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Contemporary Buddhism, Vol. 4, No. 1, 2003
Identifying Inclusivism in
Buddhist Contexts
Kristin Beise Kiblinger
Thiel College, USA
Introduction
The literature analyzing Christian attitudes towards non-Christian religions is
now quite extensive. When it comes to Buddhist attitudes towards nonBuddhists, however, the scholarship lags far behind. A few pieces can be found
on such topics as ‘Buddhism and dialogue’ or ‘Buddhism and toleration’.
Comparative work on particular topics abounds and there are numerous works
that discuss the problems of religious plurality generally, but there still is
relatively little rigorous work utilizing the categories of exclusivism, inclusivism,
and pluralism with specific reference to Buddhism. Occasionally these terms are
loosely applied to Buddhist behaviors, but we lack extended accounts of just
what each of these terms might mean in Buddhist contexts.
Of these options for responding to religious others, inclusivism, in particular,
has been enjoying widespread popularity nowadays. Many seek to justify
inclusivism using the resources of their respective religious systems. Accordingly, Christian writers have already produced a body of work developing
theological justifications for inclusivistic reasoning. Contemplating the proper
Christian response to plurality, they have distinguished various types of inclusivism and endorsed some while criticizing others. The time is at hand for
Buddhists and scholars of Buddhism to take up this sort of work.
I aim, therefore, to get the ball rolling by exploring inclusivism in Buddhist
contexts. I do so in order to encourage Buddhists and scholars to develop more
theoretical work on Buddhist responses to religious diversity and in order to mine
Buddhist cases for the light that they shed on the nature of inclusivism in general.
I selectively survey evidence of inclusivism among Buddhists in order to
categorize and compare patterns in the moves and resources that Buddhists have
used in the service of responding inclusivistically towards non-Buddhists. This
overview is a first step before Buddhists and scholars of Buddhism can reflect
with more precision on the desirability of specific inclusivistic moves.
My ancestor in this project, the late German Indologist Paul Hacker, created
a stir with his short, pioneering piece on inclusivism in the Indian context. (In
fact, he asserted that inclusivism is a particularly Indian form of thought,
although that claim has been decisively refuted by many scholars.) He explored
several examples from Hinduism but, regrettably, only a couple from Buddhism.
Beginning where he left off, I gather many more examples from Buddhist cases
and, as a result, challenge his characterization of Buddhist inclusivism.
ISSN 1463-9947 print; 1476-7953 online/03/010079-19  2003 Taylor & Francis Ltd
DOI: 10.1080/1463994032000140194
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K. B. Kiblinger
As defined by Hacker, inclusivism is seeing the central portion of a foreign
worldview as identical to the central representation of the group to which one
belongs oneself. It is telling the other, ‘What you mean when you say x is what
we mean when we say y, and y is a better way to understand it’. Furthermore,
Hacker wrote that these identifications are typically asserted without proof or
justification and ‘without consideration for the fact that this led to contradiction’.
(Later, however, he did qualify that not absolutely every case directly involves
an identification.) Hacker felt that inclusivism is a method of argument
(Auseinandersetzung) in which one polemicizes against the opponent indirectly,
on the one hand accepting the other’s concepts and, on the other, subordinating
them to one’s own view. The context for inclusivism, Hacker thought, tends to
be a situation in which a weak, minority tradition or one with an inferiority
complex (Unterlegenheitsgefühl) asserts itself against a stronger or majority
tradition — although, again, there are exceptions to this. Inclusivism, that is,
tends to be a compensation for a frustration.
Hacker’s classic case is the ‘tat tvam asi’ of Chāndogya Upanisad. Here the
text is saying, according to Hacker, ‘What you mean when you speak about satya,
what you mean when you speak to others about ātman, this is precisely what
I have in mind and what I here assert more precisely as Being (Seiende) …’.
Hacker explained that this accepts others’ ātman and satya, but through
inclusivism places Being or Brahman above them.
When Hacker turned to Theravāda Buddhism’s Dı̄ghanikāya, however, he saw
a different type of inclusivism, one that reflects a superiority complex (Überlegenheitsbewusstsein) and is an inclusivism of strength (Kraft). These Buddhist
texts interpret Brahmanical concepts in a new way, ethicizing them; they
re-conceive tapas as spiritual striving, and no longer as physical or outwardly
painful; and they reform sacrifice to be something non-violent. The Buddhists
take what they can use from the others’ concepts, do what they like with them,
and then discard the inessential things. In the process they thereby assert
themselves.
Hacker concluded that the most important thing to realize is that with
inclusivism the foreign items remain unchanged for the most part — except in
the case of the inclusivism of strength, which might be seen as re-interpretation.
Hacker (1983) preferred to classify this still within the category of inclusivism,
but as a special type (Hacker 1983). But just as most scholars find unconvincing
Hacker’s claim that inclusivism is particularly Indian, I find unconvincing his
claim that this last form of inclusivism is particularly Buddhist. The additional
examples that I have gathered provide more extensive variety among Buddhist
cases of inclusivism, and thus support my case.
Also in contrast to Hacker, here inclusivism is defined more broadly as
openness to including the other (or something of the other’s) while still taking
care to uphold a sense of superiority for the home religious system. For example,
an inclusivist might accept as true a doctrine (or many doctrines) from a foreign
religious system, but at the same time maintain that the home tradition teaches
more (or more crucial) truths than alien traditions. Or, one might admit that a
religious other could attain liberation or salvation as conceived by the home
Identifying Inclusivism in Buddhist Contexts
81
group despite belonging to another religion, while at the same time understanding
that membership in the home tradition is advantageous for achieving that
ultimate fulfillment.
So the term in use here casts a wide net, allowing many different methods and
warrants for inclusions. All that is required is that there is acknowledgement of
a provisional, subordinate, or supplementary place within the home religious
system for some element(s) from one or more alien traditions. Inclusivists
deliberately look for the potential contributions of religious others to the home
tradition and use their own system as a filter for selecting borrowings from the
outside, borrowings that will not disrupt the coherence of the home system or
obstruct its aims.
