Download Assignment 2 Reading

Assignment 2 Reading: The Tonkin Gulf Resolution
To do:
1. Please read all the handout and compose responses to the questions at the end. Your responses need to
include analysis, specific and relevant historical evidence, and a point to receive credit.
2. Your work must be handwritten, legible, neat, and include a complete heading and turn in at the beginning of
class only.
The U.S. first became involved in Vietnam in the early years of the Cold War, but significant military involvement
didn’t begin until 1964, following the passage of the Tonkin Gulf Resolution by Congress. The resolution, which
gave President Lyndon Johnson the power to wage war against communist North Vietnam, came as a result of a
controversial series of incidents in the Gulf of Tonkin, off the northeastern coast of North Vietnam. To better
understand how the U.S. went from South Vietnam’s sponsor to fighting a war, first read about the events of early
August 1964.
Historical Context Part 1: On August 2, 1964, the U.S.S. Maddox was collecting evidence while patrolling in
international waters in the Gulf of Tonkin, off the eastern border of North Vietnam. Also in the Gulf were South
Vietnamese gunboats, which had just launched a clandestine raid on the North Vietnamese coastline as part of
Operations Plan (OPLAN) - 34A, a covert intelligence operation coordinated by the U.S. The Maddox reported
being fired upon by North Vietnamese torpedo boats. In the battle that followed, two DRV (North Vietnamese)
ships were sunk, but the Maddox sustained no losses. When word reached Washington, President Johnson and
Defense Secretary Robert McNamara, along with other senior advisors began to discuss how the U.S. should
respond and what information should be shared with Congress and the public at large about the incident.
On August 3, at 10:30 pm, McNamara and Johnson discussed the incident on the phone.
Read the transcript excerpt below.
**Note: LBJ and McNamara reference a number of congressional leaders, including Speaker of the House John
McCormick, Senate Majority Leader Mike Mansfield, and Minority Leader Everett Dirksen, as well as U.S.
Secretary of State Dean Rusk. At the end of the call, they mention Goldwater, in reference to Barry Goldwater,
the conservative Republican who challenged Johnson in the 1964 presidential election, George Ball, an
American diplomat who opposed the U.S.’ increasing involvement in Vietnam, George Reedy, Johnson’s Press
Secretary, and Walter Jenkins, a longtime Johnson aide.
Telephone conversation between President Lyndon Johnson and Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara,
August 3, 1964, 10:30 EST.*
*Source for transcript and audio recording: The National Security Archive at George Washington University:
http://www.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/NSAEBB/NSAEBB132/tapes.htm.
President Lyndon B. Johnson: Now I wonder if you don't think it'd be wise for you and Rusk to get Mac, uh, the
Speaker and Mansfield to call a group of fifteen to twenty people together eh from the Armed Services and
Foreign Relations to tell them what happened. A good many of them are saying to me Secretary Robert
McNamara: Right. I've been thinking about this myself, and I thought that uh
President Johnson: They're going to start an investigation
Secretary McNamara: Yeah.
President Johnson: if you don't.
Secretary McNamara: Yeah.
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President Johnson: And you got Dirksen up there
Secretary McNamara: Yeah
President Johnson: and he's saying you've got to study it further, and say to Mansfield, "Now the President wants
us, you, to get the proper people." And we come in and you say, "They fired at us. We responded immediately. And
we took out one of their boats and put the other two running. And we kept our..., we're puttin' our boats right there,
and we're not running on in."
Secretary McNamara: And it's hard to destroy.
President Johnson: That's right
Secretary McNamara: Right. And we're going to, and I think I should also, or we should also at that time, Mr.
President, explain this Op Plan 34-A, these covert operations. There's no question but what that had bearing on.
And on Friday night, as you probably know, we had four TP [McNamara means PT] boats from Vietnam manned by
Vietnamese or other nationals, attack two is lands. And we expended, oh, a thousand rounds of ammunition of
one kind or another against them. We probably shot up a radar station and a few other miscellaneous buildings.
