africa
8
Spain
7.5-8
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Sri Lanka
5.5
Sudan
4
Suriname
5
Swaziland
4.5
Sweden
9.5
Switzerland
9.5
Syria
2.5
Tajikistan
4
Taiwan (China)
8.5
Tanzania
5
Thailand
7.5-8
Togo
4.5-5
Tonga
5.5-6
Trinidad and Tobago
8-8.5
Tunisia
6
Turkey
6.5-7
Turkmenistan
4
Tuvalu
7
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Uganda
5
Ukraine
4.5-5
United Arab Emirates
8.5
United Kingdom
9
United States
9
Uruguay
6.5-7
Uzbekistan
4
Vanuatu
6
Venezuela
5
Vietnam
5.5
Yemen
3
Zambia
4.5-5
Zimbabwe
3.5
Editor's Note:
As of 2015, the global economic crisis (emerging in 2008) had affected many countries across the
world, resulting in changes to their rankings. Among those countries affected were top tier
economies, such as the United Kingdom, Iceland, Switzerland and Austria. However, in all these
cases, their rankings have moved back upward in the last couple of years as anxieties have
eased. Other top tier countries, such as Spain, Portugal, Ireland, and Italy, suffered some
effects due to debt woes and the concomitant effect on the euro zone. Greece, another euro zone
nation, was also downgraded due to its sovereign debt crisis; however, Greece's position on the
Colombia Review 2017
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precipice of default incurred a sharper downgrade than the other four euro zone countries
mentioned above. Cyprus' exposure to Greek bank yielded a downgrade in its case. Slovenia and
Latvia have been slightly downgraded due to a mix of economic and political concerns but could
easily be upgraded in a future assessment, should these concerns abate. Meanwhile, the crisis in
eastern Ukraine fueled downgrades in that country and neighboring Russia.
Despite the "trifecta of tragedy" in Japan in 2011 -- the earthquake, the ensuing tsunami, and the
resulting nuclear crisis -- and the appreciable destabilization of the economic and political terrain
therein, this country has only slightly been downgraded. Japan's challenges have been assessed to
be transient, the government remains accountable, and there is little risk of default. Both India
and China retain their rankings; India holds a slightly higher ranking than China due to its record of
democratic representation and accountability.
There were shifts in opposite directions for Mali and Nigeria versus the Central African Republic,
Burkina Faso, and Burundi. Mali was slightly upgraded due to its efforts to return to constitutional
order following the 2012 coup and to neutralize the threat of separatists and Islamists. Likewise, a
new government in Nigeria generated a slight upgrade as the country attempts to confront
corruption, crime, and terrorism. But the Central African Republic was downgraded due to the
takeover of the government by Seleka rebels and the continued decline into lawlessness in that
country. Likewise, the attempts by the leaders of Burundi and Burkina Faso to hold onto power
by by-passing the constitution raised eybrows and resulted in downgrades.
Political unrest in Libya and Algeria have contributed to a decision to marginally downgrade these
countries as well. Syria incurred a sharper downgrade due to the devolution into de facto civil war
and the dire security threat posed by Islamist terrorists. Iraq saw a similar downgrade as a result of
the takeover of wide swaths of territory and the threat of genocide at the hands of Islamist
terrorists. Yemen, likewise, has been downgraded due to political instability at the hands of
secessionists, terrorists, Houthi rebels, and the intervention of external parties. Conversely, Egypt
and Tunisia saw slight upgrades as their political environments stabilize.
At the low end of the spectrum, devolving security conditions and/or economic crisis have resulted
in countries like Pakistan, Afghanistan, Somalia, and Zimbabwe maintaining their low ratings.
The United States continues to retain its previous slight downgrade due to the enduring threat of
default surrounding the debt ceiling in that country, matched by a conflict-ridden political climate.
In the case of Mexico, there is limited concern about default, but increasing alarm over the security
situation in that country and the government’s ability to contain it. In Argentina, a default to bond
holders resulted in a downgrade to that country. Finally, a small but significant upgrade was
attributed to Cuba due to its recent pro-business reforms and its normalization of ties with the
Unitd States.
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Source:
CountryWatch Inc. www.countrywatch.com
Updated:
2015
Corruption Perceptions Index
Corruption Perceptions Index
Transparency International: Corruption Perceptions Index
Editor's Note:
Transparency International's Corruption Perceptions Index is a composite index which ranks
countries in terms of the degree to which corruption is perceived to exist among public officials.
This index indicates the views of national and international business people and analysts about the
levels of corruption in each country. The highest (and best) level of transparency is indicated by
the number, 10. The lower (and worse) levels of transparency are indicated by lower numbers.
Rank
Country/Territory
CPI 2009
Score
Surveys
Used
Confidence
Range
1
New Zealand
9.4
6
9.1 - 9.5
2
Denmark
9.3
6
9.1 - 9.5
3
Singapore
9.2
9
9.0 - 9.4
3
Sweden
9.2
6
9.0 - 9.3
5
Switzerland
9.0
6
8.9 - 9.1
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6
Finland
8.9
6
8.4 - 9.4
6
Netherlands
8.9
6
8.7 - 9.0
8
Australia
8.7
8
8.3 - 9.0
8
Canada
8.7
6
8.5 - 9.0
8
Iceland
8.7
4
7.5 - 9.4
11
Norway
8.6
6
8.2 - 9.1
12
Hong Kong
8.2
8
7.9 - 8.5
12
Luxembourg
8.2
6
7.6 - 8.8
14
Germany
8.0
6
7.7 - 8.3
14
Ireland
8.0
6
7.8 - 8.4
16
Austria
7.9
6
7.4 - 8.3
17
Japan
7.7
8
7.4 - 8.0
17
United Kingdom
7.7
6
7.3 - 8.2
19
United States
7.5
8
6.9 - 8.0
20
Barbados
7.4
4
6.6 - 8.2
21
Belgium
7.1
6
6.9 - 7.3
22
Qatar
7.0
6
5.8 - 8.1
22
Saint Lucia
7.0
3
6.7 - 7.5
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24
France
6.9
6
6.5 - 7.3
25
Chile
6.7
7
6.5 - 6.9
25
Uruguay
6.7
5
6.4 - 7.1
27
Cyprus
6.6
4
6.1 - 7.1
27
Estonia
6.6
8
6.1 - 6.9
27
Slovenia
6.6
8
6.3 - 6.9
30
United Arab Emirates
6.5
5
5.5 - 7.5
31
Saint Vincent and the
Grenadines
6.4
3
4.9 - 7.5
32
Israel
6.1
6
5.4 - 6.7
32
Spain
6.1
6
5.5 - 6.6
34
Dominica
5.9
3
4.9 - 6.7
35
Portugal
5.8
6
5.5 - 6.2
35
Puerto Rico
5.8
4
5.2 - 6.3
37
Botswana
5.6
6
5.1 - 6.3
37
Taiwan
5.6
9
5.4 - 5.9
39
Brunei Darussalam
5.5
4
4.7 - 6.4
39
Oman
5.5
5
4.4 - 6.5
39
Korea (South)
5.5
9
5.3 - 5.7
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42
Mauritius
5.4
6
5.0 - 5.9
43
Costa Rica
5.3
5
4.7 - 5.9
43
Macau
5.3
3
3.3 - 6.9
45
Malta
5.2
4
4.0 - 6.2
46
Bahrain
5.1
5
4.2 - 5.8
46
Cape Verde
5.1
3
3.3 - 7.0
46
Hungary
5.1
8
4.6 - 5.7
49
Bhutan
5.0
4
4.3 - 5.6
49
Jordan
5.0
7
3.9 - 6.1
49
Poland
5.0
8
4.5 - 5.5
52
Czech Republic
4.9
8
4.3 - 5.6
52
Lithuania
4.9
8
4.4 - 5.4
54
Seychelles
4.8
3
3.0 - 6.7
55
South Africa
4.7
8
4.3 - 4.9
56
Latvia
4.5
6
4.1 - 4.9
56
Malaysia
4.5
9
4.0 - 5.1
56
Namibia
4.5
6
3.9 - 5.1
56
Samoa
4.5
3
3.3 - 5.3
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56
Slovakia
4.5
8
4.1 - 4.9
61
Cuba
4.4
3
3.5 - 5.1
61
Turkey
4.4
7
3.9 - 4.9
63
Italy
4.3
6
3.8 - 4.9
63
Saudi Arabia
4.3
5
3.1 - 5.3
65
Tunisia
4.2
6
3.0 - 5.5
66
Croatia
4.1
8
3.7 - 4.5
66
Georgia
4.1
7
3.4 - 4.7
66
Kuwait
4.1
5
3.2 - 5.1
69
Ghana
3.9
7
3.2 - 4.6
69
Montenegro
3.9
5
3.5 - 4.4
71
Bulgaria
3.8
8
3.2 - 4.5
71
FYR Macedonia
3.8
6
3.4 - 4.2
71
Greece
3.8
6
3.2 - 4.3
71
Romania
3.8
8
3.2 - 4.3
75
Brazil
3.7
7
3.3 - 4.3
75
Colombia
3.7
7
3.1 - 4.3
75
Peru
3.7
7
3.4 - 4.1
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75
Suriname
3.7
3
3.0 - 4.7
79
Burkina Faso
3.6
7
2.8 - 4.4
79
China
3.6
9
3.0 - 4.2
79
Swaziland
3.6
3
3.0 - 4.7
79
Trinidad and Tobago
3.6
4
3.0 - 4.3
83
Serbia
3.5
6
3.3 - 3.9
84
El Salvador
3.4
5
3.0 - 3.8
84
Guatemala
3.4
5
3.0 - 3.9
84
India
3.4
10
3.2 - 3.6
84
Panama
3.4
5
3.1 - 3.7
84
Thailand
3.4
9
3.0 - 3.8
89
Lesotho
3.3
6
2.8 - 3.8
89
Malawi
3.3
7
2.7 - 3.9
89
Mexico
3.3
7
3.2 - 3.5
89
Moldova
3.3
6
2.7 - 4.0
89
Morocco
3.3
6
2.8 - 3.9
89
Rwanda
3.3
4
2.9 - 3.7
95
Albania
3.2
6
3.0 - 3.3
95
Vanuatu
3.2
3
2.3 - 4.7
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95
Vanuatu
3.2
3
2.3 - 4.7
97
Liberia
3.1
3
1.9 - 3.8
97
Sri Lanka
3.1
7
2.8 - 3.4
99
Bosnia and Herzegovina
3.0
7
2.6 - 3.4
99
Dominican Republic
3.0
5
2.9 - 3.2
99
Jamaica
3.0
5
2.8 - 3.3
99
Madagascar
3.0
7
2.8 - 3.2
99
Senegal
3.0
7
2.5 - 3.6
99
Tonga
3.0
3
2.6 - 3.3
99
Zambia
3.0
7
2.8 - 3.2
106
Argentina
2.9
7
2.6 - 3.1
106
Benin
2.9
6
2.3 - 3.4
106
Gabon
2.9
3
2.6 - 3.1
106
Gambia
2.9
5
1.6 - 4.0
106
Niger
2.9
5
2.7 - 3.0
111
Algeria
2.8
6
2.5 - 3.1
111
Djibouti
2.8
4
2.3 - 3.2
111
Egypt
2.8
6
2.6 - 3.1
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111
Indonesia
2.8
9
2.4 - 3.2
111
Kiribati
2.8
3
2.3 - 3.3
111
Mali
2.8
6
2.4 - 3.2
111
Sao Tome and Principe
2.8
3
2.4 - 3.3
111
Solomon Islands
2.8
3
2.3 - 3.3
111
Togo
2.8
5
1.9 - 3.9
120
Armenia
2.7
7
2.6 - 2.8
120
Bolivia
2.7
6
2.4 - 3.1
120
Ethiopia
2.7
7
2.4 - 2.9
120
Kazakhstan
2.7
7
2.1 - 3.3
120
Mongolia
2.7
7
2.4 - 3.0
120
Vietnam
2.7
9
2.4 - 3.1
126
Eritrea
2.6
4
1.6 - 3.8
126
Guyana
2.6
4
2.5 - 2.7
126
Syria
2.6
5
2.2 - 2.9
126
Tanzania
2.6
7
2.4 - 2.9
130
Honduras
2.5
6
2.2 - 2.8
130
Lebanon
2.5
3
1.9 - 3.1
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130
Libya
2.5
6
2.2 - 2.8
130
Maldives
2.5
4
1.8 - 3.2
130
Mauritania
2.5
7
2.0 - 3.3
130
Mozambique
2.5
7
2.3 - 2.8
130
Nicaragua
2.5
6
2.3 - 2.7
130
Nigeria
2.5
7
2.2 - 2.7
130
Uganda
2.5
7
2.1 - 2.8
139
Bangladesh
2.4
7
2.0 - 2.8
139
Belarus
2.4
4
2.0 - 2.8
139
Pakistan
2.4
7
2.1 - 2.7
139
Philippines
2.4
9
2.1 - 2.7
143
Azerbaijan
2.3
7
2.0 - 2.6
143
Comoros
2.3
3
1.6 - 3.3
143
Nepal
2.3
6
2.0 - 2.6
146
Cameroon
2.2
7
1.9 - 2.6
146
Ecuador
2.2
5
2.0 - 2.5
146
Kenya
2.2
7
1.9 - 2.5
146
Russia
2.2
8
1.9 - 2.4
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146
Sierra Leone
2.2
5
1.9 - 2.4
146
Timor-Leste
2.2
5
1.8 - 2.6
146
Ukraine
2.2
8
2.0 - 2.6
146
Zimbabwe
2.2
7
1.7 - 2.8
154
Côte d´Ivoire
2.1
7
1.8 - 2.4
154
Papua New Guinea
2.1
5
1.7 - 2.5
154
Paraguay
2.1
5
1.7 - 2.5
154
Yemen
2.1
4
1.6 - 2.5
158
Cambodia
2.0
8
1.8 - 2.2
158
Central African Republic
2.0
4
1.9 - 2.2
158
Laos
2.0
4
1.6 - 2.6
158
Tajikistan
2.0
8
1.6 - 2.5
162
Angola
1.9
5
1.8 - 1.9
162
Congo Brazzaville
1.9
5
1.6 - 2.1
162
Democratic Republic of
Congo
1.9
5
1.7 - 2.1
162
Guinea-Bissau
1.9
3
1.8 - 2.0
162
Kyrgyzstan
1.9
7
1.8 - 2.1
162
Venezuela
1.9
7
1.8 - 2.0
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168
Burundi
1.8
6
1.6 - 2.0
168
Equatorial Guinea
1.8
3
1.6 - 1.9
168
Guinea
1.8
5
1.7 - 1.8
168
Haiti
1.8
3
1.4 - 2.3
168
Iran
1.8
3
1.7 - 1.9
168
Turkmenistan
1.8
4
1.7 - 1.9
174
Uzbekistan
1.7
6
1.5 - 1.8
175
Chad
1.6
6
1.5 - 1.7
176
Iraq
1.5
3
1.2 - 1.8
176
Sudan
1.5
5
1.4 - 1.7
178
Myanmar
1.4
3
0.9 - 1.8
179
Afghanistan
1.3
4
1.0 - 1.5
180
Somalia
1.1
3
0.9 - 1.4
Methodology:
As noted above, the highest (and best) level of transparency with the least perceived corruption is
indicated by the number, 10. The lower (and worse) levels of transparency are indicated by lower
numbers.
According to Transparency International, the Corruption Perceptions Index (CPI) table shows a
country's ranking and score, the number of surveys used to determine the score, and the
confidence range of the scoring.
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The rank shows how one country compares to others included in the index. The CPI score
indicates the perceived level of public-sector corruption in a country/territory.
The CPI is based on 13 independent surveys. However, not all surveys include all countries. The
surveys used column indicates how many surveys were relied upon to determine the score for that
country.
The confidence range indicates the reliability of the CPI scores and tells us that allowing for a
margin of error, we can be 90% confident that the true score for this country lies within this range.
Note:
Kosovo, which separated from the Yugoslav successor state of Serbia, is not listed above. No
calculation is available for Kosovo at this time, however, a future corruption index by
Transparency International may include the world's newest country in its tally. Taiwan has been
listed above despite its contested status; while Taiwan claims sovereign status, China claims
ultimate jurisdiction over Taiwan. Hong Kong, which is also under the rubric of Chinese
sovereignty, is listed above. Note as well that Puerto Rico, which is a United States domain, is also
included in the list above. These inclusions likely have to do with the size and fairly autonomous
status of their economies.
Source:
Transparency International's Corruption Perception Index; available at URL:
http://www.transparency.org
Updated:
Uploaded in 2011 using most recent ranking available; reviewed in 2015.
Competitiveness Ranking
Competitiveness Ranking
Editor's Note:
The Global Competitiveness Report’s competitiveness ranking is based on the Global
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Competitiveness Index (GCI), which was developed for the World Economic Forum. The GCI is
based on a number of competitiveness considerations, and provides a comprehensive picture of the
competitiveness landscape in countries around the world. The competitiveness considerations are:
institutions, infrastructure, macroeconomic environment, health and primary education, higher
education and training, goods market efficiency, labour market efficiency, financial market
development, technological readiness, market size, business sophistication, and innovation. The
rankings are calculated from both publicly available data and the Executive Opinion Survey.
Country/Economy
GCI 2010
Rank
GCI 2010
Score
GCI 2009
Rank
Change
2009-2010
Switzerland
1
5.63
1
0
Sweden
2
5.56
4
2
Singapore
3
5.48
3
0
United States
4
5.43
2
-2
Germany
5
5.39
7
2
Japan
6
5.37
8
2
Finland
7
5.37
6
-1
Netherlands
8
5.33
10
2
Denmark
9
5.32
5
-4
Canada
10
5.30
9
-1
Hong Kong SAR
11
5.30
11
0
United Kingdom
12
5.25
13
1
Taiwan, China
13
5.21
12
-1
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Norway
14
5.14
14
0
France
15
5.13
16
1
Australia
16
5.11
15
-1
Qatar
17
5.10
22
5
Austria
18
5.09
17
-1
Belgium
19
5.07
18
-1
Luxembourg
20
5.05
21
1
Saudi Arabia
21
4.95
28
7
Korea, Rep.
22
4.93
19
-3
New Zealand
23
4.92
20
-3
Israel
24
4.91
27
3
United Arab Emirates
25
4.89
23
-2
Malaysia
26
4.88
24
-2
China
27
4.84
29
2
Brunei Darussalam
28
4.75
32
4
Ireland
29
4.74
25
-4
Chile
30
4.69
30
0
Iceland
31
4.68
26
-5
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Tunisia
32
4.65
40
8
Estonia
33
4.61
35
2
Oman
34
4.61
41
7
Kuwait
35
4.59
39
4
Czech Republic
36
4.57
31
-5
Bahrain
37
4.54
38
1
Thailand
38
4.51
36
-2
Poland
39
4.51
46
7
Cyprus
40
4.50
34
-6
Puerto Rico
41
4.49
42
1
Spain
42
4.49
33
-9
Barbados
43
4.45
44
1
Indonesia
44
4.43
54
10
Slovenia
45
4.42
37
-8
Portugal
46
4.38
43
-3
Lithuania
47
4.38
53
6
Italy
48
4.37
48
0
Montenegro
49
4.36
62
13
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Malta
50
4.34
52
2
India
51
4.33
49
-2
Hungary
52
4.33
58
6
Panama
53
4.33
59
6
South Africa
54
4.32
45
-9
Mauritius
55
4.32
57
2
Costa Rica
56
4.31
55
-1
Azerbaijan
57
4.29
51
-6
Brazil
58
4.28
56
-2
Vietnam
59
4.27
75
16
Slovak Republic
60
4.25
47
-13
Turkey
61
4.25
61
0
Sri Lanka
62
4.25
79
17
Russian Federation
63
4.24
63
0
Uruguay
64
4.23
65
1
Jordan
65
4.21
50
-15
Mexico
66
4.19
60
-6
Romania
67
4.16
64
-3
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Colombia
68
4.14
69
1
Iran
69
4.14
n/a
n/a
Latvia
70
4.14
68
-2
Bulgaria
71
4.13
76
5
Kazakhstan
72
4.12
67
-5
Peru
73
4.11
78
5
Namibia
74
4.09
74
0
Morocco
75
4.08
73
-2
Botswana
76
4.05
66
-10
Croatia
77
4.04
72
-5
Guatemala
78
4.04
80
2
Macedonia, FYR
79
4.02
84
5
Rwanda
80
4.00
n/a
n/a
Egypt
81
4.00
70
-11
El Salvador
82
3.99
77
-5
Greece
83
3.99
71
-12
Trinidad and Tobago
84
3.97
86
2
Philippines
85
3.96
87
2
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Algeria
86
3.96
83
-3
Argentina
87
3.95
85
-2
Albania
88
3.94
96
8
Ukraine
89
3.90
82
-7
Gambia, The
90
3.90
81
-9
Honduras
91
3.89
89
-2
Lebanon
92
3.89
n/a
n/a
Georgia
93
3.86
90
-3
Moldova
94
3.86
n/a
n/a
Jamaica
95
3.85
91
-4
Serbia
96
3.84
93
-3
Syria
97
3.79
94
-3
Armenia
98
3.76
97
-1
Mongolia
99
3.75
117
18
Libya
100
3.74
88
-12
Dominican Republic
101
3.72
95
-6
Bosnia and Herzegovina
102
3.70
109
7
Benin
103
3.69
103
0
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Senegal
104
3.67
92
-12
Ecuador
105
3.65
105
0
Kenya
106
3.65
98
-8
Bangladesh
107
3.64
106
-1
Bolivia
108
3.64
120
12
Cambodia
109
3.63
110
1
Guyana
110
3.62
104
-6
Cameroon
111
3.58
111
0
Nicaragua
112
3.57
115
3
Tanzania
113
3.56
100
-13
Ghana
114
3.56
114
0
Zambia
115
3.55
112
-3
Tajikistan
116
3.53
122
6
Cape Verde
117
3.51
n/a
n/a
Uganda
118
3.51
108
-10
Ethiopia
119
3.51
118
-1
Paraguay
120
3.49
124
4
Kyrgyz Republic
121
3.49
123
2
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Venezuela
122
3.48
113
-9
Pakistan
123
3.48
101
-22
Madagascar
124
3.46
121
-3
Malawi
125
3.45
119
-6
Swaziland
126
3.40
n/a
n/a
Nigeria
127
3.38
99
-28
Lesotho
128
3.36
107
-21
Côte d'Ivoire
129
3.35
116
-13
Nepal
130
3.34
125
-5
Mozambique
131
3.32
129
-2
Mali
132
3.28
130
-2
Timor-Leste
133
3.23
126
-7
Burkina Faso
134
3.20
128
-6
Mauritania
135
3.14
127
-8
Zimbabwe
136
3.03
132
-4
Burundi
137
2.96
133
-4
Angola
138
2.93
n/a
n/a
Chad
139
2.73
131
-8
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Methodology:
The competitiveness rankings are calculated from both publicly available data and the Executive
Opinion Survey, a comprehensive annual survey conducted by the World Economic Forum
together with its network of Partner Institutes (leading research institutes and business
organizations) in the countries covered by the Report.
Highlights according to WEF -- The United States falls two places to fourth position, overtaken by Sweden and Singapore in the
rankings of the World Economic Forum’s Global Competitiveness Report 2010-2011
- The People’s Republic of China continues to move up the rankings, with marked improvements
in several other Asian countries
- Germany moves up two places to fifth place, leading the Eurozone countries
- Switzerland tops the rankings
Source:
World Economic Forum; available at URL: http://www.weforum.org
Updated:
2011 using most recent ranking available; reviewed in 2015.
Taxation
Corporate tax
The standard rate of corporate tax is 34 percent
Individual tax
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Individual tax rates are progressive rates and are as high as 34 percent.
Capital gains
Typically, capital gains are taxed as income.
Indirect tax
There is a value-added tax (VAT), which applies to most transactions, at a rate of 16 percent.
Stock Market
Colombia has three stock exchanges: the Bogota Stock Exchange, the Medellin Stock Exchange,
and the Occidente Stock Exchange in Cali, Colombia. Colombia's exchanges at the end of the
1990's had 145 listed companies.
Foreign investors can invest directly or through a mutual fund only by working with a local
manager. All investments must be registered with the Central Bank. Foreign institutional investment
funds are allowed no more than 10 percent of outstanding voting shares. The combined foreign
funds of a single local manager cannot represent more than 40 percent of the outstanding voting
shares of a company. National defense, real estate and toxic waste disposal and related sectors are
not available for foreign investment. Foreign investment in the public services and communications
sectors, and in natural resource exploitation, require approval from the National Planning
Department. This requirement applies as well to investments in financial institutions of more than
10 percent.
The acquisition of new electronic trading systems brought promise of linking the trading of the
three exchanges. There is no foreign investment ceiling for listed stocks.
For more information on Colombia's stock exchanges, see the URLs:
• The Bogota Stock Exchange:
http://www.bolsabogota.com.co/
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• The Occidente Stock Exchange:
http://www.bolsadeoccidente.com.co/
• The Medellin Stock Exchange:
http://www.bolsamed.com.co/DEFAULT.HTM
Partner Links
Partner Links
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Chapter 5
Social Overview
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People
Demography
Colombia is the third-most populous country in Latin America after Brazil and Mexico with a
population of approximately 46 million. Movement from rural to urban areas has been heavy. The
urban populations increased from 57 percent of the total population in 1951 to about 74 percent by
1994, and 30 cities have a population of 100,000 or more. The nine eastern lowlands departments,
constituting about 54 percent of Colombia's area, have less than three percent of the population
and a density of less than one person per square kilometer (two people per square mile).
Ethnicity
Colombia's ethnic diversity is a result of the intermingling of indigenous peoples, Spanish colonists
and African slaves. Its ethnic groupings are as follows: 58 percent mestizo, 20 percent white, 14
percent mulatto, four percent black and three percent mixed black-Amerindian. Today, only about
one percent of the populat ion can be identified as fully Indian on the basis of language and
customs. Meanwhile, few foreigners have immigrated to Colombia, especially when compared to
the immigration records of several other South American countries.
Language
The country's official language is Spanish. Indigenous people differed from the rest of the nation
in major cultural aspects. Although some continued to speak indigenous languages, Spanish,
introduced by missionaries, was the predominant language among all but the most isolated groups.
Religion
An estimated 90 percent of Colombians are Roman Catholics, while the remaining 10 percent
belong to other Christian denominations or other religions.
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Health and Welfare
Today, in terms of health and welfare, the infant mortality rate is 20.13 deaths per 1,000 live
births. The life expectancy at birth is 72.27 years of age, according to recent estimates. The
literacy rate was estimated to be 92.8 percent of the total population age 15 and over.
Human Development
One notable measure used to determine a country's quality of life is the Human Development
Index (HDI), which has been compiled annually since 1990 by the United Nations Development
Programme (UNDP). The HDI is a composite of several indicators, which measure a country's
achievements in three main arenas of human development: longevity, knowledge and education, as
well as economic standard of living. In a recent ranking of 169 countries, the HDI placed Colombia
in the high human development category, at 79th place.
Note: Although the concept of human development is complicated and cannot be properly captured
by values and indices, the HDI, which is calculated and updated annually, offers a wide-ranging
assessment of human development in certain countries, not based solely upon traditional economic
and financial indicators.
*********
Special Note on Ethnicity:
Recognizing the impossibility of objective ethnic classification and not wishing to emphasize ethnic
differences, the national census dropped references to race after 1918. Nevertheless, most
Colombians continued to identify themselves and others according to ancestry, physical
appearance, and sociocultural status. Social relations reflected the importance attached to certain
characteristics associated with a given racial group. Although these characteristics no longer
accurately demarcated distinct social categories, they still helped determine rank in the social
hierarchy.
The various groups were found in differing concentrations throughout the nation, largely reflecting
the colonial social system. The whites tended to live mainly in the urban centers, particularly in
Bogotá and the burgeoning highland cities. The large mestizo population was predominantly a
peasant group, concentrated in the highlands where the Spanish conquerors had mixed with the
women of Indian chiefdoms. After the 1940s, however, mestizos began moving to the cities, where
they became part of the urban working class or urban poor. The black and mulatto populations
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were also part of this trend but lived mainly along the coasts and in the lowlands.
Descendants of indigenous people who survived the Spanish conquest were found in scattered
groups in remote areas largely outside the national society, such as the higher elevations of the
southern highlands, the forests north and west of the cordilleras, the arid Guajira Peninsula, and
the vast eastern plains and Amazonian jungles, which had only begun to be penetrated by other
groups in the twentieth century.