It is important to realize that, for me, inclusivists may, but need not,
incorporate another tradition as a whole. One may be inclusivistic in my sense
while still rejecting numerous or even central aspects of alien religious systems.
In other words, one may be inclusivistic towards others in one respect, but
exclusivistic in another.
It may be helpful to compare this term with related ones, in order to avoid
confusion. Syncretism, for example, is a broader category than inclusivism. It
includes all ways that religious traditions have mixed and influenced each other,
all ways that the boundaries of traditions have been fluid historically. Inclusivism
is just one subtype of syncretism marked by selective and principled absorptions
that meet the characteristics specified earlier. Another subtype is eclecticism,
which for me will refer to uncritical or arbitrary mixing that does not respect
one tradition as primary, uphold communal standards of orthodoxy, or harmonize
well the accepted pieces into a unified, consistent system. Finally, tolerance
connotes a sense of putting up with something, not liking it, but not actively
opposing it either. Inclusivism, in contrast, is more assertive and positive with
regard to the other. It not only allows the foreign thing in question, but embraces
it as good (although sometimes with qualification), incorporating it into the home
worldview in some capacity.
Having clarified the terminology, let me put just a few more parameters on
the table. In the discussion that follows, I offer selected Buddhist expressions
that can reasonably be interpreted as instances of inclusivism. But I stress that,
although I purposefully collect cases from a wide range of Buddhist traditions
and time periods, I do not aspire to comprehensiveness; illustrative examples
showing a range of precedents will suffice to serve my purposes. Nor do I mean
to imply in any way that Buddhists as a whole typically have been, or are,
inclusivists. Differences among Buddhist communities and schools of thought
will produce various responses to religious plurality, but I am simply limiting
my focus to inclusivist forms. Admittedly, I provide minimal contextualization
and idealize types, but that is because my interests are theoretical; I am not
particularly interested here in historical explanations of Buddhist attitudes. And,
finally, although the romanticized perception of the Buddhist tradition as an
exceptionally tolerant and inclusivistic one needs to be complicated, I will
reserve evaluation of the patterns seen for another occasion. That is a further step,
beyond the work offered here.
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I begin with interpretations from inclusivist-minded Buddhists about the
examples for responding to religious others set by Siddhartha Gautama and
Aśoka. (In this case what matters, as Richard Gombrich has said, is not so much
the historical question of what the Buddha said, but rather what his hearers have
heard (Gombrich 1996, 21).) Next, I discuss inclusivism towards Vedic religion
as seen in Pali texts, again because these texts are used by inclusivists to sanction
methods for responding to religious others generally. Later I turn to the
Mahāyāna treatment of the Hı̄nayāna, especially as reflected in the
Mahāyānasūtrālam
kāra and the Saddharmapun d arı̄kasūtra. Although the
Mahāyāna attitude towards the Hı̄nayāna is an intra-Buddhist issue, not an
instance of inter-religious inclusivism, the patterns seen are nevertheless important, because often the same moves made towards the Hı̄nayāna are applied as
well towards non-Buddhist systems. This leads into a discussion of tools for
inclusivism that are associated with the Mahāyāna, in particular. Finally, I turn
to examples of inclusivism taken from Buddhism’s spread through Asia and,
more recently, to the West.
The Examples of Siddhartha and Aśoka
In their efforts to appeal to the example of Siddhartha Gautama, Buddhists have
made many claims about the approach of Gautama towards non-Buddhists,
drawing on authoritative texts.1 With the examples in this section and in the
following section on inclusiveness towards Vedic religion, I mean to emphasize
the use that inclusivists have made of these texts more than I intend to interpret
the texts themselves. To defend or refute inclusivistic readings of each of these
sample texts would exceed the limits of my project, although I must at least show
the texts’ potential in that regard. It will be enough here, I hope, if I can point
out stories that have been used as justification and explain why such references
are thought to support the inclusivist cause. Anything mentioned that raises
doubts about inclusivists’ use of these texts only supports the assumption
underlying my work overall: that inclusivist-minded Buddhists have not reflected
sufficiently on their moves and justifications; they have not developed their
position adequately.
First, the Mahāparinibbāna Sutta is often cited because it says that the Buddha
on his deathbed indicated that the key ingredient of any useful religious system
— and thus the criterion for assessing others — is the presence of the eight-fold
path. The context is that Subhadda has asked the Buddha what he should think
regarding various religious teachers, all of whom claim to have special insight.
One passage reads:
In whatever doctrine and discipline, Subhadda, the noble eightfold path is
not found, there the saman a (i.e, the Arhat) is not found either … And in
whatever doctrine and discipline, Subhadda, the noble eightfold path is
found, there is found the saman a also … (Chapter 5, 27)
Inclusivist-minded Buddhists typically do not, however, address the next lines,
which read:
Identifying Inclusivism in Buddhist Contexts
83
Now in this doctrine and discipline (i.e., Buddhism), Subhadda, the noble
eightfold path is found, and here alone, Subhadda, is the saman a. The
systems of others are empty with respect to the perfect knowledge of
saman as. And in this one, Subhadda, may the bhikkhus live rightly, so
that the world is not empty of Arhats. (Müller 1968, 106–7; author’s
translation)
Inclusivistic Buddhists, referring just to the former piece of this conversation
with Subhadda, assert that tradition here records a founder who identified
Buddhist criteria by which others are to be measured. They want to read the text
to indicate that the Buddha left open the possibility that Buddhist teachings may
exist in other forms in alien traditions and that other traditions may be accepted
to the extent that they do overlap with Buddhist teachings. In light of the latter
part of the excerpt, it is clear that no other tradition is thought to measure up
to Buddhism fully. But whether the text here still leaves room for lower level
value in other traditions depends on whether you take it to be saying that other
traditions are empty in the sense of totally empty of worth, or whether you take
it to be saying that they are void just in the sense that they do not lead to the
supreme end, the end to which Buddhism alone leads. In the latter case, the
other systems are void compared with Buddhism; they are inferior, but not
absolutely void.
