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INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS
IN A CONSTRUCTED WORLD
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INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS
IN A CONSTRUCTED WORLD
VENDULKA KusALKOvA,
NICHOLAS ONUF, PAUL KOWERT
Editors
Routledge
Taylor & Francis Group
LONDON AND NEW YORK
First published1998 by M.E. Sharpe
Published2015 by Routledge
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Copyright © 1998 Taylor & Francis.All rights reserved.
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Library of CongressCataloging-in-Publication Data
Internationalrelationsin a constructedworld /
editedby VendulkaKubalkova,NicholasOnuf, andPaul Kowert.
p. cm.
Includesbibliographicalreferencesandindex.
ISBN 0-7656-0297-0(cloth: alk. paper).ISBN 0-7656-0298-9(pbk. : alk. paper)
1. Internationalrelations. 2. Constructivism(philosophy). I. Kubalkova,V.
II. Onuf, NicholasGreenwood. III. Kowert, Paul, 1964JZ1305.1575 1998
327-dc21
97-46968
CIP
ISBN 13: 9780765602985(pbk)
ISBN 13: 9780765602978(hbk)
Contents
About the Editors and the Contributors
Preface
vii
lX
PART I. INTRODUCTION
1. ConstructingConstructivism
VendulkaKubillkowi, Nicholas Onu/, andPaul Kowert
3
PART II. CONSTRUCTIVISM IN CONTEXT
2. The Twenty Years'Catharsis:E.H. Carr and IR
VendulkaKubillkova
25
3. Constructivism:A User'sManual
NicholasOnu!
58
4. What Is at Stakein the Agent-StructureDebate?
Harry D. Gould
79
PART III. INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS UNDER
CONSTRUCTION
5. Agent versusStructurein the Constructionof
NationalIdentity
Paul Kowert
101
6. FeministStruggleas Social Construction:
Changingthe GenderedRulesof Home-BasedWork
ElisabethProgl
123
7. InternetGovernanceGoesGlobal
Craig Simon
147
PART IV. CONSTRUCTIONIN THE ACADEMY
8. RemodelingInternationalRelations:
New Tools from New Science?
Henry L. Hamman
173
9. Reconstructingthe Discipline: Scholarsas Agents
VendulkaKuMlkowi
193
Index
203
About the Editors and the
Contributors
Harry D. Gould received an M.A in International Studiesfrom Florida
InternationalUniversity. He is pursuingdoctoral studiesin the Department
of Political Science,JohnsHopkinsUniversity.
Henry L. Hamman receivedhis Ph.D. from the University of Miami in
InternationalRelations.He is presidentof SociocyberneticsInc., a systems
researchcompanybasedin Miami. He is the authorand editor of a number
of bookson internationalrelations.
Paul Kowert is an assistantprofessorin the Departmentof International
Relations at Florida International University. He is the author of recent
studies on foreign policy decision making and social identity in international politics.
Vendulka Kubalkova is a professorof internationalstudiesin the School
of InternationalStudiesat the University of Miami and the author, among
other works, with AA Cruickshank,of Marxism and International Relations.
Nicholas Onuf is a professorin the Departmentof InternationalRelations
at Florida InternationalUniversity. His most recentbook is The Republican
Legacyin International Thought.
Elisabeth Progl is an assistantprofessorin the Departmentof International
Relationsat Florida InternationalUniversity and the authorof recentstudies
in feminist international relationstheory.
Craig Simon is a databaseapplicationspecialist.He is a Ph.D. candidateat
the Schoolof InternationalStudiesat the University of Miami, and is writing a dissertation"Bandwidth Rules: Standardsand Structure in Global
InternetGovernance."
vii
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Preface
Prefacesare really postscripts.Authors write them at the very end, grateful
that their laborsare really over. They acknowledgethe assistanceof institutions, colleagues,and relatives,and explain the circumstancesunderwhich
the book was written. It is also the last opportunity to reprise some of the
book'sthemes.
It is in the nature of this particular project that we have many afterthoughts.We did not want to write yet anotherbook on the parlousstateof
theory in the field ofInternationalRelations(IR). The dominantapproaches
and theories in any field of study are seldom without critics. The "third
debate"in IR has beenespeciallyferocious,as anyonewho takesthe trouble to understandits technically difficult languagecan confirm. Somecritics have indicted mainstreamtheorists for fraud, finding them guilty by
associationwith the "Enlightenmentproject." On the evidence of great
changesin the world during the pastdecade,othercritics havebeencontent
to showthat the theoreticalmainstreamfailed in its own terms.
In this book, we do not enterinto the debate,exceptto the very limited
extentrequiredto situateourselves.Instead,we try to do somethingdifferent: to develop an alternative way of studying international relations as
social relations, and in the processreconceptualizethe field in relation to
otherfields.
The opportunity to try somethingdifferent arose when Nicholas Onuf
came to teach in Miami severalyears after he had written World of Our
Making (1989). In this systematicand technically demandingbook, Onuf
developeda "constructivist" framework from a broad range of theoretical
materials as a way beyond what was then emerging as the third debate.
VendulkaKubalkova greetedOnuf's arrival acrosstown by proposingthat
they convenethe "Miami InternationalRelationsGroup" as a running seminar for their colleaguesand students.Kubalkova soonprevailedon Onuf to
presentan accessibleversion of his constructivistframework to the Miami
Group, and other participantsfollowed suit with papersvariously relevant
to that framework. In 1996,severalmembersof the Miami Group presented
ix
x
PREFACE
their paperstogether at the joint conferenceof the International Studies
Associationand the JapanAssociationof InternationalRelations. At that
time the editorsbeganthe processof forming the work of the Miami Group
into a coherentvolume.
Since Onuf introduced"constructivism"in 1989 it has generatedgrowing interest,andmany scholarshave adoptedthe namefor their approaches.
There are, in fact, not one but several"constructivisms"in the literature.
The appeal of the name should come as no surprise in a decadethat has
witnessedepochalpolitical and economicrearrangements.
The bipolar Cold
War systemand the entire Soviet bloc collapsed.The world plunged into
turmoil with an unprecedentednumber of nations and ethnic groups demandingsovereignstatehood,political subdivision,or at leastredrawnfrontiers. The world is abuzz with economicand diplomatic activities as new
geopolitical,geoeconomic,and geostrategicchangestake place. These"international" changesoccur against the backdrop of the vast part of the
planet also changing"internal" ways of running political, economic,and
social affairs. No part of the world can avoid thesechangesor their consequences;the entire world is continuously"under construction."The choice
of the term "constructivism"thereforeseemsparticularlyapposite.
Mainstream IR failed to anticipate these changes:in theory, nothing
much was supposedto change.Many critics saw this failure as evidence
againstthe possibility of theory. Somecritics evensaw it as confirming that
the world is neverwhat it seems.Constructivismpoints to the limitations of
mainstreamthinking, but it rejects the conclusion that theory about the
world-or a coherentdescriptionof the worl~iscritics impossible.
Instead,constructivismoffers a way how to go about redescribingthe
world. Mainstreamtheoristsand their critics leavepeopleout. Constructivism puts peopleand their activities at the forefront. It is indeedan irony that
at the turn of millennium, whenpeoplehaveachievedwondroustechnological feats, scholarsdo not see how people constructthe world as a consequenceof their social relations.
Many other constructivistshave also pointed out that the scopefor people in the agent-structurerelationmust be enlarged.It is one thing of course
to say that people make the world or that state identities influence the
internationalstructure.It is quite anotherto be specific and explain by what
mechanismthis "making" or "influencing" works. The inability to figure
out how theseprocesseswork so that they can be empirically exploredhas
been a blindspot in many forms of constructivism.What binds people to
each other and to the material world around them? Onuf's constructivism
identifies the main elementthrough which this "construction"takesplace:
rules. Rules provide the medium for human interactivity. Our speciesis
PREFACE xi
inherently social, defined by the social arrangementswe create.Endowed
with free will, people(agents)are thus seenas knowledgableparticipantsin
the reproductionof social rules, and thus free from the assumeddeterminism of immaterial,inanimate,factors(structure).
Onuf begins with people, understandingfirst of all the simple social
relationsthey have with eachother. Only then doeshe work his way up to
complex relations, practices, institutions, "structures,"or social arrangements that are called statesand IR. The axioms "saying is doing," "rules
makerule," and "rules put resourcesinto play" distinguishOnufs schoolof
constructivismfrom positivist and Marxist philosophiessuch as realism,
neoliberalism,and historical materialismas well as from otherswho claim
the constructivistmantle.Thoseapproacheslook first at the ways resources
determinestructure,and then at specific social outcomes.MainstreamIR
specialiststry to see a single world by standingoutside, looking for that
which is "objectively given": measurablestructural variables that can be
said to causehumanbehaviors.The traditional mainstreamresearchinterest
is the extentto which material structuremakessocial behaviorinvoluntary
and predictable.Constructivists,on the otherhand,seehumanbehaviorand
socialstructureas inseparable, simultaneous,
co-constituted.
Constructivismprovides a template for viewing the world in a fundamentally different way from that offered in the standardIR literature. Insteadof introducing a vocabularyof states,balancesof power, anarchies,
and other IR terms, constructivismbegins its first lessonon international
relationswith an analysisof speechacts, rules, practices,agents,agencies,
and social arrangements.Theseare the building blocks of society and its
institutional structure.States,balancesof power, hegemonies,and so forth
are specific instances.As Onuf put it, constructivismpaints a picture of
"staggeringcomplexity and constantchange"within the interwoven patterns of overlappingsocial arrangements.The complexity of the constructivist redescriptionof the world, however,doesnot precludethe possibility
of focusing on any single aspectof humanrelations,internationalor otherwise. Different types of rules, different social arrangements, institutions,
conventionsand societiescanall be subjectedto this type of analysis.Rules
hold the key to understanding.
In this reading, the different political systems,ideologies,religions, or
worldviews, of North and South, of East and West, and of civilizations
throughout history are built on narrativesthat can be broken down and
analyzedaccordingto the types of speechactsthat sustainthem. All narratives consistof instruction-rules,directive-rules,and commitment-rulesthat
work in distinctive ways. Dependingon which of the three types is more
strongly represented,and on how it is mixed with the others, one might
xii
PREFACE
classify societiesand institutions. Internationalrelationsis itself a complex
institution basedon a mixture oftheserules. To study internationalrelations
as constructivistsrequiresthat we study rules ratherthan imaginary, artificially reified entities such as statesor structures.Rules have ontological
substance;they are therefor anybodyto see.
Constructivismis not a theory, it does not claim to explain why things
work as they do. Constructivismis simply an alternativeontology, a redescription of the world. Thus it does not carry any inherent ideological
stance.Constructivismis not an "ism" to be addedto the list dominatedin
the IR studiesby neorealismandneoliberalism.
We promisedthe publisherthat this book would have severalqualities
that are usually consideredmutually exclusive: the book was to introduce
somethingoriginal; it was to be scholarly and educationaland yet easyto
read. As we struggledto lighten our proslr-which camemore naturally in
some chaptersthan in others--wediscoveredjust how hard it is to write
something"easy."
In Chapter1 we try to explain someof the most difficult terms, such as
epistemology,methodology,ontology, and positivism, in a straightforward
way. This difficult task was necessaryin order to be able to place our book
againstthe backdropof currentcontroversiesin the IR discipline, the third
debatein particular. Yet we stay out of the actual debate.Our purposeis
only to distinguish constructivismfrom other approacheswith which it is
often confused,such as postmodern,deconstructionist,post-structuralist,
andcritical approachesdiscussedbriefly in Chapter2 andthe otherforms of
constructivismdiscussedin Chapter4. Chapter3 is centralto the project. It
is written by ProfessorOnuf in a deliberatelystraightforwardfashion, setting out the ABCs of constructivism.It introducesa different way of thinking aboutthe world and IR. The readershould approachthis chapteras one
would approachlearning a new languagewith a different alphabet,grammar, rangeof sounds,andmeanings.As in learninga new languageit might
be difficult at first for readersto get "their tonguesaround"the constructivist languageandbegin to think alongthe constructivistlines. The remaining
chaptersare concernedwith the payoff of this effort. Their authors do
occasionally revisitthe main featuresof Onufs framework, but their main
purposeis to showthe empirical and conceptualutility of the frameworkby
applying it to topics of contemporaryrelevancesuch as political identity
(Chapter5), social movements(Chapter6), the Information Age (Chapter
7), and even the professionof IR scholarshipitself (Chapter9). Theseare
but a few examplesof the ways constructivismcan be applied. Chapters5
and 6 also revealthe facility with which constructivistresearchcan proceed
using case historical methods, and Chapter 7 shows how constructivists
PREFACE xiii
might grapple with even the "newest" topics such as the implications of
Internet expansion.Chapter8 introducesthe readerto some of the recent
advancesin physical scienceswhich replacedconceptualinstrumentsthat
still form a bedrock of positivism in social sciences.It shows conceptual
compatibility of constructivismwith thesenew developments.
As we contemplatethe finished volume the daunting questionremains
whether we have succeededin our goal and have managedto present
Onufs constructivismas an alternative way to view the world. Will the
readerget it? How sooninto the book will the readerrealizewhat a radical a
changewe advocate?Irrespective of the answersto these questions,we
hopethat the book will be asrewardingto readas it wasto write.
It now remains only to thank all those that made this project possible.
First is the University of Miami (in particular Provost Luis Glaser and
ProfessorHaim Shaked) for helping us to go as a group to Japan in
1996. The prospectof a "school trip" providedthe incentivefor completion
of the initial papers.M.E. SharpeExecutiveEditor Patricia Kolb and Project Editor Steve Martin extendedus invaluable encouragementand help.
Craig Simon, one of the contributors to this volume, put our diversely
formatted chaptersinto digital conformity with the publisher'Sspecifications. Gonzalo Porcel-Querohelped this project as researchassistant
throughoutits development.Our thanksgo also to the graduatestudentsand
faculty of the Miami IR theory group. They read many parts of this book
and pointedout placeswhere we lapsedinto the customarilyobscureprose
of professionalacademics.Their enthusiasmhas made the work on this
book worthwhile. It is to themthat we dedicatethis project.
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_________
Part I
Introduction
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1
Constructing Constructivism
Vendulka Kubalkova, Nicholas Onuf,
and Paul Kowert
" ... so that they will not understandoneanother'sspeech. .. "
The Tower of Babel
"And thus what was written was fulfilled," and a common languagewas
lost. Books, articles,and conferencepapersexplainingthe world at the tum
of the millennium are a Tower of Babel (Genesis11). For half a century,
English has been the unofficial but universal languageof scholarly exchange. Today, scholarsspeak in many, highly specializedEnglish languages,and they barely manage to understandeach other. Specialized
languageshave always characterizeddisciplines, the subjectsof study that
scholarshave delimited among themselves,as if these subjects werethe
natural and inevitable way to arrangethe productionand disseminationof
knowledge. What is unusualand has reachedtruly biblical proportionsis
the way that specializedlanguageshave swept acrosstraditional disciplinary boundaries.InternationalRelations(for convenience,IR) is a conspicuous case, in part becauseits status as a discipline is not secure,in part
becauseits subject matter (international relations, in this book always
spelledout in the lower case)has undergonea spectaculartransformation
within a decade'stime.
Indeed, the contributors to this book do not even agree among themselveson whether IR is a discipline in its own right, an interdisciplinary
undertaking,or merely a field (or subdivision)of political science.Perhaps
3
4
KUBALKOvA, ONUF, AND KOWERT
changesin the world make the traditional ways that scholarshave divided
up the world seemincreasinglyarbitrary and irrelevant. Perhapsthe Babel
of scholarly languagessignifies the dismantlingof the currentarrangement
of disciplinesconventionallyknown as the social sciences.The editors do
agreethat a commonlanguageof scholarshipis both desirableand possible
for the subjectof internationalrelations;that this languageshouldalso suit
social relations in general; and that this languageshould never be made
deliberately obscurejust to maintain disciplinary boundariesor, for that
matter,to keeppeoplewho are not scholarlyspecialistsin the dark.
IR scholars speak in many voices. They regularly propose new "approaches"to the subject, and proponentsengagein "great debates"over
their merits. They feel obliged to proposeschemesfor classifying an ever
larger numberof approaches.Their students spendan increasing,and perhaps inordinate, amount of time reprising these debatesand memorizing
classificatoryschemes.
This volume grew out of the pedagogicalconcernsof a group of teachers and studentsat two universitiesin Miami. Although our backgrounds
and interests vary, our discussionshave increasingly centeredon "constructivism," in which the discipline as a whole has taken a great deal of
interestsince Nicholas Onuf (one of the group'smembers)introducedthe
term in 1989. As we consideredthe version of constructivismthat he had
developedin World of Our Making and beganto think about our other
scholarly interestsin constructivistterms, this book gradually took form.
Onufs essay(see Chapter 3) sets out his version of constructivismin
languagethat any serious-mindedreadercan understand.Othercontributors explain and refine constructivism,and apply it to a variety of important topics in internationalrelations. In the process,they help to dispel
some myths and misunderstandingsthat have already attachedthemselves to a term that scholarshave begun to use rather casually. One
myth is that constructivismis closely relatedto the "post-modern"practice of "deconstruction";a second is that constructivismmandatesan
"emancipatory"or "critical" politics; a third is that constructivism,being
"post-positivist," is indifferent to empirical researchand antithetical to
"positivist" science. (We shall consider these and many other terms
more fully in this introductorychapter.)
This book showsthat constructivismoffers an unfamiliar but systematic
way of thinking aboutsocial relationsin generaland internationalrelations
in particular. The book also shows the relevanceof constructivismto the
empirical investigationof important topics in contemporaryinternational
relations, such as national identity, genderin political economy, and the
emerginginformation age. In sum, the volume addressesthesequestions:
CONSTRUCTING CONSTRUCTIVISM 5
What is constructivism?Wheredoesit fit in the discipline?How it can help
the discipline to move on?
In this introductorychapter,we undertakeseveralpreliminary tasks.We
look briefly into the relatively short history and currently confusedstateof
the discipline. We discussdisciplinary boundaries,externalinfluences,and
endlessdebatesas sourcesof confusion.We show that the ways IR scholars
categorizeapproachesand stake out positions for debatehave led them to
underestimateconstructivismas an alternativeto receivedways of thinking.
Finally, and perhapsmost important, we explain a considerablenumberof
conceptsthat scholarsoften use but rarely give sufficient thought to, and
that readersunschooledin the scholarly languagesof philosophy and the
social scienceswill find utterly baffling.
The purposeof this book is not to pronounceon the stateof the discipline, to assessall sourcesof confusion,or to passjudgmenton every debate.
Part I of the book does so only as necessaryto discuss the intellectual
context from which constructivismhas grown. Nor is our purposeto discredit the efforts oflR scholarsto learn from otherdisciplines.Our purpose,
rather, is to show that constructivismcan make senseof internationalrelations by making senseof social relations,and that constructivismoffers IR
a way beyond the impasseof many discordantlanguagesand distracting
debates.
Disciplinesand Dialects
Insular and protectedas a discipline, IR is overwhelmingly the work of
scholarsfrom just two countries:Britain and the United States.Just as IR
has finally begunto openitself to other disciplinesand their languages,it is
ironic that the subjectmatterof internationalrelationscameto the attention
of scholarsin thoseotherdisciplines.All of a sudden,"global concerns"are
on everyone'sagenda.At the sametime, scholarsfrom all over the world
havebegunto identify themselves withIR as a discipline. IR hasbecomea
to be appliedto IR and authors
major importer of ideasand author~ideasespecially
to cite as sourcesof inspiration. It is especially unsettling for an older
generationof IR scholarsto seeothernamesthan their own sprinkledin the
footnotesof their youngercolleagues.
As a discipline, IR has accumulateda huge intellectual balanceof trade
deficit. Little producedin the discipline has found its way into other disciplines. IR scholarsdo not seemto lead or influence public debate.The
pastdecadewas characterizedby tumultuousand far-reachingchangesthat
exposedthe irrelevanceof the discipline'S accumulatedknowledge about
internationalrelations.Any numberof politicians, intellectuals,andjournal-
6
KUBALKOV A, ONUF, AND KOWERT
ists have declaredthe end of the Cold War, communism,modernity, and
history, and the beginning of some new epoch, with no help whatsoever
from IR scholars. Furthermore,most of these scholars are only slowly
adjusting to a new agendaof concernr-globalwarming, environmental
degradation,overpopulation,ethnic conflict-identified by somebodyoutside the discipline. Everything allegedly new and different is "post": postcommunist, post-internationalrelations, post-modern,post-positivist,
post-realist,post-Soviet,post-structural,post-theory.As a universalprefix,
"post" indicatesmore clearly what has been transcendedor rejectedthan
what may be expectedin the future.
IR is hardly alone in its bewilderment.The division of knowledge by
disciplines no longer seems convincing. There are so many bodies of
knowledge,eachcouchedin its own arcanelanguage,that reachingacross
disciplines bringshugecostsin translation,dissipatingintellectualresources
that could otherwise be used to addressnew concerns.BecauseIR combines global pretensionswith an exceptionallyinsular perspectiveon itself
and its subject, it suffers more than most disciplines from this state of
affairs.
The creation and accumulationof knowledge in the last two hundred
yearsadvancedhand in handwith the multiplication of specializationsand
their institutionalization as disciplines. Since there is nothing natural or
inevitable about the way scholars define their substantiveconcernsand
the
parcelthem out amongthemselves,someof theseconcerns--especially
onesnow popularly called "global"-areshared,but the way they are studied is not. Even if scholarswere able to overcometheir parochial tendencies, disciplinary "dialects" make it difficult for them to share anything
across disciplines.Indeed,the more somethingpassesmusteras knowledge
within a discipline, the lesslikely it is to "translate"to otherdisciplines.
Dialects develop becausethe samewords usedin severaldisciplines or
their subfields begin to carry different meaningsin each. When scholars
introduce and debatenew concepts,they give new meaningto old words.
They separatesynonyms, realign antonyms, and invent new words. As
worlds of scholarship,disciplinesare nevercompletelysealedoff from each
other. The words themselvesdrift acrossdisciplinary boundarieslike snippetsof conversationfor which an eavesdropper
hasno context. They tantalize scholarsdissatisfiedwith the stateof their own disciplines,who borrow
themwith minimal careand adapt themto new uses.
To give a few examplesrelevantto our concerns,structure, agent, and
realism mean very different things in different disciplines. The structuralism of anthropologistClaudeLevi-Strausshaslittle to do with the structural
Marxism of Louis Althusserand evenless to do with the structuralrealism
CONSTRUCTING CONSTRUCTIVISM 7
of IR's Kenneth Waltz. Economistsand sociologistsmean quite different
things by the term agent. Realismin philosophyis far removedfrom realism in internationalrelations.(SeeChapter4 for a discussionof "scientific
realism.")
The term critical is another,instructiveexample.Philosophershaveused
the term in a specializedsensethat goes back to Immanuel Kant. In the
handsof Marxist theorists,it acquireda different, though still specialized,
meaning.Other scholarshad alwaysusedthe term to refer to the "ability to
find defects andfaults," onceregardedas a critical faculty of every scholar.
Thanks to the diffusion of a specifically neo-Marxist dialect, scholarsin
several disciplines now use the term in ways that neither Kant nor any
ordinary personwould understand.The antonymof the term critical is not
uncritical but, in somecases,positivist(a term itself carrying severalmeanings) and in others,problem-solving.Not all scholarsare critical (although
this doesnot meanthat they are "uncritical"). Not being critical might mean
that a scholaris positivist or interestedonly in proposingpolicies to solve
narrowly defined problems.
There are powerful incentivesto perpetuatethe confusion. Who would
not want to be a critical scholarif it reflects on one'sintellectual abilities?
Yet becoming "critical" carries certain implications: for some scholars
being critical meansopenly acknowledginga connectionto Marx, while
other critical scholarsgo out of their way to deny such a connection.The
distinctions are not often appreciated.Some scholarsquote post-structuralists
and critical theorists in support of the sameargument,overlooking vehement disagreementsbetweenthe two groups(Kratochwil 1984). The same
argumentmay once be describedas leftist or Marxist, and anothertime as
right-wing and conservative.The samewords point in altogetherdifferent
directions.
Often scholarsand studentsblithely usewords, suchas discourseandthe
other, for their sophisticatedand contemporaryflair. The word problematique(with appropriateFrenchpronunciation)is usedinsteadof problem or hypothesisin total ignoranceof the very special meaningthat the
French term is intendedto convey. Similarly project is no longer just an
exercisefor schoolchildren.In the history of ideas, some antecedentsare
more controversialthan others,and the genesisof many currently fashionable terms in earlier leftist ideasis still a sensitivesubject.Practice is just
sucha term, only somewhatseparatedfrom the Marxist notion of praxis by
translationinto English. In fact, this is a term to which constructivistsare
partial, andreaderswill find it usedin this book.
Words are imported from all over the place, including meteorology,
physics, and mathematics.Terms such as turbulence,chaos, and cascade,
8
KUBA.LKOV A., ONUF, AND KOWERT
which natural scientistsand mathematicianshave adoptedfrom ordinary
languagefor their own very specific use, have been borrowed by social
scientists,including IR scholars,and used metaphorically.With so many
casualappropriationsand mixed signals, it is not surprisingthat many IR
scholarsare casting about for terms to describethemselvesthat simultaneouslyseemright for disciplinary purposes,flatter them in their ordinary
meaning,and suggesta connectionto otherdisciplinary conversations(conversation is another term that scholars have favored with a specialized
meaning).Justas somescholarsfeel that they ought to make sure that they
are critical in some senseof the term, many are now self-proclaimedconstructivists. They often use the term to suggestwhat they are not: they are
not realists or positivists in any narrow sense.They do not practice
"deconstruction."Taking the middle path, as they seeit (Adler 1997), they
areprotectedon both sidesby the fuzzy useof language.
InternationalRelationsas a Discipline
The Enlightenment'scelebrationof reasonunleasheda tremendousrangeof
intellectual activities previously restrictedby the medieval acceptanceof
God's revelation as the truth. By the end of the eighteenthcentury, two
previously synonymousterms, scienceand philosophy,had beenredefined
and separated.Thereafter,science dealt with the material world and includedsuchpursuitsas astronomy,chemistry,and physics.Scientistsmade
innumerablediscoveriesthat had a cumulatively staggeringeffect on the
material conditionsof daily life. Overshadowedby the dazzling successes
of science,philosophywas left with "metaphysical"questionsthat no one
could hopeto answerconvincingly.
In the nineteenthcentury,betweenthe growing edifice of scienceandthe
shrinking edifice of philosophy,ground was broken by one of the "inventors" of positivism, AugusteComte,for an ambitiousnew undertaking.The
new edifice of the "social sciences"was to be built to the image of the
highly successful"natural sciences."Sustainingthis developmentwas a
belief, known as naturalism, that natureand society do not fundamentally
differ. In positivist terms, any phenomenon,no matter how complex in
appearance,
canbe brokendown into units that canbe studiedscientifically.
Cumulativeknowledgewill faithfully representthe world as it is, explain
how it works, predict its future unfolding, and allow humanityto control its
own destiny.
Late in the nineteenthcentury, the separationof political economyinto
politics (mainly governmentand public law) and economics,and the separation of sociology from the other two disciplines, followed the liberal
CONSTRUCTING CONSTRUCTIVISM 9
practice of separatingstate, economy,and society. Anthropology came in
tandemwith colonial administration,while history occupiedan ambiguous
positionbetweenthe humanitiesandthe social sciences.
IR came late and developedslowly, in the shadow of the other social
sciences,especially politicalscience.World War I endowedit with a subject matterthat other disciplineshad relegatedto the marginsof systematic
inquiry: the study of war and ways to avoid it. The first IR scholarswere,
for the most part, international lawyers and diplomatic historians. Diplomats and journalists mattered,and professionaljournals were devoted to
policy issuesand currentevents.Studentsof politics concernedthemselves
with the subject from the point of view of international law and international organizations(chiefly the Leagueof Nations). Other social scientists
were conspicuouslyabsent,and the positivist idea of sciencewas almost
unheardof. (A British meteorologist,statistician,and Quaker,L.F. Richardson, is the most interestingexceptionto this generalization;his work went
largely unnoticeduntil after World War II.)
Betweenthe two world wars, many IR scholarswere closely connected
to the governmentsof the day in Britain and the United States.To the extent
that the discipline can be said to have existedat all, its dominantconcerns
reflectedthe liberal internationalismof English-speakingpolitical elites. A
little in
Continentaltradition of concernfor statecraft-Realpolitik-figured
the discipline. Marxist concernsmatteredevenless.
After World War II, IR gained disciplinary momentum. The United
Statesassumedan active stancetoward the world commensuratewith its
power, universities in the United States expandedrapidly, and German
Jewishexpatriatesbrought a Continentalconcernfor statecraftto the fore.
What seemedlike a new and very powerful way of thinking, styled realism,
transformedthe discipline.
Realists fostered the impression that war is a permanentfeature of
humanexperiencebecausehumancommunitieshad alwaysbeenorganized
to expectthe worst from eachother. They dismissedthe liberal internationalist project of progressivepacification as dangerouslynaive. States,they
reasoned,are hereto stay, and relationsof statesdemandconstantattention,
skillful statecraft,and an unswervingcommitmentby every state'sleaders
to the "nationalinterest."
Furthermore,realistsarguedthat humanexperienceat the level of states
and their relations is distinct from behavior at other levels. IR's subject
matterwas to be uniquely its own, as guaranteedby the principle of sovereignty. Despiterecurrentdebatesover the most appropriate"level of analysis," IR was overwhelminglystate-centric.IR's raison d'etre was the study
of states,andthusthe study of raison d'etat. Always haphazardaboutlevels
10
KUBALKOV A, ONUF, AND KOWERT
of analysis,the first generationof realistsstill showedtracesof concernfor
nationalcharacter.The behaviorof statesreflectedtheir distinctive histories
and geographicalpositions;the behaviorof their leadersreflectedthe inevitable flaws of human character. Starting in the 1960s, however, realist
scholarssoughtto makethe new discipline scientific.
The credibility of sciencedependson findings that are themselvescredible by scientific criteria and cumulative. After two decadesof science,IR
had preciouslittle to show in the latter respect.Some scholarscounseled
patience, and have diligently continued with the job of science. Others
began to doubt that realism provided sciencewith an adequatebasis for
cumulativefindings. As a matterof theory, attentionto the characteristicsof
states,no matter how scientific, missedthe point that statesmight behave
alike becauseof a commonsituationthat none of them can hope to escape.
In this situation, readily associatedwith ThomasHobbes'sstate of nature,
statesneedonly respondrationally to the radical insecurity engenderedby
their collective,unregulatedexistence.
The rationality postulatepermitteda rigoroustheoryof internationalrelations, analogousto price theory in microeconomics--orso KennethWaltz
proclaimedin his immenselyinfluential book, TheoryofInternationalPolitics (1979). Instead of an equilibrium of supply and demand,the theory
predicted(frequentlyunstable)equilibria of powerandsecurity.Redirecting
attention to the structureof the internationalsystem,Waltz attributed the
"long peace"after World War II to the simplicity of a bipolar equilibrium
of states.Structuralistrealiststhen resumeda familiar debateover the relative merits of bipolar andmultipolar arrangements.
Observing that no set of conditions consistentwith a state of nature
anticipatesgenuinelyharmoniousrelationsamongstates,other scholarsattributed the long peace instead to the United States' international hegemony. The term hegemonyhad long been used to describethe efforts of
leadingstatesto besttheir peersthroughdiplomacyand war. The useof this
term to describethe dominantposition of Britain in the nineteenthcentury
and the United Statesafter World War II signaledtwo tendenciesin the
discipline that emergedmore or less simultaneouslywith the project to
rationalizerealism.Onewas a revival of liberal institutionalism,fosteredby
recognition that these countries held their positions in good measureby
virtue of having institutionalizeda liberal world economy.In short order,
applicationof the rationality postulateto the circumstancesof liberal hegemony had the effect of joining structural realism and structural liberalism
(both often called "neo-") as the discipline'scompetingbut closely related
orthodoxies.
A secondtendencysignaledby the term hegemonystemmedfrom its use
CONSTRUCTING CONSTRUCTIVISM
11
by the Italian Marxist Antonio Gramscito refer to the importanceof ruling
ideas rather than formal institutional arrangements.In the context of the
world economy,liberal ideasmade the dominanceof Britain and then the
United Stateseasy. Until the Vietnam War, IR had developedin almost
completeisolation from the many forms of Marxist thoughtthat had proliferated over the decades.Even then, IR scholarswere slower than their
colleaguesin the other social sciencesto explore the intellectual legacy of
the Left. As a ritual, IR scholarsoften askedtheir studentsto reada little bit
of Lenin. While sociologists and diplomatic historians strenuouslydiscussedimperialismduring the Vietnam era, nothing comparabletook place
in IR. Only throughdependencytheory, which Latin Americanwriters proposed to explain the persistenceof international inequality, did the Left
make its first real contributionto the discipline. Thereuponfollowed world
systemstheory andthe Gramscianinterpretationof hegemony.
Recognitionthat writers on the left had somethingto say took the form
of an ad hoc schemesorting approachesto internationalrelationsinto three
categories-realist(including mercantilist),pluralist (meaningliberal), and
radical (or globalist, sometimesevencalledMarxist}-on what amountedto
an ideological spectrum.The radical categorywas, however, far removed
from decadesof discussionamongEuropeanMarxists, which begana great
reconsiderationof Enlightenmentpremiseson philosophicalas well as ideological grounds.Only graduallyover the last twenty yearshave IR scholars
begunto appreciatethe challengethat this reconsiderationof the "modem
project," as it is often called, representsfor their own discipline,for positivist science,for the way that they think about languageand its uses,and for
the very ideathat knowledgeis possible.
As VendulkaKubalkovamakesclearin the next chapter,confrontingthe
challengeof "post" thinking hashad a catharticeffect on many IR scholars.
Whetherit hashad a comparableeffect on the discipline as suchis harderto
say. In the short term, structuralrealists and their liberal look-alikes have
succeededin maintaining their disciplinary hegemony,especially in the
major graduateinstitutions in the United States. Indeed, rational choice
theoryholds sway at HarvardUniversity, the University of Chicago,andthe
University of California at Berkeley. The longer term may prove to be a
different story, especiallyas the discipline becomesas global as its subject
matter.
The Forest Fire
Until the "post" movementpromptedthe emergenceof new ways of thinking in IR, including constructivism,debatesin the discipline were relatively
12
KUBALKOvA, ONUF, AND KOWERT
simpltr-and practically continuous. One debatenever took place. When
David Singerdirectedattentionto the level of analysisproblem,he usedthe
imageryof trees(read"states")and forest (read"the internationalsystem")
(Singer 1961, 77). Actual forests contain many different speciesof trees,
dependingon terrain, soil conditions, human intrusion, and so on. Yet
Singer's forest is perfectly homogeneous,no doubt becauserealists have
always dismisseda liberal concern for differences among societies and
forms of governmentwithin states.In a minor debatethat still rumbleson,
liberals tried to find a place for "deer or birds, also denizensof the forest,"
as K.J. Holsti (1985, 38) suggestedin a useful extensionof the imagery,but
they failed to persuademost realists,for whom war, or "forest fire," is the
only reasonto pay attentionto the forest or to think of it as composedof
trees.Perhaps,from a realist point of view, "Smokeythe Bear" can alert us
to the dangerof forest fires, but bearsliving in the forest cannot prevent
them. We too will use the metaphoricallanguageof the forest throughout
the rest of this introductorychapter.
The power of this imagery is obvious when we stop to consider the
terrifying speedwith which peoplehave beenburning up and cutting down
tropical forests. Facedwith this sort of threat, forest rangersscanningthe
horizon for signs of smoke are beside the point. Liberal scholars have
always looked for ways of eliminating fire from the forest, while realists
rule out elimination of fires and concentratetheir attentionon damagecontrol. Dependencytheorists are happy to explain that people destroy their
forestsbecausetheir position in the world economyleavesthem no choice.
The issueis not the forest as such,but a structureof planetaryrelationsthat
force African women to walk miles for firewood while IR scholarsfurnish
their studieswith mahoganybookcases.True to Marx, dependencytheorists
would also admonishus to bewareof scholarswho claim that they have no
ax to grind.
Backto Basics
The metaphoricallanguageof forest, trees,and fire helps to clarify the sorts
of debatesin IR that havtr-Or might have--takenplace. It can also show
what scholarsin the discipline have taken for grantedin conductingtheir
debates,at least until they confrontedthe arrival of "post" influencesfrom
other disciplines.Everyonetook for grantedscholars'ability to representthe
world (or the forest) as it is. Objectiveknowledgeseemeda feasiblegoal.
To put it differently, epistemology(how do we know what we know?)
was not an issue.We know what we know, becausewtr-as scholars,and as
children of the Enlightenment---have
beenin the businessof systematically
CONSTRUCTING CONSTRUCTIVISM
13
knowing more for a long time and we have gottenbetterand betterat it. In
particular, we know how to separateour knowing selves,and our wishes,
from the world that we know more and more about. At issue and much
debatedwas methodology(how should we go about the businessof knowing?). Methodologydiffers from epistemologyin that the former inquires
into proceduresfor attesting to knowledge, while the latter is concerned
with the basisfor knowledge--theconviction that our sensoryexperienceis
systematicallyrelatedto the world outsideourselves.
Ontology (what is it that we know?) was an issue, though rarely discussedas such. We do know that there is a world out there, independentof
our efforts to know more about it. We evenknow that our efforts affect the
world; we are only provisionally outsideof it. At issue is the fundamental
natureof the world: Is it in the enda simple matterto explainhow the world
works oncewe havebrokenit down into its smallestparts?Or is it finally a
matterof greatcomplexity, perhapseven more than we can imagine?Convinced that the world will reveal its simplicity to us oncewe know enough,
positivists claimed that sciencecleared the way for ever more powerful
theories.On the defensive,historiciststreatedtheseclaims with skepticism,
only to be described,or dismissed,as traditionalistsfor doing so.
Metaphysicalissueswere off limits. Scholarshad no businessasking
what it all meant-whathigher purposeour earthly existencemight serve.
These were private matters of faith or speculation. Ethical issues were
public business,but the public consistedof consumersof knowledge,not
producers.Scholarswere both. As teachers,consultants,or occasionalpolicy makers,scholarscould speaktheir minds on what peopleshoulddo and
what the world ought to be like, but even then scholarly norms urged a
balancedanddetachedpublic demeanor.
Of the debatesthat did occur in IR, the first "great debate"ruled questions of ethics out of order, establishingthe primacy of realists over socalled idealists. The second "great debate" ratified the methodological
assumptionthat scientific testing should prevail over historical reconstruction. Although the termsof the debatewere methodological,the underlying
issuewas ontological: Is the world ultimately very simple, or is it irreducibly complex? The debate itself gradually petered out in quibbles over
method. At the same time, philosophersand social theorists began to
challenge the epistemologicalconsensusthat sustainedall such debates.
Eventually these challengesprecipitateda far deeperand more divisive
debatethan the discipline had previouslyexperienced,which was heralded
in the 1980sasthe "third debate." Manyscholarsbeganto suspectthat there
wasnothing actuallyto debate.The incompatibility of epistemologicalpositions, and the refusal to believethat a commonposition was evenpossible,
14
KUBALKOvA, ONUF, AND KOWERT
meantchoosingsides and going separateways. It was in this context that
constructivismemerged.
