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Inequality in Angola
Kamia Victor De Carvalho, Luciano Chianeque and Albertina Delgado
Introduction
In the current context of global economic recession and a continuing divide
between developed and developing countries, the analysis of inequality in Southern
Africa is both pertinent and necessary. For this exercise to make real sense there is
a need to look back to remind ourselves where we have come from, as well as to
look at where we are in our present reality, in order to better shape the future. This
paper is an important endeavour in the promotion of a more inclusive and solid
future for the Southern African region. The inclusion of Angola in this regional
analysis is a key indicator of the importance of Angola’s economy, its internal
policies and its external relations for the region, including the levels of poverty,
inequality and human development. Angola can no longer afford to be outside of
discussions related to Southern Africa and any real discussion on the region can
no longer ignore Angola’s relevance.
Angola’s recent history requires a close analysis in order to fully understand
the background of current issues, as without this analysis the contradiction of an
abundantly rich, yet poorly developed country will not allow Government, policy
makers and civil society to fully address the historical and current inequalities
faced by the Angolan people.
This paper was written after extensive research of both historical and current
books, reports by national and international organisations, Angolan State Country
reports to the international human rights organisations, national policy papers
and national plans. Country reports on human development and on Progress
towards the MDGs were also used, supported by consultation with civil society
representatives, including churches. Despite no specific primary empirical data
being collected during the writing of the paper, the paper was supported by field
missions undertaken by the researchers to establish the current reality on the
ground.11
1 The study was commissioned a few months prior to the Parliamentary elections in September 2008, and the
researchers decided it was not an appropriate time to undertake research “on the ground” regarding perceptions of
inequality or poverty, due to the political sensitivity of the subject. Feedback was given through meetings including
through the annual meeting of Pentecostal Churches in Angola, and round-table meetings with representatives of
civil society.
Introduction
39
Tearing Us Apart: Inequalities in Southern Africa
The main objective of this chapter is to present an analysis of the various facets
of inequality in Angola by looking beyond the traditional definition of inequality
as simply disparity in income, by also looking at social exclusion as well as access
to social services and other state resources, as key factors of social inequality in the
country. By paying attention to gender roles and gender inequality as well as the
human development indicators and geographical differences, an attempt is made
to identify the key factors of social inequality in the country. Suggestions are
then made on how to address these by recognising the importance of the chosen
economic framework and policies, and the importance of promoting economic
justice and inclusive economic growth. The paper should serve as a basis for
discussion and strategic interventions.
History and Background of Inequality in Angola
This chapter briefly describes the history of the country and the population in
terms of ethnicity, class and demographics and presents the root causes of social
and economic inequality and its main reasons (including gender and race relations).
Given the complexity of the structures of the traditional societies of Angola and the
limited research available, the chapter will concentrate on those cultures and tribes
explored by the missionaries or writers. The paper will not give anthropological
insights but rather analyse the traditional folklore of various groups in Angola,
focusing on bringing out the key elements of structural inequalities in the country.
Angola’s History
What was Angola like before the Portuguese settlers arrived in the latter part of
the fifteenth century? The name has its origin in the Kimbundu word jingola,
meaning a small piece of iron that became an emblem of political authority
among the Mbundu people2. Ngola then was used as the royal title in the region
from Luanda to the Malanje highlands and the Portuguese referred to it as the
kingdom of Ngola3. This kingdom was not a united political entity and had no
recognised boundaries.
During pre-colonial times what is today the territory of Angola had been
inhabited by many tribes as one can still see today. The tribes that occupied
Angola are: the Bakongo, Ambundu, Lunda-Kiokos, Ovimbundu, Ganguela,
Kwanhama, Nhaneka-Humbe, Herero, Ambo, and Xindonga. Although the
2 Miller, Joseph C. 1976. Kings and Kinsman: Early Mbundu States in Angola. Clarendon Press, Oxford.
3 Henderson, L. W. 1992. The Church in Angola: A River of Many Currents. The Pilgrim Press, Cleveland,
USA.
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Inequality in Angola
Kamia Victor De Carvalho, Luciano Chianeque and Albertina Delgado
Portuguese settlers arrived in 1482 with the “three C’s politics”, which were
Colonisation, Christianisation and Commerce, their activities were confined to
the coastal areas due to the chiefdom’s resistance to the Portuguese occupation.
The topography of Angola facilitated the penetration of the interior by the
coloniser, since the Congo and Kwanza River gave access to the relatively populous
Kongo, Mbundu and Ovimbundu areas. The country had four natural harbors:
Luanda, Lobito, Namibe and Tombwa, which provided ports to entry for the main
regions of Angola. The climate of Angola was also favorable for human habitation
even though the whole country falls within the tropical zone4.
Angola was a well-watered land, but like most of Africa, it was subject to
periodic droughts. The rainfall on the plateau fed a network of rivers that provided
water for human consumption and agriculture that later became a major source of
hydroelectric power. The moderate climate and adequate water supply contributed
to an accepted level of soil fertility in most parts of Angola. Angola’s soil could
produce a variety of crops from semi-tropical coffees, pineapple, and bananas
to temperate wheat, corn, cassava, and peaches. Iron has been important in the
mythology and economy of Angola. Importantly, Angola is also rich in a number
of minerals as well as in oil. Diamond deposits are widespread in the country and
today petroleum is Angola’s most valuable export.
The social systems in Angola were basically made up of villages (local
communities) and groups based on common family lines, actual or putative.
This was the main social structure, even if subject to change in form and function
in the period preceding the Portuguese incursion and during the centuries when
Portugal exercised direct influence in the coastal areas of the country. Throughout
the five hundred years under Portuguese rule, they introduced changes in the
structure of urban and rural areas with its impact on political and economic
systems, rural communities and kin groups. But rural communities, organisations
and the organisation of kin groups remained the most significant elements in the
lives of ordinary Angolans. In general, the community members were tied to the
members of their tribal group by marriage. Typically, neighbouring villages were
tied together either because their chiefdoms or groups were made up by members
of related blood or, in some cases, by fairly frequent inter-marriage among members
of a limited set of villages.
4 Implementation of the International Covenant Economic, Social and Cultural Rights Periodic Report 2008,
Angola, (Combined first, second and third period report), E/C.12/AGO/3, 28 April 2008, Economic and Social
Council, UN.
History and Background of Inequality in Angola
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Tearing Us Apart: Inequalities in Southern Africa
In the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries, the slave trade poisoned the Angolan
soil and the country has had a long and troubled history. The many ethnic groups
and tribes – the majority tribe being Ovimbundu, then Mbundu, Bakongo,
Kwanyama, Ganguela and Chokwe - consider themselves very different and
historically did not see eye to eye. So when the Portuguese settled in coastal Luanda
in 1575, the warring tribes plundered and sold each other into slavery in return
for food and liquor, rather than grouping together against a common enemy. So
for the next 300 years, the Portuguese were content to milk Angola for slaves. It is
estimated that 4 million slaves were exported from Angola to the Americas. The
manipulation of existing tribal conflicts and the destruction of the pre-colonial
trading culture and economy was “one of the major causes of Angola’s economic
and social backwardness as well as a factor in demographic falls˝5.
It was only at the end of the 19th century, when the Portuguese were forced
to stop the slave trade and after the infamous Scramble for Africa which saw the
continent of Africa divided up by European colonial interests, that the Portuguese
colonizers effectively settled inland. Commerce in ivory, beeswax, and rubber
replaced the slave trade but this trade required a great deal of travel and did
not allow the creation of stable communities that could be nurseries of the new
communities. The rubber trade, especially, created a mobile population. “Everyone
who was able to carry a load joined the caravan. It had always been the custom to
take boys on trading expeditions, as young as they could go, say from their tenth year
as part of their education. Now girls were also taken and hardly any but the women
stayed at home to raise the crops and provide rations for the caravans.”6
Angolan families are traditionally patriarchal, but women have also traditionally
played an important role in the family’s economy, particularly in the rural areas by
working on the family’s or the community’s plot of land and providing food staples
for the family to supplement the income generated by the men. However, in most
tribes, a woman is placed second (if not last) in the family hierarchy. Polygamy is a
common cultural practice in most of the ethnic groups, and in some tribes women
do not have any inheritance rights in their families, with all inheritance transferred
to the husband’s family, often at the detriment of the children.7 Traditional and
cultural practices have, in general, prevented women from many things including
going to the “akokotos” (ancestor’s graveyards) if they were menstruating, and
5 Childs, G. M. 1949. Umbundu Kingship and Character. p. 209 Oxford University Press, London
6 In the Northern provinces of the country such as Cabinda and Zaire inheritance is passed to the brothers or sisters
of the deceased, with the view that the widow and children would be taken care of by them. However, this cultural
practice still remains today, and is often a source of conflict and in clear violation of women’s rights to inheritance
and to property or assets as per the Angolan Family Code.
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Kamia Victor De Carvalho, Luciano Chianeque and Albertina Delgado
priority was given to the male children for education and social mobility. Women
were also expected to give birth to many children.
The structure of the colonial economy and the socio-economic policies and practices
By the 20th century, the colonial economy had become dominated by agriculture,
particularly as coffee production competed with those of countries in Latin
America. Throughout the 1960s and 1970s Angola was amongst the top five
producers of coffee in the world, which was a highly priced commodity at the
time. Other important commercial ventures in the agricultural sector included
the production of a variety of grains including rice plantations in Bié Province;
the production of a variety of fruit plantations, which supplied the wineries in the
country; cotton plantations in the Malanje province, which allowed the country to
become self-sufficient through a manufacturing industry; the sugarcane plantations
in Bom Jesus (Bengo province), Catumbela and Dombe Grande (Benguela
province) with sugar factories that made Angola a self-sufficient producer and
exporter of sugary products. Mining was minimal and was in its early stages, and
oil production began as late as the 1960s.
This economy, based on agriculture, flourished to the point where Luanda
was called by the Portuguese the “Crown of Africa”. The colonial economy can
be characterised as capitalist and globalized, as the commodities and raw materials
were priced according to the international market. The colonial economic policies
also sought to attract foreign direct investment in the country, as well as support
the large Portuguese commercial groups and the country in commercial networks
and monopolies based on import and export in the various economic sectors
(Zenha Rela, 2005)7.
However, this growing colonial economy was largely supported by practices of
segregation and exploitation of the native people by the colonisers, through the
practice of forced labour, which effectively replaced slavery as a means of dominating
and colonising the Angolan population. The large number of workers required
to sustain the large commercial farms and the new industrial initiatives were
effectively ‘recruited’ by the colonial State. It also subsidised commercial farmers
and through the building of major infrastructure such as roads and railway lines
from North to South and West to East of the country, the Portuguese attempted to
create the conditions for large long-term investments across the economic sectors.
As a result, local development was mainly in the coastal and port towns as well
as the provinces with agricultural farms and industrial potential. These main cities
7 Zenha Rela J.M, 2005, pp30-35, Angola - O Futuro já Comecou, Luanda-Angola, Editorial Nzila
History and Background of Inequality in Angola
43
Tearing Us Apart: Inequalities in Southern Africa
and towns in the provinces of Luanda, Malange, Benguela, Namibe, Huambo,
Kwanza-Sul, and Kwanza-Norte saw varying degrees of development, but were
essentially the main centers where the Portuguese settled and established an
affluent middle and upper class, who enjoyed better living conditions than many
Portuguese based in Portugal. This new class of Portuguese settlers, who were mostly
farmers and business people (commerciantes) had immigrated to Angola and had
the monopoly of the country’s commercial networks, as well as access to large
hectares of land, mostly through authorised and State-sponsored ‘land grabbing’
from the local rural farmers and communities. They were the main beneficiaries
of the positive economic trends of the colony. With regards to land, it is estimated
that in 1970, the Portuguese occupied 4.5 million hectares of arable land “an
area equal to that occupied by Angolan small farmers”8. Subsistence farming was
non-existent as small farmers and communities were forced to grow export crops.
In most of its colonies, the Portuguese established a policy of assimilation and of
christianisation. Positioning themselves in a way they believed to be “different” from
other colonizers, the Portuguese implemented policies which sought to “convert”
and “assimilate” the indigenous population believing this to be a more effective
strategy for real colonisation. One of the first things that made the occupation
possible was the baptism (christianisation) of many traditional chiefs and kings. The
Baptism became a key and effective colonial mechanism that introduced inequality
and stratification of the traditional Angolan societies. Those who were baptised
were considered as not having “the tail” any more and who no longer related to
non-Christians (the Portuguese settlers used the symbolism of African people
having tails like monkeys do)9, though they still remained inferior to the whites.
The power of the Christian evangelists’ movement cannot be underestimated in
the process of acculturation of African religions and beliefs. It is interesting to note
that in Angola the churches and the missionaries of the dominant Catholic and
Protestant faith “quietly competed”, and it is the churches’ social networks which
shape much of the regional politics and the understanding on ethnic differences
in the country (Sogge, 2009)10.
In terms of assimilation, those whom the Portuguese granted access to
education (through the State and missionary schools but which also had a tiered
8 Implementation of the International Covenant Economic, Social and Cultural Rights Periodic Report 2008,
Angola, p5, (Combined first, second and third period report), E/C.12/AGO/3, 28 April 2008, Economic and
Social Council, UN
9 The indigenous card, issued by the Colonial State, had a drawing that represented a black man with a tail, and
this was to be carried by all who were not assimilated.
10 Sogge, D., 2009, Angola: Failed yet successful, FRIDE, Working Paper nº 81, April 2009.
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Kamia Victor De Carvalho, Luciano Chianeque and Albertina Delgado
and discrimatory grading system) and who adopted the colonial values and customs,
were to be granted the legal title of assimilados (assimilated). Those who were not
assimilados were considered indigena (indigenous) and had fewer rights, including
access to jobs, as civil servants, and to higher education.
The indigenea population (the majority of the inhabitants of the country) had
to carry their ID card, Estatuto de Indigena (Indigenous Status) at all times to
prove that they were paying their indigena tax. If not, they would be sent to forced
labour, thus providing the State with the vital cheap labour needed for economic
growth and the enrichment of the colonisers. Those who were of mixed race and
therefore were (partly) of Portuguese or European descent were automatically
granted the status of “assimilados”, as were people from Cape Verde, Mozambique
and São Tome.11 Unlike the practices in the Islands of São Tome and Principe
and Cape Verde, in Angola the Portuguese did not begin a process of expanding
education and access to social services, such as health posts outside of the main
cities, until well into the 1950s and 1960s.12
Angola’s Independence – from the liberation struggle to a long civil war
Both the long years of slavery and later policies of forced labour did not endear
the colonials to the people, and neither did the policies of assimilation. Clashes
began after World War II as people rebelled against the practices of the indigena
status legislation and began to demand better living conditions. In 1961, the
authorities violently crushed the initial uprisings. The stage was set, however, and
despite the fact that the indigena law was revoked in 1963 and the new colonial
government plans put more emphasis on provision of social services, these measures
were largely unsuccessful.1314 The majority of the population remained illiterate,
with an estimated 85-90% of the population considered illiterate at the end of
the colonial period.15 The majority of the population was essentially “second class”
citizens in their own country.
From the three predominant ethnic groups, Ovimbundu, Mbundu and
Bakongos, three main liberation movements were formed and they all took to
guerrilla warfare. Although their objective was the same - to oust the Portuguese
- tribal rivalries led to splinter groups, reshuffling and often the groups planned to
11 Those Africans, mestiços and Creole considered by the colonial authorities to have met certain formal standards
indicating that they had successfully absorbed (assimilated) the Portuguese language and culture. Individuals
legally assigned to the status of assimilado assumed (in principle) the privileges and obligations of Portuguese
citizens and escaped the burdens, e.g., that of forced labour imposed on most Africans (indígenas).
12 Zenha Rela, J.M, op.cit, pp 29-42
13Ibid.
History and Background of Inequality in Angola
45
Tearing Us Apart: Inequalities in Southern Africa
destroy each other. They all drew support from differing international sources as
well: the FNLA (the National Front for the Liberation of Angola) was supported by
northern Bakongo tribes, Congo (Zaire) and anti-Communist Western countries;
the MPLA (the Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola) began with
Marxist leanings, transcending tribalism in favour of nationalism in the cities
where the majority were those of Creole descent, and was supported by assimilado
Mbundu and Songo tribes, the USSR, Cuba and other Soviet allies; and UNITA
(National Union for Total Independence of Angola) originally had the support of
the largest tribe, the Ovimbundu, Ganguela, China, USA and Apartheid South
Africa. A fourth rebel group was also established at this time, FLEC (Front for
the Liberation of the Enclave of Cabinda) which proclaimed for the separation
and autonomy of the Province of Cabinda, and although not a significant player
in the liberation struggle against the Portuguese, the group splintered and would
remain a rebel group for the next 40 years. Again, it is important to mention
the influence the Churches had on the ethnic groups as the three leaders of the
liberation movements came from three separate Protestant churches: Baptist,
Methodist and Congregational.14
In 1975, 493 years after the first settlers arrived in Angola and following the
overthrow of the fascist government in Portugal a year earlier (April 1974), the
Portuguese left the country to the Angolans, who were finally granted independence.
Portugal set up a transitional government in Angola in 1974, representing themselves
and the three different movements. But old rivalries remained, the Government
collapsed, and Angola plunged into civil war. The Portuguese fled - half a million
left in the biggest airlift in history, converting downtown Luanda into a ghost town
and robbing the country of the majority of its administrative and technical labour
force. Angola quickly became a theatre for the Cold War conflict. The MPLA
seized control of the bulk of the Angolan territory and by early 1976 became
the governing party. UNITA emerged as the main rival, but American-based oil
interests (Chevron and Gulf ) still continued to do business in MPLA-controlled
areas. This meant that at times, at the height of the Cold War, Cuban soldiers
guarded American companies’ oil interests from rebels armed by the Americans.
In 1988, a ceasefire agreement was signed by Cuba, the US and Angola, but
broke down the following year. However, the end of the Cold War also meant an end
to patronage from the superpowers, prompting a fresh accord, negotiated in Lisbon
and signed on 31st May 1991, which paved the way for the first ever democratic
elections in September 1992. After losing the general election (determined by the
14 Implementation of the Covenant for ESCR, op.cit.
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Inequality in Angola
Kamia Victor De Carvalho, Luciano Chianeque and Albertina Delgado
UN as largely free and fair) in 1992, UNITA returned to war with unprecedented
ferocity, claiming that the poll was rigged. Almost 500,000 people died between
May and October of 1993 as UNITA took what had previously been a bush war
to the provincial cities. In this war, both sides destroyed a large part of the roads,
bridges and communications infrastructure in the country and both promoted
and created tribal rivalries.15
The “Lusaka Accord” of 1994 was consistently violated by both the governing
MPLA and UNITA, and the discovery of new diamond areas and oilfields allowed
both sides to re-arm. UN partial sanctions (from 1998) against UNITA diamonds
as well as international campaigns against “blood diamonds” and penalties on the
diamond companies associated with rebel movements, all caused UNITA’s cash
supply to shrivel, and its control of the countryside gradually crumbled. Increasing
military defeats drove a desperate UNITA deeper into the hinterland and, its
leader Jonas Savimbi was killed in a government operation on 22nd February 2002.
A peace accord was signed on 4th April 2002. Thin and exhausted guerrillas
moved with their families (who had been travelling with them as they fought) to 35
agreed areas throughout the country. Senior UNITA officials emphatically declared
their commitment to peace and have since been absorbed16 into the Government
and army. Since April 2002, most Angolans are living without war for the first
time in their lives. In 2007, the protracted war between the Government and
the separatist rebels of the FLEC movement in the Province of Cabinda (where
the main bulk of the country’s oil is produced) also came to an end through an
agreement and the granting of Estatuto Especial (Special Status) to the province’s
administrative and governance structures.
