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NATIONAL CHENGCHI UNIVERSITY
INTERNATIONAL BUSINESS DEPARTMENT
The Doha Round
And
Least-Developed
Countries
Global Partnership of Asian Colleges2009
International Politics and Economics
Advisor: Kun-Ming, Chen
Po-Kuan, Lin
Yu-Hsien, Lin
Chia-Wei, Hung
Hau-Ping, Huang
Cheng-Jung, Tsai
The Doha Round and Least-Developed Countries
National Chengchi University
International Business Department
I.
Introduction
In November 2001, World Trade Organization (WTO) commenced a world-wide
trade-negotiation round named Doha Development Round. The main objective of the
Doha Round is to lower the trade barriers around the world, which allows countries
to increase trade globally. As of 2008, the Doha Round talks have stalled over a divide
on major issues, such as agriculture, industrial tariffs and non-tariff barriers, services,
and trade remedies. The most significant differences are between developed nations
led by the European Union (EU), the United States (USA) and Japan and the major
developing countries led and represented mainly by India, Brazil, China and South
Africa. The most significant divide between developed countries and the developing
countries is the problem of Preference Erosion.
Although WTO dedicates to eliminate trade barriers and urges members to
follow the principles of Most Favored Nations (MFN) and non-discrimination, some
developed countries still provide specific agreements, so-called Generalized System
of Preference (GSP), to least developed countries. The rationale behind the GDP is
that the least developed countries have competitive disadvantages in the world
market and might be harmed under the MFN, and, with the GSP, these countries are
more likely to benefit from external trade. However, if all the members in WTO lower
their tariff rates as negotiated in the Doha Round, the preference which least
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developed countries currently have might be eroded. This situation is referred to as
Preference Erosion.
Given the controversy about the preference erosion problem associated with
the WTO trade negotiations, the purpose of this paper is to employ a computable
general equilibrium model to investigate the economic impact of the Doha Round.
Specifically, the following issues will be addressed in this paper: (1) How significant
are the current preferences provided by the developed countries to the Least
Developed Countries? (2) How significant will the preference erosion be brought
about by the Doha Round trade liberalization? (3) Facing possible preference erosion,
will the least developed countries benefit or suffer from the Dona Round trade
liberalization?
This paper is organized as follows. In the next section, the current trade
barriers of the developed countries and the least developed countries are analyzed.
The changes in the preferences provided by the developed countries to the least
developed countries after the Doha Round are then estimated. Section 3 introduces
the empirical model and simulation design. Simulation results are discussed in
Section 4, and the final section concludes.
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II.
Literature Review
Some scholars argue that the problem of Preference Erosion is not that severe,
because the degree of preferences provided to least developed countries is not very
significant due to the limited ability for these countries to use the preferences and
strict conditions of the utilization of GSP. (Tsai, March 2009) Other researchers agree
on this opinion, too, but they also point out that a small number of least developed
countries still possibly face severe impact of losing market access because of their
large benefits under existing preference schemes. (Amiti and Romalis, 2007) These
two papers helped us to analyze the simulation results.
In YongZheng, Yang (2005), the author argues that the preference erosion
under the Doha Round is inevitable. African countries should seek greater market
access not only in industrial countries but also in developing countries, which have
become Africa’s important trading partners so that their commitment to a
comprehensive and ambitious Doha Round is essential for African countries to
mitigate the impact of preference erosion and to benefit overall from the round. And,
rather than try to retain trade preferences, Africa can best pursue its development
interests in the Doha Round by strengthening its commitment to liberalization while
demanding generous reciprocity from its trading partners. From the perspective of
market access, the Doha Round will serve Africa’s interests best if it leads to
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comprehensive reductions in trade barriers across all commodities in all WTO
members.