Special Note on Family Life
In the last decades, there were continued signs of change in the traditional norms and patterns of
family life, resulting from the high rate of rural-to-urban migration, the growth of urban industrial
centers, and accompanying socioeconomic developments. The decline of the patriarchal extendedfamily structure was apparent in urban society, as increased geographic and social mobility
weakened kinship ties and extended greater independence to young people. Families at the bottom
of the social ladder were adversely affected by geographic dislocation and were increasingly less
cohesive. They continued to be characterized by a large number of consensual unions and mothercentered households.
Traditional elements of trust and mutual dependence among relatives, no matter how distant the
relationship, were still strong. The already large circle of kin relationships was extended through the
institution of compadrazgo -- a complex form of ritual kinship. Ties with relatives and compadres
(godparents) continued to be important in political and business activities and provided the lowstatus person with a wide circle of mutual assistance.
The nuclear family unit continued to be authoritarian, patriarchal, and patrilineal. Legal reforms
had extended equal civil and property rights to women, but tradition dominated malefemale
relations, and roles and responsibilities in marriage were still relatively clear-cut. In the lower class,
in which the father was frequently not a permanent member of the household, the mother often
assumed the role of chief authority and family head, but in all other cases the father unquestionably
occupied this position. Within the household, the wife was considered the father's deputy and the
chief administrator of domestic activities. Her first duty was to bear and raise children. She was
also expected to keep the household running smoothly and efficiently. In her relations with her
husband, she traditionally was supposed to be deferential, thinking of his wishes and needs before
considering her own.
Men of the upper and middle class had always been paternal and protective toward their
dependents and tried to shelter their wives and children from undesirable outside influences. The
activities of women were severely circumscribed because of the male concern with protecting the
honor and virtue of the wife and unmarried daughters. Women in the upper and middle classes
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traditionally were not permitted to do work outside the home except for volunteer work. The social
life of women in the upper and middle classes, particularly of unmarried girls, was limited to the
home, the school, the church, and well-chaperoned parties and dances.
The lower-class or lower-middle-class woman was under far fewer restrictions than her upper-class
counterpart. Formal chaperonage had always been impossible to maintain because of family
instability, economic need, and the frequent absence of the husband and father and because moral
standards differed somewhat from those of the upper social levels. The lower-class woman usually
had to be employed and contribute her salary to the family's subsistence or work in the fields
beside her male relatives. Her economic contribution gave her a degree of equality and, combined
with the matrilocality of lower-class life, i.e., the fact that a husband tended to live with his wife's
family, limited the husband's and father's control over her.
There were increasing exceptions in urban society to the traditional concept of a woman's role.
Many women in the upper social levels were well educated, and some pursued careers in such
fields as the arts, social welfare, and education. Colombian women were also considered among
the most politically active in Latin America. Many of them held high elective or appointive offices.
At the same time, women who engaged in these activities were considered exceptional. Most
upper-class and upper-middle-class women did not work after marriage but devoted themselves to
their homes, families, and church groups.
The Roman Catholic Church was the single most important force affecting marriage and family
life. Nearly all formal marriages took place within the church, and most other turning points in the
life of the individual family member were marked by religious rites. The Concordat of 1887 with
the Holy See was replaced in 1973 by a new agreement, which opened the way for increased
acceptance of civil marriages. After decades of debate, a divorce law permitting the dissolution of
civil marriages was passed in the mid-1970s. In the late 1980s, however, the debate over divorce
for Catholic marriages continued unresolved.
Moreover, regardless of the increasing acceptability of civil weddings, most middle-class and
upper-class families still tried to provide their children with the most elaborate church wedding they
could afford. In the lower class, consensual union, in which both the religious and the civil
marriage ceremonies are foregone, was common. In rural communities with traditional lower-class
standards, formal marriage was regarded as neither important nor essential. Despite the efforts of
the church to encourage legal marriage within the lower class, people in this group generally
regarded Catholic marriage as a heavy social and economic burden. At the same time, however,
Catholic marriage was recognized as the ideal and the preferred legal, social, and sexual basis of the
family. Although other kinds of union were more prevalent within the lower class, Catholic
marriage often connoted superior social status and prestige. In contemplating religious marriage,
both men and women might consider carefully the heavy costs involved against the prestige that
would be gained.
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Some Colombians, especially those in the middle class, regarded marriage as one of the best means
of facilitating upward social mobility. At the same time, however, members of the upper class were
generally reluctant to marry persons of lower social position. With the increasing independence of
young people and the declining authority of the family, marriages between relatives had become
less common, but intermarriage between families of similar aristocratic background was a custom
that few young people chose to disregard.
Special Note on Class
The structure of Colombian society in recent years--strongly influenced by traditions inherited from
sixteenth-century Spain-- was highly stratified, having well-defined class membership, pronounced
status differences, and limited vertical social mobility. The urban sector was characterized by a
more flexible social system, a growing middle class, and greater participation of the population in
national politics. Rural society in all but a few regions was organized in rigidly hierarchical
structures in which change of status was very difficult. Only in the coffee-growing departments of
Caldas and Antioquia were there sizable segments of the population exhibiting the traits of a rural
middle class.
Social scientists continued to disagree about the definition of class in Colombia, the composition
and relative importance of the middle class, the role of the upper class in the larger society, and the
degree to which the society was evolving into a more open system. It was difficult to speak of
social class per se because class implied feelings of cohesion and exclusiveness vis-à-vis other
classes--characteristics that did not uniformly apply to status groups in Colombia. This class
consciousness among persons with similar economic, occupational, and sociological interests was
found only at the highest stratum of society in Colombia.
Four classes and their relative proportions could be distinguished in recent years: upper class, 5
percent; middle class, 20 percent; lower class, 50 percent; and the masses, 25 percent. There were
also two important transitional subdivisions: the new rich, who constituted perhaps 3 percent of the
total and were tenuously members of the upper class; and the upper lower class, organized bluecollar workers, and poorer white-collar workers, who made up about 15 percent of the total.
Classes were distinguished by occupation, life-style, income, family background, education, and
power. Within each of the classes, there were numerous subtle gradations in status. Colombians
tended to be extremely status-conscious, and class membership was an important aspect of social
life because it regulated the interaction of groups and individuals. Social class boundaries were far
more flexible in the city than in the countryside, but consciousness of status and class distinctions
continued to permeate social life in both sectors.
Special Note on Health and Welfare
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Today, most Colombians enjoyed significantly better health care and nutrition than previous
generations. The country had risen from the ranks of the poorest nations in Latin America during
the 1950s and 1960s to an intermediate status from the 1980s to the present, according to health
indicators. These improvements were the result of rapid socio-economic modernization, which was
accompanied by improvements in education and working conditions; greater access to urban health
care facilities, running water, and sewerage systems; and more modern attitudes toward sexuality,
medicine, disease prevention, nutrition, and exercise. There were also explicit state policies
designed to improve access to and availability of health care and medical services. In the 1970s and
1980s, Colombia developed a public and private infrastructure of hospitals and other health care
facilities, a widespread network of medical schools, and a specialized set of institutions responsible
for formulating and handling public policy in the health sector.
Despite general improvement by the early 1990s, the benefits of better health care is not evenly
distributed among the different strata and regions of Colombian society. Urban areas, the upper
and middle classes, blue-collar workers, and the central Andean region enjoy above-average health
conditions. In contrast, the rural and urban poor suffer from higher mortality and morbidity rates
because of inadequate or inaccessible medical services, housing, and food. As such, Colombian
health policy makers were faced with the task of improving services to the least-favored segments
of society, while improving the quality and overall performance of the national health care system.
Written by Dr. Denise Youngblood Coleman, Editor in Chief at CountryWatch.com. See
Bibliography for general research sources.
Human Development Index
Human Development Index
Human Development Index (Ranked Numerically)
The Human Development Index (HDI) is used to measure quality of life in countries across the
world. The HDI has been compiled since 1990 by the United Nations Development Programme
(UNDP) on a regular basis. The HDI is a composite of several indicators, which measure a
country's achievements in three main arenas of human development: longevity, education, and
economic standard of living. Although the concept of human development is complicated and
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cannot be properly captured by values and indices, the HDI offers a wide-ranging assessment of
human development in certain countries, not based solely upon traditional economic and financial
indicators. For more information about the methodology used to calculate the HDI, please see the
"Source Materials" in the appendices of this review.
Very High
Human
Development
High Human
Development
Medium Human
Development
Low Human
Development
1. Norway
43. Bahamas
86. Fiji
128. Kenya
2. Australia
44. Lithuania
87. Turkmenistan
129. Bangladesh
3. New Zealand
45. Chile
88. Dominican
Republic
130. Ghana
4. United States
46. Argentina
89. China
131. Cameroon
5. Ireland
47. Kuwait
90. El Salvador
132. Myanmar
(Burma)
6. Liechtenstein
48. Latvia
91. Sri Lanka
133. Yemen
7. Netherlands
49. Montenegro
92. Thailand
134. Benin
8. Canada
50. Romania
93. Gabon
135.
Madagascar
9. Sweden
51. Croatia
94. Surname
136. Mauritania
10. Germany
52. Uruguay
95. Bolivia
137. Papua
New Guinea
11. Japan
53. Libya
96. Paraguay
138. Nepal
12. South Korea
54. Panama
97. Philippines
139. Togo
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13. Switzerland
55. Saudi Arabia
98. Botswana
140. Comoros
14. France
56. Mexico
99. Moldova
141. Lesotho
15. Israel
57. Malaysia
100. Mongolia
142. Nigeria
16. Finland
58. Bulgaria
101. Egypt
143. Uganda
17. Iceland
59. Trinidad and Tobago
102. Uzbekistan
144. Senegal
18. Belgium
60. Serbia
103. Micronesia
145. Haiti
19. Denmark
61. Belarus
104. Guyana
146. Angola
20. Spain
62. Costa Rica
105. Namibia
147. Djibouti
21. Hong King
63. Peru
106. Honduras
148. Tanzania
22. Greece
64. Albania
107. Maldives
149. Cote
d'Ivoire
23. Italy
65. Russian Federation
108. Indonesia
150. Zambia
24. Luxembourg
66. Kazakhstan
109. Kyrgyzstan
151. Gambia
25. Austria
67. Azerbaijan
110. South Africa
152. Rwanda
26. United
Kingdom
68. Bosnia and
Herzegovina
111. Syria
153. Malawi
27. Singapore
69. Ukraine
112. Tajikistan
154. Sudan
28. Czech
Republic
70. Iran
113. Vietnam
155.
Afghanistan
29. Slovenia
71. The former Yugoslav
Republic of Macedonia
114. Morocco
156. Guinea
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30. Andorra
31. Slovakia
Pending
72. Mauritius
73. Brazil
115. Nicaragua
157. Ethiopia
116. Guatemala
158. Sierra
Leone
159. Central
African
Republic
32. United Arab
Emirates
74. Georgia
117. Equatorial
Guinea
33. Malta
75. Venezuela
118. Cape Verde
160. Mali
34. Estonia
76. Armenia
119. India
161. Burkina
Faso
35. Cyprus
77. Ecuador
120. East Timor
162. Liberia
36. Hungary
78. Belize
121. Swaziland
163. Chad
37. Brunei
79. Colombia
122. Laos
164. GuineaBissau
38. Qatar
80. Jamaica
123. Solomon
Islands
165.
Mozambique
39. Bahrain
81. Tunisia
124. Cambodia
166. Burundi
40. Portugal
82. Jordan
125. Pakistan
167. Niger
41. Poland
83. Turkey
126. Congo RC
168. Congo
DRC
84. Algeria
127. Sao Tome
and Principe
169. Zimbabwe
42. Barbados
85. Tonga
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Methodology:
For more information about the methodology used to calculate the HDI, please see the "Source
Materials" in the appendices of this Country Review.
Reference:
As published in United Nations Development Programme's Human Development Report 2010.
Source:
United Nations Development Programme's Human Development Index available at URL:
http://hdr.undp.org/en/statistics/
Updated:
Uploaded in 2011 using ranking available; reviewed in 2015
Life Satisfaction Index
Life Satisfaction Index
Life Satisfaction Index
Created by Adrian G. White, an Analytic Social Psychologist at the University of Leicester, the
"Satisfaction with Life Index" measures subjective life satisfaction across various countries. The
data was taken from a metastudy (see below for source) and associates the notion of subjective
happiness or life satisfaction with qualitative parameters such as health, wealth, and access to
basic education. This assessment serves as an alternative to other measures of happiness that tend
to rely on traditional and quantitative measures of policy on quality of life, such as GNP and GDP.
The methodology involved the responses of 80,000 people across the globe.
Rank
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1
Denmark
273.4
2
Switzerland
273.33
3
Austria
260
4
Iceland
260
5
The Bahamas
256.67
6
Finland
256.67
7
Sweden
256.67
8
Iran
253.33
9
Brunei
253.33
10
Canada
253.33
11
Ireland
253.33
12
Luxembourg
253.33
13
Costa Rica
250
14
Malta
250
15
Netherlands
250
16
Antiguaand Barbuda
246.67
17
Malaysia
246.67
18
New Zealand
246.67
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19
Norway
246.67
20
Seychelles
246.67
21
Saint Kitts and Nevis
246.67
22
United Arab Emirates
246.67
23
United States
246.67
24
Vanuatu
246.67
25
Venezuela
246.67
26
Australia
243.33
27
Barbados
243.33
28
Belgium
243.33
29
Dominica
243.33
30
Oman
243.33
31
Saudi Arabia
243.33
32
Suriname
243.33
33
Bahrain
240
34
Colombia
240
35
Germany
240
36
Guyana
240
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37
Honduras
240
38
Kuwait
240
39
Panama
240
40
Saint Vincent and the Grenadines
240
41
United Kingdom
236.67
42
Dominican Republic
233.33
43
Guatemala
233.33
44
Jamaica
233.33
45
Qatar
233.33
46
Spain
233.33
47
Saint Lucia
233.33
48
Belize
230
49
Cyprus
230
50
Italy
230
51
Mexico
230
52
Samoa
230
53
Singapore
230
54
Solomon Islands
230
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55
Trinidad and Tobago
230
56
Argentina
226.67
57
Fiji
223.33
58
Israel
223.33
59
Mongolia
223.33
60
São Tomé and Príncipe
223.33
61
El Salvador
220
62
France
220
63
Hong Kong
220
64
Indonesia
220
65
Kyrgyzstan
220
66
Maldives
220
67
Slovenia
220
68
Taiwan
220
69
East Timor
220
70
Tonga
220
71
Chile
216.67
72
Grenada
216.67
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73
Mauritius
216.67
74
Namibia
216.67
75
Paraguay
216.67
76
Thailand
216.67
77
Czech Republic
213.33
78
Philippines
213.33
79
Tunisia
213.33
80
Uzbekistan
213.33
81
Brazil
210
82
China
210
83
Cuba
210
84
Greece
210
85
Nicaragua
210
86
Papua New Guinea
210
87
Uruguay
210
88
Gabon
206.67
89
Ghana
206.67
90
Japan
206.67
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91
Yemen
206.67
92
Portugal
203.33
93
Sri Lanka
203.33
94
Tajikistan
203.33
95
Vietnam
203.33
96
Bhutan
200
97
Comoros
196.67
98
Croatia
196.67
99
Poland
196.67
100
Cape Verde
193.33
101
Kazakhstan
193.33
102
South Korea
193.33
103
Madagascar
193.33
104
Bangladesh
190
105
Republic of the Congo
190
106
The Gambia
190
107
Hungary
190
108
Libya
190
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109
South Africa
190
110
Cambodia
186.67
111
Ecuador
186.67
112
Kenya
186.67
113
Lebanon
186.67
114
Morocco
186.67
115
Peru
186.67
116
Senegal
186.67
117
Bolivia
183.33
118
Haiti
183.33
119
Nepal
183.33
120
Nigeria
183.33
121
Tanzania
183.33
122
Benin
180
123
Botswana
180
124
Guinea-Bissau
180
125
India
180
126
Laos
180
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127
Mozambique
180
128
Palestinian Authority
180
129
Slovakia
180
130
Myanmar
176.67
131
Mali
176.67
132
Mauritania
176.67
133
Turkey
176.67
134
Algeria
173.33
135
Equatorial Guinea
173.33
136
Romania
173.33
137
Bosnia and Herzegovina
170
138
Cameroon
170
139
Estonia
170
140
Guinea
170
141
Jordan
170
142
Syria
170
143
Sierra Leone
166.67
144
Azerbaijan
163.33
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145
Central African Republic
163.33
146
Republic of Macedonia
163.33
147
Togo
163.33
148
Zambia
163.33
149
Angola
160
150
Djibouti
160
151
Egypt
160
152
Burkina Faso
156.67
153
Ethiopia
156.67
154
Latvia
156.67
155
Lithuania
156.67
156
Uganda
156.67
157
Albania
153.33
158
Malawi
153.33
159
Chad
150
160
Côte d'Ivoire
150
161
Niger
150
162
Eritrea
146.67
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163
Rwanda
146.67
164
Bulgaria
143.33
165
Lesotho
143.33
166
Pakistan
143.33
167
Russia
143.33
168
Swaziland
140
169
Georgia
136.67
170
Belarus
133.33
171
Turkmenistan
133.33
172
Armenia
123.33
173
Sudan
120
174
Ukraine
120
175
Moldova
116.67
176
Democratic Republic of the Congo
110
177
Zimbabwe
110
178
Burundi
100
Commentary:
European countries, such as Denmark, Iceland, Finland, Sweden, Switzerland, Austria resided at
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the top of the ranking with highest levels of self-reported life satisfaction. Conversely, European
countries such as Latvia, Lithuania, Moldova, Belarus and Ukraine ranked low on the index.
African countries such as Democratic Republic of Congo, Zimbabwe a n d Burundi found
themselves at the very bottom of the ranking, and indeed, very few African countries could be
found in the top 100. Japan was at the mid-way point in the ranking, however, other Asian
countries such as Brunei and Malaysia were in the top tier, while Pakistan was close to the bottom
with a low level of self-identified life satisfaction. As a region, the Middle East presented a mixed
bad with Saudi Arabians reporing healthy levels of life satisfaction and Egyptians near the bottom
of the ranking. As a region, Caribbean countries were ranked highly, consistently demonstrating
high levels of life satisfaction. The findings showed that health was the most crucial determining
factor in life satisfaction, followed by prosperity and education.
Source:
White, A. (2007). A Global Projection of Subjective Well-being: A Challenge To Positive
Psychology? Psychtalk 56, 17-20. The data was extracted from a meta-analysis by Marks,
Abdallah, Simms & Thompson (2006).
Uploaded:
Based on study noted above in "Source" ; reviewed in 2015
Happy Planet Index
Happy Planet Index
The Happy Planet Index (HPI) is used to measure human well-being in conjunction with
environmental impact. The HPI has been compiled since 2006 by the New Economics
Foundation. The index is a composite of several indicators including subjective life satisfaction, life
expectancy at birth, and ecological footprint per capita.
As noted by NEFA, the HPI "reveals the ecological efficiency with which human well-being is
delivered." Indeed, the index combines environmental impact with human well-being to measure
the environmental efficiency with which, country by country, people live long and happy lives.
The countries ranked highest by the HPI are not necessarily the ones with the happiest people
overall, but the ones that allow their citizens to live long and fulfilling lives, without negatively
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impacting this opportunity for either future generations or citizens of other countries. Accordingly,
a country like the United States will rank low on this list due to its large per capital ecological
footprint, which uses more than its fair share of resources, and will likely cause planetary damage.
It should be noted that the HPI was designed to be a counterpoint to other well-established indices
of countries' development, such as Gross Domestic Product (GDP), which measures overall
national wealth and economic development, but often obfuscates the realities of countries with
stark variances between the rich and the poor. Moreover, the objective of most of the world's
people is not to be wealthy but to be happy. The HPI also differs from the Human Development
Index (HDI), which measures quality of life but not ecology, since it [HPI] also includes
sustainability as a key indicator.
Rank
Country
HPI
1
Costa Rica
76.1
2
Dominican Republic
71.8
3
Jamaica
70.1
4
Guatemala
68.4
5
Vietnam
66.5
6
Colombia
66.1
7
Cuba
65.7
8
El Salvador
61.5
9
Brazil
61.0
10
Honduras
61.0
11
Nicaragua
60.5
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12
Egypt
60.3
13
Saudi Arabia
59.7
14
Philippines
59.0
15
Argentina
59.0
16
Indonesia
58.9
17
Bhutan
58.5
18
Panama
57.4
19
Laos
57.3
20
China
57.1
21
Morocco
56.8
22
Sri Lanka
56.5
23
Mexico
55.6
24
Pakistan
55.6
25
Ecuador
55.5
26
Jordan
54.6
27
Belize
54.5
28
Peru
54.4
29
Tunisia
54.3
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30
Trinidad and Tobago
54.2
31
Bangladesh
54.1
32
Moldova
54.1
33
Malaysia
54.0
34
Tajikistan
53.5
35
India
53.0
36
Venezuela
52.5
37
Nepal
51.9
38
Syria
51.3
39
Burma
51.2
40
Algeria
51.2
41
Thailand
50.9
42
Haiti
50.8
43
Netherlands
50.6
44
Malta
50.4
45
Uzbekistan
50.1
46
Chile
49.7
47
Bolivia
49.3
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48
Armenia
48.3
49
Singapore
48.2
50
Yemen
48.1
51
Germany
48.1
52
Switzerland
48.1
53
Sweden
48.0
54
Albania
47.9
55
Paraguay
47.8
56
Palestinian Authority
47.7
57
Austria
47.7
58
Serbia
47.6
59
Finland
47.2
60
Croatia
47.2
61
Kyrgyzstan
47.1
62
Cyprus
46.2
63
Guyana
45.6
64
Belgium
45.4
65
Bosnia and Herzegovina
45.0
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66
Slovenia
44.5
67
Israel
44.5
68
South Korea
44.4
69
Italy
44.0
70
Romania
43.9
71
France
43.9
72
Georgia
43.6
73
Slovakia
43.5
74
United Kingdom
43.3
75
Japan
43.3
76
Spain
43.2
77
Poland
42.8
78
Ireland
42.6
79
Iraq
42.6
80
Cambodia
42.3
81
Iran
42.1
82
Bulgaria
42.0
83
Turkey
41.7
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84
Hong Kong
41.6
85
Azerbaijan
41.2
86
Lithuania
40.9
87
Djibouti
40.4
88
Norway
40.4
89
Canada
39.4
90
Hungary
38.9
91
Kazakhstan
38.5
92
Czech Republic
38.3
93
Mauritania
38.2
94
Iceland
38.1
95
Ukraine
38.1
96
Senegal
38.0
97
Greece
37.6
98
Portugal
37.5
99
Uruguay
37.2
100
Ghana
37.1
101
Latvia
36.7
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102
Australia
36.6
103
New Zealand
36.2
104
Belarus
35.7
105
Denmark
35.5
106
Mongolia
35.0
107
Malawi
34.5
108
Russia
34.5
109
Chad
34.3
110
Lebanon
33.6
111
Macedonia
32.7
112
Republic of the Congo
32.4
113
Madagascar
31.5
114
United States
30.7
115
Nigeria
30.3
116
Guinea
30.3
117
Uganda
30.2
118
South Africa
29.7
119
Rwanda
29.6
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120
Democratic Republic of the Congo
29.0
121
Sudan
28.5
122
Luxembourg
28.5
123
United Arab Emirates
28.2
124
Ethiopia
28.1
125
Kenya
27.8
126
Cameroon
27.2
127
Zambia
27.2
128
Kuwait
27.0
129
Niger
26.9
130
Angola
26.8
131
Estonia
26.4
132
Mali
25.8
133
Mozambique
24.6
134
Benin
24.6
135
Togo
23.3
136
Sierra Leone
23.1
137
Central African Republic
22.9
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138
Burkina Faso
22.4
139
Burundi
21.8
140
Namibia
21.1
141
Botswana
20.9
142
Tanzania
17.8
143
Zimbabwe
16.6
Source: This material is derived from the Happy Planet Index issued by the New Economics
Foundation (NEF).
Methodology: T h e m e t h o d o l o g y f o r t h e c a l c u l a t i o n s c a n b e f o u n d a t U R L :
http://www.happyplanetindex.org/
Status of Women
Overview
For over 50 years, numerous violent conflicts have plagued Columbia. Of the three million people
displaced by these conflicts in recent years, 58 percent are women. While Colombia is one of the
few countries with laws designated to protect the internally displaced, victims still contend with the
lack of access to healthcare, employment, humanitarian aid and educational opportunities.
Displaced women are also at a significant risk of domestic violence. Women in Colombia also face
the additional risk of being vulnerable to violence by the armed forces. Rape and sexual slavery are
often used as tools of repression and fear by paramilitary and guerilla forces. Finally,
discrimination against women is also a prevalent problem throughout the country. Women are a
disproportionately higher percentage of those unemployed due to discriminatory hiring practices.
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Gender Related Development Index (GDI) Rank:
55th out of 140
Gender Empowerment Measure (GEM) Rank:
52nd out of 80
Female Population:
23.1 million
Female Life Expectancy at birth:
75.4 years
Total Fertility Rate:
2.6
Maternal Mortality Ratio:
130
Total Number of Women Living with HIV/AIDS:
24,000-95,000
Ever Married Women, Ages 15-19 (%):
18%
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Mean Age at Time of Marriage:
23
Contraceptive Use Among Married Women, Any Method (%):
76%
Female Adult Literacy Rate:
92.8% for overall population with little variance for gender
Combined Female Gross enrollment ratio for Primary, Secondary and Tertiary schools:
72%
Female-Headed Households (%):
28%
Economically Active Females (%):
49.3%
Female Contributing Family Workers (%):
58%
Female Estimated Earned Income:
$4,557
Seats in Parliament held by women (%):
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Lower or Single House: 12.0%
Upper House or Senate: 8.8%
Year Women Received the Right to Vote:
1954
Year Women Received the Right to Stand for Election:
1954
*The Gender Development Index (GDI) is a composite index which measures the average
achievement in a country. While very similar to the Human Development Index in its use of the
same variables, the GDI adjusts the average achievement of each country in terms of life
expectancy, enrollment in schools, income, and literacy in accordance to the disparities between
males and females.
*The Gender Empowerment Measure (GEM) is a composite index measuring gender inequality in
three of the basic dimensions of empowerment; economic participation and decision-making,
political participation and decision-making, and power over economic resources.
*Total Fertility Rate (TFR) is defined as the average number of babies born to women during their
reproductive years. A TFR of 2.1 is considered the replacement rate; once a TFR of a population
reaches 2.1 the population will remain stable assuming no immigration or emigration takes place.
When the TFR is greater than 2.1 a population will increase and when it is less than 2.1 a
population will eventually decrease, although due to the age structure of a population it will take
years before a low TFR is translated into lower population.
*Maternal Mortality Rate is the number of deaths to women per 100,000 live births that resulted
from conditions related to pregnancy and or delivery related complications.
*Economically Active Females are the share of the female population, ages 15 and above, whom
supply, or are able to supply, labor for the production of goods and services.
*Female Contributing Family Workers are those females who work without pay in an economic
enterprise operated by a relative living in the same household.
*Estimated Earned Income is measured according to Purchasing Power Parity (PPP) in US
dollars.