Even the simplestof statementscan be usedto reinforce the understanding of someof theseissues.In everydayconversation,we do not examine
everything thatwe say in orderto understandits philosophicalimplications,
but we could. To illustrate this, let us start with a simple claim about the
world: "There is a fire in the forest." An examinationof this claim takesus
to ontology.
Ontology deals with essenceand appearance,the nature of things and
how they are related,and how this affects the way that things appearto us.
The statement"there is a fire in the forest" claims to tell us what "it" is that
we are talking about, what "it" consistsof, and how "its" parts are related.
An examinationof this claim requiresus to introducecategoriesinto which
the object we are talking about can be meaningfully placed: the forest in
questionis but one possiblememberof a classof objectscalledforests,and
its placementin that classmay be subjectto confusionor controversy.The
samegoesfor the fire.
The statement"there is a fire in the forest" ought not to be confusedwith
the statement"the forest is on fire." Both statementsare commonsense
shorthandrepresentationsof a seriesof different propositions,themselves
basedon assumptionsthat anyonehearing these statemertsmust sharein
orderto understandthem. The termfire probablyrefersto a commonchemical reactionthat takesplaceundercertainconditions,with a readily observable result (namely, that combustibleobjectsburn). It is unclear,however,
whether the speakerintends hearersto believe that the whole forest is
burning all at once; such a situation is unlikely and such an interpretation
seemstoo literal. Indeed,the statement"the forest is on fire" could simply
be intendedto convey an image of the forest on the occasionof a particularly magnificentsunset.
Even if the statement"there is a fire in the forest" is less likely to be
misconstrued,at least in English, it still dependson context for meaning.
The personreportingthe fire must assumethat hearersknow that a forest is
an extensive,unenclosedtract of land (its Latin root, faris, means"outside"), that particularkinds of chemicalreactionscalledfires are frequent
eventsin forests, that forests contain a great deal of combustiblematerial,
and that immediate conditions (such as wind and relative humidity) will
havea significant effect on the combustibilityof that material.The prepositional phase"in the forest" is ontologically significant becauseit tells us to
think about the propertiesand relationsof particulartrees,and not, at least
initially, aboutthe forest as a whole.
Furthermore,the personshouting"fire" believesthat a seriesof empiri-
CONSTRUCTING CONSTRUCTIVISM
15
cal generalizationscover the situation. Flickering light, intenseheat, vohuninous smoke, or crackling noises generally mean fIre; beyond a certain size,
fIres are generallyhard to control; big fIres in the forest are generallyundesirable; it is generallyresponsibleto report untendedfIres in the forest; and other
peoplewill generallybelieve the report of fIre if it is appropriatelyconveyed.
To report that the forest is "on fIre" invites disbelief, evenif the intention is to
report, quite specifIcally, that an untendedfIre in the forest is growing rapidly
and is possibly alreadyout of control. To report "there is a fIre in the forest"
invites hearersto participatein the processof empirical generalizationfrom
which sharedknowledgeresults.Otherswill ask: "Where is the fIre? How big
is it? What directionis it moving?What shouldwe do now?"
As this discussionshows, any statementcan be broken into a chain of
propositionsabout the world. It may be that none of thesepropositionsis
"true." As the personshouting"fIre," I may be mistakenaboutthe smokeor
the cracklingnoise. I may not realizethat the fIre is uhdercontrol, or indeed
that it was set for the desired goal of burning away underbrush.Craving
attention,I may have cried "fIre" so often in the past that no one believes
me any longer. When othersagreewith my claims aboutthe world, and acts
that we take on the basisof theseclaims have the effects that we generally
expectthem to, I think that I have spokentruly. If othersconfIrm that there
is a fIre, if we all take what we believeare the appropriateactionsto put the
fIre out, and if a numberof us then report that the fIre is no longer burning,
then I may rest assuredthat I hadreportedthe truth.
In the fIrst instance,speakingtruly is a methodologicalmatter. If others
have doubtsabout the accuracyor relevanceof my claims, I will tell them
how I fIgured out that there is a fIre in the forest. Sticking my hand in it,
looking at the flames, and smelling the smoke,I have relied on my senses
and comparedthe results with what I already know about fIres. I am
obliged, at least in principle, to show that I have chosena methodsuitedto
the circumstancesand then used it properly before others are obliged to
grant that my claims are true. If we considerthe complexity of any claim
that I might make about the outbreakof war in internationalrelations,it is
clearhow diffIcult it is to verify suchclaims.
Ever since the Enlightenment,we have assumedthat we can standapart
from the world in order to "see" it clearly and formulate statementsthat
correspondto the world as it truly is. Seeingthe world even more clearly
dependson improving our observationaltechniquesand making our empirical generalizationsmore precise.The more we are able to offer propositions
about the world, and the more we can identify relationsbetweenthem, the
better able we are to capture the truth of the world. All these activities
vouchfor our epistemologicalconvictions.
16
KUBA.LKOVA., ONUF, AND KOWERT
If we wished, we could break down even further our propositionsabout
forest fires, identifYing variousphysicalandchemicalprocesses,specifYingthe
circumstancesunderwhich they take place,measuringand classifYingthemby
referenceto their properties,and generalizingabout them on the basisof observedregularities.Ontologically speaking,this endeavoris positivism,which
holds that the world consistsof many things held togetherby many fewer sets
of relations.Methodologicallyspeaking,this is science,consistingof betterand
betterexplanationsfor what we observe,buttressedby more andbetterdata.
Questions
As yet, nothing in this discussionchallengesthe epistemologicalconsensus
that hasprevailedsincethe Enlightenment.The relationshipbetweenme, as
observer,and the fire, as an objective, observablecondition, is something
that I and the othersto whom I am speakingtake for granted.I observethe
fire at a specifiabledistance,and my report of fire will affect the fire in a
way that I or anotherobservercan also, in principle, specify: for example,
we all put the fire out. If anyonewere to raise questionsabout my assumptions, then my belief that I can speaktruly has becomea matter of epistemology. I can know the truth, given certainassumptionsaboutthe world. I
cannot know whether these assumptionsare true, however, preciselybecause they are assumptions.How do I know that I am not deluded in
thinking that I seethe world out there?How do I know whetherwe havenot
togetherinventeda world that exists (as a discerniblewhole in many parts)
only in, or inseparablyfrom, the sharedmeaningsthat we give to it? Even if
my propositionsabout the world are true, is not the truth of the world
dependenton the linguistic propertiesofthesepropositions?
The first of thesequestionsis ageless.Many a child has askedit. Treating
the questionas pointlessor silly, or as somethingfor philosophersto worry
about,allows us all to get on in a world that doesseemto exist pretty much
as we senseit. Ifwe are deluded,thendelusionshavetheir advantages.
The secondquestionchallengesthe naturalismthat most positivists espouse.The physical world may exist more or less as we senseit, but the
social world existsbecausewe participatein it and bring our wishesto bear
upon it. Detachingourselvesfrom the social world to observeit is something that we can only do provisionally, in a weak approximationof the
requirementsof science.Framingthe problemthis way raisesthe possibility
that the positivists are right, after all, to insist on the unity of the physical
and social worlds, but wrong to think about it in "natural" terms. Perhaps
the physical world is nothing apart from what we say it meansto us, and
meaningis alwayssocial.
CONSTRUCTING CONSTRUCTIVISM
17
The third questionis as old as the study of rhetoric, but with rhetoric out
of fashion for centuries,it strikes us as the newestand most challenging.It
makeslanguagethe central issue for epistemology:is truth contingenton
the way we speak?Philosophersand social theoristswho ask this question
have taken the "linguistic tum," as they call it, and their answershelpedto
launch the "post" movement. One answer, "truly" radical in its implications,holds that the truth of our propositionsis strictly limited to those
propositions;thereis no world apartfrom them. In effect, languagecan only
representitself. At best, sucha position allows us to think of the world as a
"text" and fostersan interestin "deconstructing"the propositionsmaking it
up to show how truths are fabricated and for whose benefit. A second
answerto the questionsuggeststhat languagecan neverrepresentthe world
completelyaccurately,becauselanguageis implicated in making the world
it purportsto represent.Sucha position treatsmost truths as provisionaland
the world as a complex processof social construction.Standingback and
observing this processis a useful activity, often to be undertakenwith
scientific rigor, but not an activity that can producethe comprehensively
true pictureof the world to which positivistsaspire.
The Challengeof the "Post" Movement
By now the readershouldbe able to appreciatethat IR as a social scienceis
basedupon a more or less unexaminedset of assumptions,most of which
define positivist scienceas a major undertakingof the modemworld. Positivist assumptionshave locked IR onto a particularpoint on a broad spectrum of philosophical possibilities that many scholars in the discipline
might not even have beenawareof. When a few scholarsbeganto discuss
thesepossibilities,often rather tendentiously,the tone and substanceof IR
debatescompletelychanged.Having shapedrealismwith positivist zeal,the
young radicals of an earlier generationsuddenly found themselvesdescribedas reactionarydisciplinary guardians-or,in keepingwith our earlier imagery,as forest rangerspatrolling a burned-out,desolatelandscapein
magnificentignoranceofthe irrelevanceof their vocation.
For most scholars,and certainly for the discipline'sleading figures, experiencing the "post" challenge was disagreeableand often mystifying.
What is one to make of the preposterousclaim that none of us standon the
same"ground" whenwe speakof forests?The epistemologicalchallengeto
foundationsmadedemolition of the discipline or dismissalof the challenge
seemlike the only possibilities. Even issuesthat seemthorny enough in
ontologicaltermstook a radical, epistemologicaltum. How do I know that
you and I meanthe samething by "fire" or "war"? Is my world generally
18
KUBA.LKOVA., ONUF, AND KOWERT
commensurablewith Aristotle's, a Chinesevillager's, yours? Some"post"
challengerswould arguethat there are as many worlds as there are beholders, and that theseworlds are impossibleto compareor relate to eachother.
For most scholars,any such argument simultaneouslymocks us for our
delusionsand demeansus as social beings.It hardly matterswhetherI go
walking in the forest with you or with my dog. Eachof us sensesthe world
as entirely, unrecognizablydifferent. Our only satisfactioncomesfrom the
prospect that you, I, and the dog can at least enjoy the walk, however
incommensurable
our reasons!
If the radical impulse of the "post" challengebrought cries of outrage
from the discipline's leading figures, another predictable responsealso
quickly madeits presencefelt. Perhapsthe challengecould be domesticated
by taking it inside the discipline and giving it a name. Since most of the
challengershad madethe linguistic tum, a label reflecting their preoccupation with languagewould seemto havebeenan appropriatechoice.Hermeneutics was a good candidate.Named after Hermes, the Greek god of
messengersand interpretersof messages,hermeneuticsreferredto a quest
for the correcttheologicalinterpretationof the Bible and later to the interpretationof any text. As a name,however,it suggesteda rathertoo specific
intellectualgenealogyanda too narrowconcernwith meaning.
Interpretiveand its cognateinterpretivistoffered a betterchoice. Widely
usedin sociology, interpretivistattractedconsiderableattentionin IR when
Friedrich Kratochwil and JohnRuggieusedit in 1986 to criticize positivist
assumptions.While the term itself suggestsan epistemologicalconcern
with the status of the knower, Kratochwil and Ruggie's exposition was
concernedmore with what we know (that is, ontology) was not especially
radical. For them, an interpretiviststancesuits the multiplicity of meanings
that complex, normatively freighted social processesinevitably engender
(Kratochwil andRuggie 1986).
Two years later, Robert Keohaneused his presidentialaddressto the
InternationalStudiesAssociationas an occasionto pronounceon the subject. Setting on one side scholarswith rationalistic inclinations, including
himself, he thoughtthe term interpretiveleft too much out on the otherside.
He proposedreflective insteadto indicate a stresson "human reflection"
(Keohane 1988, 382). It was a stroke of genius for Keohaneto choosea
flatteringly empty term--who wouldn't want to be thought of as reflective?--to deflect attention from the epistemologicalthrust of the "post"
challenge.In effect, he resuscitatedthe earlier debatebetweenpositivists
and historicists, and suggestedthat "reflection" is the appropriatemethod
for historicist inquiry. Many scholarswith Keohane'srationalist sensibilities adoptedthe term reflectivistto describetheir "post" challengers.
CONSTRUCTING CONSTRUCTIVISM
19
Yosef Lapid (1989) offered the challengers(himself among them) a
more attractive alternative.They are post-positivists,whom he set against
positivists in what he called the "third debate."Given the ferocity of the
challengeand the befuddledresponseto it, styling this situation a "great
debate" granted the challengersa certain legitimacy. In exchange,Lapid
softenedthe epistemologicalchallengeby calling it perspectivism,skipped
over ontology as such, and went on to discussthe move toward methodologicalpluralism (1989, 241-44).
The term post-positivismis undoubtedlybetter than its alternatives,including critical (which we criticized above).Nevertheless,the simple symmetry of the pairedtermspositivismandpost-positivismunduly rationalizes
a momentof controversyand obfuscationin the discipline'sshort history.
In theseintroductory pages,we refer to the challengeof the "post" movement. We do so for convenience,and in full recognitionthat scholarshave
attachedthe prefix "post" to so many, diverse nouns that it capturesthe
flavor of that turbulentmoment,not to mentiona continuingsenseof disorientationin the discipline.
At the same time, Onuf proposedconstructivismas a framework for
social theory. Taking the linguistic tum, he settled for the second, less
radical answerto the epistemologicalquestion"Is truth contingenton the
way we speak?"Languageis indeedimplicated in the world it purportsto
represent.This answer implies an affirmative answer to the ontological
question"Is the world somethingthat we have invented?"He then developedan additional claim about language.We use languageto representthe
world to ourselves,just as we have always thought, and we use language
quite deliberatelyto bring our representationsof the world--as we think it
is and as we want it to be-to bearupon that world. Languageis the most
powerful tool availableto us for social constructionas an ongoing, largely
unpremeditatedactivity in which everyone is inevitably and perpetually
engaged.Constructivismeffectively leaves epistemologyto the philosophers, and takes the linguistic tum back to ontology (Onuf 1989, 36-43).
Onuf thus avoidedchoosingsidesin the third debate;he dissociatedhimself
from post-structuralismand its repudiationof foundations,while conceding
that such foundationsas we have may be nothing more than "the rubble of
construction"(1989,35).
Onuf's subsequentconcern with modernity resemblesJiirgen
Habermas'sin the latter's debatewith the post-moderns,and Onufs debts
to Habermasare substantial.Nevertheless,Onuf does not see constructivism as a recipe for emancipation,which has always been the goal for
Habermasas a critical theorist. Constructivismis normative in the sense
that it takes normative phenomena-rules--as
the foundation of society,
20
KUBALKOvA, ONUF, AND KOWERT
but Onuf's claim that rules always result in a condition of rule has earned
him criticism from scholarswho believe.that a post-positivistposition is
necessarily"critical." Onuf shareswith liberal theorists (and Keohane's
rationalistic positivists) an interestin the unintendedconsequences
of individual choicesand acknowledgestheir importancefor social construction
without succumbingto the ingenuousclaim that a harmonyof interestsor
balanceof power is likely to result. As a label, constructivismconjuresup
an image of intentional activity on a grand scale,of concretebeing poured
and buildings and malls going up, or the Stalinist practice of giving out
medalsto those constructingthe bright socialist future. Onuf shareswith
Marxist theoristsan interestin the materialsof social construction(they are
never simply "raw" materials), but again without becoming a historical
materialistwho dismissesthe importanceof humanagency.
If Onuf's constructivismis indeed a third way in the third debate,it is
hardly the path of least resistance.Constructivismacceptsthe unity of nature and society, as positivists do, but does not deny society its distinctive
ontological characterby doing so. Instead, constructivismsees natureas
irrevocablysocial. From a constructivistpoint of view, the "forest" is not so
much a metaphoras a misrepresentation:
the forest shouldneverbe thought
of as an extensivepieceof naturethat is somehow"outside" society.Onuf's
constructivismoffers an alternativeontology,a redescriptionof the scenery.
If we were to force the metaphor,the forest, as an ensembleof trees and
much else,is everywhere,and we are always in it, making the treesand the
forest what they are.
About This Book
Constructivism is a constructive responseto the challenge of the "post"
movement.It rejects the "slash-and-burn"extremismof somepost-modem
thinkerswho leavenothing behindthem, nowhereto stand,nothing evenfor
themselvesto say. Constructivismtries to make senseof social relationsin
generalin order to get beyondthe pointlessposturingthat passesfor debate
in a discipline that cannot even defend its claim to a distinctive subject
matter called "internationalrelations." While constructivistsjoin the "post"
movementin calling into question much of the orthodoxy of postwar IR
scholarship,they reject neitherempirical researchnor social scienceas such.
Instead,constructivismmaintainsthat the sociopoliticalworld is constructed
by humanpractice,and seeksto explainhow this constructiontakesplace.
Four objectivesguided the contributorsto this book. First, they try to
make Onuf's "construction"of constructivismaccessibleto a broad audience that may not wish to read his technically demandingWorld of Our
CONSTRUCTING CONSTRUCTIVISM 21
Making. Onufhimselfoffers a comprehensiveoverview in simple language.
Second,severalof the contributorssituateconstructivismin the context of
IR's tormentedrecenthistory, the constructivistclaims of other scholarsin
the discipline, and recenttrendsin the philosophyof science.Third, several
contributorsexplore the relevanceof constructivismfor empirical research
and offer new ways of conceptualizingkey issuesof contemporaryinternational politics. Fourth, the book concludesby consideringthe implications
of constructivismfor teachinginternationalrelations,inasmuchas teaching
is itself an act of social construction.
Throughout, the contributors show that constructivism is a powerful,
systematicway of thinking about social relations in general and international relationsin particular.Oncefamiliar with constructivism,few readers
will continue to be comfortablewith the world as portrayedin academic
textbooks.More to the point, they will see themselvesin a new light-as
agentsin a world that makesthem what they are, and as agentsin a world
that they are responsiblefor making in everythingthat they do.
Bibliography
Adler, Emanuel. 1997. "Seizing the Middle Ground: Constructivismin World Politics."
EuropeanJournal ofInternationalRelations3 (September):319-63.
Holsti, K.J. 1985. The Dividing Discipline: Hegemonyand Diversity in International
Theory. Boston: Allen & Unwin.
Keohane,Robert o. 1988. "International Institutions: Two Approaches."International
StudiesQuarterly 32 (December):379-96.
Kratochwil, Friedrich. 1984. "Errors Have Their Advantage."International Organization 38 (Spring): 303-20.
- - - and John GerardRuggie. 1986. "International Organization:A Stateof the Art
on an Art of the State."InternationalOrganization40 (Autumn): 753-75.
Lapid, Yosef. 1989. "The Third Debate: On the ProspectsofInternationalTheory in a
Post-PositivistEra." InternationalStudiesQuarterly 33 (September):235-54.
Onuf, Nicholas Greenwood. 1989. World of Our Making: Rules and Rule in Social
TheoryandInternationalRelations.Columbia: University of SouthCarolinaPress.
Singer, 1. David. 1961. "The Level-of-Analysis Problem in International Relations."
World Politics 14 (October):77-92.
Waltz, Kenneth N. 1979. Theory of International Politics. Reading, MA: AddisonWesley.
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- - - - - - - - P a r tII
Constructivism in Context
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2
The Twenty Years' Catharsis:
E.H. Carr and IR
Vendulka Kubtilkovti
This chapteris an academicmystery story with a twist: the mystery isn't
just about whodunit, but about who is the victim, who was the villain, and
what is the meaningof the messagethat was left behind?And at the heartof
it all lies the question:"Who was Mr. Carr?" To start out, somebackground
is necessary.This much we know:
Few historical personalitiesor philosopherscan boast of adherentsand
disciples of all stripes, including adversariesengagedin deadly combat
against each other. Edward Hallett Carr (1892-1982)is one of that small
band; he has beenacclaimedas one of the intellectual founders,both of the
mainstreamin the International Relations (IR) discipline and of the approachesof its fiercest critics. Carr has been seen as the forefather of
realism and of the "post" movement,as well as a " 'proto' constructivist"
who helpedto developthe approachintroducedin this book (Dunne 1995,
373). This means that were he alive, Carr could do a circus act at IR
conferencesby sitting aloneat a roundtablediscussingthreepositionsat the
sametime. Or, was he really the victim of an academicmugging?
Carr wrote a book, publishedin 1939, called The Twenty Years' Crisis
191~ 1939: An Introduction to the StudyofInternationalRelations(hereafter referredto as Twenty Years' Crisis and cited from the 1962 printing of
the secondedition). The twenty years Carr referred to was the interwar
period, during which, in his view, the IR discipline took a wrong tum. One
of the purposesof this chapteris to show that the "twenty years' crisis" has
in fact turned out to be a crisis lasting more than sixty yearsand that, only
25
26
VENDULKA KUBALKOV A
now, long after his death, Carr's crisis might be ending. The past twenty
yearshaveseen,I will argue,the ultimate, cathartic,stageof that crisis. The
main purposeof this chapter(apart from solving the mystery) is to place
constructivism,its intellectual sources,and its origin in the contextof these
tumultuoustwenty yearsto which Carr holds the key.
Who Was E.H. Carr?
In his Twenty Years' Crisis, Carr labeledthe main approachto IR as "realism." He also coined a distinction between"realists" and "idealists" (the
latter were also referred to as "utopians"). He said they were locked in a
debate, known thereafter as the great debate. Scholars ever since have
soughtto identify somethingthat would constituteanotherdebateto follow
in the footstepsofE.H. Carr. A few havebeenlucky: HedleyBull identified
the secondgreatdebateand Y osefLapid the third debate.The third debate,
still in progress,is a part of the catharsiswith which this essaydeals.But
Carr startedthe idea of having"great debates."His book hasbeendescribed
as "the first 'scientific' treatment of modem world politics" (Hoffmann
1977,43).To complicatethe matter,however,in one of the most influential
piecesanticipatingthe third debate,Carr was namedan intellectualprogenitor of a "critical approach"to IR when other, much more deservingcandidatessuchas Habermassurprisinglydid not makethe cut (Cox 1981).1Carr
receivedapplauseand eulogiesfrom the most prominentTrotskyists(Isaac
Deutscher1955; TamaraDeutscher1983). What are we to makeof this?
Carr, the historian, madeit onto the 1997 Foreign Affairs list of the best
books of the last seventy-five years with his twelve-volume History oj
SovietRussia(Legvold 1997, 230). Carr the journalist and publicist occasionedpolitical controversyas one of the editorial writers of The Times of
London, where his political views were attackedfor a variety of reasons,
including his beingtoo pro-Soviet.Among the strongestcritics of his political views were prominent British politicians and scholars, including the
historian Hugh Trevor-Roperand Carr's co-founderof IR realism, Hans
Morgenthau(Jones1996).
Were it not for the continuationof his twenty-yearcrisis and had the
developmentsof the last twenty yearsnot takenplace,the political controversy about Carr would have been long forgotten and historiansof the IR
discipline would not be confusedabouthim. Until recently, the central fact
of Carr's IR legacy appearedto be his role as the key figure of the realist
approach.Admittedly, a numberof his distinguishedcolleaguesfrom the IR
discipline were critical of his work and found in it minor or major defects
(Morgenthau1948; Trevor-Roper1962; Bull 1969; K.W. Thompsonet al.
THE TWENTY YEARS' CATHARSIS
27
1980; Fox 1985). The numberof citations endorsingCarr as the founder of
realism, however, far outnumbersthose commentingon his various inconsistencies.Becauseof the increasingvisibility of the approvalof Carr by the
"post" movement(Cox 1981, 131; Linklater 1990, 7; Booth 1991; Linklater
1992; Howe 1994; Jones1996; Linklater 1997), the "paternity" issuewill
have to be addressedand realistswill haveto decidewhetherthey still want
to claim him as a founding father.
The paradoxis that Carr is now praisedand celebratedfor what earlier
were regardedas seriousdefects.Errors in his judgmentwere not accidental
but "rooted in a more fundamentalweaknessin his political philosophy"
(K.W. Thompsonet al. 1980, 77). In sharp contrastto this view, a critical
writer assertsthat Carr's "reputationfor Realism... servedto distort [his]
relevanceto contemporarydebates"(Linklater 1997, 321). While earlier
such labels were derogatory,they are now flattering and it is a compliment
when Carr is called a "utopian realist" (Howe 1994) or an "ambivalent
realist" (Jones1996). In a book on "post-realism,"Carr is usedas an example of a major IR figure who took what the authorscall a "rhetorical tum"
(Beer & Hariman 1996). Whateverthat might meanexactly, the drift of the
detailed"post-realist"rhetorical deconstructionof his texts concludesthat
Carr played gameswith his readershipand, in a subtle use of rhetorical
contradictory statements,tried to please,tease,or fool everybody. While
this explanationmight go someway to explainthe attitudeof the IR discipline toward Carr, it seemsto be a bit of a stretch to impute to Carr a
Machiavelliangeniusthat connivedto deceivethe discipline on a gigantic
scale. Besides,even if he had had the meansand opportunity to do this,
what would the motive havebeen?
The Overlooked Clue?
Carr agreeswith Lord Acton, who said that "few discoveriesare more irritating than thosewhich exposethe pedigreeof ideas" (Carr 1962, 71). Perhaps
Carr did not mind the misunderstanding.But there is, in my view, a much
less sophisticated,much simpler reading of Carr, which to a considerable
extent reconcilesthe seemingcontradictionof Carr's Twenty Years' Crisis.
In formal logic, A and non-A cannotbe true at the sametime. Therefore,a
realist could not at the sametime be an antirealistor an idealist. However,
there is a form of thought called dialectics and in dialectical logic a realist
could be a nonrealist. Perhapsthen Carr was a dialectician. One of the
importantmembersof the "post" movementin Australia, Jim George,briefly
noted Carr's dialectical inclinations but did not think Carr was consistent
evenat that (George1994,78). I will arguethat Carr was a dialectician.
28
VENDULKA KUBALKOV A
Carr's Twenty Years' Crisis reveals a strong influence of Marx's
thought as modified by Engels and Lenin, particularly his use of the concept of dialectics.If his Twenty Years' Crisis is rereadwith an understanding of dialectics,it becomesclear that, far from being playful or conniving,
intellectually dishonest,sloppy, or inconsistent, Carr was simply using
dialecticalreasoning.It is easily recognizableby anybodyfamiliar with the
concept of dialectics of the genre of Soviet Marxist-Leninist textbooks.
Over the years only a few IR authors noted Carr's thinking as a rather
puzzling, mild caseof Marxism. Carr has beenreferredto as a "Marxist of
sorts" and "a Marxist-realist" (Brown 1992, 25, 69). Carr's Marxism is
clearly non-Marxist Marxism "Westernized"by Carr himselfwith no help
from the "WesternMarxists." Carr's nonrelationshipwith WesternMarxists is an important reasonwhy the Marxist elementsin his thought have
been overlooked.But the WesternMarxists have played an important role
in the emergenceof the IR "post" movement.Again, it is curious to note
that some of his contemporaryadmirers believe that Carr did parallel or
anticipate Western Marxists or post-Marxists, Habermas,and Foucault
(Linklater 1997).
"WesternMarxists," initially the HungarianGeorg Lukacs (1885--1971),
the German Karl Korsch (1886-1961), and the Russian Leon Trotsky
(1879-1940),were so namedby Maurice Merleau-Ponty(1905--1961)exactly so as not to be mistakenfor the Soviet versionof Marxism-Leninism.
The term Western Marxism normally refers also to the Italian Antonio
Gramsci(1891-1937)and the GermanFrankfurt School. I refer to themby
nationalitiesto explain the contemporarycustomof referring to them also
as "ContinentalEuropean."By the mid-1930s,the WesternMarxists were
united in their rejection of the Soviet Union's practiceand theory. Despite
disclaimersthat they had nothing to do with the Soviet Union, the members of the famous GermanFrankfurt School,undoubtedlythe most influential centerof WesternMarxism in this century,adoptedin 1937 the term
critical as a code word for Marxism, so as not to use the term Marxism.
Even so, the entire school had to flee to the United Statesfrom the anticommunistand anti-SemiticHitler Germany.Carr wrote his TwentyYears'
Crisis only a coupleyearslater, in the United Kingdom There is no visible
connectionbetweenCarr and Western Marxists. On the contrary, Carr's
sort of Marxism is very different from the distinct form of WesternMarxism already established
at the time.
WesternMarxists, influencednot only by Marx but by many otherthinkers, changedtheir writing style to an idiom of tremendoustechnical diffiCUlty, accessibleonly to fellow academics.Since then, WesternMarxism
has stayedin the handsof academicsand the difficult idiom has becomea
THE TWENTY YEARS' CATHARSIS
29
characteristicfeature of social sciencesgenerally. Carr refers disapprovingly to academicswithout practical experienceas "armchair studentsof
international politics" (1962, 38), using exactly the same words as did
Lenin.
Carr's style doesnot suffer from the opacity of proseof WesternMarxism. It is more reminiscentof the Soviet version of Marxism, which met
with an oppositefate. As can be seenfrom the standardtextbooksof Marxism-Leninism from which the populacewas taught at school and in refreshercoursesthroughouttheir adulthood,Sovietsmadeout of Marxism a
fairy tale in which the good characters always
won over the bad characters.
It was accessibleand understandableto all and for many decadeswas
highly attractive in its promisesand its comforting moral justifications. In
the gigantic experimentof social construction,Marxist-Leninist textbooks
were publishedin millions of copiesacrossthe Soviet empire, achievinga
circulation secondonly to the Bible.
If anything, Carr'sproseand his definition of realismand idealismhave
beenfound too simple (Brown 1992,25). If we rereadCarr's TwentyYears'
Crisis with the help of dialectics,we get a different picture and a different
messagealtogether.The messagebecomesmore complex once we realize
that he relatedrealism dialectically to idealism. We can then seethat Carr
strongly advocatedrealism, but as a transition, a station on the way. IR
scholarsof the postwarperiod generallymissedthis point, which is hardly
surprisingsince the discipline was alreadypermanentlyembeddedin realism, like a fly in amber. Only in the last decadehas the discipline had to
reopenitself enoughto reconsiderits historical legacyand the true views of
its father figure.
A Caseof Mistaken Identity?
There are many telltale signs of Carr's exposureto some sort of Marxism.
Carr approvingly quotes Marxist classicsand even includes Marx among
key representatives
of "modemrealism" (1962, 65). Marx did write extensively aboutthe foreign policy of his time, but Carr is not referring to Marx
in that sense.Carr doesnot talk about revolutions,classstruggles,and the
proletariat.Nor is he an economicdeterminist.Carr, however,usesdialectics, at the minimum to organizehis thinking and to organizehis argument.
The celebratedpassagesof his rejectionof utopianismconstitutemuch less
thanhalf of the story containedin Carr'sbook. I will briefly overview some
key elementsof Carr's reasoningand conceptssuch as dialectics,not only
as they relate to Carr, but as a useful introduction in simple terms to the
languagerequiredfor the understandingof the "post" movement.
30
VENDULKA KUBALKOV A
TheMysteriousFormula
Dialectics has a quite respectable,if limited, place in Westernphilosophy; its
progenitors include not only Marx, Engels, and Lenin, but also Aristotle,
Heraclitus, and Hegel. American Marxist Bertell Oilman uses it as the key
conceptof his versionof Marxism, and HaywardAlker, who is by no meansa
Marxist, defines dialectics as one of the three approachesto IR (Alker and
Biersteker1984). Alker alonepublisheda numberof piecesaboutthe application of dialecticsto IR with a large cooperativeproject in progressdealingwith
the subjectof dialectics (Alker 1981, 1982, 1996). Dialectical thinking is not
unheardof in Western sociology (Ritzer 1983). Dialectics has been used in
mathematicalmodeling(Mitroff andMason 1982 andRescher1977).
Using dialecticsalone does not make one into a Marxist. The choice of
dialectics simply indicatesa rejection of the monocausalapproachand the
notion of unilinear developmentin favor of the dynamic, multicausal,and
multidirectional. Where a liberal thinker seesharmonyas the normal state
of affairs and views conflict as a deviation; for a dialecticianit is the other
way around. Dialecticiansregard conflict as normal and harmony as only
temporary.(Soviets referred to detenteas peredyshka,meaning"breathing
space," betweenstretchesof peaceful coexistencewhich had little to do
with peace.)Preoccupiedwith conflict and contradiction,thoseapplying the
dialectical method seek to understandchangethrough a study of the past
and the presentthat establishesa connectionbetweenfuture developments
and the present.Dialecticianstherefore study history and look for change
over time. Dialectics sees things as inevitably interconnectedand interdependent.Dialecticiansare by definition holistic in their approach,arguing
that eventscannotbe tom out of context. Dialecticiansneverseecauseand
effect as isolated, but perceivereciprocal causalitiesin which both events
and processesexert influence and are influenced by each other. In other
words, dialecticiansbelievethat eachpart influencesthe whole just as much
as the whole influenceseach individual part. Dialecticianssee things and
processesin a stateof constantflux andchange.
Dialecticiansthink in terms of relatedpairs of concepts;let us say A and
B, where thesepairs are construedin a binary thesis-antithesisway. A is in
a causalrelation to B, but the relation is reciprocatedsince B is also in a
causalrelation to A. Realism and utopianism,or idealism, in Carr's book
are in this relationship. The tension leads to a resolution which contains
both A and B in a transcendedform in a resulting synthesis.The synthesis
in turn becomesa thesisin contradictionto an antithesis,and so the process
goesnot in a straightline but-asit were--ona spiral. It then follows that if
A and B are in a dialectical contradiction,then B could not simply vanish
THE TWENTY YEARS' CATHARSIS
31
leaving A intact. Nothing remains intact. Everything is in some sort of
dialecticalrelationship.So A cannotbe separatedpermanentlyfrom B or B
from A. Such an outcome is not conceivable,nor would it representa
resolutionof the contradiction.Dialecticscanrepresentan ontologicalposition, finding mutually contradictoryrelationshipsbetweenthings and processes"out there," in the world and history. The standardSoviet textbooks
used Friedrich Engels's(1820-1895)butterflies cavorting in the butterfly
mating seasonto convey the point. The mating of the first butterfly ("thesis") with the second("antithesis")gives rise to thousandsof butterflies.
Dialectics, however, need not be fatuous. Apart from its ontological
claims, dialecticscan be usedalso as an epistemologicaltheory concerning
the nature of knowledge of the material world. It can also be used as a
method,a tool whoseunderstandingadvancesthe questfor truth andknowledge.In what Marx's closestfriend and coauthor,Engels,called dialectical
materialism(which meansin ordinary languagesimply "Marxist philosophy"), dialecticshas both ontological and epistemologicalsubstance.Both
the material world and the human mind are believed to follow dialectical
rules. This is importantfor our argument.Marx conceivesof man as a "real,
active man." Cognitive action is materialand practical,and thus knowledge
is not merely a cognitive reflectionupon an externalworld, but becomesthe
meansfor shaping,constructing,and changingreality. To simplify it even
further, formulating thoughts, analyzing, becauseit is going on in one's
mind and the mind is a part of the world, meansthat, as the thought is
formulated,the world undergoesa change.Thus thinking is doing, making
or changingthe world. Theory fuses with practice, values with facts, and
man in his thinking alters the world. Or, as Carr put it, "in the processof
analyzingthe facts, Marx alteredthem" (1962, 4). Carr hints hereat Marx's
notoriousEleventh Thesison Feuerbach,so well known in certain circles
that he did not need even to cite it. And Carr adds, "Nor is it only the
thinking of professionalor qualified studentsof politics which constitutesa
political fact" (41).
Deciphering Carr
Like the thinking of a contemporaryIR dialectician, ProfessorHayward
Alker, who spells out the relationship more clearly (1981, 1982), Carr's
understandingis basedon perceivingthe effect of one party to a contradiction interpenetratingthe other in sucha way that the original distinguishing
featuresof both parts of the contradictionare blurred. To Carr what was
wrong with idealism is that it developedwithout realism. Realism is the
necessarycorrectiveto the "exuberanceof utopianism,just as in otherperi-
32
VENDULKA KUBA.LKOV A.
ods, utopianismmust be invoked to counteractthe barrennessof realism.
Immaturethought is predominantlypurposiveand utopian. Thought which
rejectspurposeis the thought of old age.... Utopia and reality are thus the
two facets of political science.Soundpolitical thought and soundpolitical
life will be found only where both have their place" (1962, 10). Or, more
bluntly, "the characteristicvice of the utopian is naivety; of the realist,
sterility" (12). By that logic, having suppressedmuch of what Carr would
call idealist thought,the IR discipline, until recently, hasbeengeriatric and
sterile.
Carr'swhole book is basedupon a seriesof dialectically relatedpairs of
concepts,like realism and idealism. Parallel to realism and idealism, Carr
construesa chain of binary dialectical relationships.The point is the parallel construction:A and B, C and D, and X and Z. There is a link between
the first of the pairs, A, C, X, on the one hand, and the secondof the pairs
B, D, Z, on the other hand. Carr calls these"antitheses"and arguesthat
"these antithesesreproducethemselvesin different forms." As he puts it,
the "most fundamental utopia-reality antithesis is rooted in a different
conceptionof the relationshipof politics and ethics,the world of value and
the world of nature, purpose and fact" (1962, 20-21). Other than this
sequencethat leads to the utopian-realist distinction, he sees the same
theme, as it were, metamorphosedinto relationshipsbetweentheory and
practice, voluntarism and determinism, Left and Right, intellectual and
practitioner(bureaucrat),radical and conservative,ideals and institutions,
immature and old, inexperiencedand experienced,and many others. He
links theory, voluntarism,Left, intellectual,radical, ideals,immature,inexperienced.He links practice,determinism,Right, bureaucrat,conservative,
institutions,old, experienced.
The Message:"It Is All in E.H. Carr"
Carr's impressionsof the nascentIR discipline were derived from his
experiencewith it in the late 1930s. He did not know either structural
realism or logical positivism and empiricism in their full-blown forms in
IR. However, the current philosophical debatesin the IR discipline
would appearto him long overdue and trivial. The essenceof the last
twenty years could be summarizedas idealism-utopianismcorrecting
realismand thus man and his mind being returnedto the world and to the
theory now cleansedof its positivist distortions. Neither realism nor
idealism would be the outcomeof this process.One of the leading contemporaryBritish critical IR theorists,an admirer of Carr, suggeststhat
THE TWENTY YEARS' CATHARSIS
33
Carr himself provides "outlines of the third way" (Linklater 1997, 323).
Carr was neitherrealistnor idealist.
Thus, just as realists maintain about their wisdom that "it is all in
Thucydides,"it can be claimedwith evengreaterjustification that, as far as
the current debateis concerned,"it is all in E.H. Carr." Carr anticipatesan
application of the dialectical approachto IR. Carr championsintellectual
pluralism. Carr anticipatedthe creationof the InternationalPolitical Economy. Having had a go at both practice (as a diplomat and journalist) and
theory (as a professorof IR in Aberystwyth and a CambridgeUniversity
Fellow), Carr calls for more stresson policy relevanceof theoreticalefforts.