Reconstruction of the economy and social sectors has been underway since
the end of the war, with leadership from Government, and backing from bilateral
donors such as China as well as through partnerships with UN agencies, the
European Union and others.
15 Despite the role of religion in leading up to independence, churches and practising of faith reduced significantly
during the one-party State system but was revived from the early 1990s. Angola has a wide range of
denominations practicing their faith in the country.
16 In 1992, a number of Ovimbundu were killed in Luanda simply by belonging to the “wrong tribe”. Although
the civil war and the liberation struggle had been divided along ethnic lines, ethnic violence and discrimination
by civilians was only seen after the restart of the war in 1992 in Luanda and Zaire against Ovimbundu and
Bakongos. These incidents did not lead to or intensify the war. See Hodges, T., Angola from Afro-Stalinism to
Petro-Diamond Capitalism, The International African Institute (Norway), James Currey (Oxford) and Indiana
University Press (Bloomington & Indiapolonis), pp 27-29
History and Background of Inequality in Angola
47
Tearing Us Apart: Inequalities in Southern Africa
In September 2008, the second elections were held in the country, and the
MPLA won a landslide victory taking 81,6% of the total vote, with UNITA now the
second largest political party taking 10,4%. More importantly, peace was confirmed
as the elections were recognised as free and fair by the international community
and especially by the national civil society and development stakeholders.
Angola’s independence was marked by the disastrous colonial handover from
the Portuguese as well as the geopolitical reality of the time, due to the Cold War,
which dominated the country’s politics for the first 3 decades of independence.
The three warring liberation movements caused a civil war that would devastate
the country’s economy and its people. As often remarked, Angola was an “Orphan
of the Cold War” 17 and the reality of the political situation had a profound effect
on the socio-economic prospects of the country, and the levels of social inequality
experienced today. These will be analysed in sections 2 and 3.
The historical and root causes of Angola’s inequality at independence
Historical and root causes of inequality in Angola at independence can be largely
attributed to the following connected issues:
First, the racial legacy of colonialism and the sub-human politics of assimilation.
During the Portuguese rule in Angola, few black Angolans occupied important posts
within the administration. The majority of doctors, teachers, lawyers, municipal
administrators, and industrial workers were whites. In contrast, the local Angolans,
indigena, were expected to fish, plow, and to be blacksmiths and cattle herders. The
establishment of a two-tier system of citizens’ rights which allowed for the indigena
population to acquire a new status and move up the social ladder, based on their
acceptance of European values and customs was part of the Portuguese colonisers’
vision for creating a “modern” colony in Angola. On the surface, the Assimilado
policy looks less aggressive if one compares it with the Apartheid practised in South
Africa. However, it alienates, disintegrates, separates, and marginalises. In short,
it creates inequality. The only difference is that Apartheid was practised in the
open and Assimilado had been done clandestinely. Both policies dehumanised the
native Africans and fundamentally changed their traditional economic activities.
Second, the Portuguese exploited the frictions between the tribes very well, to
their own advantage and to the detriment of national unity. Portuguese settlers
in Angola acted on the basis of domination, using intrigue and lies in order to
generate distrust between groups which even led to wars (examples of this is the
17 Strong allegations that UNITA soldiers were bought off were made at the end of the civil war.
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Kamia Victor De Carvalho, Luciano Chianeque and Albertina Delgado
Kandimba war). The fostering of “tribalism” was one of the contributing factors
to the inequality.
Third, the slave trade: Through slavery, the capitalist mode of production was
introduced as Africa, and Angola in particular, provided slave labour for Europe
and the Americas. The full impact of the slave trade on Angola is still not fully
understood or sufficiently researched to date. However, there is no doubt that
the slave trade fundamentally changed those tribes who were beneficiaries of the
slave trade and those who were made slaves. The slave trade paved the way for
colonisation in the 20th Century and for practices such as forced labour. Famous
Angolan Kings and Queens, such as Rainha Ginga, who negotiated with the
Portuguese and fought wars against them for her kingdom, were early liberation
fighters and are important symbols for Angolans.
Fourth, forced labour: Alongside the slave trade, this was decisive in the
construction of the modern capitalist world. The Portuguese empire established
a de jure system of forced labour throughout its colonies from 1899, which
ordered colonial authorities to force nearly all adult male Africans to work. The
Government told workers that they would only have to work for six months of
every year. In practice, this obligation was a life sentence of forced labour. Whilst
providing the basis for the development of local manufacturing industries and an
agriculture sector which exported coffee, cotton and other valuable commodities
at the time, the practice of forced labour and the inhumane treatment of the
indigenous population led to uprisings and the formation of liberation movements
against the coloniser.
Fifth, acculturation as a means for social mobility: Despite the difficulty
in measuring the full impact of acculturation which resulted from the colonial
policies on assimilation, it is clear that it caused a class divide and marginalization
within the indigenous Angolan population. African traditional ways of life
(language, culture, customs, religion, political systems, and social outlook) were
systematically destroyed in order for Angolans to incorporate European values
and customs. The minority Creole/Mestiço and the Black assimilated class was
at the time of independence better educated, better established economically, and
‘cosmopolitan’. It is this class that initially occupied the key jobs in administration
and Government in the post-independence era. The fact that the Portuguese
language remained the language of instruction after independence, led Angola
to conclude in its Economic, Social and Cultural Rights Periodic Report (ESCR
2008) that “It is therefore understandable that today many Angolans cannot speak
History and Background of Inequality in Angola
49
Tearing Us Apart: Inequalities in Southern Africa
local languages and they use non- Bantu languages” and this shows the continued
practices of acculturation.18
Sixth, gender imbalances were both culturally acceptable within the indigena
population as well as the assimilado classes. Women were expected to be submissive
to men during the colonial years, and on the whole, when available for women,
education was in most cases limited to the maximum of the fourth year of primary
school which was seen as providing the basics so that women could then get married.
Amongst the poor classes, education was generally for men, while women had to
endure polygamy and enjoyed few property rights (including few rights related
to inheritance). Although in the 1960s and 1970s women became important
players in the liberation struggle, including joining the military and creating
women’s political movements within the liberation movements (OMA for the
MPLA and LIMA for UNITA), few women exercised significant political power
within these organisations. These “women wings” simply followed the doctrines
of the leadership of the movements and played a supporting role in the political
life of the country, which on the whole did little to address the gender imbalances
of the colonial period.19
Based on the aspects highlighted above, there is no doubt that there are a
number of historical socio-economic inequalities in Angola which continue to
influence society today, and will continue to do so unless remedial measures are
put in place. This study will further explore the causes of the current inequality
in the country and possible measures to redress them.
Structure of the economy and the socioeconomic policies after independence
From pre-independence economic “growth” to post-independence economic stagnation
Before the 1960s, Angola’s economy was based on a purely colonial logic in
that the country exported raw materials, imported manufactured products from
Portugal, and kept strong economic ties with the fascist Portuguese Government.
Coffee, diamonds, and iron ore were amongst the most exported products, but
Angola also exported agricultural goods to Portugal whilst at the same time
importing luxury goods, particularly for the urban middle and upper classes.
The outbreak of the anti-colonial war (from 1961 to 1974) coincided with the
18 Dame Margaret Anstee, the Secretary General’s Special Representative to Angola coined this phrase and it is the
title of her book. See Anstee, M.J., 1996, Orphan of the Cold War, London, Macmillian Press Ltd.
19 Implementation of the ESCR op cit. p4.
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Kamia Victor De Carvalho, Luciano Chianeque and Albertina Delgado
beginning of serious infrastructure investments as well as development of an oil
sector. This was an additional factor in the progressive strive by the Portuguese
settlers for autonomous economic governance in relation to Portugal in the years
leading up to independence. It played an important role in the poor handover
at independence and the subsequent mass evacuation of the Portuguese settlers.
According to the World Bank data, between 1960 and 1970 the average rate of
growth of the GDP was 7,8%. By 1973, oil had overtaken coffee to become the
main exported product20.
This economic growth was interrupted after independence and was only to
be effectively recovered after 27 years of civil war. In purely economic terms,
Angola went from a period of growth to the almost complete stagnation of its
national economy, with the notable exception to this trend being Angola’s oil
sector. However, it is important to look beyond the purely economic figures and
understand the reasons behind the stagnation and in some cases the decline of
the productive sectors of the country’s economy.
During the first phase of the long civil war of 1975-1992, there were many
setbacks which resulted in stagnation in most of the economic sectors and some
will be explored in this chapter. The principal factors can be briefly summarised
as follows:
• The systematic destruction of infrastructure such as roads, factories, energy
and water posts during the liberation struggle, prior to independence, as well
as during the civil war (guerrilla war) which followed independence in 1975;
• The flight of the settler population, including educated and skilled people who
had been key to the growth experienced in the colonial economy (farmers,
industrialist, tradesmen);
• The abandonment of traditional productive activities, including agriculture, and
the insufficient measures to address the stagnation and regression of these sectors;
• Increases in oil production and diamond mining and the dependence on these
revenues led to a “war economy”, where most investments by the State were
primarily directed towards defence and the war.
Angola’s centralised socialist economy
Since the slave trade, Angola’s economy, much like other colonial economies in
Southern Africa, had been largely dependent on external factors and the export
of its natural resources (oil, iron, cotton, diamonds, etc). As a result, the country
20 The national programme on Alphabetisation was intended to benefit women in particular as per the ESCR
report, however, concrete data on the number of women in the literacy programmes was not found for the study.
Structure of the economy and the socio-economic policies after independence
51
Tearing Us Apart: Inequalities in Southern Africa
was not protected from the international shocks which occurred in the late 1970s
and 1980s.
Angola had an additional problem which stemmed from the geo-political
reality at independence which divided the world into capitalist and socialist states,
with grave consequences not only with regards to the civil war in the country but
also because of the considerable international efforts to undermine the socialist
states and their economies.
The structure of the economy chosen by the new government after independence
was based on socialist ideologies (Marxist-Leninist), and according to the
Constitution of November 1975 and subsequent revisions, there were two basic
elements that guided and structured both the political and economic life of postindependence Angola: A planned and centralised system of economic leadership
and the building of a socialist society based on a single party political system.
Faced with the possible collapse of the economy at the outset of independence,
the Angolan State took over the responsibility of the supply and distribution of
final and intermediate goods for consumption due to the dismantling of the rural
and urban trading networks brought about by the mass desertion of the Portuguese
traders (who previously had the trading monopoly prior to independence). This
introduced a new economic model to Angola - the centralised economy.
The Government nationalised all assets, including the land2123 and banking
system. The State took over the management of numerous assets, from the small
to the big trading enterprises, the factories, the productive farms, and effectively
ended private enterprise in the country. The initial goal had been to reverse the loss
of national production caused by the independence struggle within the first five
years of the new Government’s rule, but this goal was not realised. It is important to
note that Angola’s new independent Government and the new Republic of Angola
faced a reality of high illiteracy rates across the country, a small percentage of skilled
human resources and the majority of the population in need of access to basic
services such as water and sanitation, as well as health and education. It was the
vision of the first Government that the centralized economy would allow Angola
to increase its national production and permit the country to be self-sufficient
and also continue to trade, especially with other socialist countries.2224 However,
there was effectively no master plan, and the centralised plan did not go beyond
21 From 1969 to 1973, oil went from the fourth to the first export, and in 1973 was already contributing to 30% of
the total value of all the national exports. See Zenha Rela, JM, op cit.
22 All the land in Angola is the property of the Angolan State, and this principle has been the same in the centralized
system and in the market system, as the Land Law approved in 2003 continued to uphold the principle of the
State being the first proprietor of all land.
52
Inequality in Angola
Kamia Victor De Carvalho, Luciano Chianeque and Albertina Delgado
yearly established targets of priorities within the economic sectors, which were
essentially a series of wish lists (Zenha Rela, 2005).
At the same time, the economic framework was clearly intertwined with the
political framework as per the country’s Constitution. Those who did not embrace
the new centralised approach (or more importantly the one-party system and the
MPLA ideology) were deemed to be against the system, which led some Angolans
to leave, a few years after independence, continuing to contribute to the exodus of
skilled labour in the Angolan public administration and in the newly established
State enterprises.23
The socialist economic model did not allow for private business management.
The State became the principal employer which instantly led to a heavy government
structure in terms of the number of people employed as well as in terms of formality
and bureaucratic processes. The latter were inherited from the colonial period,
often with a few added steps and forms.
It has been documented that there was a profound lack of knowledge of the
realities and specific problems of the provinces by decision-makers who were based
in Luanda, which continued to be the political and economic capital of the country.
This translated into the creation of structures in the provinces, and unilateral
measures which were not specific to the regions or applicable in the provinces.24
It soon became evident that the “State Economy” was not able to overcome
the destruction left by the independence war and the ongoing restrictions on
economic development placed on the population and the State by the ensuing
civil war. The initial programmes for reactivating the economy were not able to
halt the recession which the non-oil sectors were entering into (and which would
characterise the next 3 decades). In terms of impact, shortages of food such as
varieties of fish, meat, and other basic staples became common as most goods had
to be imported and as the main supplier of the goods for consumption, the State,
soon created a system for rationing of goods, through ration cards, which would
only end with the transition to the market economy. Again, it is important to
note that this measure was put in place to grant citizens access to the basic and
essential food staples, but in reality it was often abused, with civil servants and
23 At this time the country’s first President, Agostinho Neto, defined the slogan “The most important is the resolution
of the problems faced by the people”, which is still often used by the MPLA in addressing public rallies.
24 The loss of qualified people is intrinsically tied to the practice of assimilation which left the majority of the
population illiterate, and few skills to work in public administration and public enterprises, which were the main
employers. The State structures employed and integrated into jobs and positions with the view that they would
gain skills as they were working. However, one of the effects was the inefficiency of the governance structures during
this period which still marks the reality today. See Hodges, T., op. cit, Chapter 4.
Structure of the economy and the socio-economic policies after independence
53
Tearing Us Apart: Inequalities in Southern Africa
those with easier access to the ration cards benefitting the most. Importantly, the
civil war meant that rural populations, especially in areas of insecurity, often did
not benefit from these measures which were mainly implemented in the coastal
cities not affected by the civil war.
The decline in the agricultural sector had the most impact on the rural
population, with the coffee plantations in provinces of Uíge and Kwanza Sul
province, cotton fields in the Malanje province, sugarcane plantation fields in
Bom Jesus, Catumbela and Dombe Grande, all eventually collapsing. Measures,
by the Angolan Government, such as changing the technical staff to Cubans due
to the lack of qualified Angolans, only contributed to the collapse of the sector.
The other potentially rich sectors such as fisheries and mining were also not
properly managed. Fisheries, in particular, was affected by the lack of capacity
to control illegal fishing in the country’s international waters, and with illegal
overfishing by foreign fishing fleets, as well as the trade agreements with socialist
countries. This resulted in the exporting of particular fish stocks, causing a shortage
of these exported fish stocks in the local market. In mining, the diamond mines
became the resource which fuelled UNITA’s rebel war, and with high levels of
insecurity around the mining areas of the country, and the nature of individual/
illegal diamond mining known as “garimpeiros”, the State was not able to capture
the benefits from these resources until well into the 1990’s, despite the establishment
of the National Diamond Company, Empresa Nacional de Diamantes de Angola
(ENDIAMA).The table below clearly demonstrates the differences in the production
of key commodities from the 1970s to the 1990s and the decline in the production
of the non-oil sectors.
UNIT
1973
1993
1994
1995
1996
1997
Maize
1,0000 Tons
854
274
201
211
398
370
Coffee (exports)
1,0000 Tons
213
2
5
2
3
3
Fish (landed in
Angolan ports)
Mining
1,0000 Tons
467
129
135
137
170
----
Agriculture &Fisheries
54
Inequality in Angola
Kamia Victor De Carvalho, Luciano Chianeque and Albertina Delgado
Crude oil
UNIT
1,0000 b/d
1973
172
1993
504
1994
550
1995
617
1996
689
1997
713
Diamonds
1,0000 carats
1,940
295
537
628
917
1,212
Iron ore
Million Tons
6
0
0
0
0
0
Beer
Million litres
120
27
28
39
72
----
Cloth
Million sq
metres
1,0000 Tons
18
5
3
2
3
----
748
135
251
186
204
----
1,0000 Tons
743
1,522
1,710
1, 760
1,776
1,776
Manufacturing
Cement
Refined
Petroleum
products
Source: Hodges, 1994, p. 94
The exception to this overall stagnation of the productive sectors is the oil sector
which was not adversely affected by independence and the exodus of skilled labour
and actually showed growth early on. Government measures in the period of
transition to independence proved to be effective, including the performance of
the State Oil Company, Sociedade Nacional de Combustíveis (SONANGOL), in
negotiating important contracts for exploration of oil, particularly in the enclave
of Cabinda. The growing price of oil in the late 1970s and early 1980s meant
that oil revenues allowed Government to have a stable source of funds to support
the defence and war efforts and the heavy State bureaucracy. The oil revenues
also permitted Angola to transform itself from a self-sufficient producer of key
commodities to an importer of almost all goods, including food staples. It is the
oil sector, and particularly the National State Oil Company, SONANGOL which
was behind the “Angolan miracle” (discussed further in section 2.7).25
25 The establishment of Provincial Delegations in remote áreas including Kuando Kubango often mirrored central
level structures, even when there was little need for delegations such as the Ministry of Sports (see Zenha Rela,
Structure of the economy and the socio-economic policies after independence
55
Tearing Us Apart: Inequalities in Southern Africa
The rise of the parallel sector and duality of formal and informal
The collapse of the productive sectors led to the establishment of a totally subsidised
pricing system for almost all imported goods, and this was backed up by the
oil revenues. However, the huge subsidies in the internal prices, which clearly
showed how fragile the economy was, were not sustainable in the long-term and
were incompatible with the financial system. The subsidies on imported goods
favoured the consumer, particularly the urban population in Luanda and the
coastal towns (the stronghold of support for the MPLA Government) but ended
any real pricing for national products and prospects for the profitability of the
numerous Agricultural Cooperatives created soon after independence. The failure
of the State-sponsored Agricultural Cooperatives reduced the majority of rural
farmers to subsistence farming.
The problems in distribution and access to goods, particularly in the provinces,
created an inequality which led to schemes and personal initiatives from people
with access to ration cards or the scarce goods which were in high demand. The
emergence of the informal sector can be traced back to these measures, and to the
establishment of an economic regime which has, in hindsight, been deemed to be
based on “financial and economic repression”26. In reality, many Angolans engaged
early on in “candonga”, a word used to describe schemes in order to supplement
their limited income, including civil servants and petty traders who simply traded
goods they had access to with goods they needed. What is clear is that the parallel
informal sector grew in strength over time, and as a direct response to the centralised
system. The centralised system created an imbalance between supply and demand,
with a rationed market based on a fixed and overvalued exchange rate, which was
incapable of reflecting the effects of the loss of external competitiveness of the
economy and the destruction of national production.
The lack of national production became a political issue. It was noted that
during the 2nd National MPLA Congress in 1983, critical voices were being
heard within the party, and the centralised economy began to lose its appeal and
ideological standing. Some analysts have concluded that by the early 1980s, there
was a recognition by the Government of the excessive vulnerability of the Angolan
economy, as oil revenues are subject to international markets and its shocks (as was
the case in the drop in oil prices in 1985-86). Groups within the party had begun
JM, p 43, footnote 23). The centralized administration also meant that in practice very few (if any) governance
decisions were taken at the local level, with heavy dependence on Luanda for decisions and funds.