Another text frequently referenced by inclusivist-minded Buddhists is the
Upāli Sutta, in which a prominent Jain becomes a follower of the Buddha.
When Upāli expresses his wish to change his allegiance from Jainism to
Buddhism, Gautama hesitates and cautions him because the conversion of a
man of his stature would have many repercussions. Eventually, Gautama does
accept him as a disciple, but at the same time the Buddha advises him not to
withdraw his patronage to the Jains, which further impresses Upāli.
This story is often interpreted to imply that Gautama saw the limited value,
at least, of other traditions, for he is concerned that patronage for the other
communities continue, and he is not in much of a hurry to pull Upāli away from
the alien tradition. Furthermore, the Buddha’s hesitancy to accept a convert is
sometimes interpreted to support the view that Upāli’s native Jainism may be
suitable to or helpful for his needs and disposition, at least at this stage of his
spiritual development. Eventually, however, it is thought that Buddhism can
take him further.2 Finally, for inclusivists it is significant that Buddhism’s
respectful attitude towards religious others is portrayed as an attractive, superior
feature of Buddhism that draws converts into the faith.
Perhaps the story to which inclusivistic Buddhists most often appeal in
discussions of the Buddha’s attitude, however, is the Kālāma Sutta (Aṅguttaranikāya, Tika-Nipāta, Mahā Vagga). In this sutta, the Kālāma clan of Kesaputta
had heard the differing views of numerous teachers, each of whom disparaged
the others’ teachings, claiming superiority for his own, causing confusion and
doubt among the people. When confronted with these conflicting teachings, the
Buddha advises the people:
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Now look you, Kālāmas. Do not be misled by report or tradition or
hearsay. Do not be misled by proficiency in the collections, nor by mere
logic or inference, nor after considering reasons, nor after reflection on
and approval of some theory … nor out of respect for a recluse (who
holds it). But, Kālāmas, when you know for yourselves: These things are
unprofitable, these things are blameworthy, these things are censured by
the intelligent; these things, when performed and undertaken, conduce to
loss and sorrow — then indeed you should reject them, Kālāmas. (Morris
1885, 188–93; Woodward 1932, 170–5)3
This story is usually read by supporters of inclusivism to be recommending
open-minded (or, to stretch it, even optimistic) exploration of alien systems
alongside Buddhism. Second, inclusivists read the text to be stressing individualism and pragmatism in deciding the worth of others’ teachings, again
suggesting that differences in capabilities and needs may justify the practice of
various faiths, at least temporarily, and that other traditions may share some
lower-level benefits with Buddhism. Most agree, however, that the Buddha is
meant to be seen as confident that Buddhism in the end will appear most
conducive to well-being, especially when one’s judgment is highly developed.
Finally, especially popular (although not uniquely Buddhist) is the story of
the blind men and the elephant. In this tale, the blind men, each of whom
touches one part of the elephant only, represent religious others. They are
portrayed as bickering with one another because each has had a different
experience of the elephant, whereas it is implied that the Buddha, not blind, has
seen the whole and thus can rise above the dispute. Certainly, this is an
unfavorable characterization of other religious teachers, but on the other hand,
the analogy does imply the partial truth, at least, of others’ (limited) religious
viewpoints and provides an image for a way to harmonize other views with
Buddhism under a model of partial versus full truth.
Like Gautama, the figure of Aśoka is similarly cited by inclusivists as another
model for how to respond to and live alongside religious others. Contemporary
Buddhist inclusivists appeal especially to the Seventh and Twelfth Rock Edicts,
two of many inscriptions around Aśoka’s empire referred to as dharmaśrāvan a
(proclamations of morality). In these edicts, Aśoka expresses his wish that
members of all faiths will live together peacefully in his kingdom, recognizing
that many virtues are shared by the various religious traditions, despite their
varying forms. Explicitly, he disparages intolerance and exclusivity (Nikam and
McKeon 1978, 51–2).
The Sanskrit Aśokāvadāna, or Legend of Aśoka, tells the story of Aśoka’s
transformation from the Fierce King to the great Dharma King after a change
of heart following the Kaliṅga War and his conversion to Buddhism. Initially,
the Aśokāvadāna depicts Aśoka as extremely intolerant and exclusivistic. Aśoka
does not change his ways until his own brother, mistaken for a Jain, is beheaded
and presented to him for a reward. Following the advice of his ministers, from
that time forward the king is tolerant and respectful of the positive qualities
shared in common by many religious traditions (Strong 1983, 231–3). It is this
Identifying Inclusivism in Buddhist Contexts
85
new and improved, more spiritually advanced legendary king whom inclusivists
emphasize.
The model of inclusivism towards Vedic religion
Inclusivists also point to texts that seem to them to express inclusivism towards
Vedic religion. These texts contain Buddhist inclusivistic strategies that might
be categorized as subordination, re-interpretation, and new application.
Let us look first at the treatment of Vedic gods, such as the attitude expressed
towards Brahmā found in the Kevaddha Sutta. Here we see a clear example of
subordination. In general, Buddhism preserves reference to the Vedic gods and
still considers them very high beings, yet the gods are described as inferior to
the Buddha in several ways: they remain bound by karma, are no longer seen
as immortal or able to bring about salvation, and are tainted by ignorance.
In the Kevaddha Sutta, Brahmā’s subordination to the Buddha is emphasized.
A man unsuccessfully looks for the answer to a question. He eventually takes
his question all the way to the Brahmā world, but even the gods there do not
know the answer. They send him to Brahmā himself, whose greatness is thickly
described. Brahmā dodges the question repeatedly before finally taking the man
aside and saying that, although he did not want to admit it in front of his retinue,
he does not know the answer either. He tells the questioning man to ask the
Buddha. Finally, it is the Buddha himself who explains the answer4 (Rhys Davids
and Carpenter 1903; Müller 1968). Inclusivists conclude that Brahmā can still
be highly esteemed, but that the Buddha is far superior.