Carr strongly urgesan inclusion of Leftist thought in any academicpursuit.
"The Right is weak in theory and suffers through its inaccessibility to
ideas," while the Left suffers from a lack of practical experienceand a
failure "to translateits theory into practice." However, he says,"the intellectual superiorityof the Left is seldomin doubt. The Left alone thinks out
principles of political action and evolves ideals for statesmento aim at"
(1962, 19). If it would be too early to describeCarr as postpositivist,then
he is certainly antipositivist.For Carr, positivism in the form he knew in the
1930s was unacceptable,mainly becauseof the disagreementhe would
havewith the totally nondialecticalseparationof man and natureas subject
and object, and treating social phenomenaas if they were natural phenomena. As he put it, "By an easy analogy, the Newtonian principles were
appliedto the ethical problems... oncetheselaws were determined,human
beings would conform to them just as matter conformed to the physical
laws of nature."In natural sciences"facts exist independentlyof what anyone thinks of them. In the political sciences,which are concernedwith
humanbehavior,there are no suchfacts. The investigatoris inspiredby the
desireto cure someill of the body politic" (22). "The purposeis not, as in
the physicalsciences,irrelevantto the investigationand separablefrom it; it
is itself one of the facts" (3-4). Theory, says Carr, is for a purpose.R.W.
Cox, anotherof the contemporarycritical theoristsof IR, becamecelebrated
for saying somethingvery similar fifty years after Carr (Cox 1981, 128).
Carr distinguishesthree interdependentcategoriesof "political powerin the
international sphere": "military, economic and over opinion" (l08). No
doubt the membersof the "post" movementwill cringe at the suggestion,
but it can be arguedthat the main and lasting contribution of the "post"
movementis to be found in the attention it has drawn precisely to what
perhapsCarr clumsily calls "power over opinion." The "post" movement
hasshifted IR concernsto include the fundamentalhumanmentalprocesses
of people,both IR theoristsand states,which are madeof people.
34
VENDULKA KUBALKOV A
The Missing Pieces
In very simple tenusCarr alludedto central philosophicalissuesdebatedin
the field of IR today. In a variety of esoteric ways and in a technically
difficult idiom they becamecatapultedinto prominencein the social sciencesand, in the last twenty years, also in the discipline of International
Relations.
But what do these questionshave to do with the affairs of statesand
statecraft?As we arguedin the introduction, the answeris, in the view of
the "post" movement(and also of Carr), a greatdeal. The "post" movement
doesnot pick an argumentabout specific issuesand internationalrelations
per se. Instead,the targetsof criticism are the philosophicalfoundation of
how, in the IR discipline, the world is viewed; how what we call knowledge
is put together; and for what purposethat knowledge is used. All of the
strands of the "post" movement have in common an assertionthat the
philosophicalfoundationsof IR lead to misinterpretationand misrepresentation of the world including internationalrelations. In that view, not only
did IR get stuck at a stage of penuanentrealism; it is also basedon a
fundamentallyflawed understandingof the relationshipbetweenman and
the world-"reality"-in the usual parlance.Some,of course,arguethat it
is deliberate.This is where the argumentbeginsto be too difficult to simplify, but the points that the "post" movementmakesare too important to
set themasidejust becausethey aremadein a difficult language.
Did Waltz Do It?
None of this was everconsideredof any relevanceto the IR discipline. Why
and how did the situationchange,and how did thesetopics get introduced?
In the IR discipline therewas an increasingdissatisfactionwith the positivist portrayalof reality as reflectedin man'smind in an "objective" way. The
positivism of this position has been further compoundedin the work of
Kenneth Waltz, particularly in his book Theory of International Politics
(publishedin 1979) but circulating aroundthrough the earlier publications
of its parts (Waltz 1979; Waltz in Polsby and Greenstein1975). If previously positivism was objectedto becauseof its disregardfor the human
mind underthe guise of objectivity, then Waltz's new theory of realism, to
be known as "neorealism"or "structural realism," made this characterization evenmore valid. Waltz addeda componentof structuralismto positivism. It hasbeenthis particularmix of positivism and structuralismaddedto
realism that has stirred a more effective opposition to realism in IR than
ever before. In my view, it also set off the processesI describeas catharsis
THE TWENTY YEARS' CATHARSIS
35
and the creationof the "post" movement.To make at least a dent on the
new form of what appearedto be indestructible realism, IR authors
startedwheeling into IR studies intellectual weaponry of the Left from
all over humanitiesand social sciences,and the "post" movementcame
into existence.
Structuralismwas nothing new. It had beenusedin different fields many
times before.The term refersto a distinct approachto social phenomena.As
its critics claim, structuralismpushesman even further out of the picture.
Man is lost as "systemsand subsystems,elementsand structuresare drilled
up and down the pages[of history] pretendingto be people" (Ashley 1984,
226-27, quoting E.P. Thompson 1978). Structuralistsassertthat only by
looking into that which is hidden and underpinsthe apparentcan we reach
beyondthe study of self-conceptionsandmotivesof individuals (or individual entities such as states).Structuralistslook for a structureand structural
forces becausethey believe that individuals, or in this case, states, are
constrainedby structuralforcesover which they haveno control. Structuralism, in otherwords, sharpenssomeof the featuresof positivism.
It is worth mentioning that the line cited above about structuresbeing
drilled into the pagesof history was a quotation used by an IR scholarto
attack the structuralismof Waltz. Characteristically,however, this scholar
borrowedit, togetherwith the overall argument,from an attack on a structural Marxist. The early pieces of this genre were characterizedby extremely eclectic borrowing, in which Ashley typically spendspage after
page explaining at length to the IR audienceconceptsquite well known
elsewhere.
Kuhn as an Accomplice
Waltz was by no meanssolely responsiblefor the turmoil in the discipline.
He had a helper namedThomasKuhn. Kuhn himself did nothing, but his
slim volume (Kuhn 1970), not even intendedfor the IR discipline or social
sciences,played a role. His concept of "paradigm" was enthusiastically
usedin the IR discipline. Why would that makeany difference?
Becauseof the way the IR discipline has beenconstituted,it has proved
extraordinarily difficult to challengethe reigning approach.When the concept of paradigmwas introducedto the IR discipline, a subtle terminological substitutiontook place.IR scholarstalked suddenlynot about"theories"
or "approaches"but about "paradigms,"a term that Kuhn used. They did
not always explain what was the difference in this terminology, giving an
impressionthat the three terms are more or less synonymous,and many
scholarsin fact usedthem interchangeably.
36
VENDULKA KUBALKOV A
Kuhn's conceptof paradigm,however,hasa very specialmeaning.Kuhn
wrote about physics and not about social sciencesbut-asin the case of
Carr-it is what was made of Kuhn rather than what he himself said that
was important. The slow arrival of the concept of paradigm and IR as
"paradigmaticdiscipline" is fascinatingto follow in a sequenceof writing
spanningmore than a decade(Phillips 1974; Inkeles 1975; Lijphart 1981;
Banks 1978; Rosenau 1979; Pettman 1981; Alker and Biersteker 1984;
Holsti 1985; Banks 1985).
Those IR scholarsimpatient with realism and its staying power obviously found solacein the useof the term. Therewere several veryattractive
points about the conceptof paradigm,which undoubtedlyexplainswhy IR
discipline so enthusiasticallyembracedKuhnian analysis: first, the content
of the termparadigmruns counterto the basicpremisesof positivism. Thus
as soonas the term is used,thosethat understandits meaningknow that an
attack on positivism and its belief in the value-freenatureof knowledgeis
taking place. Second,accordingto Kuhn, the term paradigm conveysthat
any theoretical effort is only of temporary nature. Thus there can be no
continuity of knowledge but instead a successionof paradigmsoffering
different ways of viewing the world. Third, since there is an elementof
contingencyin the creationof a paradigm(via consensus inthe discipline),
additional doubt is cast on the proclaimedgoal of an objective searchfor
truth. Fourth, thus knowledgeon which paradigmsare basedis not regarded
as certain, but as fallible and open to refutation. Fifth, hencethe apparent
monopolyof one approachin the discipline is takeninto question.Sixth, out
goes the axiom that realist knowledge has been accumulatingsince
Thucydides.And finally, since it is reasonableto anticipatethe demiseof
any paradigm,that of realism and positivism shall one day also pass.The
use of the expressioninterparadigmaticfor IR simply institutionalizedan
acceptanceof a plurality of approachesas the discipline's feature, if a
replacementof a paradigmturned out to be out of reach.The door was left
ajar for an introductionof influencesunheardof in the disciplinebefore.
Carr: "Power Over Opinion"
Cox quoted mainly Gramsci, and Ashley quotedHabermasand Foucault,
authorswho did not write specifically on the subjectsof internationalrelations. In fact, Foucault'swork rangesfrom suchunlikely subjectsas prison
systemsand psychiatryto the history of sexuality. The Italian communist
Gramsci also seemsto be an unlikely candidatefor extensionto IR. He
wrote his major work in a fascist jail pondering the failure of Marxist
strategiesin WesternEurope in the aftermath of World War I. Both his
THE TWENTY YEARS' CATHARSIS
37
concernsand those of the GermanFrankfurt School, either in Germanyor
in exile in the United States,would appearto be far removedfrom anything
remotely relevant. How could Ashley, Cox, or any of the later scholars
working in this genre stretch any of these apparentlyunrelatedideas to
internationalrelations?
Except in the new Soviet Union, the dreamof a revolution was quashed.
Only in Soviet Russia wasthere a likelihood of man "constructingreality"
in his image as envisagedby Marx in his concept of praxis. The first
generationof Marx's heirs had different concernsto address:namely, why
the fiasco of Bolshevik-stylerevolutionseverywhereother than in the Soviet Union and, generally, why a permanentretreat and pessimismwere
warrantedin contrastwith the optimism of Marx. Both Gramsciand particularly the contemporaryGerman critical sociologist Jiirgen Habermas
turned their attentionto the pathologyof Westernsocietiesand the pathology of the human mind, problems that Marx envisagedwould be swept
awayin what he wrongly predictedto be forthcomingrevolutions.
When we examine Gramsci'sconceptof hegemony,Habermas'sknowledge of constitutive interests, and even post-structuralist,post-Marxist
Foucault'sidea of power-knowledgeand discourse,Carr'sideaof "power over
opinion" comes to mind. Carr's concept soundsprimitive comparedto the
sophisticatedconceptualizationsof contemporarysocial science.His concept,
however,resonateswith the imageof the ideasconveyedin the more sophisticatedterminology: the world of distortedsocial constructiondesignedto subordinate, dominate, and oppressunder the veil of positivist philosophiesthat
presentit as objectively given. Overt coercion need not be resortedto; full
consensusand cooperationof the populationis achieved,ironically without so
much as a murmur of protestfrom the targetsof oppressionand domination.
This feat is accomplishednot by overt military or economicpower, the two
forms of power Carr identifies in the fmale of his dialectical reasoning.It is
accomplishedthrough the third form of power, which Carr calls "power over
opinion." To Gramsciand his followers, and to thosethat espousethe critical
approach,this situation is still reversible: to Gramsci by meansof revolution; to the critical school by meansof what they call emancipation.For
post-structuralists
andpost-modernists,thereseemsto be no way out.
All approachesof the "post" movementseethe societiesof the twentieth
century as basedon social construction,though the particular labels attachedto the idea may vary. Although the movementis eclectic, its originality and creativity lie in applying the borrowedconceptsto international
relations. To understandjust how difficult this "stretch" might be, let me
briefly summarizesomeof the main conceptsbefore they were introduced
in a duly "internationali~ed"
summarizesome form to IR.
38
VENDULKA KUBALKOV A
Gramsci argued that the defeat of the Marxist revolution in Western
Europe in the early 1920sand its victory in the Soviet Union were due to
different stagesof developmentof the respectivesocieties.In the Western
societiesit was not possibleto replicatethe Bolshevik successand violently
overthrow governmentsas it was done in 1917 in Russia and tried with
disastrousresults in Hungary, Slovakia, and the Weimar Republic. Overthrowing governmentwould only show that the state was but "an outer
ditch" within which lay "civil society." Civil societyin the Gramsciansense
(the sameterm usedwith different meaningsin other social sciences)consists of people---thosethat are subjectto oppressionand dominationabove
all. Civil society is a social constructiondesignedin such a way that the
oppressionis disguisedand is madeeasywith the active participationof its
victims. By a skillful use of cultural and ideological instrumentswhich
Gramscicalled hegemony(again usedin a different sensein the IR discipline) the society at large was deflectedfrom its true path an~ot
especiallyto put a
fine point on it-fooled. The only strategy for overthrowing the "hegemonic" rule proposedby Gramsciwas to devisea "counterhegemony"that
would usethe samemethodas "hegemony":constructionand manipulation
of a consensusin society.EuropeanEurocommunism,inspiredby this idea,
cooperatedwith any available group of the civil society, including the
Church, as a part of its counterhegemonic
strategy.I arguedelsewherethat
Gorbachev's"new thinking" had distinct features of Gramscian counterhegemony,a point confirmed by the heightenedinterest in Western
Marxist and radical thought at the time by Gorbachevand his appeal to
Westerncivil societies(KubaIkovaandCruickshank1989b).
None of thesestrategiesworked. Beyond this point social construction
has ceasedto be a romanticist celebrationof man's creativity. It is now
creativity perverted,an indictment of man as a social being, man divided
and bent on ruthless domination of whomeverhe can through the clever
constructionof knowledge,consciousness,
andmanipulationof minds.
There are variations and subtletiesin different sources,but the theme
remainsthe same:how could this giant fraud have beengotten away with?
The answer is consistentwith Carr's phrase: by exercising "power over
opinion" in a muchmore profoundway thanthe propagandathat Carr refers
to. In 1939, when he wrote his Twenty Years' Crisis, the major Western
Marxist, post-Marxist, and post-structuralistand critical works were still to
be written. None of the other more subtle ways of expressing"power over
opinion" were in circulation. However, in their work WesternMarxists now
focus on this generaldirection: namely,on stripping the facadeof objectivity
and analysisof how and in whoseinterestsand for whosepurposethe twentieth-centuryWesternsocial world hasbeenconstructed.To thosefew critical
THE TWENTY YEARS' CATHARSIS
39
theorists, in IR and outside, who still believe in emancipation,the term
often meansno more than a full realization and understandingof the oppressivenature of the social constructionof societiesin this century. The
corollary of unveiling the pathologiesof contemporarysocietiesis an absolute denial that anything to do with social reality, or any of its representations or theories, canever be objective. Theory is always constructedfor
someone,and for someone'spurpose.As Carr says,"Purpose,whetherwe
are consciousof it or not, is a condition of thought; and thinking for
thinking's sake is as abnormaland barren as the miser's accumulationof
money for its own sake" (1962, 3-4). Or, in Habermas,class domination
takes place through the medium of distorted ideologies. In his theory of
distorted communication,Habermasallegesthat those that are subjugated
are encouragedto subordinatetheir intereststo thoserepresentingthe social
order, whose injusticesremain hidden and repressed.They are hidden behind the veil of objectivity, objective science,appealto the commongood,
the nation, and so on.
A similar themeappearsthrough the work inspiredby structuralisttheories of linguistics andpost-structuralisttheories.Languagehas now broken
loose from reality and become autonomous(Callinicos 1983, 25). The
"power over opinion" of Carr reachesanotherheight. Foucault'sepisteme
(his parallel to Vanguihelm's, Bachelard's,
and Althusser'sproblematique,
to Kuhn's paradigm, and to Lakatos's research program) is in fact an
autonomoustheoretical structuredetermininghow we perceivethe world
and how we identify and organizeits elements.To put it more simply, we
see the world through lensesartificially implanted in our eyes that we do
not even know we have. Foucaultnow studiesnot how we know what we
know, but how these lensesare distorting our vision and how they were
inserted into our eyes. Foucault's antiepistemology,his archaeologyof
knowledge,unlike epistemology,now tries to determinethe conditionsthat
permit (or require) certain statementsto be utteredand to excludethe utteranceof others (Callinicos 1983, 100). This way of thinking culminatesin
Foucault's concept of power-knowledgeand discourse.Not only is the
relationshipbetweenreality and knowledge suspended,but the pursuit of
knowledgeand truth is renderedimpossible,becauseknowledgeis inseparably wedded to power. Statements,the constituent elements of what
Foucaultcalls "discourses,"do not derive at all from objective reality, but
are constructedon the basisof power-relations.There is, in fact, no power
without the correlativeconstitutionof a field of knowledge;nor, conversely,
is thereany knowledgethat doesnot presupposeor constituteat one andthe
sametime power-relations(Foucault1977,27-28).
This line of reasoningreacheseven further when we come to those
40
VENDULKA KUBALKOV A
scholarswho, like Gadamer,believethat the world is createdby words. We
have now moved to the last stop, the post-modernists.The languageis, in
the handsof post-modernists,reducedonly to text. The real world is constituted like a text becauseone can only refer to interpretativeexperience.
Attention turns to time and spaceand their suffocatingeffect. As Anderson
describesDerrida's work,
Derrida often evadescomprehension.But this is part of the point he wantsto
get us to see. Clarity is not the only virtue in writing, and at times it may
evenbe a disadvantagesinceclarity of expressionand easeof comprehension
encouragethe belief that languageis under control. ... [He] also refusesto
be bound by the conventionsof normal academicreading. He is determined
to challengeour expectationsand so highlight what we do when we give text
a reading.(1986, 120)
To Derrida no accuraterepresentationof reality in thought is possible.
"Modes of writing," interpretations,and the textual interplay refer to mutually constitutiverelationsbetweendifferent interpretationsin the representation and constitutionof the world. This conclusionis uncoveredthrough
deconstruction--aninterpretive techniqueaimed at a radical unsettling of
stable concepts.The author of the text is dead. If the era of modernity is
connectedfirmly to man, then it is possibleto agreewith post-modernists
that modernitybuilt aroundman hascometo an end.
The Historiography of the Last Twenty Years
in the IR Discipline
These thoughts, duly applied to international relations, have been introducedto the IR discipline in the courseof the last twenty years. There are
certain milestonesthat suggeststagesof this period. Roughly I see two
stages:1977-1987and from 1987 on. I take for the starting point approximately the year 1986. Many important books and articles were published
aroundthat year. In 1977 R.O. Keohaneand J.S. Nye stagedan unsuccessful coup intended to unseat the dominant realist approach. Their book,
Power and Interdependence:World Politics in Transition, according to
somereviewers,was to becomethe new Bible, replacingin that role Hans
Morgenthau'sPolitics Among Nations (1948) and, as the title suggests,
replacinga conceptof "power" with "interdependence."In that sameyear
(1977) StanleyHoffmann publishedhis "An American Social Science:International Relations" article in Daedalus,chastisingIR discipline in the
United Statesfor excessiveparochialismand isolationismand warning that
the discipline will decayif certainchangesare not adopted.Also published
THE TWENTY YEARS' CATHARSIS
41
in 1977 was a codification of the English School wisdom in Hedley Bull' s
AnarchicalSociety.Also in 1977, Robert Tucker'sInternationalInequality
was an eloquentresponseand rebuttalto the neo-Marxistand radical liberal
theoriesof imperialism and dependencyon behalfof mainstreamrealism.
Most important, however, as mentionedearlier, Kenneth Waltz published
his Theory ofInternational Politics. Although that book cameout in 1979,
an earlier version of the theory was published as a chapterin an edited
volume in 1975 (PolsbyandGreenstein1975).
The watershedseparatingthe two stagesof the last twenty yearsis around
the years 1986-87,the namingof the new approachesthat we refer to as the
"post" movement(Kratochwil and Ruggie 1986; Keohane1988; and Lapid
1989).The"nameless"first stagethen was over. It is interestingthat the two
prominentfoundersof the "post" movement,Cox (1981) andAshley (1984),
returnedthe favor and coinedtwo namesfor Waltz's approach:"neorealism"
and "structural realism." Both labels have stuck. Though the two articles
naming Waltz's approachwere published in 1981 and 1984, respectively,
they reacheda wider audiencewhen they were reprintedin an editedvolume
by R.O. Keohane entitled Neorealism and Its Critics and published in
1986. Ashley and Cox were now granteda "statusof critics."
The Pedigree
When we add the main intellectual sourcesthat havecometo play in assisting the formation of the "post" movementand put them into one family
tree, we get a pedigreemore impressivethan any Europeanroyal houseor
racehorsecanboast(Figure2.1).
Figure 2.1 is divided into four horizontalrows, numbered1-4. The philosophicallineageof the mainstreamIR literature (and what is called realist
and pluralist approaches)is at the top, in row 1. To realists and pluralists
most classificationsof approachesadd globalists, whose roots come from
row 4. The lineageof the two bottom rows of the figure, namely the determinist andnondeterministand post-Marxistrows 3 and4, are consistentnot
only with Perry Anderson'smagisterialaccountsof the Left's intellectual
history (Anderson1976, 1983) but with a similarly construedpedigreeof
Leftist sociology (Burawoy 1982, S5ff.). Figure 2.1 shows the contemporary divisions and currentsas they can be tracedalong approximatelyhorizontallines.For lack of space,not all namesthat ought to be are included.
The figure is intended to show how difficult it is to attach labels. If the
cross-referencingand influenceswere to be markedwith arrows, the page
would be black and illegible. As Perry Andersononce put it, lateral bourgeois influences make Marx just one of the names among others. The
Functionalism
Sociolinguistics
Logical Empiricism
Hempel(1905-)
Kelsen (1881-1973)
Levl-Strauss (1908)
Structural
Functionalism
Merton(1910-)
Parsons (1902-1979)
Structuralism
Ordinary Language Philosophy
i J.L Austin (1911-1960)
Legal Positivism
H A L Hart (1907-1992)
Logical Positivists
Vienna Circle
(1920-1930)
Kamap
Nagel (1901-1985)
| Utopian Tradition and
World Constitutionalists
Wittgenstein (1889-1951)
Wobor (1864-1920)
Durkheim (1858-1917)
Structuralism
Comte (1795-1857)|
Hume (1721-1776)
Kant (1724-1804)
Figure 2.1
1
(1900-Continued on next page
Hermeneutics
Gadamer (1900-)
Structuration
Giddens
Lakatos (1922-1974) I
Popper (1902-1994)
Behaviorism
Hermeneutics
3
Structuration
2
IR Discipline
1
44
VENDULKA KUBALKOV A
Political Economy
Smith (1723-1823)
Ricardo (1772-1823)
Hegel
(1770-1831)
Utopian Socialists
Saint Simon
(1760-1825)
Fourier
(1772-1837)
\ Trotsky' (1879-1Mo}
Gramsci
(1891-1937)
Hegelian Marxism
Lukacs
(1885-1971)
Luxemburg
(1870-1919)
Engels (1820-1895)1
| Lenin (1870-1924)
Marx (1818-1883)
Young Hegelians
Feuerbach
(1804-1872)
Freud (1856-19391
Anarchists
Bakunin
(1814-1876)
Economic
Determinism
Kautsky (1854-1938)
Fourth International
Critical School
Horkheimer
(1895-1973)
Adorno (1903-1969)
Marcuse (1898-1981)
Nietsche (1844-1900)
Heidegger (1889-1976)
Sartre (1905-1980)
Revisionist Historians
W.A.Williams (1921-)
Alperovitz (1936-)
G. Kolko (1932-)
Mandel (1923-)
Hobsbawm(1917-)
Structural Marxism
Althusser (1918-1990)
Poulantzas (1936-1979)
PostStructuralism
Foucault
(1926-1984)
Bourdieu (1930-)
Economic Marxism
Sweezy(1910-)
Baran (1910-1964)
Braverman
(1920-1976)
! Annates
Braudel
(1902-1985)
Structural Linguistics
de Saussure (1857-1913)
3
Neo-imperialism
Dependencia
Wallerstein (1930-)
World System
Anderson (1938)
E.P. Thompson
(1924-1993)
Habermas (1929-)
Post-Modernism
Lyotard(1924-)
Derrida (1930)
Kristeva (1941)
Lacan (1901-1981)
^Historical '
^/Materialism
3
| World System
Critical Theory
Dialectical
Approach
PostStructuralism
PostModernism
3 cont.
THE TWENTY YEARS' CATHARSIS
41
44
VENDULKA KUBALKOV A
influence of Croce on Gramsci; of Weber on Lukacs; of Freud,
Schopenhauer,
Nietzsche,Dilthey, and Bergsonon the Frankfurt School,of
the FrenchSchool of Annaleson Wallerstein;and of the variousstructuralists on Marxist Frenchstructuralistsand post-structuralistshas beenas potent an influenceas hasbeenthe Marxian (AndersonPerry 1976).
Looking at Figure 2.1 from the bottomup, one notes,fIrst of all, the shaded
areaof economicdeterminism(row 4). This is the familiar Marxist legacy.
Many IR scholarsare unawareof any other school of thoughtthat might be
derivative from Marxism other than "economicdeterminism."The "globalist" approach referred to in most IR textbooks originates from these
sources.Among thoselisted in this row, there is the North Americanschool
of the Monthly Review,of Baranand Sweezyin particular,to whosecontribution we owe to a large extent the renaissanceof classical theories of
imperialism and the impetus for the developmentof dependencytheories.
Wallerstein'smore recentanalysisof the world capitalist systemhas welldocumentedaffInities with this school.
Second,there are the American "revisionist" historiansassociatedwith
the University of Wisconsinand journals such as Studieson the Left (and
later with Socialist Revolution and Socialist Review): W.A. Williams, G.
Kolko, G. Alperovitz, and others. They are important for their persistent
argumentthat the Cold War was constructedby the United States.Finally,
there is the Trotskyist tradition as perpetuatedin works of high scholarly
value by such prominentLeftist writers as British historian E. Hobsbawm
and Belgian economistErnst Mandel. The Trotskyist tradition, as David
MacLellan haspointedout, was extremelyimportantuntil recently, since it
was the dominant form of Marxism in English-speakingcountries
(MacLellan 1979,308)and was an obviousinfluenceon more authorsthan
would admit to it, including I. Wallerstein.
Above the shadedband, there is row 3, which begins with historical
sociologistswho gaveup or subduedthe economicdeterministinclinations
underthe influenceof the FrenchSchoolof Annalesor Max Weber.Generally speaking,abovethe shadedband we enterwhat to many international
relations specialistshave been until recently, areas that they never connectedto Marxism: Referredto as HegelianMarxism, this is a tradition that
hasheld sway over continental(Western)Europeand that only recentlyhas
found its way to Britain and the United States,displacingthere Trotskyist
influences. As I mentionedin discussingthe changesin emphasisof the
contemporaryMarxists, HegelianMarxism is virtually freed from suchconcernsas economicsubstructure,political economy,and the historical materialist method. Here are the origins of a "nondeterministic" Marxism
characteristicof this century. Hegelian Marxists still explore society as a
THE TWENTY YEARS' CATHARSIS
45
complex network of social relations and material interests,and insist that
none of thesecan be understoodin isolation from the others,but that ideas
play an increasinglyimportantrole.
The beginningsof the tradition of HegelianMarxism in this century are
associatedwith the work in particularof (Hungarian)Georg Lukacs, (German) Karl Korsch, and (Italian) Antonio Gramsci. Into the sameHegelian
tradition falls the work of membersof the GermanFrankfurt School, such
as Horkheimer, Benjamin, Adorno, and Marcuse, and later the work of
Jiirgen Habermas.Their work is known as critical theory or sociology.The
work of the late E.P. Thompson,the major figure of the British and Europeanpeacemovement,has recognizableaffinities with someof the themes
of Germancritical theory.
I list Gadameron behalf of hermeneuticsas a significant influence on
Habermasin particular.I list structuralfunctionalismbecauseof its influence
on both FrenchMarxism and "post-Marxism"as well as on the dependency
theory. I list the work of FrenchstructuralistsAlthusserand Poulantzasonly
for the sakeof completeness.With the tragic departurefrom the sceneof the
main protagonistsof the approach(after Poulantzas'ssuicideandAlthusser's
deathin a mentalasylum)we are left mainly with many of their terminological innovationsandtermsthat havebecomea part of scholarlylanguagewith
no heed to their initial meaning, such as problematique,conjecture,2and
manyother terms.It is interestingthat nobodyhastried to explorethe contribution of the exceptionally talented Nicos Poulantzas,who in fact wrote
quite explicitly on internationalrelations.
It is the post-structuralistssuchas Foucaultand Bourdieuwho appearto
have attractedconsiderableattention. They are not only post-structuralist
but also "post-Marxist." As I mentioned, the critical sociologist Jurgen
Habermasmaintainsthat post-structuralistsand anyonebeyondthem, that
is, post modernists,have nothing to do with Marxism. It has been noted,
however, that, despite these protestations,Habermasand Foucault reach
strikingly similar conclusions.
With the exceptionof Max Weber, the area into which we enter next
(row 2 in Figure 2.1) will likely be as alien to IR scholarsas the oneswe
have alreadyexplored.There are the late 1940s Oxford analytical philosophers H.A.L. Hart and J.L. Austin. The former played a major role in the
transformationof the philosophyof law and the latter was a key influence
on the later developmentof "linguistic philosophy."Ludwig Wittgensteinis
the giant of philosophyin this century. He hasa connectionto the pedigree
of the "old" IR discipline through his associationwith the Vienna circle
(from which the IR discipline derivesits versionof positivism). Someof the
ideas of Wittgensteinwill be known to the studentsof the IR discipline
46
VENDULKA KUBALKOV A
through a slim book by Wittgenstein'sstudent,PeterWinch (1958), which
was widely read by students of IR. In it, Winch adapted some of
Wittgenstein'sideasto social sciences.Hart, Austin, and Wittgensteinare
all associatedwith what is calleda "linguistic tum": a recognitionoflimitations imposedon philosophyby the imperfectionsand inadequaciesof language, calling into question positivists' belief in objective knowledge.
Anthony Giddens'sprolific work hasunderstandablychangedits focus over
the years: Hisearlier work shouldbe listed in the historical materialistrow.
His later work is more influencedby Weberand particularly by Durkheim,
and I list him close to the "old" IR discipline (row 1 in Figure 2.1) because
of his idea of structuration thathas been drawn upon by a range of IR
scholarsin their attemptsto developa constructivistapproach.
The top row depictsthe philosophicalroots of the mainstreamIR discipline as we usedto know it, beforethe arrival of the "post" movement.Here
in row 1, we can see the distinction betweenthe utopian-idealist tradition
and the "post-Carr"realists.I list Hempel, Popper,and Lakatosas philosophersof sciencewhom IR studentshearaboutin connectionwith the different mixes of logical positivism, logical empiricism,and falsificationismand
their different modifications,as taughtin mostAmericanIR programs.
If we look in today'sIR literature for a continuationof Carr's realismidealism distinction in terms of partnersin a debate,it is obvious that the
intellectual resourcesnecessaryto mount a meaningful dialogue and critique of the mainstreamrealist approachhave been exhaustedinside the
discipline. What Figure 2.1 makesclear is just how important the opening
up to the sourcesfrom outside the discipline in the last twenty years has
been. Most of theseapproaches,idealist in the senseof dealing with ideas
and their dominanceor influence over the world, haveall drawn on outside
sources,particularly from the scholarshipthat can be found in row 3 in
Figure 2.1. Many topics of IR publications,Ph.D. dissertations,and conference papersreflect influencescoming from all strandsdepictedin Figure
2.1. It is not surprisingthat very few IR scholarscareto examinethe roots
of the new approaches.However,whetheranybodylikes it or not, this is the
intellectual pedigreeof the IR discipline as it has beenenlargedin the last
twenty years.
First Stage: 1977-1986
In Table 2.1 I list chronologically the first important works. For lack of
space,I do not go into detail of all the works that influencedthe arrival of
the new approaches:works of Galtung, Krippendorff, Brucan, and others.
The presenceof new influencesin the IR field was first noted becauseof
THE TWENTY YEARS' CATHARSIS
47
Table 2.1
Selected Publications of the "Post" Movement, Stage 1: Until 1986
Cox, RW. 1979. "Reflections of Some Recent Literature." International Organization.
McGowan, P., and Harmer, F. 1979. "Teaching International Political Economy: The
Role of Values, History, and Theory." Teaching Political Science.
Ashley, R.K. 1980. The Political Economy of War and Peace: The Sino-Soviet
American Triangle and the Modern Security Problematique.
Galtung, J. 1980. The True Worlds.
Alker, H.R. 1981. "Dialectical Foundation of Global Disparities." International Studies
Quarterly.
Cox, RW. 1981. "Social Forces, States and World Orders: Beyond International
Relations Theory." Millennium. Reprinted in Neorealism and its Critics, ed.
Keohane, 1986.
Cox, RW. 1981. "In Search of International Political Economy: A Review Essay."
New Political Science.
Maclean, J. 1981. "Marxist Epistemology, Explanations of 'Change' and the Study
of International Relations." In Change and the Study of International Relations, ed.
Barry Buzan and R.J.B. Jones.
Maclean, J. 1981. "Political Theory, International Theory, and Problems of
Ideology." Millennium.
McGowan, P., and Walker, S.G. 1981. "Radical and Conventional Models of U.S.
Foreign Economic Policy Making." World Politics.
Ashley, RK 1981. "Political Realism and Human Interests." International Studies
Quarterly.
Alker, H.R. 1982. "logic, Dialectics, Politics: Some recent controversies."ln
Dialectical Logics for the Political Sciences, ed. H.R. Alker. Poznan Studies in the
Philosophy of the Sciences of Humanities.
Ashley, R.K. 1983. "The Eye of Power: the Politics of World Modeling." International
Organization.
Ashley, R.K. 1983. "Three Modes of Economism." International Studies Quarterly.
Mittelman, J.H. 1983. "World Order Studies and International Political Economy."
Alternatives.
Cox, RW. 1983. "Gramsci, Hegemony and International Relations: An Essay in
Method." Millennium.
Halliday, Fred. 1983. The Making of the Second Cold War.
Alker, H.R., and Biersteker, T.J. 1984. "The Dialectics of World Order: Notes for a
Future Archaeologist of International Savior Faire." International Studies Quarterly.
Ashley, R.K. 1984. "The Poverty of Neorealism." International Organization.
Reprinted in Neorealism and Its Critics, ed. Keohane, 1986.
Maclean, J. 1984. "Interdependence-an Ideological Intervention in International
Relations?" In Interdependence on Trial: Studies in the Theory and Reality of
Contemporary Interdependence, ed. R.J. Barry Jones and Peter Willetts.
Walker, R.B.J. 1984. ed. Culture, Ideology and World Order.
Cox, R.W. 1986. "Postscript 1985." In Neorealism and Its Critics, ed. Keohane.
48
VENDULKA KUBALKOV A
ratherunusualfootnotes.Insteadof Thucydides,Machiavelli, Hobbes,Grotius,
Rousseau,or Kant and the IR exemplarssuchas Carr, Morgenthau,and regular
academicsciting eachother,the footnotesof the internationalrelationsjournals
becamepopulatedby suchnew and unfamiliar namesas Grarnsci,Habermas,
Bourdieu, and Foucault, with works dealing not with IR but rather with a
decayedcapitalistsystem,madness,prisons,psychiatry,social medicine,mental institutions,sexuality, architecture,
and tribal rituals. Practicallynobodyand
nothing in the IR discipline escapedattack, although structural realism or
neorealismwas the prime target. Significantly, the teachingof IR was criticized. On the basis of a survey of syllabi of IR coursesoffered at leading
Americanuniversities,the authorsfound not only ordinary geographicalparochial attitudesbut also "paradigmatic"parochialism.Paradigmaticparochialism was definedas the exclusionfrom syllabi andstudents'reachof one or two
of the threeparadigmsthat the authorsidentified-includingthe radical dialectical paradigm-andthat were found to be in a dialectical relationshipto each
other (Alker and Biersteker1984). Alker and Biersteker'sarticle was also
the first attemptto presenta full-fledged and comprehensiveclassification
of the IR paradigms,as could be found not just in the IR discipline but
acrossthe world and time. The authors'own "radicaldialectical approach"
was proposedas a designationfor all the new theoretical developments,
what we call herethe "post" movement.
In this first period, the main activities of the protagonistsof the new
approachconsistedoften of discovering and lifting conceptsfrom those
sourcesthat might be applied to IR and trying to stretch them in various
ways to make them fit. Though very small, the group was heterogeneous:
virtually everyLeftist thinker listed in the two bottomrows, andparticularly
in row 2, of Figure 2.1, has "auditioned" for an internationalrelationsrole.
What is noticeableis how underrepresented
in its influence on this emerging group is the economic determinist "band"--confirming the developments of Leftist thought in other social sciencesin this century. Indeed, if
anything, the emerginggroup of writers, Ashley in particular,were critical
of economicdeterminism,ofeconomism,of dependency,and of the World
Systems approach. Marx's ideas were directly extendedto IR mainly
through the work of McLean. Alker deriveshis conceptsof dialecticsfrom
Lenin. The other influencesincludedin Figure 2.1 tendedto be drawn upon
randomlyandquite indiscriminately.
As I have alreadymentioned,R.W. Cox combinesin his work the concept of critical theory, Gramsci'sconceptof hegemony,and civil society,
which for the internationalcontext he redefinesas being basedon "hegemonic consensus,createdby a variety of cultural and ideological instruments." (Cox 1981, 165ff.). Academics like ourselvesare by no means
THE TWENTY YEARS' CATHARSIS
49
excludedfrom the processesof creating such as "hegemonicconsensus."
Instrumentalin fostering the hegemonic consensus
is the "historical bloc"
of bourgeoisintellectuals,including academics.Gramsci'shegemony,as
applied to the international level by Cox, refers to "an order within the
world economyexpressedin the dominantmode of productionsupporting
universalnorms, internationalinstitutions, and mechanismsfor the behavior of statesand other actors" (171-72). Most of this literature was introduced to IR through articles by Richard Ashley. Despitehis denial of the
fact, Ashley's intellectual path began with a Lenin-inspired dissertation,
subsequentlypublishedas a book. He progressedsoon after through more
esoteric ideas ranging from critical to post-structuralistand then to postmodem.Ashley was obviously "learning on the job," often taking up a lot
of spacesimply paraphrasingand explainingconceptsto his IR colleagues,
often not even getting far enoughto show the relevanceto international
relations.
The SecondStage: 1987 On
Stage2 marks a clear shift from the footnotesinto the texts of IR studies.
Table 2.2 lists again only samplesof full- fledged literature of this kind. In
the incredibly short period of one decade,the new generationof IR scholars, most of whom would still have been at graduateschools during the
first period, have more than made up for the time lost by the chronic
absenceof Leftist thought from the IR discipline. Marxism madea fleeting
appearancein the IR discipline and was fast replacedby its Hegelian or
indeedpost-Marxistversions.There is no longer any hesitation.The main
approaches,as I have identified them in Figure 2.1 (right-hand column),
have not just one or two, but a contingent of full supporterswho have
written book-lengthstudiesinspiredby this or that source.Therehasbeena
continuousoutpouringof work on historical sociologywhich challengesthe
IR discipline'sneglectof theoriesof stateand which, for lack of space,I do
not include in Table 2.2. There is the historical materialist approach,initially clearly Trotskyist,of Fred Halliday. The critical schoolhasnew energetic supportersin many authors such as Linklater, in addition to Cox.