And following twenty-four hours after that, with this destroyer in that same area, undoubtedly led them to connect
the two events.
President Johnson: Well say that to Dirksen.
Secretary McNamara: That's what I know he'll like.
President Johnson: You notice Dirksen says this morning, that "we got to reassess the situation, do something
about it." I'd tell him that we're doing what he's talking about.
Secretary McNamara: Well, I, I was, I was thinking doing this myself in personal visits. But I think your thought is
better. We'll get the group together. You want us to do it at the White House or would you rather do it at State or
Defense?
President Johnson: I believe it'd be better to do it uh up on the Hill.
Secretary McNamara: All right.
President Johnson: I believe it'd be better if you say to Mansfield, "You call"
Secretary McNamara: Yup President Johnson:
Foreign Relations Secretary McNamara: Yup, OK.
President Johnson: Armed Services
Secretary McNamara: OK. OK.
President Johnson: and get Speaker to do it over on his side [i.e., within the House of Representatives, as
opposed to the Senate].
Secretary McNamara: We'll do it
President Johnson: And just say it's very, I'd tell him awfully quiet, though, so they won't go in and be making a
bunch of speeches. And tell Rusk that a, that's my idea.
Secretary McNamara: Great. .
President Johnson: And he's in New York, so I don't know whether he's got back.
Secretary McNamara: Well I just talked to George Ball a few minutes ago, and I'll have George arrange it. Or at
least I'll tell him that, and then I'll call the Speaker and Mansfield himself.
President Johnson: Now I wish that uh you'd give me some guidance on what we ought to say. I want to leave an
impression on the background in the people we talk to over here that we're gonna be firm as hell without saying
something that's dangerous. Now what do you think? Uh, uh, the people that are calling me up, I just talked to a
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New York banker, I just talked to a fellow in Texas, they all feel that the Navy responded wonderfully and that's
good. But they want to be damned sure I don't pull 'em out and run, and they want to be damned sure that we're
firm. That's what all the country wants because Goldwater's raising so much hell about how he's gonna blow 'em
off the moon, and they say that we oughten to do anything that the national interest doesn't require. But we sure
oughta always leave the impression that if you shoot at us, you're going to get hit.
Secretary McNamara: Well I think you would want to instruct George Reedy this morning at his news conference
to say that you personally have ordered the, the Navy to carry on the routine patrols uh off the coast of North
Vietnam, uh to add an additional destroyer to the one that has been carrying on the patrols, to provide an air cap,
and to issue instructions to the commanders to destroy any uh force that attacks our force in international
waters….
Historical Context, Part 2: Two days later, on August 4, 1964 the U.S.S. Maddox, and another U.S. ship, the C.
Turner Joy, were in the Gulf of Tonkin together. Both ships were on high alert, following the reported August 2
attack. That day, both ships recorded a number of sonar and radar signals they assumed to be from hostile DRV
torpedo boats. In addition, naval personnel confused North Vietnamese radio signals actually sent on August 2
as new orders from Hanoi to attack the American ships. In this confusion, the ships radioed to Washington that
they were under attack. The local commander, Captain John D. Herrick, quickly questioned this initial report, but
the head of the Pacific fleet and Washington moved forward as if the initial confused reports were accurate.
On August 4, at 9:43 am, McNamara and Johnson discussed the incident on the phone.
Secretary McNamara: …. I've talked to Mac Bundy [national security adviser] a moment ago and told him that I
thought that was the most important subject we should consider today, and, and be prepared to recommend to
you a response, a retaliation move against North Vietnam in the event this attack takes place within the next six
to nine hours. And we
President Johnson: All right. Now we better do that at lunch. There's some things I don't want to go in with these
other, I want to keep this as close as I can. So let's just try to keep it to the two….