26 Soares de Oliveira, R., Business Sucees, Angola-Style, 2007, J,of Modern Áfrican Studies, 45, 4, p 605- “A top oil
executive of a major European firm with decades of involvement in Angola did not hesitate to say that “Sonangol
is the Angolan Miracle”.
56
Inequality in Angola
Kamia Victor De Carvalho, Luciano Chianeque and Albertina Delgado
to push for the liberalisation of the economy and argued for the privatisation of
the nationalised infrastructure.27
Thus, the downfall of the centrally planned economy has often been explained
by using the liberal economic theory, presenting the establishment of a set of norms,
rules and procedures for nationalisation of property, the fixing of prices, and other
measures of the centralized economy, as contradicting “the spirit of free initiative,
the freedom of the economic agent to understand, buy and sell any product, and
the consumer’s freedom of choice”28. With the additional element of the collapse
of the key productive sectors such as industry and agriculture, the collapse of
Angola’s model for a centralized economy is often presented as inevitable.
However, this perspective does not give sufficient weight to the postindependence context of economic recession caused by the destruction of the
country’s infrastructure, the exodus of skilled labour, the change in value in the
international markets for commodities such as cotton and coffee, as well as the
reality of the civil war and the constraints it imposed on economic development.
These factors alone threatened the basis of the centralized economy and the
possibilities of turning the socialist ideology into practical reality; however,
additional factors such as poor planning, weak sectoral recovery plans and poor
economic macro-management exacerbated the situation. Some analysts have argued
that the centralized economy also failed due to private interests and different view
points within the ruling one party system, as these groups were able to demonstrate
through the inability of the economy to recover, that the State should abandon the
socialist economic doctrines. All of these factors opened the way to the transition
into the mixed/ market economy.
The Transition – from centralised to open market economy through
hyperinflation and numerous economic reforms
In 1992, the revised Angolan Constitution which had been promulgated about
two weeks before the first Parliamentary and Presidential elections took place (on
29th and 30th September 1992) and brought in formal changes in the economic
system, namely, the end of the planned and centralised economic system, and the
establishment of a mixed economic system, which is the current economic structure
of the country (see Annex 1 for overall explanation on types of economic systems).
27 Albertina Delgado, Draft of the Inequality Study Chapter 2, not published.
28 See both Hodges, T. op.cit, and Zela Renha, JM, op cit as both authors argue that private interests within the
MPLA contributed significantly to push for privatisation.
Structure of the economy and the socio-economic policies after independence
57
Tearing Us Apart: Inequalities in Southern Africa
Article 10 of the Constitution states that “the economic system is based on the
coexistence of different types of property: public, private, mixed, cooperative and
family; all enjoying equal protection”. Thus the principle of coexistence of different
sectors of property and economic activity acquired formal constitutional dignity.
However, apart from controlling the economy, the State continues to control
important areas29 such as the production, distribution, trade in arms, banking activity
in regard to the central bank; ports and airports, and basic telecommunication
network. The new economic framework provided by the Constitution is based on
the recognition of the general principles of equality and justice of economic agents.
This is in line with the change in the political framework based on a multi-party
State and democratic principles as well as respect for human rights also enshrined
in the 1992 Constitution, thereby formally ending the era of the one party State
and the State Economy.30
These formal changes in legislation came as result of a number of economic
measures implemented from the mid-1980s onwards which had been essentially
about reforming the economic system in order to halt the recession in the non-oil
sectors and also paving the way for the market system to be (re)introduced in the
country. The crash in oil prices in 1985-86, the high interest rates of Angola’s ever
growing international debt and the subsequent deficit in balance of payments had
led to “severe macro-economic disequilibria”.31 The next one and a half decades
were, therefore, marked by a series of trial and error reforms with uneven results,
with grave consequences for the population and contributing further to uneven
economic development, which benefitted a few but left out the majority.
Firstly, in 1987 the Government implemented SEF (Programa de Saneamento
Economico e Financeiro), which served as the principal base for the privatisation
and restructuring of the States’ numerous assets, from housing, to factories,
and companies. It is through implementing the SEF and its successor, the PRE
(Programa de Recuperação) that Angola became a member of the World Bank and
the IMF in 1989. With the end of the Cold War and the changing geo-political
29 Albertina Delgado, Draft of the Inequality Study Chapter 2, not published.
30 Article. 11, nº2 of Law 5/02 – Law on the Delimitation of Sectors (April 16)
31 The State appears as the organiser and the arbitrator of all economic activities, and reflexive of economic
leadership (objective dimension). It also becomes the guarantor of the corresponding fundamental economic
rights, (subjective dimension), the “maxim” of the right to own productive property (public, private, cooperative,
family), as well as the freedom of economic initiative, freedom of economic association, the right to work and other
related fundamental economic rights and principles that directly or indirectly derive from it. At the same time, it is
important to stress the “freedom of economic association” as provided by Law Nº 10/88 as a right guaranteed to
all economic agents to participate in social organizations representing their professional and economic interests.
58
Inequality in Angola
Kamia Victor De Carvalho, Luciano Chianeque and Albertina Delgado
reality, Angola’s poor creditworthiness in the international banking systems, due to
the decline in oil prices, made the Breton Woods institutions loans more attractive
to the Angolan authorities. However, many unsuccessful attempts were made by
Angola to be granted significant IMF loans, but to no avail (further discussed in
section 2.6).
The SEF and PRE formed the basis for the transition to market economy, but
were not fully implemented and it is only in 1990 through the PAG (Programa de
Acção do Governo) that the Kwanza was revalued, (leading to the devaluing of the
national currency); that accounts in the State Banks were frozen; that “excessive”
subsidies on products and services were reduced; and that the privatisation of state
assets took place. What followed were years of financial and economic instability
and a series of macro-economic strategies that would start with being reformist in
nature (measures for opening the economy to the international markets, reducing
the intervention of the State in the economic sphere) and be replaced by nonreformist measures (increasing state intervention in the economy). On a yearly
basis, new strategies were attempted as the macro-economic reality was marked by
continuous high inflation rates (hyper-inflation in some years), and the continued
overall recession in the non-oil sectors.
The “trial and error” approach to economic reforms was interconnected with
various factors, including the outbreak of intense fighting in 1994-95 and later
in 1997-98, and periods of instability and stunted economic development, as
well as the continuing practice of centralising the political power in the hands of
President Dos Santos and the staff working directly with him in the Presidential
offices (Futungo de Belas), often at the expense of Government Institutions,
including the Ministries of Planning and Finance. The lack of cohesion in the
implementation of the reforms, and the weakness of key Government institutions
vis-a-vis the Presidency, meant that political considerations often overrode technical
recommendations and thus good reform proposals were not always given the right
time or mechanisms to have a positive impact.
Another important factor was the management and use of the country’s oil
revenues, with the State expenditures falling outside of the programmed State budget,
and with various institutions including the Central Bank, Ministry of Petroleum
and the national oil company, SONANGOL playing different and often conflicting
roles in the management of the country’s principal source of revenue (discussed
further in 2.6).
The boom of the parallel/informal sector happened in the context of successive
reforms, with the liberalisation of the economy allowing for micro and small
informal enterprises to operate in the new mixed economic framework (even if
Structure of the economy and the socio-economic policies after independence
59
Tearing Us Apart: Inequalities in Southern Africa
not fully legalised) alongside the formal and large enterprises. The informal sector
was still very much geared towards the sale of imported goods, including food and
essential items (petty trading). It is the informal sector which became the principal
“employer” of the majority of the population, particularly those with limited skills
or who were illiterate and living in urban centres such as Luanda.
In the formal sector, the rebirth of the private sector in Angola was aided by
Government measures which provided incentives for foreign private investors,
primarily through low import tax, but again most initial investors focused on
commerce and not on industry or agriculture, and mainly in the safe areas of the
country (coastal towns). The basic legal requirement was that these foreign investors
had to enter into joint ventures with Angolan partners and these measures were
supported by the programme on privatisation.
The Process of privatisation and its main beneficiaries
The move towards privatisation was the main vehicle for the transition to a mixed/
market economy and was regarded as proof of the will of the Angolan Government
to restructure its economy and fuel it with a greater efficiency and competiveness.
This had been one of the core issues in the negotiations with the International
Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Bank. It was the “Programa de Saneamento
Económico e Financeiro” (SEF) that set the foundations for privatisation. The first
steps towards privatisation took place in 1988 with the approval of the foreign
investment law, and the laws on enterprises and economic activities and later in
1994 the law on privatisation served as a boost for the entire process. The main
focus was the reduction of State companies and the weight on State resources; an
increase in efficiency, productivity and the competitiveness of all the economic
sectors; the development of the national private sector; and the boosting of
entrepreneurship. Importantly, it was also intended as a means for enabling the
participation of the Angolan citizens in the ownership of social capital within
private enterprises.
Based on legislation, the privatisation process was intended to be conducted
through procedures which respected principles of transparency, including public
and limited bidding. In specific cases, the option for direct negotiations with
specific investors was also available, all based on market principles. In reality,
little data exists on how the process was implemented in the early years of the
programme, although analysts have concluded that overall, the process lacked
sufficient transparency and the necessary rigueur. The immediate result was the
significant reduction of State managed assets, and an instant creation of a new
legitimately “entrepreneurial” Angolan middle and upper class, and the attraction
60
Inequality in Angola
Kamia Victor De Carvalho, Luciano Chianeque and Albertina Delgado
of a new international business class to the country, investing and working outside
the oil sector. Most notably of these, in the 1990s, were Lebanese businessmen
focusing on imports of essential goods, previously a function of the State. A recent
balance of the implementation of the programme between 1990 and 2000 (the
first phase of the privatisation process) came to the following conclusions:32
Proposed objectives
State Revenue Generated
Main Conclusions
US$100 million were collected through the selling
of State-owned enterprise property;
An amount that is far beyond the expected, due to the prevailing model of
direct adjustment and the fragile financial capacity of the entrepreneurs;
Investments
There were additional investments of about US$ 100 million made
by the purchasers:10% of the privatised enterprises were responsible
for 90% of additional investments with own resources; 90% of
the entrepreneurs made investments with their own resources;
60% of the purchasers did not make any kind of investment;
Private enterprises established 409 enterprises were either privatised or reappraised,
corresponding to about 1.533 production units;
Job creation and private
sector development
35,4% of formal employment and 29,5% of the amount of business
of the public sector was transferred to the private sector;
At first glance, the privatisation programme was successful as it achieved many of
the expected objectives. However, closer inspection presented issues which continue
to affect the current structure of the economy. The privatisation process served to
benefit those who were closest to the political power and served to enrich those
who were connected to economically and politically powerful groups and had
access to information and other resources, including credit from State Banks. The
study noted that within the 409 enterprises privatised, 19 920 shareholders were
32 Hodges, T, op.cit, Chapter 5.
Structure of the economy and the socio-economic policies after independence
61
Tearing Us Apart: Inequalities in Southern Africa
Angolans without capital and with a limited management capacity, signalling to
a large portion of “figure head” Angolans in joint ventures with foreign investors,
with limited capacity and who are not effective entrepreneurs.33 Also, of the 409
enterprises, “a large share” of the enterprises had obsolete equipment and broken
infrastructure (namely, in the most war- torn areas, such as Huambo and Malanje,
where the majority of the enterprises were destroyed). This fact prevented large
investments in modernization during the periods of instability in the 1990s,
effectively resulting in unproductive private enterprises/property (rather than
unproductive State enterprises!).
It is by analysing two key State assets, land and housing, that true beneficiaries
of the privatisation process are revealed. The study concludes that about 203,6
thousand hectares of coffee-producing land was privatised (81% of all) and 33
coffee enterprises were closed. Other sources confirm that these former State
enterprises were turned into 400 farms and sold to prospective commercial farmers,
and significant portions of land were also privatised in the traditional agricultural
strongholds such as Huambo, Huila and Kwanza-Sul during the 1990s and early
2000s. Due to limited research on property and land,34 and the lack of data on who
holds legal titles and where in the country, it is impossible to affirm with statistics,
but it is estimated (and supported through field visits) that large portions of land
have in fact been purchased by high ranking military personnel, politicians, and
other high ranking state officials. Importantly, as the war was being fought and
won by the MPLA armed forces, more diamond fields were recovered from the
control of UNITA. Some of these are controlled by the State Diamond Company,
and others are privately owned, and it is alleged, mainly by military officers.
In the urban centres, with particular reference to Luanda, housing and periurban land had been loosely managed by the State, and nationalisation of property,
as with many of the measures of the centralised economy, was not comprehensively
implemented. In reality, until the 1990s, no formal land allocation mechanisms
had been established for the peri-urban areas. On the other hand, in urban areas,
much of the State property had been simply occupied by citizens and a nominal
rental fee was paid to the State in those buildings and houses which had been
nationalised or were being managed by the agencies of the State. At the outset
of the privatisation programme, large portfolios of the State’s properties were
33 Anuário Angola Magazine 2004/2005, pag. 62
34Ibid.
62
Inequality in Angola
Kamia Victor De Carvalho, Luciano Chianeque and Albertina Delgado
purchased at well below the market rate, and again it is those with access to some
capital, information and political connections, who benefitted most.35
In the peri-urban areas, where land had previously passed between citizens,
mostly subsistence farmers, with little or no involvement of the local administrative
authorities, land became governed by the new land law passed in 1992, which
followed colonial legislation and sought to licence land. However, this land law
was little known and poorly applied by both the local administration and citizens.
The institutions mandated to manage land were poorly coordinated and weak, as
well as “disorganized and open to abuse”.
In the rural areas, the purchasing of large portions of valuable agricultural
land, as mentioned above, was done with little consultation with local subsistence
farmers or knowledge and respect for pastoralist communities. The revival of
commercial agricultural production by a few notable commercial farmers, in some
provinces (namely Huila and Huambo), resulted in the cordoning off of land used
by pastoral communities, giving rise to the first high-profile post-independence
land dispute, in 1999, in the region of Gambos, Huila. Some commentators have
referred to this process as a second “land grab”, reminiscent of the practice of the
Portuguese settlers decades earlier.
The full impact of the privatisation of land and housing is now being felt, years
later, because of the renewed vibrancy in the Angolan oil sector since the 1990s.
In addition, there are increasing foreign investments and expatriates arriving
in the capital, providing an important source of income for a select portion of
society who are property owners. On the other hand, rapid urbanisation which
resulted from the internal displacement during the conflict in the 1990s, led to
large informal settlements in Luanda and other towns, and left a large portion of
the urban population living in precarious conditions (discussed further in Chapter
3). A decade later, this land has proved to be very valuable, and is attracting
keen interests from individuals and investors. This has given rise to a new urban
phenomenon of forced evictions.36
Recognising the growing potential for both revenues through taxation and for
public-private enterprise (as well as a source of potential conflict if unresolved),
the Government presented a new land law in 2002, which was discussed and
debated by Civil Society Organisations, and passed in 2004. Importantly, the law
35 DW, 2005, Terra, Urban land reform in post-war Angola: research, advocacy & policy development, Luanda,
Development Workshop (NGO).
36 “As with the colonial laws and regulations, the system gave advantages to those who were able to understand the
system, knew how it operated, and knew the people who administered it.” Ibid, pp62-64
Structure of the economy and the socio-economic policies after independence
63
Tearing Us Apart: Inequalities in Southern Africa
recognises community land ownership, and provides for a flat rate of taxation based
on the number of hectares (annual rate 10% of total market value of property),
and maintains that all land is owned by the State, and the State grants concessions
for private management for a specific period of time. Land can also still be
expropriated by the State if not “fully exploited” by private individuals. With
regards to the existing informal settlements, the land law was less clear, simply
granting a three-year window for the legalisation of the informal occupation and
although de facto occupation is still recognised, the burden of proof of occupation
is higher than in previous legislation.
In short, the privatisation of land and housing benefitted the urban elites, and
as an important asset in both rural and urban contexts, for both the poor and the
rich, with often conflicting public and private interests. Trends in land management
and land ownership promise to be a key factor for economic empowerment (or
disempowerment), which will affect the country in the coming years.
The privatisation programme was revamped between 2001 and 2005, with
the new strategy focused on more transparency, including the following aims:
• Remodelling productive sectors of the economy and the increase of state
revenues,
• Promoting institutions set up to support entrepreneurship and small and
medium enterprises;
• Broadening participation of citizens with financial and entrepreneur capacity
in owning capital in private enterprises;
• Resolving problems that arose from the first phase.
Although data exists on the number of privatised enterprises,37 and the sectors
in which they will operate, it is questionable whether they will have the desired
impact such as remodelling the sectors and creating “broad participation”.
Angola’s resource dependency – the oil sector
Angola may be one the most dramatic examples of how being a resource-rich
country does not translate into prosperity for the majority of its people, even after
independence from colonial powers.
It is on the onset of independence that the oil sector became the Government’s
main source of revenue through the establishment of the national oil company
37 Forced Evictions have affected key areas of the city and most have been as a result of large- scale housing projects
and condominiums, including Boavista and Nova Vida. Violence and the excessive use of force as well as no
compensation have marked the forced evictions in Luanda. UN´s Special Rapporteur on Right Housing as well
as NGOs such as SOS Habitat have called on the halting of the practice of forced evictions.
64
Inequality in Angola
Kamia Victor De Carvalho, Luciano Chianeque and Albertina Delgado
in 1976, the “Sociedade Nacional de Combustíveis” (SONANGOL), to manage
the whole oil exploration, production, and distribution. As a result, the main oil
operator prior to independence, the Gulf Oil, was soon brought back through
the Cabinda Gulf Oil Company (CABGOC). In 1978, the Angolan government
authorised SONANGOL to acquire a 51% share of the Cabinda concessions,
although operational management remained under the control of the operators
(foreign partners). Substantial royalties were paid to the MPLA by American
companies, despite the MPLA being a political enemy of the USA at the time.
The capacity for the Angolan Government to reap benefits from the oil was shown
early on, as the oil sector was kept firmly as “business” and the nationalisation of
operators in the sector was considered not an option.
The State became the sole owner of the country’s oil resources and transformed
SONANGOL into the single and exclusive Concessionaire for Oil research
and exploration, allowing the Company to associate with foreign partners in
order to find the necessary resources for research, development and production.
Other companies soon joined the Cabinda Gulf Oil Company, such as Petrofina
and Texaco, and through the successful negotiation of contracts and ventures,
SONANGOL grew in capacity and prestige for responding to the oil companies’
needs and providing the important lifeline of revenues to support the newly
independent Angolan Government. Today, there are over 30 multinational
Companies investing in the Angolan oil sector, including Chevron, Elf, Exxon
Mobil (Esso), Texaco, BP-Amoco, Shell, Statoil and AGIP.
The oil sector became an enclave industry in relation to the rest of the economy,
as over 97% of Angola’s oil is explored offshore, and operations were not affected
by the years of civil war. The limited interaction between the oil operators, the
local communities and other economic sectors served to create two realities in the
country, one of growth in volume of exports, research, technological advances and
large investments in the oil sector, and the other of stagnation and limited or no
investment for the rest of the productive sectors.
By providing such crucial revenue, the oil sector allowed the Government to
finance the high military costs of the civil war and the large public administration
established after independence, and to become an importer of basic food staples
during the centralised economy. This dependence left the country vulnerable to
international market crashes, as was the case in 1985-86, opening the way for the
transition to the mixed economy, with all the shortcomings and negative impact
already discussed above.