Many post-structuralistauthors have moved on to post-modernism,and
both of theseinfluenceshave been taken up by a large group of feminist
authors,a new and rapidly growing sectionof the IR discipline. Walker and
Der Derian lead the field of post-modernisttreatisesofIR. Walker's work
in particular has been earmarkedas a future classic.The main featuresof
the sourceswhen applied to IR are kept intact. Thus the distinguishing
featureof critical theory and post-structuralismcontinuesto be the stressof
50
VENDULKA KUBA.LKOV A.
Table 2.2
Selected Publications of the "Post" Movement, Stage 2: After 1986
DIALECTICAL
Alker, Hayward R. 1995. Rediscoveries and Reformulations.
CRITICAL THEORY
Cox, R.w. 1987. Production, Power, and World Order: Social Forces in the Making
of History.
- - . 1992. "Multilateralism and World Order." Review of International Studies.
- - . 1995. Approaches to World Order.
Hoffman, M. 1987. "Critical Theory and Inter Paradigm Debate." Millennium.
- - - . 1988. "Conversations on Critical International Relations Theory." Millennium.
Linklater, Andrew. 1990. Beyond Realism and Marxism: Critical Theory and
International Relations.
- - . 1992. "The Question of the Next Stage in International Relations Theory: A
Critical Theoretical Point of View." Millenium.
Neufeld, Mark. 1995. The Restructuring of International Relations Theory.
POST·STRUCTURALIST-POST·MODERN
Ashley, R.K. 1987. "The Geopolitics of Geopolitical Space: Toward a Critical Social
Theory of International Politics." Alternatives.
----. 1988"Untying the Sovereign State: A Double Reading of the Anarchy
Problematique." Millennium.
- - - . 1989. "Living on the Border lines: Man, Post-Structuralism and War." In
Internationalllntertextual Relations. Der Derian ed.
Ashley, R.K., and R.B.J. Walker. 1990. "Reading DissidencelWriting the Discipline:
Crisis and the Question of Sovereignty in International Studies." International
Studies Quarterly.
--.1990. "Speaking the Language of Exile: Dissident Thought in International
Studies." International Studies Quarterly.
Bartelson. J. 1995. A Genealogy of Sovereignty.
Campbell, David. 1990 "Global Inscription: How Foreign Policy Constitutes the United
States." Alternatives.
- - . 1992. Writing Security: United States Foreign Policy and the Politics of
Identity.
- - . 1993. Politics Without Principle: Sovereignty, Ethics, and the Narratives of
the Gulf War.
Der Derian, James. 1987. On Diplomacy: A Genealogy of Western Estrangement.
- - - . 1988. "Philosophical Traditions in International Relations." Millennium.
---.1989. "Boundaries of Knowledge and Power." In Internationalllntertextual
Relations. Der Derian and Shapiro, eds.
- - - . 1989. "Spy Versus Spy: The Intertextual Power and International Intrigue." In
Internationalllntertextual Relations. Der Derian and Shapiro, eds.
- - . 1990. "The (S)pace of International Relations: Simulation, Surveillance, and
Speed." International Studies Quarterly.
- - . 1992. Antidiplomacy: Spies, Terror, Speed and War.
THE TWENTY YEARS' CATHARSIS
51
- - . ed. 1994. International Theory: Critical Investigation.
Der Derian, J., and M.J. Shapiro, eds. 1989. Internationallintertextual Relations:
Postmodern Readings of World Politics.
Dillon, Michael. 1996. Politics of Security: Towards a Political Philosophy of the
Continental Thought.
George, Jim, and Campbell, David. 1990. "Patterns of Dissent and the Celebration
of Difference: Critical Social Theory and International Relations." International
Studies Quarterly.
George, Jim. 1994. Discourses of Global Politics: A Critical (Re)lntroduction to
International Relations.
Klein, Bradley S. 1987. Strategic Discourse and Its Alternatives.
- - . 1987. "Hegemony and Strategic Culture: American Power Projection and
Alliance Defence Politics." Review of International Studies.
- - . 1988. "After Strategy: Toward a Postmodern Politics of Peace." Alternatives.
--.1989. ''The Textual Strategies of Military Strategy: Or, Have You Read Any
Good Defence Manuals Lately?" In Internationallintertextual Relations. Der Derian
and Shapiro, eds.
Shapiro, Michael. 1989. "Textualizing Global Politics." In Internationallintertextual
Relations. Der Derian and Shapiro, eds.
Walker, R.B.J. 1987. "History and Structure in the Theory of International Relations."
Millennium.
- - . "Realism, Change and International Political Theory." International Studies
Quarterly.
- - . 1988. One World, Many Worlds: Struggles for a Just World Peace.
--.1989. "The Prince and 'The Pauper': Tradition, Modernity, and Practice in
the Theory of International Relations." In Internationallintertextual Relations. Der
Derian and Shapiro, eds.
- - . 1993. InsidelOutside: International Relations as Political Theory.
FEMINIST POST-STRUCTURALIST-POST-MODERN
Enloe, Cynthia. 1989. Bananas, Beaches and Bases: Making Feminist Sense Out of
International Politics.
Flax, Jane. 1990. Thinking Fragments: Psychoanalysis, Feminism and
Postmodernism in the Contemporary West.
Grant, Rebecca, and Kathleen Lewland, eds. 1991. Gender and International
Relations.
Peterson, V. Spike, ed. 1992. Gendered States: Feminist (Re)Visions of International
Relations Theory.
- - . 1992. "Transgressing Boundaries: Theories of Knowledge, Gender and
International Relations." Millennium.
Peterson, V. Spike, and Runyan Anne Sisson. 1993. Global Gender Issues.
Sylvester, Christine, ed. 1993. "Feminists Write International Relations." Alternatives.
Special Issue.
- - . 1993. Feminist Theory and International Relations in a Postmodern Era.
HISTORICAL MATERIALISM
Halliday, Fred. 1994. Rethinking International Relations.
52
VENDULKA KUBALKOV A
purposeor interestthat createsknowledge,allegedby positivists to be objective and value-free.The critical school addsits importantleitmotif--the
possibility of emancipation.A number of IR scholarstried their hand at
deconstructinga variety of IR traditional texts, reinterpretingIR as intertextual relations and deconstructingits main concepts,such as anarchyor
sovereignty.
Constructivism
Throughoutthis chapterthe verb constructhas frequently appeared.If the
use of the term alone is a qualification, then everybodyI havereferredto is
a constructivist.There is no doubt about the importanceof the active creation of societalstructuresand their purposefulmanipulationin the "post"
movement.The thrust of this approachderivesfrom the notion of a perversion of the conceptof praxis, the abuseof "power over opinion" so loosely
termed by Carr, disguisedand marketedas value-free objectivity. I now
tum to constructivismas Onuf defined it in 1989 and as he himself introducesit in this volume in Chapter3.
Here it will suffice to say that Onufs constructivismis totally different
from the other varietiesand it is his approachalone which shouldcontinue
using that designation.My discussionof the "post" movementwould have
shown how tenuousany similarities are if only we review the intellectual
origins in Onufs case,markedin Figure 2.1 by arrows: Onuflinks together
the old and the new IR pedigree,as the arrows in Figure 2.1 indicate.
Through Habermasand the early Giddens,there is a distant connectionto
Marx, while his startingpoint is an attemptto overcomethe impassein the
"old" IR. The other sources,which he alone in the IR discipline uses,
provide him with tools totally different from any of those used in the extendedIR discipline. Onufs constructivismabandonsobsessivecritique of
structuralrealismor Westernsocietyand simply offers an alternativeontology of what the social world is all about. Nor is Onufs constructivism
mainly an epistemologicaldevice providing a layer of unreal or surreal
"construction"over reality to disguisethe underpinningontology. While for
other constructivistapproachesdescribedin Chapter3 in this volume, the
act of the constructionis restrictedto "states,"for Onuf constructivismis a
universalexperience.His constructivismis not only a contributionto the IR
discipline; it is a full-fledged social theory as well. Onufs constructivismis
applicablenot simply to the level of states,but to humansin any dimension
of their social activity, internationalrelations being merely one, albeit an
extremelyimportantone,amongmany.
Unfortunately, instead of welcoming this developmentas a positive
THE TWENTY YEARS' CATHARSIS
53
trend, someof his IR colleaguesexpressconcernabout his challengeto the
central IR concept of anarchy, without which international studies fears
losing its claim to having a distinct subjectmatter(Buzan,Jones,and Little
1994).
Onuf obviously does not sharethesefears. His constructivismmakesit
possibleto seelayers of mutually constructedrelationsoperatingalong the
samebasic lines. The key point is that speechacts,rules, and norms,which
are at the heartof his approachand at the heartof humanexistenceas social
beings, are generatedfrom within people; that is to say, they are endogenousto real peopleas active, creativebeings,and to their practice.They are
not dictated by some outside, exogenousstructure(as in Waltz or Wendt)
which has taken a life and dynamism of its own. Onuf opens a broad
theoreticalavenuefor incorporatinginto the IR discipline a host of phenomenaof the post-ColdWar world for which there is no apparentplace in the
traditional approaches.In contrastto theseapproaches,Onufs framework
makes it easy to understandconceptssuch as identity and culture, or the
implications of the Information Age, conceptswhich are am'.Jvgthe central
issuesof our time.
E.H. Carr, Realism,and Idealism
To return to E.H. Carr: An IR discipline that does not exclude Leftist
influences and that allows for an interplay of a whole spectrumof ideas
would seem to be something Carr called for. Onuf might be portrayed
within Carr's terms as trying to integrateor transcendrealist and idealist
traditions as defined by Carr, althoughthere are candidatesfor exactly the
same role---Carr himself, at least in broad outline, or critical theory, as
Linklater suggests(1997).
For those of us who are not dialecticians,Onufs approach,as he describesit in Chapter3, offers a constructiveway forward, away from the
unabatingwar wagedin the IR discipline. One thing is for sure. The discipline of IR is now complete.It is no longer like an airplanetrying desperately to lift off without its left wing. It can now fly. And out of the turmoil
of the cathartic last twenty years a brand-newapproachto IR, to which
Chapter3 and the rest of this volume are dedicated,hasbeenborn.
Whodunit?
There was no body, no villain; no crime was committed; no chargeswere
pressed.We all did it in our characteristicacademicway, shooting ourselvesin the foot. Did I just use Carr to constructan argument,and did I
54
VENDULKA KUBALKOV A
misunderstandhim or cite him out of context?Certainly no more than the
IR discipline has done, over the last fifty years.Unpleasantthoughit might
be, thereexiststhe empirical evidenceto prove it!
Notes
I would like to thank Nicholas Onuf and Henry Hammanfor their suggestions:the idea
that I write this chapteras a whodunit story was Henry Hamman's.Nick Onufs general
commentswere invaluable.
1. It was the Frankfurt School's seconddirector, Max Horkheimer, who in 1937
coined the term critical theory, taking his inspiration from the understandingof Marxism as a "critique of political economy,"a phraseusedby Marx. It is thereforesurprising
that Habermas,the main contemporaryfigure of the same Frankfurt School, is not
namedamongthe sourcesof Cox's inspiration for the "critical theory" that he defined
and introducedto the IR discipline. In fact, a negativefootnote referenceto Habermas
suggeststhat Cox's and Habermas'sunderstandingof the same expression,"critical
theory," is not in any way related.
2. Theseterms have beenusedso frequently that it is worth reminding ourselvesof
their original meaning. Problematiqueconveys an ipso facto antipositivist attitude. It
refers to a "theoretical or ideological framework" whose "production" necessarilyinvolves a value judgment as to what is important in the world, namely "the objective
internal referencesystemof its particularthemes,the systemof questionscommanding
the answersgiven by the ideology" (Althusser1969, 67, note 30). That is, the use of the
term hasantipositivistimplications.
The term conjectureis the "central conceptof the Marxist scienceof politics." It
"denotesthe exactbalanceof forces at any given momentto which political tacticsmust
be applied" (Althusser 1969,250).The term is used by Cox as "historical conjecture"
and also by Halliday (1983).
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3
Constructivism: A User's Manual
Nicholas Onuf
Constructivismis a way of studying social relations--anykind of social
relations. While it draws from a variety of other ways of studying such a
broadand complexsubject,it standson its own as a systemof conceptsand
propositions.Constructivismis not a theory as such. It doesnot offer general explanationsfor what people do, why societiesdiffer, how the world
changes.Instead,constructivismmakesit feasibleto theorizeaboutmatters
that seemto be unrelatedbecausethe conceptsand propositionsnormally
usedto talk aboutsuchmattersare also unrelated.
As presentedhere, constructivismappliesto all fields of social inquiry.
In recentyears,dissidentscholarsin many fields have selectivelyusedthe
languageof social constructionto criticize existing social arrangementsand
scholarly practices.A great deal of discord has ensued.(Also see Part I,
Introduction.)When constructivismis usedsystematically,it has the opposite effect. It finds value in diverse materialsand forges links where none
seemedpossible.
Full of discordantvoices, InternationalRelations is the field to which
this particularsystemof conceptsand propositionswas first applied.While
this manual is intended for the use of anyone with methodical habits of
mind, its usersare most likely to have an interestin the subjectof international relations.They may havealso had someexposureto the field's scholarly controversies.If this is indeedthe case,they will soondiscoverthat the
subject is less distinctive, but more complex, than they have been led to
believe.
58
CONSTRUCTIVISM: A USER'S MANUAL
59
Overview
Fundamentalto constructivismis the propositionthat humanbeingsare social
beings,and we would not be humanbut for our social relations.In otherwords,
the kind of beings
social relationsmakeor constructpeople-ourselves-into
that we are. Conversely,we makethe world what it is, from the raw materials
that natureprovides,by doing what we do with eachotherand sayingwhat we
say to each other. Indeed, saying is doing: talking is undoubtedlythe most
importantway that we go aboutmakingthe world what it is.
Countriessuch as France,the United States,and Zimbabwe are among
the social constructions,or societies,that peoplemake throughwhat we do.
Countries are self-containedworlds becausepeople talk about them that
way and try to keepthem that way. Yet they are only relatively self-contained.
Relationsamongcountries---internationalrelations---constitutesa world in
its own right. This is a self-containedworld for the simple reasonthat it
coversthe earth, but it is still nothing more than a world of our making--a
societyof relatively self-containedsocieties.
Constructivismholds that peoplemake society, and society makespeople. This is a continuous,two-way process.In order to study it, we must
start in the middle, so to speak,becausepeopleand society, always having
made each other, are already there and just about to change.To make a
virtue of necessity,we will start in the middle, betweenpeopleand society,
by introducing a third element,rules, that always links the other two elementstogether.Social rules (the term rules includes,but is not restrictedto,
legal rules) make the processby which peopleand society constituteeach
othercontinuousand reciprocal.
A rule is a statementthat tells peoplewhat we shoulddo. The "what" in
questionis a standardfor people'sconductin situationsthat we can identify
as being alike, and can expectto encounter.The "should" tells us to match
our conductto that standard.If we fail to do what the rule tells us to, then
we can expectconsequences
that someotherrule will bring into effect when
other peoplefollow the rule calling for suchconsequences.
All the ways in
which peopledeal with rules---whetherwe follow the rules or break them,
whetherwe makethe rules, changethem, or get rid of them--maybe called
practices.Even when we do not know what a rule says,we can often guess
what it is aboutby looking at people'spractices.
Among much else, rules tell us who the active participantsin a society
are. Constructivistscall these participantsagents. People are agents,but
only to the extent that society,through its rules, makesit possiblefor us to
participatein the many situationsfor which there are rules. No one is an
agentfor all suchsituations.
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NICHOLAS ONUF
Ordinarily, we think of agents as people who act on behalf of other
people. Consideringthe matter more abstractly,we see that rules make it
possible for us to act on behalf of social constructions,which may be
ourselves,otherhumanbeings,or evencollectionsof people,alongwith the
rules, the practices,and the actualthings that we makeanduse.Conversely,
agentsneednot be individual humanbeingsto be able to act on behalfof
others(hereI refer to agentsin the third personto emphasizethat the terms
peopleand agentsare not completelyinterchangeable).Agency is a social
condition. Thus the governmentof a country is a collection of peopleand a
social construction.According to the relevant rules, thesepeople act, together and in various combinations,on behalf of that country as a much
largercollectionof people.
Rules give agents choices. As we have already seen, the most basic
choice is to follow the rule-to do what the rule says the agent should
d()-{)r not. Only human beingscan actually make choices, becausewe
alone(andnot all of us) havethe mentalequipmentto considerthe probable
of making the choicesthat are availableto us. Nevertheless,
consequences
we always make such choices on behalf of, and in the name of, social
constructions,whetherourselves,other peopleor collections of other people, or practicesand artifacts.
Agentsact in societyto achievegoals.Thesegoalsreflect people'sneeds
and wishesin light of their material circumstances.Every societyhas rules
telling agentswhich goals are the appropriateones for them to pursue.Of
course,thereare situationsin which peopleareperfectlyaimless.For example, when we freeze up in fear or fall asleepfrom exhaustion,we are no
longeragentsor, for that matter,socialbeings.
When we, as humanbeings,act as agents,we havegoalsin mind, evenif
we are not fully aware of them when we act. If someoneasks us to think
about the matter, we can usually formulate thesegoals more or less in the
order of their importanceto whomeverwe are acting as agentsfor, starting
with ourselves.Most of the time, agentshave limited, inaccurate,or inconsistentinformation about the material and social conditionsthat affect the
likelihood of reaching given goals. Nevertheless,agentsdo the best they
can to achieve their goals with the means that nature and society (together-alwaystogether)makeavailableto them. Acting to achievegoalsis
rational conduct,and agentsfaced with choiceswill act rationally. Viewed
from outside,thesechoicesmay appearto be less than rational, but this is
due to the complexitiesof agencyandhumanfallibility.
Agents make choices in a variety of situations. Rules help to define
every such situation from any agent'spoint of view. In many situations,
rules are directly responsiblefor presentingagentswith choices. Agents
CONSTRUCTIVISM: A USER'S MANUAL
61
have made or acknowledgedtheserules in the belief that following rules
generallyhelpsthemreachtheir intendedgoals.
In these situations, rules are related to agents' practices,and to each
other, through the consequencesthat agents intend their acts to have.
Whether by accident or by design, rules and related practicesfrequently
form a stable (but never fixed) pattern suiting agents' intentions. These
patternsare institutions. As recognizablepatternsof rules and relatedpractices, institutions make people into agentsand constitutean environment
within which agentsconductthemselvesrationally. While it is always possible, and often useful, to think of agents--allagents--asinstitutions in
their own right, we more commonly think of agentsas operating in an
institutional context thatgives themat leastsomeopportunitiesfor choice.
Exercising choices, agentsact on, and not just in, the context within
which they operate, collectively changing its institutional features, and
themselves,in the process.Nevertheless,from any agent'spoint of view,
society consistsof diverse institutions that seem,for the most part, to be
held in place by rules linking them to other institutions. Any stablepattern
of institutions (including agentsof all sorts) is also an institution. Agents
are awareof the institutions populatingtheir environments,and not simply
becausethe rules forming theseinstitutions directly bearon their conduct.
To the extentthat someagentsmake choices,and other agentsare affected
by these choices, institutions produce consequences
for other agentsthat
they cannothelp but be awareof andrespondto.
In a complexworld, agentsoften make choicesthat have consequences,
for themselvesand others,that they had not anticipatedor do not carevery
much about.Unintendedconsequences
frequently form stablepatternswith
respectto their effect on agents.A perfect market provides a compelling
illustration of this phenomenon.One by one, a large numberof sellersand
buyers are incapableof affecting the supply of, and demandfor, a good.
Collectively, their rational choiceshave the unintendedconsequence
of setting a price for that goodwhich they mustindividually acceptas fixed.
In
Anyone may notice such stablepatternsof unintendedconsequences.
the caseof a market, no one could fail to notice it in the form of a good's
price, over which no agent seemsto have any control. Sometimesagents
will chooseto preventchangesin such patternsby adoptingrules that are
intendedto have this effect. A rule fixing the price of a good undercertain
conditionsis only the mostobviousexample.
Any stable pattern of rules, institutions, and unintendedconsequences
gives society a structure, recognizableas suchto any observer.Agents are
always observers.Insofar as they observeconsequences
that they had not
intended, andacceptthem, suchconsequences
are no longer unintendedin
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NICHOLAS ONUF
the usual senseof the word. If agentsdecide that theseconsequences
are
bad for them, they will act to changethem, perhapswith other unforeseen
consequences
resulting.
Outside observers(agents from a different society) may recognize a
more complex structurethan agentsdo as observers.Outsiderscan stand
back, so to speak,and seepatternsthat insiderscannotseebecausethey are
too closeto them. As agentson the inside becomeawareof what observers
have to say, observersbecome agents, whatever their intentions. When
agentsin generaltake this new information into account in making their
choices,an evengreatercomplexityof structureresults.
Scholarswho think of themselvesas constructivistshave given a good
deal of attentionto the "agent-structureproblem." (SeeHarry Gould'scontribution to this volume in Chapter4 for a thoroughreview of thesediscussions.) The term structureis the sourceof much confusion(an ontological
confusion), becausescholarscannot agree on whether structuresexist in
reality or only in their minds. The important point to rememberis that
structure is what observerssee, while institutions are what agents act
within. Nevertheless,structurecan affect agents.We are often affectedby
phenomena,natural and social, that we do not or cannot see,but we then
respondas agentsby putting what has happenedto us in an institutional
context. When agentsdo this, they institutionalize structure by bringing
rules to bearon their situations.
Generally speaking,scholarstoday tend to think that the structure of
internationalrelationsis not institutionalizedto any greatdegree.This is so
even for some scholarswho think of themselvesas constructivists.They
believe that countriesare highly institutionalizedas states,but that states,
through their agents,conducttheir relationsin an anarchicworld. The term
anarchypoints to a condition of rule amongstatesin which no one stateor
group of statesrules over the rest. It also implies that there is no institution
above statesruling them. When we say that statesare sovereign,we are
sayingthe very samething.
By calling internationalrelations anarchic,scholarsare not saying that
there is an absenceof rule. This would be chaos,not anarchy.Instead,they
sellerssellersespeciallya stable pattern of uninseemto be saying that structur~nd
tendedconsequences--rules
the day. In the samesense,we might say that
the marketrulesthe behaviorof sellersandbuyers.
Starting with rules, as constructivistsoften do, leadsquickly enoughto
patternsof relationsthat we can only describeas a condition of rule. Usually this condition is sufficiently institutionalized that we can recognize
specific agentsas rulers. Sometimesthere is very little evidenceof institutionalization, as in mob rule, but there is also little reasonto think that this
CONSTRUCTIVISM: A USER'S MANUAL
63
condition will persist as a stable pattern without institutions emerging.In
other words, where there are rules (and thus institutions), there is rule-a
condition in which some agentsuse rules to exercisecontrol and obtain
advantagesover other agents.Rule is a stablepatternof relations,but not a
symmetricalone.
Anarchy is a condition of rule in which rules are not directly responsible
for the way agentsconducttheir relations.To be sure,there are rules in the
of agents'
background.They make sure that the unintendedconsequences
many choices, and not rulers, do the job of ruling. If unintendedconsequencesseemto rule, it is becausesome agentsintend for themto do so.
Someagentswant to be ruled in this indirect sort of way becauseit suits
their goalsmore than any otherarrangementwould. Other agentshave little
or no choice in the matter. Perhapspatternsjust happen,but agentsmake
arrangements.Arranging for anarchyis just onepossibility.
Constructivistsshould seriously consider dropping the word structure
from their vocabularies.Socialarrangementis a betterchoice.Appearances
recognizablya
aside, internationalanarchyis a social arrangement-aninstitutio~n
grandscale.Within its scope,many other institutionsare recognizablyconnected. In every society, rules create conditions of rule. The society that
statesconstitutethroughtheir relationsis no exception.
Whetherwe, as constructivists,start with agentsor with social arrangements,we come quickly enoughto particularinstitutions and thus to rules.
If we start with rules, we can move in either direction-towardagentsand
the choices that rules give them an opportunity to make, or toward the
social arrangements
that emergefrom the choicesthat agentsare making all
the time. Whicheverway we go, we ought to keep in mind that rules yield
rule as a conditionthat agents(as institutions)canneverescape.
The practicalproblemis that, as constructivists,we want to move in both
directionsat the sametime. Yet if we try to do so, we come up againstthe
staggeringcomplexityof the social reality that we want to know about.It is
impossibleto do everything.The practicalsolution is to start with rules and
show how rules make agentsand institutions what they are in relation to
each other. Then we can show how rules make rule, and being ruled, a
universalsocialexperience.
The remainderof this user'smanual is dedicatedto thesetwo tasks. To
makepoints as clearand understandable
as possible,it repeatsmost of what
the readerhas now had a tasteof. In the process,it introducesmany additional conceptsand propositions,expressedin the simplest terms that its
author can think of. Used consistentlyand systematicallyrelated, these
conceptsandpropositionsconstitutea comprehensiveframeworkfor understandingthe world in constructivistterms.
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NICHOLAS ONUF
Rules Make Agents, Agents Make Rules
Rulesmakeagentsout of individual human beingsby giving them opportunities to act upon the world. These acts have material and social consequences,someof them intendedand somenot. Through theseacts, agents
make the material world a social reality for themselvesas human beings.
Becauseagentsare human beings, acting singly or togetheron behalf of
themselvesor others, they act as they do for human purposes--theyhave
goalsreflecting humanneedsand wishes.The tangledconnectionsbetween
agency(who is acting on whose behalf?),goals (whose goals are affected
by what acts?),and circumstances(which features of the world actually
matter?)make it difficult for agentsto explain fully and convincingly why
they act as they do. Even if they seemconfused,observerscan often figure
the reasonsfor their conductfrom the evidenceat hand.
Agentsusewhatevermeansare availableto them to achievetheir goals.
Thesemeansinclude material featuresof the world. Becausethe world is a
social place, at least for human beings, rules make the world's material
features into resourcesavailable for agents'use. Some resourcesare not
directly material-rulesalso constituteagentsand institutionsas resources.
Whetheragentsare able to spell out their reasonsfor using the resources
availableto them, or observersfigure themout from the evidence,recognizablepatternsin the resultsconstituteagents'interests.
Agentsneednot know what their interestsare to act on them. Oncethey
learn more from other agents(as observers)about their own interests,they
may act differently. Indeed,humanbeingsdo not needto think aboutthemselvesas agentsto be agents.While being an agent does not require the
degree of self-consciousnessthat we associatewith having an identity,
agentsare usually awareenoughof their identities, singularand collective,
to havean interestin fosteringthoseidentities.
As agents,peoplecan makeother peopleinto agentsby giving the latter
the opportunity to act on the former's behalf for particular purposes.The
former may do so individually or collectively, and the latter may be one or
more individuals acting on the former's behalf. Agents acting collectively
becomea singularagent.By using resources,they acquirea material existence, and, as the previous paragraphsuggests,they become objects of
identification.
Agency is always limited. Agentsare neverfree to act upon the world in
all the ways that they might wish to. Many limits have a material component. We need air to breathe;we do not have wings to fly. No rule can
readily make things otherwise,even though rules allow us, agents,to use
resourcesto alter theselimits, for example,by fashioning scubagear and
CONSTRUCTIVISM: A USER'S MANUAL
65
airplanes.Rules that give any agentan opportunity to act createlimits for
other agents.Rules in generallimit the range of acts that other agentsare
free to take.
It follows from this proposition that no individual human being, as an
agent,has full autonomy.By the sametoken, agentsacting togethernever
have full independence.As noted, agentsare always limited by rules that
give other agentsopportunitiesto act. Agents acting togetherare additionally limited by the very rules that give them the opportunity to act collectively. Rulesallowing otheragents,individual and collective, to act on their
behalflimit themevenfurther.
When a very large number of people collectively operateas an agent,
when they have agentsacting for them, when they have someconsiderable
measureof identity (including some place identified as theirs), and when
they are free to act within very wide limits, thesepeopleconstitutea country. For severalcenturies,agentshave had a consistentinterest in talking
aboutcountriesas if they are independentof eachotherand anyothersocial
construction. This is made clearest by defining sovereignty as absolute
independenceand describingcountriesas sovereignstates.As constructivists, however, we should always bear in mind that full independenceis a
useful fiction, andsovereigntyis a matterof degree.
The freedomthat agentsdo havedependson their ability to recognizethe
material and social limits that apply to them. They must also be able to
evaluatethe consequences
of exceedingthose limits. To be an agent requiresthe mentalequipmentthat individual humanbeingsnormally develop
over the course of their social lives. Agents exercise their freedom by
choosingto act one way or another,in an unendingseriesof situationsthat
make choosingunavoidable.It hardly needssaying that not choosingis a
choice, presumablytaken, as all choices are, to advanceagents' goals.
Agents make choices in light of the skills that they possessand the resourcesthat they haveaccessto, for reasonsthat they are more or lessable
to articulate.In short,they makechoicesin pursuitof their interests.
Rules offer agentsthe simplestkind of choices.Agents may chooseto
follow a given rule, or to break it. Comparedto most situationsin which
agentsmake choices, the choice of following a rule or not following it
involves consequences
that are easyto calculate.While unintendedconsequencesare always possible, rules give agents the opportunity to make
rational choices--choicesdictatedby referenceto goals--with someassurancethat they are makingthe bestchoicesavailableto them.
A rule makes rational choice relatively easy by telling the agents to
whom it referswhat they shoulddo in somesort of situationthat they might
find themselvesin. Theseagentsmay act on the contentsof the rule without
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NICHOLAS ONUF
realizing that the contentsform a rule. In principle, however, any agent
(including any observerwith enoughinformation) canformulate contentsof
a rule in the form of a rule. Thereis nothing tricky aboutthis. Sayingwhat a
rule is-putting its contentsin the right fonn--is exactly the sameas speaking in a form that gets anyonewho is listening to respondto whateverwe
are saying. The point of speakingin this way is to have somethingtake
place-toaccomplishsomethingwith the assistanceof someoneelse.
The act of speakingin a form that getssomeoneelseto act is commonly
called a speechact. The form that a speechact must havewill be clearfrom
the following examples:(1) You assertthat duck seasonhas begun (you
might actually say, "Duck seasonhasbegun!"). (2) Shedemands thatwe all
go duck hunting (she might actually say, "Let's go duck hunting!"). (3) I
promise to roast duck for dinner (I might actually say, "I'll cook!"). The
genericform for a speechact is: I (you, etc.) herebyassert(demand,promise) to anyone hearing me that some state of affairs exists or can be
achieved.The threeexamplessuggestthat speechactsfall into threecategories, here called assertivespeechacts, directive speechacts, and commissive speechacts.
Whether speechacts accomplishanything dependson whether others
respondto what they hear. The responseto your assertionabout duck season was obviouslypositive. I, at least,acceptedher inclusive but imperative
demandto go hunting when I promisedto cook. We may surmisethat both
of you acceptedmy offer, andwe all threewent duck hunting, perhapsafter
we checkedthe newspaperto be surethat duck seasonhad indeedbegun.
Whatevercategorya particularspeechact falls within, particularspeech
acts imply nothing about future situations. We start all over again when
deer seasonbegins. A speakermay assertthe existenceof some state of
affairs and others may agree, or may requestsomethingand others may
comply, or may make a commitmentthat othersaccept,without any necessary consequences
in the long run.
If, however, speakersfrequently repeata particular speechact with the
samegeneraleffect, everyoneinvolved begins to think that the repetition
becomessignificant. We end up hunting with each other all the time becausewe go through the samecycle of speechacts wheneverhunting season begins. Constantly repeated,the same old speech acts turn into
conventionas everyonecomesto believethat the words themselves,and not
the speakersmouthing them, are responsiblefor what happens.Hunting
togetheris what we do at certaintimes, whetherany of us evenhave to say
anythingmuch aboutit anymore.
Conventionscomecloseto being rules. Recall that rules tell agentswhat
they shoulddo. A conventionremindsagentswhat they havealways done.
CONSTRUCTIVISM: A USER'S MANUAL
67
The borderlinebetweenknowing that we have always done somethingand
probably will continueto do it, and believing that we shoulddo it because
we have always done it, is exceedingly fuzzy. If a convention prompts
agentsto think that they should do somethingthat they have always done,
then the conventionis indeeda rule. We should considerthe rule in question a weakrule becauseit is normative,which meansthat agentsacceptthe
"should" element, only to the extent that the regular pattern of conduct
(suchas huntingtogether)continues.
As agentsbegin to realize that they should act as they always have,and
not just becausethey always have acted that way, the convention gains
strengthas a rule. Rules keep the form of a speechact by generalizingthe
relation betweenspeakerand hearer.Within the generalform of a speech
act, given rules make hearersinto agentsto whom those rules apply. Finally, agentsrecognizethat they shouldfollow the rules in questionbecause
they are rules and for no otherreason.
Rules can take the general form of speechacts in each of the three
categoriespresentedabove:assertivespeechacts,directive speechacts,and
commissivespeechacts. Rules in the form of assertivespeechacts inform
agentsabout the world--the way things are, the way it works--andinform
them what consequences
are likely to follow if they disregardthis information. The information containedin suchrules may be statedin very general
terms, in which casewe might call it a principle. The principle of sovereignty is a conspicuousexample.
At the other end of the spectrumof possibilities, rules in the form of
assertivespeechacts may be statedin very specific terms. Instructionsfor
operatingappliances,filling committeeseats,or presentingdiplomatic credentialsare useful examples.Whereverrules in this form fall on the spectrum, they are instruction-rules.Providing information is not normative,but
telling agentswhat they should do with that information is. Agents always
know what they should do becausethe rule tells them somethinguseful
abouttheir relationto the world.
Directive speechactsare recognizableas imperatives.If the speakersays
that you must do something,the speakerwants you to believe that you
should do it. Rules in the form of directive speechacts, directive-rules,are
emphaticallynormative.By telling agentswhat they must do (no hunting!),
theserules leave no doubt as to what they shoulddo. Directive-rulesoften
provide information aboutthe consequences
for disregardingthem. Having
this information (sixty days in jail!) helps rational agentsto make the right
choicein decidingwhetherto follow theserules or not.
Commissivespeechacts involve promises.Speakersmakepromisesthat
hearersaccept.Commissivespeech acts
give form to rules when hearers,as
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NICHOLAS ONUF
speakers,respondwith promisesof their own. Oncethesewebsof promises
become sufficiently generalizedand normative in their own terms, they
becomecommitment-rules.Agents are most likely to recognizetheserules
in their effects.Theseeffectsare the rights and dutiesthat agentsknow they
possesswith respect to other agents.Any given agent'srights constitute
dutiesfor otheragents(privateproperty--nohunting!).
Rights may entitle the agentspossessingthemto specific benefits.Rights
may also empower agents to act toward other agents in specific ways.
Obviously, powers and limits on powers tum people into agents. More
generally,right and dutiestum peopleinto agentsby defining opportunities
for them to act upon the world. Instruction-rulesand directive-rulesalso
tum peopleinto agentsfor exactlythe samereason.
Speechacts fall into three categoriesbecausethey perform different
functions--theyget things done for speakersand hearerstogetherin three,
and only three,ways. The samethreecategorieshold for niles becausethey
work in the samethree ways that speechacts do--they get things done by
instructing,directing, and committing agents.As observers,we seerules in
eachcategoryperformingdifferent functions for society.Quite a few scholars in such fields as law and sociologyhave worked out variationson this
functional scheme,but they have never used all three of thesecategories,
andjust thesecategories,at the sametime.
Philosophershavedeviseda different schemefor categorizingrules, and
a numberof constructivistscholarshaveadoptedit. On functional grounds,
there are two categoriesof rules: constitutive rules and regulative rules.
Constitutive rules are the medium of social construction.Regulativerules
are the mediumof socialcontrol.
While this schememight seemto be constructivist,it is actually a source
of confusion. From a constructivist point of view, all rules are always
constitutive and regulative at the sametime. By definition, rules regulate
the conduct of agentsbecauserules are normative--theytell agentswhat
they shoulddo. Furthermore,the regulationof conductconstitutesthe world
within which such conduct takes place, whetheragentsintend this consequenceor not. Acting in the world meansacting on the world, often as an
unintendedconsequence.Intentions might be a useful way to categorize
acts,but they are nevera decisivebasisfor categorizingrules.
Even when agents intend that a particular rule serve only to regulate
conduct(an intention that other agentsmay thwart by choosing,for example, to disregardthe rule), the conduct in questionwill have the effect of
strengtheningor (if agentschooseto disregardit) weakeningthe rule. In the
sameway, a rule that agentsintend to be constitutive will have to affect
conductif it is to succeed.Often agentsintend rules to be simultaneously
CONSTRUCTIVISM: A USER'S MANUAL
69
constitutiveand regulative.To give an obviousexample,whenagentscalled
players take turns in playing a game, the rule instructing them to do so
constitutesthe gameas one in which playersregularly take turns.
As we have seen,rules servethreepossiblefunctions. Agentsmakerules
and use them for instruction, direction, and commitment. Within each of
these three functional categories,rules differ in the extent to which they
have been formalized. Rules are formal if agentsencounterthem as fixed
and unavoidablefeatures of their world. Rules also differ in the extent
which they are linked to other rules. Agents often discover that particular
rules are linked to other rules telling other agentswhat to do in the event
that the relevant agents disregardthe particular rules in question. Formal
rules that are effectively backedup by otherrules are legal.
Formality strengthensa rule by making its normative characterclearer,
in the processseparatingit from rules that are normativelymore ambiguous
(conventions,for example).A rule supportinganotherrule strengthensthe
latter by increasingthe chancesthat agentswill chooseto follow the latter
rule. The more frequently agentsfollow a rule, the strongerthe rule will be,
normatively (and the easierit will be to make it formal). For example,the
principle of sovereigntyis a highly formal instruction-ruleconstitutingthe
societyof states.It is supportedby commitment-rulesempoweringstates,as
agents, to bring new membersinto this society. These supporting rules,
which we know as rules of recognition,are supportedby instruction-rules
that spell out a numberof social and the material conditionsthat must be
satisfiedbeforestatehoodis possible.
Agents are inclined to make rules legal and to follow them if they are
legal becausethey know what the rules are, how much they matterto other
agents,and what consequences
they can expect from not following them.
When agentsfind themselvesin a legal environment,it is rational for them
to follow rules as a general proposition. It costs them less than careless
conduct will. International relations is a peculiar environmentin this respect,but still a legal environment.While there are very few formal directive-rules to be found, there are large numbersof other, quite formal rules
intricately linked in support of each other. Relevant agentsare perfectly
awareof the situationandproceedaccordingly.
Rules Form Institutions, Institutions Form Societies
Rulesare linked to eachother in contentas well as function--bothby what
they say and by what they do. Standingback, agentscan easily identify the
ways that rules reinforce each other in what they say and do. Speaking
figuratively, we might say that rules come in families, and that somefami-
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NICHOLAS ONUF
lies of rules come with rules documentingthe family pedigree.Other families of rules dependon observersto documentfamily resemblances.These
and many other practiceshelp to give families of rules their distinguishing
features.Rules and related practicesare almost impossibleto separatein
practice, becauseevery time agentsrespondto rules, whether by making
choicesor by observingthe choicesthat other agentsmake, they have an
effect on thoserules and on their placesin families of rules.