III. The Doha Round and Preference Erosion
The data in Appendix show the import tariff rates by industry in different
countries. It is clear that the import tariff rates of Developed countries applied to
LDCs are generally lower than those imposed on other countries. It indicates that
there are significant trade preferences provided by Developed countries to LDCs. For
example, the import tariff rates of Rice, Wheat and Meat from Tanzania to USA are all
zero. Despite those obvious preferences, some developed countries still set high
import tariff rates on specific sectors or sensitive products. Take processed food
imported from Zambia for instance, EU set a very high import tariff rate up to about
87% on it.
Bangladesh, Tanzania, and Zambia are classified as least developed countries
according to UN. Many developed countries voluntarily provide Generalized System
of Preference (GSP) to developing and least developed countries in order to help
their economic development and growth. The beneficiary countries must apply the
petition to granting countries, and comply with certain rules that granting countries
set, like rules of origin, safeguard measures, product-by-exclusion, etc. Granting
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countries often set strict rules. For example, if the goods export from beneficiaries
exceed certain amount, their preferential rate will not be applicable, and turn to the
MFN rate. However, some developing and least developed countries have benefited
from these preferential treatments indeed. All developed countries in our study, such
as United States, EU, Japan and South Korea, have provided GSP to Bangladesh,
Tanzania and Zambia. A comparison of GSPs is shown in Table A1 in Appendix.
To evaluate how the preferences will be eroded by the Doha Round, we use
two specific formula to calculate the negotiated tariff cuts:
(1) For non-agricultural sectors, the formula we use is so-called Swiss Formula.
This formula was first introduced by the Swiss Delegation to the WTO during the
Doha Development Round. In Swiss Formula, Tf=(B X Ti)/(B + Ti), Tf represents the
final binding tariff rate after tariff cut of the Doha Round, and Ti denotes the initial
rate. B is a coefficient which represents the ceiling of the final tariff rate and varies
with the level of countries’ development, no matter how high the original tariff rate
is. As a result, the more the tariff barriers are, the more the tariff reduction will be.
We adopt the Swiss Formula with a combination of B=25 for least-developed
countries, B=20 for developing countries and B=10 for developed countries to acquire
the target rate under the Doha Round.
(2) For Agricultural sectors, we use Uruguay Round Approach to calculate the
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tariff reduction. This approach was eventually adopted in the 1986-94 Uruguay
Round agriculture negotiations. It uses a linear formula to lower trade barriers of
every country. According to the Doha Agriculture Negotiation in 2008, we simplify
the rules of reduction as following: For developed countries, if tariff rate is higher
than 75%, it will be reduced by 69.5%. If tariff rate is between 50~75%, it will be
reduced by 64%. If tariff rate is between 20~50%, it will be reduced by 57%. If tariff
rate is lower than 20%, it will be reduced by 50%. For developing and least developed
countries, the reduction volume is two-thirds of which reduced in developed
countries. But the levels of tariff classification are 30%, 80% and 130%.
A comparison of the average applied tariff rates before and after the Dona
round, as respectively shown in Tables 1 and 2, reveals that the percentage
deductions of import tariff rate of non-LDCs is more than those of LDCs. In addition,
despite the fact that the relative import tariff rates between different countries stay
the same, their variations decrease. It implies that the Doha round will result in
preference erosion, which is one of the major divide between developed countries
and the least developed countries.