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Global Gender Gap Index
Global Gender Gap Index
Editor's Note:
The Global Gender Gap Index by the World Economic Forum ranks most of the world’s countries
in terms of the division of resources and opportunities among males and females. Specifically, the
ranking assesses the gender inequality gap in these four arenas:
1. Economic participation and opportunity (salaries and high skilled employment participation
levels)
2. Educational attainment (access to basic and higher level education)
3. Political empowerment (representation in decision-making structures)
4. Health and survival (life expectancy and sex ratio)
2010
rank
2010
score
2010
rank
among
2009
countries
Iceland
1
0.8496
1
1
0.8276
4
0.7999
4
Norway
2
0.8404
2
3
0.8227
1
0.8239
2
Finland
3
0.8260
3
2
0.8252
2
0.8195
3
Sweden
4
0.8024
4
4
0.8139
3
0.8139
1
2009
rank
2009
score
2008
rank
2008
score
2007
rank
Country
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New
Zealand
5
0.7808
5
5
0.7880
5
0.7859
5
Ireland
6
0.7773
6
8
0.7597
8
0.7518
9
Denmark
7
0.7719
7
7
0.7628
7
0.7538
8
Lesotho
8
0.7678
8
10
0.7495
16
0.7320
26
Philippines
9
0.7654
9
9
0.7579
6
0.7568
6
Switzerland
10
0.7562
10
13
0.7426
14
0.7360
40
Spain
11
0.7554
11
17
0.7345
17
0.7281
10
South Africa
12
0.7535
12
6
0.7709
22
0.7232
20
Germany
13
0.7530
13
12
0.7449
11
0.7394
7
Belgium
14
0.7509
14
33
0.7165
28
0.7163
19
United
Kingdom
15
0.7460
15
15
0.7402
13
0.7366
11
Sri Lanka
16
0.7458
16
16
0.7402
12
0.7371
15
Netherlands
17
0.7444
17
11
0.7490
9
0.7399
12
Latvia
18
0.7429
18
14
0.7416
10
0.7397
13
United
States
19
0.7411
19
31
0.7173
27
0.7179
31
Canada
20
0.7372
20
25
0.7196
31
0.7136
18
Trinidad and
Tobago
21
0.7353
21
19
0.7298
19
0.7245
46
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Mozambique
22
0.7329
22
26
0.7195
18
0.7266
43
Australia
23
0.7271
23
20
0.7282
21
0.7241
17
Cuba
24
0.7253
24
29
0.7176
25
0.7195
22
Namibia
25
0.7238
25
32
0.7167
30
0.7141
29
Luxembourg
26
0.7231
26
63
0.6889
66
0.6802
58
Mongolia
27
0.7194
27
22
0.7221
40
0.7049
62
Costa Rica
28
0.7194
28
27
0.7180
32
0.7111
28
Argentina
29
0.7187
29
24
0.7211
24
0.7209
33
Nicaragua
30
0.7176
30
49
0.7002
71
0.6747
90
Barbados
31
0.7176
31
21
0.7236
26
0.7188
n/a
Portugal
32
0.7171
32
46
0.7013
39
0.7051
37
Uganda
33
0.7169
33
40
0.7067
43
0.6981
50
Moldova
34
0.7160
34
36
0.7104
20
0.7244
21
Lithuania
35
0.7132
35
30
0.7175
23
0.7222
14
Bahamas
36
0.7128
36
28
0.7179
n/a
n/a
n/a
Austria
37
0.7091
37
42
0.7031
29
0.7153
27
Guyana
38
0.7090
38
35
0.7108
n/a
n/a
n/a
Panama
39
0.7072
39
43
0.7024
34
0.7095
38
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Ecuador
40
0.7072
40
23
0.7220
35
0.7091
44
Kazakhstan
41
0.7055
41
47
0.7013
45
0.6976
32
Slovenia
42
0.7047
42
52
0.6982
51
0.6937
49
Poland
43
0.7037
43
50
0.6998
49
0.6951
60
Jamaica
44
0.7037
44
48
0.7013
44
0.6980
39
Russian
Federation
45
0.7036
45
51
0.6987
42
0.6994
45
France
46
0.7025
46
18
0.7331
15
0.7341
51
Estonia
47
0.7018
47
37
0.7094
37
0.7076
30
Chile
48
0.7013
48
64
0.6884
65
0.6818
86
Macedonia,
FYR
49
0.6996
49
53
0.6950
53
0.6914
35
Bulgaria
50
0.6983
50
38
0.7072
36
0.7077
25
Kyrgyz
Republic
51
0.6973
51
41
0.7058
41
0.7045
70
Israel
52
0.6957
52
45
0.7019
56
0.6900
36
Croatia
53
0.6939
53
54
0.6944
46
0.6967
16
Honduras
54
0.6927
54
62
0.6893
47
0.6960
68
Colombia
55
0.6927
55
56
0.6939
50
0.6944
24
Singapore
56
0.6914
56
84
0.6664
84
0.6625
77
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Thailand
57
0.6910
57
59
0.6907
52
0.6917
52
Greece
58
0.6908
58
85
0.6662
75
0.6727
72
Uruguay
59
0.6897
59
57
0.6936
54
0.6907
78
Peru
60
0.6895
60
44
0.7024
48
0.6959
75
China
61
0.6881
61
60
0.6907
57
0.6878
73
Botswana
62
0.6876
62
39
0.7071
63
0.6839
53
Ukraine
63
0.6869
63
61
0.6896
62
0.6856
57
Venezuela
64
0.6863
64
69
0.6839
59
0.6875
55
Czech
Republic
65
0.6850
65
74
0.6789
69
0.6770
64
Tanzania
66
0.6829
66
73
0.6797
38
0.7068
34
Romania
67
0.6826
67
70
0.6805
70
0.6763
47
Malawi
68
0.6824
68
76
0.6738
81
0.6664
87
Paraguay
69
0.6804
69
66
0.6868
100
0.6379
69
Ghana
70
0.6782
70
80
0.6704
77
0.6679
63
Slovak
Republic
71
0.6778
71
68
0.6845
64
0.6824
54
Vietnam
72
0.6776
72
71
0.6802
68
0.6778
42
Dominican
Republic
73
0.6774
73
67
0.6859
72
0.6744
65
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Italy
74
0.6765
74
72
0.6798
67
0.6788
84
Gambia,
The
75
0.6762
75
75
0.6752
85
0.6622
95
Bolivia
76
0.6751
76
82
0.6693
80
0.6667
80
Brueni
Darussalem
77
0.6748
77
94
0.6524
99
0.6392
n/a
Albania
78
0.6726
78
91
0.6601
87
0.6591
66
Hungary
79
0.6720
79
65
0.6879
60
0.6867
61
Madagascar
80
0.6713
80
77
0.6732
74
0.6736
89
Angola
81
0.6712
81
106
0.6353
114
0.6032
110
Bangladesh
82
0.6702
82
93
0.6526
90
0.6531
100
Malta
83
0.6695
83
88
0.6635
83
0.6634
76
Armenia
84
0.6669
84
90
0.6619
78
0.6677
71
Brazil
85
0.6655
85
81
0.6695
73
0.6737
74
Cyprus
86
0.6642
86
79
0.6706
76
0.6694
82
Indonesia
87
0.6615
87
92
0.6580
93
0.6473
81
Georgia
88
0.6598
88
83
0.6680
82
0.6654
67
Tajikistan
89
0.6598
89
86
0.6661
89
0.6541
79
El Salvador
90
0.6596
90
55
0.6939
58
0.6875
48
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Mexico
91
0.6577
91
98
0.6503
97
0.6441
93
Zimbabwe
92
0.6574
92
95
0.6518
92
0.6485
88
Belize
93
0.6536
93
87
0.6636
86
0.6610
94
Japan
94
0.6524
94
101
0.6447
98
0.6434
91
Mauritius
95
0.6520
95
96
0.6513
95
0.6466
85
Kenya
96
0.6499
96
97
0.6512
88
0.6547
83
Cambodia
97
0.6482
97
104
0.6410
94
0.6469
98
Malaysia
98
0.6479
98
100
0.6467
96
0.6442
92
Maldives
99
0.6452
99
99
0.6482
91
0.6501
99
Azerbaijan
100
0.6446
100
89
0.6626
61
0.6856
59
Senegal
101
0.6414
101
102
0.6427
n/a
n/a
n/a
Suriname
102
0.6407
102
78
0.6726
79
0.6674
56
United Arab
Emirates
103
0.6397
103
112
0.6198
105
0.6220
105
Korea, Rep.
104
0.6342
104
115
0.6146
108
0.6154
97
Kuwait
105
0.6318
105
105
0.6356
101
0.6358
96
Zambia
106
0.6293
106
107
0.6310
106
0.6205
101
Tunisia
107
0.6266
107
109
0.6233
103
0.6295
102
Fiji
108
0.6256
108
103
0.6414
n/a
n/a
n/a
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Guatemala
109
0.6238
109
111
0.6209
112
0.6072
106
Bahrain
110
0.6217
110
116
0.6136
121
0.5927
115
Burkina
Faso
111
0.6162
111
120
0.6081
115
0.6029
117
India
112
0.6155
112
114
0.6151
113
0.6060
114
Mauritania
113
0.6152
113
119
0.6103
110
0.6117
111
Cameroon
114
0.6110
114
118
0.6108
117
0.6017
116
Nepal
115
0.6084
115
110
0.6213
120
0.5942
125
Lebanon*
116
0.6084
n/a
n/a
n/a
n/a
n/a
n/a
Qatar
117
0.6059
116
125
0.5907
119
0.5948
109
Nigeria
118
0.6055
117
108
0.6280
102
0.6339
107
Algeria
119
0.6052
118
117
0.6119
111
0.6111
108
Jordan
120
0.6048
119
113
0.6182
104
0.6275
104
Ethiopia
121
0.6019
120
122
0.5948
122
0.5867
113
Oman
122
0.5950
121
123
0.5938
118
0.5960
119
Iran
123
0.5933
122
128
0.5839
116
0.6021
118
Syria
124
0.5926
123
121
0.6072
107
0.6181
103
Egypt
125
0.5899
124
126
0.5862
124
0.5832
120
Turkey
126
0.5876
125
129
0.5828
123
0.5853
121
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Morocco
127
0.5767
126
124
0.5926
125
0.5757
122
Benin
128
0.5719
127
131
0.5643
126
0.5582
123
Saudi Arabia
129
0.5713
128
130
0.5651
128
0.5537
124
Côte
d'Ivoire*
130
0.5691
n/a
n/a
n/a
n/a
n/a
n/a
Mali
131
0.5680
129
127
0.5860
109
0.6117
112
Pakistan
132
0.5465
130
132
0.5458
127
0.5549
126
Chad
133
0.5330
131
133
0.5417
129
0.5290
127
Yemen
134
0.4603
132
134
0.4609
130
0.4664
128
Belarus
n/a
n/a
n/a
34
0.7141
33
0.7099
23
Uzbekistan
n/a
n/a
n/a
58
0.6913
55
0.6906
41
*new country 2010
Commentary:
According to the report’s index, Nordic countries, such as Iceland, Norway, Finland, and Sweden
have continued to dominate at the top of the ranking for gender equality. Meanwhile, France has
seen a notable decline in the ranking, largely as a result of decreased number of women holding
ministerial portfolios in that country. In the Americas, the United States has risen in the ranking to
top the region, predominantly as a result of a decreasing wage gap, as well as higher number of
women holding key positions in the current Obama administration. Canada has continued to
remain as one of the top ranking countries of the Americas, followed by the small Caribbean island
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nation of Trinidad and Tobago, which has the distinction of being among the top three countries of
the Americans in the realm of gender equality. Lesotho and South African ranked highly in the
index, leading not only among African countries but also in global context. Despite Lesotho still
lagging in the area of life expectancy, its high ranking was attributed to high levels of female
participation in the labor force and female literacy. The Philippines and Sri Lanka were the top
ranking countries for gender equality for Asia, ranking highly also in global context. The
Philippines has continued to show strong performance in all strong performance on all four
dimensions (detailed above) of the index. Finally, in the Arab world, the United Arab Emirates
held the highest-rank within that region of the world; however, its placement near the bottom of
the global list highlights the fact that Arab countries are generally poor performers when it comes
to the matter of gender equality in global scope.
Source:
This data is derived from the latest edition of The Global Gender Gap Report by the World
Economic Forum.
Available at URL:
http://www.weforum.org/en/Communities/Women%20Leaders%20and%20Gender%20Parity/GenderGapNetw
Updated:
Based on latest available data as set forth in chart; reviewed in 2014
Culture and Arts
Etiquette
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BUSINESS AND CULTURE IN COLOMBIA
EDITOR'S NOTE:
This section is divided into three main portions, with the objective of informing travelers of
conveying a general notion of “in country” values and understanding, examining cultural etiquette,
and explicating typical business practices in Colombia. The first sub-section is titled “Cultural
Orientation in Colombia,” the second sub-section is titled "Cultural Etiquette in Colombia," and the
third sub-section is titled 'Business Practices Cultural Context."
1. CULTURAL ORIENTATION IN COLOMBIA
Introduction
Every culture has its own unique traits. Understanding a little about the cultural orientation of the
people in a country or a given society can be helpful in navigating the often-difficult waters of
international travel. Cultural orientation involves three key considerations: cognitive style,
understandings of truth, and value systems.
Cognitive Style
People in different cultures process and organize information differently. There is no standard
global manner of acquiring and internalizing knowledge. In general, non-Western cultures tend to
eschew analytical processes and deal more in terms of concrete though. Western cultures tend to
involve more analyzing in information acquisition and organization. Its position as a developing
country in the globalized world means that Colombia does not fit neatly on either side of this
dichotomy. That said, one can expect Colombians to generally process and organize information in
a subjective and associative manner. Each situation tends to be understood in concrete and unique
terms, although there is some room for abstraction to the level of higher principles and tenets.
In practice: One might say, "My mother worked hard to provide me with a good life" in Colombia,
but an American might say, "My mother was a wonderful person." The first case is stated in
concrete and unique terms; the second case is an abstraction of the subject's being.
Understandings of Truth
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Factual, impersonal and evidentiary knowledge tends to be the basis of truth in Western cultures
influenced by the rationalism of the Enlightenment Era. Again, Colombia does not fit precisely into
this mold. While cold, hard facts are viewed as evidence in determining that which is deemed true
or false, feelings -- or subjective knowledge --also factor highly into typical Colombian notions of
truth. In this way, facts can be nebulous and malleable in the context of reality.
In practice: One might say, "Yes, the project will be done next week" in Colombia, but the same
situation might be presented by an American as such, "If we're lucky and everything goes without
complications, the project will be done next week." The first case describes the situation as he/she
would like it to be (ideally); the second case describes the situation in the context of difficult
realities.
Value Systems
The underlying value systems in varying cultures form the bases for culturally and socially distinct
behaviors. Whereas in Western cultures, particularly in the case of American culture, the individual
is the basis of defining selfhood. In other cultures, selfhood is to be understood within the context
of a larger group.
In the United States, the individual seeks to distinguish himself or herself in the work place. By
extension, his or her family is understood in individual -- that is, nuclear family -- terms. In other
countries, such as Colombia, the person is part of a larger group. In the familial context, the
person is part of an extended family network with obligations and connections that stretch far and
wide. Indeed, those connections can also extend into the business arena where helping a family
member get a job or contract would not be regarded as nepotism, but expected practice in a
country where kinship is a core value.
Family aside, even within organizations (business, government etc.), decision making is done with
the broader group in mind. In fact, there is even a word for decision-making groups: -- roscas.
People tend to make decisions while being influenced by the group -- in some cases, even seeking
to satisfy the group. To this end, the phrase "Que diran?" is commonplace in Colombia. The
phrase translates into "What will people say?" and illustrates the the intensity of group pressures
and maintaining social stability.
In practice: In Colombia, trust and mutual dependence form the basis of selfhood and one's
interactions; in the United States, independence is paramount and determines one's actions.
2. CULTURAL ETIQUETTE IN COLOMBIA
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Greetings
Social Greetings -A firm handshake with direct eye contact is the customary form of greeting. Men will need to wait
for a woman to extend her hand first if she wants her hand shaken. Friends and relatives will often
greet each other with a kiss and/or a hug -- called the abrazo in Spanish. A pat on the shoulder is a
sign of friendship.
Generally, greetings among Colombians are lengthy endeavors involving both greetings and many
inquiries about health, travels, relatives, friends or acquaintances. Quick greetings are interpreted as
disrespectful and thoughtless.
While Westerners, and particularly Americans, tend to progress quickly past the initial greeting into
business, Colombians like to ease into a conversation. They like to inquire about one's health,
one's trip, as well as relatives and friends. Brushing past this initial phase of interaction is not wellregarded in Colombia, and, indeed, may be viewed as disrespectful.
In business -Use first names only when invited to address someone in this way.
Handshakes are the most common form of greeting. Handshakes upon arrival and at the time of
departure are crucially important in Colombian culture. It should also be noted that people who are
very familiar with one may greet each other with an embrace, as noted above.
As noted just above, after the initial greeting, one should ease into conversation, and spend much
time asking and answering questions, indulging in "small talk," before getting down to business.
Formality: Forms of Address, Titles
As in all parts of Latin America, formality is the norm. Colombian culture is no different. One
should always address people by their title and last name until invited to do otherwise. Indeed,
titles are of grave importance and convey respect to those with authority, especially elder and more
senior members of a given working group. One should also note that. courtesy titles, such as “Mr”
(Señor), “Mrs”(Señora), or “Miss” (Señorita), as well as professional titles (i.e. “Licenciado”,
“Doctor”, “Profesor”) should be adhered to, followed by a surname.
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Names
Note that many Latin Americans have two surnames -- one from the father, which is listed first,
followed by the surname of the mother. When addressing someone, however, one can use the
courtesy tile followed by the first surname. That is to say, Ms. Maria Theresa Aznar Rodriguez
may be addressed as Señorita Aznar. But if Ms. Aznar married Mr. Rodrigo Gutierrez Torres,
then she would change her name to Ms. Maria Theresa Aznar Rodriguez de Gutierrez, and she
would be addressed as Señora Gutierrez.
Dress
Latin Americans are very conscious of self-presentation. Business attire is somewhat more
orthodox, including suits for both men and women. However, Colombian men may wear the
guayabera shirt to the office, and Colombian women may wear sleeveless dresses. Most social
occasions would generally require suits for men and cocktail dresses for women. Outside of
special occasions, dress is generally casual but fashionable and one should always dress with good
taste.
Shorts should be confined to private homes and are not generally worn on the street. That said,
resort-wear, including shorts, are permissible in coastal regions.
Notions of Time
Time is flexible in Colombia. An invitation to dinner at six may result in a meal being served at
nine. A business lunch hour may extend for several hours. Being late for a social occasion would
not be regarded as a sign of disrespect. Deadlines may not be met, negotiations are lengthy, and
getting mundane things done in this country also takes time. What would normally take two days
to do in the United States (i.e. acquiring a permit or having a telephone line installed) might take a
week or more to accomplish in Colombia.
Class Consciousness
Colombia is a class conscious and hierarchical society. In business, this means that decisions are
made in a top-down manner, typical of a vertical integration model. In private life, this means that
one of a higher class does not get one's hands dirty. Notions of egalitarianism, of which Americans
are especially proud, do not translate culturally to Colombia. The manual laborer is not viewed as
an equal to the business person in the office, and treating them in the same manner will result in
discomfort for all involved.
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Cultural Dos and Taboos
Spatial differences are to be observed. Colombians tend to leave less bodily space between
themselves than do Americans. That said, Colombians are not quite as likely to touch one another
during conversation as do other Latin Americans. As well, Colombians do not tend to be as
effusive and animated in their gestures as are other Latin Americans or even Italians and Spaniards.
Yawning or coughing in public, especially while in conversation, is very rude. Always cover the
mouth if you must yawn or cough. Eating in public is also not advised. Note also that pointing
one's fingers may be perceived as an obscene gesture.
Never stand with your hands on your hips, as this will be perceived as a sign you are angry. While
such aggressive stances are normal in North America, they do not translate well elsewhere.
Colombians indicate length by extending their right arm and placing their left hand at the point on
the arm where the distance from the fingertips on the right hand to the point marked by the left
hand is equal to the length being indicated.
The American gesture for "okay' does not translate the same way in other parts of the world. It is
ill-advised to use the gesture when traveling internationally.
Social Etiquette
Sports (especially soccer which is called "futball" locally), culture, literature, dance, music, family
and travel make excellent topics of conversation. Try to be informed about the local cultural life in
this regard. Avoid discussing politics, terrorism, or illegal drugs in Colombia; Colombians are very
proud of their nation, their cultural and artistic achievements and do not enjoy listening to criticisms
of their country.
Like other Latin Americans, Colombians have a tradition of hospitality and may invite guests to
their homes. Dinner is normally eaten between 7:00 and 9:00 P.M., but a dinner party will begin
and end later. A dinner party will end soon after the meal, but a cocktail party (with dancing) may
go until 5:00 A.M. Expect formal or semi-formal dress for either event.
Dining is formal with diners keeping wrists on the table and elbows off the table. The fork should
remain consistently in the left hand and the knife should be used in the right hand. The "fork flipover" from left-to-right, common in North American usage, is inappropriate in Latin America.
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If you are invited to dinner, it is appropriate to bring a gift for the host or hostess. Exotic flowers,
expensive and imported chocolates, pastries, cognacs, whiskey and other upper tier brands of
liquor make fine gifts. Inappropriate gifts include knives (they symbolize the dissolution of a
friendship) or flowers (such as lilies and marigolds) which are used at funerals. A wrapped gift may
not be opened in the presence of the giver for fear of appearing greedy, but if you are the recipient
of a gift, profuse appreciation is expected.
Note on Business Etiquette
Note that business is not usually discussed at social dinners, although business dinners at
restaurants do occur frequently. See section below on business and culture for more details.
3. BUSINESS PRACTICES IN CULTURAL CONTEXT
Business Culture: Information for Business Travelers
There is a very vigorous international business community in Colombia, with hundreds of wellestablished companies committed to their long-term presence in the country. Colombia, in terms of
natural and human resources, offers a strategic location, a well-developed industrial and
infrastructure capacity, and a modern business environment.
In spite of the negative perceptions reflected through the often-distorted prism of international
news reporting about Colombia's security problems, first-time business visitors are usually
pleasantly surprised at the high level of development and sophistication of the Colombian private
sector. Colombian business people tend to be well educated (often with some training in North
America) and professional. They are serious, hardworking, and share many of the same work
habits and ethics as business people in the North America and Europe. This is one of the many
reasons that, despite Colombia's political and social problems, knowledgeable business people have
for many years come to Colombia to do business.
Colombians tend to be friendly, straightforward and direct in their business dealings. They
understand the give-and-take of business, and look to negotiate business arrangements that will be
of mutual advantage to both parties. Colombian business people are generally punctual, yet flexible,
and expect the same of their business associates. Most business customs are similar to those in
North America.
Given the proximity of the two countries and the long-term presence of U.S. firms in the market,
Colombians are used to doing business with the U.S. Many of them have traveled or studied in the
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United States and have family members or friends there. Colombian executives and technicians, as
well as government officials, travel frequently to the U.S. for meetings, conferences, trade fairs,
training and tourism.
Working breakfasts and lunches at hotels and private clubs have become common practice in most
Colombian cities. Dinner meetings tend to be less formal. Business cocktails and official receptions
are common events and are used as opportunities to make contacts and discuss outstanding
business. Colombian trade associations, government entities, and private firms are hosting an
increasing number of national and regional conventions, conferences, and seminars in the country.
These events present excellent opportunities for meeting Colombian business people and key
government officials as well as for assessing market potential.
Working practices in Colombia
In most urban centers in Colombia, business hours are generally 9.00 a.m. to 5.00 p.m., however,
hours may extend as late as 7.00 p.m. during the work week. Banking hours are shorter than
business hours -- generally, 9:00 am to 3:00 p.m. Business is infrequently conducted on
weekends. In fact, weekends tend to be oriented toward family time.
Impromptu business meetings are rare. In fact, one should schedule business appointments at
least two to three weeks in advance, and also confirm them again prior to the date of the scheduled
meeting. Such meetings tend to run late and, as such, one should allow extra time after the
scheduled end of the meeting.
A consideration of the structure and hierarchy of a given company is of paramount importance,
Generally, Colombian companies conform to vertical hierarchies and this reality must be
respected. As such, decisions are made in a top-down manner -- from the senior management and
in a downstream manner, although there are inclusive and consensus-driven dynamics with
subordinates that cross-cut the hierarchies.
Negotiating styles and interactions tend to be formal, although a more relaxed attitude prevails in
coastal parts of Colombia.
Business lunches are popular venues conducting business in Colombia and often extend onward for
several hours. A flexible understanding of time must be appreciated. As well, business lunches are
not always about business. Expect to accept invitations from your Colombian business cohorts at
other business or social occasions. Spending time getting to know one's cohorts is also part of
doing business.
Crafting close working relationships in Colombian business culture is the norm. That is to say, a
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productive working climate will require that one spend time cultivating personal relationships and
building trust. This is not a "soft" consideration. Colombians generally prefer to do business with
people whom they know and trust. To this end, several family members working in the same
business in Colombia is quite typical.
Because the relational aspect is important, it is ill-advised to change the negotiating team midstream. Colombians tend to negotiate with the person(s) and not the corporation.
In general, crafting business relationships, going through negotiations, as well as getting deals
closed, are long processes. This is due partially to the trust and relational issues aforementioned,
but also reflect the high level of formality of Colombian business culture. Be patient and do not
rush the process. In particular, do not rush or press for final decisions.
Along a similar vein, do not be overly aggressive in negotiations. Such behavior is regarded as
arrogant and rude, rather than admirable as per Western culture.
Time is understood in flexible terms. As such, deadlines can become problematic across cultural
lines. If a deadline must be met, non-Colombians working with Colombians are urged to stay in
close contact for the duration of the project to ensure that completion is achieved in a timely
manner.
Other practical considerations
Unless you expect to remain in the coastal lowlands, you should anticipate your body having to
adjust to higher altitudes. For example, the capital of Bogota is 2,600 meters (8.600 feet) above
sea level.
Unless you speak Spanish, it you plan to do business in Colombia, it is advisable to take an
interpreter with you.
Be sure to translate all your marketing literature, business cards and any other documents you
present in your business dealings into Spanish. Failure to do so may jeopardize your business
potential.
Note that dates may be written differently in Latin America. Whereas the date in the United States
is written first with the month, then day, then year [ April 10, 2008 ], in Colombia, it may be
written first with the day, then month, and then year [ 10th April, 2008 ].
Colombia is five hours behind Greenwich Mean Time (GMT), which means that it is the same
time as Eastern Standard Time (EST) in the United States.
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Do not be fully reliant on the mail for transmitting correspondence; follow up with telephone calls
and emails.
Travel Information
Please Note: This is a generalized travel guide and it is intended to coalesce several
resources, which a traveler might find useful, regardless of a particular destination. As
such, it does not include travel warnings for specific "hot spot" destinations.
For travel alerts and warnings, please see the United States Department of State's listings
available at URL:
http://travel.state.gov/content/passports/english/alertswarnings.html
Please note that travel to the following countries, based on these warnings, is ill-advised, or
should be undertaken with the utmost precaution:
Afghanistan, Algeria, Burundi, Cameroon, Central African Republic, Chad, Colombia,
Democratic Republic of Congo, Djibouti, El Salvador, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Guinea,
Honduras, Iraq, Iran, Lebanon, Liberia, Libya, Mali, Mauritania, Mexico, Nepal, Niger,
Nigeria, North Korea, Pakistan, Palestinian Territories of West Bank and Gaza,
Philippines areas of Sulu Archipelago, Mindanao, and southern Sulu Sea, Saudi Arabia,
Sierra Leone, Somalia, South Sudan, Sudan, Syria, Ukraine, Venezuela, and Yemen.
***
Please note:
Security in Colombia has improved significantly in recent years, including in tourist and
business travel destinations such as Bogota, Cartagena, Barranquilla, Medellin, and Cali.
However, violence linked to narco-trafficking continues to affect some rural and urban
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areas.
***
International Travel Guide
Entry Requirement for Travelers to Colombia
All United States (U.S.) citizens who are not also Colombian citizens must present a valid U.S.
passport to enter and depart Colombia, and to return to the United States. Dual U.S-Colombian
citizens must present a Colombian passport to enter and exit Colombia, and must have a U.S.
passport to return to the United States. Be aware that any person born in Colombia may be
considered a Colombian citizen, even if never documented as such. If you are an American citizen
who was born in Colombia or who otherwise has Colombian citizenship, you will need both a
Colombian passport and a U.S. passport for your trip.
U.S. passports issued in Colombia generally take at least eight days for processing and in some
cases considerably longer. To avoid delays in your return to the United States, it is recommended
that you obtain your U.S. passport before departing the United States. Instructions for obtaining a
passport in the United States can be found at www.travel.state.gov.
U.S. citizens do not need a Colombian visa for a tourist stay of 60 days or less. Tourists entering
Colombia may be asked for evidence of return or onward travel, usually in the form of a round-trip
ticket. Americans traveling overland must enter Colombia at an official border crossing. Travelers
arriving by bus should ensure, prior to boarding, that their bus will cross the border at an official
entry point. Entering Colombia at unauthorized crossings may result in fines or incarceration.
The length of stay granted to travelers will be determined by the Colombian immigration officer at
the point of entry and will be stamped in your passport. Extensions may be requested by visiting
an office of the Colombian immigration authority, known as DAS (Departamento Administrativo
de Seguridad) Extranjeria, after arrival in Colombia. Fines are levied if a traveler remains in
Colombia longer than authorized. Any foreigner who possesses a Colombian visa with more than
three months’ validity must register the visa at an office of DAS Extranjeria within 15 days of
arrival in Colombia, or face fines. There is no arrival tax collected upon entry into Colombia, but
travelers leaving by plane must pay an exit tax of approximately $56 at the airport. Some airlines
include a portion of this tax in the cost of your airline ticket; check with your airline to find out
how much of the tax you will have to pay at the airport.