By recentconvention,scholarly observersof internationalrelationscall
thesefamilies of rules and relatedpractices"regimes." At an earlier time,
they called them "institutions," and this remains the usual term for most
scholarswho devotetheir attentionsto social relations.In practice,the two
terms are indistinguishable.International regimes are said to consist of
principles, rules, norms,and procedures.By whatevername, theseare all
categoriesof rules. Principles and proceduresanchor the two ends of a
spectrumof possibilitiesdistinguishableby how generalthey are in content.
Rules and norms are distinguishableby how formal they are, norms being
sufficiently informal that observersare not always sure that they are rules
until they seehow otheragents respond
to them.
Internationalregimesdiffer in size. They have rules that work in different ways (assertive-,directive-, and commitment-rules)in different proportions. Additionally, regimes differ in the extent to which they have rules
backing up other rules. Institutions differ in exactly the sameways. They
are madeup of rules that vary, not just in generalityand formality but also
in numberandarrangement.
Somesimple institutions consistof a small numberof rules whosecontent makesthem a family, even if the rules seemto give little support to
eachother, andto get little supportfrom otherinstitutionsto which they are
connected.In the world of internationalrelations,the balanceof poweris an
exampleof suchan institution. Instruction-rulesconstitute,andregulate,the
balanceof power. Theserules tell the great powers what to expect when
they chooseallies and go to war. Yet even the balanceof power, as an
institution, is not as simple as it seems.Treatiesgive allies rights and duties.
Rules limiting the conduct of war help to keep the balancefrom being
permanentlyupset.
In the context of international relations, spheresof influence are also
simple institutions made up of informal directive-rules.Theserules direct
weak stateswithin the sphereto carry out a much strongerstate'swishes.
When theserules are backedup by principlesjustifying sucharrangements,
the sphereof influenceis no longerquite so simplean institution. As formal
equals,statesmay also adopttreatiesdistributing rights and dutiesthat have
unequal consequences
within the sphere. Treaties are themselvessimple
CONSTRUCTIVISM: A USER'S MANUAL
71
institutions minimally consisting of fonnal commitment-rulesthat apply
only to the states adopting such treaties. The principle that treaties are
binding, andthereforelegal, automaticallyprovidesthemwith supportfrom
other,highly fonnal rules.
Institutions suchas the balanceof power, spheresof influence, and treaties are simple only becauseobserverscan easily pick them out of an
institutional environmentcharacterizedby a large number of linked rules
and related practices. Agents act as observerswhen they recognize any
institution as such, no matter how complex it is. Scholarsoften think of
internationalregimesas somethingthat they alonecan see,while agents can
see only the simpler institutions making up the regime. Yet observersbecome agents, and regimes become institutions, when other agents learn
what observershaveto say.
Internationalregimes are hard to see becausethe rules connectingthe
institutions that make them up tend to be infonnal. Agents take them for
granted.Fonnal rules make things clearer,and agentsneednot standback.
For a long time in the context of international relations, agentshave had
accessto a legal institution, conventionallyknown as the sourcesof international law, through which they can make legal rules and thus institutions
whoseexistenceno one can doubt. Treatiesare one such institution, thanks
to the legal principle that treatiesare binding on the statesadoptingthem.
Agentsrespondto rules with goals in mind; institutionsservetheir interests. As a generalmatter, simple institutions have a more straightforward
relation to agents' intereststhan do more complex and more difficult to
recognizeinstitutions.We think of relatively simple institutionsas perfonning distinct functions for agentsand for other institutions. Dependingon
what theserelatively simple institutionsdo, they give priority to rules in one
of the functional categoriesthat we havealreadyidentified.
When instruction-rulesare most in evidence,agentsare situatedin networks of rules and relatedpractices.The balanceof power is an example.
Its rules assignan elevatedstatusto a few greatpowers(ideally five states)
that must act as if they are roughly equalin the resourcesavailableto them.
If states'agentsact as instructed,the consequences
are supposedto be an
ever-shifting and relatively peacefulbalanceof alliancesamong the great
powers,whateverthe immediateintentionsof their agentsmight be. Recognizing the balanceof power as an institution whose function suits their
interests,agentsintentionally foster those sameconsequences
in the name
of the balance.
When directive-rulesare most in evidence,agentsare situatedin a chain
of command,a finn, or an organization.A sphereof influenceis a rudimentary institution of this sort. Its very infonnal rules assigneachagentto an
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NICHOLAS ONUF
office, as we would call it in a more formal organization.Officers report up
the chain of commandand carry out ordersthat come down the chain. By
this logic, the top officer decideswhat the organization'sfunction is. In
practice, most organizationsare more complex than this. Nevertheless,a
sphereof influence is so rudimentary in organizationthat its function is
nothing more than to fulfill the wishes of a leading power, as top officer,
over the weakerstateswithin the sphere.
Finally, when commitment-rulesare most in evidence,agentsend up in
partnerships,or associations,with other agents.In the institutional context
of international relations, the principle of sovereigntyand the supporting
rules of recognition make states into formal equals. When two or more
statesadopt a treaty, they act as membersof an associationgiving them at
least somerights in common, including the right to commit themselvesto
eachother. Underthe termsof the treaty, all partiestake on additionalrights
and duties with respectto the others. In this situation, statesare formally
equal becausethey all have the samerole. The function of any association
is to distributeroles to agentsthroughits commitment-rules.
Only states(and the associationsthat they have createdby treaty) can
adopt treaties, becausethere is a commitment-ruleassigningthis role to
them exclusively. To return to an earlier example, markets function by
assigning agents either of two roles---they are either sellers or buyers.
Every seller is formally equalin possessingthe right to buy, and so is every
buyer. Note, however,that neithersellersnor buyershave a right to a fixed
price. Formally speaking,agentsin these roles are free to competewith
eachother, presumablyfor the good of every agentin the association.The
function of this, or any, associationis implied by the commitmentsthat
agentshavemadeto a given distributionof roles.
It is importantto note, however,that an association'sroles are not generally equal in the rights and duties that they create.Think, for example,of
the roles that membersof most householdshave. For that matter, agents
holding the samestatus(for example,white males)are equal to eachother
within the terms of that status, even if different statusesare unequal in
relation to each other. This is no less true for agentsholding the sameor
similar offices (for example,foreign ministers).Nevertheless,commitmentrules are especially useful for making large numbersof agentsformally
equalfor limited purposes.
Agency consistsof statuses,offices, and roles. Dependingon the institutional context, every agent must have a status,an office, or a role. Most,
perhapsall, agentshaveall threein somecombination.This is becausemost
peopleare agentsin a variety of institutions,andmany institutionscombine
featuresof networks,organizations,andassociations.
CONSTRUCTIVISM: A USER'S MANUAL
73
Institutionssuchas theseare complex in function and structure.Instruction-, directive-, and commitment-rulesare all present,even if the proportions differ from institution to institution. Observersusually have no
difficulty in picking out the patternof rules, becauseinstitutions are social
arrangements
that alwaysreflect agents'interests.From an observer'spoint
of view, institutionshavepurposes.It seemsthis way evenif the observeris
an interestedagent.
A complex institution will have generalinstruction-rules,or principles,
telling agentswhat the purposesof that institution are. Detailedinstructionrules may provide support for theseprinciples by spelling out all relevant
statuses.Directive-rulesmay also repeatand elaborateon what theseprinciples have to say and then supportthem by demandingthat officers do what
theserules say that they should. In situationswhere there are no conspicuous instruction-rulesor directive-rulessupportingprinciples, commitmentrules createroles for agentsthat have, from anyoneagent'spoint of view,
the unintendedeffect of supportingthe institution'sprinciples.
Rules in all three categoriesoften work together to support an
institution'sprinciples. Sometimes,however,institutions developin such a
way that rules from one or eventwo categoriesare scarceor not to be found
at all. If we considerinternationalrelationsas taking place within a single,
overarching institution, its rules constitute a conspicuouslylopsided arrangement.Thanks to the principle of sovereignty,there are few if any
formal directive-rules.Observerswill discover informal directive-rulesin
practice,evenif someagentsroutinely denythat suchrules exist.
Consideredas a complex institution, international relations takes
place in a context where agentsand observersfind a large number of
formal commitment-rules(rules of international law), behind which
there is an even larger number of instruction-rules.These latter rules
differ enormouslyin formality (quite a few are legal rules), detail, and
the degree to which they are linked to each other. They support the
principle of sovereigntyand a few other principles more or less directly
and effectively. Thanks again to the principle of sovereignty,statesare
complex institutions within which formal directive-rulesallow agentsto
act on behalfof statesin their relations.
The contextwithin which any institution functions as an agentis itself an
institution. Societyis a complexinstitution within which many otherrelated
institutions are to be found. Agents are likely to act as if their society's
boundariesare clearand accepted,evenif observers,including agents,have
a hard time specifyingthoseboundariesto anyone'ssatisfaction.Statesare
societiesthat have exceptionallyclear boundariesas well as highly developedinstitutionsfor conductingrelationswith otherstates.
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NICHOLAS ONUF
The complex institution within which statesfunction as relatively selfcontainedsocietiesis itself a society. Within international society, states
function as primary agentssimply by conductingrelationswith eachother.
Internationalsocietyincludesmany other, more or less self-containedinstitutions. Some of them add secondaryagents,such as officers of international organizations,to that society. The sum total of institutions and their
relationsadd up to a societyof staggeringcomplexity and constantchange,
even though its large patternsseemat least to some observersto call for
generalization.
Rules Yield Rule
We have seenthat institutions consist of related rules and practices.It is
possibleto think of a single rule as an institution. As a practicalmatter,we
never find a single rule standingby itself. Every rule gives the agentsto
whom it appliesthe choice of following the rule, or not, with more or less
predictableconsequences.
Most of the time, agentschooseto follow the rule. The patternof agents'
choiceshasa generalconsequence,
whetheror not it is intendedby particular agents--it has the effect of distributing material and social benefits
amongagents.An extremelyimportantcategoryof such benefitsis control
over resourcesand control over other agents and their activities. Some
agentsbenefit more than other agents.Over time, institutions work to the
advantageof someagentsat the expenseof otheragents.
As rational beings,thoseagentswho benefit the most from the rules that
apply to them are the most inclined to follow those rules. Agents who
benefit less are still inclined to follow the rules becausedoing so still
benefitsthem more than not doing so. Nevertheless,agentsmay proceedto
break any given rule after weighing the consequences
of either choice for
themselves.As a generalconsequence,
rule breakingis likely to involve a
loss of benefitsto otheragents.
Agentswho are negativelyaffectedby the breakingof a rule also havea
choice. They may acceptthe consequences
(including a weakenedfaith in
the broken rule and a greaterchanceof its being broken again). Alternatively, they may chooseto follow a rule that has the consequenceof presenting the rule breakerwith a loss of benefits, which the rule breakeris
either preparedto acceptor had thought would not be likely to occur. The
second choice, which we think of as enforcing the rule, involves using
resourcesthat might otherwisehavebeenput to beneficialuse. This loss of
benefitsis still lessthanthe loss that comesfrom not enforcingthe rule.
Insteadof breakinga given rule, agentswho do not benefit from follow-
CONSTRUCTIVISM: A USER'S MANUAL
75
ing it may chooseto usewhateverresourcesare neededto changethat rule,
and thus to changethe distribution of benefits that results from the rule's
existence.If some agentstry to changethe rule, other agentswho would
benefit less from the changesmay chooseto use the necessaryresourcesto
keep the rule from changing. Furthermore,those agentswho benefit the
most from a given rule will probably have to use fewer of the resources
availableto them to keep the rule from changingthan will agentswho want
to changethe rule. Clearly, rules say what they say, and institutions are
slow to change, because
agentsmakerational choicesin circumstancesthat
alwaysgive the advantageto someagentsover others.
The general consequenceof agents' respondingto rules with the resourcesavailableto them is that someagentsexercisegreatercontrol over
the contentof those rules, and over their successin being followed, than
other agentsdo. In other words, rules yield rule. By making agentsand
society what they are, rules make rule inevitable. Rule is somethingthat
agentsdo to, and for, otheragents,and they do it by following rules. Rule is
somethingthat happensto agents when they follow rules or when they
of not following rules.
suffer the consequences
Specific institutions may formalize rule by seemingto limit its exercise
to a particularagentor set of agents---torulers. Justbecausewe can identify
rulers, we shouldnot concludethat they alonedo the ruling. Whereverthere
are informal rules (which is everywhere),there is informal rule, either supporting or undercuttingformal institutions of rule, or both (probably in a
complex and hard to observepattern). Even if the formalities of rule are
nowhereto be found, rule remains apervasivecondition for that society.
Loadedwith rules but lacking rulers, internationalsocietyis a casein point.
Rules in different functional categoriesyield different forms of rule.
Where instruction-rulesare paramountand status is a defining feature of
society,ideasand beliefs seemto do the ruling. Despiteappearances,
agents
actually do the ruling by getting other agents to accept their ideas and
beliefs. They do so by exampleand by indoctrination. Rule in this form is
hegemony.
Any society where principles get most of their support from detailed
instruction-rulesis hegemonicallyruled. Castesocietiesare examples.Each
hegemonicallyruled castehas clear boundariesand a fixed position in the
network of castesconstituting the society. Membership in a caste gives
agentsso much of their identity, defined as a set of ideas about self and
position in society, that casteidentity seemsto rule the societyas a whole.
Hegemonicallyruled institutionsexist in societieswhereothersortsof institutions and a mixed form of rule can be identified. The professionsoffer an
example.Detailed instruction-rules,ordinarily learnedthrough a long ap-
76
NICHOLAS ONUF
prenticeship,supportprofessionalstandardsand rule agentsto their advantagein their relationswith clients needingtheir professionalservices.
In institutionswheredirective-rulesare paramountandoffice is a defining
feature of society, offices are vertically organizedin a chain of command.
Officers at eachposition in the chain use resourcesthat their offices make
availableto themto carry out the rules that their offices requirethem to carry
out. From top to bottom, such an arrangementof offices is called a hierarchy, and so might we call the form of rule that resultswhen officers carry out
directive-rules.The stateas a legal orderexemplifieshierarchicalrule.
When directive-rulesare legal, hierarchyis formal. Despitethe minimal
description of the state as a legal order, formal hierarchiesrarely stand
alone.Hegemonicalideastypically reinforceformal hierarchy.The result is
authority, conventionally defined as legitimate control. Military officers
possessauthority accordingto their rank, which is their statusand office
formally joined togetherin mutual reinforcement.Finally, informal hierarchy may reinforce hegemonythat has achieveda relatively high level of
formality. After World War II, the so-calledpaxAmericanamay be thought
of as a condition of rule in which the United Statesruled, in the name of
freedom and prosperity, by intervening wheneverand whereverit chose.
Proclaimingprinciples had the effect (perhaps initiallyunintended)of formalizing the statusof the United Statesas leaderof "the free world," while
acting on thoseprinciplesgaveit an informal office.
Where commitment-rulesare paramountand role is a defining featureof
society, agentshold a variety of roles that are defined by referenceto the
roles that otheragentshold. No one role, or institution, evencomesclose to
making particularagentsinto rulers. On the contrary, formal commitmentrules mostly seemto reinforce formal hierarchy. They do so by granting
officers well-definedpowersto help them issueordersand carry them out,
and by granting agentswell-defined rights to help protect them from officers abusingtheir powers.The result is a constitutionalstate,in which the
constitutionformalizes commitment-rulesthat limit the governmentof the
stateandmakeit responsible.
Takenas a whole, roles may yield rule on their own, and not just because
they reinforce other forms of rule. Agents in associationare the rulers--all
of them together--evenif none of them have the statusor office to make
them rulers. Ruled by association,agentsdo not seerule in their roles. As
agents,they are mostly concernedwith their roles and what they are free to
do within them. To return once more to the exampleof a market, agents
participatingin it generallyhave the sensethat this is an institution free of
rule. As sellers and buyers, they are neverthelessruled as an unintended
consequenceof the exerciseof their right to buy and sell. Adam Smith's
CONSTRUCTIVISM: A USER'S MANUAL
77
invisible hand is a hand that rules, and it rules to the advantageof some
agentsover others.
As we saw, quite a few scholars describe international relations as
anarchical.An anarchyis rule by no one in particular, and thereforeby
everyone in association,as an unintendedconsequenceof their many,
uncoordinatedacts. Recall that agentswho observea generalpattern of
unintendedconsequences
can no longer be said to act without intending
consequences,
even if they continueto act as they had beenacting. They
intend to be ruled for good reasons,and if they did not have good
reasons,they would makeother choices.
If anarchyis a condition of rule unrelatedto any agent'sintentions,
then international relations is no anarchy. We need another term to
indicate the form of rule in which agentsintend that they be ruled by
what seem to be unintendedconsequencesof exercising their rights.
Heteronomyis a better term. Autonomousagentsact freely, while heteronomousagents cannot act freely. Both terms refer to agents, not
society. From a constructivistperspective, however,agentsare always
autonomous,but their autonomy is always limited by the (limited)
autonomy of other agents.The exerciseof autonomy makes heteronomy a social condition, which agents accept as an apparently unintendedconsequence
of their individual, autonomouschoices.
International society is heteronomouslyruled becausestates exercise
their independenceunder the principle of sovereigntyand under a number
of commitment-rulesgranting them rights and duties with respectto each
other. One state'sindependenceis a limit on every other's,and all states'
agentsacceptthe unintendedconsequences
that result from their many individual choices.Within this generalcondition of rule are to be found a large
numberof institutionscontributingto rule in a variety of ways. Agents(and
not just states' agents) constantly work on these institutions and work
within them. Despitetheir numberand variety, and the complexity of their
relations,they are arrangedas they are on purpose,by agents'intentions,to
servetheir interests--includingtheir sharedinterestin beingruled.
Note
Kurt Burch, Harry Gould, and Vendulka KubaIkova persuadedme to write a concise
expositionof constructivismas I had developedit in World of Our Making (1989). The
result is "A ConstructivistManifesto" (Onuf 1997), which I wrote in a telegraphicstyle
for a scholarly audience,introducing somenew material and leaving a great deal out.
While I had plannedmy essayfor this book as a sentence-by-sentence
reconstructionof
the "Manifesto" for a larger audience,I ended up making quite a few substantive
additionsand changes,and I deletedall of its relatively few citations. I am grateful to
78
NICHOLAS ONUF
membersof the Miami InternationalRelationsGroup for their questionsand suggestions.
Bibliography
Onuf, Nicholas Greenwood. 1989. World of Our Making: Rules and Rule in Social
TheoryandInternationalRelations.Columbia:University of SouthCarolinaPress.
- - - . 1997. "A Constructivist Manifesto." In Constituting International Political
Economy, ed. Kurt Burch and Robert A. Denemark, 7-17. Boulder, CO: Lynne
Rienner.
4
What Is at Stake in the
Agent-Structure Debate?
Harry D. Gould
Introduction
As notedin the introductorychapterto this volume, the division of international relations (IR) into a series of debateshas becomea conventional
device for making senseof the field. Beyond the "great debates,"at least
three and possiblyfive in number(Wrever 1997, 12-25), two debatesare of
interesthere: the "levels of analysis"debatetouchedoff by David Singerin
1961 and especially the "agent-structure"debate initiated by Alexander
Wendt in 1987.
Simply put, the conceptualproblem at the heart of the agent-structure
debateis: How are agentsand structuresrelated?Over the course of the
debate,this problem has disappearedfrom view, or, more to the point, the
debateitself hasbecomeproblematic.There are severalproblems:the positions held by someof the participantshave changedover time, the terms of
debatehave changed,and the serial subdebateshave becomefurther removedboth from the core issueand from IR' s substantiveconcerns.
The purposeof this paperis to put Onufs constructivisminto the context
of the agent-structuredebate,expandingon his contributionto this book, his
book World of Our Making (1989), and several articles which have also
servedto refine his position (Onuf 1994, 1995, 1996, 1997). This will entail
a brief review of constructivism,as well as a detailed analysisin which I
shall put constructivisminto dialoguewith the various positionsstakedout
during the debate. The concluding discussionwill look at the levels of
79
80
HARRY D. GOULD
analysis debatein IR, the relation of which to the agent-structuredebate
formed an important part of Wendt'sseveralexchangeswith Martin Hollis
and SteveSmith.
Constructivism
At its barest,the constructivistposition on the relation of agentsto structures is that they each constitute the other. Simultaneously,agents and
structureenableand constraineachother. In itself, this advancesvery little
beyondAnthony Giddens's"structurationtheory" (Giddens1979, 1984),to
which Onuf is obviously indebted. The relation of constructivism to
structuration is complex. Constructivism'sdebt to structuration is plain
enough,but the origin andnatureof the differencesare important.The most
importantdifferencelies in the indispensablerole playedby rules in Onufs
constructivism.A fuller accountof structurationis to be found below; what
is importantto note at the presentis that Giddens'sconcernwas to answer
the question, which dominates: structure (determinism) or agency (free
will)? His answer,put in the mostbasicway, is that eachshapesthe other.
Both accountstake as their starting point the rejection of ontological
individualism and pure ontological structuralism.As we shall see, this is
true of all of the perspectivesvoiced in the debate.Both claim that agents
and structuresactively and continuouslyconstituteand changeeachother.
Structuration,however, lacks a fully developedmechanismcapableof explaining the meansby which agentsand structuresconstituteone another.
Onuf found this mechanismin the conceptof rules, as developedin legal
and linguistic philosophy.In his words:
The co-constitutionof peopleas social beingsand of societyis a continuous
process.Rules are central to this processbecausethey make people active
participants(or agents)in society, and they give any society its distinctive
character(or structure).Rules define agentsin tennsof structures,and structures in tenns of agents.... As rules changein number, kind, relation and
content, they constantlyredefine agentsand structures,always in tenns of
eachother. (1996, 6)
For Onuf, the solution to the structurationistdilemmaof how to deal at the
level of methodwith the continuous,dynamic processof co-constitution-where to cut into the process--isto "emphasizerules, but neverrules considered in a vacuum. To begin with rules simultaneouslyleads in two
directions--towardagents and their choices, and toward social arrangementsthat eventuatefrom agentschoices"(Onuf 1997,8).
Concomitantwith the focus on rules, andby necessitypresupposingit, is
THE AGENT-STRUCTURE DEBATE
81
a focus on deeds.Deedsare responsesto and constituentsof the circumstancesin which peoplefind themselves.Peopleuselanguageboth to representtheir deedsand to perform them. Speakingis doing. Utterancesthrough
which peopleaccomplishsocial endsdirectly-performdeeds-arespeech
acts. Furthermore,rules take form from speechacts.
Ruleslink agentsand structuresin a commonprocessof constitution,but
only if rules have an ontologicalstandingappropriateto their dual function.
Giddensdid not see this; he saw rules as a property of structure,not as a
material property (Onuf 1996, 8--9). Rules have propertiesof their own.
Languagegives rules an autonomouscharactersuited to their function;
throughlanguagerules exist in their own right. "Competencewith rules is a
defining featureof humancognition, and the presenceof rules is a defining
featureof the humancondition" (9).
According to Onuf (9-10), rules describe some class of actions and
indicate whethertheseactionsconstitutewarrantedconducton the part of
thoseto whom the rules are addressed.They can do this because,as stated
above,rules come from performativespeech.Speechacts convey propositional contentand elicit an appropriateresponse.Becausepeoplerespondto
these(speech)actswith their own performances,the patternof speechactsand
their responsesmake human life intelligible. The pattern of speechacts
endows practiceswith normativity, giving rise to rules. As we shall see
below, this is part of the way in which we "construct"structure.
As far as Giddensand Onuf are concerned,all rules are simultaneously
constitutive and regulative. Rules are regulative by definition. Regulation
yields constitutionas an effect. Even if a particularrule is strictly intended
to regulateconduct,it will have an additional constitutiveeffect. The converseis also true: rules intendedto be only constitutivewill haveregulative
consequences.
Agents are, or consist of, individuals whose acts materially affect the
world. Rules constitutinga societydefine the conditionsunderwhich individuals may intervenein the world. Rules make individuals into agentsby
enabling them to act upon the world in which they find themselves.As
shown above, these acts have material and social effects; they make the
world what it is materiallyand socially. Onceconstitutedas agents,individuals intervenein the world by respondingto choicesofferedby rules.
Wendt situatedthe agent-structureproblem in a debatefew scholarsin
IR had encountered:the debatein philosophyof sciencebetweenpositivists
and scientific realistsover the ontological statusof phenomenathat cannot
be directly observed.Pure positivists refuse to considersuch phenomena,
even if their effects are observable.Most scientiststake unobservablephenomena,suchas magnetism,for granted.For purposesof debate,scientific
82
HARRY D. GOULD
realists attribute so much impOltance to unobservablesthat someonedipping into the debatemight be inclined to underestimatethe practicalsignificance of observablephenomena.We see this particularly in Wendt's
scientific realist treatmentof structuration,in which he not only ignores
Giddens's sense of the importance of rules and resources,but rejects
Giddens'saccountof structurefor this very emphasis.!
Above we saw that rules have an ontological status. Rules constitute
themselvesin regular patternsthat mayor may not be observed,but are
always observablein principle. We observea world of regularitiesupon
which the mind seeks toimposeorder. The regularitiesare not themselves
structures.They are better called "institutions," which is an ontologically
unambiguousterm. It is through the cognitive functions of the mind that
patternedregularitieshave order, or structure,imposedupon them. When
agents"see"structuresandact on them, rulesand institutionsare affectedstructuresare real, evenif "structure"is not.
Agents act on observableregularitiesfor the samereasonthat scientific
realists attribute causal significance to unobservablestructures--tomake
the world a more orderly place for instrumentalreasons.Insofar as observers imposestructureson the phenomenalworld, or perhapsmakethe world
phenomenal,observersalso act as agents.This tends to give phenomenal
propertiesto structures,which then createsthe feedbackloop which constructivistsand structurationistsemphasize,the patternof co-constitution.
This synthetic structureimposedupon the world functions like a template. In imparting order it imputesfunction; parts are relatedto wholes.
Beyond this implicit teleology, function is also ascribedto structures;we
assignmeaningto what structuresdo. Theseconjoined problemsbetray
an Aristotelian, teleological bias implicit in structuralism-partsare
functionally related to wholes-to which both structuration and constructivism can all too easily faU prey. To avoid this, it must be remembered that structures have only those functions ascribed to them by
agents;therc is nothing natural (necessary)about either structuresor the
functions they perform. For this reason, structuresare perhaps better
thoughtof as institutions,becausethis term more adequatelyconveysthe
constitutiverole played by agents,thus avoiding the functionalist road to
structuraldeterminism.
Constructivismand the Agent-StructureDebate
It shouldby now be plain what the constructiviststanceon issuesof agency
and structureis, but to clarify at the outsetjust how this stancerelatesto the
debateover agencyand structurein JR, 1makethe following claims:
THE AGENT-STRUCTURE DEBATE
83
1. The agent-structureproblemraisesissuesof importanceto IR' s second debate,not (asmost scholarsseemto think) the third debate.
2. The issuescentral to the debateare primarily of method,and to an
extentontological;they arenot epistemologicaL
3. Structuration theory cannot resolve the debate; it does not adequately delineatethe meansby which agentsand structuresconstitute oneanother.
4. The scientific realist focus on efficacious unobservablesdoes not
addthe neededcorrective.
5. The constructivistfocus on rulesis what is needed.
6. Scientific realismis not necessaryto explainthe ontologicalstatusof
rules.
7. Rules are necessaryto agency.They make statesinto agentsat the
macro level in much the same fashion that they make individuals
agentsat the micro leveL
8. Rules form institutions. They link agents and institutions, which
mustbe accordedequalontologicalstatus.
9. Structureis in the mind's eye. Structuresexist becauseagentssee
patternsto which they imputestructure.
10. Once structuresare "produced," knowledge about them takes on
phenomenalproperties.They becomea propertyof institutions,any
of which may function as agents.
The agent-structuredebatehas been remarkablyone-sided.In IR, no selfconsciousadvocateof methodologicalindividualism has taken up the debate. The nature of agency is so neglectedthat it is misleading even to
speakof an "agent-structuredebate."By and large, what we shall seeis a
fight over the middle, in which eachtheoristmakesthe claim that his or her
representationof the effectsthat agentsand structureshave on one another
is the mostaccurateor usefuL2
In what may be reasonablycalled the prehistoryof the debate,Kenneth
Waltz (1979) attackedthe rampant reductionismin the field becausethe
of state behaviorproduce irreducible structures
unintendedconsequences
that have consequencesfor behavior. This unequivocal claim providcd
Wendt an opportunity to introduce the issue of structurefrom a scientific
realist point of view. If his discussionof world systemstheory seemscursory by comparison,reductionistsciencegot no attentionat alL
Waltz's defenseof structural realism as good sciencelinks the agentstructuredebateto IR's seconddebate.On the face of it, the seconddebate
is about method. Should IR continue to be historicist in orientation,as
it had been in its first decades,or should it follow the other social
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HARRY D. GOULD
sciencesand adopt the model of positivist natural science?Many scholars
believedthat all the secretsof human behavior,from individual to social,
political, and economic,could be fully understoodby properapplicationof
positivist methodsof inquiry. The actual debatelargely pitted the British
"traditionalists,"trained in diplomatic history and law, against"scientists"
from the United States.
Among the latter we find a running subdebate,which has probably engagedmore intellectual energyand filled morejoumal pagesthan the second debate proper, pitting behavioralistsagainst systemicists.The
behavioralistsprobably made a better claim to being "scientific" by the
standardsof the day-theirorientationwas more explicitly empiricist than
that of the systemicists,who came from the largely discreditedrationalist
epistemologicaltradition? Ratherthan constructmodelsof the workings of
unobservablestructures,the behavioralistsstudiedregularitiesof behavior.
Their methodwas inductive, beginning with observationof the actionsof
parts, rather than deductivelyworking out the relationsof parts in a hypothetical whole. In articulating the concept of levels of analysis, Singer
(1961) tried to give both sides legitimacy, which each side acceptedfor
itself but deniedto the other.
Waltz overturnedthe preeminenceof the behavioralists.He placedsystemicism on top. In effect, he rejectedbrute empiricism, which had been
dominant in its various forms since Hume, and the notion that knowledge
progressivelyaccumulatesin the absenceof deductive theory. Waltz acof the
complishedthis by treating structureas the unintendedconsequence
interactions(behavior) of self-interestedactors (here, states;in the microeconomictheory he emulated,firms). Structureis observable,irreducible,
efficacious.4
Wendt1987
"The Agent-StructureProblem in InternationalRelationsTheory" (Wendt
1987) is noteworthy on several counts, not least of which is that it was
written when Wendt was still a graduatestudent, and it was IR's first
sustainedexplorationof questionsof agencyand structure.Wendt had two
purposesin this piece, first to demonstratethe inadequacyof both Waltz's
version of structuralismand that of Immanuel Wallerstein, and secondto
advocatestructurationtheory as a replacementfor structuralismgenerally.
Wendt madethe startling claim that Waltz was, in fact, not at all the structuralist he claimed, but, to the contrary, an ontological individualist. Conversely,he found Wallerstein'sworld systemstheoryto be too holistic.
In the case of Waltz's implicit individualism, Wendt claimed that the
THE AGENT-STRUCTURE DEBATE
85
systemand its structureare the creationsof the states;despitethe influence
exertedby the structureover the states,the statesmust, by Waltz's logic,
predate(be ontoiogically prior to) the systemand its structure.Therefore,
the unit exhibits a controlling influence over the structure.The exact converse is true of Wallerstein: the system both predatesand creates the
states--thisis pure holism, the units derive all meaningfrom the generative
structure. The problem with each position, as Wendt quite correctly asserted, is that, in each case, the ontologically prior entity is taken to be
given and unproblematic. In short, Waltz has no theory of the state,
Wallersteinno theoryof the system.
In contrastto theseextremes,Wendt advocatedapplicationof Giddens's
structurationtheory. As used by Wendt, structurationtheory incorporates
the bestof both individualism and structuralism.The philosophicalfoundations for structuration,Wendt claimed,are to be found in scientific realism.
Realistscan be rigorously scientific about "unobservablegenerativestructures." They are treatedas if they are real if their effects can be observed
(Wendt 1987,350).
The importanceof scientific realism to structurationbecomesevident
when one considersthe scientific realist claim that to make an explanatory
claim, it is necessaryto identifY the underlying causal mechanismsthat
makean eventa necessaryoccurrence.Ifwe can explain the physicaldispositions and causalpowersof unobservableentities,we can make legitimate
inferencesaboutnecessarycausalrelations(354).
Having establishedwhat he takesto be the scientific realist bonafides of
structuration,Wendt proceededto discussstructurationitself. His central
claim on behalfof structurationis that the "capacitiesand even the existence of human agentsare in some way necessarilyrelated to a social
structuralcontext-thatthey are inseparablefrom humansociality" (355).
For Wendt, structurationtheory is analyticalin nature,not substantive;it is
what he would later call metatheory--atheoryabouttheory. It addresses
the
typesof entitiesto be found in the socialworld and their relations.
Wendtoffered four core claims on behalfof structurationtheory:
1. In oppositionto individualists, structurationistsacceptthe reality and
explanatoryimportanceof irreducible and potentially unobservablesocial
structuresthat generateagents.
2. In oppositionto structuralists,structurationistsopposefunctionalism
that
and stress"the needfor a theory of practicalreasonand consciousness
canaccountfor humanintentionalityandmotivation."
3. Theseoppositionsare reconciledby joining agentsand structuresin a
"dialectical synthesis"that overcomesthe subordinationof one to the other,
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HARRY D. GOULD
which is characteristicof both individualismand structuralism.
4. Finally, structurationistsargue that social structuresare inseparable
from spatialandtemporalstructures,and that time and spacemusttherefore
be incorporateddirectly and explicitly into theoreticaland concretesocial
research(Wendt 1987,356).
Although structuration is Giddens'sterm, Wendt relied more heavily on
the work of Roy Bhaskar(1979), undoubtedlybecauseBhaskarwas more
explicitly scientific realist in orientationthan Giddens.This is reflected in
their respectiveconceptionsof social structure. For Giddens, structureis
conceptualizedin termsof rules and resources,while Bhaskartreatedstructure in realist terms, as unobservablebut still causallyefficacious (Wendt
1987,357,note 57).
Following Bhaskar,Wendt definedstructurein generativeterms as a set
of internally related elements(agents,units). Becausethese elementsor
agentsare internally related,they cannotbe defined or conceivedindependently of their position within the structure.This translatesto a view of the
statesystemwhereinstatesare viewed in relational terms. They are constituted by the internal relations of individuation and penetration.Statesare
thus not conceivableas states,apartfrom their position in a global structure
of individuatedand penetratedpolitical authority. States,thus, are not conceivableas suchoutsideof their positionin the internationalsystem(357).
As a set of possibletransformations,social structuresarenot reducibleto
the relations between the structure'selements. Structuresmake a given
combinationof elementspossible,but they are not limited to the combinations that have already manifestedthemselves.Becausesocial structures
generateagentsand their behavior, and becausethey have observableeffects, we can claim that they are real entities despitebeing quite possibly
unobservable(357).
Dessler1989
Two yearsafter Wendt'scelebratedessayappeared,anotheryoung scholar,
David Dessler,published"What's at Stakein the Agent-StructureDebate?"
(1989) in the samejournal. It is not clear what motivatedDessierto substitute the term debatefor problem, which is the term Wendt used. There is
little easily construedas "debate"before the Wendt, and Hollis, and Smith
exchangesbeginningin 1991. DessleraddressedWendt only at one point,
and then only parentheticallyin a footnote, which will be discussedbelow.
The changewas,however,prescient.
For Dessler,the root of the agent-structuredebatelies in the recognition
THE AGENT-STRUCTURE DEBATE
87
of humanagencyas the only force behindactions,events,and outcomesof
the social world; human agencycan be realized, however, only within a
structure.Thus, while the needexiststo acknowledgethe powersof agents,
we mustconcurrentlyrecognizethe causalrelevanceof structuralfactors. In
Dessler'sconception,"all social action presupposessocial structure, and
vice versa. An actor can only act socially becausethere exists a social
structure to draw on, and it is only through the actions of agents that
structureis reproduced"(Dessler1989,452).
For reasonssimilar to Wendt's,Desslerwas critical of Waltz's approach.
Desslercalled the ontology of Waltz's structural realism "positional" becausethe system'sstructureresults from the positioning of ontologically
prior units. The systemis, as discussedabove,the productof the unintended
of interactingunits. Desslercounteredthis with his own transconsequences
formational ontology. To do so, he too relied on scientific realism, which,
on his reading,holds that a theory'sexplanatorypower is derived from the
richncss of its ontology. Central to this transformationalontology are the
following two claims. First, structureboth enablesand constrainsthe possibilities for agent actions, and, second,structureis both medium and outcomeof agentaction. In both claims, he is well in line with structurationist
andconstructivistthought.
For scientific realists,the structural approachto international relations
starts with the recognition that state action is possibleonly if the instruments of action exist to carry it out. Dessleridentified two such instruments: resourcesand rules. Resourcesare material capabilities. Rules he
defined as "the media through which action becomepossibleand which
action itself reproducesand transforms"(1989, 467). Desslerfurther identifies two typesof rules. Regulativerules prescribeand proscribebehaviorin
particular circumstances;constitutiverules createtypes of behavior. In practice, however,the regulativehave constitutiveimplications,and vice versa
(453-56).
It is interestingto note at this point that Desslerand Onuf concurrently
made rules ontologically central to the agent-structurerelation, although
Dnuf did so without embracingscientific realism. Furthermore,"What's at
Stakein the Agent-StructureDebate?"and World of Our Making cameout
nearly simultaneously,althoughthe authorswere unawareof one another's
efforts.
In Dessler'stransformationalontology, rules are the material conditions
of action, which agentsappropriateandthroughwhich action reproducesor
transforms.Structureis a mediumof activity that in principle can be altered
throughactivity. Any given action will reproduceor transformsomepart of
the social structure.Social action is both a productand a by-product.This
88
HARRY D. GOULD
ontology groundsconsiderationof rules not only by making their existenee
explicit, but also by providing a useful model of how they exist in relation
to agentsand structures(458-66).
Dessler specifically addressedWendt's paper only with respect to
Wendt'sinterpretationof scientific realism.
On this crucial conceptualpoint [the realist definition of structureas "the
social fonns that preexistaction"], Wendt misinterpretsthe scientific realist
understandingof structure.... Wendttilts toward a structuraldetenninismin
his analysis of the relation between state and system, conceptualizingthe
stateas an effect of the internaJly related elementscomprisingstructure....
According to scientific realism, agentsand structuresare not "two moments
of the sameprocess"but "radicaJlydifferent kinds of thing." (Dessler1989,
452, note45, quoting Bhaskar1979,42)
Wendt 1991
Wendt's 1991 pieeeis an extendedreview essayofOnufs book, World of
Our Making (1989), and Hollis and Smith's book, Explaining and UnderstandingInternationalRelations(1990). In the courseof this essay,Wendt
reiteratedsome aspectsof the position he took in his 1987 paper.He was
largely approvingof Onuf for his relianceon Giddens,but more critical of
Hollis and Smith.