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Table 1: Current Average Applied Import Tariff Rates
Unit: %
Japan Taiwan China Korea Bangladesh Tanzania Zambia ROW
Industry
USA EU
1 Rice
2.80 37.43 329.19
0.00 0.14 282.03
1.03
2.73
1.41
5.21
2 Wheat
0.55 0.20 77.18
2.25 0.40
0.74
2.00
2.50
1.43
16.44
3 Meat
1.62 8.54 32.42 16.24 8.88 14.53
12.48
6.89
5.18
17.01
4 Other_Agri
1.12 4.38
4.71 17.28 52.70
6.48
9.53
5.26
8.75
5 Food_Process 2.29 10.47 13.21 13.05 16.33 16.98
15.15
17.34
8.74
15.29
6 Minerals
0.06 0.02
0.03
0.52 1.35
1.70
10.69
5.25
0.56
3.04
7 Tex_Clo
8.33 4.50
5.64
5.50 13.49
6.03
20.98
17.84 17.69
11.31
8 Other_Mnfcs 0.97 1.23
0.31
2.99 10.09
3.69
12.35
12.71
8.19
6.91
9 Svces
0.00
0.00 0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.02
0.00 0.00
4.25
Sources: GTAP database version 6
Table 2: The Average Applied Import Tariff Rates after the Doha Round
Unit: %
Industry
USA EU
1 Rice
1.40 12.53 0.00 100.40
0.09 61.99
0.69
1.81
0.94 1.40
2 Wheat
0.27 0.10 1.13 23.54
0.26 0.44
1.33
1.66
0.95 3.98
3 Meat
0.81 3.88 7.10 12.81
5.91 5.83
8.30
4.58
3.45 7.31
4 Other_Agri
0.56 2.19 2.35
2.12 431.73 15.34
4.31
6.34
3.50 4.66
5 Food_Process 1.65 4.36 4.71
4.35
7.87 5.17
8.03
13.47
5.95 9.09
6 Minerals
0.06 0.02 0.46
0.03
1.19 1.36
6.16
7.25
0.49 2.74
7 Tex_Clo
4.16 2.51 3.17
2.90
7.21 3.40
9.51
14.91
9.77 7.66
8 Other_Mnfcs 0.84 0.98 2.11
0.29
6.31 2.50
7.84
13.04
5.97 4.28
9 Svces
0.00
0.00 0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00 0.04
Japan Taiwan China Korea Bangladesh Tanzania Zambia ROW
0.00 0.00 0.00
Sources: GTAP database version 6
IV.
Empirical Model and Simulation Design
A. Empirical Model
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The Doha Round and Least-Developed Countries
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To evaluate the economic impact of the Dona Round on the least developed
countries, Global Trade Analysis Project (GTAP) is adopted in this paper. GTAP is a
multi-region, multi-sector, computable general equilibrium model. The standard
GTAP model we use is the sixth edition with a given reference year 2001. In the
model, it is assumed that all markets are perfectly competitive and production
technology exhibits constant returns to scale. The database in GTAP 6 composes of
87 regions/countries and 57 sectors. To simplify our analysis, the database is further
aggregated into 10 regions/countries and 9 sectors in this paper. Three of these ten
regions chosen (Bangladesh, Tanzania, and Zambia) have the highest trade volume
among the Least Developed Countries, and the other seven are regions which
provide trade preferences to them.
B. Simulation Design
We first adopt the Swiss Formula and Uruguay Round Approach to simulate the
result of tariff reduction. We use Swiss Formula with a combination of B=25 for least
developed countries, B=20 for developing countries and B=10 for developed
countries to estimate the tariff cuts in the Doha Round. Second, we simulate the
effects of the Doha Round multilateral trade liberalization according to the estimated
tariff cuts.
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V.
Simulation Results
As shown in Table 3, the Doha Round trade liberalization will bring about
increases in the import and export volume in each country. Bangladesh and China
have very high growth rates in both import and export volume; while USA and EU
have relatively insignificant changes. The differences in the response of external
trade to tariff cuts might be attributed the differences in the initial tariff rates. A
country with lower initial tariff rates will have smaller tariff cuts and thus have
smaller increase in imports as well as exports.
Column 3 of Table 3 shows that the percentage changes in Real GDP of most
countries/regions are positive except for Zambia. South Korea and Bangladesh
especially benefit from huge growth rate in Real GDP. Their real GDP increases by
1.371% and 0.552%, respectively. The real GDP of China also increases by 0.504%. In
contrast, the growth rate of the real GDP of Taiwan is only 0.053%. As for other
Least developed countries, the real GDP of Tanzania increases by 0.193%, while
Zambia’s Real GDP decreases by 0.011%, yet the percentage changes are all lower
than 1%. The tariff reduction does not have much impact on Real GDP in those
countries.