U.S. citizens whose U.S. passports are lost or stolen in Colombia must obtain a new U.S. passport
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before departing. They must then present the passport, along with a police report describing the
loss or theft, to an office of DAS Extranjeria. Information about obtaining a replacement U.S.
passport in Colombia is available on the U.S. Embassy’s website at http://Bogota.usembassy.gov.
Contact information for DAS Extranjeria is available in Spanish at www.das.gov.co. The Embassy
in Bogotá or the U.S. Consular Agency in Barranquilla can provide you with additional guidance
when you apply for your replacement passport.
See the United States Department of State's Foreign Entry Requirements brochure for more
information on Colombia and other countries. See Entry and Exit Requirements for more
information pertaining to dual nationality and the prevention of international child abduction.
Please refer to our Customs Information to learn more about customs regulations.
For further information regarding entry and customs requirements, travelers should contact the
Colombian Embassy at 2118 Leroy Place, N.W., Washington, DC 20008 ; telephone (202) 3878338; Internet website - http://www.colombiaemb.org; or a Colombian consulate. Consulates are
located in Atlanta, Boston, Chicago, Houston, Los Angeles, Miami, New Orleans, New York, San
Francisco and San Juan.
Source: United States Department of State
Checklist for Travelers
1. Take out travel insurance to cover hospital treatment or medical evacuation. Overseas medical
costs are expensive to most international travelers, where one's domestic, nationalized or even
private health insurance plans will not provide coverage outside one's home country. Learn about
"reciprocal insurance plans" that some international health care companies might offer.
2. Make sure that one's travel insurance is appropriate. If one intends to indulge in adventurous
activities, such as parasailing, one should be sure that one is fully insured in such cases. Many
traditional insurance policies do not provide coverage in cases of extreme circumstances.
3. Take time to learn about one's destination country and culture. Read and learn about the place
one is traveling. Also check political, economic and socio-cultural developments at the destination
by reading country-specific travel reports and fact sheets noted below.
4. Get the necessary visas for the country (or countries) one intends to visit - but be aware that a
visa does not guarantee entry. A number of useful sites regarding visa and other entry requirements
are noted below.
5. Keep in regular contact with friends and relatives back at home by phone or email, and be sure
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to leave a travel itinerary.
6. Protect one's personal information by making copies of one's passport details, insurance policy,
travelers checks and credit card numbers. Taking copies of such documents with you, while
leaving another collection copies with someone at home is also good practice for travelers. Taking
copies of one's passport photograph is also recommended.
7. Stay healthy by taking all possible precautions against illness. Also, be sure to take extra supplies
of prescription drugs along for the trip, while also taking time to pack general pharmaceutical
supplies, such as aspirin and other such painkillers, bandages, stomach ailment medication, antiinflammatory medication and anti-bacterial medication.
8. Do not carry illicit drugs. Understand that the punishment for possession or use of illegal drugs
in some countries may be capital punishment. Make sure your prescription drugs are legal in the
countries you plan to visit.
9. Know the laws of one's destination country and culture; be sure to understand the repercussions
of breaking those laws and regulations. Often the transparency and freedoms of the juridical
system at home is not consistent with that of one's destination country. Become aware of these
complexities and subtleties before you travel.
10. For longer stays in a country, or where the security situation is volatile, one should register
one's self and traveling companions at the local embassy or consulate of one's country of
citizenship.
11. Women should take care to be prepared both culturally and practically for traveling in a
different country and culture. One should be sure to take sufficient supplies of personal feminine
products and prescription drugs. One should also learn about local cultural standards for women,
including norms of dressing. Be aware that it is simply inappropriate and unsafe for women to
travel alone in some countries, and take the necessary precautions to avoid risk-filled situations.
12. If one is traveling with small children, one should pack extra supplies, make arrangements with
the travel carrier for proper seating that would adequately accommodate children, infants or
toddlers. Note also that whether one is male of female, traveling with children means that one's
hands are thus not free to carry luggage and bags. Be especially aware that this makes one
vulnerable to pickpockets, thieves and other sorts of crime.
13. Make proper arrangements for accommodations, well in advance of one's arrival at a
destination. Some countries have limited accommodation, while others may have culturally
distinctive facilities. Learning about these practicalities before one travels will greatly aid the
enjoyment of one's trip.
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14. Travel with different forms of currency and money (cash, traveler's checks and credit cards) in
anticipation that venues may not accept one or another form of money. Also, ensuring that one's
financial resources are not contained in one location, or by one person (if one is traveling with
others) can be a useful measure, in the event that one loses a wallet or purse.
15. Find out about transportation in the destination country. In some places, it might be advisable
to hire a local driver or taxi guide for safety reasons, while in other countries, enjoying one's travel
experience may well be enhanced by renting a vehicle and seeing the local sights and culture
independently. Costs may also be prohibitive for either of these choices, so again, prior planning is
suggested.
Tips for Travelers
• Check your embassy, consulate, or appropriate government institution related to travel before
traveling.
• Get travel and medical insurance before you leave.
• Bring enough money, in the form of dollars or dollar travelers' checks.
• Keep belongings, especially your passport, in a safe place. Carry a photocopy of your passport at
all times.
• Respect local laws and customs: do not overstay your visa (given on entry).
• Beware of pickpockets, street robbery and approaches by strangers in bars and clubs: drinks can
be spiked or drugs administered by needles.
• Enter next of kin details into the back of your passport.
• Don't carry drugs: Colombian justice is slow and the prisons harsh.
• Do not travel overland without taking Embassy advice: air travel is usually the only safe option. If
you cannot avoid traveling overland, do not accept any food, sweets or drinks offered by fellow
travelers: they may be drugged.
• Do not enter Colombia overland: the border with Panama is particularly dangerous.
• Do not flag down taxis on the street. Always phone for a taxi: you will be given a code to give to
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the designated driver.
Note: This information is directly quoted from the United Kingdom Foreign and Commonwealth
Office.
Sources: United Kingdom Foreign and Commonwealth Office
Business Culture: Information for Business Travelers
There is a very vigorous international business community in Colombia, with hundreds of wellestablished companies committed to their long-term presence in the country. Colombia, in terms of
natural and human resources, offers a strategic location, a well-developed industrial and
infrastructure capacity, and a modern business environment.
In spite of the negative perceptions reflected through the often-distorted prism of international
news reporting about Colombia's security problems, first-time business visitors are usually
pleasantly surprised at the high level of development and sophistication of the Colombian private
sector. Colombian business people tend to be well educated (often with some training in North
America) and professional. They are serious, hardworking, and share many of the same work
habits and ethics as business people in the North America and Europe. This is one of the many
reasons that, despite Colombia's political and social problems, knowledgeable business people have
for many years come to Colombia to do business.
Colombians tend to be friendly, straightforward and direct in their business dealings. They
understand the give-and-take of business, and look to negotiate business arrangements that will be
of mutual advantage to both parties. Colombian business people are generally punctual, yet flexible,
and expect the same of their business associates. Most business customs are similar to those in
North America.
Given the proximity of the two countries and the long-term presence of U.S. firms in the market,
Colombians are used to doing business with the U.S. Many of them have traveled or studied in the
United States and have family members or friends there. Colombian executives and technicians, as
well as government officials, travel frequently to the U.S. for meetings, conferences, trade fairs,
training and tourism.
Working breakfasts and lunches at hotels and private clubs have become common practice in most
Colombian cities. Dinner meetings tend to be less formal. Business cocktails and official receptions
are common events and are used as opportunities to make contacts and discuss outstanding
business. Colombian trade associations, government entities, and private firms are hosting an
increasing number of national and regional conventions, conferences, and seminars in the country.
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These events present excellent opportunities for meeting Colombian business people and key
government officials as well as for assessing market potential.
Sources: United States Department of State Commercial Guides
Online Resources Regarding Entry Requirements and Visas
Foreign Entry Requirements for Americans from the United States Department of State
http://travel.state.gov/travel/cis_pa_tw/cis/cis_1765.html
Visa Services for Non-Americans from the United States Department of State
http://travel.state.gov/visa/visa_1750.html
Visa Bulletins from the United States Department of State
http://travel.state.gov/visa/frvi/bulletin/bulletin_1360.html
Visa Waivers from the United States Department of State
http://travel.state.gov/visa/temp/without/without_1990.html - new
Passport and Visa Information from the Government of the United Kingdom
http://www.bia.homeoffice.gov.uk/
Visa Information from the Government of Australia
http://www.dfat.gov.au/visas/index.html
Passport Information from the Government of Australia
https://www.passports.gov.au/Web/index.aspx
Passport Information from the Government of Canada
http://www.voyage.gc.ca/preparation_information/passport_passeport-eng.asp
Visa Information from the Government of Canada
http://www.voyage.gc.ca/preparation_information/visas-eng.asp
Online Visa Processing by Immigration Experts by VisaPro
http://www.visapro.com
Sources: United States Department of State, United Kingdom Foreign and Commonwealth Office,
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Government of Australia: Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade, Government of Canada
Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade
Useful Online Resources for Travelers
Country-Specific Travel Information from United States
http://travel.state.gov/travel/cis_pa_tw/cis/cis_1765.html
Travel Advice by Country from Government of United Kingdom
http://www.fco.gov.uk/en/travelling-and-living-overseas/travel-advice-by-country/
General Travel Advice from Government of Australia
http://www.smartraveller.gov.au/zw-cgi/view/Advice/General
Travel Bulletins from the Government of Australia
http://www.smartraveller.gov.au/zw-cgi/view/TravelBulletins/
Travel Tips from Government of Australia
http://www.smartraveller.gov.au/tips/index.html
Travel Checklist by Government of Canada
http://www.voyage.gc.ca/preparation_information/checklist_sommaire-eng.asp
Travel Checklist from Government of United Kingdom
http://www.fco.gov.uk/en/travelling-and-living-overseas/staying-safe/checklist
Your trip abroad from United States Department of State
http://travel.state.gov/travel/tips/brochures/brochures_1225.html
A safe trip abroad from United States Department of State
http://travel.state.gov/travel/tips/safety/safety_1747.html
Tips for expatriates abroad from United States Department of State
http://travel.state.gov/travel/living/residing/residing_1235.html
Tips for students from United States Department of State
http://travel.state.gov/travel/living/studying/studying_1238.html http://travel.state.gov/travel/tips/brochures/broc
Medical information for travelers from United States Department of State
http://travel.state.gov/travel/tips/health/health_1185.html
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US Customs Travel information
http://www.customs.gov/xp/cgov/travel/
Sources: United States Department of State; United States Customs Department, United Kingdom
Foreign and Commonwealth Office, Foreign and Commonwealth Office, Government of Australia;
Government of Canada: Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade
Other Practical Online Resources for Travelers
Foreign Language Phrases for Travelers
http://www.travlang.com/languages/
http://www.omniglot.com/language/phrases/index.htm
World Weather Forecasts
http://www.intellicast.com/
http://www.wunderground.com/
http://www.worldweather.org/
Worldwide Time Zones, Map, World Clock
http://www.timeanddate.com/
http://www.worldtimezone.com/
International Airport Codes
http://www.world-airport-codes.com/
International Dialing Codes
http://www.kropla.com/dialcode.htm
http://www.countrycallingcodes.com/
International Phone Guide
http://www.kropla.com/phones.htm
International Mobile Phone Guide
http://www.kropla.com/mobilephones.htm
International Internet Café Search Engine
http://cybercaptive.com/
Global Internet Roaming
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http://www.kropla.com/roaming.htm
World Electric Power Guide
http://www.kropla.com/electric.htm
http://www.kropla.com/electric2.htm
World Television Standards and Codes
http://www.kropla.com/tv.htm
International Currency Exchange Rates
http://www.xe.com/ucc/
Banking and Financial Institutions Across the World
http://www.123world.com/banks/index.html
International Credit Card or Automated Teller Machine (ATM) Locator
http://visa.via.infonow.net/locator/global/
http://www.mastercard.com/us/personal/en/cardholderservices/atmlocations/index.html
International Chambers of Commerce
http://www.123world.com/chambers/index.html
World Tourism Websites
http://123world.com/tourism/
Diplomatic and Consular Information
United States Diplomatic Posts Around the World
http://www.usembassy.gov/
United Kingdom Diplomatic Posts Around the World
http://www.fco.gov.uk/en/about-the-fco/embassies-and-posts/find-an-embassy-overseas/
Australia's Diplomatic Posts Around the World
http://www.dfat.gov.au/missions/
http://www.dfat.gov.au/embassies.html
Canada's Embassies and High Commissions
http://www.international.gc.ca/ciw-cdm/embassies-ambassades.aspx
Resources for Finding Embassies and other Diplomatic Posts Across the World
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http://www.escapeartist.com/embassy1/embassy1.htm
Safety and Security
Travel Warnings by Country from Government of Australia
http://www.smartraveller.gov.au/zw-cgi/view/Advice/
Travel Warnings and Alerts from United States Department of State
http://travel.state.gov/travel/cis_pa_tw/tw/tw_1764.html
http://travel.state.gov/travel/cis_pa_tw/pa/pa_1766.html
Travel Reports and Warnings by Government of Canada
http://www.voyage.gc.ca/countries_pays/menu-eng.asp
http://www.voyage.gc.ca/countries_pays/updates_mise-a-jour-eng.asp
Travel Warnings from Government of United Kingdom
http://www.fco.gov.uk/en/travelling-and-living-overseas/travel-advice-by-country/
http://www.fco.gov.uk/en/travelling-and-living-overseas/travel-advice-by-country/?
action=noTravelAll#noTravelAll
Sources: United Kingdom Foreign and Commonwealth Office, the United States Department of
State, the Government of Canada: Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade,
Government of Australia: Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade
Other Safety and Security Online Resources for Travelers
United States Department of State Information on Terrorism
http://www.state.gov/s/ct/
Government of the United Kingdom Resource on the Risk of Terrorism
http://www.fco.gov.uk/servlet/Front?
pagename=OpenMarket/Xcelerate/ShowPage&c=Page&cid=1044011304926
Government of Canada Terrorism Guide
http://www.international.gc.ca/crime/terrorism-terrorisme.aspx?lang=eng
Information on Terrorism by Government of Australia
http://www.dfat.gov.au/icat/index.html
FAA Resource on Aviation Safety
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http://www.faasafety.gov/
In-Flight Safety Information for Air Travel (by British Airways crew trainer, Anna Warman)
http://www.warman.demon.co.uk/anna/inflight.html
Hot Spots: Travel Safety and Risk Information
http://www.airsecurity.com/hotspots/HotSpots.asp
Information on Human Rights
http://www.state.gov/g/drl/hr/
Sources: The United States Department of State, the United States Customs Department, the
Government of Canada, the Government of United Kingdom, the Government of Australia, the
Federal Aviation Authority, Anna Warman's In-flight Website, Hot Spots Travel and Risk
Information
Diseases/Health Data
Please Note: Most of the entry below constitutes a generalized health advisory, which a
traveler might find useful, regardless of a particular destination.
As a supplement, however, reader will also find below a list of countries flagged with current
health notices and alerts issued by the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC).
Please note that travel to the following countries, based on these 3 levels of warnings, is
ill-advised, or should be undertaken with the utmost precaution:
Level 3 (highest level of concern; avoid non-essential travel) -Guinea - Ebola
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Liberia - Ebola
Nepal - Eathquake zone
Sierra Leone - Ebola
Level 2 (intermediate level of concern; use utmost caution during travel) -Cameroon - Polio
Somalia - Polio
Vanuatu - Tropical Cyclone zone
Throughout Middle East and Arabia Peninsula - MERS ((Middle East Respiratory
Syndrome)
Level 1 (standard level of concern; use practical caution during travel) Australia - Ross River disease
Bosnia-Herzegovina - Measles
Brazil - Dengue Fever
Brazil - Malaria
Brazil - Zika
China - H7N9 Avian flu
Cuba - Cholera
Egypt - H5N1 Bird flu
Ethiopia - Measles
Germany - Measles
Japan - Hand, foot, and mouth disease (HFMD)
Kyrgyzstan - Measles
Malaysia -Dengue Fever
Mexico - Chikungunya
Mexico - Hepatitis A
Nigeria - Meningitis
Philippines - Measles
Scotland - Mumps
Singapore - Hand, foot, and mouth disease (HFMD)
South Korea - MERS ((Middle East Respiratory Syndrome)
Throughout Caribbean - Chikungunya
Throughout Central America - Chikungunya
Throughout South America - Chikungunya
Throughout Pacific Islands - Chikungunya
For specific information related to these health notices and alerts please see the CDC's
listing available at URL:
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http://wwwnc.cdc.gov/travel/notices
Health Information for Travelers to Colombia
Recently, there has been increased yellow fever activity in Brazil in the states of Minas Gerais,
Rondonia, Goias, and Bahia. For more information and recommendations, see the following
websites:
Yellow Fever Disease and Vaccine Information
(http://www.cdc.gov/travel/yfever.htm)
World Health Organization Disease Outbreak News
(http://www.who.int/disease-outbreak-news/)
Food and waterborne diseases are the number one cause of illness in travelers. Travelers' diarrhea
can be caused by viruses, bacteria, or parasites, which are found universally throughout the region
and can contaminate food or water. Infections may cause diarrhea and vomiting (E. coli,
Salmonella, cholera, and parasites), fever (typhoid fever and toxoplasmosis), or liver damage
(hepatitis). Make sure your food and drinking water are safe (see below).
Malaria is a preventable infection that can be fatal if left untreated. Prevent infection by taking
prescription antimalarial drugs and protecting yourself against mosquito bites (see below). Malaria
risk in this region exists in some urban and many rural areas, depending on elevation. For specific
locations, see Malaria Information for Travelers to Tropical South America
(http://www.cdc.gov/travel/regionalmalaria/tropsam.htm).
A certificate of yellow fever vaccination may be required for entry into certain of these countries.
For detailed information, see Comprehensive Yellow Fever Vaccination Requirements
(http://www.cdc.gov/travel/yelfever.htm).
If you visit the Andes Mountains, ascend gradually to allow time for your body to adjust to the
high altitude, which can cause insomnia, headaches, nausea, and altitude sickness. In addition, use
sunblock rated at least 15 SPF, because the risk of sunburn is greater at high altitudes.
Dengue, filariasis, leishmaniasis, onchocerciasis, and American trypanosomiasis (Chagas disease)
are other diseases carried by insects that also occur in this region. Protecting yourself against insect
bites (see below) will help to prevent these diseases.
Because motor vehicle crashes are a leading cause of injury among travelers, walk and drive
defensively. Avoid nighttime travel if possible and always use seat belts.
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CDC Recommends the Following Vaccines (as Appropriate for Age):
See your doctor at least 4-6 weeks before your trip to allow time for immunizations to take effect.
• Hepatitis A or immune globulin (IG).
• Hepatitis B, if you might be exposed to blood (for example, health-care workers), have sexual
contact with the local population, stay >6 months in the region, or be exposed through medical
treatment.
• Rabies, if you might be exposed to wild or domestic animals through your work or recreation.
• Typhoid, particularly if you are visiting developing countries in this region.
• Yellow fever vaccination, if you will be traveling outside urban areas.
• As needed, booster doses for tetanus-diphtheria and measles. Hepatitis B vaccine is now
recommended for all infants and for children ages 11-12 years who did not complete the series as
infants.
To Stay Healthy, Do:
• Wash hands frequently with soap and water.
• Drink only bottled or boiled water, or carbonated (bubbly) drinks in cans or bottles. Avoid tap
water, fountain drinks, and ice cubes. If this is not possible, make water safer by BOTH filtering
through an "absolute 1-micron or less" filter AND adding iodine tablets to the filtered water.
"Absolute 1-micron filters" are found in camping/outdoor supply stores.
• Eat only thoroughly cooked food or fruits and vegetables you have peeled yourself. Remember:
boil it, cook it, peel it, or forget it.
• If you will be visiting an area where there is risk for malaria, take your malaria prevention
medication before, during, and after travel, as directed. (See your doctor for a prescription.)
• Protect yourself from insects by remaining in well-screened areas, using repellents (applied
sparingly at >4-hour intervals) and permethrin-impregnated mosquito nets, and wearing longsleeved shirts and long pants from dusk through dawn.
• To prevent fungal and parasitic infections, keep feet clean and dry, and do not go barefoot.
• Always use condoms to reduce the risk of HIV and other sexually transmitted diseases.
To Avoid Getting Sick:
• Don't eat food purchased from street vendors.
• Don't drink beverages with ice.
• Don't eat dairy products unless you know they have been pasteurized.
• Don't share needles with anyone.
• Don't handle animals (especially monkeys, dogs, and cats), to avoid bites and serious diseases
(including rabies and plague). (For more information, please see the Animal-Associated Hazards on
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the Making Travel Safe page at URL http://www.cdc.gov/travel/safety.htm.)
• Don't swim in fresh water. Salt water is usually safer. (For more information, please see the
Swimming Precautions on the Making Travel Safe page.)
What You Need To Bring with You:
• Long-sleeved shirt and long pants to wear while outside whenever possible, to prevent illnesses
carried by insects (e.g., malaria, dengue, filariasis, leishmaniasis, and onchocerciasis).
• Insect repellent containing DEET (diethylmethyltoluamide), in 30%-35% strength for adults and
6%-10% for children, as well as a bed net impregnated with the insecticide permethrin. (Bed nets
can be purchased in camping or military supply stores.) Bed nets may also protect against insect
bites that transmit Chagas disease.
• Over-the-counter antidiarrheal medicine to take if you have diarrhea.
• Iodine tablets and water filters to purify water if bottled water is not available. See Do's above for
more detailed information about water filters.
• Sunblock, sunglasses, hat.
• Prescription medications: make sure you have enough to last during your trip, as well as a copy
of the prescription(s).
After You Return Home:
If you have visited an area where there is risk for malaria, continue taking your malaria medication
weekly for 4 weeks after you leave the area. If you become ill with a fever-even as long as a year
after your trip-tell your doctor that you traveled to a malaria-infected area.
For More Information:
Ask your doctor or check the CDC web for more information about how to protect yourself
against diseases that occur in Tropical South America, such as:
For information about diseasesCarried by Insects
Dengue, Malaria, Yellow Fever
Carried in Food or Water
Cholera, Escherichia coli, diarrhea, Hepatitis A, Schistosomiasis, Typhoid Fever
Person-to-Person Contact
Hepatitis B, HIV/AIDS
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For more information about these and other diseases, please check the Diseases
(http://www.cdc.gov/travel/diseases.htm) s e c t i o n a n d t h e H e a l t h T o p i c s A - Z
(http://www.cdc.gov/health/diseases.htm).
Note:
Colombia is located in the tropical South American health region.
Sources:
The Center for Disease Control Destinations Website:
http://www.cdc.gov/travel/destinat.htm
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Chapter 6
Environmental Overview
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Environmental Issues
GEOGRAPHY AND ENVIRONMENT
Editor's Note: This section is divided between the Geography and the Environment of Colombia.
Geographic Considerations:
Terrain:
flat coastal lowlands, central highlands, high Andes Mountains, eastern lowland plains
Elevation extremes:
lowest point: Pacific Ocean 0 m
highest point: Pico Cristobal Colon 5,775 m
note: nearby Pico Simon Bolivar also has the same elevation
Geography -- Resources:
Natural resources:
petroleum, natural gas, coal, iron ore, nickel, gold, copper, emeralds, hydropower
Land use:
arable land: 2.01%
permanent crops: 1.37%
other: 96.62%
Irrigated land:
9,000 sq km
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Total renewable water resources:
2,132 cu km
Freshwater withdrawal (domestic/industrial/agricultural):
total: 10.71 cu km/yr (50%/4%/46%)
per capita: 235 cu m/yr
Geography -- Natural Hazards:
-Volcanic eruptions
-occasional earthquakes
-periodic droughts
Environment -- General Overview of Colombia's Environment:
Colombia's climate varies from tropical to temperate, resulting in a diverse environmental system.
As well, Colombiais a highly populous country, with up to a quarter of the entire population living
in urban centers. This concentration of people in cities results in a collection of urban-oriented
environmental problems, the most significant of which is air pollution.
In non-urban areas, coffee production, mining activities, and clearing of land for cattle grazing all
contribute to deforestation and the concomitant problem of soil erosion. In the Choco region of
Colombia, there are marked threats to biodiversity, specifically to wildlife and plant species. The
exploitation of forests for timber and the prevalence of cocaine trafficking intensify these threats.
Environment -- Current Issues in Colombia:
-Deforestation, largely as a result of agricultural activities, and misuse of timber resources
-Loss of biodiversity, particularly of rare flora and fauna
-Soil damage, as a result of pesticide overuse
-Air pollution, especially in Bogota, from vehicle emissions
Environment --Total Greenhouse Gas Emissions (Mtc):
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43.9
Environment -- Country Rank (GHG output):
35th
Environmental Policy
Regulation and Jurisdiction:
The regulation and protection of the environment in Colombia is under the jurisdiction of the
following:
Ministry of the Environment
Ministry of Agriculture
The National Institute of Renewable Natural Resources and the Environment
Major Non-Governmental Organizations:
The "Fundación Herencia Verde" (FHV) or Green Heritage Foundation
The "Fundación Jardín Botánico 'Leandro Agreda' " or Botanical Garden Foundation
The "Fundación Natura" or Nature Foundation
The International Board for Plant Genetic Resources (IBPGR).
International Environmental Accords:
Party to:
Antarctic Treaty
Biodiversity
Climate Change
Climate Change-Kyoto Protocol
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Desertification
Endangered Species
Hazardous Wastes
Marine Life Conservation
Nuclear Test Ban
Ozone Layer Protection
Ship Pollution
Tropical Timber 83
Tropical Timber 94
Wetlands
Signed but not ratified:
Law of the Sea
Kyoto Protocol Status (year ratified):
2001
Greenhouse Gas Ranking
Greenhouse Gas Ranking
GHG Emissions Rankings
Country
Rank
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1
United States
2
China
4
Russia
5
Japan
6
India
7
Germany
8
United Kingdom
9
Canada
10
Korea, South
11
Italy
12
Mexico
13
France
14
South Africa
15
Iran
16
Indonesia
17
Australia
18
Spain
19
Brazil
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20
Saudi Arabia
21
Ukraine
22
Poland
23
Taiwan
24
Turkey
25
Thailand
26
Netherlands
27
Kazakhstan
28
Malaysia
29
Egypt
30
Venezuela
31
Argentina
32
Uzbekistan
33
Czech Republic
34
Belgium
35
Pakistan
36
Romania
37
Greece
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38
United Arab Emirates
39
Algeria
40
Nigeria
41
Austria
42
Iraq
43
Finland
44
Philippines
45
Vietnam
46
Korea, North
47
Israel
48
Portugal
49
Colombia
50
Belarus
51
Kuwait
52
Hungary
53
Chile
54
Denmark
55
Serbia & Montenegro
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56
Sweden
57
Syria
58
Libya
59
Bulgaria
60
Singapore
61
Switzerland
62
Ireland
63
Turkmenistan
64
Slovakia
65
Bangladesh
66
Morocco
67
New Zealand
68
Oman
69
Qatar
70
Azerbaijan
71
Norway
72
Peru
73
Cuba
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74
Ecuador
75
Trinidad & Tobago
76
Croatia
77
Tunisia
78
Dominican Republic
79
Lebanon
80
Estonia
81
Yemen
82
Jordan
83
Slovenia
84
Bahrain
85
Angola
86
Bosnia & Herzegovina
87
Lithuania
88
Sri Lanka
89
Zimbabwe
90
Bolivia
91
Jamaica
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92
Guatemala
93
Luxembourg
94
Myanmar
95
Sudan
96
Kenya
97
Macedonia
98
Mongolia
99
Ghana
100
Cyprus
101
Moldova
102
Latvia
103
El Salvador
104
Brunei
105
Honduras
106
Cameroon
107
Panama
108
Costa Rica
109
Cote d'Ivoire
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110
Kyrgyzstan
111
Tajikistan
112
Ethiopia
113
Senegal
114
Uruguay
115
Gabon
116
Albania
117
Nicaragua
118
Botswana
119
Paraguay
120
Tanzania
121
Georgia
122
Armenia
123
Congo, RC
124
Mauritius
125
Nepal
126
Mauritius
127
Nepal
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128
Mauritania
129
Malta
130
Papua New Guinea
131
Zambia
132
Suriname
133
Iceland
134
Togo
135
Benin
136
Uganda
137
Bahamas
138
Haiti
139
Congo, DRC
140
Guyana
141
Mozambique
142
Guinea
143
Equatorial Guinea
144
Laos
145
Barbados
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146
Niger
147
Fiji
148
Burkina Faso
149
Malawi
150
Swaziland
151
Belize
152
Afghanistan
153
Sierra Leone
154
Eritrea
155
Rwanda
156
Mali
157
Seychelles
158
Cambodia
159
Liberia
160
Bhutan
161
Maldives
162
Antigua & Barbuda
163
Djibouti
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164
Saint Lucia
165
Gambia
166
Guinea-Bissau
167
Central African Republic
168
Palau
169
Burundi
170
Grenada
171
Lesotho
172
Saint Vincent & the Grenadines
173
Solomon Islands
174
Samoa
175
Cape Verde
176
Nauru
177
Dominica
178
Saint Kitts & Nevis
179
Chad
180
Tonga
181
Sao Tome & Principe
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182
Comoros
183
Vanuatu
185
Kiribati
Not Ranked
Andorra
Not Ranked
East Timor
Not Ranked
Holy See
Not Ranked
Hong Kong
Not Ranked
Liechtenstein
Not Ranked
Marshall Islands
Not Ranked
Micronesia
Not Ranked
Monaco
Not Ranked
San Marino
Not Ranked
Somalia
Not Ranked
Tuvalu
* European Union is ranked 3rd
Cook Islands are ranked 184th
Niue is ranked 186th
Global Environmental Snapshot
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Introduction
The countries of the world face many environmental challenges in common. Nevertheless, the
nature and intensity of problem vary from region to region, as do various countries' respective
capacities, in terms of affluence and infrastructure, to remediate threats to environmental quality.