Wendt'sprimary criticism of Hollis and Smith's work is that they conflate the levels of analysisproblemwith the agent-structureproblem.Wendt
went back to Singer for his formulation of the former: "Levels of analysis
had to do with determining which level of social aggregationoffers the
most promise for building theories" (Wendt 1991,387).What Wendt felt
Hollis and Smith importantly overlook is that, regardlessof the level, the
same unit of analysis is utilized as the dependentvariable: the foreign
policy of states.As formulatedby Hollis and Smith, the phenomenonto be
explainedchangeswith the level. First, it is the behaviorof states,then the
behaviorof the system(387-S8).
This is, for Wendt, an ontological problem with methodological implications. The questionseemsto be whetherthe propertiesor behaviorof
one unit at one level of analysiscan be reducedto thoseof another.Nevertheless,Wendt thought that methodologicalargumentsabout individualism
and holism are really about agencyand structure,not about analytic practices. The efforts of Hollis and Smith to defend structural realism as an
exemplarof holistic theory at the systemiclevel of analysisare surprising
(or so Wendt thought), since they argueat severalpoints that international
society containstoo few constitutive rules and collective forms of life to
THE AGENT-STRUCTURE DEBATE
89
sustaina truly social or constitutiveanalysisof stateaction. While questioning
whether international society is developedenough to support a holistic
worldview, they continueto endorsestructuralrealism'sclaim to do just that.
Hollis andSmith1991
Hollis and Smith usedtheir reply to Wendt'sreview article to critique his
and Dessler'sstructurationistpositions,the scientific realism underpinning
them, and the radical ontological individualism associatedwith Jon Elster,
not articulatedelsewherein this debate.This is done in the context of a
warningaboutfollowing "gurus"-here,Giddens,Bhaskar,andElster.
Hollis and Smith were particularly suspiciousof Wendt's version of
structurationtheory, which they likened to trying to find the correctproportions of agentand structureto blend. "Agents and structuresdo not blend
easily in any proportions,and the solutionstend to be unstable"(Hollis and
Smith 1991,393).They contendedthat structurationcomplicatesthe problem by employing both structural relations betweenunits which are not
necessarilyhuman,and hermeneuticconceptsthe referentsof which must
be human.For them, structurationis more an ambition than an established
body of theoreticalachievements(405--6).
In advocatingclarity aboutthe termsepistemology,ontology,andmethodology, which they found lacking in Wendtand Dessier,Hollis and Smith identifY
three sets of questions: ontological, epistemological,and methodological.
There are three ontological questions:Is there a real-world difference in
what it is to which the systems-termsand the unit-terms refer? How do
systemsrelate to units? Is the sharedreferent primarily that of systemsterms or unit-terms?They also identifY a basic epistemologicalquestion:
How are statementsabout internationalrelationsknown to be true or false?
The methodologicalissue questionswhat forms of explanationor understandingare to be attempted,and how they are to be achieved.Thereis no
disputeamongall partiesto the debatethat all threekinds of questionsare
involved in the debate.The disputeis over which questionor questionsare
primary; as Hollis and Smith saw it, empiricists favor epistemology,and
scientific realistsfavor ontology (1991,394).
Hollis and Smith claimed that Wendt focused on theoretically interdependententitieswithout any self-evidentway to conceptualizethe entities
or their relations, which yields the ontological problem of knowing how
many entitiesthereare and what their relationsare. In responseto Wendt's
claim that Hollis and Smith conflatethe levels of analysisand agent-structure
problems,they askedwhetheranalysisshouldproceedfrom systemto unit,
or vice versa, but pointed out that this is not automatically reducible to
00
HARRY D. GOULD
ontology. Foreshadowingtheir responseto Walter Carlsnaesand their later
exchangewith Vivienne Jabri and StephenChan,Hollis and Smith claimed
that the ontologicaljustification of a theory is connectedto its explanatory
merits, which is an epistemologicalissue.
Wendt1992
In a rejoinder, Wendt maintainedthat Hollis and Smith conflatedtwo (presumably)distinct problems,and he disputedtheir interpretationof Waltz. It
is this secondpoint which defines this exchange.Hollis and Smith imply,
he claimed,that therecan be only one typeof systemictheory, that of Waltz
and microeconomics.All else is reductionism. Wendt refused the choice
betweenreductionismand systemicism.He arguedthat the idea of systemic
theory shouldbe broadenedto include a concernwith the processof identity
and interest formation which should not be treated as exogenous(as per
Waltz). This led him to argueagain for the distinctivenessof the levels of
analysisproblemand the agent-structureproblem(Wendt 1992a, 181). The
structural realist attitude toward causationat the systematiclevel was, in
Wendt's opinion, too behavioralist. Waltz did not claim that the system
shapesstates,but ratherthat statesare exogenouslyself-interested.What is
affectedby the systemis their behavior.
For Wendt, the central issue dividing individualists and holists is
whetherit is the propertiesof actorsor their behaviorthat can be reducedto
structural determinants.Here Waltz seemsto be a holist, but, becausehe
treated the identity and interestsof statesas exogenous,rather than as a
"socially constructedfunction of interaction,"and did not thereforeaddress
how these interestsare produced,he is, in fact, an individualist. It is this
inconsistencyin Waltz which allowed Hollis and Smith to reducethe question of systemiccausationto the questionof whetherthe internationalsystem conditionsthe behaviorof states.They thus reducedthe agent-structure
problemto the levelsof analysisproblem(Wendt 1992a,182-83).
Wendt saw two answersto the questionof how to explain the actionsof
statesif they cannotbe reducedto the anarchicalsystem.The holistic position is particularly interesting to Wendt. In such a view, identities and
interestsare constructedby a processof interactionwithin anarchy(1992b).
If they were lesswed to a behavioralistvocabulary,Waltz, as well as Hollis
and Smith, would see this. The difference, according to Wendt, is that a
world in which thesevariablesare exogenous--orare not variable-isnecessarily one where the patternsof interaction do not change. In Waltz's
language,the ordering principle does not change;anarchy is therefore an
inescapablefeature of international life. If identity and interests are re-
THE AGENT-STRUCTURE DEBATE
91
gardedas capableof change,then the natureof internationallife can similarly change(1992a,183).
RoUisand Smith 1992
Answering Wendt, Hollis and Smith contendedthat a holist needconcede
nothing in recognizingstatesas self-interested.A holist would only needto
add that theseinterestsare shapedby the system,becausea holist considers
the systemthe sourceof what matters.However,sucha top-downexplanation does need some kind of mechanismto explain the means by which
agentscontributeto the process,even if only in ways limited by the system
(Hollis and Smith 1992, 187).
Although Wendt thoughthe was speakingonly aboutthe levels-of-analysis
problem, his argumentpresupposesa stanceon the agent-structureproblem.
This is becauseboth levels of analysis involve questionsabout agency-not
just abouthow to explainbehavior,but also aboutwhat it meansto be an actor.
The latter questionis necessarilycentralto the agent-structureproblem.Therefore, asHollis andSmith reiterated,the two cannotbe separated.
Carlsnaes1992
In "The Agency-StructureProblem in Foreign Policy Analysis" (1992),
Carlsnaesclaimed that the problem can be overcome.He warned against
solutions of the problem which make either agentsor structuresthe sole
ontological primitive, and then attemptto explain the otherby reductionto
it. On this point he, Wendt, Dessler,and Onuf are, at least in principle, in
agreement.Reducingeach one to the other tends to rule out the interplay
identified by structurationand constructivism.Since neither structuresnor
actors remain constantover time, good social theory must be able to account for social changeas a dynamic phenomenon,in respectof which,
neither factor "determines"the other, but both are independentvariables
linked in a "temporalprocess."He felt that Giddens(and anyonefollowing
in his footsteps)had failed to capturethe dynamic interplaybetweenagents
and structures.For Giddens,the two merely presupposeone another.Each
is irrcducibleto the other,but they are still conflated.
To overcomethe problemof conflation,Carlsnaesfound a new "guru" in
MargaretArcher. From Archer, Carlsnaesborrowedthe term morphogenesis. As used by Archer and Carlsnaes,morphogenesiscontrasts with
structuration.Accordingto Archer:
The emergentpropertieswhich characterizesocio-culturalsystemsimply discontinuity between interactionsand their product, the complex system. In
turn this invites analytical dualism when dealing with structureand action.
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HARRY D. GOULD
Action of course is ceaselessand essentialboth to the continuation and
further elaborationof the system,but subsequentinteractionwill be different
from earlier action becauseconditioned by the structural consequencesof
that prior action. Hencethe morphogeneticperspectiveis not only dualistic
but sequential,dealing in endlesscycles--of structural conditioning/social
interaction/structuralelaboration--thusunraveling the dialectical interplay
betweenstructure and action. (Carlsnaes1992,259,quoting Archer 1982,
458; emphasisin original)
The analytic strategyat work involvesuncoveringthe morphogeneticcycles
that can be analytically broken into intervals in order to penetraterelations
betweenstructureand action. This representsfor Carisnaesthe core to the
solution of the epistemologicalpart of the problem (Carisnaes1992, 259).
This solution is predicated,however,on two ontological assumptions.The
first is that "structure logically pre-datesthe action(s) which transformit,"
and the secondis that "structural elaboration logicallypost-datesthose actions." Sucha position is strongly in contrastto the structurationistposition,
which views structure and structurationas processbut not product (Carlsnaes1992,259, quoting Archer 1982,468). The rationalebehindmorphogenesisis that structural factors logically predateand postdateany action
affecting them; and that action logically predatesand postdatesthe structural faetors conditioning it. This encapsulatesthe ontological notion of a
continuouscycle of action-structureinteractions.
Hollis and Smith 1994
Returningto the debate,Hollis and Smith felt that Carlsnaesfailed to overcome the agent-structureproblemmerely by allowing for time as a variable
("adding a dash of diachronics")(Hollis and Smith 1994, 244). For them,
one cannotsettle an ontological problem without worrying aboutthe more
fundamental epistemologicalone. They identified two presumptionsat
work in Carlsnaes'spiece. First, Carlsnaesassumedthat agentsand structurescan be placedon the sameontologicalfooting, as if they were distinct
objects in the social world. He then assumedthat their relation is one of
causal conditioning (Hollis and Smith 1994, 244). In effect, Carlsnaes
claimed to solve the agent-structureproblem by treating agentsand structuresas if they take turnsaffecting the social world.
For Hollis and Smith, morphogenesisis no solution. If Giddensis to be
criticized for conflating agentsand structuresat any given time, how does
addingtime as a variable help? How doesit help to judge rival accountsof
agentsand structuresover time? (247-50).
Furthermore,Carlsnaeswent too far in claiming that ontology is para-
THE AGENT-STRUCTURE DEBATE
93
mount; it does affect what can be acceptedepistemologically,but importantly, the reverseis also true. "[E]pistemology can only be secondaryif
you arc unpuzzledby what is a cause."If one is unclearas to what constitutes a cause, then one's position on epistemologyis similarly unclear
(250-51). Carlsnaescan only have claimed to have resolved the agentstructureproblem becausehe is, in Hollis and Smith'sterminology,a resolute "interpretivist," for whom issuesof causalityare distinctly secondary.
In 1994, Wendt publishedan article that is not directly relevant to the
agent-structuredebate, but, like his immensely influential "Anarchy Is
What StatesMake of It" (Wendt 1992b),is professedlyconstructivist.Both
piecesevince a drift toward structuralism,and an avoidanceof the role of
rules in the co-constitutionof agentsand structures.Wendt (1992b) turned
insteadto symbolic interactionismas an explanationfor the constructionof
collective identity. Still wed to a realist philosophyof science,Wendt has
yet to confront the fact that symbolic interactionismis rootedin an antithetical tradition, pragmatism.5
Jabr; and Chan 1996; Hollis and Smith 1996
This latestphaseof the debateis particularly unhelpful, especiallythe confused piece by Jabri and Chan, which takes the debatein new and unproductiveepistemologicaldirections.
Jabri andChanfelt that any critical post-positivistIR necessarily requires
abandoningcriteria for "universal epistemologicallegitimacy" in favor of
focusing on ontological claims. Jabri and Chan claimedto follow Giddens
in granting the primacy of ontology. They also claimed that "an assumed
universalistepistemologynegatesdifference"(1996, 107; emphasisin original). In their view, Giddens's"duality of structure"expressesnot causality,
but relationsof mutual constitution.Structurationis an attemptto showhow
agentsand structuresare mutually constitutive. In this conception(as we
have seenso many times before),action is meaningfulonly in terms of its
relations to structure,just as structure is definitionally dependentupon
agentsandtheir actions.
With regard to Hollis and Smith's claim that epistemologymust be regardedas beingof equalimportanceto ontology,Jabri and Chanconcluded
that, for Hollis and Smith, thereis only one correctepistemology.They also
concludedthat such a position does violence to difference (109-10). In
response,Hollis and Smith accusedJabri and Chan of misconstruingthe
relationship betweenepistemologyand ontology in their "discussion of
what is a cause"(1996, Ill). They never said that epistemologywas as
important as ontology, merely that, contra Giddens, Wendt, Dessler,and
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HARRY D. GOULD
Carlsnaes,it does matter. Any ontology that assertsitself without establishing what it holds as standardsof epistemologicalwarrant is, for them,
meredogma(Ill).
For Hollis and Smith, epistemologymatters becauseontological disputes can almost never be solved by "direct appealto how the world is."
Each side in a dispute must give reasonsfor believing what it does. To
make senseof the world, they claim, we needan ontology, an epistemology, and a methodology.This has, however,nothing to do with questions
of whetheragentsand structuresare causallylinked (112).
Appearing too late for the complete assessmentit deservesin these
pagesis RoxanneDoty's highly critical review of the agent-structuredebate from a post-structuralperspective(1997). For Doty, the generalproblem is that scientific realism, "which either explicitly or implicitly
underpinsthe various 'solutions' to the agent-structureproblem, remains
wedded to an essentialistnotion of structure" (366). Attempts to make
rules "the basic constitutiveelementsof structures"illustrate the problem
becauseconnectingrules to structuredisconnectsthem from "the intersubjective understandingsof agentsin their immediate and local practices"
(371).
Doty's critique makesno mention ofOnufs constructivistemphasison
rules as having an independentontological basis.If indeedscientific realism is the problem, Onufs version of constructivismoffers a solution that
Doty should find appealing,becauseit affirms (as she does) the importance of practice.It also insists that practicealways takes place in a ruled
context (a reality that her emphasison the "play" of practice neglects).
While Doty's conceptionof practicewould seemto deny agentsan ontological statusin their own right, at least she has broughtagencyback into
the debate.
If individualists and post-structuralistswere capableof talking to each
other, at leastthey would agreethat scientific realism'spreoccupationwith
structural properties is the problem with the agent-structuredebate. Instead, participants in the debate toss around philosophical terms that
bounce off their targets like defective grenades.Hollis and Smith seem
generally to have meant "methodology"when they talked about "epistemology," and the "interpretivism" they seeaboutthem is merelya methodological responseto the difficulties in observing complex relations of
causality.If Jabri and Chan are right about the epistemologicalconsensus
underlying the debate(they are, as Doty more successfullydemonstrates),
then the ontological issuesthey pursueare besidethe point. From a poststructuralpoint of view, thereis literally nothing to debate.
THE AGENT-STRUCTURE DEBATE
95
Levels of Analysis
The relationship of the levels-of-analysisdebateto the agent-structuredebatehas beena running themein this chapter.While neverdirectly entering
the agent-structurefray, Onufs 1995 article, "Levels," may be considered
an oblique entry. As we have seen, when behavioralistsand systemicists
took sideson levels of analysis,they placedthe issue squarelywithin IR's
seconddebatt}-theontological debatebetweenpositivists and historicists.
The positivist focus on units as positivities brings the discussionof levels
back to its ontological core, an effort well servedby analyzingthe relation
betweenlevels and social constructionsas an ontologicalissue.
It is essentialto note at the outsetthat all positivities are always simultaneously parts and wholes. A level is the imputed demarcationat which a
whole ceasesto be relevantas such, and becomesa part. By necessity,the
conversemust be true. Before exploring the meansby which this comes
about, let us look more closely at the assertionthat parts are wholes, and
vice versa.
Any given positivity, any thing, a whole, is composedof parts, each of
which is further composedof smallerparts. In this respect,we seethat these
(initial) parts are also wholes. This regressioncan hypothetically continue
ad infinitum. Returning to the original positivity, which we had initially
treatedas a whole, we see that it too is a part of a larger whole, which is
part of a yet larger whole, again conceivablyad infinitum. Any object can
thus be seenas part or whole, as well as being seenas part and whole.
Even the individual as a social being is reducible,althoughthe relations
of partsare no longersocial nor the being herself.Every whole is composed
of many parts, which are the units of analysisof one discipline, while the
aggregationis the unit of interest to the first. Further, there will be yet
anotherdiscipline for which the initial aggregation/wholeis the unit/part.
This is the great insight of Comteanpositivism: wholes are systematically
stratified into levels, and discretefields of study occupythe spacesbetween
levels.
As has been said of structures,levels are methodologicalcontrivances,
templatesimposedby the observerto order the world for instrumentalpurposes.As such,they haveno phenomenalexistenceuntil they are contrived.
Onuf identified two meansby which levels are constructed,identified respectivelywith Comteanpositivism and Kantian historicism, and linked to
the Aristotelian conceptionof parts and wholes. "[W]holes have like attributes defining them as parts; parts have continuousand limited relations
defining them as a whole" (1995,50).
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HARRY D. GOULD
The positivist method (which is linked to the first part of Aristotle's
conception)revolvesaroundthe stipulationof a criterion for membershipin
one level that clearly setsit apart from that of adjacentlevels. The focus is
on attributes. "All positivities possessingthat attribute are deemedalike;
they and only they qualify as parts in the whole; the whole and the space
thus createdare effectively the same"(50).
Onufs secondmethod focuses on relations rather than attributes. ImmanuelKant distinguishedrelationsof causalityand relationsof community;
in this Kantian schema,relationsof causalityare unidirectional,while those
of community are reciprocal.For Kant, causalrelations take place between
wholes,while relationsof communitytake placebetweenparts(51).
However,as explainedabove,all wholesare also partsof greaterwholes.
This causesan apparentparadox, since as both parts and wholes, they
should engage in relations both causal and communal, which is
(stipulatively) nonallowable. The operational question is to determine
wherecommunalrelationsend andcausalrelationsbegin. In the instanceof
social relations, a constructivistseestheseboundariesas createdby rules.
"Rules work to make some relations more consistentlycausal in pattern
than would otherwisebe the case"(52).
At the level of the social, rules empowerindividuals to act-to become
agents. Such rules are responsiblefor demarcatinglevels in the social
realm. "Each level containssetsof rules and arrangementsthat include as
parts all of thosesetsof rules and arrangementsin the level beneath"(52).
Whether one choosesthe Comteanpositivist formulation or the Kantian
historicist formulation, it is importantto note that both are appropriateways
to study social construction.
With regard to the distinctnessof the levels of analysis and the agentstructureproblems,it should by now be clear that for a constructivist, in
agreementwith Hollis and Smith's assertions,the questionof the primacy
of agentsand structuresis repeatedat eachunit The agentis the part. The
structure is the whole. At the next level of analysis, the original structure/wholeis now the agent/part,while at the next level down, the original
agent/partis now the relevantstructure/whole.Bearing this in mind, however, the determinationof the degreeof structuralconstraintimposedupon
the agentis still left to be determined,or, in line with constructivistthought,
the co-constitutionof agentsand structuresis still thereto be observed.
Conclusion
From a constructivistpoint of view, agentsand structuresmake eachother
real. They do so throughrulesthat are real becauseagentsmakethoserules,
THE AGENT-STRUCTURE DEBATE
97
know what they are, and generallychooseto follow them. The agent-structure
debate arose becausestructure is not observableas such, and especially
becausethe idea that the unintendedconsequencesof agents' conscious
choicescanhave an efficaciousstructureseemsdoubly removedfrom reality. In this context,Onufs increasingaversionto the term stroctureand his
effort to show that agents,as statusholders, officers, and role occupants,
always act in institutional settings,may be construedas an effort to keep
thingsreal.
Are rules real enough?Can social sciencedo without the concept of
structure?What are we to make of the "institutional turn" now so much in
evidencein several disciplines?These are questionsthat might bring the
agent-structuredebatebackto earth.
Notes
I thank Nick Onuf for patiently reading multiple drafts, and Archie Arghyrou, John
Clark, Lourdes Cue, Heidi Hobbs, Vendulka Kubalkova, Dario Moreno, Ellie
Schemenauer,
and John Woolridgefor supportand criticism.
I. "Giddens indicates that he also acceptsa realist conceptionof science,but his
realism is generally less explicit and thus more attenuatedthan Bhaskar's. A more
important reasonfor relying on Bhaskarrather than Giddens, however, is the latter's
weakerconceptionof social structureas rules and resourcesrather than as a set of real
but unobservableinternal relations"(Wendt 1987,357,note 57).
2. I am grateful to Paul Kowert for this astuteobservation.
3. On this matter,Hollis (1995,chaps.2-3) is particularly useful.
4. On the matter of unintendedconsequences,
cf Waltz (1979, chaps. 3, 5) with
Hollis (1987,47-58).
5. For discussionof the tensions between scientific realism and pragmatism,see
Bhaskar(1991). Thesetensionsare further discussedin Hollis (1994).
Bibliography
Archer, Margaret. 1982. "StructurationversusMorphogenesis:On CombiningStructure
and Action." British Journal ofSociology33 (December):455-83.
Bhaskar,Roy. 1979. The Possibilityc:f Naturalism. Brighton: Harvester.
- - - . 1991. Philosophyand the Idea ofFreedom.Oxford: Basil Blackwell.
Carisnaes,Walter. 1992. "The Agency-StructureProblem in Foreign Policy Analysis."
InternationalStudiesQuarterly 36 (September):245-70.
Dessler,David. 1989. "What's at Stake in the Agent-StructureDebate?"International
Organization43 (Summer):441-73.
Doty, Roxanne Lynn. 1997. "Aporia: A Critical Exploration of the Agent-Structure
Problematiquein InternationalRelationsTheory." EuropeanJournal c:lInternational
Relations3 (September):365-92.
Giddens,Anthony. 1979. The Central Problemsin Social Theory: Action, Structureand
Contradiction in SocialAnalysis.'BerkeleyandLos Angeles:University of California
Press.
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- - - . 1984. The Constitution of Society: Outline of the Theory of Structuration.
Berkeleyand Los Angeles:University of California Press.
Hollis, Martin. 1987. The CunningofReason.Cambridge:CambridgeUniversity Press.
- - - . 1994. The Philosophyof Social Science:An Introduction. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- - - . 1995. Reasonin Action: Essaysin the Philosophy of Social Science.Cambridge: CambridgeUniversity Press.
- - - , and SteveSmith. 1990. Explainingand UnderstandingInternationalRelations.
Oxford: ClarendonPress.
- - - and - - - . 1991. "Beware of Gurus: Structure and Action in International
Relations."ReviewofInternationalStudies17 (October):393-410.
- - - and- - - . 1992. "Structureand Action: FurtherComment."Reviewof International Studies18 (April): 187-88.
- - - and - - - . 1994. "Two Stories About Structure and Agency." Review of
InternationalStudies20 (July): 241-51.
- - - and - - - . 1996. "A Response:Why EpistemologyMatters in International
Theory." ReviewofInternationalStudies22 (January):111-16.
labri, Vivienne, and StephenChan. 1996. "The Ontologist Always Rings Twice: Two
More StoriesAbout Structureand Agency in Reply to Hollis and Smith." Reviewof
InternationalStudies22 (January):107-10.
Onuf, Nicholas Greenwood. 1989. World of Our Making: Rules and Rule in Social
Theoryand InternationalRelations.Columbia: University of SouthCarolinaPress.
- - - . 1994. "The Constitution of InternationalSociety." EuropeanJournal of International Law 5: 1-19.
- - - . 1995. "Levels." EuropeanJournal of International Relations I (March): 3558.
- - - . 1996. "Rules, Agents, Institutions: A ConstructivistAccount." Working Papers
on International Societyand Institutions 96-92. Global Peaceand Conflict Studies
at University of California, Irvine.
- - - . 1997. "A Constructivist Manifesto." In Constituting International Political
Economy, ed. Kurt Burch and Robert A. Denemark, 7-17. Boulder, CO: Lynne
Rienner.
Singer,1. David. 1961. "The Level-of-Analysis Problem in International Relations."
World Politics 14 (October):77-92.
Wa!ver, Ole. 1997. "Figures of International Thought: Introducing PersonsInsteadof
Paradigms."In The Future of International Relations: Masters in the Making, ed.
Iver B. Neumannand Ole Wa!ver, 1-37. London: Routledge.
---.1979. TheoryofInternational Politics. Reading,MA: Addison-Wesley.
Waltz, KennethN. 1979. TheoryofInternational Politics. Reading,MA: Addison-Wesley.
Wendt, Alexander. 1987. "The Agent-StructureProblemin InternationalRelationsTheory." InternationalOrganization41 (Summer):335-70.
- - - . 1991. "Bridging the Theory/Meta-TheoryGap in InternationalRelations."Review ofInternationalStudies17 (October):383-92.
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Politics." InternationalOrganization46 (Spring): 391--425.
- - - . 1994. "Collective Identity Formation and the International State." American
Political ScienceReview88 (June):384-96.
________
PartIII
International Relations
Under Construction
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5
Agent versus Structure in the
Construction of National Identity
Paul Kowert
But how will eachsingle individual succeedin incorporating
himselfinto the collectiveman, and how will educativepressure
be appliedto single individuals so as to obtain their consent
and their collaboration, turning necessity
and coercion into
'Jreedom"?
Antonio Gramsci(1971,242)
How can nation-statesmade up of citizens whose interestsmight diverge
sharplychooseforeign (or any other) policiesto servethepublic good?This
problem of collective action, and the related problem of how statesthemselvescan cooperate,dominatesinternationalrelations.It animates debates
over whetherwar can serve a general interest or only particular interests
(munitions producers,for example),or whetherlower barriersto trade are
good for the whole country or only for some groups within it (perhaps
favoring importersover domesticproducersand laborers).
The collective action problemalso lies at the heartof disagreements
over
whetheror not internationalrelationscan be a positive sum game (Grieco
1988). As AlexanderWendt argues,many of the contortionsto which both
neorealistand neoliberal theoriesare forced to subjectthemselvesas they
addressthis problemare madenecessaryby their failure to offer an account
of national (or other actor) identity and interests. Instead, "they either
bracketthe formation of interests,treating them as if they were exogenous,
or explain interestsby referenceto domesticpolitics, on the assumptionthat
101
102
PAUL KOWERT
they areexogenous"(Wendt 1994,384).Becausetheseapproachesincorporate no theory of national identity or collective interest formation, they
cannot explain collective behavior by referring to collective goals. They
must focus, instead,on the mechanismsthat allow rationally egoisticagents
to integrate their goals. To explain intemational cooperation,neorealists
might look to hegemonyor coercionfor incentivesthat restrain the ambitions of particularnations. Neoliberalslook insteadeither to the "shadow"
of future interactionor to the coordinatingrole of institutionssuchas international regimesthat reducetransactioncosts.Neither approachenvisions
collective ambitions grounded in a common political identity (although
neoliberalism'spositive-sumview of internationalrelationsat least admits
to the possibility).
In opposition to the individualism and rationalism of such approaches
(which eitherdenycollective identitiesor treattheir formation as exogenous
and usually imposed), Wendt offers the rival claim that state identity is
endogenousto structuredinteractionamongstates.Drawing on integration
theory and some versions of interpretivist scholarship(see Chapter 1),
Wendt proposesthat the structural context of state interaction, systemic
factors such as interdependence
and the transnationalconvergenceof domestic values,and even the manipulationof symbolsin the strategicpractice of rational agentsall contributeto the formation of collective identities.
To put this more plainly, Wendt points out that: (1) states often share
interpretationsof their environment (e.g., as "Cold War," "detente," or
"new world order"); (2) statesdependon each other, at least in part, for
someof theseinterpretations(e.g., a commonfate might encouragea common identity); and (3) the strategicinteractionof statesfurther contributes
to sharedunderstandings(1994, 389-91). Each of these relationshipsbetweenstatesnot only shapesbehaviorbut also shapesthe self·understanding
of
the agentsinvolved. Thus, Wendt concludes,neorealistsand neoliberalsare
not constrained--asthey have themselvesgenerallyassumed--totreat collective identity and interestsas exogenous.Many of the processeson which
they alreadyfocus shapeidentity.
Yet one neednot makethe dualistic assumptionthat identity must either
be given intrinsically (and determinedexogenously)as an actor propertyor
else be determinedby the social structuresof the environmentthat actors
inhabit. The first approachis broadly rationalist (assumingintrinsic preferencesand constantidentities) and ontoiogically naturalist(ignoring collec·
tive interpretation).The secondapproachis dynamic (becauseit permits
identity to change)and ontologically interpretivist (insisting that material
and social reality are always the product of collective interpretation).But
what these two approachesshare is structuralism (for discussionsof
THE CONSTRUCTION OF NATIONAL IDENTITY
103
structuralismin internationalrelations,seeAshley 1984; Dessler1989; and
Wendt 1987). The first approachassumesthat the structuresof international
politics constrainstatebehavior; the seeondarguesthat internationalstructuresaffect both behaviorand identity.
Neorealistand neoliberal theoriesordinarily focus on the material determinantsof structuresuch as the distribution of physical,technological,geographical, or other material determinantsof power. Even when discussing
suchintangiblesas political ideologyand identity, neorealistsand neoliberals
take care to trace ideas to an underlying physical reality (see,for example,
Goldsteinand Keohane1993). The intersubjectivestructuresto which Wendt
refers,on the otherhand,aremore broadly defined.They leave"room for the
emergenteffects of material capabilities" but consist themselves"of the
sharedunderstandings,expectations,and social knowledgeembeddedin international institutions and threat complexes"(Wendt 1994, 389). In both
cases,however,identity is shaped(to the extentit is malleable)by structural
constraintsand incentives.Such argumentsde-emphasizethe ways the behavior of agents within structuresshapesidentity (although Wendt's description of strategicinteractionamong statesis a partial exception; 1994,
390-91).While Wendt'scritique of materialrationalismis a valuableontological corrective, it pays less attention than it might to the active role
peopleand nationsplay in the fabricationof their own political identities.
This chapter will offer no defenseof the proposition that theories of
political identity are a useful things to have (see Katzenstein1996; Lapid
andKratochwil 1996; andLegro 1996). That much, it assumes,is evidentin
light of the way competition to define identity currently plays (and has
always played) a prominent role in both domestic and international conflicts. The next section will examine the contribution constructivismand
psychologicaltheoriesof social identification can togethermake to an account of nationalidentity. It arguesthat, in concert,they yield an accountof
national identity that explainschanginginterestsand foreign policy behavior and that more fully appreciatesthe role national leadersplay in forging
national identities. The remainderof this chapterillustrates this synthetic
approachto nationalidentity by examiningthe evolution of British attitudes
toward Egypt prior to and during the Suezcrisis.
From Agency to Identity
Constructivism(seeChapter3 and Onuf 1989) holds that social structure,
by itself, cannot serve as the basis for a complete account of identity.
Agents and their behaviormust also be considered.Speakingis doing, and
constructivistsmaintain that social meanings,institutions, and structures
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PAUL KOWERT
(aU, in a sense,the samething) are constructedout of practical linguistic
rules. The instruction-, directive-, and commitment-rulesthat are the foundation of Onufs approach,for example,are all instancesof behavior as
well as social acts (see Searle 1969). They occur at the nexus of biology,
psychology,and sociology. But constructiviststake biological, psychological, or social performanceone step further. They argue that people strive
not only to make senseout of their world and to act within it, but also to
communicatetheir understandingsto others.At the sametime, the process
of communicationis a processof making sense.This extendsthe syllogism
offered above:speakingis doing is knowing. As communicationis a social
act, so is knowledge.This is preciselythe bridge that constructivismoffers
betweenontology (the socially constructedworld) and epistemology(our
ability to know somethingaboutit).
Although the "semanticdimensionsof the language"permit somesocial
constructions,they render other constructionsunintelligible (see Giddens
1984; Kratochwil 1989). JohanGaltung (1990) describesU.S. foreign policy as a theologicalsystemin which certainconstructionsmake sense(such
as orderversusdisorderor hierarchyversusanarchy)and other alternatives
do not (see also Campbell 1992). While American presidentsmight occasionally denounceother statesas "evil empires,"for example,they engage
in no sustaineddiscussionof the morality of foreign policy. The language
of realism offers little purchaseto those, such as PresidentJimmy Carter,
who might wish to do so. For Galtung, languageis pivotal. Once discussions of international politics are framed in certain terms, interestsand
identitiesbecomeobvious: "With anarchysufficiently decriedthis option is
rejected;what is left is hierarchy. In hierarchythe strongesthave to be on
top.... The rest becomesalmosta tautology" (Galtung1990, 138). In such
a discussion,one's own identity--presumably--shouldbe "on top" (e.g.,
that of the "hegemon"). Kratochwil's (1996) analysisof "belonging" and
"citizenship"exploresanothersetoflinguistic polaritieswith similar consequencesfor identification. Here, too, languageis structuredto promote
identity. Who would not wish to "belong"?
Feministinternationalrelationstheoristshavealso devotedspecialattention to the role of languagein identity formation, arguing that traditional
and androcentricmetaphorsof internationalpolitics not only ignore but in
fact preventconsiderationof alternativepolitics and identities(Enloe 1989;
Peterson1992; Sylvester1994; Tickner 1992). Accordingto Tickner (1992,
36), the languagein which most (traditional) discussionsof international
politics are conducted "comes out of a Western-centeredhistorical
worldview that ... privileges a view of security that is constructedout of
valuesassociatedwith hegemonicmasculinity." Sheargues,moreover,that
THE CONSTRUCTION OF NATIONAL IDENTITY
105
the masculine discourseof internationalpolitics directly informs national
identities and "has all but eliminated the experiencesof women from our
collectivenationalmemories"(138).
The intensificationof concernwith languagehas led someto proclaim a
"linguistic tum" in internationalrelations.1 Although some scholarsview
the linguistic tum as emancipatory(George and Campbell 1990; Lapid
1989; Neufeld 1995; Sylvester1994), in that it permits alternativeconceptions of international politics, they must also reckon with the problems
posedby this very malleability. Languageis not just a social mechanism
that createsand reinforcesmeaningand identity; it can be manipulatedby
speakers(especiallythosewith power). Soviet officials who spokeof "new
thinking," to take one example,not only challengeda conceptionof history
that hadnot admittedthe possibility of perestroikabut also servedtheir own
political interests. These liberal reformers especially benefited from the
vaguenessof the category they created.Becausemany people with very
different political agendascould all seethemselvesas "new thinkers," perestroika was a useful idea around which to mobilize (see Herman 1996).
Thus languageis not simply the repository of what exists. It is also the
meansthroughwhich things are broughtinto and out of existence.Political
leadersare able to manipulatethis process,but they are also constrainedby
it. 2 Scholars,who havetheir own ambitions,also participatein this process,
certainlycomplicatingtheir own effortsto studyit. The incentivesof academia encouragea bias toward novel constructions.Perhapsit is no accident
that Soviet reformers were also influenced by academicexchanges that
broughtSovietandAmericanphysicists,socialscientists,andotherscholars
together(Herman1996; Mendelson1993; Zisk 1993).
Recognizingthe way people and nations manipulatelanguageto "construct" themselveschallengescommonassumptionsaboutthe fixity of the
main charactersin the dramaof internationalrelations.But the purposeof
this chapteris to show what constructivismcontributesto researchon national identity, not to play with language.It is easyto show how linguistic
rules and proceduresare implicated in the formation of social identities.
This is unsurprising.All languageconsistsof distinctions.Instruction-rules
distinguish one thing from another. Directive-rulesand and commitrnentrules distinguishone stateof affairs (desired)from another(actual) and, in
so doing, also specifY who (the listener Of the speaker,respectively) is
expectedto reconcile the two states.At a very basic level, languageand
identity thus dependon eachother. Identity exists throughthe "distinguishing" function of language.But language--directivesand commissivesin
particular-alsodependson the identitiesof selfand other. As Dnuf (1989,
109) puts it, "constituting practices in categories(even perceptiontakes
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PAUL KOWERT
practice)is not just universal,it is fundamental."And yet, "if categorization
is fundamental,no set of categoriesis" (109). This is as far as constructivism can proceed toward a theory of identity. It does not prescribe any
particular set of categoriesor identities. It simply acknowledgesthat languagefunctions, in part, to constrain uncategorized
experienceand transform it into categorizedmeaning.For languageto function, there must be
categories.But it is up to agentsto determinewhich categories.
Cognitive psychology picks up where constructivismleaves off in its
discussion of identity: with the claim that the ordinary functioning of
humancognition cleavesthe social world into "self' and "other" categories
of agency.3 Psychologistshave shown that, even when no obviousgrounds
for categorizingexist, peoplewill invent them. MuzaferSherif(1961, 1966)
arguedthat two groups given competing(interdependent)goals will form
negativeattitudesabout eachother--evenin the total absenceof infonnation about the personalqualities of out-group members--aswell as more
positive and cohesiveattitudes about themselves(the in-group). Placing
people in situationsof objective conflict, he reasoned,would promotedistinct identities, while providing superordinategoals for the groups would
erode these identities and reduce out-group bias.4 Later researchshowed
that the presenceof objective conflict or competitionwas not necessaryto
producedistinct identities, leading to a "minimal group paradigm."Henri
Tajfel (1978, 1981) found that wheneversocial divisions are salient,people
will invent correspondinglydivergent identities. In other words, one need
do little more than divide peopleinto groupsfor distinct identities to begin
to emerge.And when groupsare in competition,their identities and biases
will becomeevenmore distinct (CartwrightandZander1968).
The minimal group paradigm(MGP) suggeststhat distinct group identities will quickly and inevitably emergein social interactions.A variety of
explanationsfor this phenomenonare consistentwith the MGP. One interpretation, appealingin its simplicity, is that social identity emergesfrom
individual cognitive "miserliness."According to John Turner, "[t]he first
question determining group-belongingnessis not 'Do I like these other
individuals?', but 'Who am I?' " (1982, 16). Individuals are continually
confrontedwith the problemof locating themselves,and others,in a web of
social categoriesthat periodically confront them as salient. They have limited cognitive resourcesto devoteto this task and, as a result, must make
use of certain simplifying and memory-enhancingstrategies(see also
Turner 1991). In constructivisttenns, "rules" presentagentswith simpler
ways to interpretthe world and to makechoices.
Psychologicalexperimentsindicate that the earlier and the more frequently individuals are exposedto information about the attributesof oth-
THE CONSTRUCTION OF NATIONAL IDENTITY
107
ers, the more extremewill be their ratings of the otherson theseattributes
(Oakesand Turner 1986; Tajfel 1981,62-89,110-14).Put succinctly,people
tend to exaggeratetheir perceptionsof others in order to make memory and
categorizationeasier.And they particularly exaggerateattributesthat, perhaps
becauseof priority (early exposure)or frequency, are more salient. One implication of this finding is that distinctionsbetweenmembersof different social
groupsare often exaggerated.This tendencyto perceiveintergroupdistinctions
is matchedby a correspondingtendencyto perceiveintragrouphomogeneity.