Column 4 shows the changes in terms of trade (TOT) in both developed and
developing countries. USA, China, Bangladesh, and Tanzania face deterioration in
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their TOTs while EU, Japan, Taiwan, South Korea and Zambia see improvement in
their TOTs. The decreases in the TOTs of USA, Bangladesh, and Tanzania might be
attributed to preference erosion. In the case of USA, because of the deep regional
integration in the North America, currently USA can benefit from the preferential
tariff treatment in their trade among members. The tariff reduction in the Doha
Round might cause the preferences to be eroded to some extent. Similarly, the
current preferences provided to Bangladesh and Tanzania might also be reduced. In
contrast, since Japan, Taiwan and South Korea did not join regional integration until
recently, their TOTs will be improved by the multilateral trade liberalization. As for
the deterioration of China’s TOT, it might be because of relatively higher tariff cuts in
the Doha Round due to its higher initial tariff rates.
In the GTAP model, the social welfare is represented by Equivalent Variation
(EV), which is closely related to Real GDP and TOT. The Doha Round trade
liberalization will result in social welfare gains in most of the regions except for USA
and Tanzania. The decrease in USA’s social welfare is due to the decreases in its TOT.
Despite the positive change in Real GDP of Tanzania, it is not large enough to offset
the impact of its negative TOT. In contrast, although TOTs in China and Bangladesh
get worse, their positive changes in Real GDP are large enough so that EV of the
countries still increase. As for the case of Zambia, its significant gains in terms of
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The Doha Round and Least-Developed Countries
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trade cause the rise in social welfare even it has a negative change in real GDP.
In the end, we find that EU has far less percentage change than most countries
in import volume, export volume, real GDP and terms of trade. As a result, we infer
that the impact of Doha Round on the economic situation of EU is very insignificant.
Table 3: Simulation Result
Change rate of
Item
Import
Volume
(%)
Export
Volume
(%)
Real
GDP
(%)
Terms of
Trade
(%)
EV
(USD
million)
Region
USA
0.476
1.802
0.003
-0.208
-2289.89
EU
0.587
0.787
0.032
0.001
2819.581
Japan
4.728
3.83
0.173
0.349
8875.052
Taiwan
2.609
1.902
0.053
0.168
388.189
China
11.338
7.73
0.504
-0.314
4913.88
South Korea
5.863
2.666
1.371
0.791
7037.515
Bangladesh
13.777
17.677
0.552
-1.981
84.766
Tanzania
4.566
7.825
0.193
-0.859
-11.772
Zambia
3.757
1.916
-0.011
0.585
9.763
ROW
2.886
2.406
0.084
-0.007
6345.567
Source: This study.
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Figure 1 Change rate of Import and Export( % )
20
15
10
5
0
Import
Export
USA
EU
Japan
Taiwan
China
SouthKorea
Bangladesh
Tanzania
Zambia
ROW
Source: GTAP simulation model
Figure 2 Changes in Real GDP( % )
1.4
1.2
1
0.8
0.6
0.4
0.2
0
-0.2
RealGDP(Change rate,%)
USA
EU
Japan
Taiwan
China
SouthKorea
Bangladesh
Tanzania
Zambia
ROW
Source: This study.
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VI. Conclusion
This paper employs a computable general equilibrium model to investigate the
preference erosion problem associated with the Doha Round multilateral trade
liberalization. Our estimates indicate that the preference erosion caused by tariff cuts
in the Doha Round does not have the same effect on every least developed country.
Indeed, some of the least developed countries might face severe preference erosion
in the Doha Round trade liberalization and result in decline in their social welfare.