Structure of the economy and the socio-economic policies after independence
65
Tearing Us Apart: Inequalities in Southern Africa
From 1995 to 2001, the oil tax revenues corresponded to 70% to 90% of
the State revenues and over 60% of the GDP. The following table highlights the
dependence/ weight of the oil sector on the Angolan economy:
The Oil weight on the Angolan economy
YEARS
1993
1994
1995
1996
1997
1998
1999
2000
2001
2002
2003
GDP
48,58
67,61
65,65
73,14
60,33
47,96
73,75
77,67
65,12
66,81
68,72
Exports
97,45
96,19
94,60
93,82
92,47
87,24
87,08
89,89
88,80
91,77
91,34
Fiscal
revenues
84,70
87,20
62,18
89,68
84,05
70,23
87,77
86,62
81,20
78,44
76,18
The dependence on the oil sector had a profound effect on the style of governance
as well as on the macro-economic management of the country. The management
of the oil revenues in Angola has been a hotly debated topic with many national
and international organisations and analysts presenting the mismanagement of
these revenues, or the corruption and cronyism attributed to the Governance style
in the country, as key factors in the underdevelopment of the country, regardless
of the effects and the impact of the civil war. The centralisation of political and
economic power in the hands of those close to the President represented an extreme
case of a powerful Presidential system, that in fact weakened other Government
and State structures. Oil dependence and a loyal state oil company provided the
necessary revenues for maintaining the centralised power structure, even after
Angola’s first democratic election.38
It is accepted that the National State budgets during the civil war had not
captured the full amount of revenue generated by the oil sector, and that extrabudgetary expenditure was common. However, the official position continues to
point to the military efforts as a justification, as per the ESCR. The true volume
38 Forced Evictions have affected key areas of the city and most have been as a result of large- scale housing projects
and condominiums, including Boavista and Nova Vida. Violence and the excessive use of force as well as no
compensation have marked the forced evictions in Luanda. UN´s Special Rapporteur on Right Housing as well
as NGOs such as SOS Habitat have called on the halting of the practice of forced evictions.
66
Inequality in Angola
Kamia Victor De Carvalho, Luciano Chianeque and Albertina Delgado
of this extra-budgetary expenditure is unknown, but this has led to repeated
accusations of corruption being levelled at the Government of Angola.39
One of the main factors why the IMF was not wiling to go beyond the “Staff
Monitored Programmes” with which it engaged the Government of Angola as
a step towards possible IMF- backed loans in the 1990s, was the lack of clarity
regarding financial and economic governance structures (Central Bank, Ministry
of Finance, even Sonangol) and their role in the revenues management and more
importantly the Government’s resistance to the economic measures proposed by the
IMF. Despite the grave macro-economic instability the Government faced in 1990s,
Angola’s oil wealth meant that the IMF, the World Bank and other international
organisations had a very limited leverage. Ultimately, the Government chose to
ignore the proposals, resulting in repeated breakdown in discussions. Today, the
IMF continues to periodically engage with the Angolan Government but little has
come of these discussions. Angola is an exception in Southern Africa with regards
to the IMF Structural Adjustments loans, in that these institutions did not play a
direct and significant role in the restructuring of the economy, even as the country
went from the transition of a centralized economy to a mixed/market economy.
In short, depending on a single product of export made the country vulnerable
to price crashes in the international market, but at the same time this type of
landlocked economy encouraged the neglect of other industries, and allowed for
a centralised style of economic governance even after initiating market-orientated
economic reforms. Angola’s transition from a one-party state system to a multiparty democracy proved in practice to be fraught with tensions, including weak
independence of the Judiciary and Parliament with regards to the Government,
and the centralised decision-making largely attributed to the President and his
office. Likewise, the transition from centralised to mixed economy continues to
be shaped by conflicting public and private interests and influenced heavily by
the oil sector and its revenues.
Being a capital-intensive industry and not labour-intensive, the oil sector
was not able to generate large numbers of formal employment, contributing
to the sense of enclave industry, essentially benefitting a few in the country.
Today, SONANGOL employs over 5,000 workers who benefit from access to
39 The privatisation process for 2001-2005 passed by Act 74/01 of October 12, covered 93 enterprises from sectors
such as: fishing (12 – Luanda, Kwanza-Sul, Benguela and Namibe), trade (2-Luanda), tourism and hotels
(3- Luanda and Huambo), public works and urbanization (20 – Luanda, Kwanza-Norte and Namibe),
agriculture (3-Uige and Luanda), transports (11), industry (34 – Luanda, Benguela, Huila), oil (1), geology
and mines (4, including 10 Endiama enterprises), energy and water (1), telecommunications (1) and finances
(1).
Structure of the economy and the socio-economic policies after independence
67
Tearing Us Apart: Inequalities in Southern Africa
the company’s housing programmes, various company health clinics, insurance
coverage, and other social benefits. The international operators have also created
packages for their employees that include secure housing, health and even leisure
facilities. All of these factors set the oil sector and its direct employees apart from
the rest of the reality of the country, and contribute to the inequalities, as explored
in Chapter 3.
The end of the war and the economic “boom”
The end of the war in Angola in 2002 signalled a break with the economic
instability of the previous decade, and in a relatively short period, Angola’s infamous
potential for growth began to manifest itself through impressively positive macroeconomic indicators. Angola’s fast growth can be seen in the following data:
KEY ECONOMIC INDICATORS
• Angola’s real GDP growth increased from 3.3% in 2003 to 23.4% in 2007
• Non-oil sector GDP also grew from 10.3 in 2003 to 22.3% in 2007
• The price of Angola’s oil went from US$ 28.2 to US$ 61.4 in 2006 and peaked at over US$
130 in 2008
• Inflation rates dropped from more than 100% prior to 2003 to less than 12% in 2007
• Non-oil sector growth was calculated at nearly 17% per year (2003-2007)
Source: IMF IV Article Staff Consultation, 2007
With over 15% of the annual output growth between 2003-2007, Angola was
soon being considered as one of the fastest growing economies in the world, with
considerable surpluses in the current and fiscal accounts as well as significant
increases in the international reserves. This has meant that Angola was now
regarded as a middle-income as well as a post-conflict country, representing a unique
opportunity for substantive economic growth for the first time since independence.
This remarkable change in macroe-conomic reality is attributed to the following
factors:
• Increase in production and price of oil, resulting in unexpected high revenues
for the Government;
• More effective macro-economic policies and better implementation of policy
measures (more rigorous monetary policy since 2002, exchange rate policies
and practice) significantly contributing to the reduction of inflation and value
of the national currency;
• Significant reduction of the external debt and the increase in foreign reserves,
made possible through oil revenues;
68
Inequality in Angola
Kamia Victor De Carvalho, Luciano Chianeque and Albertina Delgado
• Large public investments in roads and infrastructure based on credit from
China and other bilateral credit lines, allowing for better and faster access
within the country;
• Recovery of non-oil sectors, made possible due to the cessation of conflict in
the country, which benefitted particularly the agricultural sector;
• Increase in foreign investment in the non-oil sectors such as agriculture,
•
manufacturing and construction;
• Government’s focus on diversification of the economy and investment in the
non-oil sectors, allowing for the oil sectors’ revenues to have an impact on the
whole of the economy (see table below).
2003
2004
2005
2006
Total GDP
3.3
11.2
20.6
18.6
Oil GDP
2.2
13.1
26.0
13.1
Non-Oil GDP
Agriculture, Forestry
and Fishing
Diamonds
10.3
12.1
9.0
14.1
14.1
17.0
27.5
9.8
20.1
0.6
16.2
30.9
Manufacturing
12.0
13.5
24.9
44.7
Electricity and water
10.0
11.5
17.4
13.2
Construction
Trade and Commerce
12.5
9.9
14.0
10.4
16.9
8.5
30.0
38.1
Non-tradable Services
2.0
2.5
13.9
13.0
Source: IMF Article IV 2007
Angola’s swift peace time recovery has been commended by the IMF, the World
Bank, regional neighbours and international community, and the country has
become a destination for foreign investment, with a medium to long-term
perspective. In terms of effective restructuring of the economy, the opportunities
appear limitless.
Structure of the economy and the socio-economic policies after independence
69
Tearing Us Apart: Inequalities in Southern Africa
However, the reality of the uneven transition from a centralised economy to a
mixed/market economy is still being felt, and the business environment in Angola
is still described as too restrictive, with low ratings in the index for ease of doing
business (ranked 167 out of 178 countries by the World Bank). Despite the restart
of the non-oil sectors, the positive trends regarding low inflation and high fiscal
revenues are still largely due to the high oil prices, which as past experiences have
shown, still leave the economy vulnerable to international shocks.
Angola’s recent history has been described as “from afro-Stalinism to petrodiamond capitalism”,40 a phrase that captures the essence of the changes in the
economic structure with all the negative effects of poor economic management,
allegations of mismanagement of the country’s principal resource, weak governance
structures and weak economic and financial institutions. Most significantly, and
as mentioned repeatedly, the majority of Angolans did not benefit from the
country’s oil wealth for nearly 3 decades. The end of the civil war offers Angola
the opportunity to break that reality, and more importantly, to address the deep
inequalities in the country, as discussed in the next chapter.
Social Inequalities and Attempts to Confront Them
Analysing social inequality in Angola continues to be a complex task, not because
the social inequality is well-hidden, (in fact, it is quite obvious for all to see) but
because there is a lack of updated, concrete social data. This lack of updated data
is a serious constraint for social scientists, for civil society, for the Government
and State Institutions in defining programmes and policies intended to address
the root causes of social inequality and also in monitoring the progress of the
implementation of existing programmes.
It is important to note that the principal sources of data and analysis presented
in this Chapter relate to two surveys, the Multiple Indicator Cluster Survey (MICS)
conducted in 2001 and the Household Survey on Revenues and Expenditures
(IDR) of 2002 which were the last officially published “national” social surveys
conducted through the Institute of National Statistics (INE).41 All other data is
based on Government sectoral reports as well as the analyses published by national
and international organisations. As a result, recent reports or analyses on Angola
are largely based on outdated data, and all struggle with providing suitable estimates
40 Title of Tony Hodges book, op cit.
41 The IDR was conducted in 7 provinces, and it did not have crucial information from areas which were not
accessible at the time, due to continuing war.
70
Inequality in Angola
Kamia Victor De Carvalho, Luciano Chianeque and Albertina Delgado
to effectively describe the current levels of poverty and inequality, and this chapter
is no exception to this current state of affairs.
Importantly, in 2008 the INE embarked on the Inquerito de Bem Estar da
População (IBEP)42, a national household survey which combines the MICS
and the IDR, which will provide important information on the levels of poverty
across the country, as well as reply to crucial questions related to geographical
differences, gender, education and other factors of poverty and social inequality.
The IBEP was expected to be published in late 2009, and will certainly provide
a clearer picture of poverty and social inequality in Angola, seven years after the
end of the war, and more importantly, after the economic boom the country has
experienced since 2002.
The current chapter seeks to present the various forms of inequality existing
in the country today as well as the main strategies to address them, based on the
available data and research, with particular emphasis on the following:
• Income inequality and income distribution;
• Regional inequalities and the urban and rural divide;
• Racial and class inequalities;
• Inequality in access to social services;
• Vulnerable groups and gender-based inequalities.
Income inequality and income distribution
Income distribution in Angola has recently been described in two words – “strongly
skewed”43. The country’s impressive economic growth since the end of the civil
war has placed it amongst the fastest growing economies in the world, a fact
that has recently been reinforced by the political stability provided by free, fair,
and importantly conflict- free elections held in September 2008, leading many
commentators to grant Angola a new status as “the world’s richest poor country”.44
There are startling visible examples found in Luanda, the capital city of Angola,
such as the coexistence between the wealthy elite and the numerous young street
vendors selling imported goods on the main roads of the city, and the ever growing
musseques (shanty towns) in sharp contrast with the new high rising buildings
in downtown Luanda. Beyond other such images of the disparity between the
42 The IBEP is a combination of two surveys, the MICS and the Household Survey on Expenditures and Revenues
and is being carried out by the INE with support from the UNICEF and the World Bank.
43 Isaksen, J. et al, 2006, Experience and Institutional Capacity for Poverty and Income Distribution, Analysis in
Angola, CMI Report, R2006:19, p5
44 Kampfner, J, 2008, “Welcome to the world’s richest poor country”, GQ COM, 197, July 2008, 196-201
Social Inequalities and Attempts to Confront Them
71
Tearing Us Apart: Inequalities in Southern Africa
ultra rich and the very poor is the contrast between the positive macro-economic
indicators and the continuing poor social indicators.
The 2008 Human Development Report was unable to report on the GINI
Coefficient for Angola, a principle indicator of social inequality in a country, due
to the fact that no new data has been published to support its calculation; hence
the last data provides a picture of the reality just before the end of the war. In 1995
Angola’s GINI Coefficient was calculated at 0.54 but in 2000/01, the value had
grown to 0.62, giving a clear indication that the disparity between rich and poor
was certainly growing at the end of the 1990’s. More importantly, a closer inspection
of the breakdown per province showed that there had been little or no difference
in those provinces where data was available for both periods which, as highlighted
in the 2004 National Human Development Report, indicated that “public policies
for (equitable) income redistribution did not have a positive impact”.
Income distribution based on GINI Coefficient per province
Provinces
Value of GINI Coefficient:
1995
Ranking
Benguela
0.57
Cabinda
0.49
1998
Ranking
2001/01
Ranking
4
0.51
4
1
0.49
3
0.57
7
Cunene
Huambo
Huila
0.59
5
0.68
0.68
2
3
0.51
5
0.50
2
0.66
1
0.49
2
0.56
6
Kwanza-Sul
Luanda
Lunda-Norte
Moxico
72
0.52
Inequality in Angola
3
Kamia Victor De Carvalho, Luciano Chianeque and Albertina Delgado
Provinces
Value of GINI Coefficient:
1995
Ranking
1998
Ranking
Namibe
Uige
National
0.72
0.54
0.67
2001/01
Ranking
0.48
1
4
0.67
Source: 2004 National Human Development Report
Income inequality in Angola is characterised by unequal functional income
distribution, with the Government being the main recipient of the revenues of
the country’s most valuable resources and biggest exports-oil and diamonds. At
the same time, there is an unequal spatial income distribution as specific parts of
the country have continued to receive more income than others.
One of the main reasons for these manifestations of income inequality in the
country is the Angolan economy’s heavy dependence on oil and the fact that the
oil sector has not, and cannot, by itself provide the means for equitable income
distribution. Unfortunately, both the oil and mining industries are not a source of
greater income distribution as they are capital-intensive and not labour-intensive
industries. They do not create job opportunities for the general population, which
three decades after independence, is largely illiterate and with no specialised skills.
The impressive macro-economic indicators for Angola have been possible due
to the oil boom and the high oil prices which have trebled during this period,
and the doubling of oil production since 2002. More importantly, medium-term
economic estimates in 2007 pointed towards consistent growth, including the
non-oil sectors, for example, agriculture, construction, and the manufacturing
sectors where there has been impressive growth.
However, a closer analysis of this economic growth and the current policies
has led many to conclude that Angola’s GINI Coefficient indicator will not
dramatically improve over the next few years, and there is in fact a fear that the
rich will continue to get richer and the poor, poorer.45
45 See Isaksen J. et al, op cit and Kampfner. J. op cit, and in Chapter 4 an estimate of rate of poverty since the end of
the war is provided.
Social Inequalities and Attempts to Confront Them
73
Tearing Us Apart: Inequalities in Southern Africa
The reality continues to present a paradox between this fast economic growth,
and the social indicators in the country, which are only exacerbated by the lack of
updated data. The poverty indicators continue to present 68% of the population
as living below the poverty line defined as US$ 1,7 a day, with 28% of the
population considered extremely poor, earning less than US$ 0.7 a day as per the
Government’s Poverty Reduction Strategy (2003) and Angola’s Millennium Goals
Report (2005). Crucially, the 2008 Human Development Report’s overall ranking
for Angola did not show an improvement in the country’s ranking since the end
of the war, but actually Angola’s overall ranking worsened in 2008 from 160th in
2005 to 162nd in 2008 out of 177 countries. Angola still has to be considered
as a country with low human development.
Basic Social Indicators for Angola- Human Development Report 2008
Human development index value, 2005
0.446 HDI
Life expectancy at birth, annual estimates (years), 2005
Adult literacy rate (% aged 15 and older), 1995-2005
41.7 years
67.4%
Combined gross enrolment ratio for primary,
secondary and tertiary education (%), 2005
Life expectancy at birth, annual estimates (years), 2000-05
Population, total (thousands), 2004
41.7
16.095 Million
Fertility rate, total (births per woman), 2000-05
6.8 births per woman
Under-five mortality rate (per 1,000 live births), 2005
HIV prevalence (% aged 15-49), 2005
Population undernourished (% of total population), 2002/04
Population using an improved water source (%), 2004
25.6%
260 per 1,000 live births
3.7 [2.3–5.3]
35
53
Source: Human Development Report Angola 2007/08.
The official response of the Government was to discredit the Human Development
Report claiming that it was using outdated data and that the socio-economic
74
Inequality in Angola
Kamia Victor De Carvalho, Luciano Chianeque and Albertina Delgado
situation of the country had improved substantially. In reality, the Human
Development Index, which provides a composite measure of three dimensions of
human development: living a long and healthy life (measured by life expectancy),
being educated (measured by adult literacy and enrolment at the primary, secondary
and tertiary level) and having a decent standard of living (measured by purchasing
power parity (PPP) and income) did show a slight improvement for Angola, from
0.445 in 2005 to 0.446 in 2008. However, the lack of new data signalled no overall
improvement, and the drop of two places in the overall ranking was certainly a
blow to Angola’s image as a rapidly changing country, as the following charts
demonstrate. The macro-economic stability and growth, when checked against
the human development in the country, shows a negative trend, particularly in
comparison with other countries not experiencing an impressive growth but still
improving their human development indicators, and thereby improving the reality
of the poor and importantly achieving a more equitable income distribution.
Social Inequalities and Attempts to Confront Them
75
Tearing Us Apart: Inequalities in Southern Africa
Source: Isaksen et al, 2006, Experience and Institutional Capacity for Poverty and Income
Distribution, Analysis in Angola, CMI Report, 2006:19; Human Development Report 2005: 4.
Regional Inequalities
Poverty and vulnerability studies conducted before the end of the war demonstrated
that there is little change from the traditional inequality found under colonial rule,
whereby coastal towns received most of the Government development assistance
and the Central, Southern and Eastern parts of the country continued to be the
most neglected.
The civil war contributed substantially to maintaining the status quo regarding
the regional inequalities, given that at different times during the conflict almost
1/3 of the country was not under Government control. The fact that these were
mostly rural areas, which had essentially been the bread basket of the country during
colonial times, meant that those in the central highlands, the planalto central,
were both affected by unequal local development prior to independence and then
were held back by the civil war, even when these areas came under Government
control. The stagnation of the industrial sector and the failure of agricultural
policies during 1980s and 1990s, combined with internal displacement and the
war economy where profits from the oil and diamond sector were channelled to the
war, contributed to maintaining the regional disparity and inequality established
by the colonial governance systems.
The provinces most affected by the conflict such as Huambo, Bié, Kuando
Kubango, Cunene and Malange, particularly as the war intensified in the 1990’s,
and which are within the highlands of the country, continued to be affected by
high levels of food insecurity and vulnerability even after the end of the war. This
was confirmed by the World Food Programme’s Vulnerability and Analysis mapping
(2005). The vulnerability study presented the reality of the rural populations,
particularly those receiving returnees and Internally Displaced Person’s at the end
of the war. This continued to show a lack of appropriate strategies and coping
mechanisms by the Governance structures in those provinces.
However, other provinces such as Kwanza-Sul and Bengo, which are bordering
with Luanda, the capital city, have not presented better social indicators either.