In addition, inclusivist-minded Buddhists sometimes point to texts that they
read to show evidence of inclusivism towards Vedic sacrifice. In these cases,
however, we see the techniques of significant re-interpretation and new application rather than subordination. A good example is the Kūtadanta Sutta, in
which the brahmin Kūtadanta, wanting every detail of his planned sacrifice to
be done properly so that he would accrue as much merit as possible, approaches
Gautama for advice. He is taught by the Buddha to re-interpret the sacrifice. The
three modes of Vedic sacrifice correlate to states of mind. The sixteen conditions
(requirements concerning the altar, the priest’s clothes, etc.) are re-conceived as
the cooperation of the four classes of people (the ksatriyas, the ministers and
officials, the brahmins, and the householders); as eight qualities of the sacrificing
king (being well-born, handsome, wealthy, powerful, generous, learned, articulate, and intelligent); and as four qualities of the advising brahmin (being
well-born, learned, virtuous, and intelligent). Furthermore, the killing of animals
is replaced with offerings of milk, butter, and honey.
Then, even this sort of re-fashioned Vedic sacrifice is put at the bottom of a
hierarchical list of Buddhist practices, which are also construed as types of higher
‘sacrifice’. Gautama says that building a vihāra for the Order is a better kind of
sacrifice; even better is taking refuge in the Buddha, Sangha, and Dharma with
a trusting heart; even better is taking the precepts, and so on; the list continues
all the way up the ladder to the attainment of Arhatship5 (Rhys Davids 1899,
163–4; Rhys Davids and Carpenter 1903, 127–49; Müller 1968, 160–85).
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Revealing yet another kind of method, James Egge has illustrated what I
will call a re-application strategy in his discussion of how almsgiving was seen
in terms of Vedic sacrificial discourse in early Buddhist gāthā literature. Here
the texts seem to include something from Vedic religion not so much by
re-fashioning Vedic sacrifice, but more by applying Vedic notions of sacrifice
to the Buddhist practice of almsgiving, resulting in a new, Buddhist application
of a Vedic notion. Buddhists appropriated Vedic forms, Egge explains, when
they understood the Buddha or Buddhist monastic, rather than the sacred fire
and Vedic deity, to be the recipient of offerings. This new use for the older
paradigm was possible because the daksin ā, or gift to the priest that accompanies a Vedic sacrifice, was seen as an independent sacrifice. At the same time,
however, distance was placed between Vedic and Buddhist practices because of
the shift to sacrificial rituals that did not involve killing and because the
recipients of Buddhist ‘sacrifices’ were deemed superior (Egge 1998, 6, 21–2,
43–65, 80–92).
As a final example of texts treating Vedic religion that are used by
inclusivists, let us turn to the Aggañña Sutta. Here inclusivists focus on the
Buddha’s response towards brahmins and the van n a system. A brahmin is said
to be not someone born into a certain superior class (van n a), but rather someone
who is superior ethically. The twist on this method of re-interpretation by
ethicization, however, is that the Buddhist interpretation is claimed to be what
the Vedic system itself taught originally, before it became corrupted over time.
In other words, the Buddhists are rejecting aspects of Vedic beliefs and
practices, but they also are re-conceiving something from the others in order
to make it accord with Buddhist sensibilities and thus be acceptable. The
Buddha of the sutta justifies this move with the claim that this understanding
represents the original intention of Vedic teachings in pure form, charging that
the others’ interpretation is not true to their own ancient scriptures and
cosmogonies.
The Buddha says in the sutta that when brahmins speak of themselves as
purified, born from Brahmā, the heirs of Brahmā, and so on (as opposed to
inferior classes), they are not remembering the past and are slandering Brahmā,
speaking falsely, and generating de-merit. Or sometimes the Buddha says that
they recall the original, primary words, but they do not understand them, having
forgotten their real meaning. He then discusses how moral sins are found in
each class of people, as is good behavior. The Buddha concludes that it is the
Arhat who is really the best or highest. The Arhat is the embodiment of what
is meant by ‘brahmin’ (Carpenter 1911, 80–98; Collins 1993).
Inclusivists do not address the objection that this re-definition of the meaning
of brahmin is satirical and that this text might therefore be more polemical than
inclusive.6 Nevertheless, satire can still convey sincere points, as it does here.
The fact that the Buddhist text is satirical with Brahmanical terms and is trying
to come up with an acceptable way to understand them does allow the reading
that this is a form of inclusivism. However, satire can perhaps be a warning sign
of a less sincere or weak form of inclusivism, one that has to work hard to put
to use the foreign item by re-interpreting it or by telling others what they are
Identifying Inclusivism in Buddhist Contexts
87
supposed to be doing or meaning. This is the type of Buddhist case that Hacker
focuses on, and helps explain his generalizations about Buddhist inclusivist
forms.
The patterns set by Mahāyāna treatment of the Hı̄nayāna
I move now to a discussion of how Mahāyāna Buddhist texts have treated
Buddhist others (Hı̄nayāna Buddhists), because the identified moves set a
pattern for Buddhist treatment of non-Buddhist others as well, as we will see
later. I draw especially on the three-vehicle (triyāna) theory expressed in the
Mahāyānasūtrālam
kāra and then contrast this with the one-vehicle (ekayāna)
theory found in the Saddharmapun d arı̄kasūtra, or the Lotus Sutra.7
The Mahāyānasūtrālam
kāra sees the Hı̄nayāna traditions (śrāvaka-yānas and
pratyekabuddha-yānas) as eliminating suffering by teaching no-self in persons
and by purifying beings of afflictive obstructions (kleśāvaran a), leading to
nirvana. The Mahāyāna vehicle, in contrast, according to the text, surpasses this.