Consciousness of perils affecting the global environment came to the fore in the last third or so of
the 20th century has continued to intensify well into the new millennium. According to the United
Nations Environment Programme, considerable environmental progress has been made at the level
of institutional developments, international cooperation accords, and public participation.
Approximately two-dozen international environmental protection accords with global implications
have been promulgated since the late 1970s under auspices of the United Nations and other
international organizations, together with many additional regional agreements. Attempts to address
and rectify environmental problems take the form of legal frameworks, economic instruments,
environmentally sound technologies and cleaner production processes as well as conservation
efforts. Environmental impact assessments have increasingly been applied across the globe.
Environmental degradation affects the quality, or aesthetics, of human life, but it also displays
potential to undermine conditions necessary for the sustainability of human life. Attitudes toward
the importance of environmental protection measures reflect ambivalence derived from this
bifurcation. On one hand, steps such as cleaning up pollution, dedicating parkland, and suchlike,
are seen as embellishments undertaken by wealthy societies already assured they can successfully
perform those functions deemed, ostensibly, more essential-for instance, public health and
education, employment and economic development. On the other hand, in poorer countries,
activities causing environmental damage-for instance the land degradation effects of unregulated
logging, slash-and-burn agriculture, overgrazing, and mining-can seem justified insofar as such
activities provide incomes and livelihoods.
Rapid rates of resource depletion are associated with poverty and high population growth,
themselves correlated, whereas consumption per capita is much higher in the most developed
countries, despite these nations' recent progress in energy efficiency and conservation. It is
impossible to sequester the global environmental challenge from related economic, social and
political challenges.
First-tier industrialized countries have recently achieved measurable decreases in environmental
pollution and the rate of resource depletion, a success not matched in middle income and
developing countries. It is believed that the discrepancy is due to the fact that industrialized
countries have more developed infrastructures to accommodate changes in environmental policy, to
apply environmental technologies, and to invest in public education. The advanced industrialized
countries incur relatively lower costs in alleviating environmental problems, in comparison to
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developing countries, since in the former even extensive environmental programs represent a rather
minuscule percentage of total expenditures. Conversely, budget constraints, lagged provision of
basic services to the population, and other factors such as debt service and militarization may
preclude institution of minimal environmental protection measures in the poorest countries.
A synopsis for the current situation facing each region of the world follows:
Regional Synopsis: Africa
The African continent, the world's second-largest landmass, encompasses many of the world's
least developed countries. By global standards, urbanization is comparatively low but rising at a
rapid rate. More heavily industrialized areas at the northern and southern ends of the continent
experience the major share of industrial pollution. In other regions the most serious environmental
problems typically stem from inefficient subsistence farming methods and other forms of land
degradation, which have affected an increasingly extensive area under pressure of a widely
impoverished, fast-growing population. Africa's distribution of natural resources is very uneven. It
is the continent at greatest risk of desertification, especially in the Sahel region at the edge of the
Sahara but also in other dry-range areas. Yet at the same time, Africa also harbors some of the
earth's richest and most diverse biological zones.
Key Points:
Up to half a billion hectares of African land are moderately to severely degraded, an occurrence
reflecting short-fallow shifting cultivation and overgrazing as well as a climatic pattern of recurrent
droughts.
Soil degradation is severe along the expanse directly south of the Sahara, from the west to the east
coasts. Parts of southern Africa, central-eastern Africa, and the neighboring island of Madagascar
suffer from serious soil degradation as well.
Africa contains about 17 percent of the world's forest cover, concentrated in the tropical belt of the
continent. Many of the forests, however, are severely depleted, with an estimated 70 percent
showing some degree of degradation.
Population growth has resulted in continuing loss of arable land, as inefficient subsistence farming
techniques affect increasingly extensive areas. Efforts to implement settled, sustainable agriculture
have met with some recent success, but much further progress in this direction is needed.
Especially in previously uninhabited forestlands, concern over deforestation is intensifying.
By contrast, the African savanna remains the richest grassland in the world, supporting a
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substantial concentration of animal and plant life. Wildlife parks are sub-Saharan Africa's greatest
tourist attraction, and with proper management-giving local people a stake in conservation and
controlling the pace of development-could greatly enhance African economies.
Significant numbers of mammal species in parts of northern, southern and eastern Africa are
currently threatened, while the biological diversity in Mauritania and Madagascar is even further
compromised with over 20 percent of the mammal species in these two countries currently under
threat.
With marine catch trends increasing from 500,000 metric tons in the 1950s to over 3,000,000
metric tons by 2000, there was increasing concern about the reduction in fisheries and marine life,
should this trend continue unabated.
Water resource vulnerability is a major concern in northeastern Africa, and a moderate concern
across the rest of the continent. An exception is central Africa, which has plentiful water supplies.
Many Africans lack adequate access to resources, not just (if at all) because the resources are
unevenly distributed geographically, but also through institutional failures such as faulty land tenure
systems or political upheaval. The quality of Africa's natural resources, despite their spotty
distribution, is in fact extraordinarily rich. The infrastructure needed to protect and benefit from
this natural legacy, however, is largely lacking.
Regional Synopsis: Asia and the Pacific
Asia-earth's largest landmass-and the many large and nearly innumerable small islands lying off its
Pacific shore display extraordinarily contrasting landscapes, levels of development, and degrees of
environmental stress. In the classification used here, the world's smallest continent, Australia, is
also included in the Asia-Pacific region.
The Asia-Pacific region is home to 9 of the world's 14 largest urban areas, and as energy use for
utilities, industry and transport increases in developing economies, urban centers are subject to
worsening air quality. Intense population density in places such as Bangladesh or Hong Kong is the
quintessential image many people have of Asia, yet vast desert areas such as the Gobi and the
world's highest mountain range, the Himalayas, span the continent as well. Forested areas in
Southeast Asia and the islands of Indonesia and the Philippines were historically prized for their
tropical hardwood, but in many places this resource is now severely depleted. Low-lying small
island states are extremely vulnerable to the effects of global warming, both rising sea levels and an
anticipated increase in cyclones.
Key Points:
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Asian timber reserves are forecast to be depleted in the next 40 years. Loss of natural forest is
irreversible in some areas, but plantation programs to restore tree cover may ameliorate a portion
of the resulting land degradation.
Increased usage of fossil fuels in China and other parts of southern Asia is projected to result in a
marked increase in emissions, especially in regard to carbon dioxide. The increased usage of energy
has led to a marked upsurge in air pollution across the region.
Acidification is an emerging problem regionally, with sulfur dioxide emissions expected to triple by
2010 if the current growth rate is sustained. China, Thailand, India, and Korea seem to be
suffering from particularly high rates of acid deposition. By contrast, Asia's most highly developed
economy, Japan, has effected substantial improvements in its environmental indicators.
Water pollution in the Pacific is an urgent concern since up to 70 percent of the water discharged
into the region's waters receives no treatment. Additionally, the disposal of solid wastes, in like
manner, poses a major threat in a region with many areas of high population density.
The Asia-Pacific region is the largest expanse of the world's land that is adversely affected by soil
degradation.
The region around Australia reportedly suffers the largest degree of ozone depletion.
The microstates of the Pacific suffer land loss due to global warming, and the consequent rise in
the levels of ocean waters. A high-emissions scenario and anthropogenic climate impact at the
upper end of the currently predicted range would probably force complete evacuation of the
lowest-elevation islands sometime in this century.
The species-rich reefs surrounding Southeast Asia are highly vulnerable to the deleterious effects of
coastal development, land-based pollution, over-fishing and exploitative fishing methods, as well as
marine pollution from oil spills and other activities.
With marine catch trends increasing from 5,000,000 metric tons in the 1950s to over 20,000,000
metric tons by 2000, there was increasing concern about the reduction in fisheries and marine life,
should this trend continue unabated.
Significant numbers of mammal species in parts of China and south-east Asia are currently
threatened, while the biological diversity in India, Japan, Australia, the Philippines, Indonesia and
parts of Malaysia is even further compromised with over 20 percent of the mammal species in
these countries currently under threat.
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Water resource vulnerability is a serious concern in areas surrounding the Indian subcontinent.
Regional Synopsis: Central Asia
The Central Asian republics, formerly in the Soviet Union, experience a range of environmental
problems as the result of poorly executed agricultural, industrial, and nuclear programs during the
Soviet era. Relatively low population densities are the norm, especially since upon the breakup of
the U.S.S.R. many ethnic Russians migrated back to European Russia. In this largely semi-arid
region, drought, water shortages, and soil salinization pose major challenges.
Key Points:
The use of agricultural pesticides, such as DDT and other chemicals, has contributed to the
contamination of soil and groundwater throughout the region.
Land and soil degradation, and in particular, increased salinization, is mostly attributable to faulty
irrigation practices.
Significant desertification is also a problem in the region.
Air pollution is prevalent, mostly due to use of low octane automobile fuel.
Industrial pollution of the Caspian Sea and the Aral Sea, as a result of industrial effluents as well as
mining and metal production, presents a challenge to the countries bordering these bodies of water.
One of the most severe environmental problems in the region is attributable to the several billion
tons of hazardous materials stored in landfills across Central Asia.
Uzbekistan's particular problem involves the contraction of the Aral Sea, which has decreased in
size by a third, as a consequence of river diversions and poor irrigation practices. The effect has
been the near-total biological destruction of that body of water.
Kazakhstan, as a consequence of being the heartland of the former Soviet Union's nuclear
program, has incurred a high of cancerous malignancies, biogenetic abnormalities and radioactive
contamination.
While part of the Soviet Union, the republics in the region experienced very high levels of
greenhouse gas emissions, as a consequence of rapid industrialization using cheap but dirty energy
sources, especially coal.
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By contrast, however, there have recently been substantial reductions in the level of greenhouse
gas emissions, especially those attributable to coal burning, with further decreases anticipated over
the next decade. These changes are partially due to the use of cleaner energy technologies, such as
natural gas, augmented by governmental commitment to improving environmental standards.
Regional Synopsis: Europe
Western Europe underwent dramatic transformation of its landscape, virtually eliminating largescale natural areas, during an era of rapid industrialization, which intensified upon its recovery from
World War II. In Eastern Europe and European Russia, intensive land development has been less
prevalent, so that some native forests and other natural areas remain. Air and water pollution from
use of dirty fuels and industrial effluents, however, are more serious environmental problems in
Eastern than in Western Europe, though recent trends show improvement in many indicators. Acid
rain has inflicted heavy environmental damage across much of Europe, particularly on forests.
Europe and North America are the only regions in which water usage for industry exceeds that for
agriculture, although in Mediterranean nations agriculture is the largest water consumer.
Key Points:
Europe contributes 36 percent of the world's chlorofluorocarbon emissions, 30 percent of carbon
dioxide emissions, and 25 percent of sulfur dioxide emissions.
Sulfur and nitrogen oxide emissions are the cause of 30 to 50 percent of Central and Eastern
Europe's deforestation.
Acid rain has been an environmental concern for decades and continues to be a challenge in parts
of Western Europe.
Overexploitation of up to 60 percent of Europe's groundwater presents a problem in industrial and
urban areas.
With marine catch trends increasing from 5,000,000 metric tons in the 1950s to over 20,000,000
metric tons by 2000, there was increasing concern about the reduction in fisheries and marine life,
should this trend continue unabated.
Significant numbers of mammal species in parts of western Europe, Eastern Europe and Russia are
currently threatened, while the biological diversity on the Iberian Peninsula is even further
compromised with over 40 percent of the mammal species in this region currently under threat. As
a result, there has been a 10 percent increase in protected areas of Europe.
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A major environmental issue for Europe involves the depletion of various already endangered or
threatened species, and most significantly, the decline of fish stocks. Some estimates suggest that
up to 50 percent of the continent's fish species may be considered endangered species. Coastal
fisheries have been over-harvested, resulting in catch limits or moratoriums on many commercially
important fish species.
Fortunately, in the last few years, these policies have started to yield measurable results with
decreasing trends in marine fish catch.
Recently, most European countries have adopted cleaner production technologies, and alternative
methods of waste disposal, including recycling.
The countries of Eastern Europe have made air quality a major environmental priority. This is
exemplified by the Russian Federation's addition to the 1995 "Berlin Mandate" (transnational
legislation based on resolutions of the Rio Earth Summit) compelling nations to promote "carbon
sinks" to absorb greenhouse gases.
On a relative basis, when compared with the degree of industrial emissions emitted by many
Eastern European countries until the late 1980s, there has been some marked increase in air quality
in the region, as obsolete plants are closed and a transition to cleaner fuels and more efficient
energy use takes place.
Regional Synopsis: The Middle and Near East
Quite possibly, the Middle East will exemplify the adage that, as the 20th century was a century
fixated on oil, the 21st century will be devoted to critical decisions about water. Many (though far
from all) nations in the Middle East rank among those countries with the largest oil and gas
reserves, but water resources are relatively scarce throughout this predominantly dry region.
Effects of global warming may cause moderately high elevation areas that now typically receive
winter "snowpack" to experience mainly rain instead, which would further constrain dry-season
water availability. The antiquities and religious shrines of the region render it a great magnet for
tourism, which entails considerable economic growth potential but also intensifies stresses on the
environment.
Key Points:
Water resource vulnerability is a serious concern across the entire region. The increased usage of,
and further demand for water, has exacerbated long-standing water scarcity in the region. For
instance, river diversions and industrial salt works have caused the Dead Sea to shrink by one-third
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from its original surface area, with further declines expected.
The oil industry in the region contributes to water pollution in the Persian Gulf, as a result of oil
spills, which have averaged 1.2 million barrels of oil spilt per year (some sources suggest that this
figure is understated). The consequences are severe because even after oil spills have been cleaned
up, environmental damage to the food webs and ecosystems of marine life will persist for a
prolonged period.
The region's coastal zone is considered one of the most fragile and endangered ecosystems of the
world. Land reclamation, shoreline construction, discharge of industrial effluents, and tourism
(such as diving in the Red Sea) contribute to widespread coastal damage.
Significant numbers of mammal species in parts of the Middle East are currently threatened.
Since the 1980s, 11 percent of the region's natural forest has been depleted.
Regional Synopsis: Latin America and the Caribbean
The Latin American and Caribbean region is characterized by exceedingly diverse landforms that
have generally seen high rates of population growth and economic development in recent decades.
The percentage of inhabitants residing in urban areas is quite high at 73.4 percent; the region
includes the megacities of Mexico City, Sao Paulo, and Rio de Janeiro. The region also includes the
world's second-highest mountain range, the Andes; significant expanses of desert and grassland; the
coral reefs of the Caribbean Sea; and the world's largest contiguous tropical forest in the Amazon
basin. Threats to the latter from subsistence and commercial farming, mineral exploitation and
timbering are well publicized. Nevertheless, of eight countries worldwide that still retain at least 70
percent of their original forest cover, six are in Latin America. The region accounts for nearly half
(48.3 percent) of the world's greenhouse gas emissions derived from land clearing, but as yet a
comparatively minuscule share (4.3 percent) of such gases from industrial sources.
Key Points:
Although Latin America is one of the most biologically diverse regions of the world, this
biodiversity is highly threatened, as exemplified by the projected extinction of up to 100,000
species in the next few decades. Much of this loss will be concentrated in the Amazon area,
although the western coastline of South America will also suffer significant depletion of biological
diversity. The inventory of rainforest species with potentially useful commercial or medical
applications is incomplete, but presumed to include significant numbers of such species that may
become extinct before they are discovered and identified.
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Up to 50 percent of the region's grazing land has lost its soil fertility as a result of soil erosion,
salinization, alkalinization and overgrazing.
The Caribbean Sea, the Atlantic Ocean, and the Pacific Ocean have all been contaminated by
agricultural wastes, which are discharged into streams that flow into these major waters. Water
pollution derived from phosphorous, nitrates and pesticides adversely affects fish stocks,
contributes to oxygen depletion and fosters overgrowth of aquatic vegetation. Marine life will
continue to be severely compromised as a result of these conditions.
Due to industrial development in the region, many beaches of eastern Latin America and the
Caribbean suffer from tar deposits.
Most cities in the region lack adequate sewage treatment facilities, and rapid migration of the rural
poor into the cities is widening the gap between current infrastructure capacity and the much
greater level needed to provide satisfactory basic services.
The rainforest region of the Amazon Basin suffers from dangerously high levels of deforestation,
which may be a significant contributory factor to global warming or "the greenhouse effect." In the
late 1990s and into the new millennium, the rate of deforestation was around 20 million acres of
rainforest being destroyed annually.
Deforestation on the steep rainforest slopes of Caribbean islands contributes to soil erosion and
landslides, both of which then result in heavy sedimentation of nearby river systems. When these
sedimented rivers drain into the sea and coral reefs, they poison the coral tissues, which are vital to
the maintenance of the reef ecosystem. The result is marine degradation and nutrient depletion.
Jamaica's coral reefs have never quite recovered from the effects of marine degradation.
The Southern Cone of Latin America (Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Paraguay, and Uruguay) suffers the
effects of greatly increased ultraviolet-B radiation, as a consequence of more intense ozone
depletion in the southern hemisphere.
Water resource vulnerability is an increasingly major concern in the northwestern portion of South
America.
Regional Synopsis: North America
North American nations, in particular the United States and Canada, rank among the world's most
highly developed industrial economies-a fact which has generated significant pollution problems,
but also financial resources and skills that have enabled many problems to be corrected. Although
efforts to promote energy efficiency, recycling, and suchlike have helped ease strains on the
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environment in a part of the world where per capita consumption levels are high, sprawling land
development patterns and recent preferences many households have demonstrated for larger
vehicles have offset these advances.
Meanwhile, a large portion of North America's original forest cover has been lost, though in many
cases replaced by productive second-growth woodland. In recent years, attitudes toward best use
of the region's remaining natural or scenic areas seem to be shifting toward recreation and
preservation and away from resource extraction. With increasing attention on the energy scarcity in
the United States, however, there is speculation that this shift may be short-lived. Indeed, the
energy shortage on the west coast of the United States and associated calls for energy exploration,
indicate a possible retrenchment toward resource extraction. At the same time, however, it has also
served to highlight the need for energy conservation as well as alternative energy sources.
Despite generally successful anti-pollution efforts, various parts of the region continue to suffer
significant air, water and land degradation from industrial, vehicular, and agricultural emissions and
runoff. Mexico, as a middle-income country, displays environmental problems characteristic of a
developing economy, including forest depletion, pollution from inefficient industrial processes and
dirty fuels, and lack of sufficient waste-treatment infrastructure.
Key Points:
Because of significantly greater motor vehicle usage in the United States (U.S.) than in the rest of
the world, the U.S. contribution of urban air pollution and greenhouse gas emissions, especially
carbon dioxide, is disproportionately high in relation to its population.
Acid rain is an enduring issue of contention in the northeastern part of the United States, on the
border with Canada.
Mexico's urban areas suffer extreme air pollution from carbon monoxide, nitrogen oxides, sulfur
dioxide, and other toxic air pollutants. Emissions controls on vehicles are in their infancy, compared
to analogous regulations in the U.S.
The cities of Mexico, including those on the U.S. border, also discharge large quantities of
untreated or poorly treated sewage, though officials are currently planning infrastructure upgrades.
Deforestation is noteworthy in various regions of the U.S., especially along the northwest coastline.
Old growth forests have been largely removed, but in the northeastern and upper midwestern
sections of the United States, evidence suggests that the current extent of tree cover probably
surpasses the figure for the beginning of the 20th century.
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Extreme weather conditions in the last few years have resulted in a high level of soil erosion along
the north coast of California; in addition, the coastline itself has shifted substantially due to soil
erosion and concomitant landslides.
Agricultural pollution-including nitrate contamination of well water, nutrient runoff to waterways,
and pesticide exposure-is significant in various areas. Noteworthy among affected places are
California's Central Valley, extensive stretches of the Midwest, and land in the Chesapeake Bay
watershed.
Inland waterways, especially around the Great Lakes, have substantially improved their water
quality, due to concentrated efforts at reducing water pollution by governmental, commercial and
community representatives. Strict curbs on industrial effluents and near-universal implementation
of sewage treatment are the chief factors responsible for this improvement.
A major environmental issue for Canada and the United States involves the depletion of various
already endangered or threatened species, and most significantly, the decline of fish stocks. Coastal
fisheries have been over-harvested, resulting in catch limits or moratoriums on many commercially
important fish species. In the last few years, these policies have started to yield measurable results
with decreasing trends in marine fish catch.
Due to the decay of neighboring ecosystems in Central America and the Caribbean, the sea
surrounding Florida has become increasingly sedimented, contributing to marine degradation,
nutrient depletion of the ecosystem, depletion of fish stocks, and diseases to coral species in
particular.
Polar Regions
Key Points:
The significant rise in sea level, amounting 10 to 25 centimeters in the last 100 years, is due to the
melting of the Arctic ice sheets, and is attributed to global warming.
The Antarctic suffers from a significant ozone hole, first detected in 1976. By 1985, a British
scientific team reported a 40 percent decrease in usual regeneration rates of the ozone. Because a
sustained increase in the amount of ultraviolet-B radiation would have adverse consequences upon
all planetary life, recent environmental measures have been put into effect, aimed at reversing
ozone depletion. These measures are projected to garner significant results by 2050.
Due to air and ocean currents, the Arctic is a sink for toxic releases originally discharged thousands
of miles away. Arctic wildlife and Canada's Inuit population have higher bodily levels of
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contaminants such as PCB and dioxin than those found in people and animals in much of the rest
of the world.
Global Environmental Concepts
1. Global Warming and Greenhouse Gases
The Greenhouse Effect:
In the early 19th century, the French physicist, Jean Fourier, contended that the earth's atmosphere
functions in much the same way as the glass of a greenhouse, thus describing what is now
understood as the "greenhouse effect." Put simply, the "greenhouse effect" confines some of the
sun's energy to the earth, preserving some of the planet's warmth, rather than allowing it to flow
back into space. In so doing, all kinds of life forms can flourish on earth. Thus, the "greenhouse
effect" is necessary to sustain and preserve life forms and ecosystems on earth.
In the late 19th century, a Swedish chemist, Svante Arrhenius, noticed that human activities, such
as the burning of coal and other fossil fuels for heat, and the removal of forested lands for urban
development, led to higher concentrations of greenhouse gases, like carbon dioxide and methane, in
the atmosphere. This increase in the levels of greenhouse gases was believed to advance the
"greenhouse effect" exponentially, and might be related to the trend in global warming.
In the wake of the Industrial Revolution, after industrial development took place on a large scale
and the total human population burgeoned simultaneously with industrialization, the resulting
increase in greenhouse gas emissions could, many scientists believe, be significant enough to have
some bearing on climate. Indeed, many studies in recent years support the idea that there is a
linkage between human activities and global warming, although there is less consensus on the
extent to which this linkage may be relevant to environmental concerns.
That said, some scientists have argued that temperature fluctuations have existed throughout the
evolution of the planet. Indeed, Dr. S. Fred Singer, the president of the Science and Environment
Policy Project has noted that 3,000-year-old geological records of ocean sediment reveal changes
in the surface temperature of the ocean. Hence, it is possible that climate variability is merely a
normal fact of the planet's evolution. Yet even skeptics as to anthropogenic factors concur that any
substantial changes in global temperatures would likely have an effect upon the earth's ecosystems,
as well as the life forms that inhabit them.
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The Relationship Between Global Warming and Greenhouse Gases:
A large number of climatologists believe that the increase in atmospheric concentrations of
"greenhouse gas emissions," mostly a consequence of human activities such as the burning of fossil
fuels, are contributing to global warming. The cause notwithstanding, the planet has reportedly
warmed 0.3°C to 0.6°C over the last century. Indeed, each year during the 1990s was one of the
very warmest in the 20th century, with the mean surface temperature for 1999 being the fifth
warmest on record since 1880.
In early 2000, a panel of atmospheric scientists for the National Research Council concluded in a
report that global warming was, indeed, a reality. While the panel, headed by Chairman John
Wallace, a professor of atmospheric sciences at the University of Washington, stated that it
remained unclear whether human activities have contributed to the earth's increasing temperatures,
it was apparent that global warming exists.
In 2001, following a request for further study by the incoming Bush administration in the United
States, the National Academy of Sciences again confirmed that global warming had been in
existence for the last 20 years. The study also projected an increase in temperature between 2.5
degrees and 10.4 degrees Fahrenheit by the year 2100. Furthermore, the study found the leading
cause of global warming to be emissions of carbon dioxide from the burning of fossil fuels, and it
noted that greenhouse gas accumulations in the earth's atmosphere was a result of human activities.
Within the scientific community, the controversy regarding has centered on the difference between
surface air and upper air temperatures. Information collected since 1979 suggests that while the
earth's surface temperature has increased by about a degree in the past century, the atmospheric
temperature five miles above the earth's surface has indicated very little increase. Nevertheless, the
panel stated that this discrepancy in temperature between surface and upper air does not invalidate
the conclusion that global warming is taking place. Further, the panel noted that natural events,
such as volcanic eruptions, can decrease the temperature in the upper atmosphere.
The major consequences of global warming potentially include the melting of the polar ice caps,
which, in turn, contribute to the rise in sea levels. Many islands across the globe have already
experienced a measurable loss of land as a result. Because global warming may increase the rate of
evaporation, increased precipitation, in the form of stronger and more frequent storm systems, is
another potential outcome. Other consequences of global warming may include the introduction
and proliferation of new infectious diseases, loss of arable land (referred to as "desertification"),
destructive changes to existing ecosystems, loss of biodiversity and the isolation of species, and
concomitant adverse changes in the quality of human life.
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International Policy Development in Regard to Global Warming:
Regardless of what the precise nature of the relationship between greenhouse gas emissions and
global warming may be, it seems that there is some degree of a connection between the
phenomena. Any substantial reductions in greenhouse gas emissions and global warming trends will
likely involve systematic changes in industrial operations, the use of advanced energy sources and
technologies, as well as global cooperation in implementing and regulating these transformations.
In this regard, the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC)
stipulated the following objectives:
1. To stabilize "greenhouse gas" concentrations within the atmosphere, in such a manner that
would preclude hazardous anthropogenic intervention into the existing biosphere and ecosystems of
the world. This stabilization process would facilitate the natural adaptation of ecosystems to
changes in climate.
2. To ensure and enable sustainable development and food production on a global scale.
*** See section on "International Environmental Agreements and Associations" for information
related to international policies related to limiting greenhouse gases and controlling climate change
emanating from historic summits at Kyoto, Copenhagen, Doha, and Paris. ***
2. Air Pollution
Long before global warming reared its head as a significant issue, those concerned about the
environment and public health noted the deleterious effects of human-initiated combustion upon
the atmosphere. Killer smogs from coal burning triggered acute health emergencies in London and
other places. At a lower level of intensity motor vehicle, power plant, and industrial emissions
impaired long-range visibility and probably had some chronic adverse consequences on the
respiratory systems of persons breathing such air.
In time, scientists began associating the sulfur dioxide and nitrogen oxides released from coal
burning with significant acid deposition in the atmosphere, eventually falling as "acid rain." This
phenomenon has severely degraded forestlands, especially in Europe and a few parts of the United
States. It has also impaired some aquatic ecosystems and eaten away the surface of some human
artifacts, such as marble monuments. Scrubber technology and conversion to cleaner fuels have
enabled the level of industrial production to remain at least constant while significantly reducing
acid deposition. Technologies aimed at cleaning the air and curtailing acid rain, soot, and smog
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may, nonetheless, boomerang as the perils of global warming become increasingly serious. In brief,
these particulates act as sort of a sun shade -- comparable to the effect of volcanic eruptions on the
upper atmosphere whereby periods of active volcanism correlate with temporarily cooler weather
conditions. Thus, while the carbon dioxide releases that are an inevitable byproduct of combustion
continue, by scrubbing the atmosphere of pollutants, an industrial society opens itself to greater
insolation (penetration of the sun's rays and consequent heating), and consequently, it is likely to
experience a correspondingly greater rise in ambient temperatures.