Kwanza-Sul continues to have high rates of food insecurity and high levels of
malnutrition amongst children, which indicates that they are not benefitting
from being closer to the capital (see Zone 7 with 38% food aid received and 15%
household food insecurity).
76
Inequality in Angola
Kamia Victor De Carvalho, Luciano Chianeque and Albertina Delgado
Food Insecurity by zone
Planalto Zone 1 Zone 2 Zone 3 Zone 4 Zone 5 Zone 6 Zone 7
New Returnees
(<3 years)
35%
20%
48%
27%
47%
38%
35%
25%
Displaced
67.4
61.1
73.1
61
87
62.7
57.5
71.9
Female HH
36%
34%
31%
45%
34%
27%
42%
46%
Wealth Index
0
0.14
0.72
-0.26
0.03
-0.59
0.07
-0.33
Total Income
Earned (rank)
-
4
2
5
1
7
6
3
Stunting (<2 Z)
45%
50%
42%
46%
38%
36%
55%
51%
Eating <= 1 meal/day
16%
16%
24%
16%
8%
20%
6%
27%
Oxen for animal
traction
6%
3%
10%
0%
20%
2%
4%
0%
Households food
insecure
18%
23%
28%
15%
14%
17%
12%
15%
Food aid received
44%
32%
37%
41%
48%
53%
58%
38%
Source: WFP Vulnerability 2005, Zones refer to municipalities in the provinces of Huambo, Kwanza
Sul, Benguela, Bie, and Huila.
As already mentioned, despite being the biggest contributors to the national
GDP, the oil and diamond sectors do not have the capacity for large-scale local
employment at the provincial level. These industries mostly require specialised skills
and higher education, which are not readily available in most provinces due to lack
of educated and skilled persons. The fact that there are still only few facilities in
the country for skills -training for the oil sector, only contributes to this situation.
Social Inequalities and Attempts to Confront Them
77
Tearing Us Apart: Inequalities in Southern Africa
Furthermore, there is a heavy reliance on expatriate workers, and as a corrective
measure in the late 1990`s the Government declared a policy of “Angolanisation”
within the oil sector, which is to be monitored and enforced by the Ministry of
Petroleum. The Angolanisation policy makes it the responsibility of all the oil
companies operating in the country to hire Angolans, at all levels, within these
companies from the operational staff to management.46
Oil companies are expected to hire Angolans at the local and central levels,
and report the numbers to the Ministry. Although no specific quotas were set,
the policy seeks to monitor not only the number of Angolans, but their career
prospects and training opportunities within the companies. Nevertheless, it is
important to highlight that the geographic focus of these industries has mostly
been in 4-5 provinces out of 18 (Luanda, Cabinda, Benguela, Zaire, LundaNorte e Lunda-Sul). Interestingly, with the exception of Luanda and recently
Cabinda, the existence of these industries has not translated into significant local
development for those provinces where these sectors are operating. In short, the
biggest contributors to the GDP do not have a major impact on improving the
local conditions in the provinces in which they have been operating and clear
examples are the provinces of Zaire, Lunda Norte and Lunda Sul which continue
to be visibly underdeveloped. These provinces continue to have poor social services,
high unemployment, and in the case of the diamond provinces, Lunda Norte and
Lunda Sul, security issues and human rights abuses have been documented and
attributed to both the national police and the security companies of diamond
companies operating in the provinces.47
The main reasons for the continued regional inequalities can thus be largely
traced back to the colonial policies, with coastal cities having greater access to the
country’s resources and investments by the central powers, and which was never
effectively reversed by the post-independence Government. The civil war and
the isolation of the provinces in the highlands contributed to greater poverty and
vulnerability levels in those provinces. However, even some provinces which were
not affected by the civil war, and were contributing to the State´s income, did not
have effective local development plans or concrete investments and this continues
to perpetuate the regional inequalities.
46 The measure resulted in a few high profile appointments of Angolans at management level in oil companies such as
the former Angolan Ambassador to the USA, Mr. José Patrício in BP.
47 Marques. R, Lundas- The stones of death, Angola’s deadly diamonds, Human Rights Abuses in the Lunda
Provinces, 2004, Report published by Open Society.
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Kamia Victor De Carvalho, Luciano Chianeque and Albertina Delgado
Urban and rural divide
One of the most devastating impacts of the civil war was rapid urbanisation and
high levels of urban poverty created as a result of people fleeing the rural areas and
taking refuge in the urban centres of the country during the 1980s and 1990s.
Not only did the poor become poorer, due to the conflict, but a large portion
of the population went from rural poverty with its own coping mechanisms and
community support structures, to face urban poverty with key issues of basic
sanitation, overcrowding, and lack of formal employment opportunities. The
demographic data estimates the total population to be 16, 5 million (MDG
Report, 2005) with 60% of the population under 20 years old. This very young
population is largely concentrated in the capital, Luanda, which received the highest
number of people fleeing the war, and which currently houses an estimated 4-5
million inhabitants, despite being built originally for less than 1 million. More
recent reports have estimated the total population at 17 million, and the Luanda
population at 6-7 million, highlighting again the issue of working with estimates
regarding demographic data. There has been no national census conducted since
the colonial period.
As a result of being the political and economic capital of the country, a very
large informal sector has developed in Luanda, creating the main coping mechanism
for the survival of a large section of the inhabitants who had few skills and low
education. According to available data, the musseques (shanty towns) house the
majority of the urban poor, such as Cazenga, including a large section of people
living on US$ 1 (National Human Development Report, 2004). Rapid urbanisation
also impacted on a lack of access to basic services, and the informal sector created
was largely based on the sale of imported goods. Only in recent years has this
focussed more on delivery of services, as these informal businesses attempt to
become legitimate and legal micro, small and medium enterprises. Thus, Angola
presented a classic example of the dualism of the enclave economy that characterises
many African states.
The reality in the rural areas was shaped by the large displacement of people
(it estimated that in 2000/01 there were 4 million internally displaced people in
Angola) who survived through subsistence farming, and were literally left to govern
themselves as the majority of municipios and comunas had poorly functioning
governance structures.48 As presented above, in 2005 the food insecurity in the
planalto central was still affecting an average of 20% of rural households even those
48 The administrative organisation of Angola is on three levels: the provinces (18), the municipalities (173) and the
communes (618).
Social Inequalities and Attempts to Confront Them
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Tearing Us Apart: Inequalities in Southern Africa
which had received food aid and support. Besides the issues of food insecurity,
the rural poor were left with very few assets and due to the displacement, in some
cases, communities were displaced several times during the conflict. They had
little access to arable land, seeds, agricultural tools and little opportunity to have
access to markets to sell agricultural products. This was due to insecurity and
lack of infrastructure such as roads and bridges which were destroyed or damaged
during the conflict.
It is important to note that the urban and rural statistics went from 6% of
the population being urban, in the colonial period, to an estimate of 60% at
the end of the war in 2002. This shift in the urban and rural divide created
further inequalities and different dimensions of poverty specific to the urban
reality. Those specific to rural poverty will require different sets of responses. The
already discussed regional inequalities simply add to the problem, showing that
the provinces and rural populations were adversely affected by the war and lack of
functioning Government structures and policies to support their development.
Racial and class inequality
As presented in Chapter 1, Angola is largely populated by Bantu tribes with 6
major ethno-linguistic groups – the largest being Ovimbundu which constitutes
37% of the population, then the Mbundu with 25%, the Bakongo with 13%,
and 22% is made up of the Kwanyama, Ganguela and Chokwe. Also, 2% of
Angola’s population is of mixed race, mesticos, and 1% is white, from Portuguese
and other European descent. Racial and ethnic inequalities are the least discussed
and researched factors of inequality in Angola, but they undoubtedly continue
to shape the country’s socio- economic profile and do have an impact on income
distribution and regional inequalities.
The colonial policy of creating a class of assimilados as discussed in Chapter 1
established a minority of post-colonial educated and politically influential mestiços
(mixed) and white Angolans, and it is often noted that the first Government of
Angola had a number of high profile, mixed and white members of Government.
At the same time, blacks from the 6 ethno-linguistic groups who were descendents
of those who had access to education in colonial times and/or had also been civil
servants (and in some cases nurses and in rare examples, doctors, as was the case
with the country’s first President) continued to separate themselves into two main
groups, either of assimilado or indigena descent. However, this distinction was not
carried out officially, but informally, as a means for determining an individual’s or
a family’s background. This, in turn, shaped social and professional relationships.
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Kamia Victor De Carvalho, Luciano Chianeque and Albertina Delgado
Having adopted a socialist governance system, the rhetoric was that Angola
would become a classless society. However, in practice, the assimilation of
European cultural values (in the culinary, music, social practices) continued after
independence to function as a means for determining a person’s background and
therefore their status in society. Amongst blacks, the main distinction with regards
to higher social status was the assimilation of European customs as well as the level
of higher education, political influence and later, with the advent of the mixed
economy and the possibility for entrepreneurship, economic power also became an
important determinant for social status. Despite the fact that traditional languages
and practices were no longer forbidden as they had been under the colonial rule,
Portuguese continued to be the official language. Although people were free
to speak their specific ethnic languages, as noted in Chapter 1, a large number
of people, especially in the urban centres, did not pass the knowledge of ethnic
languages to the next generation, instead they focussed on the Portuguese language.
Although respecting traditional Bantu social practices also became important for
some individuals and families, it was not a central issue for Government.
The urban and rural divide serves to create even further practices of assimilation,
particularly amongst urban blacks of assimilado descent. Traditional Bantu
practices, including speaking the Bantu languages, are even less common than in
the rural or even peri-urban settings.49
Importantly, the race and class distinctions shaped all three liberation
movements, with the educated assimilados taking leadership positions within all
three of the main movements, and in particular in the MPLA where mestiços and
white Angolans have had high representation since Angola’s first post-independence
Government. It is well-known that the mestiços and white representation at both
the political and economic sectors of the country is disproportionate compared
to their percentage of the population. However, concrete figures are not readily
available, due to the stigma associated with discussing race and ethnicity, and
because of its role in the civil war, which often placed Mbundus and Ovimbundus
on opposite sides of the war.
As noted by the respected Angolan historian, Cornelio Caley, race issues and
ethnic issues are inherent in “social, economic and political relationships, but
Angolans have not been able to denounce nor face the issue, as it still constitutes
a taboo in society”.
49 Essentially, in the years post- independence and also with the rapid urbanisation after the 1992 elections, there
was a distinction based on those of the “cidade” (city) and those who had recently come to the city, and those of the
“mato” (rural/ bush), in terms of their social status. Again, this distinction is made informally and not officially.
Social Inequalities and Attempts to Confront Them
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Tearing Us Apart: Inequalities in Southern Africa
The main conclusions of his preliminary analysis on the issue point to the
continuing practice of assimilation and discrimination as designed by the colonial
powers. This is still being applied, with naming and distinguishing between the
variations of colour or mixed races ( branco puro, cabrito, mestiço, mestiço escuro
e claro, cafuso, negro escuro e claro) still playing a role in the access to education,
jobs and resources. The main problem is that the issue is often ignored and simply
presented as an issue of education.
Discrimination and inequality is hardly ever denounced, but it is often an
important social factor for those who are in the minority (mestiços and whites or
ethnic groups such as Bakongos, Chokwe, etc....) and those who are part of the
majority (blacks and ethnic groups such as Mbundus and Ovimbundus).
The MPLA movement, and later the political party based its political doctrine
on socialist principles of equality, as well as being against the importance of
ethnicity (despite traditionally having a predominantly Mbundu base of support).
However, after independence, it ignored racial and ethnic inequalities and thus
no specific policies were adopted to redress these colonial practices. As a result,
Angolan politics was still being heavily influenced by ethnic divisions in the 1990s,
as key opposition parties were established which had their support base along
predominantly ethnic lines, such as the of PRS for the Chokwe and their main
support which came from the provinces of Lunda-Norte and Lunda-Sul. The
difference in the ethnic base of support for the three movements (Mbundu for
MPLA, Ovimbundu for UNITA, Bakongo for FNLA), which later became three
political parties, continued to be a factor in politics in the1990s.
The 2008 elections and the victory by the MPLA with 81.6% of the vote appear
to signal a shift in this paradigm, and present a new power base for the MPLA
which includes a higher percentage of Ovimbundu and Bakongo support than
ever before. Angolan politics are now regarded as immune to the traditional ethnic
divisions which have plagued other elections in Africa. The Government’s end of
war messages and campaigns regarding reconstructing the Angolan society and
focussing on unifying and going beyond ethnic lines, appear to have yielded results.
However, regional, urban and rural inequalities contribute to and sustain the
differences in the realities of different ethnic groups. These must be addressed
in order to also address ethnic inequalities, and keep ethnic divisions outside of
politics in the long term.
Inequality in access to social services (especially health and education)
Before the end of the war Angola’s health and education indicators were amongst
the worst in the world, and this has been one of the main contributors to the low
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Inequality in Angola
Kamia Victor De Carvalho, Luciano Chianeque and Albertina Delgado
human development and social indicators in the country. The child mortality rate
was one of the highest in the world with 1 in 4 children dying before the age of
five, with the principal causes of death being malaria and diarrhoea. In terms of
maternal mortality, 1,500 women died per 100,000 meaning an estimated 12,000
women died due to child birth each year.
With respect to education, in 2001 an estimated 33% of the population was
illiterate based on the MICS study, however, other reports place illiteracy rates as
high as 58% (ESCR Report). Although recent figures indicate a 91,1% enrolment
in primary education, it is estimated that 80% of children are now going through
primary school. In reality, however, many children do not stay in schools as dropout rates remain high and this particularly affects young girls and young women.
It is expected that the IBEP, with its inclusion of multiple indicators based on
the MICS study will be able to provide realistic figures of the current situation.
Other studies are also being conducted on education enrolment and attendance,
and on health services.
The main reason for the poor social indicators is the lack of access to basic
social services for the majority of the population. The liberalisation of the economy
and transition to an open market allowed for the establishment of private clinics
and private education facilities in the early 1990s. This included Universities,
allowing the emerging Angolan elites and middle class to use these services, which
up until then had been provided for free and solely by the State. Until 2002 both
the health and education sector were severely underfunded by the State budget
and as a result had the following problems:
• Inadequate infrastructure and geographical coverage, particularly with regards
to the number of primary health posts and primary and secondary schools;
• Lack of equipment, including medical supplies, and with shortages of supplies,
desks and chairs in schools being common;
• Demotivated and underpaid teachers and health professionals, particularly
through the years of economic instability;
• Overall poor quality of both schooling and health services;
• Corruption, as citizens had to pay for access and use of services;
• Proliferation of private schools and clinics in the urban centres, providing
expensive services with little regulation.
Again, it is important to note that the war and displacement of the population
were presented as the key background factors, and those provinces with limited
Government assistance were also left with limited social services during most of
the conflict.
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Tearing Us Apart: Inequalities in Southern Africa
With regards to statistics in the health sector, it is estimated that less than
35% of the population have access to the national health system. Another study
indicated that of those who use the health system, 42% use the public health care
services (29% health posts and centres and 13% hospitals) and 26% use private
clinics. There was actually a drop in the use of public services at the outset of the
privatisation of the health sector, due to the offer of better services, medication
and up-to-date laboratory equipment, which the public health sector continued
to struggle with up until the end of the war. Importantly, since 1994, the public
health service has also introduced nominal charges for certain services and materials,
which may have been a contributing factor to the significant increase in corruption
in this sector during the 1990s and which still persists today. Although no data is
available regarding the levels of corruption, the Angolan Government admitted in
its ESCR report that “hidden payments were accepted by health workers unlawfully
to supplement their low wages”.
This practice of low grade corruption, where people had to pay health workers
to receive assistance but actually received the worst service, undoubtedly contributed
to less access by the poor and vulnerable. They often sought traditional or home
medicine and would seek assistance in the national health system often too late
for effective treatment. This contributed to high mortality rates for adults and
for children and often for diseases which were easily curable.
The state of the health care system is recognised as extremely poor, with malaria
being one the principal causes of death. The country has also had fluxes of cholera
epidemics, particularly in the urban centres, which attest to the grave problems
of basic sanitation faced by the majority of the population, particularly in urban
centres such as Luanda.
Another important factor is that there are currently an estimated 1,000 doctors
in the country, of which 25% are foreign doctors, mostly working in the provinces.
Luanda has the bulk of the total number of doctors, foreign and national, with
70% being based in the capital city. This statistic in itself demonstrates the clear
inequality in access to health professionals between those in the capital and those
in other provinces, particularly in the rural areas.
In education, despite high profile literacy campaigns in the late 1970s and an
early concerted effort to address the problem of a high illiteracy rate as a result of
colonial practices, the initial success of high enrolment figures was dramatically
reduced in the 1980s and 1990s due to the war, lack of infrastructure, qualified
teaching staff, and very limited funding. The primary and secondary education
system functioned erratically, in parts of the country, and tertiary education
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Inequality in Angola
Kamia Victor De Carvalho, Luciano Chianeque and Albertina Delgado
was not able to develop until the end of the war, as most of it was essentially
concentrated in Luanda.
Angola’s education indicators continue to be one of the lowest in Southern
Africa as official data confirms that in 2000, 25% of children between 5 and 18
years of age had never been to school, confirming the gap in access to schools
which has literally marked generations of school-age children. This can only be
reversed through a substantial increase in net enrolment and the construction
of schools since the end of the war. However, there is a need to combat the late
enrolment of children in schools as 34% of those children outside of the school
system are between 5-11 years of age. Importantly, even in the new data on the
increase in net enrolment, there is a marked distinction between the enrolment
in urban and rural areas (average of 60% against 40 %) and in the enrolment of
girls and boys. Again, geographical and gender inequalities prevail even within a
context of marked improvement in the net enrolment and the availability of schools.
The same phenomenon of low grade corruption became a feature of the sector
in the 1990s, as education professionals also sought to supplement their limited
incomes, and this further limited access for the poor. Many children would enrol
and start school but would not finish or would not be able to continue to the next
year without paying the teachers or the staff of the school in order to confirm
their place in the specific school. The true levels of corruption have not been
duly researched and the impact on access to education properly analyzed, but in
2007 and 2008 the Ministry of Education embarked on television campaigns
encouraging parents to denounce such practices, and more importantly clarifying
that the practice was wrong and illegal.
Having focused on access to health and education with regards to social services
and the role played by the war, it is important to highlight the role played by the
limited resources allocated to these services, which have been consistently below the
average for the Southern African region, as shown in the graphs below. They reflect
the expenditure on health and education as a percentage of the national budget.
Social Inequalities and Attempts to Confront Them
85
Tearing Us Apart: Inequalities in Southern Africa
Expenditure in Education
25
20
15
10
5
0
SADC
Angola
Zambia
Tanzania
South Africa
Zimbabwe
Botswana
Namibia
Expenditure in Health
12
10
8
6
4
2
0
SADC
86
Angola
Inequality in Angola
Botswana
Zambia
Malawii
Zimbabwe
Namibia
South Africa
Kamia Victor De Carvalho, Luciano Chianeque and Albertina Delgado
Source: Vinyals, L., 2002, O Financiamento Publico dos Sectores Sociais em Angola.
Angola’s social services have been underfunded, affected by a low number
of qualified staff, including the quality of education being affected by the low
professional capacity of teachers, low morale, and also low grade corruption. The
Government understood that in order to change the reality for the majority of
Angolans, it had to increase access to and quality of these services (see section 3.9).
Vulnerable groups at the end of the conflict
A considerable section of the population was regarded as living below the poverty
line (68%). In addition, there were those who were deemed to be extremely poor
(23%) as presented above. Specific groups considered to be vulnerable at the end
of the war in 2002 included:
• Ex- combatants and their families;
• Handicapped people (ex- soldiers, mine victims, and those affected by measles) ;
• Street children;
• IDPs and Returnees and Rural communities with food insecurity.