The Mahāyāna acknowledges the truth of no-self not only in persons, but also
in phenomena. The higher vehicle removes not only afflictive hindrances
(kleśāvaran a), but also cognitive obstructions (jñeyāvaran a). It not only helps
sentient beings to end the cycle of rebirths, but also helps them to attain
omniscience and buddhahood (D’Amato 2000).
What is most important about this text’s three-vehicle theory of Buddhist
others is that here both vehicles lead to their own final ends rather than serving
only as stepping stones to the higher vehicle’s end. As teachers, buddhas and
bodhisattvas are understood to use both Hı̄nayāna and Mahāyāna vehicles, not
teaching that all must use the same, or the best, vehicle. They lead sentient
beings to distinct ends (i.e., buddhahood or nirvana), not necessarily to the same
end, and those ends are ranked hierarchically. Thus, this text expresses threevehicle theory because there are, in the end, multiple vehicles that do not reduce
to a common one.
Applying this three-vehicle model now to the inter-religious context, Buddhists may see non-Buddhist religions as having final ends distinct from the
home Buddhist ones. Inclusivistically, those ends may be deemed good but less
than the ideal (because the ideal would be the Buddhist goal). In other words,
the three-vehicle view suggests an alternative to using the common core theory
of religions as an approach to inclusivism.
The Lotus Sutra as well as the Śrı̄mālādevı̄sim
hanāda Sūtra, in contrast,
teach the ekayāna or one-vehicle theory. Buddhahood is, according to this view,
the one and only efficacious goal; all others are merely provisional. This view
teaches that all will eventually attain the supreme Mahāyāna goal (i.e., buddhahood) and, ultimately, can do so only through the bodhisattva vehicle. There is
only one final fulfillment; there cannot be different final ends. Here the
non-Mahāyāna others are included but only by positing that they are inevitably
aids for or stages advancing towards the Mahāyāna. Multiple ways are merged
into a single path along which only the Mahāyāna vehicle can take you the
whole way.
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The second chapter of the Lotus Sutra and the famous burning house parable
are especially important for understanding how the ekayāna theory is carried
out. The Mahāyāna includes the non-Mahāyāna by using the notion of skillful
means (upāyakauśalya), according to which buddhas supposedly modify their
teachings to suit their audiences’ spiritual levels and stages of development.
This creates an apparent plurality of teachings but, when viewed from an
advanced perspective, these diverse teachings cooperate in furthering a single
message or goal (Kern 1963, 82–97; Kern and Nanjio 1977, 83–9).
Seen as a model for inter-religious inclusivism, then, the one-vehicle pattern
imposes on other practices a hidden Buddhist teleology. It has much in common
with the anonymous Christian style of inclusivism made famous by Karl Rahner
— we might even call it ‘anonymous Buddhism’. This method asserts that
religious others might implicitly or anonymously follow a path oriented to the
Buddhist goal while not explicitly or consciously acknowledging the Buddhist
ultimate reality or teachings. In addition, notice that this technique of inclusivism fits well with the common core theory of religions. As we will see later,
numerous particular moves associated with Mahāyāna concepts fall under this
one-vehicle philosophy.8
Mahāyāna tools employed in the service of inter-religious
inclusivism
The notion of skillful means, as already described, is one of several tools of
Mahāyāna Buddhism that has been widely used to formulate inclusivistic
stances. For example, His Holiness the Dalai Lama explicitly says that, when
he thinks about skillful means aimed toward varying dispositions, he is ‘able to
truly appreciate the richness and value of other traditions, because it enables
[him] to extend the same principles of diversity to other [non-Buddhist]
traditions as well’ (Dalai Lama 1996, 72). In Spiritual Advice for Buddhists and
Christians, he writes:
… [G]iven the vast array of humanity — of so many different kinds of
people, of so many people with differing mental dispositions — we need
a variety of religious traditions and so it is far better to have this
variety … [I]t is not a question of which religion is superior as such. The
question is, which will better cure a particular person … [F]or certain
people a Christian method is much more effective than others. Muslims
find their own approach to better suit their lives. So we cannot say, ‘this
religion is good, that religion is not good’ … So it is on this basis that it
is extremely important to appreciate all the different religious traditions of
the world … (Dalai Lama 1998, 15–8)
Another related Mahāyāna notion heavily used (even by Theravāda Buddhists)
is the theory of the two truths — that is, conventional and ultimate. For
example, in his Christianity and Buddhism, Bhikkhu Buddhadāsa of Thailand
writes,
Identifying Inclusivism in Buddhist Contexts
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To put it in conventional language we may say that Christianity is a
religion which relies on external help, whereas Buddhism teaches the way
of self-help. Thus there is, ordinarily speaking, no possibility of their
going together. But speaking in the language of Dhamma or from the
view-point of absolute truth by keeping in mind the truth hidden in
between the letters … there definitely is a possibility of blending. And
how? In the language of Dhamma, God and the ‘Law of Karma’ are one
and the same thing. (1967, 3–7, 22–32, 66–79)
The theory of the two truths is related, in turn, to the concept of emptiness. This
notion (śūnyatā) conveys the teaching that all persons and phenomena lack
independent and enduring essences. It points to the relative, conditioned nature
of all things. And since words and concepts are associated with reference to
enduring entities, emptiness teaching treats language and views with caution.
Four-fold negation refutes all logically possible views on a topic: x cannot be
y, nor non-y, nor both, nor neither. In this way, Buddhists often see emptiness,
or śūnyatā, as an antidote to all positions (rather than itself another position),
so that Buddhism becomes not just one religion among others, but stands above
all, transcending religion with a qualitative leap. Buddhists claim that their
religion represents a non-view or special, exceptional view that, by its very
nature, trumps all particular views.