Members of one group are consistentlyperceivedas more similar to one
anotherthan to membersof othergroups(McGarty and Penny 1988; Tajfel
1969). Again, the cognitive advantagesof such a simplifying assumption
are apparent.Gordon Allport (1954) made a similar point in his classic
work on prejudice, arguing that the classification of others into distinct
social groups(with group-relatedidentities)facilitatesprocessesof identification and adjustmentin new social situations.Fine distinctionsrequirethat
one remembermore information, and this in tum increasesthe difficulty of
. recallingthe information.
Consistentwith the cognitive biasesdescribedso far-towardintergroup
differentiationand intragrouphomogeneity-isanotherbias in causalattribution. Becauseout-groupsare perceivcdas homogeneous,their behavior
canmore easily be explainedas the result of positive intent (seeDeschamps
1977; Hewstoneand Jaspars1982). This attributional bias is, in effect, a
social identity versionof what cognitive psychologistshavecalled the "fundamental attributionerror"-the attribution of other people'sbehavior to
their intent or dispositional qualities rather than to some situational constraint.s In this ease,the behaviorof other groupsis more readily explained
by attributes of group members(presumablyshared homogeneouslyby
members)than by external constraintson their behavior. A particularly
interestingvariation of this argumentis Jean-ClaudeDeschamps'ssuggestion that when out-groupsare perceivedas powerful, then the attributional
error will be enhanced(1982). Powerful groups, even if they face situational constraints,could presumablyuse their power to overcomethese
constraints.This bias leadsto the tautologicalperceptionthat all behaviorof
powerful out-groupsis intentional ("since they are powerful, they can do
whateverthey want").
Much of the literatureon self-categorizationsuggeststhat in-groupswill
also be seenas homogeneous(althoughthis effect is not as robust as with
out-groups; see Mullen and Hu 1989; Park and Judd 1990). For several
reasons,however, this homogeneitydoes not necessarilyimpede a sclfserving (in-group-serving)bias. First, even though one's own group may
seemhomogeneousrelative to others--therebyestablishingits identity-
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PAUL KOWERT
some differences between group members will neverthelessbe apparent
(Judd, Ryan, and Park 1991; Park, Ryan, and Judd 1992). The behaviorof
one's own group can thus readily be explainednot only as the product of
situationalconstraintsbut also as the result of negotiationswithin the group
(Bendor and Hammond 1992; Welch 1992). Moreover, infonnation about
situational constraintson the behavior of one's own group may be much
more readily available than similar infonnation for out·groups(Hewstone
and Jaspars1982). Thus,while a cognitive intragrouphomogeneitybias may
exist for all social categories,the processof behavioralattribution might be
very different (andmore forgiving) for in·groupsthanfor out·groups.
It is one thing for psychologiststo explain how cognitive bias affectsthe
way we view ourselvesand others.It is a much bolder step to suggestthat
the sameprocessworks at the level of nation·states.Mercer (1995) takes
just this step, arguing that even if constructivistsare correct in assuming
that the world can be constructedin different ways, the MOP nevertheless
predicts that internationalrelations will be constructedin the highly competitive and egocentricmold of neorealism.There are two problemswith
this daring analytic leap: first, the MGP is not so detenninisticthat it pre·
diets only one fonn of national identity (egoistic) or internationalrelations
(anarchical);and second,the linkage betweenindividual biasesand images
(or identities)ascribedto nation·statesdeservescloserattention.
Just as people are not highly suspiciousof every other personthey encounter, So states are not equally threatenedby (or suspiciousof) every
other statethey "encounter."Democraciesmay find, for example,that they
belong to a common in-group (Chafetz 1995; Doyle 1986). Some states
seemmore trustworthythan others,and it is preciselysuchdifferencesthat
a theory of national identity must explain. To apply the insights of social
identity theory and the MGP to international relations, then, narrower
hypothesesmustbe considered.
Many different hypothesesabout the creation,maintenance,and impact
of social identity might be derived from the complex body of researchon
the MGP, self-categorization,prejudice, stereotyping,cognitive balancing,
and social attribution. For presentpurposes,however, three fairly simple
lessonswill suffice:
1. Wheneverdistinctive categoriesfor political groupsare salient,group
members will perceive strengthenedgroup identities (ordinarily
evaluatively positive for in-groups and negativefor out-groups).Conflict
betweengroupswill strengthentheseidentitiesand encourageexaggeration
of groupattributes.
2. People will also tend to exaggeratedifferences between political
THE CONSTRUCTION OF NATIONAL IDENTITY
109
groups and to underestimatedifferenceswithin thesegroups. Again, conflict will strengthenthis tendency.
3. Finally, people will tend to attribute the behavior of political outgroupsto the intent or desiresof thosegroups;in-group behavior,however,
will more often be attributedto the influence of environmentalconstraints.
Perceivedincreasesin the powerof out-groupswill strengthenthe tendency
to assumeintent (attributionalbias).
Theselessonsseemplausiblegiven the extensivebody of researchsupporting the MGP. At the level of individuals, they are well tested. But the
problemof the leap to internationalrelationsremains.
Constructivismmakes this leap possible by insisting that people construct larger social realities--inciudingnational identity. To make this leap
reasonable,however,we must once again tum to the relationshipbetween
languageand psychology.The MGP predicts a linguistic bias in the relationship betweeninstruction-rulesand directives or commissives.In short,
people should not be equally willing to commit themselvesto action on
behalf of all groups. Once instruction-rulescategorizethe social world,
demandswill be madeof out-groups,while commitmentwill occur primarily on behalfof in-groups. Constructivismthus provides an important link
acrosslevels of analysis. Cognitive bias not only shapesthe identities of
otherpeople(as they are meaningfulto oneself);it biasesthe functioning of
languageto create (biased) identities at every level of human relations.
Languagetranslatesindividual bias eveninto internationalrelations.Agents
at all levels are mademeaningful,then, becauseindividuals confer identity
on themselvesand on the institutions that representthem (such as the nation-state).Seriousstudentsof diplomatic history might decry the tendency
of novicesto reify statesand to treatthem as pseudo-individualswith coherent objectives. But doing so is not merely an error to be correctedin the
graduatetraining of historians.It is, in fact, a widespreadand unavoidable
tendency-withsomenegativeconsequences--on
which ordinary usageof
the term national identity depends.Constructivismand psychologytogether
predictthat nationalidentity is rarely (if ever) neutralwith respectto self.
An Illustration: National Identity in the SuezCrisis
The 1956 crisis provoked by Egyptian presidentNasser'sdecision to nationalize the Suez Canal brought questionsof identity to the fore in dramatic fashion. At the time, both Egypt and Israel confronted wrenching
dilemmasas they attemptedto carve out new sovereign,national identities
for themselves.Similarly, the United States and the Soviet Union both
110
PAUL KOWERT
faced the problem of accommodatingthemselvesto their new roles as superpowersin a competitivebipolar world. Franceand Britain, meanwhile,
were playing out the last act of their rapidly erodingcolonial identities.The
remainder of this chapter will focus exclusively on the evolution of
Britain's perceptionsof identity (both its own and Egypt's), first taking up
the origins of theseperceptionsand then briefly consideringtheir impact on
British policy.
It may be helpful, at the outset, to restatethe above hypothesesin the
context of this case.First, as political categoriesbecomemore salient,participants in the crisis will exaggerateboth their opponent'sand their own
identities. We might thereforeexpectthe British prime minister, Anthony
Eden,to regardthe Egyptianprime minister (later, president),GamalAbdel
Nasser,as more and more "typically Egyptian" as the crisis wears on, and
himselfas more "typically British." Second,we might expectEdento exaggeratethe distinctionsbetweenthesetwo identities,assigningnegativeattributes to the outgroup. Nasser will be seen, therefore, not only as
increasingly Egyptian, but as increasingly different from--and somehow
inferior or opposedto--theBritish. 'Finally, as the exaggeratedin-group and
out-groupidentities develop,they will encouragein tum a seriesof attribution errors. We might expectEden to view Nasser's(or Egyptian) behavior
as purely intentional while readily perceiving the constraintson British
optionsandbehavior,
Long before the crisis, both Eden and his predecessor, WinstonChurchill, were well aware of Egyptian discontentwith the British presencein
Egypt. For this very reason,and becausethe lone British base along the
SuezCanal was of comparativelylittle strategicvalue in any case,English
policy favored a gradual withdrawal from the region. Earlier, thesetroops
had servedthe important function (from London'sperspective)of securing
easyBritish accessto India via the SuezCanaland then, in the early twentieth century,to Middle East oil depositsas well. Yet, althoughthe accessto
oil reservesremainedimportant, its value was increasinglyovershadowed
by the negative consequencesof Egyptian hostility toward the foreign
troops.By the early 1950s,Churchill confidedto an associatethat "not even
a single soldier is in favor of staying there" (Neff 1981, 56). As Britain
preparedto withdraw from the Middle Eastat the conclusionof World War
II, therefore,it hopedto fill the resultantpolitical and military vacuum by
promotingan alternativesecurityarrangement:the BaghdadPact.
The BaghdadPactwas actually one part of a two-partBritish strategyfor
the Middle East. The Pact itself sought to organize"northern tier" Arab
states(Turkey, Iraq, Iran, and Pakistan)into a defensiveallianceagainstthe
Soviet Union. To this end, Britain joined an existing alliance betweenTur-
THE CONSTRUCTION OF NATIONAL IDENTITY
111
key and Iraq, hoping that other Arab countries and the United States
would follow its lead.6 The other part of British Middle East strategy,
"OperationALPHA," was a joint effort with the United Statesto resolve
the Arab-Israeli problem. Operation ALPHA sought rapprochementbetween Egypt and Israel and, in consultationwith Jordan,a negotiatedterritorial settlementfor Palestinianrefugees.Unfortunately,the two objectives
of British policy worked againsteachother. As Sir Evelyn Shuckburgh(one
of the chief architectsof ALPHA) later reminisced,"We did not face up
soonenoughto this basiccontradictionin our strategy"(Shamir1989,90).
Nasser and other Egyptian nationalists certainly approved of British
withdrawal from the region. But Nasserrecognizedthe Pact for what it
clearly was: an attemptto maintain some Europeaninfluence over the region and, as such, a direct affront to the pan-Arab collective security arrangementhe favored. Nasser'sblunt appraisal of the Pact was that it
representedan attemptby the West "to get [the Arabs] to unite to fight your
enemy[Russia] while they know that if they show any intention of fighting
their enemy [Israel] you would quickly stop all aid" (Neff 1981, 76). Despite thesestrongreservations,however,Nasserremainedwilling for a time
to work with the British, hoping therebyto securethe first completewithdrawal of British troops from Egyptian soil since 1882. And despite
Nasser'sclear opposition to the BaghdadPact, the British governmentremainedconvinceduntil early 1955 that it could work with Nasser.In fact,
after his only face-to-facemeeting with Nasserin February 1955, Eden
reportedto Churchill that he was "impressedby Nasser,who seemedforthright and friendly" (Kyle 1991, 39). Roger Allen, the British assistant
undersecretary
for the Middle East,similarly concludedthat Englandshould
attempt"to consolidatehis (Nasser's)position ... it looks as though he is
our bestbet" (Louis 1989,48).One way of achievingthis, clearly, would be
to withdraw from Egypt--somethingBritain had long promised.The irony
of the Suezcrisis, therefore,is that Nassersimply pushedBritain further in
a direction it was alreadymoving.
In the year after Eden met with Nasser,a seriesof eventsdramatically
changedthe relationshipbetweenthem. The first of theseeventsoccurred
only eight days after their meeting: on the night of February28, a special
detachmentof Israeli commandosled by Ariel Sharonattackedan Egyptian
military baseat Gaza,ostensiblyin responseto a seriesof borderincursions
by Palestiniansfrom the Gaza Strip. In this attack, thirty-eight Egyptians
were killed, and "from this momenton Nasser's... overriding needwas to
ensureEgyptian rearmamentfrom whateversourcesit could be obtained"
(Kyle 1991, 65). Nasserquickly appealedto the American ambassadorin
Cairo, Henry Byroade,for arms. But, despitea barrageof telegramsfrom
1I2
PAUL KOWERT
Byroade to Washington requestingthese anns, PresidentDwight Eisenhower and Secretaryof StateJohn FosterDulles moved aheadcautiously,
facedwith oppositionto an annssaleboth from abroad(Israel) and at home
(in Congress).Inevitably, Nassersoughtassistanceelsewhere,and on September27, he announceda sizablecontractto buy Soviet annamentsfrom
Czechoslovakia.
From this point onward, British perceptionsof Nasserbeganto change
inexorablyfor the worse. Even beforethe annsdeal becamepublic, Eden's
impressionof Nasserhad soured. When Egypt backedSaudi Arabia in a
disputeover Buraimi (an oasisin the Saudi desert),Eden reactedstrongly:
"This kind of thing is really intolerable. Egyptiansget steadily worse....
They should surely be told finnly no more annsdeliverieswhile this goes
on" (Lucas 1991, 49). The anns deal was the first overt confinnation of
Eden's fears, indicating that Nassermight not only challengeBritain but
perhapsevenside with the Soviets.Yet Britain hadnowhereelseto tum. As
Shuckburghconcludedat the time, "the plain fact is that, howeverdisappointedwe may be in the attitude of Colonel Nasserand his colleagues,we
can see no alternativeEgyptian Governmentin sight which would be any
better" (Lucas 1991, 49). The absenceof a clear alternativeto Nassermade
it even easier for Eden to view Egyptian leadershipas monolithic-and
increasinglythreatening.
If Nasser'sstanceon Buraimi and his acceptanceof the Czechoslovakian
annsdeal had begunto call his "identity" into question,a seriesof intelligence reports received beginning in November from a British agent in
Nasser'sentourageswiftly pushedEden and his cabinet toward an even
of this "emergingenemy."The agent,codemore pessimistic reassessment
named"Lucky Break," raised the disturbing prospectthat Nasserplanned
once again to tum to the Soviets for assistance,this time for funding to
build the Aswan High Dam. Eden himself had pushedhard for a $200
million Westernaid packageto help financethe dam, but Britain lackedthe
resourcesand the United States(especiallythe Americanpublic) lackedthe
will for such a massiveloan program.Despitetheir awarenessthat Nasser
believedthe situation to be pressing,Eden and his advisorswere shocked
by the newsthat Nasserwas actually consideringa Soviet aid package.The
specterof communistEgypt loomedevenlarger.
Ironically, the final straw for Eden was an event for which Nasserbore
no direct responsibility--theremovalof GeneralJohnBagot"Pasha"Glubb
from his post commandingthe Arab Legion in Jordan. In fact, Pasha
Glubb's ouster was, indirectly, a product of the British decision to seek
Jordanianmembershipin the BaghdadPact. After Britain's clumsy efforts
to woo Jordandestabilizedthe Jordaniangovernment,Glubb was forced to
THE CONSTRUCTION OF NATIONAL IDENTITY
113
stepin and restoreorder. This action, in tum, convincedKing Husseinthat
Glubb himself had becomea threat. The Pashawas orderedto leave the
country on short notice, and British officials leapt to the conclusion that
Nasser had somehoworchestratedthe .whole affair. The British foreign
minister, Selwyn Lloyd, was in Cairo at the time. In a meetingwith Nasser
the morning after Glubb's dismissal,Lloyd musedthat the Egyptian leader
"had deterioratedsincetheir first meeting.... 'He smileda greatdeal more,
for no apparentreason.He had lost the simplicity I rather liked in 1953' "
(Kyle 1991,94).Eden'sreactionwas far stronger.
The news of Glubb's removal convulsedEden with fury. Anthony Nutting
was with the Prime Minister until 5 A.M. trying to calm him: "[Eden] put all
the blame on Nasserand brushedaside every argumentthat mere personal
considerationshad in fact influenced Hussein'sarbitrary decision.... He
decidedthat the world was not big enough to hold both him and Nasser."
(Lucas 1991,95)
In fact, when Nutting did try to reasonwith Eden,the Prime Minister could
not contain himself. " 'You love Nasser,'he burst out, 'but I say he is our
enemy and he shall be treated as such'" (Nutting 1967, 29). After this
incident, Eden began to compare Nasser to Mussolini. In the prime
minister'sview, there no longer remainedany room for compromise:"It is
eitherhim or us" (Kyle 1991,96).
By this time, Nasser'sidentity (and Egypt's to a lesser extent) had
clearly becomevery salient to Eden and his cabinet. They made frequent
referenceto his untrustworthinessand his sympathyto communism.Their
opposition to him thus came more from who he was and what he represented--acommunist,or possibly a fascist, and clearly an enemy of Britain--thanfrom what he hadactuallydone.Nutting's(1967,28) observation
that it "was almostas if No. 10 itself had beenattackedand a howling mob
of Arabs were laying siegeto Downing Street" is a vivid illustration of the
new identity the British hadconferredon Nasser.But more thanNasserwas
at issue. The new "out-group," Egypt, would thereafter be treated as a
homogeneousentity--a "howling mob of Arabs"-with just one more of
the "mob" at the helm. And Eden's responseto Nutting's ill-considered
attempt to defend Nasser-thatNutting must "love Nasser"-showsthe
strengthand extent of this new social categorization.By this point, Eden
could conceiveof only two camps:thosewho "loved" Arabs and thosewho
did not.7 Not only was this social categorizationincreasinglysalient but,
with the frequent(if inconsistent)referencesto Hitler, Mussolini, and communists,it was greatlyexaggerated.
As one might expect, this negative redefinition and exaggerationof
114
PAUL KOWERT
Nasser'sidentity also encouragedattribution bias within the British government. Eden's strong reaction to the Lucky Break intelligence suggestsa
failure to appreciatethe constraintsthe Egyptian leader faced. After the
Czechoslovakianannsdeal, the British ambassadorto Egypt reportedthat
he "saw no reasonthat [Nasser]would not havepreferredto get annsfrom
the West and [he] only decidedto acceptthe Soviet offer when he felt he
could wait no longer in the face of increasedtension on the Gazafrontier
and internal pressure"(Lucas 1991, 65). But while Eden was well aware
that Washingtonwas onceagaindraggingits heelsand, in the end,unlikely
to provide financing---andalthoughNasscrtook stepsto minimize Western
criticism, emphasizingthat "it was a once-for-all deal" and that "there
would be no Soviet technicians"-Edencould not help but jump to the
conclusionthat the Soviet financing representeda fundamentalshift toward
communismon Nasser'spart (Kyle 1989, 107). In otherwords, Edenfound
it easierto attributethe Sovietoffer to Nasser'sown (changing)desiresand
identity than to the constraintsthat the Egyptian leaderfaced. This attribution bias is set in further relief by the fact that the Americansinterpretedthe
sameintelligencemuch differently. From the CIA's perspective,there"was
a sweepingand absolutequality about [the British] analysisthat gratedon
the American agentsand was not borne out by their own sources"(Kyle
1991, 102). And if Eden's reaction to Lucky Break exhibited attribution
bias, his responseto Glubb's dismissalis an evenbetterexampleof serious
attribution error. In this case,without any supportingevidenceat all, Eden
blamedNasserfor the behaviorof the king of Jordan.The apparentrise of
Nasser'spower and prestigein the region, after he assumedthe Egyptian
presidencyand then successfullynegotiatedthe Czechoslovakianannsdeal,
may have further contributedto Eden'sbiases.Nasser'sincreasingpower
madeit that much easierto blamehim for British setbacks.
By the summerof 1956, the prospectof Westernsupportfor the Aswan
High Dam had becomeremote. Dulles fonnally withdrew American support for the loan packageon July 19. Sevendays later-perhapsin retaliation and perhapsin an effort to secure a new source of funds--Nasser
announcedthe nationalizationof the SuezCanal. By this time, little further
damagecould be done to Eden's exceedinglylow estimation of Nasser.
Nationalizationmerelyservedto confinn what Edenalreadybelievedandto
intensify his already-strongtendencyto view Middle East politics through
the singularlens of Anglo-Egyptianconflict. From this point onward,Eden
"was out of sync with his old cautious, compromising self. He was obsessed,a driven man, his vast experienceand intellect reducedto tunnel
vision. At the end of the tunnel was Nasser"(Neff 1981, 278). Of course,
after the seizureof the Canal, Eden was hardly alone. The generalconsen-
THE CONSTRUCTION OF NATIONAL IDENTITY
115
sus in the British cabinet, according to Andrew Foster (the U.S. charge
d'affaires in London), was that "Nassermust not be allowed to get away
with it" (Lucas 1991, 142). And the British pressthereafter "maintaineda
steadydrumbeatof shrill criticism againstNasser,"ranking him amongthe
worst threatsto freedom and democracy(Neff 1981, 204). Even Winston
Churchill, who up this point had been concernedabout Eden'snewly aggressiveattitude toward Egypt, swungquickly into line with the prevailing
national mood. "We can't have that malicious swine sitting across our
communications,"he proclaimed(277).
What is particularly notableabouttheseexpressionsof British outrage
is their emphasison Nasser'spersonalcharacter(that is, his identity) as
the explanationfor his behaviorand as sufficient reasonfor British reprisals. The problem was not the nationalizationper se, which British lawyers quickly agreed was legal since the Suez Canal Company was
registeredas an Egyptian companyand since its shareholderswere all to
be compensated.The problem was that Hitler had been reincarnatedin
the Middle East. And, as social identity theory predicts,Nasser'sbehavior was assumedto reflect on all Egyptians.Consistentwith this form of
social stereotyping,the British ministersconcludedin a cabinetmeeting
on July 27 that "[t]he Egyptians... did not possessthe technicalability
to manage the Canal effectively" (Kyle 1991, 138). As the London
Times put it, "An internationalwaterway of this kind cannotbe worked
by a nation with low technical and managerialskills such as the Egyptians" (Neff 1981, 277). The crisis was not simply a personal matter
betweenBritish and Egyptian leaders.Their mutual animosity was writ
large in the way they viewed their antagonist'Snational identity and in
their diplomatic practice.
Once the crisis was truly underway, the leaders'own national identities
came into playaswell. When out-group identity becomessalient, a correspondingtransformationshould occur in definitions of the in-group. The
available documentaryevidenceon the Suez crisis provides less evidence
for this than for exaggeratedattributionsto out-groups.Nevertheless,there
is at least some evidenceto support the claim that in-group identity also
becameincreasinglysalient during the courseof the crisis. The principal
manifestationof this transformationin Britain was an increasedemphasis
on the potential damageto British reputation (thus, identity) as a major
power if Nasserwere allowed to succeed.Indeed,Harold "Macmillan flatly
declaredto Dulles that Britain would be finished as a world power if Nasser
won: 'This is Munich all over again'" (Neff 1981, 290). And Sir Ivone
Kirkpatrick (the permanentundersecretaryat the Foreign Office) managed
to take, if possible,an evenmore alarmistposition:
116
PAUL KOWERT
[I]fwe sit back while Nasserconsolidateshis position and gradually acquires
control of the oil-bearingcountries,he can, and is, accordingto our information, resolvedto wreck us. If Middle Eastoil is deniedto us for a year or two
our gold reserveswill disappear.If our gold reservesdisappearthe sterling
areadisintegrates.If the sterling areadisintegratesand we have no reserves
we shall not be able to maintain a force in Germanyor, indeed, anywhere
else. I doubt whetherwe shall be able to pay for the bareminimum necessary
for our defence.And a country that cannotprovide for its defenceis finished.
(Kyle 1989, 123)
Although Kirkpatrick strikes an alannist tone, his point was essentially
correct: Britain faceda test of its survival as a greatpower.
The importanceof both British and Egyptian national identity in this
casewas far-reaching.One obvious effect of the changingBritish views of
Egyptian identity, as already noted, was the tendencytoward attribution
error that thesechangesencouraged.In the year following Eden'smeeting
with Nasser,English officials tendedmore and more often to blameNasser
for setbacksto Britain's Middle East policy. This becamea self-fulfilling
prophecy. The more the British focused on Nasser,the more they attributed every failure to him, and thus the larger he loomed. The increasingly
negative British view of Nasser contributed in tum to the collapse of
project ALPHA, undenninedfinancing for the Aswan Dam, and made
Nasser'seventual retaliation all the more likely. And when Nasserdid
nationalize the Suez Canal Company,the British conceptionof him left
only one conceivableresponse.To simply acceptnationalizationhad, for
Eden, becomesynonymouswith appeasinga new Hitler. In short, British
leaders constructedthe very threat to which they were ultimately compelled to respond.
Ironically, the British tendencyto demonizeNasserhad the unintended
effect of enhancingthe Egyptianleader'spopUlarity. Egyptiansmight well
concludethat "if the West hatedNasserso much then surely he must be
powerful" (Neff 1981, 205). The strong emotions evoked among British
leadersby defining Nasseras anotherHitler had the further effect of blinding Edenand his colleaguesto the likely American responseto their invasion plan. Even after Eisenhowersent a letter explicitly warning against
the use of force, Eden simply refusedto comprehendthe line the Americans had just drawn. "Eden's passion so clouded his reason that after
reading Ike's forceful letter he concludedthat 'the Presidentdid not rule
out the use of force.' True, but there were so many qualifiers in the letter
that only Eden in his blind hatredof Nassercould have missedthe point"
(Neff 1981,291).And, as Eden soon discovered,Britain was no longer in
a position to undertakesucha project without American support.After this
THE CONSTRUCTION OF NATIONAL IDENTITY
117
crisis, the British "habit of using the languageand assumptionsof a Great
Powerhadbeensmothered"(Kyle 1989, 130).
Conclusion
The elaborateedifice of constructivismin not required simply to observe
that, in British eyes,the imageof Egypt and its leaderchanged dramatically
in the year leading up to the Suez crisis.But cognitive theoriesof social
stereotypingdo not addressthe problemof how in-groupbias is inscribedin
higher levels of collective behavior.One might thus dismissthe cognitive
account of Egypt's changing identity, viewed from London, as so many
individual perceptionswith no particular relevanceto international relations. Or, at best,theseperceptionsmight be deemedrelevantonly insofar
as they affectedthe beliefs and policies of Britain's prime minister. Morgenthau (1948) warned long ago that rationalizationsand justifications
shouldnot be allowedto concealthe true natureof foreign policy-that it is
dangerousto take states at their "word" and that perceptionsare often
misleading. Yet, misleadingor not, rationalizationsand justifications are
foreign policy. The contribution of constructivismis to make it clear that
theseperceptionswere internationalrelations in this case.They were the
instruction-rulesthat formed the reality to which Edenresponded.
A constructivistapproachwould be unnecessaryif this reality were uncontested.A simpler alternativeto the accountoffered here is that Nasser's
actionsrepresenteda genuinethreatandthat Britain's response was
dictated
by considerationsof power politics and national security. Indeed, the frequent referencesby British leaders to Nasser'sresultant control over
Europe'soil lifeline evoke a straightforwardconcernwith material issues
(and a concernnot too different from the concernsvoicedaboutIraq during
the PersianGulf War).
But Britain's reaction remains difficult to explain on these grounds
alone. As Nasserhimself pointed out during the crisis, Egypt was already
eligible to purchasethe Suez Canal Company beginning in 1968. "Why
should Britain say that this nationalization will affect shipping in the
canal?" he complained. "Would it have affected shipping twelve years
hence?"(Neff 1981,283).Moreover,the threatthat Britain apparentlyperceivedto its oil supplycould well havebeenmitigatedby lessdrasticmeans
than a military invasionof the canalzone. One approach,advocatedby the
United Statesduring the crisis as a way of dissuadingBritain from more
bellicoseaction, was the creationof an internationalboardto overseecanal
operation.Britain's responseseemstoo hasty and too disproportionateto
the actual threat posedby nationalization,therefore,to explain on material
118
PAUL KOWERT
groundsalone. Indeed,the fact that Britain finished withdrawing its troops
from Suezlittle more than a month beforeNasserannouncednationalization
indicatesthe limited practicalimportanceof British control of the canal.Not
surprisingly,"when Anthony Nutting pointedout to Eden that Britain might
not actually haveany worry aboutthe canalstayingopensince it was now in
recognizably
~gypt's
bestintereststo collect as many tolls as possible,the prime minister
'merely replied that I shouldknow that the capacityof the Arabs to cut off
their noses to spite their face was infinite'" (284). Apart from being a
striking example of negative out-group identification, Eden's remark suggeststhat he found it impossible,by this point, to believe that Nasserwas
remotely capableof rational action--<iespiteNasser'sconsiderableeffort to
assurethe smoothfunctioning of the canal and to carry out the nationalization plan in accordancewith Egyptianandinternationallaw.
Eden's responsemakesit plain that his attention focused not on what
Nasserhad done (or could reasonablybe cxpectedto do) but on what he
thought Nasserhad become.The act of nationalizationitself was not the
problem. It was what the act said aboutwhat Nasserand Egypt had become
(a growing nationalistand possibly communistthreat) and aboutwhat Britain was in dangerof becoming(a declining power). Nationalizationwarrantedto Edenthat Egypt was no longer competentto deal with a complex
environmentof internationaldirective-rulesand commitment-rules,no matter the carethat Nasseractually took to obey theserules. The British interpretationof Egyptianbehaviorhingednot on the behavioritself but on the
ascribedidentity of Egyptian agents.Moreover, Eden and his cabinetnot
only redefinedEgyptianidentity but increasinglyexaggeratedboth the identity itself and the distinction betweenthis identity and their own (the Egyptians would not respect the rules; the English were honorable and
law-abiding). Finally, with these exaggerationsof political identity came
attribution errors, generallyascribingto Nassermalicious intent regardless
of the constraintshe may havefaced.
Not only were thesetransformationsof identity endogenousto the interaction betweenBritain and Egypt, but they dependedheavily on the behavior of political agents. No international structures(not even those of the
Cold War) completelydeterminedthe patternof interaction betweenEden
and Nasser.Even if the Westmight eventuallyhave found Nasser'snationalism intolerablefor other reasons,greatercooperationon the Aswan Dam
might well have forestalled that conflict long enoughto preventthe Suez
crisis. The crisis occurred becauseof "who" it involved, not becauseof
what it involved. And long before the crisis, the characterof the states
involved in it was conceivedand reconceivedin the minds of a small group
of individuals.
THE CONSTRUCTION OF NATIONAL IDENTITY
119
Notes
The author is grateful for support in the fonn of a National ScienceFoundationgrant
(DIR-9I13599)to the Ohio StateUniversity'sMershonCenterResearchTraining Group
(RTG) on the role of cognition in collective political decision making. DeborahAvant,
Martha Finnemore,Richard Hernnann,PeterKatzenstein,Jeffrey Legro, NicholasOnuf,
participantsin threeSocial ScienceResearchCouncil/MacArthurFoundationworkshops
on "Nonns and National Security," membersof the MershonCenterRTG, and members
of the Miami InternationalRelationsGroup at Florida InternationalUniversity and the
University of Miami have all offered helpful commentsand advice that enrichedthis
paper.This chapteralso drawson ideasdeveloped,in part, in Kowert and Legro (1996).
I. Actually, appreciationof the relationshipbetweenlanguageand identity is nothing new. In his classicstudy of Europeannationalism,for example,Karl Deutsch(1953)
recognizedthat communicationwas a key to social identity. Seealso Kubalkova's"The
Twenty Years' Catharsis,"Chapter2 in this volume.
, 2. In a superb illustration of the way political leaders are affected by their own
manipulations,Jack Snyder (1991) shows that not only may domestic interest groups
benefiting from national expansionbe very successfulat promoting imperialist ideologies, but also their leadersmay come to believe passionatelyin theseideologies,blinding them to the dangersof overexpansion.Snydercalls this process"blowback."
3. For a psychologicalapproachdifferent from the one developedin this chapter,see
Kratochwil's brief discussionof social nonns,eros, and thanatosin Freudianpsychology (1989, 126-29). Also seeBrewer'stheory of social distinctionsthat relies on motivational psychology(1991).
4. In an experimentnotableperhapsas much for the ethical issuesit raisedas for its
results, Sherif (1961) tested his hypothesisby dividing children attending a summer
campinto two groupsand giving them first competingand then superordinategoals.Not
only did Sherif find that the competinggoals producedconsiderablehostility toward
out-groupmembers,but it was much harderto restorecollective identity with superordinategoalsthan to fracture it. Seealso Blake and Mouton (1961).
5. A natural complementto the fundamentalattribution error is the attribution of
one'sown behaviorto situational constraints("I had to do it") rather than to personal
desires("I didn't want to"). For an excellentdiscussionof this and other relatedattributional biases,seeFiske and Taylor (1984,72-99).
6. Unfortunatelyfor Eden,once Britain hadjoined Turkey and Iraq to fonn the core
of the BaghdadPact, the United Stateshad little incentive to follow. Britain's presence
alone would serveas a deterrentto Soviet expansion,and joining the Pact would only
alienate Egypt-the opposite of what Eisenhowerand Dulles hoped to achieve (see
Louis 1989,44-46).
7. Ironically, Eden had studiedArabic and was himself on many earlier occasionsa
strong advocateof Arab positions,often in the face of a Frenchforeign policy that was
generallymore supportiveof Israel. In 1941, Eden admittedto his private secretarythat
"if we must have preference,let me murmur in your ear that I prefer Arabs to Jews"
(Neff 1981, 206).
Eden's interest in Arab culture does not, of course, necessarilyimply a positive
imageof the "other"; seeSaid'sdiscussionof "orientalism" (1979). The dramaticreversal of Eden'sviews toward Nassermay also have beenhastenedby the prime minister's
physicalailments.Eden'shealthdeterioratedmarkedlyprior to and during this crisis as a
result of a damagedbile duct and chronic infections. To compensate,he routinely took
both antibiotics and amphetamines.This condition may account for much of Eden's
120
PAUL KOWERT
irritability and perhapseven his emotional responseto Nasser'sbehavior. See Neff
(1981,182-83).
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6
Feminist Struggle as Social
Construction: Changing the Gendered
Rules of Home-BasedWork
Elisabeth Priigl
"Thosewho were marginalare now enteringthe mainstream"was the hopeful conclusion of Ela Bhatt, secretary general of the Self-Employed
Women's Association (SEWA) of India, at the Meeting of Experts convenedby the InternationalLabor Organization(ILO) in Genevain the fall
of 1990. The meeting explored the situation of homeworkers(i.e., those
who work at home for pay), their conditionsof work, governmentpolicies
toward them, and the possible role of the ILO in improving their lives.
Ubiquitous in urban and rural areasaroundthe world, home-basedworkers
sew garments;embroider; make lace; roll cigarettes;weave carpets;peel
shrimp; preparefood; polish plastic; processinsuranceclaims; edit manuscripts; and assembleartificial flowers, umbrellas,and jewelry. Somesubcontractwith factories,large firms, intermediaries,or merchants;othersare
quasi-independent
and sell their goods and services--oftenin a highly dependentfashion. Some work by themselves;others are embeddedwithin
family enterprises.Virtually all receivelow wagesand work underadverse
conditions. While the meeting in Genevawas divisive, Bhatt's sentiment
proved visionary: in June of 1996 the International Labor Conference
of the ILO, passedan internationalcon(ILC), the policy-making assembly
vention (multilateral treaty) committing ratifYing statesto developnational
policies on home-basedworkers, which recognizedthem as employeesand
securedthem basicworker rights and protections.
123
124 ELISABETH PROGL
The fight for an internationalconventionon homeworkprovides a case
for the study of genderedrules in global politics and for the centralrole that
social movementsplay in the reconstructionof such rules. A network of
women in nongovernmentalorganizationsfrom Asia, Europe, and South
Africa lobbied for the homeworkconvention.Their efforts built on thoseof
the global women'smovement,which had long arguedthat female workers
were no different from male workers and that women'shome-basedwork,
both paid and unpaid, was as valuableas work outsidethe home. Employing a constructivistframework allows me to interpreteventsthat led to the
conventionas a processof changing,institutionalizing, and codifYing different categoriesof rules.
A disproportionatenumberof home-basedworkers are married women
with children. Their work is embeddedin a numberof overlappinginstitutions, and both conformsto and clasheswith the rules of theseinstitutions.
As membersof households,home-basedworkersoccupythe roles of wives,
mothers,daughters,or sisters,and are expectedto fill theseroles according
to culturally diverse expectations.As agentsin a polity, women workers
gain rights and duties of citizenship which carry strongly genderedovertones.As participantsin a labor market, women workers are subjectto the
rules of sex-typingand the unequaldistribution of rewardsthis engenders.
Frequently,genderrules in households,the economy,and stateshave functioned to disempower women. The disadvantagedstatus of home-based
workers is one result, and has spawnedthe movementto rectifY this situation. Changingrules abouthome-based work
thus implies a wider changeof
rules in households,the economy,and the state.
The focus of my investigationis the practicesof the "homeworkermovement," embeddedwithin the global feminist movementand the labor movement. Social movementsconstitute a counterpartto the globalization of
production and the accompanyinginternationalizationof states
which in~
recognizably
creasinglyorient their economic and social policies to the systemic imperatives of global capitalism. In finding alliances across borders and
focusing their activities "aboveand below the state" (Wapner1995), social
movementsquestion the reality of statesas the containersof legitimate
politics and open up spacefor the democratizationof global politics. They
do so by seekingto influence internationaltreaties,conventions,and other
commitments.They do so as well by establishingthe legitimacy of new
claims to rights (e.g., human rights), and by creatingcommitmentson the
part of those in power to honor theserights. But they exercisedemocracy
perhapsmost importantly by changingthe rules of identity. Arguably the
main accomplishmentof the global women'smovementhas beento funda-
FEMINIST STRUGGLE AS SOCIAL CONSTRUCTION
125
mentally challengeunderstandingsof proper womanhoodand manhood,
which havelong servedto subordinatewomen.
Feminism and Constructivism
Although feminism is not a monolithic body of thought, and although it
thrives on disagreementsand multiple perspectives,most contemporary
feminists agreeon one issue: genderis a social construct.The rejection of
biological determinismwas at the base of early feminist critiques in the
second wave of the women's movement. Today many feminists have
shifted from talking about sex and women to talking about genderin order
to focus attention from the biological to the social. This is reflected in
SandraHarding's characterizationof genderas "a systematicsocial constructionof masculinityand femininity that is little, if at all, constrainedby
biology" (1987, 8). As a social construct, gender has history and is an
integral part of politics. Joan Scott'sdefinition complementsHarding's in
framing genderpolitically as "a constitutiveelementof social relationships
basedon perceiveddifferencesbetweenthe sexes,and .. , a primary way of
signifYing relationshipsof power" (Scott 1986, 1067). As a constitutive
elementof social relations,genderinvolves symbols,norms, organizations,
institutions, and subjectiveidentities. As a way of signifYing relationships
of power, genderdivides the world in a binary fashion which providesthe
meansfor the articulationandlegitimation of power.
Feminist writers on internationalrelationshave long arguedthat gender
is a useful categoryfor understandingglobal politics and have insistedthat
gender constructionsare pervasive. Unfortunately, feminist international
relations(IR) literaturetypically doesnot connectthe term social construction to a body of theory. This usagepapersover considerabledifferencesin
approachof authorssteepedin different theoreticaltraditions.At the risk of
oversimplification,it is possibleto suggesttheoreticalinfluencesin recent
tcxts. Michel Foucault's concerns with the formation of identities and
JacquesDerrida's method of deconstructionresonatein Christine
Sylvester'susageof the term. Sylvesterdescribesmen and women as "socially constructed"in the sense"that men and women are the stories that
havebeentold about 'men' and 'women'andthe constraintsand opportunities that have thereby arisen as we take to our proper places" (1994, 4).