The end of the conflict revealed the dire situation of ex-soldiers and their families,
particularly ex-soldiers of the UNITA, many of whom were malnourished and
living in extreme poverty. Resettlement camps were set up, and the process of
demobilisation and reintegration was conducted with financial support from the
World Bank and the European Union, in order to avoid social instability at the
end of the conflict, with Government setting up a specific programme within
the Ministry of Social Assistance and Reintegration. This process was conducted
with more than US$ 100 million for a little over 100,000 soldiers. Some of the
ex-soldiers were integrated into the new Army, the Forças Armadas Angolanas
(Angolan Armed Forces), which now includes soldiers from both UNITA and
the MPLA’s military wing.
Given the importance of reintegration of the ex-combatants for consolidating
the peace process, the Government also embarked on a rural development project
named Aldeia Nova (New Village) which sought to replicate the colonial rural
development experiment which “created” rural villages in areas of agricultural
potential. This project in the area of Waku Kungo, Kwanza Sul, targeted the excombatants specifically, and placed them in a new role of farmers.
The project has received considerable media attention and is often hailed as a
success of the reintegration process, with the production of maize and milk products,
and for linking the producers to the commercial banks as well as creating jobs
for a previously vulnerable community. However, critics question the success of
Social Inequalities and Attempts to Confront Them
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Tearing Us Apart: Inequalities in Southern Africa
the approach taken in replicating colonial practices proven not to be sustainable,
and which require considerable funding to run (US$ 37,000 per family). There
is also a lack of clarity on issues such as land ownership, and the restrictions on
the types of farming which can be undertaken by these communities, as this is
determined by the project. Despite strong criticism of the project, it continues to
be implemented, and there are plans to replicate the model in other provinces.50
In reality, there is little public data on the subsequent reintegration of many
of these families into civilian life. However, in some parts of the country, they are
still receiving support from the Ministry of Social Reintegration, and therefore
would still be considered vulnerable groups.
A visible sign of the scars of the war on people’s lives is the considerable number
of handicapped men, women and children - victims of the mines, and the conflict.
Many of the men are former soldiers who, due to the loss of limb, are no longer
able to be soldiers or hold a job. Hence, they are unable to support their families
and often fall within the bracket of extreme poverty. At the same time, due to the
lack of functioning health systems, a large number of handicapped people can be
attributed to poor vaccination programmes against measles and other childhood
diseases. These vulnerable groups are often part of larger statistics and there is
little disaggregated data to fully understand the extent of the vulnerability, and
the level of inequality in access to resources, employment or social services faced
by those who are considered handicapped.
The rapid urbanisation during the 1990s also saw a new phenomenon emerge,
that of street children. Before the end of the war, the numbers were estimated at
10,000 nationwide and 4,000 in the capital city (1995), and it is clear that a new
vulnerable group had emerged which faced the reality of severe poverty and lack
of personal security. The principal problems faced by street children are access to
health and education and the lack of integration into society which often leads
to abuse of drugs and alcohol, as well as crime and prostitution. Again, concrete
data on the current situation is lacking, as well as an analysis of whether the end
of the conflict has effectively reduced these numbers due to the re-integration of
children into society or for other reasons.
Lastly, as discussed above, displacement of the population meant that many
IDPs were also highly vulnerable, but in 2005/6, the official closure of the IDPs
camps and returnees’ camps signalled an end to this phase. The often mentioned
“spontaneous return” of IDPs to their areas of origin is hailed as a success of the
50 CEAST, 2007, Justiça Social – III Semana Social Nacional, Centro Cultural Mosaiko, Fernando Pacheco,
Modelos de Desenvolvimento: o caso Waku Kungo p139-169.
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Inequality in Angola
Kamia Victor De Carvalho, Luciano Chianeque and Albertina Delgado
peace process. However, it is clear that these individuals and communities remain
vulnerable to food insecurity as the WFP Vulnerability Study clearly demonstrated
in 2005 and will still need to have support for full integration into society with
access to social services being an important barometer for improving their lives.
Despite these vulnerable groups disappearing to a certain extent from both
national and international front page news, the fact remains that Angola’s
social security mechanisms are still poorly coordinated and underfunded. Two
Ministries have key mandates to support vulnerable groups: the Ministry of
Social Reintegration and Social Assistance (MINARS), and the Ministry of Public
Administration, Employment and Social Security (MAPESS), and other specific
programmes related to rural development. Ministries such as the Ministry for
Former Combatants have an important role to play in offering assistance to those,
who amongst a large poor population are considered particularly vulnerable.
Gender inequalities
The civil war came to aggravate not only the regional but also the gender
inequalities, and increased the vulnerability of women across the country both
in urban and rural areas. Illiteracy rates continue to present disparities between
men and women, with best estimates pointing to 53.4% of women being literate
compared to 82.1% of men, and recognising this as the colonial inheritance
which was not sufficiently addressed by the early years of the State’s illiteracy
programmes. During the civil war many women became more disenfranchised
and disempowered.
Some gender issues directly arising from the conflict are the effects of internal
displacement and the rise in female-headed households (31% of total households,
with 29% in urban areas and 33% in rural areas) often due to the death or
disappearance of a partner, which left women vulnerable to abuse and also more
likely to fall below the poverty lines. An example of this was the rise in prostitution
in the urban centres in the country attesting to the increase in vulnerability created
by urban poverty and also financial instability experienced during the 1990s.
Beyond the issues attributable to the civil war, remain the social, cultural and
political issues which contribute to gender disparity in the country:
• Access to Education - enrolment for girls is still comparatively lower and dropout rates higher and this continues to be a reality within the education sector.
This seriously affects the opportunities for young women to enter formal
employment and increases women’s dependence on men.5153
51 no reference
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Tearing Us Apart: Inequalities in Southern Africa
• Land and property rights - Despite the increase in female-headed households,
cultural practices in some parts of the country do not give women inheritance
rights of property. This is still being practised and has been transferred from
the rural to the urban settings due to displacement and rapid urbanisation.
There is also little attention to gender in discussions of land and urban planning.
• Polygamy and/or Concurrent Partners -The practice is no longer limited to
rural areas and is no longer simply attributable to cultural beliefs. As the war
led to the death of many men, it is estimated that this has contributed to a
more accentuated imbalance between numbers of men and women, allowing
for the “de facto” practice of polygamy in both urban and rural areas, without
legal recognition and protection for many women. In response to this reality,
children from a second concurrent relationship are protected by the Family
Code, but not women in concurrent relationships/partnerships. So they have
no inheritance rights.
• Access to markets and the informal sector - The war and the transition to a
mixed economy led to the establishment of a large informal sector, which
effectively employed mostly women, particularly those involved in micro
and small commercial ventures (which in turn supported the family). Within
these activities, women are still dependent on men for bargaining, and on the
authorities to grant them the space to realize their economic activities while
women’s needs are often ignored.
• Domestic Violence - An issue which has previously been ignored by both the
State and society has become a national concern due to the high levels of domestic
violence against women and children. Studies point to the changing gender roles
in society, with the women’s increasing economic independence, but also due to
the effects and trauma of war.
The institutional mandate for addressing gender inequalities lies primarily with the
Ministry of Women and Family Affairs, and the focus since the end of the war has
been on the rise of domestic violence, with a number of high profile campaigns
being undertaken. Public debates occurred regarding the proposal for a Law on
Domestic Violence (not yet approved) and the drafting of a National Plan on
Gender, which aims to mainstream gender issues in governance. Although these
measures are important milestones for gender equality and provide an institutional
and legal basis for addressing inequalities, there is still a vacuum in addressing key
issues such as women’s access to secondary and tertiary education, discrimination
in the workplace, women’s access to land, guaranteeing of inheritance, and women’s
dependence on the informal sector, to name but a few.
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Inequality in Angola
Kamia Victor De Carvalho, Luciano Chianeque and Albertina Delgado
In 1998, women represented 22% of the formal sector employees, and 63.5%
of the informal sector. Although it has been noted that women have gained
economic independence and in effect have sustained families through petty
trading, the barriers faced by particularly poor women continue to be largely
ignored. Having established fiscal policing units, women street sellers (as well as
male street vendors) are targeted and often harassed in order to stop them from
selling in the streets. The proposal to move one of the biggest markets in Africa,
Roque Santeiro, which employs an estimated 5,000 vendors, to an area which
is 30 kilometres away from the present site of the market is another example of
measures which impact on poor women and which have enjoyed little attention
from the authorities.
In politics, despite the participation of women in the liberation struggle
and the specific women’s groups such as OMA and LIMA, women’s political
participation and representation has been largely unimpressive in the last 3
decades. After the 1992 election, the National Assembly had 9.5% women
representatives, and although there were a few women Ministers during this period
in Government (including as Ministers of Planning and Petroleum) in general,
women’s participation in other Government structures such as local government
and local administration was extremely limited. Having established a 30% quota
for women as one of the campaign pillars and in accordance with the SADC
targets, the MPLA Government proceeded to nominate 10 women in Cabinet
posts and to have 37.3% representation in the National Assembly. Women were
also nominated as provincial governors and local administrators. This significant
scaling up of women’s participation in public and high-profile political posts is
an important step to strengthening and empowering women, but should not be
simply regarded as a success in itself. It should encourage further participation from
women from various social backgrounds, in order to effectively address inequalities.
HIV/AIDS and women is also another area of inequality as the rate of infection
in women is greater than in men, with a formerly estimated average male to
female ratio of 0.8: 1 of infections. However, the new statistics indicate the rate
of infections being as much as 0.2:1 male to female in the 20-29 age bracket.
The picture is extremely worrying, when 76.6% of new cases are attributed to
heterosexual sex, and it is suspected the majority are attributable to concurrent
heterosexual relationships. Despite the overall HIV/AIDS rate being estimated
as between 2,2% (Ministry of Health) and 5,0 (Ministry of Planning), women’s
vulnerability to the disease has been inadequately addressed in terms of measures
for prevention. Knowing the number of female-headed households, the percentage
of women economically activate in the informal sector, and the number of women
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being infected, should be a cause for concern and should be addressed as a top
priority in the National Plan to Combat HIV/AIDS.
Source: UNGASS Report 2000, Angola
Measures to address social inequalities
As already highlighted, at the end of the civil war in 2002, Angola faced a series of
challenges both in the economic and social spheres. Having spent large portions
of its oil revenues in financing a civil war and other undefined extra-budgetary
activities, which actually contributed to the impoverishment and displacement
of its population, and recognizing the magnitude of both financial and human
resources that it would require to rebuild the country, the Angolan Government
engaged the international community in the hope that an International Donor
Conference would be held. Like Iraq, Angola hoped to receive large amounts of
Overseas Development Assistance for its rebuilding efforts.
However, the conference never took place, and the international community’s
calls for Angola to have IMF- backed loan agreements, Poverty Reduction Strategy
Papers approved by the World Bank, and greater transparency in the expenditure
of oil revenues, fell on deaf ears and did not materialise. Much like the end of
the war was settled by Angolans, with little outside interference, the efforts for
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rebuilding and addressing social inequalities has also squarely fallen, as the main
responsibility, on the Angolan Government, with limited donor funding. This
had both positive and negative implications. Below, a snapshot of key measures
to address inequality at both the macro and micro levels is explored, highlighting
the main stakeholders involved, and the constant tension between positive and
negative implications of measures adopted.
Poverty Reduction Strategy and other Macro Economic Strategies
In 2003, the Government of Angola approved the Estrategia de Combate a
Pobreza (ECP) with the aim of addressing poverty and receiving support from
the World Bank and donors for the reconstruction of the country. The strategy
signalled the intent of the Government to urgently build on the peace dividend.
However, the Strategy did not receive the backing of the World Bank, and was
never incorporated into the Bank’s support for Poverty Reduction Strategies as it
failed to meet the requirements for such funding. At the same time, the strategy
had limited participation from Civil Society and donors, at a time when these
stakeholders were demanding more involvement in the strategic plans and in
defining the steps for addressing poverty and social inequalities.
The document entitled “Strategy to Combat Poverty: Social reinsertion,
Rehabilitation, Reconstruction and economic stabilisation” had 10 main goals:
social reinsertion, demining, food security and rural development, hiv/aids,
education, health, basic infra-structure, employment and professional training,
governance (justice, public administration, decentralisation, planning and public
finance management) and lastly macro-economic management. It set the stage
for Government’s vision of poverty reduction, which in practice prioritised the
rebuilding of infrastructure and roads as the principle means to address inequalities,
particularly regional inequalities in the country and to permit the resurgence of
agriculture, commerce and industry.
The rebuilding of Angola’s main roads and infrastructure was greatly associated
with confirming peace in the country as it was finally possible, given that there was
no immediate threat of the resurgence of war. With the increasing mobility of the
population, there was a possibility of ending the regional divide and possibly even
the urban and rural divide. By the same token, the official end of displacement
and refugee camps was another measure to propel and encourage those who
had fled their areas of origin to return and help in the rebuilding of the regions
devastated by the war. However, the ECP was never fully monitored and unlike
in Mozambique and other countries which had followed similar strategies, it did
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Tearing Us Apart: Inequalities in Southern Africa
not lead to better dialogue between Government and Civil Society and its level of
implementation has not been monitored or evaluated in a participatory manner.
Crucially, without the financial backing of European and USA donors and
without the big loans from the international financial institutions, the Government
of Angola looked East and revived an old partnership by negotiating a US$ 2 billion
credit line with the Government of China. This credit line has now been increased
to more than US$ 4 billion, and has resulted in the emigration of Chinese labour
and Chinese companies to the country who have been granted a series of economic
rights, including tax incentives for importing products and also when bidding for
privileges for large-scale public works, to name a few. Described by President Dos
Santos as “mutually advantageous” and with “no political pre-conditionalities”, the
credit line provided the much-needed political and financial boost which fuelled
the Government’s reconstruction efforts.52
Along with the ECP, the Government has drafted a 25 year vision, entitled
Angola 2025, but this strategy has remained unpublished and cannot be officially
referred to by the Government and its partners, although it is known that the
strategy exists. This strategy was drafted with little (or no) public and partner
participation, but is nevertheless expected to influence Government’s planning
and actions over the next few years.
Between 2007-2008, having completed the PRSP cycle, the Government
prepared a Medium-Term Plan for 2009-2013. This plan was elaborated with the
participation of the sectoral and provincial Government authorities, but again there
was no civil society or international partner consultation and sharing of the macrostrategy. The plan which has not yet been endorsed by the Council of Ministers
is expected to continue along the same lines of intervention, with more focus on
the support for the productive sectors (agriculture and industry in particular).
Interestingly, the MPLA Government’s Programme 2009-2012, presented after
the electoral campaign, highlights the following, as the Government’s priorities:
• Peace, justice, democracy, social stability, unity and national cohesion and
internal security;
• Elimination of hunger and extreme poverty, employment, economic growth
and equitable distribution of the national income;
• Sustainable long-term development. Human development and good health to
all angolans and harmonious development of the territory;
• Good and transparent governance;
52 Campos. I and Vines. A, Angola and China a Pragmatic Partnership, Working Paper presented a CSIS
Conference, “Prospects for improving US-China- Africa Cooperation” December 5th 2007.
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Kamia Victor De Carvalho, Luciano Chianeque and Albertina Delgado
• Angola, a country with a future respected by its neighbours and partners and the
international community with its participation in the growing global economy.
These Government priorities are built on the ECP and are expected to be mirrored
in the medium-term plan, with more specificity and clearer targets. These macrostrategies provide an idea of the Governments’ priorities in addressing inequalities
in the post-conflict scenario, and on the whole towards a conscious and focused
effort to address poverty and the rebuilding of the social sectors. In short, they
say all the “right things”. However, these documents are still being drafted with
limited consultation outside of government structures, and with little indication
of targets and monitoring mechanisms and of budgeting for each of the expected
results. This does not allow for larger ownership or accountability.
In support of the macro-strategies, a number of sectoral plans and programmes
have been approved in the last few years including the Education For All policy, and
the programme for the revitalisation of health centres targeting mother and child
healthcare. There is a national plan to combat HIV/AIDS, a national programme
to fight malaria, water for all (basic sanitation programme), a national vocational
and professional training programme, and a rural development programme,
spearheaded by the newly established Secretariat of State for Rural Development.
A National Policy and National Commission for Urban Planning has also been
established, amongst many other measures, by the Government, which all seek
to directly or indirectly address inequality.
Despite the fact that it is still difficult to map out concretely the key results
and evaluate the rate of implementation of Government strategies, a few public
documents such as the ESCR report and the Government’s report on Balance of
Execution of the 2005-2006 Programme provide key information. A brief analysis
identifies the following trends:
• Increase in allocation of funds to social sectors through the Programa de
Investimentos Publicos (PIP), the programme for public investments (44%
of PIP in 2005, 28.3% of PIP in 2006);
• Uneven job creation across sectors, with the construction and the agriculture
sectors providing the bulk of new employment opportunities. Fisheries and
industry and other sectors have produced only a limited increase in employment
opportunities. The estimated rate of unemployment is 25.2% in both the
ESCR and Balance of Execution reports. However, this figure is contested
and regarded as too low;
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• Increase in the number of both primary, secondary and tertiary education
facilities, and levels of enrolment across the education sector, in both private
and public facilities, with considerable investments made in private tertiary
education facilities;
• Investments in health are still largely targeted at provincial and municipal
hospitals, with less investment in the local health posts (4 regional hospitals,
13 municipal hospitals, and 9 health posts in 2006);
• The decentralisation process is regarded as an important exercise for all sectors,
with focus on the building of capacity of the local and municipal administration
for planning and budgeting, and increasing transparency in the management
of public funds.
The three principal constraints faced by the programmes are:
• Limited number of qualified personnel, particularly in the provinces persists;
• Limited access to financial capital in agriculture, industry, tourism, transport,
and fisheries;
• Poor infrastructure (roads, bridges) and limited (or no) energy and water supply
still affecting the restart of key sectors of the economy.
From these reports, it is clear that there has been some important rebuilding of
infrastructure, diversification of the non-oil sectors, and that there is an increase
in the number and availability of social services such as health posts and schools,
thereby facilitating greater access to these services by the general population.
However, the true impact of these measures on the quality of life of 68% of the
population considered poor and the current social indicators of the country will
only be effectively answered through the results of the IBEP and other national
studies on social conditions. Nevertheless, it is clear from the ESCR report and
even in the MPLA’s Programme for 2009-2012 that Government realises that
there is much more to be done.
National Budget – Increase in Social Sectors
Funding and Expenditure
The overall expenditure from the National Budget on social sectors increased
from 16.1% in 2002 to 28.0% in 2008, and peaked at 35,6% in 2007. The
consistent increase in the allocation and expenditure to the social sectors has been
a welcome measure that has served as a catalyst to many of the Government’s social
programmes mentioned above, as well as the investments in the economically
productive sectors, with particular attention to the agriculture sector.
However, the capacity for effective implementation is still a considerable challenge,
given the still limited capacity at the local and central levels for planning and
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Kamia Victor De Carvalho, Luciano Chianeque and Albertina Delgado
budgeting as well as the bias on spending on infrastructure rather than on
personnel and improving the quality of services. The increase in social sector
spending still needs to translate into an improved quality of services, particularly
in health and education. There is also a need for greater transparency regarding
the use of public funds.
