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Historically Speaking Ball’s Bluff, the Trent Affair And the Joint Committee at 150 B A steel engraving by H. Wright Smith depicts the death of U.S. Senator and Union brigade commander COL Edward D. Baker during the Battle of Ball’s Bluff, near Leesburg, Va., in 1861. 70 ARMY ■ November 2011 Library of Congress a brigade commander—also a U.S. oth the Union and the ConfederBy BG John S. Brown senator and friend of President Linacy experienced ups and downs U.S. Army retired coln—was in charge when the scatthroughout the Civil War. In the fall of tered and poorly positioned units faced a con1861, 150 years ago, the Union certainly suffered certed Confederate counterattack. Baker was from its share of setbacks. A battlefield debacle shot dead and his command soundly deat Ball’s Bluff, 30 miles northwest of Washingfeated. Withdrawal became rout when the ton, D.C., cast doubts on efforts to recover victorious Confederates caught the retreatfrom the greater disaster at Bull Run three ing Federals against the river bank. About months earlier. Then, a diplomatic fiasco em1,700 had been engaged on each side, out of bodied in the so-called Trent Affair presented which more than 900 Union soldiers were the United States with the very real possibility killed, wounded, missing or captured while of war with Great Britain, forcing a humiliating the Confederates lost fewer than 150. Baker and disavowal of U.S. action. The response to these his predecessors in command on the ground were downward trends introduced a political blunder, or at least political theatrics, in the U.S. Congress Joint Com- empowered to withdraw in the face of superior forces. This mittee on the Conduct of the War. Let us examine these was to be a raid, not a pitched battle, but they were loath to withdraw without having accomplished at least someevents in turn and perhaps draw lessons from them. Shortly after the First Battle of Bull Run, President Abra- thing. Intelligence was fatally flawed and the plan correham Lincoln replaced defeated MG Irvin McDowell with spondingly bogus; still they drove on in the hopes of someMG George B. McClellan. McClellan had conducted a suc- how achieving a positive result. Embarrassed by the defeat at Ball’s Bluff, the United States cessful, albeit miniature, campaign in West Virginia and was a capable organizer and trainer. He energetically re- soon had an even greater danger to worry about. It was combuilt the muddled forces McDowell had left him, giving mon knowledge that the South hoped to parlay battlefield birth to the eventually peerless Army of the Potomac. By successes and cotton futures into diplomatic leverage with October, increasingly trained and competent units and Great Britain and France. Recognition of its independence leaders were spoiling for a fight. The opportunity seemed seemed likely, and active support or even intervention possito present itself when reconnaissance and intelligence sug- ble. It was no great secret that Confederate commissioners gested that a poorly secured Confederate encampment James M. Mason and John Slidell sought transportation was perched on Ball’s Bluff above the Potomac River and that the Confederates were on the verge of abandoning nearby Leesburg, Va.; neither assessment proved correct. The alleged underdefended camp was a mirage, and the Confederates were more than willing to fight for Leesburg. Union command evolved as different units moved forward across the Potomac on October 21, the division commander having remained on the friendly bank. COL Edward D. Baker, to London to pursue their cause. They slipped out of Charleston, S.C., on a blockade runner and booked passage from Havana, Cuba, on the HMS Trent. On November 8 the USS San Jacinto intercepted the Trent in the Bahamas and forcibly removed Mason and Slidell. It is impossible today to determine whether the San Jacinto’s captain, Charles Wilkes, was eccentric, overzealous or insane, but he justified his egregious breach of international protocol by defining Mason and Slidell as contraband—as though they were illicit guns or illegal merchandise. Needless to say, the British parliament and public erupted with indignation—even those inclined to favor the North out of abolitionist sentiment. Their fervor was reflected in the North by bouts of jingoism on the streets, but Lincoln and other leaders clearly recognized they could ill afford a confrontation with Great Britain. The United States government disavowed Wilkes’ rash act and released Mason and Slidell to a British warship that sped them on their way. The lesson might have been to ensure that commanders at every level were mindful of the strategic consequences of their acts. n light of mounting military disasters, Congress decided to intercede by appointing an investigative Joint Committee on the Conduct of the War. There certainly was a lot worth investigating: battlefield losses, military contracts, recruiting, medical treatment, fund-raising and financing, and so on. Warfare had become so extensive and complex that there was ample scope for congressional participation and review. Unfortunately the committee tended to attack personalities rather than issues. Established in early December, the committee’s first target was the defeated division commander from Ball’s Bluff, BG Charles P. Stone. Brushing aside such issues as the soundness of intelligence, tactics, battle command or support, the committee focused instead on Stone’s political views. Given that he was not a fervent abolitionist, was he not also a traitor? Radical political theater became a hallmark of the committee. Generals and leaders not in accordance with the committee leaders’ political views found themselves hounded, and those in accordance were too often excused. The committee ultimately did some useful work, but it also excited discord, underscoring the dangers of mixing war management with extreme political partisanship. (Lessons drawn from it were applied to the so-called “Truman Committee,” which provided far less contentious and more effective congressional oversight during World War II.) President Lincoln and the United States government had little to cheer about 150 years ago. Battlefield defeat had BG John S. Brown, USA Ret., was chief of military history at the U.S. Army Center of Military History from December 1998 to October 2005. He commanded the 2nd Battalion, 66th Armor, in Iraq and Kuwait during the Gulf War and returned to Kuwait as commander of the 2nd Brigade, 1st Cavalry Division, in 1995. He has a doctorate in history from Indiana University. His book, Kevlar Legions: A History of Army Transformation 1989–2005, was recently published. Library of Congress I The USS San Jacinto (right) forced the mail packet HMS Trent to heave to off the Bahamas in 1861 and forcibly removed Confederate commissioners James M. Mason and John Slidell, a major breach of international protocol that Britain decried. become recurrent, war with Great Britain and perhaps France loomed, and congressional radicals tore away at moderates within the Lincoln administration and the Army. There were a few bright spots, however. On November 7 a joint Army-Navy expedition overwhelmed the defenses of Port Royal Sound between Charleston and Savannah, Ga., advancing an “Anaconda Plan” of economic strangulation first proposed by GEN Winfield Scott. On the same day, in far-off Missouri, little-known BG Ulysses S. Grant boldly attacked 5,000 Confederates with 3,000 Federals at Belmont, inflicting approximately 900 casualties while suffering 500. Federal losses were more readily replaced. We will hear more of both the Anaconda Plan and GEN Grant in due course. ✭ Recommended Reading: Ballard, Ted, Staff Ride Guide: The Battle of Ball’s Bluff (Washington, D.C.: Center of Military History, 2001) Foote, Shelby, The Civil War, A Narrative: Fort Sumter to Perryville (New York, N.Y.: Vintage Books, 1986) McPherson, James, Battle Cry of Freedom: The Civil War Era (New York, N.Y.: Oxford University Press, 1988) November 2011 ■ ARMY 71