One example of the way that emptiness supports inclusivism can be found in
the writing of Judith Simmer-Brown, an American Buddhist in the Tibetan
tradition, and another example is also provided in the next section. Employing
the catuskoti, Simmer-Brown shows the implications of śūnyatā for dialogue
with the other. Revealing the problems inherent in considering the dialogue
partner as the same, totally other, both, or neither, she brings us to ‘a
positionless position’, which is labeled emptiness. She writes:
Authentic exchanges dawn when the presuppositions concerning the
relationship [between self and other] begin to break down … Out of this
positionless position, tremendous warmth and interest arise naturally. In
environments such as these, attempts to appropriate, categorize, or subjugate the partner have been given up … When we have this kind of
interest, we appreciate that the truth of the other person is his or her own,
and we might learn from the partner’s truth. (Simmer-Brown 2000)
Finally, let us consider the Three Body doctrine developed by the Yogācārins.
According to this teaching, Buddhahood has three aspects: Nirmān a-kāya
(transformation body), Sambhoga-kāya (enjoyment body), and the Dharma-kāya
(Dharma body). Three Body theory’s notion of Buddha appearing in diverse
forms has proven useful for inclusivist-minded Buddhists. D.T. Suzuki, for
example, has said that non-Buddhist religious teachers may be seen also as
transformation bodies appearing in order to suit the needs of a particular culture
(Harvey 1990, 126). In addition, Shingon and Tendai schools responded
inclusivistically towards Shintoism by teaching that the most popular kamis
(Shintō deities) were manifestations of buddhas and bodhisattvas. Amaterasu,
for example, was identified with Vairocana Buddha.
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Examples from Buddhism’s spread
This section provides additional examples taken from Buddhism’s spread
beyond India through Asia, and even to the West. Although some examples
from beyond India were provided already in the previous section, additional
ones here will fill out my account and introduce as yet unexplained inclusivist
maneuvers. I begin with moves that fit a hierarchical ranking model, and then
discuss moves that are inclusive without necessarily ranking.
The Three Teachings (i.e., Confucianism, Taoism, and Buddhism combined
into one religious movement) in China during the Ming Period (1368–1644) is
a classic example of Buddhist inclusivism that ranks in order to harmonize.
Buddhist leader Han-shan Te-ch’ing (1546–1623) said that the sages of the
Three Teachings ‘taught men according to their several capacities: Confucianism represented the human vehicle, Taoism the heavenly vehicle, and the
Bodhisattva the vehicle which transcended them both. Confucianism was
suitable for teaching ethics, Taoism for getting men beyond desires, and
Buddhism for completing their transformation’ (Berling 1997, 52–8). Te-ch’ing
saw these other traditions not as totally false, but nor are they final truths. The
other vehicles are useful as instruments, yet he warned at the same time that,
if clung to, they become hindrances (Hsu 1979, 24–5, 51–4, 115–9).
Yet another way to employ a hierarchical strategy is to assign different
domains or separate functions to Buddhism and its rivals, so long as Buddhism
remains supreme. According to John Powers’s work on Tibetan Buddhism,
Buddhists managed to co-exist with and incorporate aspects of the indigenous
Bön religion mostly by relegating to each religion a different domain or
function. That is, Bön was practiced for mundane or pragmatic goals, whereas
Buddhism aided attainment of final liberation (Powers 1995, 433–8). Similarly,
in Japanese Dual Aspect or Ryōbu Shintō (which mixes Shintō with Buddhism,
as seen especially in the Shingon school), Shintō is assigned worldly duties
while Buddhism is assigned responsibility for what is to come after death and
longer-term concerns (Bunce 1955, 10–1, 69–70).
Inclusivism by way of re-interpretation is also common within ranking
inclusivistic strategies. Albrecht Wezler writes about Englishwoman Rōshi Jiyu
Kennet, a Soto Zen nun living in California. She discusses how wrong eating,
incorrect breathing, and bad posture during zazen practice can cause hallucinations and visions. Such phenomena are called makyō. She says that, according
to Dōgen Zenji, all of these abnormalities are simply proof that one ‘has got
himself caught up in gedo Zen, the second and dangerous stage of meditation
through which all must pass’. Kennett groups Christian claims under this
category:
This explains how some Christian saints, after great ascetic practices,
have had visions of God and angels. These visions do not mean that they
are any nearer to heaven but simply that, having punished their bodies
excessively, their minds created a balance so as to make them stop doing
so … The mass hallucination of the Christian disciples who, after the
Identifying Inclusivism in Buddhist Contexts
91
crucifixion, saw Christ ‘risen from the dead’, as they thought, is explained
quite easily by the overwrought state of their minds at the time (Wezler
1983, 68–70).
According to Wezler, classifying the miracles of Jesus, the visions of the
Christian saints, the resurrection of Christ from the dead, and so on as makyō
can be interpreted as an expression of an inclusivistic attitude, for this
classification is not merely dismissing these Christian things as illusion, but
rather is seeing them as markers of a stage of religious progress (even if one
is to leave them behind and move to the next stage) (Wezler 1983, 68–70).
Yet another example of re-interpretation has to do with Chinese Buddhist
concerns to include the Confucian virtue of filial piety. Chinese Buddhists have
re-interpreted the concept of filial piety itself so as to make Buddhism
exemplify a superior sort of filial piety. Although the Buddhists admitted that
leaving household life to become a monk may appear to be unfilial, they in fact
said this was supreme filial piety (ta-hsiao), because monks thereby ‘turn
themselves into vehicles’ for the conversion and salvation of parents and of all
other living beings, aiming at universal salvation (Ch’en 1973, 34–50).