The health benefits of removing the sources of acid rain and smog are indisputable, and no one
would recommend a return to previous conditions. Nevertheless, the problematic climatic effects of
continually increasing emissions of carbon dioxide and other greenhouse gases pose a major global
environmental challenge, not as yet addressed adequately.
3. Ozone Depletion
The stratospheric ozone layer functions to prevent ultraviolet radiation from reaching the earth.
Normally, stratospheric ozone is systematically disintegrated and regenerated through natural
photochemical processes. The stratospheric ozone layer, however, has been depleted unnaturally as
a result of anthropogenic (man-made) chemicals, most especially chlorine and bromide compounds
such as chloroflorocarbons (CFCs), halons, and various industrial chemicals in the form of
solvents, refrigerants, foaming agents, aerosol propellants, fire retardants, and fumigants. Ozone
depletion is of concern because it permits a greater degree of ultraviolet-B radiation to reach the
earth, which then increases the incidences of cancerous malignancies, cataracts, and human
immune deficiencies. In addition, even in small doses, ozone depletion affects the ecosystem by
disturbing food chains, agriculture, fisheries and other forms of biological diversity.
Transnational policies enacted to respond to the dangers of ozone depletion include the 1985
Vienna Convention on the Protection of the Ozone Layer and the 1987 Montreal Protocol on
Substances that Deplete the Ozone Layer. The Montreal Protocol was subsequently amended in
London in 1990, Copenhagen in 1992 and Vienna in 1995. By 1996, 155 countries had ratified the
Montreal Protocol, which sets out a time schedule for the reduction (and eventual elimination) of
ozone depleting substances (OPS), and bans exports and imports of ODS from and to nonparticipant countries.
In general, the Protocol stipulates that developed countries must eliminate halon consumption by
1994 and CFC consumption by 1996, while developing countries must eliminate these substances
by 2010. Consumption of methyl bromide, which is used as a fumigant, was to be frozen at the
1995 in developed countries, and fully eliminated in 2010, while developing countries are to freeze
consumption by 2002, based on average 1995-1998 consumption levels. Methyl chloroform is to
be phased out by 2005. Under the Montreal Protocol, most ODS will be completely eliminated
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from use by 2010.
4. Land Degradation
In recent decades, land degradation in more arid regions of the world has become a serious
concern. The problem, manifest as both "desertification" and "devegetation," is caused primarily by
climate variability and human activities, such as "deforestation," excessive cultivation, overgrazing,
and other forms of land resource exploitation. It is also exacerbated by inadequate irrigation
practices. Although the effects of droughts on drylands have been temporary in the past, today, the
productivity and sustainability of these lands have been severely compromised for the long term.
Indeed, in every region of the world, land degradation has become an acute issue.
Desertification and Devegetation:
"Desertification" is a process of land degradation causing the soil to deteriorate, thus losing its
nutrients and fertility, and eventually resulting in the loss of vegetation, known as "devegetation."
As aforementioned, "desertification" and "devegetation" are caused by human activities, yet human
beings are also the greatest casualties. Because these forms of land degradation affect the ability of
the soil to produce crops, they concomitantly contribute to poverty. As population increases and
demographic concentrations shift, the extent of land subject to stresses by those seeking to wrest
subsistence from it has inexorably risen.
In response, the United Nations has formed the Convention to Combat Desertification-aimed at
implementing programs to address the underlying causes of desertification, as well as measures to
prevent and minimize its effects. Of particular significance is the formulation of policies on
transboundary resources, such as areas around lakes and rivers. At a broader level, the Convention
has established a Conference of Parties (COP), which includes all ratifying governments, for
directing and advancing international action.
To ensure more efficacious use of funding, the Convention intends to reconfigure international aid
to utilize a consultative and coordinated approach in the disbursement and expenditure of donor
funds. In this way, local communities that are affected by desertification will be active participants
in the solution-generation process. In-depth community education projects are envisioned as part of
this new international aid program, and private donor financing is encouraged. Meanwhile, as new
technologies are developed to deal with the problem of desertification, they need to be distributed
for application across the world. Hence, the Convention calls for international cooperation in
scientific research in this regard.
Desertification is a problem of sustainable development. It is directly connected to human
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challenges such as poverty, social and economic well-being and environmental protection as well.
Broader environmental issues, such as climate change, biological diversity, and freshwater supplies,
are indirectly related, so any effort to resolve this environmental challenge must entail coordinated
research efforts and joint action.
Deforestation:
Deforestation is not a recent phenomenon. For centuries, human beings have cut down trees to
clear space for land cultivation, or in order to use the wood for fuel. Over the last 200 years, and
most especially after World War II, deforestation increased because the logging industry became a
globally profitable endeavor, and so the clearing of forested areas was accelerated for the purposes
of industrial development. In the long term, this intensified level of deforestation is considered
problematic because the forest is unable to regenerate itself quickly. The deforestation that has
occurred in tropical rainforests is seen as an especially serious concern, due to the perceived
adverse effects of this process upon the entire global ecosystem.
The most immediate consequence of deforestation is soil degradation. Soil, which is necessary for
the growth of vegetation, can be a fragile and vital property. Organically, an extensive evolution
process must take place before soil can produce vegetation, yet at the same time, the effects of
natural elements, such as wind and rain, can easily and quickly degrade this resource. This
phenomenon is known as soil erosion. In addition, natural elements like wind and rain reduce the
amount of fertile soil on the ground, making soil scarcity a genuine problem. When fertile topsoil
that already exists is removed from the landscape in the process of deforestation, soil scarcity is
further exacerbated. Equally significant is the fact that once land has been cleared so that the
topsoil can be cultivated for crop production, not only are the nutrient reserves in the soil depleted,
thus producing crops of inferior quality, but the soil structure itself becomes stressed and
deteriorates further.
Another direct result of deforestation is flooding. When forests are cleared, removing the cover of
vegetation, and rainfall occurs, the flow of water increases across the surface of land. When
extensive water runoff takes place, the frequency and intensity of flooding increases. Other adverse
effects of deforestation include the loss of wildlife and biodiversity within the ecosystem that
supports such life forms.
At a broader level, tropical rainforests play a vital role in maintaining the global environmental
system. Specifically, destruction of tropical rainforests affects the carbon dioxide cycle. When
forests are destroyed by burning (or rotting), carbon dioxide is released into the air, thus
contributing to an intensified "greenhouse effect." The increase in greenhouse gas emissions like
carbon dioxide is a major contributor to global warming, according to many environmental
scientists. Indeed, trees themselves absorb carbon dioxide in the process of photosynthesis, so their
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loss also reduces the absorption of greenhouse gases.
Tropical rainforest destruction also adversely affects the nitrogen cycle. Nitrogen is a key nutrient
for both plants and animals. Plants derive nitrogen from soil, while animals obtain it via nitrogenenriched vegetation. This element is essential for the formation of amino acids, and thereby for
proteins and biochemicals that all living things need for metabolism and growth. In the nitrogen
cycle, vegetation acquires these essential proteins and biochemicals, and then cyclically returns
them to the atmosphere and global ecosystem. Accordingly, when tropical rainforest ecosystems
are compromised, not only is vegetation removed; the atmosphere is also affected and climates are
altered. At a more immediate level, the biodiversity within tropical rainforests, including wildlife
and insect species and a wealth of plant varieties, is depleted. Loss of rare plants is of particular
concern because certain species as yet unknown and unused could likely yield many practical
benefits, for instance as medicines.
As a result of the many challenges associated with deforestation, many environmental groups and
agencies have argued for government policies on the sustainable development of forests by
governments across the globe. While many countries have instituted national policies and programs
aimed at reducing deforestation, and substantial research has been advanced in regard to
sustainable and regenerative forestry development, there has been very little progress on an
international level. Generally speaking, most tropical rainforests are located in developing and less
developed countries, where economic growth is often dependent upon the exploitation of tropical
rainforests. Timber resources as well as wildlife hunting tend to be particularly lucrative arenas.
In places such as the Amazon, where deforestation takes place for the construction of energy
plants aimed at industrialization and economic development, there is an exacerbated effect on the
environment. After forests are cleared in order to construct such projects, massive flooding usually
ensues. The remaining trees then rot and decay in the wake of the flooding. As the trees
deteriorate, their biochemical makeup becomes more acidic, producing poisonous substances such
as hydrogen sulphide and methane gases. Acidified water subsequently corrodes the mechanical
equipment and operations of the plants, which are already clogged by rotting wood after the
floodwaters rise.
Deforestation generally arises from an economically plausible short-term motivation, but
nonetheless poses a serious global concern because the effects go beyond national boundaries. The
United Nations has established the World Commission on Forest and Sustainable Development.
This body's task is to determine the optimal means of dealing with the issue of deforestation,
without unduly affecting normal economic development, while emphasizing the global significance
of protecting tropical forest ecosystems.
5. Water Resources
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For all terrestrial fauna, including humans, water is the most immediate necessity to sustain life. As
the population has increased and altered an ever-greater portion of the landscape from its natural
condition, demand on water resources has intensified, especially with the development of
industrialization and large-scale irrigation. The supply of freshwater is inherently limited, and
moreover distributed unevenly across the earth's landmasses. Moreover, not just demand for
freshwater but activities certain to degrade it are becoming more pervasive. By contrast, the oceans
form a sort of "last wilderness," still little explored and in large part not seriously affected by
human activity. However, coastal environments - the biologically richest part of the marine
ecosystem-are experiencing major depletion due to human encroachment and over-exploitation.
Freshwater:
In various regions, for instance the Colorado River in the western United States, current
withdrawals of river water for irrigation, domestic, and industrial use consume the entire
streamflow so that almost no water flows into the sea at the river's mouth. Yet development is
ongoing in many such places, implying continually rising demand for water. In some areas reliant
on groundwater, aquifers are being depleted at a markedly faster rate than they are being
replenished. An example is the San Joaquin Valley in California, where decades of high water
withdrawals for agriculture have caused land subsidence of ten meters or more in some spots.
Naturally, the uncertainty of future water supplies is particularly acute in arid and semi-arid regions.
Speculation that the phenomenon of global warming will alter geographic and seasonal rainfall
patterns adds further uncertainty.
Water conservation measures have great potential to alleviate supply shortages. Some city water
systems are so old and beset with leaking pipes that they lose as much water as they meter. Broadscale irrigation could be replaced by drip-type irrigation, actually enhancing the sustainability of
agriculture. In many areas where heavy irrigation has been used for decades, the result is
deposition of salts and other chemicals in the soil such that the land becomes unproductive for
farming and must be abandoned.
Farming is a major source of water pollution. Whereas restrictions on industrial effluents and other
"point sources" are relatively easy to implement, comparable measures to reform hydraulic
practices at farms and other "nonpoint sources" pose a significantly knottier challenge. Farmcaused water pollution takes the following main forms:
- Nitrate pollution found in wells in intensive farming areas as a consequence of heavy fertilizer use
is a threat to human health. The most serious danger is to infants, who by ingesting high-nitrate
water can contract methemoglobinemia, sometimes called "blue baby syndrome," a potentially fatal
condition.
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- Fertilizer runoff into rivers and lakes imparts unwanted nutrients that cause algae growth and
eventual loss of oxygen in the body of water, degrading its ability to support fish and other
desirable aquatic life.
- Toxic agricultural chemicals - insecticides, herbicides, and fungicides - are detectable in some
aquifers and waterways.
In general, it is much easier to get a pollutant into water than to retrieve it out. Gasoline additives,
dry cleaning chemicals, other industrial toxins, and in a few areas radionucleides have all been
found in water sources intended for human use. The complexity and long time scale of
subterranean hydrological movements essentially assures that pollutants already deposited in
aquifers will continue to turn up for decades to come. Sophisticated water treatment processes are
available, albeit expensive, to reclaim degraded water and render it fit for human consumption. Yet
source protection is unquestionably a more desirable alternative.
In much of the developing world, and even some low-income rural enclaves of the developed
world, the population lacks ready access to safe water. Surface water and shallow groundwater
supplies are susceptible to contamination from untreated wastewater and failing septic tanks, as
well as chemical hazards. The occurrence of waterborne disease is almost certainly greatly
underreported.
Marine Resources:
Coastal areas have always been desirable places for human habitation, and population pressure on
them continues to increase. Many types of water degradation that affect lakes and rivers also affect
coastal zones: industrial effluents, untreated or partially treated sewage, nutrient load from
agriculture figure prominently in both cases. Prospects for more extreme storms as a result of
global warming, as well as the pervasiveness of poorly planned development in many coastal areas,
forebode that catastrophic hurricanes and landslides may increase in frequency in the future.
Ongoing rise in sea levels will force remedial measures and in some cases abandonment of
currently valuable coastal property.
Fisheries over much of the globe have been overharvested, and immediate conservation measures
are required to preserve stocks of many species. Many governments subsidized factory-scale
fishing fleets in the 1970s and 1980s, and the resultant catch increase evidently surpassed a
sustainable level. It is uncertain how much of the current decline in fish stocks stems from
overharvesting and how much from environmental pollution. The deep ocean remains relatively
unaffected by human activity, but continental shelves near coastlines are frequently seriously
polluted, and these close-to-shore areas are the major biological nurseries for food fish and the
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smaller organisms they feed on.
6. Environmental Toxins
Toxic chemical pollution exploded on the public consciousness with disclosure of spectacularly
polluted industrial areas such as Love Canal near Buffalo, New York. There is no question that
pollutants such as organophosphates or radionucleides can be highly deleterious to health, but
evidence to date suggests that seriously affected areas are a localized rather than universal problem.
While some explore the possibilities for a lifestyle that fully eschews use of modern industrial
chemicals, the most prevalent remediative approach is to focus on more judicious use. The most
efficient chemical plants are now able to contain nearly all toxic byproducts of their production
processes within the premises, minimizing the release of such substances into the environment.
Techniques such as Integrated Pest Management (IPM) dictate limited rather than broadcast use of
pesticides: application only when needed using the safest available chemical, supplemented as
much as possible with nontoxic controls.
While heightened public awareness and growing technical sophistication suggest a hopeful outlook
on limiting the damage from manmade environmental toxins, one must grant that previous incidents
of their misuse and mishandling have already caused environmental damage that will have to be
dealt with for many years to come. In the case of the most hazardous radioactive substances, the
time scale for successful remediation actually extends beyond that of the recorded history of
civilization. Moreover, in this era of high population density and rapid economic growth, quotidian
activities such as the transport of chemicals will occasionally, seemingly inevitably result in
accidents with adverse environmental consequences.
7. "Islandization" and Biodiversity
With increased awareness regarding the adverse effects of unregulated hunting and habitat
depletion upon wildlife species and other aspects of biodiversity, large-scale efforts across the globe
have been initiated to reduce and even reverse this trend.
In every region of the world, many species of wildlife and areas of biodiversity have been saved
from extinction. Nationally, many countries have adopted policies aimed at preservation and
conservation of species, and one of the most tangible measures has been the proliferation of
protected habitats. Such habitats exist in the form of wildlife reserves, marine life reserves, and
other such areas where biodiversity can be protected from external encroachment and exploitation.
Despite these advances in wildlife and biodiversity protection, further and perhaps more intractable
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challenges linger. Designated reserves, while intended to prevent further species decline, exist as
closed territories, fragmented from other such enclaves and disconnected from the larger
ecosystem. This environmental scenario is referred to as "islandization." Habitat reserves often
serve as oversized zoos or game farms, with landscapes and wildlife that have effectively been
"tamed" to suit. Meanwhile, the larger surrounding ecosystem continues to be seriously degraded
and transformed, while within the islandized habitat, species that are the focus of conservation
efforts may not have sufficient range and may not be able to maintain healthy genetic variability.
As a consequence, many conservationists and preservationists have demanded that substantially
larger portions of land be withheld as habitat reserves, and a network of biological corridors to
connect continental reserves be established. While such efforts to combat islandization have
considerable support in the United States, how precisely such a program would be instituted,
especially across national boundaries, remains a matter of debate. International conservationists
and preservationists say without a network of reserves a massive loss of biodiversity will result.
The concept of islandization illustrates why conservation and preservation of wildlife and
biodiversity must consider and adopt new, broader strategies. In the past, conservation and
preservation efforts have been aimed at specific species, such as the spotted owl and grizzly bear in
North America, the Bengal tiger in Southeast Asia, the panda in China, elephants in Africa. Instead,
the new approach is to simultaneously protect many and varied species that inhabit the same
ecosystem. This method, referred to as "bio-regional conservation," may more efficaciously
generate longer-term and more far-reaching results precisely because it is aimed at preserving entire
ecosystems, and all the living things within.
More About Biodiversity Issues:
This section is directly taken from the United Nations Environmental Program: "Biodiversity
Assessment"
The Global Biodiversity Assessment, completed by 1500 scientists under the auspices of United
Nations Environmental Program in 1995, updated what is known (or unknown) about global
biological diversity at the ecosystem, species and genetic levels. The assessment was uncertain of
the total number of species on Earth within an order of magnitude. Of its working figure of 13
million species, only 13 percent are scientifically described. Ecological community diversity is also
poorly known, as is its relationship to biological diversity, and genetic diversity has been studied for
only a small number of species. The effects of human activities on biodiversity have increased so
greatly that the rate of species extinctions is rising to hundreds or thousands of times the
background level. These losses are driven by increasing demands on species and their habitats, and
by the failure of current market systems to value biodiversity adequately. The Assessment calls for
urgent action to reverse these trends.
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There has been a new recognition of the importance of protecting marine and aquatic biodiversity.
The first quantitative estimates of species losses due to growing coral reef destruction predict that
almost 200,000 species, or one in five presently contributing to coral reef biodiversity, could die
out in the next 40 years if human pressures on reefs continue to increase.
Since Rio, many countries have improved their understanding of the status and importance of their
biodiversity, particularly through biodiversity country studies such as those prepared under the
auspices of UNEP/GEF. The United Kingdom identified 1250 species needing monitoring, of
which 400 require action plans to ensure their survival. Protective measures for biodiversity, such
as legislation to protect species, can prove effective. In the USA, almost 40 percent of the plants
and animals protected under the Endangered Species Act are now stable or improving as a direct
result of recovery efforts. Some African countries have joined efforts to protect threatened species
through the 1994 Lusaka Agreement, and more highly migratory species are being protected by
specialized cooperative agreements among range states under the Bonn Agreement.
There is an emerging realization that a major part of conservation of biological diversity must take
place outside of protected areas and involve local communities. The extensive agricultural areas
occupied by small farmers contain much biodiversity that is important for sustainable food
production. Indigenous agricultural practices have been and continue to be important elements in
the maintenance of biodiversity, but these are being displaced and lost. There is a new focus on the
interrelationship between agrodiversity conservation and sustainable use and development practices
in smallholder agriculture, with emphasis on use of farmers' knowledge and skills as a source of
information for sustainable farming.
Perhaps even more important than the loss of biodiversity is the transformation of global
biogeochemical cycles, the reduction in the total world biomass, and the decrease in the biological
productivity of the planet. While quantitative measurements are not available, the eventual
economic and social consequences may be so significant that the issue requires further attention.
******
Specific sources used for this section:
Bendall, Roger. 1996. "Biodiversity: the follow up to Rio". The Globe 30:4-5, April 1996.
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Global Environmental Change: Human and Policy Implications. 1995. Special issue on "People,
Land Management and Environmental Change", Vol. 3, No. 4, September 1995.
Golubev, Genady N. (Moscow University) In litt. 29 June 1996.
Heywood, V.H. (ed.). 1995. Global Biodiversity Assessment. United Nations Environment
Programme. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge.
Heywood, V.H. 1996. "The Global Biodiversity Assessment". The Globe, 30:2-4, April 1996.
Reaka-Kudla, Marjorie. 1996. Paper presented at American Association for Advancement of
Science, February 1996. Quoted in Pain, Stephanie. "Treasures lost in reef madness". New
Scientist, 17 February 1996.
Uitto, Juha I., and Akiko Ono (eds). 1996. Population, Land Management and Environmental
Change. The United Nations University, Tokyo.
USFWS. 1994. U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service report to Congress, cited in news release 21 July
1994.
Online resources used generally in the Environmental Overview:
Environmental Protection Agency Global Warming Site. URL: http://www.epa.gov/globalwarming
Food and Agriculture Organization of United Nations: Forestry. URL:
http://www.fao.org/forestry/site/sofo/en/
Global Warming Information Page. URL: http://globalwarming.org
U n i t e d
N a t i o n s
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P r o g r a m .
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http://www.unep.org/GEO/GEO_Products/Assessment_Reports/
United Nations Global Environmental Outlook. URL: http://www.unep.org/geo/geo4/media/
Note on Edition Dates:
The edition dates for textual resources are noted above because they were used to formulate the
original content. We also have used online resources (cited above) to update coverage as needed.
Information Resources
For more information about environmental concepts, CountryWatch recommends the following
resources:
The United Nations Environmental Program Network (with country profiles)
<http://www.unep.net/>
The United Nations Environment Program on Climate Change
<http://climatechange.unep.net/>
The United Nations Environmental Program on Waters and Oceans
<http://www.unep.ch/earthw/Pdepwat.htm>
The United Nations Environmental Program on Forestry: "Forests in Flux"
<http://www.unep-wcmc.org/forest/flux/homepage.htm>
FAO "State of the World's Forests"
<http://www.fao.org/forestry/FO/SOFO/SOFO99/sofo99-e.stm>
World Resources Institute.
<http://www.wri.org/>
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Harvard University Center for Health and the Global Environment
<http://www.med.harvard.edu/chge/the-review.html>
The University of Wisconsin Center for Sustainability and the Global Environment
http://sage.aos.wisc.edu/
International Environmental Agreements and Associations
International Policy Development in Regard to Global Warming:
Introduction
Regardless of what the precise nature of the relationship between greenhouse gas emissions and
global warming may be, it seems that there is some degree of a connection between the
phenomena. Any substantial reductions in greenhouse gas emissions and global warming trends will
likely involve systematic changes in industrial operations, the use of advanced energy sources and
technologies, as well as global cooperation in implementing and regulating these transformations.
In this regard, the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC)
stipulated the following objectives:
1. To stabilize "greenhouse gas" concentrations within the atmosphere, in such a manner that
would preclude hazardous anthropogenic intervention into the existing biosphere and ecosystems of
the world. This stabilization process would facilitate the natural adaptation of ecosystems to
changes in climate.
2. To ensure and enable sustainable development and food production on a global scale.
Following are two discusssions regarding international policies on the environment, followed by
listings of international accords.
Special Entry: The Kyoto Protocol
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The UNFCCC was adopted at the Rio Earth Summit in 1992, and entered into force in 1994. Over
175 parties were official participants.
Meanwhile, however, many of the larger, more industrialized nations failed to reach the emissions'
reduction targets, and many UNFCCC members agreed that the voluntary approach to reducing
emissions had not been successful. As such, UNFCCC members reached a consensus that legally
binding limits were necessitated, and agreed to discuss such a legal paradigm at a meeting in Kyoto,
Japan in 1997. At that meeting, the UNFCCC forged the Kyoto Protocol. This concord is the first
legally binding international agreement that places limits on emissions from industrialized countries.
The major greenhouse gas emissions addressed in the Kyoto Protocol include carbon dioxide,
nitrous oxide, hydrofluorocarbons, perfluorocarbons, sulfur hexafluoride, and methane.
The provisions of the Kyoto Protocol stipulate that economically advanced nations must reduce
their combined emissions of greenhouse gases, by approximately five percent from their 1990
levels, before the 2008-2010 deadline. Countries with the highest carbon dioxide emissions, such as
the United States (U.S.), many of the European Union (EU) countries, and Japan, are to reduce
emissions by a scale of 6 to 8 percent. All economically advanced nations must show
"demonstrable progress" by 2005. In contrast, no binding limits or timetable have been set on
developing countries. Presumably, this distinction is due to the fact that most developing countries - with the obvious exceptions of India and China -- simply do not emit as many greenhouse gases
as do more industrially advanced countries. Meanwhile, these countries are entrenched in the
process of economic development.
Regardless of the aforementioned reasoning, there has been strong opposition against the
asymmetrical treatment assigned to emissions limits among developed and developing countries.
Although this distinction might be regarded as unfair in principle, associations such as the Alliance
of Small Island States have been vocal in expressing how global warming -- a result of greenhouse
gas emissions - has contributed to the rise in sea level, and thus deleteriously affected their very
existence as island nation states. For this reason, some parties have suggested that economically
advanced nations, upon returning to their 1990 levels, should be required to further reduce their
greenhouse gas emissions by a deadline of 2005. In response, interested parties have observed that
even if such reductions were undertaken by economically advanced nations, they would not be
enough to completely control global warming. Indeed, a reduction in the rate of fossil fuel usage by
developing nations would also be necessary to have substantial ameliorative effect on global
warming. Indeed, a reduction in the rate of fossil fuel usage by developing nations would also be
necessary to have substantial ameliorative effect on global warming.
As such, the Protocol established a "Clean Development Mechanism" which permits developed
countries to invest in projects aimed at reducing emissions within developing countries in return for
credit for the reductions. Ostensibly, the objective of this mechanism is to curtail emissions in
developing countries without unduly penalizing them for their economic development. Under this
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model, the countries with more potential emissions credits could sell them to other signatories of
the Kyoto Protocol, whose emissions are forecast to significantly rise in the next few years. Should
this trading of emissions credits take place, it is estimated that the Kyoto Protocol's emissions
targets could still be met.
In 1999, the International Energy Outlook projected that Eastern Europe, the former Soviet Union
and Newly Independent States, as well as parts of Asia, are all expected to show a marked
decrease in their level of energy-related carbon emissions in 2010. Nations with the highest
emissions, specifically, the U.S., the EU and Japan, are anticipated to reduce their emissions by up
to 8 percent by 2012. By 2000, however, the emissions targets were not on schedule for
achievement. Indeed, the U.S. Department of Energy estimates forecast that by 2010, there will be
a 34 percent increase in carbon emissions from the 1990 levels, in the absence of major shifts in
policy, economic growth, energy prices, and consumer trends. Despite this assessment in the U.S.,
international support for the Kyoto Protocol remained strong, especially among European countries
and island states, who view the pact as one step in the direction away from reliance on fossil fuels
and other sources of greenhouse gases.
In 2001, U.S. President, George W. Bush, rejected his country's participation in the Kyoto
Protocol, saying that the costs imposed on the global economic system, and especially, on the US,
overshadowed the benefits of the Protocol. He also cited the unfair burden on developed nations to
reduce emissions, as another primary reasons for withdrawal from the international pact, as well as
insufficient evidence regarding the science of global warming. Faced with impassioned international
disapproval for his position, the U.S. president stated that his administration remained interested in
dealing with the matter of global warming, but would endorse alternative measures to combat the
problem, such as voluntary initiatives limiting emissions. Critics of Bush's position, however, have
noted that it was the failure of voluntary initiatives to reduce emissions following the Rio Summit
that led to the establishment of the Kyoto Protocol in the first place.
In the wake of the Bush administration's decision, many participant countries resigned themselves
to the reality that the goals of the Kyoto Protocol might not be achieved without U.S. involvement.
Nevertheless, in Bonn, Germany, in July 2001, the remaining participant countries struck a political
compromise on some of the key issues and sticking points, and planned to move forward with the
Protocol, irrespective of the absence of the U.S. The key compromise points included the
provision for countries to offset their targets with carbon sinks (these are areas of forest and
farmland which can absorb carbon through the process of photosynthesis). Another compromise
point within the broader Bonn Agreement was the reduction of emissions cuts of six gases from
over 5 percent to a more achievable 2 percent. A third key change was the provision of funding for
less wealthy countries to adopt more progressive technologies.
In late October and early November 2001, the UNFCC's 7th Conference of the Parties met in
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Marrakesh, Morocco, to finalize the measures needed to make the Kyoto Protocol operational.
Although the UNFCC projected that ratification of the Protocol would make it legally binding
within a year, many critics noted that the process had fallen short of implementing significant
changes in policy that would be necessary to actually stop or even slow climate change. They also
maintained that the absence of U.S. participation effectively rendered the Protocol into being a
political exercise without any substance, either in terms of transnational policy or in terms of
environmental concerns.