Furthermore, some developed countries which have advantages of regional
integration might also be negatively affected by global tariff cuts.
In general, however, the negative effects brought about by the Doha Round are
negligibly small. Besides, the Doha Round will bring forth significant expansion in
external trade, real GDP, and social welfare in most developed countries as well as
the least developed countries. These results suggest that all member countries of the
WTO should make every effort to resume the Doha Round negotiation as soon as
possible.
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The Doha Round and Least-Developed Countries
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References
Amiti, Mary, and John Romalis. 2007. “Will the Doha Round Lead to Preference
Erosion? ” IMF Staff Papers, 54(2):338-384.
Dean, Judith M. 2006.”Is Trade Preference Erosion Bad for Development?” Office of
Economics Working Paper U.S. International Trade Commission No. 2006-11-A
Huang, Li, and Kun-Ming, Chen. 2000. A study of WTO and Main Countries Providing
Preferential Treatment to Developing and Least Developed Countries. Taipei:
Bureau of Foreign Trade.
Meng-Chia, Tsai. 2009. “Issue on the Preferences Erosion Caused by the Multilateral
Trade Negotiations to the Developing Countries.” 9th International Economic and
Trade Law Development Conference, National Chengchi University, Taipei.
WTO documents online. 2009. World Trade Organization.
http://docsonline.wto.org/imrd/directdoc.asp?DDFDocuments/t/tn/ma/S3R2.doc (accessed
July 15, 2009)
UNCTAD Secretariat. 2005. “Erosion of Preferences for the Least Developed
Countries: Assessment of Effects and Mitigating Options” Trade and
Development Board, TD/B/52/4.
YongZheng, Yang.2005.” Africa in the Doha Round: Dealing with Preference Erosion
and Beyond” IMF Policy Discussion Paper, PDP/05/8.
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Appendix : GSP system
Table A1 Comparison of Generalized System of Preferences between Countries
Countries Beneficiary
Beneficial Product
Limitation on Preference
United
States
Should apply
to application
Determined
by the degree
of economic
development
and com
Should
qualified the
legal forced
standard and
measures.
A.
A.
Depend on
the it’s
development
of economy
(like
GNP/income
per capita,
total
development
in industries)
If countries
qualified the
special
preferential
treatment, it
should make
an application
A.
A.
B.
C.
Europe
Union
A.
B.
B.
B.
C.
The import
products are
The same type or
has a direct
non-sensitive.
competitive products
Qualified the B. The product involved
rules of origin
in the treatment of
Europe metal
C. Beneficiary doesn’t
adopt related policies
to protect the labor
right, protect drugs
and washing money,
or the beneficiary has
unfair trade
transaction and false
countries of origin
Giving
different
preferential
treatment
according to
the sensitivity
of products
Giving further
preferential
treatment if
the product
conform to
labor right or
environment
al protection
Qualify the
rules of origin
16
A. Market share of
imported goods in
excess of the
statutory standards
B. To protect the
competiveness of
domestic industries.
Beneficiary doesn’t adopt
related policies to protect
the market access,
intellectual property
right, to lower the
barriers in trade of
service and investment,
and protect the labor
right
The Doha Round and Least-Developed Countries
National Chengchi University
International Business Department
Japan
A.
B.
Whether
countries or
regions are
developing
Whether
countries or
regions
express the
petition to
accept the
GSP system
that Japan
granted
A.
B.
Whether the A. Follow the principle
product will
of protection of
make an
Japan's competitive
impact on the
industries
domestic
B. Follow the principle
agriculture
making sure that
Whether the
developing countries
product have
get the GSP system
sensitivity to
fairly
industrial
C. Using both the
product
limitation on dollars
and amounts
Sources: Huang, Li, and Kun-Ming, Chen. 2000.