Percentage of Expenditure per Function
2002
2003
2004
2005
2006
2007
2008
Social
16,1
12,7
17,6
28,8
28,9
35,6
28,0
Economic
7,4
8,9
7,2
9,0
15,2
21,7
28,5
Defence and Security
15,3
13,8
22,8
23,3
19,3
17,8
18,2
General Public Service 34,1
47,9
20,8
22,9
14,7
14,6
14,4
Finance
27,1
16,8
31,6
16,0
21,9
10,3
10,9
Total
100,00
100,00
100,00
100,00
100,00
100,00
100,0
Source: CEIC Annual Economic Report 2008
Providing a better understanding of the national budget and its execution is also
an important exercise which needs to be undertaken, both at the level of members
of the National Assembly (which approves the Government’s budget) as well as the
citizens. Previous studies have indicated lack of knowledge of the budget process,
which continues to be conducted largely through closed doors, and with little or no
debate with regards to Government’s priorities and allocation. Given the continuing
dependence on the oil and diamond sector, and the vulnerability to international
shocks, the risk of reversal of the recent positive trends, with regards to spending
in social sectors, is still high, and is an issue which needs greater transparency and
greater participation by citizens and civil society in general.
CSOs, Social Funds and the Relevance of
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Tearing Us Apart: Inequalities in Southern Africa
Development Stakeholders
The role of civil society organisations, and particularly national and international
NGOs has been important not so much in terms of the impact of projects
which seek to address social inequalities but more in the promotion of citizens’
participation in development, presenting different models of poverty reduction
and providing a greater understanding of dimensions of poverty in the country.
Often described as weak, Angolan civil society organisations exist only at the
outset of change from one party system to multi-party democracy. They were
the primary partners during the 1990s for the distribution of emergency aid and
support to displaced and other vulnerable populations. There are an estimated
300 NGOs registered in Angola, and a significant number of these NGOs does
not have functioning offices or functioning programmes. Since the end of the
war, limited donor support has meant many exist only on paper. At the same
time, much like the difficulties in assessing the full impact of Government efforts
to address inequalities, the poor coordination and limited data and information
on evaluation of programmes means that it is also difficult to assess the impact
of activities on addressing inequalities by CSOs. However, a few key aspects can
be highlighted:
Main intervention
Micro-credit and micro-finance initiatives
Key activities
The first micro-finance initiatives in the country where developed by the NGO, Development
Workshop (DW), which recognised such initiatives as key to supporting the poor, particularly
women, who survived through the informal market and petty trading. The NGO piloted projects
which focused on providing micro-credit and savings mechanisms to poor communities and
proved with time that such initiatives were an important mechanism for combating poverty.
The projects benefitted thousands and led to the establishment of the first Micro-Finance
Institution in Angola, Kixi Credito which in 2007 alone reached 15,000 micro-entrepreneurs
and loaned US$12 million. The NGO can also be credited with advocacy on micro-finance,
which today has received the institutional support it deserves, with commercial banks such
as Banco Sol and NovoBanco offering micro-finance services targeting the poor. Having also
become a principal “cause” of the MINFAMU, a national policy and strategy are currently
being drafted with the aim of establishing access to financial services to the poor/ microentrepreneurs.
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Kamia Victor De Carvalho, Luciano Chianeque and Albertina Delgado
Main intervention
Promotion of rural development and advocacy on the land law
Key activities
A number of NGOs have focused on rural populations, aiding particularly vulnerable
communities on food security and rural development, as well as on the promotion of civic
education. Prominent in this regard were organisations such as ADRA, OIKOS, and CLUSA,
to name a few. These organizations permitted a greater understanding of the “on the
ground” reality of the rural population since the 1990s and piloted projects including microcredit in the rural areas. Importantly, the draft land law presented in 2002 allowed for the
establishment of networks to be formed on land rights, through Rede Terra, which facilitated a
national consultation process and made contributions to Parliament. The fact that community
land and the de facto occupation are recognised as rights in the law can largely be attributed
to efforts by this NGO network.
Main intervention
Promotion and protection of human rights and economic justice
Key activities
National and international human rights organizations have been instrumental in highlighting
the existing inequalities in the country, with some national organizations being in the
frontline of exposing human rights violations. The following 3 NGOs were particularly visible:
• Mâos Livres, a human rights/ legal assistance organisation focused on the bringing to
court of violations of civil and economic rights including worker’s rights and spotlighting
forced evictions. It has been instrumental in providing legal assistance to poor citizens in
more than 7 provinces.
• AJPD – much like Mãos Livres – is an NGO mostly run by lawyers and has focused its
main work on advocacy and legal assistance regarding illegal detentions, conditions and
abuses in prisons. It has also advocated on the human rights of HIV positive people and
on the revision of the constitution in order to raise awareness of the implications of the
presidential system.
• SOS Habitat- The smallest and most polemic of the human rights organisations. This NGO
has been working exclusively on the issue of forced evictions, principally in the province
of Luanda, with specific communities displaced due to large-scale housing and industrial
projects. Due to its often combative advocacy, the NGO has garnered high visibility both
in the media and within CSOs.
• Economic justice has been the principal focus of advocacy from church organisations,
which have argued that peace in Angola has to go beyond the silencing of guns, and
needs to translate into social peace and economic justice. The main actors in economic
Social Inequalities and Attempts to Confront Them
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Tearing Us Apart: Inequalities in Southern Africa
justice include Alianca Evangelica de Angola, AEA, Conferencia Eclesial de Angola e Sao
Tome (CEAST) and Conselho de Ingrejas Cristâs em Angola (CICA).
Main intervention
Promotion of better education and health
Key activities
A few international and national organisations exist in the country in the education and
health sector, with most acting principally as service providers in the area of teacher training,
implementation of health programmes in malaria, tuberculosis and HIV/AIDS, and being
partners of the Government at both the central and local levels. With regards to advocacy
in health, it is HIV/AIDS which has gained the most focus, with the national network ANASO
and a number of NGOs working on HIV/AIDS awareness and prevention campaigns as well as
on education. In the past, another NGO network, Ensino Gratuito Já! (Free Education Now!)
has highlighted the right to free education and the need to guarantee access to all children.
Importantly, it is in the education sector that Angola’s most visible and active independent
trade union is found, the Trade Union of Teachers, Sincato dos Professores (SINPROF) which
has advocated for free and better quality education and better teacher’s salaries, including
through strikes and negotiations with Government. SINPROF is regarded as an exception
within trade unions, as it has been independent from Government and advocating for its
professional class, which has traditionally been directly attached to the MPLA Government, for
example, through UNTA (National Union for Workers of Angola) and UNACA (Union of Farmers
of Angola).
Main intervention
Social Funds and Corporate Social Responsibility
Key activities
Angola has one public foreign fund following the World Bank model, Fundo de Apoio Social
(FAS), and several private domestic and private foreign social funds financed in particular by
the oil companies based on their corporate social responsibility commitments and payment
of social bonuses.
The private domestic social funds correspond to the social funds within both SONANGOL
and ENDIAMA which have supported a few social projects. The Eduardo Dos Santos Foundation
(FESA) and the Social Solidarity Fund- Lwini are charitable funds of President Dos Santos and
of his First Lady respectively. FESA has been engaged in the building of infrastructure, schools,
houses, providing food aid, and promoting conferences on specific development themes, and
Lwini has focused its activities on victims of landmines by handing out wheelchairs and microcredit projects and fundraising through an annual gala. Although these domestic social funds
have been active and at times highly visible, there is little information on the key results of
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Kamia Victor De Carvalho, Luciano Chianeque and Albertina Delgado
programmes undertaken, on the levels of funding received and from which partners.
Oil companies have traditionally channelled funds to these domestic social funds, but a
few companies have also established their own “development support” units which have funds
to support NGOs, charities and UN agencies. They have sought to respond to international
calls for greater corporate social responsibility by focusing on supporting local social projects
in previously neglected provinces in Cabinda and Zaire, in areas of health and education
infrastructure as well as private sector development and support to micro-entrepreneurs.
Information on amounts invested and success of programmes is difficult to obtain. Thus their
impact is difficult to determine.
FAS, the only public foreign fund in the country, has been the exception and scores
“quite high on transparency, accountability and sustainability”53. Established in 1994, the
programme has received considerable funding from the Angolan Government, the World
Bank and the European Union (US$ 88 million for 2004-2008), and now covers all 18
provinces, focusing on basic infrastructure in education, health and water and sanitation and
the environment. In the period of 2004-2008, the programme had an estimated 6,625,742
beneficiaries across the country.5456 FAS has also been a visible programme, not only through
the establishment of schools and health facilities across the country with their logo, but more
importantly in developing a community demand-driven programme which focuses on the
identification of needs by the community and their involvement in the FAS intervention. The
production of materials on community participation and vulnerability analysis has also been
an important contribution.
Main intervention
UN and overall relevance of development aid and stakeholders
Key activities
The United Nations had been the traditional partner of both Government and donors
during the humanitarian phase of the war, particularly agencies such as the World Food
Programme (WFP) which provided assistance to vulnerable populations during the conflict.
In a post-conflict scenario, UN agencies have focused on development through supporting
Government programmes such as Reform to Justice and Decentralization (UNDP),
revitalisation of health structures and vaccination programmes as well as public health
policies (UNICEF and WHO), food security and land policies (FAO) to name a few strategic
areas of intervention. However, the UN’s relevance in the country in a post-conflict scenario
53 Wiig, A. and Ramalho. M., Corporate social responsibility in the Angolan oil industry, CMI Working Paper, WP
2005:8
54 Ducados. H, Angola: Progresso da Democracia- progresso de desenvolvimento, Apresentação a Conferencia no
Centre Culturel Angolais, Maiso de l’Angola, Junho 2008
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Tearing Us Apart: Inequalities in Southern Africa
is often questioned given the limited importance given to its work by central structures and
its limited engagement with Angolan CSOs actors, essentially focusing on providing sectoral
support to a few key ministries with varying degrees of leverage even within these structures.
The principal issue with the relevance of the UN and more broadly with the overseas
development partners in Angola is the lack of financial clout to address the series of
development issues facing the country. Given Angola’s economic boom, it is no longer
considered a “poor country” or “least developed country”. Therefore, the total overseas
development aid is minimal, estimated at between 1-3% of the total of the National Budgets
since the end of the war. The fact that there was no donor conference for Angola, and that
overseas development agencies such as SIDA and DFID have closed their offices in the country,
has contributed to the questions of relevance and possible contribution. The UN argues that its
role is not one of financial but of technical assistance to the Government to help achieve the
MDGs as well as other international obligations on human rights, gender, and environment
protection. However, how far these efforts go towards addressing inequalities in the country
and how much can be attributed to efforts by UN and overseas development assistance,
remains a difficult question to answer.
Overall, the interventions by some CSOs, FAS, and other development stakeholders
has been important in demonstrating ways to address poverty and inequalities, and more
importantly in pushing for a more democratic space and more respect for human rights, which
will be crucial for effectively addressing inequalities in the post-conflict scenario.55
Alternative Policy Options
Model to redress inequalities: Could Angola become a Developmental
State or will it continue to be a “Failed, but successful State”?
There is no denying that the effects of 27 years of civil war have contributed to
the immense inequality in the country. There is also no denying that Angola’s
resource dependency on oil and diamonds has made it a perfect example of “Dutch
disease” and that its economy is firmly dependent on the price of its principal
commodities in international markets. Thus, Angola is influenced by geo-politics
and the global politics of who controls the existing hydro-carbon energy in the
world. For these reasons, the focus and interest in Angola and its post-conflict
and economic boom phase is intense, with very different analyses and opinions
55 For more detailed information on the CSOs in Angola see the following three papers: Amundsen, I. and Abreu,
C., 2006, Civil Society in Angola:Inroads, Space and Accountability, CMI REPORT and Govender, s. and
Skagestad, B., 2009, Civil Society and Oil for Development in Angola Ways to enhance Strategic Cooperation
among Non-state Actors, IDASA as well Wiig, A. and Ramalho. M., Corporate social responsibility in the
Angolan oil industry, CMI Working Paper, WP 2005:8
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Kamia Victor De Carvalho, Luciano Chianeque and Albertina Delgado
on the significance of current strategies and the actual situation on the ground.
Having presented an analysis of the historical and current inequalities in
the country, and the attempts to address them by various actors in Angola, it is
necessary to understand what type of development Angola is really engaged in and
what the possible future scenarios are with regards to inequalities in the country.
As mentioned repeatedly, the lack of updated data has kept the reality of poverty
and human development in the country a few years out of step. However, it is
also understood that to effectively change the dire statistics regarding child and
maternal mortality, poverty and extreme poverty in the country, would require a
series of intense, coordinated and well-implemented strategies backed not only by
financial but importantly by human resources in a medium to long-term perspective.
Recent estimates regarding poverty indicators in the country paint two scenarios:
Best Estimate
Worst Estimate
Years
Estimate Rate of Poverty
Years
Estimate Rate of Poverty
2003
67,7%
2003
N/A
2004
66,0%
2004
N/A
2005
62.6%
2005
68,7%
2006
59,7%
2006
69,0%
2007
56,5%
2007
69,3%
2008
54,7%
2008
69,5%
Source: CEIC – Annual Economic Report 2008 (p 43-44)
Given the Government’s target of reducing poverty by 50% as per its commitment
to the MDGs, these estimates show that there is still considerable ground to be
covered and that it is highly unlikely that Angola will meet this target by 2015.
However, the key questions are not only whether poverty is being reduced and
by how much, but on whether the economic model in the country is addressing
poverty reduction and inequality in a sustainable manner. Are the peace dividend
and the oil boom revenues being put to effective use?
Alternative Policy Options
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Tearing Us Apart: Inequalities in Southern Africa
Recently published analyses point to diverging opinions of whether Angola
could be on its way to becoming the next Nigeria, a country which has essentially
squandered its oil wealth, or the next Malaysia, a country which used its oil wealth
to become a “world class economy”.56
Paul Collier, described as a “cautious development economist”57, has addressed
the opportunities available to Angola and provided a five-point strategy which
could place Angola en route to becoming the next Malaysia:
1. Get macro-economic basis rights (fiscal surplus for 3 years, low inflation,
medium-term smoothing rule, evaluation and procurement for infrastructure);
2. Massively increase the size and accountability of social spending (including
distributing some oil money directly to households);
3. Constrain the prospective emergence of political patronage (set up checks and
balances, limit campaign finance, improve citizen information);
4. Manage post-conflict divisions (broad-based growth, prioritize social
expenditures, deeply cut military spending);
5. Grow the non-oil economy (deregulate and de-tax the non-oil economy,
encourage small-scale construction, help agriculture to adjust to the Dutch
Disease).
In contrast, David Sogge has assessed whether Angola is a failed, yet successful
State, and although he rejects that Angola continues to be a failed State, he is
more cautious in his prediction of the future and of the benefits of this peace
dividend and the oil boom: “Angola’s historical pattern of economic boom and
bust, and of successive development models launched only to be shipwrecked,
appears to be repeating itself ”. Sogge emphasises that the country is a long way
from becoming a developmental state, and predicts a “scenario of inequitable,
unsustainable growth shaped by state patronage backed from abroad by US military
and economic power”.58
In short, despite the right political discourse in terms of targets for the
eradication of poverty, for the diversification of the economy and even the need
56 Collier, P., Angola: Options for Prosperity, Department of Economics, Oxford Univesity, May 2006.
57 Sogge,D. Angola: Failed yet sucessful, Working Paper 81, April 2009.
58Ibid.
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Kamia Victor De Carvalho, Luciano Chianeque and Albertina Delgado
for good governance by the Government of Angola in its strategic documents,
the threat of Angola not reaching its projected potential and not using its oil
wealth to benefit long-term human development is still high. Hence, the need
to analyse the current development model in the country and provide alternative
solutions which will place Angola in the best position for becoming not only of
global economic importance but also of turning around the low levels of human
development. This chapter explores such an alternative.
ANSA and the 10-point strategy for holistic development
Across Southern Africa, labour movements, NGOs and other CSO organisations
are providing greater resistance to the existing neo-liberal development models in
the region which have traditionally been implemented in the form of Structural
Adjustment Programmes of the financial institutions, the liberalisation of the
emerging economies, and a focus on the interests of international markets and
capital.
In recent years, a programme of the Southern African Trade Union Coordination Council, (SATUCC) in partnership with the African Labour Research
Network (ALRN) entitled “Alternatives to Neo-Liberalism in Southern Africa”,
ANSA, has provided a 10-point strategy which considers three key factors in
achieving a holistic approach to development in Southern Africa:
1. The Social Factor: The respect for human rights, and more specifically the
protection of the most vulnerable populations against poverty and exploitation;
2. The Democratic Factor: The decision-making and their implementation within
political systems, and distribution of resources and the implementation of
justice and fairness;
3. The Global Factor: The global decision-making and its impact on Africa, and
the control and distribution of resources.
The strategy places the human rights approach at the centre of development by
addressing both civil and political rights as well as economic, social and cultural
rights, and not merely using the rhetoric of human rights to push for an external
Western agenda. Other pillars of the strategy include: recognising that people are
the principal agents of change, that a holistic approach requires analysing colonial
practices which continue today in the now independent African countries (elites
and cronyism), that the engagement with the State is key to influencing change, and
that the right to self-determination is an ongoing process in a globalised economy.
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An analysis of ANSA’s 10-point strategy against the current development
model being implemented in Angola brings to the fore a series of issues which
must be addressed if Angola is to become a developmental state as desired by the
Government and suggested by analysts:
i] It is a people-led (as opposed to an IMF-World Bank-WTO donorled) strategy.
Angola did not implement any IMF Structural Adjustment Programmes, in the
1990s, and did not receive any funding for post-war reconstruction through a
donor conference as it had expected. Hence, its current development strategies have
been largely drafted without the direct participation of donors and international
financial institutions. After negotiating multibillion US Dollar loans with China,
the country was able to start its crucially important rebuilding process. However,
the development strategies in the country are currently not “people-led” but
are essentially Government-led, and focusing on priorities of the ruling party.
Government has continued to have few consultations with CSOs and with
citizens in general in the drafting and implementing of development programmes
as discussed in chapter 3. Despite stating all the right priorities for the country’s
reconstruction phase, which include investments in the human capital of the
country and improving access to social services, the implementation is both
difficult to monitor and outside the Government’s reports to Parliament. There
are few structures to make Government accountable for their implementation.
ii] Autocentric development, based on domestic, human needs and the
use of local resources
The diversification of the Angolan economy away from its resource dependency on
oil and diamonds is generally recognized as the country’s top priority. The memory
of the self-sufficient Angola in the colonial period, with a growing industry, local
commerce, and agricultural production and exports, is the new aspiration. The
Government has identified industrial focal points and agricultural programmes
across the country in an attempt to revisit that colonial reality. Although not
impossible, these aspirations need to be adjusted to face the current reality of the
needs of the population and the fact that reconstruction efforts have to be stepped
up if industry, commerce and agriculture are to have the intended impact on the
country’s economy in the medium-term. The expected growth in these sectors must
be parallel to the improvement of conditions of the population, and attention must
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be paid to the types of foreign direct investments, and labour practices established
in the re-emerging sectors. Prioritising the production of goods and services for local
and regional consumption would also be an important exercise, and Government
programmes such as the “Nosso Super” network of supermarkets, which targeted
the provision of basic food staples (cesta basica) to the poorest populations are to
be encouraged. They must, in fact, be both sustainable and not for campaign
purposes or for publicity, and should meet their stated objectives of providing
quality food for the poorest populations.59
iii] Regional integration, led from the grassroots
Angola’s regional integration has been somewhat stunted and has been reduced to
participation in NEPAD and SADC events with little impact at home, as it had yet
to translate to any significant practices of regional trade. However, few of these
initiatives have trickled down to the grass roots, and there is very little advocacy
on the issues. To make this a grass roots-led process, a greater understanding of
the benefits to both economic sectors and to the Angolan people would have to be
advocated. The colonial model of exporting to Europe with little regional focus,
and the differences in regional realities in the development of economic sectors
in comparison to Angola’s, has meant regional integration has remained merely
a political debate with little impact on the economic structure of the country.
iv) Selective de-linking and negotiated re-linking (from neo-liberal
globalisation)
The country’s oil and mineral wealth place it firmly at the table of the world’s
most powerful countries, and Angola’s accession to the OPEC Presidency proves
that it wants to play a significant role in these processes. The Angolan President’s
participation at the last G8 summit was hailed as a victory by the Government and
the State media, arguing that Angola’s miraculous economic growth had placed it
among countries with good practices across the world. However, these celebrations
of Angola’s new-found place in global economic politics mean that more than
ever the Government must strive for an economic framework which is linked to
59 The supermarket chain Nosso Super was established as a response to strong criticisms of the Government for
focusing on infrastructure projects that were not benefitting the people (e.g Belas shopping mall) and was intended
to satisfy the population prior to elections. However, there are strong signs that the Government intends to privatise
this chain of supermarkets targeting the poor consumer, which will essentially end its social mission and turn the
network of supermarkets into another chain of commercial supermarkets.