The adoption of the compromises ensconced within the Bonn Agreement had been intended to
make the provisions of the Kyoto Protocol more palatable to the U.S. In this regard, it failed to
achieve its objective as the Bush administration continued to eschew participation in the
international accord. Still, however, the Bonn Agreement did manage to render a number of other
positive outcomes. Specifically, in 2002, key countries, such as Russia, Japan and Canada agreed
to ratify the protocol, bringing the number of signatories to 178. The decision by key countries to
ratify the protocol was regarded as "the kiss of life" by observers.
By 2005, on the eve of a climate change conference in London, British Prime Minister Tony Blair
was hoping to deal with the problems of climate change beyond the provisions set forth in the
Kyoto Protocol. Acknowledging that the Kyoto Protocol could not work in its current form, Blair
wanted to open the discussion for a new climate change plan.
Blair said that although most of the world had signed on to Kyoto, the protocol could not meet any
of its practical goals of cutting greenhouse gas emissions without the participation of the United
States, the world's largest polluter. He also noted that any new agreement would have to include
India and China -- significant producers of greenhouse gas emissions, but exempt from Kyoto
because they have been classified as developing countries. Still, he said that progress on dealing
with climate change had been stymied by "a reluctance to face up to reality and the practical action
needed to tackle problem."
Blair also touted the "huge opportunities" in technology and pointed toward the possibilities offered
by wind, solar and nuclear power, along with fuel cell technology, eco-friendly biofuels, and
carbon capture and storage which could generate low carbon power. Blair also asserted that his
government was committed to achieving its domestic goal of reducing carbon dioxide emissions by
20 percent by 2010.
In the United States, President George W. Bush has said that global warming remained a debatable
issue and despite conclusions reached by his own Environmental Protection Agency, he has not
agreed with the conclusion that global warming and climate change are linked with human
activities. Bush has also refused to ratify Kyoto on the basis of its economic costs.
Australia, an ally of the United States, has taken a similarly dim view of the Kyoto Protocol.
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Ahead of the November 2005 climate change meeting in Canada in which new goals for the
protocol were to be discussed, Australia 's Environment Minister, Ian Campbell, said that
negotiating new greenhouse gas emission levels for the Kyoto Protocol would be a waste of time.
Campbell said, "There is a consensus that the caps, targets and timetables approach is flawed. If
we spend the next five years arguing about that, we'll be fiddling and negotiating while Rome
burns." Campbell, like the Bush administration, has also advocated a system of voluntary action
in which industry takes up new technologies rather than as a result of compelling the reduction of
emissions. But the Australian Conservation Foundation (ACF) has called on its government to
ratify the Kyoto Protocol, to establish a system of emissions trading, and to set binding limits on
emissions. Interestingly, although it did not sign on to Kyoto , Australia was expected to meet its
emissions target by 2012 (an 8 percent increase in 1990 levels in keeping with the country's
reliance on coal). But this success has nothing to do with new technologies and is due to statebased regulations on land clearing.
Note: The Kyoto Protocol calls for developed nations to cut greenhouse emissions by 5.2 percent
of 1990 levels by 2012.
Special Entry: Climate Change Summit in Copenhagen (2009) -In December 2009, the United Nations Climate Change Summit opened in the Danish capital of
Copenhagen. The summit was scheduled to last from Dec. 7-18, 2009. Delegates from more than
190 countries were in attendance, and approximately 100 world leaders, including British Prime
Minister Gordon Brown and United States President Barack Obama, were expected to participate.
At issue was the matter of new reductions targets on greenhouse gas emissions by 2020.
Despite earlier fears that little concurrence would come from the conference, effectively pushing
significant actions forward to a 2010 conference in Mexico City, negotiators were now reporting
that the talks were productive and several key countries, such as South Africa, had pledged to
reduce greenhouse gas emissions. The two main issues that could still lead to cleavages were
questions of agreement between the industrialized countries and the developing countries of the
world, as well as the overall effectiveness of proposals in seriously addressing the perils of climate
change.
On Dec. 9, 2009, four countries -- the United Kingdom, Australia, Mexico and Norway - presented a document outlining ideas for raising and managing billions of dollars, which would be
intended to help vulnerable countries dealing with the perils of climate change. Described as a
"green fund," the concept could potentially help small island states at risk because of the rise in sea
level. Bangladesh identified itself as a potential recipient of an assistance fund, noting that as a
country plagued by devastating floods, it was particularly hard-hit by climate change. The "green
fund" would fall under the rubric of the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate
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Change, for which developed countries have been committed to quantifying their emission
reduction targets, and also to providing financial and technical support to developing countries.
The United Kingdom, Australia, Mexico and Norway also called for the creation of a new legal
treaty that would replace the Kyoto Protocol. This new treaty, which could go into force in 2012,
would focus largely on the reduction of greenhouse gas emissions by 2020. But Australia went
even further in saying that the successor treaty to the Kyoto Protocol, should be one with
provisions covering all countries. Such a move would be a departure from the structure of the
Kyoto Protocol, which contained emissions targets for industrialized countries due to the prevailing
view that developed countries had a particular historic responsibility to be accountable for climate
change. More recently, it has become apparent that substantial reductions in greenhouse gas
emissions demanded by scientists would only come to pass with the participation also of significant
developing nation states, such as China and India. Indeed, one of the most pressing critiques of the
Kyoto Protocol was that it was a "paper tiger" that failed to address the impact of the actions of
emerging economies like China and India, with its focus on the developed economies.
Now, in 2009, China -- as the world's biggest greenhouse gas emitter -- was responding this
dubious distinction by vocalizing its criticism of the current scenario and foregrounding its new
commitments. Ahead of the Copenhagen summit, China had announced it would reduce the
intensity of its carbon emissions per unit of its GDP in 2020 by 40 to 45 percent against 2005
levels. With that new commitment at hand, China was now accusing the United States and the
European Union of shirking their own responsibilities by setting weak targets for greenhouse gas
emissions cuts. Senior Chinese negotiator, Su Wei, characterized the goals of the world's second
largest greenhouse gas emitter -- the United States -- as "not notable," and the European Union's
target as "not enough." Su Wei also took issue with Japan for setting implausible preconditions.
On Dec. 11, 2009, China demanded that developed and wealthy countries in Copenhagen should
help deliver a real agreement on climate change by delivering on their promises to reduce carbon
emissions and provide financial support for developing countries to adapt to global warming. In so
doing, China's Vice Foreign Minister He Yafei said his country was hoping that a "balanced
outcome" would emerge from the discussions at the summit. Echoing the position of the Australian
government, He Yafei spoke of a draft agreement as follows: "The final document we're going to
adopt needs to be taking into account the needs and aspirations of all countries, particularly the
most vulnerable ones."
China's Vice Foreign Minister emphasized the fact that climate change was "a matter of survival"
for developing countries, and accordingly, such countries need wealthier and more developed
countries to accentuate not only their pledges of emissions reduction targets, but also their financial
commitments under the aforementioned United Nations Framework Convention on Climate
Change. To that end, scientists and leaders of small island states in the Indian Ocean, the Pacific
Ocean and the Caribbean Sea, have highlighted the existential threat posed by global warming and
the concomitant rise in sea level.
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China aside, attention was also on India -- another major player in the developing world and a
country with an industrializing economy that was impacting the environment. At issue was the
Indian government's decision to set a carbon intensity target, which would slow emissions growth
by up to 25 percent by the 2020 deadline. This strong position was resisted by some elements in
India, who argued that their country should not be taking such a strong position when developed
wealthy countries were yet to show accountability for their previous commitments to reduce
greenhouse gas emissions. The matter grew so heated that the members of the opposition stormed
out of the parliament in protest as Indian Environment Minister Jairam Ramesh defended the
policy. But the political pressure at home in India was leaving the Indian delegation in Copenhagen
in a state of chaos as well. In fact, India's top environmental negotiator refused to travel to
Copenhagen in protest of the government's newly-announced stance.
China and India were joined by Brazil and South Africa in the crafting of a draft document calling
for a new global climate treaty to be completed by June 2010. Of concern has been the realization
that there was insufficient time to find concurrence on a full legal treaty, which would leave
countries only with a politically-binding text by the time the summit at Copenhagen closed. But
Guyana's leader, President Bharrat Jagdeo, warned that the summit in Denmark would be
classified as a failure unless a binding document was agreed upon instead of just political
consensus. He urged his cohorts to act with purpose saying, "Never before have science,
economics, geo-strategic self-interest and politics intersected in such a way on an issue that impacts
everyone on the planet."
Likewise, Tuvalu demanded that legally binding agreements emerge from Copenhagen. Its
proposal was supported by many of the vulnerable countries, from small island states and subSaharan Africa, all of whom warned of the catastrophic impact of climate change on their
citizens. Tuvalu also called for more aggressive action, such as an amendment to the 1992
agreement, which would focus on sharp greenhouse gas emissions and the accepted rise in
temperatures, due to the impact the rise in seas. The delegation from Kiribati joined the call by
drawing attention to the fact that one village had to be abandoned due to waist-high water, and
more such effects were likely to follow. Kiribati's Foreign Secretary, Tessie Lambourne, warned
that the people of Kiribati could well be faced with no homeland in the future saying, "Nobody in
this room would want to leave their homeland." But despite such impassioned pleas and
irrespective of warnings from the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change that the rise in sea
level from melting polar ice caps would deleteriously affect low-lying atolls such as such as Tuvalu
and Kiribati in the Pacific, and the Maldives in the Indian Ocean, the oil-giant Saudi Arabia was
able to block this move.
Meanwhile, within the developed countries, yet another power struggle was brewing. The
European Union warned it would only agree to raise its target of 20 percent greenhouse gas
emissions reductions to 30 percent if the United States demonstrated that it would do more to
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reduce its own emissions. It was unknown if such pressure would yield results. United States
President Barack Obama offered a "provisional" 2020 target of 17 percent reductions, noting that
he could not offer greater concessions at Copenhagen due to resistance within the United States
Congress, which was already trying to pass a highly controversial "cap and trade" emissions
legislation. However, should that emissions trading bill fail in the Senate, the United States
Environment Protection Agency's declaration that greenhouse gases pose a danger to human health
and the environment was expected to facilitate further regulations and limits on power plants and
factories at the national level. These moves could potentially strengthen the Obama
administration's offering at Copenhagen. As well, President Obama also signaled that he would be
willing to consider the inclusion of international forestry credits.
Such moves indicated willingness by the Obama administration to play a more constructive role on
the international environmental scene than its predecessor, the Bush administration. Indeed, ahead
of his arrival at the Copenhagen summit, President Barack Obama's top environmental advisors
promised to work on a substantial climate change agreement. To that end, United States
Environmental Protection Agency Administrator Lisa Jackson said at a press conference, "We are
seeking robust engagement with all of our partners around the world." But would this proengagement assertion yield actual results?
By Dec. 12, 2009, details related to a draft document prepared by Michael Zammit Cutajar, the
head of the Ad-hoc Working Group on Long-Term Cooperative Action, were released at the
Copenhagen climate conference. Included in the document were calls for countries to make major
reductions in carbon emissions over the course of the next decade. According to the Washington
Post, industrialized countries were called on to make cuts of between 25 percent and 40 percent
below 1990 levels -- reductions that were far more draconian than the United States was likely to
accept. As discussed above, President Obama had offered a provisional reduction target of 17
percent. The wide gap between the released draft and the United States' actual stated position
suggested there was much more negotiating in the offing if a binding agreement could be forged,
despite the Obama administration's claims that it was seeking greater engagement on this issue.
In other developments, the aforementioned call for financial support of developing countries to deal
with the perils of climate change was partly answered by the European Union on Dec. 11, 2009.
The European bloc pledged an amount of 2.4 billion euros (US$3.5 billion) annually from 2010 to
2012. Environment Minister Andreas Carlgren of Sweden -- the country that holds the rotating
presidency of the European Union at the time of the summit -- put his weight behind the notion of
a "legally binding deal." Meanwhile, Yvo de Boer, a top United Nations climate change official,
focused less on the essence of the agreement and more on tangible action and effects saying,
"Copenhagen will only be a success if it delivers significant and immediate action that begins the
day the conference ends."
The division between developed and developing countries in Copenhagen reached new heights on
Dec. 14, 2009, when some of the poor and less developed countries launched a boycott at the
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summit. The move, which was spurred by African countries but backed by China and India,
appeared to be geared toward redirecting attention and primary responsibility to the wealthier and
more industrialized countries. The impasse was resolved after the wealthier and more
industrialized countries offered assurances that they did not intend on shirking from their
commitments to reducing greenhouse gases. As a result, the participating countries ceased the
boycott.
Outside the actual summit, thousands of protestors had gathered to demand crucial global
warming, leading to clashes between police and demonstrators elsewhere in the Danish capital city.
There were reports of scattered violence across Copenhagen and more than 1,000 people were
arrested.
Nevertheless, by the second week of the climate change summit, hopes of forging a strong deal
were eroding as developed and developing nations remained deadlocked on sharing cuts in
greenhouse gases, and particularly on the matters of financing and temperature goals. In a bid to
shore up support for a new climate change, United States President Barack Obama joined other
world leaders in Copenhagen. On Dec. 14, 2009, there was a standoff brewing between the
United States and China. At issue was China's refusal to accept international monitoring of its
expressed targets for reducing greenhouse gas emissions. The United States argued that China's
opposition to verification could be a deal-breaker.
By the close of the summit, the difficult process eventually resulted in some consensus being
cultivated. A draft text called for $100 billion a year by 2020 to assist poor nations cope with
climate change, while aiming to limit global warming to two degrees Celsius compared with preindustrial levels. The deal also included specific targets for developed countries to reduce
greenhouse gas emissions, and called for reductions by developing countries as a share of their
economies. Also included in the agreement was a mechanism to verify compliance. The details of
the agreement were supported by President Barack Obama, Chinese Premier Wen Jiabao, Indian
Prime Minister Manmohan Singh and Brazilian President Luiz Inacio Lula da Silva.
This draft would stand as an interim agreement, with a legally-binding international pact unlikely to
materialize until 2010. In this way, the summit in Copenhagen failed to achieve its central
objective, which was to negotiate a successor to the Kyoto Protocol on greenhouse gas emissions.
Editor's Note
In the background of these developments was the growing global consciousness related to global
warming and climate change. Indeed, as the Copenhagen summit was ongoing, it was clear there
was enormous concurrence on the significance of the stakes with an editorial on the matter of
climate change being published in 56 newspapers in 45 countries. That editorial warned that
without global action, climate change would "ravage our planet." Meanwhile, a global survey taken
by Globescan showed that concern over global warming had exponentially increased from 1998 -Colombia Review 2017
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when only 20 percent of respondents believed it to be a serious problem -- to 64 percent in 2009.
Such survey data, however, was generated ahead of the accusations by climate change skeptics
that some climate scientists may have overstated the case for global warming, based on emails
derived in an illicit manner from a British University.
Special Entry: Climate change talks in Doha in Qatar extend life of Kyoto Protocol (2012)
December 2012 saw climate talks ensue in the Qatari city of Doha as representatives from
countries across the world gathered to discuss the fate of the Kyoto Protocol, which seeks to
minimize greenhouse gas emissions. The summit yielded results with decisions made (1) to extend
the Kyoto Protocol until 2020, and (2) for wealthier countries to compensate poorer countries for
the losses and damage incurred as a result of climate change.
In regards to the second matter, Malia Talakai of Nauru, a leading negotiator for the Alliance of
Small Island States, explained the necessity of the compensation package as follows: “We are trying
to say that if you pollute you must help us.”
This measure was being dubbed the "Loss and Damage" mechanism, and was being linked with
United States President Barack Obama's request for $60 billion from Congress to deal with the
devastation caused by Hurricane Sandy months before. The sight of a hurricane bearing down on
the northern Atlantic seaboard, along with the reality of the scope of reconstruction, appeared to
have illustrated the economic costs of climate change -- not so much as a distant environmental
issue -- but as a danger to the quotidian lives of people. Still, there was blame to be placed on the
United States and European countries -- some of world's largest emitters -- for failing to do more
to reduce emissions.
To that latter end, there was in fact little progress made on the central issue of reducing greenhouse
gas emissions. Had those emissions been reduced, there would have been less of a need to
financially deal with the devastation caused by climate change. One interpretation was that the
global community was accepting the fact that industrialization was contributing to global warming,
which had deleterious effects on the polar ice caps and concomitantly on the rise of sea level, with
devastating effects for small island nations. Thus, wealthier countries were willing to pay around
$10 billion a year through 2020, effectively in "damages," to the poor countries that could be
viewed as the "collateral damage" of industrial progress. But damages today could potentially be
destruction tomorrow, leaving in place the existential challenges and burdens to be born by some of
the world's smallest and least wealthy island countries.
Perhaps not surprisingly, the representative for the small island nation states at the Doha summit
responded with ire, characterizing the lack of progress on reducing emissions as follows: "We see
the package before us as deeply deficient in mitigation (carbon cuts) and finance. It's likely to lock
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us on the trajectory to a 3,4,5C rise in global temperatures, even though we agreed to keep the
global average temperature rise of 1.5C to ensure survival of all islands. There is no new finance
(for adapting to climate change and getting clean energy) -- only promises that something might
materialize in the future. Those who are obstructive need to talk not about how their people will
live, but whether our people will live."
Indeed, in most small island countries not just in the Pacific, but also the Caribbean and Indian
Ocean, ecological concerns and the climate crisis have been dominant themes with dire life and
death consequences looming in the background for their people. Small island nations in these
region are already at risk from the rise of sea-level, tropical cyclones, floods. But their very
livelihoods of fishing and subsistence farming were also at risk as a result of ecological and
environmental changes. Increasingly high storm surges can wipe out entire villages and contaminate
water supplies. Accordingly, the very existence of island nations, such as Kiribati and Tuvalu, are
at severe risk of being obliterated from the map. Yet even with the existential threat of being wiped
off the map in the offing, the international community has been either slow or restrictive in its
efforts to deal with global warming, climate change, economic and ecological damage, as well as
the emerging global challenge of environmental refugees.
A 2012 report from the United Nations Environment Program (UNEP) and the Pacific Regional
Environment Program underlined the concerns of small island nations and their people as it
concluded that the livelihoods of approximately 10 million people in Pacific island communities
were increasingly vulnerable to climate change. In fact, low-lying islands in that region would
likely confront losses of up to 18 percent of gross domestic product due to climate change,
according to the report. The report covers 21 countries and territories, including Fiji, Kiribati,
Samoa and Tonga, and recommended environmental legislation intended to deal with the climate
crisis facing the small island countries particularly. As noted by David Sheppard, the director
general of the Pacific Regional Environment Program that co-sponsored this study: “The findings...
emphasize the need more than ever to raise the bar through collective actions that address the
region's environmental needs at all levels."
Regardless of the failures of the summit in Qatar (discussed above), the meeting did facilitate a
process starting in 2015, which would bind both wealthy and poor countries together in the
mission of forging a new binding treaty that would replace the Kyoto Protocol and tackle the
central causes of climate change.
For more information on the threats faced in small island nations by climate change and the
measures being undertaken to lobby for international action, please see the Alliance for Small
Island States available online at the URL: http://aosis.org/
Special Report
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COP 21 summit in Paris ends with historic agreement to tackle climate change; rare
international consensus formed on environmental crisis facing the planet (2015) -In mid-December 2015, the highly-anticipated United Nations climate conference of parties (COP)
in Paris, France, ended with a historic agreement. In fact, it would very likely be understood as
the most significant international agreement signed by all the recognized countries of the world
since the Cold War. Accordingly, the Paris Agreement was being distinguished as the first
multilateral pact that would compel all countries across the world to cut its carbon emissions -- one
of the major causes of increasing greenhouse gas emissions, which contribute to global warming,
and its deleterious effects ranging from the dangerous rise in sea level to catastrophic climate
change.
The accord, which was dubbed to be the "Paris Agreement," was the work of rigorous diplomacy
and fervent environmental advocacy, and it aimed to address the climate change crisis facing the
planet. As many as 195 countries were represented in the negotiations that led to the landmark
climate deal. Indeed, it was only after weeks of passionate debate that international concurrence
was reached in addressing the environmental challenges confronting the world, with particular
attention to moving beyond fossil fuels and reducing greenhouse gas emissions.
The success of the COP 21 summit in Paris and the emergence of the landmark Paris Agreement
was, to some extent, attributed to the efforts of France's Foreign Minister Laurent Fabius who
presided over the negotiations. The French foreign minister's experience and credentials as a
seasoned diplomat and respected statesman paid dividends. He skillfully guided the delegates from
almost 200 countries and interest groups along the negotiations process, with ostensibly productive
results and a reasonably robust deal to show for it.
On Dec. 12, 2015, French Foreign Minister Fabius officially adopted the agreement, declaring: "I
now invite the COP to adopt the decision entitled Paris Agreement outlined in the document.
Looking out to the room I see that the reaction is positive, I see no objections. The Paris
agreement is adopted." Once Foreign Minister Fabius' gavel was struck, symbolically inaugurating
the Paris Agreement into force, the COP delegate rushed to their feet with loud and bouyant cheers
as well as thunderous applause.
In general, the Paris Agreement was being hailed as a victory for enviromental activists and a
triumph for international diplomats, while at the same time being understood as simply an initial -and imperfect -- move in the direction of a sustainable future. China's chief negotiator, Xie
Zhenhua, issued this message, saying that while the accord was not ideal, it should "not prevent
us from marching historical steps forward."
United States President Barack Obama lauded the deal as both "ambitious" and "historic," and the
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work of strenuous multilateral negotiations as he declared, "Together, we've shown what's possible
when the world stands as one." The United States leader acknowledged that the accord was not
"perfect," but he reminded the critics that it was "the best chance to save the one planet we have. "
Former United States Vice President Al Gore, one of the world's most well known environmental
advocates, issued a lengthy statement on the accompishments ensconced in the Paris Agreement.
He highlighted the fact that the Paris Agreement was a first step towards a future with a reduced
carbon footprint on Planet Earth as he said, "The components of this agreement -- including a
strong review mechanism to enhance existing commitments and a long-term goal to eliminate
global-warming pollution this century -- are essential to unlocking the necessary investments in our
future. No agreement is perfect, and this one must be strengthened over time, but groups across
every sector of society will now begin to reduce dangerous carbon pollution through the framework
of this agreement."
The central provisions of the Paris Agreement included the following items:
- Greenhouse gas emissions should peak as quickly as possible, with a move towards balancing
energy sources, and ultimately the decrease of greenhouse gases in the second half of this century
- Global temperature increase would be limited to 1.5 degrees Centigrade above pre-industrial
levels and would be held "well below" the two degrees Centigrade threshold
- Progress on these goals would be reviewed every five years beginning in 2020 with new
greenhouse gas reduction targets issued every five years
- $100 billion would be expended each year in climate finance for developing countries to move
forward with green technologies, with further climate financing to be advanced in the years beyond
It should be noted that there both legally binding and voluntary elements contained within the
Paris Agreement. Specifically, the submission of an emissions reduction target and the regular
review of that goal would be legally mandatory for all countries. Stated differently, there would be
a system in place by which experts would be able to track the carbon-cutting progress of each
country. At the same time, the specific targets to be set by countries would be determined at the
discretion of the countries, and would not be binding. While there was some criticism over this
non-binding element, the fact of the matter was that the imposition of emissions targets was
believed to be a major factor in the failure of climate change talks in Copenhagen, Denmark, in
2009.
In 2015, the talks faced challenges as several countries, such as China and India, objected to
conditions that would stymie economic and development. In order to avoid that kind of landmine,
a system Intended Nationally Determined Contributions (INDCs) was developed and formed the
basis of the accord. As such, the Paris Agreement would, in fact, facilitate economic growth and
development, as well as technological progress, but with the goal of long-term ecological
sustainability based on low carbon sources. In fact, the agreement heralded as "the beginning of
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the end of the fossil fuel era." As noted by Nick Mabey, the head of the climate diplomacy
organization E3G, said, "Paris means governments will go further and faster to tackle climate
change than ever before. The transition to a low carbon economy is now unstoppable, ensuring
the end of the fossil fuel age."
A particular sticking point in the agreement was the $100 billion earmarked for climate financing
for developing countries to transition from traditional fossil fuels to green energy technologies and a
low carbon future. In 2014, a report by the International Energy Agency indicated that the cost of
that transition would actually be around $44 trillion by the mid-century -- an amount that would
render the $100 billion being promised to be a drop in the proverbial bucket. However, the general
expectation was that the Republican-controlled Senate in the United States, which would have to
ratify the deal in that country, was not interested in contributing significant funds for the cause of
climate change.
A key strength of the Paris Agreement was the ubiquitous application of measures to all countries.
Of note was the frequently utilized concept of "flexibility" with regard to the Paris Agreement.
Specifically, the varying capacities of the various countries in meeting their obligations would be
anticipated and accorded flexibility. This aspect presented something of a departure from the 1997
Kyoto Protocol, which drew a sharp distinction between developed and developing countries, and
mandated a different set of obligations for those categories of countries. Thus, under Kyoto,
China and India were not held to the same standards as the United States and European
countries. In the Paris Agreement, there would be commitments from all countries across the
globe.
Another notable strength of the Paris Agreement was the fact that the countries of the world were
finally able to reach consensus on the vital necessity to limit global temperature increases to 1.5
degrees Centrigrade. Ahead of the global consensus on the deal, and as controversy continued to
surface over the targeted global temperature limits, the leaders of island countries were sounding
the alarm about the melting of the Polar ice caps and the associated rise in seal level. Prime
Minister Enele Sopoaga of Tuvalu issued this dismal reminder: “Tuvalu’s future … is already
bleak and any further temperature increase will spell the total demise of Tuvalu. No leader in this
room carries such a level of worry and responsibility. Just imagine you are in my shoes, what
would you do?” It was thus something of a victory for environmental advocates that the countries
of the world could find cnsensus on the lower number -- 1.5 degrees rather than 2 degrees.
A significant weak point with regard to the Paris deal was a "loss and damage" provision, which
anticipates that even with all the new undertakings intended to reduce greenhouse gas emissions
and move to a low carbon future, there would nonetheless be unavoidable climate change
consequences. Those consequences ranged from the loss of arable land for farmers as well as soil
erosion and contamination of potable water by sea water, to the decimation of territory in coastal
zones and on small islands, due to the rise in sea level, with entire small island countries being
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rendered entirely uninhabitable. The reality was that peoples' homes across the world would be
destroyed along with their way of life.
With that latter catastrophic effect being a clear and present danger for small island countries, the
Association of Small Island States (AOSIS) demanded that the developed world acknowledge its
responsibility for this irreversible damage.. Despite the fact that greenhouse gas emissions and the
ensuing plague of global warming was, indeed, the consequence of development in the West (the
United States and Europe) and the large power house countries, such as Russia, China and India,
there was no appetite by those countries to sign on to unlimited liability. Under the Paris
Agreement, there was a call for research on insurance mechanisms that would address loss and
damage issues, with recommendations to come in the future.
The call for research was being regarded as an evasion of sorts and constituted the weakest aspect
of the Paris Agreement. Not surprisingly, a coalition of small island nations demanded a "Marshall
Plan" for the Pacific. Borrowing the term "Marshall Plan" from the post-World War II
reconstruction effort, the coalition of Pacific island nation, which included Kiribati, Tuvalu, Fiji,
and the Marshall Islands, called for an initiative that would include investment in renewable energy
and shoreline protection, cultural preservation, economic assistance for economies in transition,
and a plan for migration and resettlement for these countries as they confront the catastrophic
effects of the melting of the Polar ice caps and the concomitant rise in sea level. The precise
contours of the initiative remained unknown, unspecified, and a mere exercise in theory at the time
of writing. Yet such an initiative would, at some point, have to be addressed, given the realities of
climate change and the slow motion calamity unfolding each day for low-lying island nations across
the world.
As noted by Vice President Greg Stone of Conservation International, who also functions as an
adviser to the government of Kiribati, “Imagine living in a place where you know it’s going to go
away someday, but you don’t know what day that wave’s going to come over and wash your
home away." He added, “It’s a disaster we know is going to happen.” Meanwhile, the
intervening years promised to be filled with hardship for small island nations, such as Kiribati.
Stone explained, “For every inch of sea-level rise, these islands lose 10 feet of their freshwater
table to saltwater intrusion,” Stone explained. “So it’s not just about the day the water finally goes
over the island; it’s also about the day that there’s just not enough water left and everyone has to
move off the island.” Presaging the future for island nations that could face submersion, Stone
said, “If you look ahead 50 years, a country like Kiribati could become the first aqueous nation.
possibility of migration. That is, they own this big patch of ocean, and they administer it from
elsewhere.”