Not all Buddhist inclusivistic moves, however, demonstrate or emphasize a
superseding model. When skillful means, which hierarchizes, is taken to an
extreme, it leads to privatization, which does not. A clear expression of the
privatizing attitude is found in His Holiness the Dalai Lama’s Ethics for the
New Millennium:
… I must acknowledge that while Buddhism represents the best path for
me — that is, it suits my character, my temperament, my inclinations, and
my cultural background — the same will be true of Christianity for
Christians. For them, Christianity is the best way … for some, the concept
of rebirth and karma will seem highly effective in inspiring the aspiration
to develop love and compassion within the context of responsibility. For
others, the concept of a transcendent, loving creator will come to seem
more so. (1999, 225–9)
Whether he is hierarchizing here (and whether he is an inclusivist) depends on
how deep you take his privatizing to go. I confess that I am not entirely sure
how to interpret him — his ideas here are not sufficiently theorized. If he means
to say that differing traditions can be helpful for people at lower stages of
religious development, that they all work to cure symptoms of the same illness,
and that there is only one tradition that can take you to total health, then he is
still hierarchizing and inclusivistic. But if he means that different religions are
best for different people, period, then he is not hierarchizing and is tolerant but
not inclusivistic, because he fails to keep Buddhism primary.
A second move that reconciles but does not always hierarchize is to
re-classify either the alien religion or Buddhism so that the two traditions are
no longer competing tokens of the same type. One of the two systems in
question is re-labeled so that it is not considered to be a religion, and how this
occurs can vary.
The Burmese sometimes decrease the conflict between Buddhism and the
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spirit cults by saying that only Buddhism, and not the spirit cults, should be
thought of as a religion (Spiro 1978, xxx–v, 71–80, 247–51). In this way, the
Burmese indicate a difference between that which concerns mundane affairs,
which is not a religion, and that which concerns ultimate liberation, which is a
religion. The two systems then do not clash since they are not on a par. This
variation clearly still hierarchizes.
In contrast, sometimes in Sri Lanka and the United States, it is Buddhism that
is re-classified so that it is not considered to be a religion; instead, it is thought
to be a philosophy. In Sri Lanka this move developed as Enlightenment-inspired
Theosophists promoted the idea that Buddhism is a philosophy, not a ‘creed’;
ethical, not ritualistic; and rational, not faith-based. Buddhism, for some Sri
Lankans, is thus seen as a different sort of thing than Christianity or Hinduism.
Similarly, in the United States, because Buddhism usually recognizes no savior
deity and also because it was introduced for the most part through books, the
perception arose that Buddhism is a philosophy rather than a religion. Furthermore, Buddhism is often connected with humanism and psychotherapy, so that
Insight Meditation in Barre, Massachusetts often presents Buddhism not as a
religion, but rather as an ‘awareness technique fostering awakening and psychological healing through practices taught by the Buddha’ (Seager 1999, 6, 148).
This might still be seen as hierarchizing, because being a philosophy may be
judged superior to being a religion.
Buddhadāsa’s method of re-classifying Buddhism so that it is not on a par
with others, however, is doing something different, something related to
inclusivists’ use of emptiness as discussed in the previous section. Buddhadāsa
posits that Buddhists understand there to be a ‘further level of religious life in
which religion itself disappears’, a move that places Buddhism not as one
religion alongside many, but rather on a level that trumps the others by
supposedly leading to the transcendence of all religion. He says, ‘… (T)here is
no Buddhism, Christianity, or Islam. Therefore, how can they be the same or
conflicting? Thus the phrase “No religion!” …’; when one ‘speaks more
precisely’, he says, one sees that ‘there is no Buddha, there is no dhamma, there
is no sangha!’ (Buddhadāsa 1989; Chappell 1991, 363–4). Emptiness, in effect,
gives Buddhism the status of non-religion — or, better, of meta-religion.
The third type of move that does not necessarily fit the superseding model is
the common core strategy, or the move to see religions as varying manifestations of a common essence or experience. Buddhadāsa says that Dhamma, God,
and the Tao point to the same truth. Any elements of a particular religion that
lie beyond this universal core will be whittled away, in his view, until, in the
evolution of religions over time, they disappear completely. The notion of God
as a person, for instance, will be lost, gradually changing and evolving into God
as Dhamma.
As Buddhadāsa’s thinking here shows, this common core technique often
causes him to dismiss and peripheralize differences between religions as if they
are unimportant details, as when he claims that there are no real differences in
essence among all religions’ conceptions of redemption. At his most extreme,
Buddhadāsa writes: ‘… (W)hether Jesus Christ did or did not sacrifice His life
Identifying Inclusivism in Buddhist Contexts
93
is incidental to natural circumstances, and may have nothing to do with
redemption whatsoever. Had he preached in India, especially in an era contemporary with that of the Lord Buddha, He might not have been forced into paying
with His life and might have been able to continue preaching’ (1967, 115).
Indeed, this is a convenient way to wipe away all kinds of huge differences with
one big sweep!
The fourth method that I have isolated is also exemplified by Buddhadāsa. He
suggests that no one religion — not even Buddhism — is in possession of
comprehensive truth, even if all that it teaches is true. It is easy to see how this
view would facilitate inclusivism, for it leaves room for improvement within the
home tradition and shows openness to adding new truths. If Buddhism is said
to contain more truth than other religions, then this move still fits with the
hierarchizing model. Otherwise, it meshes well with seeing religions as complementary (Buddhadāsa 1989).
Some of the aforementioned moves, in turn, occasionally lead into the
phenomenon of asserting dual or multiple religious identity. That is, Buddhists
may see no contradiction in also calling themselves Christians or Jews, for
example. Unfortunately, to sort out exactly what is going on in such cases and
what constitutes legitimate affiliation would take another whole article (or
more). Still, this phenomenon is widespread enough to necessitate acknowledgment, at least, however brief.
Buddhadāsa says explicitly that ‘we can be both Christians and Buddhists at
the same time. And what is more we can be Muslims or Hindus at the same
time’ (1967, 38). For American examples, Sylvia Boorstein sees no contradiction in calling herself a Jubu, or a Jew and a Buddhist simultaneously. She says,
‘I’m not an ethnic Buddhist, but I’m a real Buddhist, and I’m also a Jew. I’m
not a person without a country. I am a person who has dual citizenship’
(Boorstein 1997, 9). And American Paul Carus writes:
I have said repeatedly that I am a Buddhist, but you must not forget that
I am at the same time a Christian insofar as I accept certain teachings of
Christ. I am even a Taoist … I am a Israelite [sic] … In one word, I am,
as it were, a religious parliament incarnate. To say that I am a Buddhist
and nothing else but a Buddhist would be a misstatement, and, indeed, it
would be unBuddhistic, it would be against the teachings of Buddha
himself (Tweed 1992, 101).