Secretary McNamara: Now, thirdly, Sharp recommends that, that, uh, the, uh, task force commander be
authorized to engage in hot pursuit beyond the eleven-mile limit in as far as the three-mile limit, which we [i.e., the
United States] accept as the definition of territorial waters. At present the instructions to the commander are: do
not pursue an attacker, uh, closer to shore than eleven miles. Uh, Sharp recommends that that eleven-mile limit
be shifted to three miles. I've talked to Dean about this; he agrees, uh, as far as air pursuit is concerned. Pursue
by air as close as three miles to shore. Do not pursue by sea closer than eleven miles... The air power is likely the
most effective power anyhow. And I would, therefore, recommend that we accept Sharp's recommendation but
limit it to air. President Johnson: All right. OK….
Historical Context Part 3: Despite questions about the accuracy of early reports detailing a second attack in the
Gulf of Tonkin, President Johnson addressed the nation late on the night of August 4.
My fellow Americans: As President and Commander in Chief, it is my duty to the American people to report that
renewed hostile actions against United States ships on the high seas in the Gulf of Tonkin have today required
me to order the military forces of the United States to take action in reply. The initial attack on the destroyer
'Maddox, on August 2, was repeated today by a number of hostile vessels attacking two U.S. destroyers with
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torpedoes. The destroyers and supporting aircraft acted at once on the orders I gave after the initial act of
aggression. We believe at least two of the attacking boats were sunk. There were no U.S. losses. The
performance of commanders and crews in this engagement is in the highest tradition of the United States Navy.
But repeated acts of violence against the Armed Forces of the United States must be met not only with alert
defense, but with positive reply. That reply is being given as I speak to you tonight. Air action is now in execution
against gunboats and certain supporting facilities in North Viet-Nam which have been used in these hostile
operations.
In the larger sense this new act of aggression, aimed directly at our own forces, again brings home to all of us in
the United States the importance of the struggle for peace and security in southeast Asia. Aggression by terror
against the peaceful villagers of South Viet-Nam has now been joined by open aggression on the high seas
against the United States of America.
The determination of all Americans to carry out our full commitment to the people and to the government of
South Viet-Nam will be redoubled by this outrage. Yet our response, for the present, will be limited and fitting. We
Americans know, although others appear to forget, the risks of spreading conflict. We still seek no wider war. I
have instructed the Secretary of State to make this position totally clear to friends and to adversaries and,
indeed, to all. I have instructed Ambassador Stevenson to raise this matter immediately and urgently before the
Security Council of the United Nations. Finally, I have today met with the leaders of both parties in the Congress
of the United States and I have informed them that I shall immediately request the Congress to pass a resolution
making it clear that our Government is united in its determination to take all necessary measures in support of
freedom and in defense of peace in southeast Asia. I have been given encouraging assurance by these leaders
of both parties that such a resolution will be promptly introduced, freely and expeditiously debated, and passed
with overwhelming support. And just a few minutes ago I was able to reach Senator Goldwater and I am glad to
say that he has expressed his support of the statement that I am making to you tonight. It is a solemn
responsibility to have to order even limited military action by forces whose overall strength is as vast and as
awesome as those of the United States of America, but it is my considered conviction, shared throughout your
Government, that firmness in the right is indispensable today for peace; that firmness will always be measured.
Its mission is peace.
Compose responses that follow directions given to the following questions:
1. What did McNamara and Johnson want Congress and the public to know about what happened in the Gulf of
Tonkin on August 2?
2. Explain why do you think Johnson and McNamara were so worried about controlling what the public heard
about the incident. (Think about the larger historical context when you answer this.)
3. Why did President Johnson and Secretary McNamara want to believe the early reports which
erroneously claimed that the U.S. was attacked by North Vietnam on August 4?
From President Johnson’s speech to the nation, August 4:
4. Outline what happened in the Gulf of Tonkin on August 2 and on August 4. (Not a list, but an organized
description.)
5. 3-part question: What does LBJ say happened in the Gulf? Is this report accurate? Why or why not?
6. Consider Johnson’s argument that military action will promote peace and freedom in Southeast Asia.
Evaluate why Johnson used this language and what his reasoning has to do with American efforts
to contain communism.
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