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Table A2 Initial Tariff Rates in USA
Unit: %
Industry
Exporting country
EU
Japan Taiwan China Korea Bangladesh
Tanzania Zambia ROW
Rice
4.49
4.20
0.00
5.98
9.89
0.00
0.00
0.00
3.41
Wheat
2.54
0.00
2.78
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.16
Meat
1.12
2.37
2.30
4.80
1.71
1.74
0.00
0.00
2.16
Other_Agri
1.66
0.62
0.91
1.50
0.83
1.55
2.93
0.18
1.01
Food_Process
3.83
3.69
4.23
3.12
4.75
0.02
0.00
0.00
3.24
Minerals
0.04
0.06
0.20
0.24
0.02
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
Tex_Clo
8.49
8.35
12.37 12.33 13.04
11.61
2.54
5.81
8.71
Other_Mnfcs
1.59 1.71
1.30
1.70
1.34
1.84
0.00
0.00
0.26
Svces
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
Table A3 Initial Tariff Rates in EU
Unit: %
Indsutry
Rice
Exporting country
US
Japan Taiwan China Korea Bangladesh Tanzania Zambia ROW
73.60 93.84
0.00 43.18 89.15
24.04
0.00
0.00 50.45
Wheat
1.27
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
Meat
21.97
8.52
5.22
8.86
7.50
0.00
0.00
0.00 33.35
4.49
2.60
4.22 14.07 12.01
0.00
0.00
0.00
14.75 10.76
9.92 23.25 15.33
0.01
4.73
Other_Agri
Food_Process
0.74
6.42
87.08 15.48
Minerals
0.00
0.16
0.03
0.00
0.01
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
Tex_Clo
7.22
6.80
9.19
9.47
9.12
0.00
0.00
0.00
3.19
Other_Mnfcs
1.74
3.44
1.62
1.53
3.34
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.61
Svces
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
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Table A4 Initial Tariff Rates in Japan
Unit: %
Industry
Exporting country
US
EU
Taiwan China
Korea Bangladesh Tanzania Zambia ROW
Rice
804.46 898.60
0.00 1000.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00 588.84
Wheat
185.05 180.45
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00 181.03
15.54 55.34
49.99
0.00
0.00
41.11
225.27
Meat
55.34
66.75
40.11
Other_Agri
13.64
3.41
3.03
11.22
4.96
0.20
0.02
0.00
6.01
Food_Process
27.35
22.16
6.13
27.86 14.91
3.37
2.95
0.00
27.39
Minerals
0.00
0.08
0.06
0.04
0.10
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.02
Tex_Clo
9.23
12.39
7.29
9.66
9.91
0.21
0.00
0.00
7.74
Other_Mnfcs
0.41
0.54
0.40
0.19
1.00
0.00
0.07
0.00
0.45
Svces
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
Table A5 Initial Tariff Rates in Taiwan
Unit: %
Industry
Exporting country
US
EU
Japan China Korea Bangladesh
Tanzania
Zambia ROW
Rice
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
Wheat
7.00
3.91
7.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
4.61
37.15 23.87 15.91 33.80 26.50
0.00
0.00
0.00 25.20
5.55
7.51
0.11
0.00
15.31 13.67 19.96 26.19 17.18
4.10
10.83
Meat
Other_Agri
Food_Process
3.15
7.60
5.65
8.88
8.62
0.00 23.21
Minerals
0.11
1.63
0.07
0.02
0.97
0.00
0.46
0.00
1.96
Tex_Clo
5.00
9.84
7.95
9.43
6.48
5.93
0.89
1.36
8.16
Other_Mnfcs
2.03
6.03
4.01
3.49
2.59
7.02
1.98
0.72
2.01
Svces