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human development. In reality, Government strategy has placed foreign direct
investment and the establishment of a vibrant private sector in the country high
on the agenda, but this must be done not only to benefit the investors but also the
population. There should be no “race to the bottom” to attract investments in the
country, although the recent experience with the Chinese credit line and the tax
incentives and contractual prioritising of Chinese companies signals a willingness
of the Government to engage in processes which do not, on the whole, result in
transfer of knowledge and skills to the country.
v) Alternative science and technology (based on harnessing the
collective knowledge and wisdom of the people)
Angola’s national state oil company, SONANGOL, has become a reference
point within African oil States for successfully negotiating its oil blocks and for
demonstrating technical capacity for both business management and national
engineers with expertise. Having had a policy of staff development and of building
internal capacity through training and education grants for University and
masters degrees in many foreign Universities, the company has not only invested
in updating itself on both science and technology developments in the oil sector
but also on management mechanisms.60 It is in the oil and diamond sector (and
to a lesser degree in the growing telecommunications sector) that science and
technology have become a priority and where serious investment was made to
garner updated knowledge for Angolans. However, it is now urgently necessary to
take the same approach across all sectors of the economy and more importantly
to make science and technology transfer a priority for innovation in sectors such
as agriculture and industry, and to make it a top priority in the education system
in order to facilitate and promote future innovation that will provide answers for
problems in Angola (home- grown solutions). Rather than simply replicating the
SONANGOL model of internal capacity building (with little impact outside of
the sector), it would be useful to take the approach further and adopt ANSA’s
strategy of “harnessing collective knowledge and wisdom of the people” in order
to develop home-grown answers through science and technology that can propel
the development agenda of the country.
vi) National, regional and global, progressive alliances
60 Soares de Oliveira, R., Business Sucees, Angola-Style, 2007, J,of Modern Áfrican Studies, 45, 4, p 605
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Kamia Victor De Carvalho, Luciano Chianeque and Albertina Delgado
Angola’s recent economic alliances with China, Portugal, Argentina, Brazil, Israel,
to name a few, have centred on providing the Angolan Government with the
necessary financial, technological and human resources to rebuild the country.
Estimates place the total investments needed to rebuild the country to at least US$
20 billion,61 and the Government has been clear since 2002 that it cannot finance
this level of investment without strategic economic partnerships. Furthermore, the
country needs more capacitated human resources than are currently available, and
despite the return of a number of Angolans to the country from the diaspora, in
a reverse exercise to the usual “brain drain” being experienced in Southern Africa,
it is not sufficient and skills are still concentrated in the capital.
Global and regional alliances are indeed necessary in the current context.
However, making sure that such alliances work for the benefit of the people, are
progressive and mutually beneficial, needs to be a priority and regularly assessed
by civil society. Cooperation agreements in education, banking, agriculture,
industry and other sectors have been signed in recent years which have facilitated
both foreign migration and foreign direct investment, opening new markets for
the Brazilians, Chinese, as well as the Portuguese in particular.
An analysis of the China-Angola cooperation, which has been crucial to the
recent rebuilding of infrastructure across the country, demonstrated that the mutual
benefit approach is based on China’s increasing need for oil consumption (second
only to the USA) and Angola’s need to secure favourable loans with lower, longer
repayment plans, and most importantly with no conditionalities regarding good
governance (in contrast to the international financial institutions). However, the
fact that 70% of companies in reconstruction programmes financed by the Chinese
credit line have to be Chinese companies and only 30% are open to Angolan
companies means that a heavy bias for the promotion of Chinese companies
results in an unequal playing field. Given the challenges faced by emerging
Angolan construction companies to make this global partnership progressive
in the long-term, Government needs to pay attention to fostering local content
and/or Angolonisation measures as well and pushing for a transfer of knowledge.
Attention to local content should be paid across all strategic alliances being signed
to make these strategies progressive in the long-term.
Regional and domestic national alliances will also be important and should be
particularly prominent in the agriculture and industry sectors. This is important
because “chosen” regions within the country need to propel growth and development
61 This figure is taken from a speech by the President Dos Santos regarding the total cost of the reconstruction efforts
in the country, see Campos. I and Vinces. A, op. cit.
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in other parts of the country, in order to avoid repeating the same colonial pattern
of concentrating development in the coastal towns. The Government Focal Points
for Industry need to have regional impacts and to do this, national and regional
alliances across the sectors will be necessary.
vii) A politically-governed redistribution of wealth and opportunities
from the formal to the non-formal sectors of the economy.
The current GINI Coefficient places Angola amongst the most unequal societies
in the world. Despite the fact that estimates show that poverty has reduced since
the end of the war, there is also an observation that the “spill-over effect” of the
economic boom has benefitted a few of those who had more “abilities” to take
themselves out of poverty through access to technology and higher education.
However, it is still estimated that those who remained poor are actually poorer
now and that their situation has worsened (CEIC, 2008).
Improving access to a social assistance framework which offers better services is
therefore a priority. As suggested by Paul Collier, one of the most immediate ways
to redistribute wealth is not to simply use the oil revenues of the Government for
large programmes, but also to target vulnerable families and communities through
cash transfer social security programmes. These examples are being analysed
in Angola, although there are considerable bureaucratic hurdles which have to
be conquered in order to make this a reality in the short-term. Other measures
being advocated by CSOs include the adoption of measures such as “Fome Zero”
(Zero Hunger) which provided the poorest with basic food staples and which
sought to eradicate hunger in Brazil. However, this has yet to materialise into
programmes outside of the National Food Security Policy and other strategic
documents. Tying school attendance to cash transfers for vulnerable people and
communities as suggested by Collier would be an innovative and highly effective
way to not only reach targets in terms of education, but also to eradicate poverty.
However, experiences so far have shown a slow rate of implementation of such
programmes, as evidenced by the school feeding programme which in the 2008
was still only benefitting 300 primary schools in 12 provinces. The urgency to
mainstream such programmes in both primary and secondary schools as well as in
all 18 provinces is clear.62 These measures on social protection need to become a
short-term action to avoid the “poor getting poorer” tendency that accompanied
the recent economic growth.
62 ESCR Report, op. cit
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Kamia Victor De Carvalho, Luciano Chianeque and Albertina Delgado
The non-formal sectors of the economy should also be supported, which in
Angola includes the large informal sector engaged in petty trading in local markets.
Current economic policies and tactics of punishing and abusing street vendors have
not proved successful and there is an urgent need to debate the options available
for the Government which wants to primarily promote the formal sector. A large
section of the poor is surviving by selling on the streets and in makeshift markets.
In the rural areas, small-hold farmers must also not be forgotten in the push for
large commercial farming aiming to reach colonial production levels of coffee and
other commodities. The current economic development framework has focused
largely on the promotion of the formal sector, with little attention to the informal
economy. It simply aims at the distribution of wealth through job creation in the
formal sector, and the Angolan Government regards this as a way to end poverty.
However, the Government of Angola needs to see this as a long-term process
which should not shut out the existing informal sector, or simply push them out
of reach in a bid to organize and beautify the towns and cities. This may have the
opposite effect and actually contribute to poverty in both urban informal markets
and rural communal markets.
viii) Women’s rights as the basis for a healthy and productive society
Women’s participation in public life has dramatically improved since the last
election as discussed in section 3. Although an important indicator of respect for
women’s rights is their political participation, Angola must continue to address
the gender inequalities which are reflected in the feminisation of poverty in the
country, the higher dropout rates amongst girls in school, and one of the highest
maternal mortality rates in the world. Placing a gender lens in the current economic
development framework would require greater attention to the informal sector
and to measures such as micro-finance as a means to support women getting out
of poverty. More attention also needs to be paid to the situation of rural women
with regards to access to land and their vulnerability to food insecurity. The impact
of proposed Government measures on women in the economic and social sectors
and also the participation of women in both the political sphere and in CSOs
through participatory forums should be assessed regularly.
Primary and secondary education and programmes such as vocational training
and professional education must also be targeted at women (through grants if
necessary) and should seek to retrain women if the inequalities are to be addressed.
With regards to the legal framework, the domestic violence legislation will be an
important mechanism, but must be supported by a series of other measures such as
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police training, counselling and support, as well as continued campaigning against
violence in the family. Another key issue is HIV/AIDS, given the higher ratio of
infection amongst women. HIV/AIDS will certainly manifest itself in Angola
as a grave issue for women and for the development of women in the country.
Real poverty reduction in Angola depends to a larger extent on the improvement
of the situation of women, and in particular female-headed households across the
country. Hence possible measures such as cash transfers should also target women
in situations of extreme poverty and vulnerability.
ix) An education system that addresses the needs for sustainable
human development by improving technical, managerial, research and
development skills
The rebuilding of the education sector is well underway and addressing inequalities
in education facilities across the country. It is attempted through programmes such
as FAS, at the primary and secondary levels. However, tertiary education continues
to be largely offered in the capital, with a number of private universities being
available, offering opportunities for those who can pay. The capacity for absorption
of the State University, Agostinho Neto University, is extremely limited given the
high demand from a very young population and given the higher demand for
qualified persons from the private and public sectors. There is thus an urgency
to address access to all levels of education.
Combating low grade corruption in schools should continue to be a priority
for this sector in order to guarantee access to the poor and also elevate the sector.
This will also include the rebuilding of confidence amongst teachers and school
personnel, which has been under strain in the last few years.
Addressing the current needs of the economic sectors, and guaranteeing access
to science and technology as well as developing capacity to find home-grown
solutions to problems are tasks which the education sector, in both private and
public schools must be fully engaged in. The Government’s “Education for All”
policy needs to be reflected not only in the number of students enrolled in schools
and the number of available schools but also in the quality of education being
provided. It is the quality of education that poses major challenges, in both private
and public sectors.
x) The creation of a dynamic, participatory and radical democracy,
which regards peoples’ mobilisation, demonstrations, open hearings as
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part of the struggle for an ethical and developmental state.
The 2008 elections signalled the normalisation of Angola’s democratic electoral
process, 16 years after its first election process had led to further conflict in the
country, and 6 years after the end of the war. The Government had repeatedly
stalled elections, arguing for the creation of “suitable conditions” on the ground
before holding elections. Democracy in Angola has existed on paper since 1992,
but in practice the years of the socialist one-party state and its repressive and
controlling, top-down governance mechanism are still being evidenced today.
Despite the fact that CSOs are generally regarded as important and have in the past
supported Government through humanitarian assistance, it is when organisations
focus on issues of governance and human rights that the democratic space created
on paper is tested. In terms of the independence of governance structures from
Government and the ruling party, there is considerable ground to cover to have a
fully independent judiciary and an independent and vibrant House of Parliament.
These are fundamental to enable a participatory democracy to exist in practice,
as they will function as the pillars to counter-balance the concentration of power
in the hands of a few. Equally important is the creation of an understanding that
the State is accountable to its people, its citizens, and not simply to the ruling
party. This is still an immense challenge for Angola.
Advocating for better governance in an attempt to address inequalities is
fundamental to implementing any and all of the 9 proposed strategies. But the
space for advocacy must not be “for show”, and must not be open only to the
“organized civil society”, the term used by Government officials to clarify which
CSOs they consider relevant (and which CSOs they do not). An assessment of the
CSOs, since the end of the war, has revealed diverging opinions on whether there
is more or less democratic space. The Government has pointed to the elections of
2008, the participation in the human rights mechanisms and reports such as the
ESCR report, and the participation in EITI conferences, as some of the signs of
its commitment to human rights and democracy. However, issues regarding press
freedom, forced evictions and expulsions of illegal immigrants from diamond-rich
provinces, continue to show evidence of uneasy tension between what is professed
through the official positions and what is practiced, particularly when strong
economic forces are at play as in the case of forced evictions and access to valuable
urban and rural land. There is a lack of independence of the judiciary, which so
far has had very few successful cases of citizens suing the state for violations of
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their rights. The courts have largely failed, thus far, to act in favour of the poor
or even as transformative vehicles for greater democracy in the country.63
The ongoing decentralisation process of public administration has adopted
a principal of “gradualism” in its main goal of empowering local administration
including through local budget units and the eventual establishment of locally
elected governance structures, autarquias locais. The opportunity for establishing
a dynamic, participatory and (possibly even) radical democratization will certainly
depend on this process, and on creating a culture of accountability at the local level.
Making the central level more accountable is also currently the main issue for
this process to become a reality in the long-term in Angola. The decentralisation
legislation has created local consulting councils, Conselhos de Auscultação e
Concertação Social (CACS), at both provincial and communal levels. However,
in reality, they are still functioning in an ad hoc fashion across the country, with
CSOs still advocating for greater participation in these spaces, to make them a
reality and not only a measure on paper.
The space for active, vibrant CSOs must also be conquered (once and for
all), through greater engagement with Government and State institutions rather
than less engagement as in the past. The work of CSOs should be to influence
Government action and policies, and the Government needs to be receptive to
these exchanges. With regards to promoting grass roots level democracy through
the CACs and other forums with CSOs, the ruling party’s mantra of “MPLA is
the people and the people are the MPLA”, needs to be turned into a reality given
that 81.7% of the electorate backed the party.
An Angolan model for a more inclusive economic growth: Short-term, medium-term
and long-term interventions necessary to overcome poverty and inequality
Based on the analyses of ANSA for a people-centred development and other analyses
discussed throughout the study, the following 9 interventions are regarded as top
priorities for a more inclusive economic growth that addresses her inequalities
in the country:
SHORT- TERM
• Improve the social assistance mechanism available in the country, and implement
cash transfer programmes to the poor and vulnerable communities (particularly
for those who have not seen their lives improve since the end of the war);
63 Gargarella, R. et al, 2006, Courts and Social Transformation in New Democracies, Ashgate Publishing Limited
p 213-232, Skaar, E. and Van Dunnem, O.S, Cours under Construction in Angola: What can they for the poor?
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Kamia Victor De Carvalho, Luciano Chianeque and Albertina Delgado
• Invest heavily in public and free education and vocational training throughout
the country in order to address illiteracy, capacity gaps, and the lack of qualified
human capital (use the existing oil revenues for this purpose);
• Invest heavily across all other social sectors including health, in order to see
improvements in the living conditions of the population and social indicators
of the country (again using the existing oil revenues).
MEDIUM - TERM
• Diversify the economy and reduce the dependence on oil, through a pro-poor
and gender lens, with priorities being on job creation and more equitable
income distribution across the country and the various economic sectors, as
well as linking the formal sectors with the informal sectors (and not ignoring
the informal sector);
• Address corruption and cronyism and its effect on both the public and private
sectors, efficiency- reducing bureaucracy, promoting a culture of transparency
in institutions, denouncing low and high-grade corruption in social services,
and most importantly increasing the transparency and accountability of oil
revenues and state-budget expenditure;
• Support an enabling business environment that is not based simply on the “race
to the bottom” and attract foreign direct investment through deregulation and
tax incentives, but it is for local Angolan businesses to establish themselves in
the private sector and in the process create jobs as well as uphold corporate
social responsibility.
LONG-TERM
• Review current global alliances to ensure these are indeed progressive strategic
alliances, as well as promote greater regional integration through trade as well
as political alliances;
• Maintain the good results achieved in terms of macro-economic stability and
pursue economically sound measures coupled with redistributive interventions;
• Lastly, and most importantly, promote democratic spaces and practices at both
the local and central levels of governance, through strengthening CSOs and their
dialogue with Government, as well as building an independent judiciary and
Parliament, which are sensitive to the need to address inequalities in the country.
The next 30 years will be important in determining whether Angola will be the
next Nigeria or Malaysia as stated by Paul Collier. Angola needs to invest in its
human capital and address extreme poverty and social conditions in the shortterm, and using the oil revenues to do so. This takes considerable investment,
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which Angola does have access to and will continue to have, based on its oil and
diamond wealth.
Building a strong non-oil sector needs to be based on realistic targets and
understanding of the current reality as well as access to capital, and should not be
based simply on colonial experiences in agriculture, industry and other sectors.
A central focus must be on more equitable income distribution and reduction
of poverty.
Anti-corruption measures and establishing an enabling business environment
for all Angolans (and not through cronyism) as well as for progressive foreign
partners is also necessary in order to see the benefits of private sector development
as a means to reduce poverty.
The participation of citizens in the development discourse of the country and
development options, needs to go beyond simply the ballot box, but should
translate into actual spaces for sharing of information and for exchanging views
and proposed solutions. This has to involve Government and central and local
levels. This has to be the starting point for all the other actions to have their
intended impact.
Conclusions
This study set out to present a comprehensive analysis of factors of inequality
past and present in Angola. It also presented some future interventions which
should help Angola to become a developmental state by using its oil wealth to
address inequalities of income distribution, disparities in development across the
country, gender, urban and rural areas, the never spoken-about racial and ethnic
differences in access to resources, and access to social services. Addressing these
issues needs both human capital and financial resources with a very clear vision
of the need for more inclusive growth than has been experienced in the country
thus far. The break with the colonial past and its inequalities must be effected and
this will only be possible by investing in Angolans and their future, and using the
existing resources wisely. During the next 4 years, the MPLA Government aims
to achieve the following:
• Peace, justice democracy, social stability, unity, national cohesion and internal
security;
• Eliminate hunger and extreme poverty, create employment, economic growth
and equitable distribution of the national income;
• Sustainable long-term development, human development and good health for
all Angolans and harmonious development of the country;
• Good and transparent governance;
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Kamia Victor De Carvalho, Luciano Chianeque and Albertina Delgado
• Earn respect from its African neighbours and partners in the international
community with insertion into the growing global economy.
This political rhetoric must be turned into reality, and there is little time to waste.
There is an opportunity to learn from the mistakes of countries such as Nigeria, but
to do this, the existing governance style has to change and adopt a more focused
developmental perspective, far from the old cronyism and corruption. Angola
has to look for alternative options to the neo-liberal globalisation discourse. Thus
far, the Angolan Government has shown that it is determined to resolving its own
problems in the way that it has sought strategic alliances, and can no longer be
dependent on any one geo-political power. However, the oil dependence and the
“Dutch” disease will take a few generations to break away from completely and
the Government needs to explore alternative options, including better regional
integration and engaging in progressive alliances.
The jury is still out on Angola, but what is clear is that Angolan citizens as
well as the Angolan Government will have to change if they are to become “the
next Malaysia”. This study outlined some “stepping stones” for both citizens
and Government in order to steer the country towards a more people-driven
development agenda, which will result in less inequality and provide a sustainable
peaceful future for generations to come.
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