Foreign Minister Minister Tony Debrum of the Marshall Islands emerged as the champion
advocating on behalf of small island nation states and a loose coalition of concerned countries from
the Pacific to the Caribbean, but with support from the United States. He addressed the
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comprehensive concerns of small island nations regarding the weaknesses of the deal, while
simultaneously making clear that the Paris Agreement signified hope for the countries most at risk.
In a formal statement, Debrum declared: "We have made history today. Emissions targets are still
way off track, but this agreement has the tools to ramp up ambition, and brings a spirit of hope that
we can rise to this challenge. I can go back home to my people and say we now have a pathway to
survival.” Debrum highlighted the imperatives of Pacific island nations, saying, “Our High
Ambition Coalition was the lightning rod we needed to lift our sights and expectations for a strong
agreement here in Paris. We were joined by countries representing more than half the world. We
said loud and clear that a bare-bones, minimalist agreement would not fly. We instead demanded an
agreement to mark a turning point in history, and the beginning of our journey to the post-carbon
era.”
Debrum of the Marshall Islands espoused the quintessential synopsis of the accord and its effects
for those most likely to be affected by climate change as he noted, “Climate change won’t stop
overnight, and my country is not out of the firing line just yet, but today we all feel a little safer.”
Editor's Entry on Environmental Policy:
The low-lying Pacific island nations of the world, including Kiribati, Tuvalu, the Marshall Islands,
Fiji, among others, are vulnerable to the threats posed by global warming and cimate change,
derived from carbon emissions, and resulting in the rise in sea level. Other island nations in the
Caribbean, as well as poor countries with coastal zones, were also at particular risk of suffering the
deleterious effects of climate change.
Political policy in these countries are often connected to ecological issues, which have over time
morphed into an existential crisis of sorts. Indeed, ecological concerns and the climate crisis have
also been dominant themes with life and death consequences for the people of island nations in the
Pacific. Indeed, the very livelihoods of fishing and subsistence farming remain at risk as a result of
ecological and environmental changes. Yet even so, these countries are threatened by increasingly
high storm surges, which could wipe out entire villages and contaminate water supplies. Moreover,
because these are low lying island nations, the sustained rise in sea level can potentially lead to the
terrain of these countries being unihabitable at best, and submerged at worst. Stated in plain terms,
these countries are at severe risk of being obliterated from the map and their plight illuminates the
emerging global challenge of environmental refugees. In these manifold senses, climate change is
the existential crisis of the contemporary era.
Since the time of the 1997 Kyoto Protocol, there have been efforts aimed at extending the life of
that agreement, with an eye on minimizing greenhouse gas emissions, and thus minimizing the
effects of climate change. Those endeavors have largely ended in failure, as exemplified by the
unsuccessful Copenhagen talks in 2009 and the fruitless Doha talks in 2012 respectively. The
success of the COP 21 talks in France, with the adoption of the landmark Paris Agreement in
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2015, was regarded as the first glimmer of hope. Not only did the Paris Agreement signify the
triumph of international diplomacy and global consensus, but it also marked the start of the end of
the fossil fuel era, with the path forward toward a low carbon future reliant on greener
technologies. Most crucially, the Paris Agreement stood as the first significant response in recent
times to the central challenge of climate change and its quotidian effects on the lives of real human
beings across the world.
1. Major International Environmental Accords:
General Environmental Concerns
Convention on Environmental Impact Assessment in a Transboundary Context, Espoo, 1991.
Accords Regarding Atmosphere
Annex 16, vol. II (Environmental Protection: Aircraft Engine Emissions) to the 1044 Chicago
Convention on International Civil Aviation, Montreal, 1981
Convention on Long-Range Transboundary Air Pollution (LRTAP), Geneva, 1079
United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC), New York, 1002
Vienna Convention for the Protection of the Ozone Layer, Vienna, 1985 including the Montreal
Protocol on Substances that Depleted the Ozone Layer, Montreal, 1987
Accords Regarding Hazardous Substances
Convention on the Ban of the Import into Africa and the Control of Transboundary Movements
and Management of Hazardous Wastes within Africa, Bamako, 1991
Convention on Civil Liability for Damage Caused during Carriage of Dangerous Goods by Road,
Rail and Inland Navigation Vessels (CRTD), Geneva, 1989
Convention on the Control of Transboundary Movements of Hazardous Wastes and their Disposal
(Basel Convention), Basel, 1989
Convention on the Transboundary Effects of Industrial Accidents, Helsinki, 1992
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Convention to Ban the Importation into Forum Island Countries of Hazardous and Radioactive
Wastes and to Control the Transboundary Movement and Management of Hazardous Wastes
within the South Pacific Region (Waigani Convention), Waigani, 1995
European Agreement Concerning the International Carriage of Dangerous Goods by Road (ADR),
Geneva 1957
FAO International Code of Conduct on the Distribution and Use of Pesticides, Rome, 1985
2. Major International Marine Accords:
Global Conventions
Convention on the Prevention of Marine Pollution by Dumping of Wastes and Other Matter
(London Convention 1972), London, 1972
International Convention for the Prevention of Pollution from Ships, 1973, as modified by
Protocol of 1978 relation thereto (MARPOL 73/78), London, 1973 and 1978
International Convention on Civil Liability for Oil Pollution Damage 1969 (1969 CLC), Brussels,
1969, 1976, and 1984
International Convention on the Establishment of an International Fund for Compensation for Oil
Pollution Damage 1971 (1971 Fund Convention), Brussels, 1971
Convention on Liability and Compensation for Damage in Connection with the Carriage of
Hazardous and Noxious Substances by Sea (HNS), London 1996
International Convention on Oil Pollution Preparedness, Response, and Co-operation (OPRC),
London, 1990
International Convention Relation to Intervention on the High Seas in Cases of Oil Pollution
Casualties (Intervention Convention), Brussels, 1969
United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS), Montego Bay, 1982
Regional Conventions
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Convention for the Prevention of Marine Pollution by Dumping from Ships and Aircraft (Oslo
Convention), Oslo, 1972
Convention for the Prevention of Marine Pollution from Land-based Sources (Paris Convention),
Paris, 1974
Convention for the Protection of the Marine Environment of the North East Atlantic (OSPAR
Convention), Paris, 1992
Convention for the Protection of the Marine Environment of the Baltic Sea Area (1974 Helsinki
Convention), Helsinki 1974
Convention for the Protection of the Marine Environment of the Baltic Sea Area (1992 Helsinki
Convention), Helsinki 1992
Conventions within the UNEP Regional Seas Programme
Convention on the Protection of the Black Sea against Pollution, Bucharest, 1992
Convention for the Protection and Development of the Marine Environment of the Wider
Caribbean Region, Cartagena de Indias, 1983
Convention for the Protection, Management, and Development of the Marine and Coastal
Environment of the Eastern African Region, Nairobi, 1985
Kuwait Regional Convention for Co-operation on the Protection of the Marine Environment from
Pollution, Kuwait, 1978
Convention for the Protection and Development of the Marine Environment and Coastal Region of
the Mediterranean Sea (Barcelona Convention), Barcelona, 1976
Regional Convention for the Conservation of the Red Sea and Gulf of Aden Environment, Jeddah,
1982
Convention for the Protection of the Natural Resources and Environment of the South Pacific
Region, Noumea, 1986
Convention for the Protection of the Marine Environment and Coastal Area of the South-East
Pacific, Lima, 1981
Convention for Co-operation in the Protection and Development of the Marine and Coastal
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Environment of the West and Central African Region, Abidjan, 1981
3. Major Conventions Regarding Living Resources:
Marine Living Resources
Convention on the Conservation of Antarctic Marine Living Resources (CCAMLR), Canberra,
1980
International Convention for the Conservation of Atlantic Tunas (ICCAT), Rio de Janeiro, 1966
International Convention for the Regulation of Whaling (ICRW), Washington, 1946
Nature Conservation and Terrestrial Living Resources
Antarctic Treaty, Washington, D.C., 1959
Convention Concerning the Protection of the World Cultural and Natural Heritage (World Heritage
Convention), Paris, 1972
Convention on Biological Diversity (CBD), Nairobi, 1992
Convention on the Conservation of Migratory Species of Wild Animals (CMS), Bonn, 1979
Convention on International Trade in Endangered Species of Wild Fauna and Flora (CITES),
Washington, D.C., 1973
Convention on Wetlands of International Importance especially as Waterfowl Habitat (Ramsar
Convention), Ramsar, 1971
Convention to Combat Desertification (CCD), Paris 1994
FAO International Undertaking on Plant Genetic Resources, Rome, 1983
International Tropical Timber Agreement, 1994 (ITTA, 1994), Geneva, 1994
Freshwater Resources
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Convention on the Protection and Use of Transboundary Watercourses and International Lakes,
Helsinki, 1992
4. Major Conventions Regarding Nuclear Safety:
Convention on Assistance in the Case of a Nuclear Accident or Radiological Emergency
(Assistance Convention), Vienna, 1986
Convention on Early Notification of a Nuclear Accident (Notification Convention), Vienna, 1986
Convention on Nuclear Safety, Vienna, 1994
Vienna Convention on Civil Liability for Nuclear Damage, Vienna, 1963
5. Major Intergovernmental Organizations
Commission on Sustainable Development (CSD)
European Union (EU): Environment
Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO)
Global Environment Facility (GEF)
International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA)
International Council for the Exploration of the Sea (ICES)
International Fund for Agricultural Development (IFAD)
International Labour Organization (ILO)
International Maritime Organization (IMO)
International Monetary Fund (IMF)
International Oil Pollution Compensation Funds (IOPC Funds)
Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD), Environment Policy
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Committee (EPOC)
United Nations Children's Fund (UNICEF)
United Nations Development Programme (UNDP)
United Nations Educational, Scientific, and Cultural Organization (UNESCO)
United Nations Environment Programme (UNEP)
United Nations Industrial Development Organization (UNIDO)
United Nations Population Fund (UNFPA)
World Bank
World Food Programme (WFP)
World Health Organization (WHO)
World Meteorological Organization (WMO)
World Trade Organization (WTO)
6. Major Non-Governmental Organizations
Atmosphere Action Network East Asia (AANEA)
Climate Action Network (CAN)
Consumers International (CI)
Earth Council
Earthwatch Institute
Environmental Liaison Centre International (ELCI)
European Environmental Bureau (EEB)
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Forest Stewardship Council (FSC)
Friends of the Earth International (FoEI)
Greenpeace International
International Chamber of Commerce (ICC)
International Confederation of Free Trade Unions (ICFTU)
International Planned Parenthood Federation (IPPF)
International Solar Energy Society (ISES)
IUCN-The World Conservation Union
Pesticide Action Network (PAN)
Sierra Club
Society for International Development (SID)
Third World Network (TWN)
Water Environment Federation (WEF)
Women's Environment and Development Organization (WEDO)
World Business Council for Sustainable Development (WBCSD)
World Federalist Movement (WFM)
World Resources Institute (WRI)
World Wide Fund For Nature (WWF)
7. Other Networking Instruments
Arab Network for Environment and Development (RAED)
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Global Legislators for a Balanced Environment (GLOBE)
Regional Environmental Center for Central and Eastern Europe (REC)
United Nations Non-Governmental Liaison Service (UN-NGLS)
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Appendices
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Bibliography
BIBLIOGRAPHY
Sources: Key Data
Altapedia. URL: http://www.atlapedia.com/online/country_index.htm
Ethnologue. URL: http://www.ethnologue.com
Geobase Global Statistics. URL: http://www.geoba.se
Infoplease: URL: http://www.infoplease.com
The Statesman's Year Book 2006. Barry Turner, ed. London: St. Martin's Press.
United States D e p a r t m e n t o f S t a t e , B a c k g r o u n d N o t e s . U R L :
http://www.state.gov/www/background_notes/index.htm
United States Central Intelligence Agency, World Factbook. Washington, D.C.: Printing and
Photography Group. URL: http://www.cia.gov/cia/publications/factbook/index.html
World Bank. URL: http://www.worldbank.org/
World Climate Data Online. URL: http://www.worldclimate.com
Methodology Note for Demographic Data:
The demographic numbers for cities and national populations listed in CountryWatch content are
derived from the Geoba.se website, which analyzes data from the World Bank. The current
demographic numbers displayed on the Countrywatch website are reflective of the latest available
estimates.
The demographic information for language, ethnicity and religion listed in CountryWatch content is
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derived from a mix of sources including the Altapedia, Central Intelligence Agency Factbook,
Infoplease, and State Department Background Notes.
Sources: Political Overview
Agence France Presse. URL: http://www.afp.com/en/
BBC International News. URL: http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/ (Various editions and dates as
cited in particular reviews)
Britannica Book of the Year. 1998-present. David Calhoun, ed. Chicago: Encyclopedia Britannica,
Inc.
Britannica Online URL :http://www.eb.com
Britannica Year in Review. URL: http://www.britannica.com/browse/year
Chiefs of State and Cabinet Members of Foreign Governments. URL:
http://www.cia.gov/cia/publications/chiefs/index.html
Christian Science Monitor. URL: http://www.csmonitor.com/ (Various editions and dates as cited
in particular reviews)
CNN International News. URL:http://www.cnn.com/WORLD/ (Various editions and dates as cited
in particular reviews)
Current Leaders of Nations. 1997. Jennifer Mossman, ed. Detroit: Gale Research
The Economist Magazine. (Various editions and dates as cited in particular reviews)
The Economist Country Briefings. URL: http://www.economist.com/countries/
Eldis Country Profiles. URL: http://www.eldis.org/country/index.htm
Elections Around the World. URL: http://www.electionworld.org/
Election Resources. URL: http://electionresources.org/
Europa World Yearbook 1999. Vols. I & II. 1999. London: Europa Publications Ltd.
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Europe World Online. URL: http://www.europaworld.com/pub/
Financial Times. URL: http://www.financialtimes.com
Foreign Government Resources. URL: http://www.lib.umich.edu/govdocs/foreign.html
Human Rights Watch. URL: http://www.hrw.org
IFES Election Guide. URL: http://www.electionguide.org
International Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance. URL: http://www.idea.int/
International Who's Who 1997-1998, 61st Edition. 1997. London: Europa Publications Ltd.
L e a d e r s h i p V i e w s , C h i e f s o f
http://www.cia.gov/cia/publications/chiefs/index.html
S t a t e
O n l i n e .
U R L
:
Library of Congress Country Studies. URL: http://lcweb2.loc.gov/frd/cs/cshome.html
New Encyclopedia Britannica. 1998. Chicago: Encyclopedia Britannica Inc.
New York Times. URL: http://www.nytimes.com (Various editions and dates as cited in
particular reviews)
Patterns of Global Terrorism. n.d. United States Department of State. Washington D.C.: United
States Department of State Publications.
Political Handbook of the World. n.d. Arthur S. Banks, Thomas C. Muller, ed. Binghamton, New
York: CSA Publications.
Political Reference Almanac Online. URL: http://www.polisci.com/almanac/nations.htm
Reuters News. URL: http://www.reuters.com/
Rulers. URL: http://rulers.org/
The Guardian Online. URL: http://www.guardian.co.uk/
particular reviews)
(Various editions and dates as cited in
The Statesman's Year-Book 2006. Barry Turner, ed. London: St. Martin's Press.
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United Nations Development Programme. URL: http://hdr.undp.org
United Nations Refugee Agency. URL: http://www.unhcr.org
United States Central Intelligence Agency, World Factbook.Washington, D.C.: Printing and
Photography Group. URL: http://www.cia.gov/cia/publications/factbook/index.html
United States Department of State, World Military Expenditures and Arms Transfers (WMEAT)
URL : http://www.state.gov/www/global/arms/bureau_ac/reports_ac.html
United States Department of State, Country Reports on Human Rights Practices. URL:
http://www.state.gov/g/drl/rls/hrrpt/2002/18245.htm
United States D e p a r t m e n t o f S t a t e , B a c k g r o u n d N o t e s . U R L :
http://www.state.gov/www/background_notes/index.html
Virtual Library: International Relations Resources. URL: http://www.etown.edu/vl/countgen.html
World Bank: Governance Indicators. URL: http://info.worldbank.org/governance
-- See also list of News Wires services below, which are also used for research purposes. -Note on Edition Dates:
The earlier edition dates are noted above because they were used to formulate the original Country
Reviews and serve as the baseline for some of the information covered. Later editions have been
used in some cases, and are cited as such, while other more recent online resources (cited above)
contain recent and ever-updated data sets used for research.
Sources: Economic Overview
BP Statistical Review of World Energy. URL: http://www.bp.com/genericsection.do?
categoryId=92&contentId=7005893
BP Statistical Review of World Energy, June 1998. 1998 to present. Page 1.C. London: The
British Petroleum Company.
International Monetary Fund, Direction of Trade Statistics Yearbook. Washington, D.C.:
International Monetary Fund Publication Services.
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International Monetary Fund, International Financial Statistics. 1998 to present. Washington,
D.C.: International Monetary Fund Publication Services.
International Monetary Fund, International Financial Statistics Yearbook. 1999 to present.
Washington, D.C.: International Monetary Fund Publication Services.
International Monetary Fund, World Economic Outlook, May 1999. 1999 to present. Washington,
D.C.: International Monetary Fund Publication Services.
International Labour Office, World Employment Report, 1998-99. 1998 to present. Geneva:
International Labour Office.
United Nations Statistical Division Online. URL: http://unstats.un.org/unsd/default.htm
United Nations Statistics Division, Monthly Bulletin of Statistics (MBS On Line), November 1999
Edition. 1999 to present. New York: United Nations.
United Nations, Statistical Yearbook, 43rd Issue. 1999. 1999 to present New York: United Nations.
United Nations, Food & Agricultural Organization, FAOSTAT Database. URL : http://apps.fao.org/
United Nations, Comtrade Data Base, http://comtrade.un.org/
United States Department of Energy, Country Analysis Briefs.
URL:http://www.eia.doe.gov/emeu/cabs/contents.html
United States Department of Labor, Bureau of Labor Statistics Database
United States Geological Service, Mineral Information
United States Department of State, Country Commercial Guides. Washington, D.C. United States
of America. URL:http://www.state.gov/www/about_state/business/com_guides/index.html
The World Bank, Global Development Finance, Country Tables. 1999 to present. Washington,
D.C.: The World Bank.
The World Bank Group, World Development Indicators. 1999 to present. Washington, D.C.: The
World Bank.
Yearbook of Tourism Statistics, World Tourism Organization. 1998 to present. Madrid: The World
Tourism Organization.
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Note on Edition Dates:
The earlier edition dates are noted above because they were used to formulate the original country
reviews and serve as the baseline for some of the information covered. Later editions have been
used in some cases, and are cited as such, while other more recent online resources (cited above)
contain recent and ever-updated data sets used for research.
Methodology Notes for Economic Data:
Estimates by CountryWatch.com of GDP in dollars in most countries are made by converting local
currency GDP data from the International Monetary Fund World Economic Outlook to US dollars
by market exchange rates estimated from the International Monetary Fund International Financial
Statistics and projected out by the CountryWatch Macroeconomic Forecast. Real GDP was
estimated by deflating current dollar values by the US GDP Implicit Price Deflator.
Exceptions to this method were used for:
• Bosnia-Herzegovina
• Nauru
• Cuba
• Palau
• Holy See
• San Marino
• Korea, North
• Serbia & Montenegro
• Liberia
• Somalia
• Liechtenstein
• Tonga
• Monaco
• Tuvalu
In these cases, other data and/or estimates by CountryWatch.com were utilized.
Investment Overview
C o r r u p t i o n a n d T r a n s p a r e n c y
http://www.transparency.org/documents/cpi/2001/cpi2001.html#cpi
<http://www.transparency.org/documents/
I n d e x .
U R L :
Deloitte Tax Guides. URL: http://www.deloittetaxguides.com
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Trade Policy Reviews by the World Trade Organization .
http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/tpr_e/tp_rep_e.htm#bycountry
URL:
United States Department of Energy, Country Analysis Briefs. URL:
http://www.eia.doe.gov/emeu/cabs/contents.html
United States D e p a r t m e n t o f S t a t e , B a c k g r o u n d N o t e s . U R L :
http://www.state.gov/www/background_notes/index.html
United States Department of State, Country Commercial Guides. 1996-2006. Washington, D.C.
U n i t e d S t a t e s
o f
A m e r i c a .
U R L :
http://www.state.gov/www/about_state/business/com_guides/index.html
World Bank: Doing Business. URL: http://www.doingbusiness.org
World Bank: Governance Indicators. URL: http://info.worldbank.org/governance
Social Overview
Borden, G.A., Conaway, W.A., Morrison, T. 1994. Kiss, Bow, or Shake Hands: How to do
Business in Sixty Countries. Holbrook, Massachusetts, 1994.
Center for Disease Control. URL: http://www.cdc.gov
Eldis Country Profiles. URL: http://www.eldis.org/country/index.htm
Ethnologue. URL: http://www.ethnologue.com/
Government of Australia D e p a r t m e n t o f F o r e i g n A f f i a r s a n d T r a d e . U R L :
http://www.dfat.gov.au/geo
Government of
Canada F o r e i g n A f f a i r s a n d I n t e r n a t i o n a l T r a d e . U R L :
http://www.voyage.gc.ca/consular_home-e.htm
Library of Congress Country Studies. URL: http://lcweb2.loc.gov/frd/cs/cshome.html
Lonely Planet. URL: http://www.lonelyplanet.com/worldguide/
Steve Kropla's Online Help For World Travelers. URL: http://www.kropla.com/
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United Kingdom Ministry of Foreign and Commonwealth Office. URL: http://www.fco.gov.uk/
United Nations Human Development Report. URL: http://www.undp.org/hdro
UNICEF Statistical Database Online. URL: http://www.unicef.org/statis/atoz.html
United States Central Intelligence Agency, World Factbook. 2001. Washington, D.C.: Printing and
Photography Group. URL: http://www.cia.gov/cia/publications/factbook/index.html
United States Department of State, Background Notes. URL:
http://www.state.gov/www/background_notes/index.html
United States Department of State, Commercial and Business Affairs: Travel Tips. URL:
http://www.state.gov/www/about_state/business/cba_travel.html
United States Department of State, Bureau of Consular Affairs. URL: http://travel.state.gov/
World Health Organization. URL: http://www.who.int/home-page/
World News Connection, National Technical Information Service. Springfield, Virginia, USA.
Internet News Service, Xinhua News Agency (U.S.) Inc. Woodside, New York. URL:
http://www.xinhuanet.com/english/
Note on Edition Dates:
The earlier edition dates are noted above because they were used to formulate the original country
reviews and serve as the baseline for some of the information covered. Later editions have been
used in some cases, and are cited as such, while other more recent online resources (cited above)
contain recent and ever-updated data sets used for research.
Methodology Notes for the HDI:
Since 1990, the United Nations Development Programme, in concert with organizations across the
globe, has produced the Human Development Index (or HDI). According to the UNDP, the index
measures average achievement in basic human development in one simple composite index, and
produces from this index a ranking of countries. The HDI is a composite of three basic
components of human development: longevity, knowledge and standard of living. Longevity is
measured by life expectancy. Knowledge is measured by combination of adult literacy and mean
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years of schooling. Standard of living is measured by purchasing power, based on real GDP per
capita (in constant US$) adjusted for differences in international living costs (or, purchasing power
parity, PPP). While the index uses these social indicators to measure national performance with
regard to human welfare and development, not all countries provide the same level of information
for each component needed to compute the index; therefore, as in any composite indicator, the
final index is predicated on projections, predictions and weighting schemes. The index is a static
measure, and thus, an incomplete measure of human welfare. In fact, the UNDP says itself the
concept of human development focuses on the ends rather than the means of development and
progress, examining in this manner, the average condition of all people in a given country.
Specifically, the index is calculated by determining the maximum and minimum for each of the
three components (as listed above) and then measuring where each country stands in relation to
these scales-expressed as a value between 0 and 1. For example, the minimum adult literary rate is
zero percent, the maximum is 100 percent, and the reading skills component of knowledge in the
HDI for a country where the literacy rate is 75 percent would be 0.75. The scores of all indicators
are then averaged into the overall index.
For a more extensive examination of human development, as well as the ranking tables for each
participating country, please visit: http://www.undp.org
Note on History sections
In some CountryWatch Country Reviews, open source content from the State Department
Background Notes and Country Guides have been used.
Environmental Overview
Environmental Profiles: A Global Guide to Projects and People. 1993. Linda Sobel Katz, Sarah
Orrick, and Robert Honig. New York: Garland Publishing.
The Environment Encyclopedia and Directory, 2nd Edition. 1998. London: Europa.
Environmental Protection Agency Global Warming Site. URL: http://www.epa.gov/globalwarming
Food and Agriculture Organization of United Nations: Forestry. URL:
http://www.fao.org/forestry/site/sofo/en/
Global Warming Information Page. URL: http://globalwarming.org
Introduction to Global Environmental Issues, 2nd Edition. 1997. Kevin Pickering and Lewis Owen.
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London: Routledge.
Trends: Compendium of Data on Global Change.
http://cdiac.esd.ornl.gov/trends/emis/em_cont.htm
U n i t e d N a t i o n s E n v i r o n m e n t a l
http://www.unep.org/GEO/GEO_Products/Assessment_Reports/
P r o g r a m .
URL:
U R L :
United Nations Global Environmental Outlook. URL: http://www.unep.org/geo/geo4/media/
United States Department of Energy, Country Analysis Briefs. URL:
http://www.eia.doe.gov/emeu/cabs/contents.html
World Climate Data Online. URL: http://www.worldclimate.com
World Directory of Country Environmental Studies. 1996. The World Resource Institute.
World Factbook. US Central Intelligence Agency. Washington, D.C.: Printing and Photography
Group.
1998-1999 World Resources Guide to the Global Environment by the World Resources Institute.
May, 1998.
1998/1999 Yearbook of International Cooperation on Environment and Development. 1998.
London: Earthscan Publications.
Note on Edition Dates:
The earlier edition dates are noted above because they were used to formulate the original country
reviews and serve as the baseline for some of the information covered. Later editions have been
used in some cases, and are cited as such, while other more recent online resources (cited above)
contain recent and ever-updated data sets used for research.
Other Sources:
General information has also been used in the compilation of this review, with the courtesy of
governmental agencies from this country.
News Services:
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CANA Daily Bulletin. Caribbean Media Agency Ltd., St. Michael, Barbados.
Central and Eastern Africa Report, United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian
Affairs - Integrated Regional Information Network for Central and Eastern Africa.
Daily News, Panafrican News Agency. Dakar, Senegal.
PACNEWS, Pacific Islands Broadcasting Association. Suva, Fiji.
Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty. Washington D.C. USA.
Reuters News. Thomson Reuters. New York, New York. USA.
Southern Africa Report, United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs Integrated Regional Information Network for Southern Africa.
Voice of America, English Service. Washington D.C.
West Africa Report, United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs Integrated Regional Information Network for West Africa. 1998-1999
Note: Some or all these news services have been used to research various sections of this Country
Review.
USING COUNTRYWATCH.COM AS AN ELECTRONIC SOURCE:
MLA STYLE OF CITATION
Commentary
For items in a "Works Cited" list, CountryWatch.com suggests that users follow recommended
patterns forindentation given in the MLA Handbook, 4th edition.
Individual Works
Basic form, using an Internet protocol:
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Author/editor. Title of Print Version of Work. Edition statement (if given). Publication information
(Place of publication: publisher, date), if given. Title of Electronic Work. Medium. Available
Protocol (if applicable):Site/Path/File. Access date.
Examples:
Youngblood-Coleman, Denise. Country Review: France. 2003. Houston, Texas: CountryWatch
Publications, 2003.
C o u n t r y R e v i e w : F r a n c e. O n l i n e . A v a i l a b l e U R L :
http://www.countrywatch.com/cw_country.asp?vCOUNTRY=61 October, 12, 2003.
Note:
This is the citation format used when the print version is not used in the reference.
Parts of Works
Basic form, using an Internet protocol:
Author/editor. "Part title." Title of Print Version of Work. Edition statement (if given). Publication
information (Place of publication: publisher, date), if given. Title of Electronic Work. Medium.
AvailableProtocol (if applicable): Site/Path/File. Access date.
Examples:
Youngblood-Coleman, Denise. "People." CountryWatch.com: France. 2003. Houston, Texas:
CountryWatch Publications, 2003. CountryWatch.com: France. Online. Available URL :
http://www.countrywatch.com/cw_topic.asp?
vCOUNTRY=61&SECTION=SOCIAL&TOPIC=CLPEO&TYPE=TEXT. October 12, 2003.
Note:
This is the citation format used when the print version is not used in the reference.
For further source citation information, please email: [email protected] or
[email protected].
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The management of CountryWatch has extensive international experience and has utilized this experience to
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