So Carus interprets Buddhism to condemn ‘exclusive devotion — even to
Buddhism itself’ (Tweed 1992, 101). In both China and Japan, Buddhists often
affiliate themselves with more than one religion. Judith Berling reports, in fact,
that in a recent census the number of religious affiliations of the Japanese was
almost twice that of the population (1997, 43).
Dual or multiple religious allegiances will not always fall under my definition
of inclusivism, but they can. Dual or multiple allegiances are instances of
Buddhist inclusivism in so far as the ends of the other tradition(s) are seen to
supplement or coincide with Buddhist ends, and in so far as Buddhism is the
lens through which the other tradition is read. Inclusivists who dual affiliate are
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more likely than other inclusivists to keep Buddhism primary at a less conscious
and less explicit level. I have not characterized dual allegiance as necessarily
hierarchical because, when this move is employed, the practitioner does not
choose the top form over the lower members of a hierarchy so much as identify
equally with two or more. But if one expresses dual allegiance in a way that
meets the requirements of inclusivism, there will be gradation involved, at least
implicitly.
Finally, a strategy that does not necessarily hierarchize religions is to take
something from the other’s faith and re-apply it to the home situation. My first
example is the Dalai Lama’s expressed desire to learn from Jews about how
best to deal with the situation of exile. He hopes that Buddhists might apply
Jewish coping strategies to the Tibetan situation (Kamenetz 1994). A second
example is Judith Simmer-Brown’s article ‘Suffering and Social Justice: A
Buddhist Response to the Gospel of Luke’, in which she argues that ‘the model
of Jesus as social activist can helpfully inform movements within the Buddhist
tradition that emphasize social justice, such as “engaged Buddhism” ’ (1996,
99). These examples are cases in which the borrowed alien elements are not
considered to be provisional or subordinate, nor are they changed by reinterpretation; judged to be compatible and helpful, they are just added, so that
the home tradition is expanded.
In conclusion, of all of the areas to which Buddhism has spread, several
scholars have remarked that American new Buddhism has the highest prevalence of inclusivism yet to be found in any Buddhist region (Prebish 1979,
182–3; Tweed 1992, 18–23, 96–9; Rawlinson 1994, 371). At the same time,
however, some scholars and practitioners have expressed concern about
Buddhist trends in this direction, not necessarily seeing the tendency towards
inclusivism as a positive thing and worrying that Western Buddhists are edging
toward an incoherent eclecticism. Charles Prebish has said that American
Buddhists need to be more discriminating in absorbing various approaches.
Otherwise, he writes, there will be, despite its initial popularity, an amalgam
which is no longer Buddhist nor quite anything else and is ‘the salvation of
nobody’ (Prebish 1979, 183). Similarly, Sonam Kazi, a Tibetan Buddhist
teacher in the United States, ‘viewed the American predilection for eclecticism
with some disdain’. ‘You only end up’, he said, ‘with a concoction like chop
suey’ (Fields 1992, 324).
This brings us to the next task: thinking critically about these inclusivistic
moves and suggesting a proper form of Buddhist inclusivism. But that must
wait for another day.
Notes
1
2
A native Sinhalese Buddhist and academic, J. N. (Jayatilleke 1996) is a particularly
good example of a Buddhist who appeals to these sorts of proof texts.
The Dalai Lama seems to follow this example. He has been known to discourage
conversion and send potential Buddhist converts back to their native traditions. As
Rodger Kamenetz reports, the Dalai Lama has said, ‘In my public teaching I always
tell people who are interested (in converting to Buddhism) that changing religions is
Identifying Inclusivism in Buddhist Contexts
3
4
5
6
7
8
95
not an easy task. So therefore it’s better not to change, better to follow one’s own
traditional religion, since basically the same message, the same potential is there’.
And just as the Buddha told Upāli not to cease his patronage to the Jains, so the Dalai
Lama tells those who do decide to convert to Buddhism not to criticize their previous
traditions. ‘Just because that tradition is no longer effective in the case of one
individual does not mean it is no longer of benefit to humanity. On the contrary, we
can be certain that it has been an inspiration to millions of people in the past, that
it inspires millions today, and that it will inspire millions in the path of love and
compassion in the future’ (Kamenetz 1994, 228–9; Dalai Lama 1999, 230).
I have updated Morris’ translation only by changing ‘Be ye not’ to ‘Do not be’ and
changing ‘Do ye’ to ‘You should’.
Hacker discusses the inclusion and subordination of Brahmā in the Tevijja Sutta
(1983, 24).
Hacker discusses this sutta (1983, 25–7). Also, a similar example is Buddhist ethical
re-interpretation of Vedic fire sacrifices in the Aggi Sutta.
Richard Gombrich and Steven Collins have both written on the question of satire in
this sutta (Gombrich 1992; Collins 1993).
I am heavily indebted to Mario D’Amato’s study of the former śāstra (D’Amato
2000).
Other important texts for intra-Buddhist hierarchical ordering include the
Mahāparinirvān a, in which the parable of the five flavors is told. This parable
teaches that, just as milk can progress to coagulated milk, butter, melted butter, and
ghee, so different texts progress from tentatively to absolutely true. Also famous is
the Sam
dhinirmocana-sūtra’s teaching of the three turnings of the dharma wheel.
The lesser vehicle represents the first turning, the second is Perfection of Wisdom
scriptures, and the third is the hidden meaning of the Perfection of Wisdom
scriptures.
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Correspondence address: Kristin Beise Kiblinger, 75 College Avenue, Greenville, PA
16125 USA. [email protected]