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Historically Speaking
Ball’s Bluff, the Trent Affair
And the Joint Committee at 150
B
A steel engraving by H. Wright Smith
depicts the death of U.S. Senator and
Union brigade commander COL Edward D. Baker during the Battle of Ball’s
Bluff, near Leesburg, Va., in 1861.
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Library of Congress
a brigade commander—also a U.S.
oth the Union and the ConfederBy BG John S. Brown
senator and friend of President Linacy experienced ups and downs
U.S. Army retired
coln—was in charge when the scatthroughout the Civil War. In the fall of
tered and poorly positioned units faced a con1861, 150 years ago, the Union certainly suffered
certed Confederate counterattack. Baker was
from its share of setbacks. A battlefield debacle
shot dead and his command soundly deat Ball’s Bluff, 30 miles northwest of Washingfeated. Withdrawal became rout when the
ton, D.C., cast doubts on efforts to recover
victorious Confederates caught the retreatfrom the greater disaster at Bull Run three
ing Federals against the river bank. About
months earlier. Then, a diplomatic fiasco em1,700 had been engaged on each side, out of
bodied in the so-called Trent Affair presented
which more than 900 Union soldiers were
the United States with the very real possibility
killed, wounded, missing or captured while
of war with Great Britain, forcing a humiliating
the Confederates lost fewer than 150. Baker and
disavowal of U.S. action. The response to these
his predecessors in command on the ground were
downward trends introduced a political blunder, or
at least political theatrics, in the U.S. Congress Joint Com- empowered to withdraw in the face of superior forces. This
mittee on the Conduct of the War. Let us examine these was to be a raid, not a pitched battle, but they were loath to
withdraw without having accomplished at least someevents in turn and perhaps draw lessons from them.
Shortly after the First Battle of Bull Run, President Abra- thing. Intelligence was fatally flawed and the plan correham Lincoln replaced defeated MG Irvin McDowell with spondingly bogus; still they drove on in the hopes of someMG George B. McClellan. McClellan had conducted a suc- how achieving a positive result.
Embarrassed by the defeat at Ball’s Bluff, the United States
cessful, albeit miniature, campaign in West Virginia and
was a capable organizer and trainer. He energetically re- soon had an even greater danger to worry about. It was combuilt the muddled forces McDowell had left him, giving mon knowledge that the South hoped to parlay battlefield
birth to the eventually peerless Army of the Potomac. By successes and cotton futures into diplomatic leverage with
October, increasingly trained and competent units and Great Britain and France. Recognition of its independence
leaders were spoiling for a fight. The opportunity seemed seemed likely, and active support or even intervention possito present itself when reconnaissance and intelligence sug- ble. It was no great secret that Confederate commissioners
gested that a poorly secured Confederate encampment James M. Mason and John Slidell sought transportation
was perched on Ball’s Bluff above the
Potomac River and that the Confederates were on the verge of abandoning
nearby Leesburg, Va.; neither assessment proved correct. The alleged underdefended camp was a mirage, and the
Confederates were more than willing
to fight for Leesburg.
Union command evolved as different units moved forward across the
Potomac on October 21, the division
commander having remained on the
friendly bank. COL Edward D. Baker,
to London to pursue their cause. They slipped out of
Charleston, S.C., on a blockade runner and booked passage
from Havana, Cuba, on the HMS Trent. On November 8 the
USS San Jacinto intercepted the Trent in the Bahamas and
forcibly removed Mason and Slidell. It is impossible today
to determine whether the San Jacinto’s captain, Charles
Wilkes, was eccentric, overzealous or insane, but he justified
his egregious breach of international protocol by defining
Mason and Slidell as contraband—as though they were illicit guns or illegal merchandise. Needless to say, the British
parliament and public erupted with indignation—even
those inclined to favor the North out of abolitionist sentiment. Their fervor was reflected in the North by bouts of jingoism on the streets, but Lincoln and other leaders clearly
recognized they could ill afford a confrontation with Great
Britain. The United States government disavowed Wilkes’
rash act and released Mason and Slidell to a British warship
that sped them on their way. The lesson might have been to
ensure that commanders at every level were mindful of the
strategic consequences of their acts.
n light of mounting military disasters, Congress decided
to intercede by appointing an investigative Joint Committee on the Conduct of the War. There certainly was a lot
worth investigating: battlefield losses, military contracts,
recruiting, medical treatment, fund-raising and financing,
and so on. Warfare had become so extensive and complex
that there was ample scope for congressional participation
and review. Unfortunately the committee tended to attack
personalities rather than issues.
Established in early December, the committee’s first target
was the defeated division commander from Ball’s Bluff, BG
Charles P. Stone. Brushing aside such issues as the soundness of intelligence, tactics, battle command or support, the
committee focused instead on Stone’s political views. Given
that he was not a fervent abolitionist, was he not also a traitor? Radical political theater became a hallmark of the committee. Generals and leaders not in accordance with the
committee leaders’ political views found themselves
hounded, and those in accordance were too often excused.
The committee ultimately did some useful work, but it also
excited discord, underscoring the dangers of mixing war
management with extreme political partisanship. (Lessons
drawn from it were applied to the so-called “Truman Committee,” which provided far less contentious and more effective congressional oversight during World War II.)
President Lincoln and the United States government had
little to cheer about 150 years ago. Battlefield defeat had
BG John S. Brown, USA Ret., was chief of military history at
the U.S. Army Center of Military History from December
1998 to October 2005. He commanded the 2nd Battalion, 66th
Armor, in Iraq and Kuwait during the Gulf War and returned
to Kuwait as commander of the 2nd Brigade, 1st Cavalry Division, in 1995. He has a doctorate in history from Indiana
University. His book, Kevlar Legions: A History of Army
Transformation 1989–2005, was recently published.
Library of Congress
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The USS San Jacinto (right) forced the mail packet HMS Trent
to heave to off the Bahamas in 1861 and forcibly removed
Confederate commissioners James M. Mason and John Slidell,
a major breach of international protocol that Britain decried.
become recurrent, war with Great Britain and perhaps
France loomed, and congressional radicals tore away at
moderates within the Lincoln administration and the
Army. There were a few bright spots, however. On November 7 a joint Army-Navy expedition overwhelmed the
defenses of Port Royal Sound between Charleston and Savannah, Ga., advancing an “Anaconda Plan” of economic
strangulation first proposed by GEN Winfield Scott. On
the same day, in far-off Missouri, little-known BG Ulysses
S. Grant boldly attacked 5,000 Confederates with 3,000
Federals at Belmont, inflicting approximately 900 casualties while suffering 500. Federal losses were more readily
replaced. We will hear more of both the Anaconda Plan
and GEN Grant in due course.
✭
Recommended Reading:
Ballard, Ted, Staff Ride Guide: The Battle of Ball’s Bluff
(Washington, D.C.: Center of Military History, 2001)
Foote, Shelby, The Civil War, A Narrative: Fort Sumter to
Perryville (New York, N.Y.: Vintage Books, 1986)
McPherson, James, Battle Cry of Freedom: The Civil War
Era (New York, N.Y.: Oxford University Press, 1988)
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