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
19
The Doha Round and Least-Developed Countries
National Chengchi University
International Business Department
Table A6 Initial Tariff Rates in China
Unit: %
Industry
Exporting country
US
EU
Japan Taiwan Korea Bangladesh
Tanzania Zambia ROW
Rice
1.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.36
Wheat
1.00
0.99
1.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.99
Meat
12.69 16.99 17.97
12.89 13.47
0.00
0.00
0.00 14.82
Other_Agri
68.76 14.21
9.03
13.84 14.51
7.89
5.10
2.64 36.80
Food_Process
21.46 26.78 24.67
25.40 24.24
16.07
7.81
0.00 16.84
2.63
0.00
0.00
0.06
Minerals
2.54
2.06
2.84
3.14
0.22
Tex_Clo
16.98 16.68 21.70
19.91 18.84
8.41
14.18
0.00 18.23
Other_Mnfcs
10.29 13.56 12.85
12.10 12.24
15.27
10.92
2.93 10.71
0.00
0.00
Svces
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
Table A7 Initial Tariff Rates in South Korea
Unit: %
Industry
Exporting country
US
EU
Japan Taiwan China Bangladesh
Tanzania
Zambia ROW
Rice
9.90 0.00
0.00
0.00
9.90
0.00
0.00
0.00
9.88
Wheat
1.83 0.64
0.00
0.00
1.82
0.00
0.00
0.00
1.81
Meat
7.82 7.20
5.01
5.76
7.43
0.00
0.00
0.00
7.57
Other_Agri
9.39 5.56
5.78
4.38
9.58
2.54
6.44
0.00
8.99
Food_Process
6.94 7.59
7.33
6.61
7.61
5.35
3.68
0.00
6.61
Minerals
1.42 1.72
2.08
2.49
1.11
0.00
0.88
1.11
2.78
Tex_Clo
4.31 4.83
4.68
4.21
5.16
3.05
0.98
2.22
4.54
Other_Mnfcs
2.58 3.55
3.34
1.92
3.40
3.63
3.72
0.23
2.60
Svces
0.00 0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
20
The Doha Round and Least-Developed Countries
National Chengchi University
International Business Department
Table A8 Initial Tariff Rates in Bangladesh
Unit: %
Industry
Exporting country
US
EU
Japan
Taiwan China
Korea Tanzania Zambia ROW
Total
Rice
0.00
0.00
5.00
0.00
0.00
2.50
0.00
0.00
2.85
10.35
Wheat
5.00
5.00
5.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
4.99
19.99
Meat
1.41
10.21
22.72
18.41
23.92 23.54
0.00
0.00 24.60 124.80
Other_Agri
2.40
8.76
5.34
11.20
9.82 12.46
5.32
2.30
Food_Process 14.30
Minerals
0.22
26.85 21.93
23.14
27.92
0.00
0.00 19.41 151.46
6.02 23.94
25.50
0.00 25.28 106.89
Tex_Clo
27.67
31.07 28.71
30.47 35.12 32.48
0.00
0.00 24.28 209.80
Other_Mnfcs
8.44
10.81 16.71
17.59 15.24 16.23
8.26
12.16 18.10 123.53
Svces
0.00
Total
9.60
0.00
5.96
0.00
17.91
10.37
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
59.44 102.30 111.36 111.18 108.03 139.07
39.08
0.00
7.17
0.00
64.78
0.00
14.46 126.67 811.60
Table A9 Initial Tariff Rates in Tanzania
Unit: %
Industry
Rice
Exporting country
US
10.00
EU
Japan Taiwan China Korea Bangladesh
0.00 10.00
Zambia ROW
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
7.28
Wheat
0.00 12.48
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00 12.48
Meat
15.52 17.03
0.00
18.99
1.24
0.00
0.00
0.00 16.12
Other_Agri
18.46 14.54
5.94
0.00 10.39
1.67
4.72
23.18 16.42
Food_Process
24.94 22.29 24.78
9.73 24.87 19.97
0.00
24.99 21.83
Minerals
13.80
5.00
0.00
0.00
Tex_Clo
18.73 20.48 15.22
22.54 20.68 17.54
20.00
21.72 21.47
Other_Mnfcs
13.98 12.81 10.40
13.56 16.30 11.03
19.98
16.80 12.23
Svces
0.00
6.66
0.00
5.00
0.00
0.00
21
5.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
8.18
0.00
8.84
0.00
The Doha Round and Least-Developed Countries
National Chengchi University
International Business Department
Table A10 Initial Tariff Rates in Zambia
Unit: %
Industry
Exporting country
US
EU
Japan Taiwan China Korea Bangladesh
Tanzania
ROW
Rice
0.00
5.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
5.00
4.13
Wheat
0.00
4.98
5.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
4.35
Meat
0.00 22.36
0.00
0.00
3.45
0.00
0.00
18.01
8.01
Other_Agri
5.12
7.07
0.00 12.24
0.00
0.00
14.89
3.97
4.73
7.06 14.98
0.00
11.53 11.90
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
17.11 22.94 15.51
25.00
Food_Process
Minerals
Tex_Clo
9.32
11.17 15.17 10.88
0.00
4.27
0.00
24.63 20.90 10.98
0.00
1.35
22.32 17.52
Other_Mnfcs
7.97
7.92 11.61
9.55
8.64 11.16
6.49
10.43
8.08
Svces
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
Table A11 Initial Tariff Rates in the Rest of World
Unit: %
Industry
Exporting country
US
EU
Japan Taiwan China Korea Bangladesh
Tanzania Zambia
Rice
9.59 13.08
0.03
0.00 12.36
9.00
0.00
5.24
0.00
Wheat
5.94 16.59
9.14
0.00
7.98
4.66
98.67
13.51
0.00
Meat
18.50 26.99
9.74
9.01 17.44 21.34
39.87
10.83
1.80
8.90 13.32
2.89
5.68
7.88
9.82
14.98
7.19
15.12 10.60 24.81
19.79
8.67
13.77
1.41
0.00
5.73
1.36
11.57 12.44 14.28
9.32
13.29
12.93
Other_Agri
Food_Process
14.84 18.47 10.10
7.53
Minerals
0.87
2.26
Tex_Clo
6.36
9.28 11.27
Other_Mnfcs
2.86
5.69
7.08
4.67
5.83
8.52
8.27
14.21
6.50
Svces
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.19
3.99
3.76
22
7.79
The Doha Round and Least-Developed Countries
National Chengchi University
International Business Department
Appendix : Current general situation of three LDCs
Table A12 Output subsidies in Bangladesh, Tanzania, and Zambia
Unit: %
Industry
Bangladesh
Tanzania
Zambia
Rice
0
0
-0.1
4.5
0
-0.4
0
-2.3
0
Other_Agri
-137.6
-35.4
-6
Food_Process
-187.2
187.2
-10.3
-9.3
Minerals
-152.2
-47.5
-2.9
Tex_Clo
500.1
-3.3
-10
-447.7
-11.5
-176.7
Svces
113
-39.2
-34.7
Total
-307
-149.5
-239.9
Wheat
Meat
Other_Mnfcs
Import partner
Tanzania
China 12%, Kenya 8%, South Africa 7.7%, India 6.9%, UAE 5.9% (2007)
Zambia
South Africa 47.4%, UAE 6.3%, China 6%, India 4.1%, UK 4% (2007)
Bangladesh
China 15%, India 14.3%, Kuwait 8.3%, Singapore 6.2%, Hong Kong 4.2% (2007)
Export partner
Tanzania
China 10.3%, India 9.7%, Netherlands 6.5%, Germany 6.3%, UAE 4.9% (2007)
Zambia
Switzerland 41.8%, South Africa 12%, Thailand 5.9%, Democratic Republic of the
Congo 5.3%, Egypt 5%, Saudi Arabia 4.7%, China 4.1% (2007)
Bangladesh
US 23%, Germany 13%, UK 9.1%, France 5.5%, Belgium 4% (2007)
Source: https://www.cia.gov/index.html
23