Foucaultianand Marxist themesappearin CynthiaEnloe'semphasison the
practicesof variousglobal actorsto describemanipUlationsof and contests
over definitions of masculinityand femininity (Enloe 1989, 1993). Similar
frameworksmay underlie JanJindy Pettman'srecentbook in which social
126 ELISABETH PROGL
constructionsemergeas the manipulationsof stateswhich, sheargues,construct the public/private divide, "manufacture" citizens, and construct
"'deviant' forms of sexuality" (Pettman 1996). Spike Petersonand Anne
SissonRunyan draw on sociological and Marxist conceptsto suggestthat
social construction involves the socialization and social reproduction of
stereotypesand ideologies(1993. 19--26). SandraWhitworth and Deborah
Stienstra,in Coxianlneo-Gramscian
fashion, conceptualizesocial construction as an interaction of material conditions,institutions, and ideasor discourses(Whitworth 1994,4;Stienstra1994).
Thesetexts use social constructionto convey two ideas. First, the term
signalsa concernwith "the social" as opposedto material :::apabilities,static
structures,unquestionedpositivities, or "pre-given" identities.The social becomes real in discourses,stories, practices,and ideas. Second,the term is
meantto indicate impermanence,historicity, and malleability. Storiescan be
rewritten; discoursescan be deconstructed;practicescan change;stereotypes
can alter; ideologies can be revealed; and material conditions, institutions,
and ideas can change. The texts thus do capture basic insights of social
constructivism,especially those which are useful to an understandingof
feminist struggleand in this way to informing feminist practice.Yet, what is
lacking is an understandingof the processesof institutionalization,of the
way in which agency and structure are co-constitutedin the social. This
gives rise to both theoretical and practical problems. Closer looks at two
exemplaryauthors,Whitworth as an advocateof the materialist framework
and Sylvesteras a protagonistof post-structuralideas,showthe difficulty.
I see two weaknessesin Whitworth's approach,which result from not
following throughon social constructivism.First, Cox's materialistfoundations trap her in modernistdualisms inimical to some of the most consequential feminist theorizingwhich insists that the biological and bodiesare
as much part of the social as other expressionsof gender.Whitworth (and
Cox) insist that the relationship betweenideas, institutions, and material
conditionsis reciprocal and that no one determinesthe other. Yet, material
conditions appearto have a reality of their own, not outside history but
outside politics and social construction.This leads to problematicconclusions when Whitworth grafts nonclasscategoriesonto Cox's class-based
framework. "Age, race, sex, sexualorientation,etc." emergeas prepolitical
givens, material realities which may be politicized in particular contexts
but, like class, exist as categoriesin themselves(Whitworth 1994, 69).
However, human sexuality and sexual orientation are not prediscursive.
Social orderscreatebiological conceptionsthat perpetuateunequaldistributions of power. Genderdiscourserequiresthat therebe a coherencebetween
sex and gender,and this coherenceis built on a compulsoryheterosexual
FEMINIST STRUGGLE AS SOCIAL CONSTRUCTION 127
matrix (Harding 1986, 12&-30; Butler 1990). From a social constructivist
perspective,the distinctionbetweenthe materialandthe ideal is not tenable;
ideascontaminatematerial reality. From the perspectiveof many feminists,
the distinction is at a minimum problematic;at a maximumit participatesin
the naturalizationof sexandgender.
A secondproblem with Cox's approaeharisesfrom its failure to adequately addressthe agent-structureproblem. While Whitworth discusses
extensivelythe needfor an approachthat accountsfor both individual purposeandthe social constraintsof history, Cox doesnot provide her with the
analytical tools to follow through on this insight. To be sure, her analysis
explores theinterests,intentions,and agitationsof activists, states,and the
ILO, togetherwith material conditions in various phasesof history. But
asidefrom statingcorrespondences,
Whitworth is not able to connectideas,
institutions, and material conditions. Ideas and material conditions appear
ontologically separate,and institutions emergeas reflections of ideas and
materialconditions.One is left to wonderhow thesereflectionsare generated and how ideas, institutions, and material conditions relate to agency
and structure.Cox and Whitworth miss an opportunity in not taking seriously Cox's own definition of institutions as social constructs,as "the
broadly understoodand acceptedways of organizingparticular spheresof
social action" (Cox 1996, 149).
Sylvester'sFeminist Theory and International Relations in a PostmodernEra tacklesa major debateamongcontemporaryfeminist theorists,
which pits "post-structuralists,"who destabilizeand questionthe unity of
subjects,against"humanists,"who argue that such practicehas pernicious
effects. Critical of the implications of modernistlogocentrism,of its concern with origins and foundations,and of its silencingof "Others" through
the naturalizationof identities, post-structuralistfeminists reject an understandingof "women" as subjectsof politics and insist that "women" needto
be analyzedas an outcomeof discursivepractices.Humanistfeministsreply
that this understandingdelegitimizes emancipatoryclaims on behalf of
womenas a group and doesaway with historical agents.As subjectsdisappear, so do notions of intentionality, accountability, self-reflexivity, and
autonomy,ideaswhich they claim are central to feminist critique and practice (Benhabibet al. 1995).
Sylvesterjoins a growing numberof feminist thinkers who seekto combine the insightsof post-structuralistsandhumaniststo makethe casefor "a
position of negotiation between standpoint feminism [which privileges
women's experiencesas constitutedsubjects] ... and postmodernskepticism [which questionsthe constitutionof thesesubjects]"(Sylvester1994,
12; seealso Alcoff 1988; Ferguson1993).Thus, Sylvesterrescueshumanist
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ELISABETH PROGL
valuesby mergingthe standpointapproach'sinsistenceon a fusion of being
and knowing with post-modernunderstandingsof the variability and multip!icity of identities. She insists that subjectscan find temporary "homesteads"from which they can speak.Such homesteadsenablea politics of
emancipation.In this way "people called women" do not need to have a
unitary, immobile, and monolithic identity. They speakfrom ever-shifting
anddifferent standpoints.
Sylvester'sformulation is appealing. It foregrounds feminist practice
while cautioningabout the totalizing implications of fixing a unitary feminine identity. However,Sylvester'spost-structuralistpoint of departureprevents her from developinga theory of agency,in which not only are men
and women the "stories that have been told about 'men' and 'women'"
(Sylvester1994,4),but also discoursesare continuouswith everydaycommunicationand subjectsactively constructeachother through communicative practices.Sylvesterremainscaughtin an ultimately static methodology
that puts congealedtexts at the centerof its analysis.We learn that women
at GreenhamCommonsand in the cooperativesof Zimbabwe challenge
meaningsand interpretations,but we do not learn how these challenges
enterthe storiesabout thesewomen. What is lacking is a theory of agency
that illustratesthe institutionalizationof narratives.Constructivismprovides
sucha theory. Indeed,there is a significant strandof feminist constructivist
theorizing in the social sciences(e.g., Connell 1987; Kesslerand McKenna
1978; Lorber 1994).
Constructivism in International Relations:
A Method for Gender Analysis
Constructivismhas emergedas one of the major strandsof the "third debate" in internationalrelations. The central tenet of constructivismis that
people and societies,agentsand structures,construct, or constitute, each
other. Constructivistsargue that internationallife is social, that is, that it
follows norms and rules which make up social structures.Thesestructures
reproduceonly through the practicesof knowledgeableagents.Structures
and agentscannotexist without eachother: they are mutually constitutive.
Actors draw on the rules that makeup structuresin their everydayroutines,
and in doing so they reproducethese rules. They have the capacity to
understandwhat they are doing and why they are doing it, which allows
them to "reflexively monitor" the social practicesthey engagein. Structures
make possiblesimilar social practicesacrosstime and space,thus ensuring
the relative stability of social life.
Like the post-structuralistswho influencedSylvester,constructivistsput
FEMINIST STRUGGLE AS SOCIAL CONSTRUCTION
129
languagein the centerof their understandingof the social. But unlike poststructuralists,constructivistsfocus on processesthat producethe social, not
on the social as an effect of relatively static discourses.They approach
languageas social practice,not as a textual artifact or discursivefonnation.
They are interestednot only in identities signified in narratives,stories,and
discourses,but in the intersectionof signifYing and doing. The fluidity of
the social is well capturedin Jtirgen Habennas'stheory of communicative
action,which roots socialpracticein communicationandargumentationand
which fonns the basisof NicholasOnuf's constructivistdiscussionof rules.
Onuf's refonnulationmakespossiblean understandingof the multiple ways
in which genderfonns, perpetuates,and mutatesthrough communicative
action.
According to Habennas,all communicativestatementsentail validity
claims; that is, a speakerclaims that a statementis factually correct, nonnatively right, andnondeceptive.If the heareracceptstheseclaims,understanding
is accomplishedand speechacquiresa binding force. Communicativeagents
renew their interpersonalrelationshipand afftnn their agreementaboutobjective facts of the world andaboutSUbjectiveexperiences(Habennas1984,
295-305).Onufarguesthat the speechact agreementsthat underliecommunicative action produceand reproducesocial structures.Rulesprovide the
"missing link" betweensocial structuresand temporaryagreementsresulting from understanding.The nonnative force of a speechact agreement
becomesa conventionwhen othersjoin in the agreementand repeatpropositions with complementarycontent.Conventionsbecomerules oncepeople
follow conventionsas a matter of routine and once they recedefrom consciousdeliberations(Onuf 1989,78--95).
Various authorsin the field recentlyhavethrown light on the importance
of studying nonns and rules in international politics from a sociological
perspective.Onuf criticizes this work, togetherwith post-positivistliterature, for treating nonns as context. He arguesinsteadthat rules (a tenn he
prefersto nonns)arepositivitiesandas suchare capableof empirical investigation and classification(Onuf 1997). His classificationof rules into instruction-rules,directive-rules,and commitment-rulesprovides a heuristic
tool for investigatingthe interlacing ways in which genderis constructed.
Instruction-rulesdefine, describeidentities,and statebeliefs about the way
things are. They makeclaims aboutfacts, elicit agreementaboutthesefacts
on the part of others,and therebybring about confonnity. Directive-rules
imply commands,requests,demands,pennissions,and warnings. They
elicit compliance,obeisance,submission.Commitment-rulesimply promises and offers that oblige individuals to act accordingly.All three types of
rules are both regulative and constitutive. In other words, all three elicit
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ELISABETH PROGL
action on the part of otherswhile also establishingsocial facts(Onuf 1989,
78-95).
Constructivismprovidesa promisingmethodfor studyingthe struggleof
homeworkeradvocates.First, constructivismallows for a specificationof
genderas a constellationof rules and in this way providesa tool for investigating a social fact which, as many feminists have correctly argued,is both
historical and fluid. Second,the focus on rules uniquely puts activism in the
center and allows for an understandingof the ways it effects changes.
Ratherthan depictinga singularoppressivestructure,reflectionsof material
or ideological changes,or the economicsof a static text, a constructivist
approachallows for a specification of the types of rule changeswhich
different forms of activism accomplish.Third, constructivismprovides for
an understandingof how rule changeseffect new realities within institutions, themselvessetsof rules. Suchinstitutionsmay be individuals or other
agents,such as householdsor states(seeOnufs essayin Chapter3 of this
volume). In addition, genderitself constitutesan institution, one that cuts
acrossother institutions and supportsthe constellationsof rule and power
they constitute.Altering rules of genderthus inevitably affects the rules of
other institutions as well. A focus on institutions allows me to trace such
interlockingchanges.
The Gendered Rules of Home-BasedWork
Home-basedwork carriesvery different meaningsin different contexts.For
somewomen it meansan extensionof their domesticactivities to provide
an additional "service" to their families, for some it is an opportunity to
savein a honorableway for their dowries, for someit is a tradition, and for
some it is the equivalentof factory jobs in the absenceof a factory. For
example,in Rio de Janeiro,Brazil, cultural ideasaboutproperwomanhood
and religious identifications mergewith exploitativepracticesof employers
as housewives.In Lahore, Pakistan,
to constructhome-basedseamstresses
understandingsof honor, respectability,and family status,togetherwith the
needto savemoneyfor their dowries,encourageyoung womento engagein
home-basedwork. For rural, home-basedTurkish carpetweavers,weaving
is part of a girl's socialization,and is integral to farming householdswhere
female householdmemberssharetheir labor power and weavingsubsidizes
agricultural investments.In Thailand, rural homeworkersfall into two
groups:a group of older women and men for whom homeworkis a supplementary activity that easily integratesinto the agricultural cycle, and a
group of younger women who produce for export-orientedfirms and for
whom home-basedpieceworkis the main sourceof income.
FEMINIST STRUGGLE AS SOCIAL CONSTRUCTION 131
Despite the differences in contexts and the divergent meanings they
spawn, understandingsof home-basedwork have one thing in common:
they invariably define such work as secondary.On the one hand, homebasedwork emergesas subsidiary to either male income or agricultural
income. On the other hand, it appearsas transitional for those moving
toward marriage or for those who think of themselvesas unemployed.
Instruction-rulesthat associatehome-basedwork with women are grafted
onto a basic principle that identifies women as subordinateto men; in this
way instruction-rulesfacilitate a constructionof home-basedwork as supplementary.This goes along with an identification of men as primary incomeearnersand of women'swork as "not real work." The genderedrules
of households,labor markets, and statespowerfully conspire to effect a
constructionof home-basedwork as secondary.
RulesoftheHousehold
Householdsare institutions defined largely by commitment-rules.These
rules pervasivelycommit women to take on the duties of motherhoodand
housework,duties that come with marriage.There is considerablevariation,
as expectationsabout women's roles within householdsrespondto local
rules of custom and religion. A woman in Pakistanmay have to commit
herselfto live in one of various degreesof seclusion,while custom tells a
woman in Ghana to work the fields and grow food for the family, or a
working-class woman in the United Statesmay be expectedto make an
economiccontributionto the householdin additionto perfonningherdomestic duties. Despite these differences,married women in particular tend to
share a tie to the home, which limits their work options. In the Western
context it is appropriateto describethis limitation as implied in a "marriage
contract"throughwhich womenin effect give up part of the propertyin their
own person,including full control over their labor power (Pateman1988).
The languageof contractsmay be inappropriatefor describingthe situations
of women in other cultures, but for them marital status and motherhood
equally are definedthrough a seriesof commitment-ruleswhich often function to tie their labor power to the needsof the household.Not surprisingly,
statisticsconfinn that a disproportionatenumberof home-basedworkers in
countries all over the world are not only female but married with small
children. Home-basedwork allows such womento combinetheir household
andmotheringdutieswith earningan income(Priigl 1992).
From thosein the gannentindustry in Delhi to thosein white-collarjobs
in Great Britain and Silicon Valley, many home-basedworkers see themselvesprimarily as housewives,mothers,or dutiful daughtersand only sec-
132
ELISABETH PROGl
ondarily as income-earners;they consciouslysubordinatetheir paid work to
family commitments (Rao and Husain 1987, 62-63; Hakim 1987, 98;
Lozano 1989, 122). Women who participatedin the clerical homeworker
program of the Wisconsin PhysiciansServicesInsuranceCorporationbelieved that a woman'splace was in the home with her family and that she
should not take away a male breadwinner'sjob (Costello 1989, 201). In
Rio, 50 percent of the seamstresses
who said they preferred to work at
homedid so becauseof family or domesticreasons.They perceivedbeing a
seamstressnot as a profession but as a service to themselvesand their
families (Sorj 1991, 7f.). Garmenthomeworkersin CentralJavawere often
their families' main income earnersin a context of high levels of male
unemploymentYet they insisted that they were only "working for salt,"
and that the men were the true breadwinners.They maintainedthat their
domesticwork camefirst, eventhoughthey had no time to cook during the
peak sewing seasonand frequently bought food from local vendors(Susilastuti 1990,9).
Despite this primary commitment to the family, home-basedincome
earning often conflicts with householdduties, and home-basedworkers
draw negativeconsequences
from violating their promisesto be good mothers and housewives.Husbandsof home-basedworkers rarely reducetheir
expectationsabout domestic work. For example,a homeworkerfrom the
u.K. complainedthat "if I haven'tmanagedto get some houseworkdone
becauseI've been too busy doing homework then I'm asked--'Whatdo
you do all day long(?]' as ifI just sit around all day long" (Trivedi 1985,
18). The attitude of men in Pakistanwas that home-basedwork was something which women indulged in and which therefore should not cut into
their time for housework:"Well, we did not ask them to work. If shewants
to work it's her responsibilityto make sure she can handleher housework
first, which is her first duty as mother and wife" (Shaheedand Mumtaz,
n.d., 53-54).
Women'shome-basedwork affected genderroles in the householdby
questioningwho was the breadwinner.Husbandsusedvarioustechniquesto
deny this challengeand to uphold the notion that they were breadwinners
and their wives were nonworking housewives.In Narsapur,husbandsdid
not produce lace but created a myth that they invested money in their
wives' work and portrayed themselvesas entrepreneurs.In Turkey and
Afghanistan,men sold the carpetsthat womenin their householdmade,and
kept the money. In this way they retainedcontrol over householdspending
decisionsand appearedto be the true breadwinners(Mies 1982,95;Berik
1987,72).
The rules of householdsare one elementin definitions of genderand the
FEMINIST STRUGGLE AS SOCIAL CONSTRUCTION 133
privilegesthey distribute. They are a centralelementin a set of interlocking
institutions that keepshome-basedworkers subordinate.The commitmentrules of marriageand the householdthus emergeas a crucial challengefor
homeworkeradvocates.
Rulesofthe State
Many statestoday are built on liberal understandingsthat divide a society
into a public and a private sphere.The line that divides the two spheresis a
matter of social agreement,but liberal statestypically have treatedhouseholds as private and out of the reach of the state. Since the industrial
revolution moved most manufacturinginto factories, and with the creation
of welfare states, work outside the home has become a target of state
interventioneffectedby law, or fonnal directive-rules.In parallel, the home
increasinglyhas been defined as the sphereof women and has been constructed ideologically as outside the regulatory reach of the state. In an
effort to reducethe unfair competition home-basedworkers posedto factory workers, legislatorsin Europe, the Americas, and Australia regulated
home-basedwork in the first half of the twentieth century. But in most
countriestoday legislation on home-basedwork is severelylacking. Out of
150 countriesthe ILO surveyedin the early 1990s, only 18 (mostly European) countries had specific homework legislation; another 22 (mostly
Latin American) countriesaddressedthe matter in their labor codes. With
the exceptionof Japan,India, and the Philippines,no country in Africa or
Asia regulatedhome-basedwork. The definition of householdsas homes,
supposedlyout of the reach of the state and ruled by private convention
under the authority of male headsof households,preventedregulation (InternationalLabor Office 1994,28).
In most casesif home-basedworkerswant to qualify for legal protection,
they have to claim that they are not only membersof householdsbut also
employeesof a finn. But legal testsof employmentstatustypically address
the situationof office and factory workers. Under a numberof commonlaw
legal criteria, home-basedworkers.often emergeas self-employed.Such
criteria test whether work is carried out on the employer's premises,
whether the worker owns any of the tools, whether the worker works for
more than one employer, or whether the worker has been engagedfor a
continuousperiod of time. Many home-basedworkers would fail to qualify
on all thesecriteria. Furthennore,home-basedworkers often are preempted
from benefitsbecausebenefitsare frequently conditionalupon the length of
serviceor upon the numberof hoursworked.
It is thereforenot surprisingthat lawyers, legislators,and other officers
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of the state have arguedthat home-basedworkers are not real employees.
For example,the Indian SupremeCourt, in a 1961 ruling, interpretedthe
Indian FactoriesAct to apply only when "workers were working on the
premisesof the employer,had no liberty to work at homeand the employer
could exercisethe power of control by rejecting the sub standard[products]" (Mahajan 1985, 8). And while the Indian Bidi and Cigar Workers
Act of 1966 clearly defined home-basedbidi (cigarette)rollers as employees,the chief labor inspectorin Gujarat"insisted on questioningas to how
somebodyworking in a private house could ever be an employee" (31).
When based on an instruction-rule that defined home-basedworkers as
nonworkers, directives geared toward improving the status of workers
failed home-basedworkers. The JapaneseIndustrial Homework Law of
1970 is one of the few homework laws which explicitly excludeshomebasedworkers from protection under various labor laws and from social
security protection. As a result, they do not receive benefits in casesof
injuries or sickness,maternity benefits, unemploymentbenefits, or retirement benefits(Kamio 1991, 25-26). In other countries,laws do not exclude
home-basedworkers explicitly, but confusionabout their statusoften functions to exclude them de facto. In parallel to instruction-rulesthat define
public and private, work and home, as separate,home-basedworkers are
confirmednot to be real workers and are excludedfrom directivesthat gain
employeesbenefitsandprotection.
Statistical practices reinforce these instruction-rules.National surveys
routinely undercounthome-basedworkers becausesuch surveystypically
take placeat one point in time and miss seasonalor intermittenthome-based
work, becausehome-basedwork sometimesresemblesproduction for domestic use, becausemale heads of householdswho respond to surveys
considerthe women'swork a leisure-timeactivity or would like to hide this
work for reasonsof family honor, becausesurveysrarely ask about "secondary" employment,becausecensustakersmay not speakthe languageof
home-basedworkers who-especiallyin England,the United States,Canada, and Australia-are often immigrants, becausehome-basedworkers
themselvesmay not want to reveal their work and alert tax authoritiesand
enforcersof labor law, and becausesurveysof businessestablishmentsdo
not cover thesetypes of activities (Dixon 1982, 543-46). The practice of
undercountingwomen'shome-basedwork producesstartling outcomes.For
example, in Narsapur, India, the 1971 censusshowed 6,449 personsinvolved in householdindustries.But the main industry in town, with 8 million to 9 million rupeesa year in turnover, was home-basedlace making,
employingan estimated100,000women. Becauselace making was considereda leisureactivity of housewives,lace makersdid not appearas workers
FEMINIST STRUGGLE AS SOCIAL CONSTRUCTION 135
in the census(Mies 1982,49,54).In Turkey, carpetweaving was similarly
deemeda pastimesuitable for women and national employmentstatistics
did not count weavers,although they earnedabout half the householdincomeof poor families (Berik 1987,2,15,61).
In changingthe practicesof states,homeworkeradvocatesneedto combine changesin instruction-ruleswith Jaws that direct employersto define
homeworkersas employeesand with administrativeregulationsthat ensure
the properimplementationof suchlaws, as wen as making sure that homebasedwork is countedin censuses.Such directivesare likely to strengthen
changedimages of what home-basedworkers are and also are likely to
facilitate a sensethat home-basedworkersare entitledto workers' rights.
Ruleso/theLaborMarket
Labor market practicesreinforce rules that constructhome-basedworkers
as nonworkersand their work as secondaryand subordinate.On the face of
it, the rules of supply and demandare systemicand outside social control,
and genderbiasesare an unintendedconsequence
resultingfrom constraints
external to the labor market. But feminist critique has denaturalizedthe
rules of the market,pointing out that employersdraw on instruction-rulesof
gender in making employment decisions. Genderednotions of skill
(women's skills, such as sewing, are usuany defined as natural) and the
sex-typing of jobs form the labor market counterpartto the rules of the
household.They conspirewith the understandingthat home-basedworkers
are housewiveswho earn merely supplementalincome and whosework is
not important for family survival, to provide a powerful legitimation for
denyingsuchworkersbasicrights. Most perniciously,theserules legitimate
the puny wagesof home-basedworkers. There is overwhelmingevidence
that home-basedworkers almost invariably earn less than minimum wages
and less than their factory counterparts,lending credenceto the assertion
that theseworkers are "superexploited"(Mies 1982, 172-78; Prtigl 1992,
226-39,323-32).
Becausehome-basedworkers are definedas nonworkers,by the rules of
the labor market they often becomeself-employed(even though they may
actually qualify for employeestatusundernationallaw). The self-employed
constitutea default category, comprising all those who do not have employeestatus.In practice,the self-employedhaveconsiderablyfewer rights
and protectionsthan employees.Their role in the labor market is defined
througha "contractfor services;'in which they appearas individual sellers,
not of their labor power, but of a service. They negotiatethe price of that
service, are not coveredunder minimum wage laws, and fall outside the
136 ELISABETH PROGL
umbrella of collective bargaining. They set their own hours, do not earn
incomewhen sick or on vacation,and are responsiblefor their own training.
They lack any type of job security.
The rules of the market encourageself-employmentstatusfor all workers. From the perspectiveof employers,self-employedworkers are desirable becausethey reducelabor costs: Employerscan circumventstatutory
minimum wages and collective bargaining agreements,and they do not
have to provide a workplace and pay the overheadcosts associatedwith
maintaining a workplace. Furthermore,self-employedworkers allow employers flexibility: Employersdo not have to keep workers on the payroll
when no work is available and thus effectively transferpart of the risk of
doing businessto the workers.By resortingto self-employedworkersrather
than employees,employersincreasetheir chancesof successfullycompeting in the market.
Conditions of surpluslabor encouragesituationsin which workers will
make themselvesattractive to employersby assumingthe status of seIfemployment.As a result, most home-basedworkers in Africa, Asia, and
Latin America are defacto self-employed.The marketfunctions as a heteronomousinstitution in which workers becomecomplicit in their own exploitation. For women in addition, the rules of the householdand the state
encourageself-employment.Becauselabor laws have beenwritten largely
for male workers who have full control over their own labor power, they
make no allowance for flexibility. Women workers need such flexibility
becausethey needto integratefamily and householdduties with earningan
income.Despitethe considerablepotentialfor exploitation,rigid labor laws
leaveself-employmentas a desirableoption.
Thus the seeminglyinnocuousrules of supply and demandconspireto
keephome-basedworkersin a subordinateposition in the labormarket.The
challengefor homeworkeradvocatesis to shapethe rules of employment
contractsso that employerstake on the obligationsof ensuringbasicworker
rights while maintainingthe flexibility of home-based
work.
HomeNet International and the Struggle for
Home-basedWorkers
In March 1994, a group of homeworkactivists, representativesof international union federations, and ILO officers met in Brussels to launch
HomeNet International,a loose network of individuals and organizations
with the sharedaim of improving the lot of home-basedworkersaroundthe
world. HomeNet'spurposewould be to facilitate the exchangeand dissemination of information about home-basedworkers and their organizations
FEMINIST STRUGGLE AS SOCIAL CONSTRUCTION
137
and to coordinate an international campaign to improve the living and
working conditions of theseworkers. It was the Self-EmployedWomen's
Association(see p. 123), a nongovernmentalgroup from India, that called
the meeting.SEWA had worked with home-basedworkers for many years
and had actively lobbied the ILO to draft an internationallabor standardfor
such workers. SEWA was concernedthat homeworkeradvocatesmobilize
supportfor sucha standardin their countriesbecausethe 1995 International
Labor Conferencehad placed homework on its agenda.Among those atof SEWA, the National
tending the founding meetingwere representatives
HomeworkingGroup in the United Kingdom, the Associationfor the Establishment of a Self-EmployedWomen's Union in South Africa, and the
International Ladies' Garment Workers' Union in Canada; officers of
HomeworkSupportCentersand the CleanClothesCampaignin the Netherlands; and delegatesfrom internationalunion federationsand the International Labor Office (Ramirez 1995, 29-30). An all-female gathering,the
meeting constituted a section of the organizationalface of the global
women's movement.Feminists in nongovernmentalorganizationsjoined
forceswith thosein the ILO to pushthe casefor an internationalconvention
on homework.
The homeworkeradvocates'successin realizing the formalization of
rules to regulatehomework was built on long-standingefforts within the
of what it meansto be
global women'smovementto changeunderstandings
a home-basedworker. The "women in development"(WID) movement
provideda devastatingcritique of technicalassistanceefforts and economic
policies formulatedunderthe presumptionthat all womenwere nonworking
housewives.Such policies had a detrimentaleffect on women'sstatusand
frequently dcrailed developmentprojects. The WID critique initiated a
change in instruction-rules,creating awarenessthat home-basedwomen
contributed to national wealth. Increasingly, plannersand policy makers
understoodthat thesewomenwere workers.Homeworkeradvocatesparticipatedin this redefinition through researchand public advocacyas well as
throughconsciousness
raisingamonghome-based
workers.
The fight for an ILO conventionon homework drew strengthfrom the
degreeto which changedunderstandingsof women workers had become
accepted.Homeworker advocateshoped that the convention would lead
statesto issuedirective-rulesaboutthe way in which employersand officers
of the statewere to treathome-based
workers. Indian, British, and Canadian
advocatesespeciallyfound national legislation to be insufficient. Neither
country had homeworking laws, and all had encounteredthe damaging
effects of neoliberal economic restructuringfor unprotectedworkers. In
Britain, the Thatcheradministrationabolishedthe "trades boards,"which
138
ELISABETH PROGL
sincc the beginningofthe centuryhad establishedminimum wagesin "lowpay industries."While many advocatesfound the boardsproblematic,doing
away with them left British homeworkerswithout any legal recourse.In the
Canadiangarmentindustry, the effects of the North American Free Trade
Agreement (NAFTA) showed in the form of jobs moving south and in
increasedsubcontractingto home-basedworkers, many of them immigrants. Intensive lobbying yielded a few changesin regulationsbut no
substantivereform of the law. In India, SEWA had managedto get introduced to the Indian parliamenta homeworkerprotection bill, but the bill
neverreachedthe floor. In the contextof talk aboutopeningthe economyto
foreign investment and making the country intemationally competitive,
home-basedworkers and new regulationscarried low priority for Indian
lawmakers.Having encounteredless than sympatheticgovernments,Indian
andBritish advocatesin particulartumedto the internationallevel.
While advocatesexpendeda considerableamountof energyin lobbying
for an ILO conventionon homework, they retaineda realistic view of its
potentialeffects.Advocatesknew that legislationwas uselessin the absence
of strongorganizationsto standguardover its implementation.To makethe
laws a reality--to tum governmentorders into workers' rights---would require the interventionsof strong workers' organizations.But in India, the
Bidi and Cigar WorkersAct had taughtadvocatesthat having a law was in
itself a powerful organizing tool. SEWA activists used the act to gather
workers in the tobaccoindustry into their union while gaining them their
legal rights. Knowing that the Indian governmenttook very seriouslyany
ILO action, SEWA's aim was to use the conventionto lobby for a law for
all home-basedworkersand to maketheserights a reality for all.
ChangingInstruction-Rules
At the 1995 ILC, conflict arose over a photo exhibit, organized by
HomeNet,which was displayedat the entranceto the meetingroom of the
Committeeon Homework. Australian union representativescriticized the
exhibit as "too pretty," becauseit showed British homeworkersin tidy
homes, Indian homeworkersin colorful saris working togetherin front of
their houses,and Philippinehomeworkerscollaboratingon decorativecrafts
items. The Australiansaddedtheir own imagesof homeworkers: black-andwhite photos showing tired immigrants at sewing machinesin dilapidated
houses.HomeNet representativesdefendedtheir pictures, insisting that it
was necessaryto get away from the image of homeworkersas victimized
dupeswho haveno powerto changetheir own situation.
The photo exhibit constitutedan attack on instruction-rulesabouthome-
FEMINIST STRUGGLE AS SOCIAL CONSTRUCTION
139
basedworkers prevalentin union circles. Theserules define such workers
as outsidethe working class,unable to act in concerton their own behalf.
The advocates'attackson instruction-rulesabout home-basedworkers also
targetthe imagethat they are nonworkinghousewives.Researchand media
projectshaveprovidedtwo of the most salienttools in this effort.
Many homeworkeradvocacygroups have a close relationshipwith researchersand carry out considerableresearchthemselves.The Leicester
Outwork Campaign, one of the most successfulhomeworker advocacy
groups in Britain, has coordinatedresearchwith academicsand provided
them with data(Allen and Wolkowitz 1987). In turn, the British homeworking campaignsgained support from researchconductedby the Low Pay
Unit, a nongovernmentalorganizationwhich advocatesfor workers in lowpay industries.During the 1970s,its national surveyon homeworkin Britain had a strong impact in the media and fueled a national debateabout
introducing a law on homework (Tate 1995, 84). In South Asia, several
studies, some sponsoredby the ILO's Employment and Development
Branch,havegiven visibility to homeworkand preparedthe groundfor ILO
action (Singh and Kelles-Viitanen 1987; Bhatty 1981; Mies 1982). In
SoutheastAsia, an ILO project on improving the protectionof home-based
workers sponsoredand published researchfindings from Indonesia, the
Philippines,and Thailand,which laid the ground for organizingefforts and
raisedinterestwithin governmentalbureaucracies,including social security
agencies,which beganto look for ways to covertheseworkers(Homeworkersof SoutheastAsia 1992).
Typically, these studies unveil as a myth the image that horne-based
workers are housewives.They documentthe long hours theseworkers put
into their work; the significant contribution they make to family income;
and the importanceof their work in the local, national,and global economy.
They also documentthe variety of activitieshome-basedworkersengagein,
to counteraetunderstandingsthat homeworkis marginal and limited to the
gannentindustry. In doing so, they instruct their readersthat homeworkis
not just a hobby for housewives,but centralto the functioning of the economy. Thereforehomeworkersmust be consideredworkersjust like thosein
factoriesand offices.
Thosewho organizehome-basedworkers extensivelyuse researchas a
tool to effect change of consciousnessand as an entry to organizing.
Through interviews, they educatehome-basedworkers about their rights
and about ways to improve their situation. Researchalso helps them identify potentialleadersamonghome-basedworkers.Often organizersdraw on
home-basedworkers themselvesto becomeresearchersof their own situation, and suchinvolvementhas given workers a chanceto participatein the
140 ELISABETH PROGL
attackon unwarrantedinstruction-rulesin the processof defining their own
alternatives. For example, when studentsstarted the Leicester Outwork
Campaignin the early 1980s, they believed that homeworkerswould be
interestedin strugglingfor betterchild care,which would allow them to go
out and find better work. Action researchtaught the studentsthat most
home-basedworkers preferred to stay home with their young children.
Ratherthan wanting to agitatefor better child care, they were more interestedin strugglingfor betterand more flexible work arrangements.Homebased workers in effect disagreedwith the students' implicit view that
home-basedwork was undesirable--thatgood work and real work was that
which took place outsidethe home. Action researchfosteredan identification of thesehome-basedworkersas workers--althoughin a nontraditional
workplace. By changing self-identifications,action researchweakensinstruction-rulesthat definehome-basedworkersas not real workers.
In addition to research,advocatesuse audiovisualmaterialsto publicize
the notion that home-basedproducersare workers. British campaignshave
contributedto severalvideo productionswhich have beenmadeavailableto
national and international television. For example,"A-Z Homework" is a
short, professionallymade film that shows the different kinds of products
homeworkersmake, interspersedwith demandsfor just wagesand working
conditions.Its messagesare: first, homeworkis pervasiveand homeworkers
makemany everydayitems; and second;homeworkersare real workerswho
deserveto be treatedas such. The British campaignsalso participatedin an
ILO documentarymadefor and distributedon the occasionof the 1995 ILC.
Similarly, SEWA has beenthe object of at leastone documentaryshownon
U.S. public television, andit runs its own video project, through which its
membersdocumenttheir situationand demandtheir rights as workers.
Through these diverse interventions, homeworker advocateseffect
changesin an instruction-rule that is pervasivethroughout society. The
messagethat it is a myth to considerhome-basedworkershousewivesneeds
to reacheveryonefrom husbandsand neighborsto employersand governments. Defining home-basedworkers as workers is a first step toward
changingtheir inferior statusin society. Adding directive-rulesto instruction-rulescansupportthis change.
ChangingDirective-Rules
The establishmentof HomeNetInternationalsignals astep toward greater
coordination and organization among homeworkeradvocates.HomeNet
builds on the strengthof SEWA in particular,an accomplishedorganization
with tensofthousandsof members,its own bank,social insuranceschemes,
FEMINIST STRUGGLE AS SOCIAL CONSTRUCTION
141
severalcooperatives,and a good track record of using technical assistance
funds from internationaldonors. When SEWA leadersdecidedto push for
an ILO conventionon homework,they establishedlinks with and membership in internationaltrade union federationsand won their supportfor the
convention. This organizationalstrengthening,of which the formation of
HomeNetwas a part, positionedthe movementwell to begin formulating
directive-rules andto demand that stateswrite these directive-rulesinto
laws. HomeNet members'most important demandwas that home-based
workers shouldbe consideredworkersand gain the sameprotectionas other
typesof workers.
The ILO convention on homework achievesprecisely that. It directs
ratifying states to "adopt, implement and periodically review a national
policy on home work," and setsas the guiding principle for such a policy
"equality of treatmentbetweenhomeworkersand other wage earners."It
then lists the areas where equality of treatment should apply: "(a) the
homeworkers'right to establishand join organizationsof their own choosing ... ; (b) protection againstdiscrimination in employmentand occupation; (c) proteetion in the field of occupational safety and health; (d)
remuneration;(e) statutorysocial securityprotection;(1) accessto training;
(g) minimum age for admissionto employmentor work; and (h) maternity
protection" (International Labor Conference1996, 3). In legislative and
administrativepracticethis list will translatcinto directive-rulesdemanding
that employersand agenciesof the stateensureequaltreatment.
A home-basedworker who subcontractsfrom an intermediaryor from an
employerclearly belongsto a hierarchicalorganizationin which the provider of work rules by giving directives.Indeed,the commondefinition of a
dependentemployeeas "under the direction" of a work giver signals precisely this situation. Much of the discussionin formulating the convention
on homework centeredaround Article 1, which defined homeworkers:
Shouldthey be consideredpart of the work giver's organization,or did they
run their own enterprise?Were they in a dependentrelationship,or were
they self-employed?Employers insisted that it was impossible to decide
which home-basedworker was an independentcontractorandwhich was an
employee.Workers, on the other hand, insistedthat a combinationof criteria, mostimportantlygaugingeconomicindependence,
allowedfor sucha
decision. In defining a broad group of home-basedworkers as dependent,
the conventionnot only changedan instruction-rulethat identified homebasedworkers as nonworkersbut acknowledgedthat they were part of an
employer-definedorganizationalsetting and were guided by the directives
of this setting.
The task homeworkeradvocateshave setfor themselvesat this point is
142
ELISABETH PRUGL
not to changethesedirectivesbut to gain a broadacceptanceof the principle
that home-basedworkers are indeedpart of an employer'sorganization.At
the sametime, they seekto combinehome-basedworkersinto organizations
that will provide them the opportunity to more effectively negotiatetheir
interestsvis-a-vis firms and organizedemployers'interests.Changingdirectives is the bread and butter of such organizations.While a loose network may be sufficient to supportglobal aspirationsand efforts to change
instruction-rules,networkscannotsubstitutefor organizationsas actual vehicles effecting changesin the pay and treatmentof workers.
Changing Commitment-Rules
In most industrialized countries,employeescan expect employersto pay
minimum wages and to abide by certain regulations of working hours.
There is also a broad expectationthat workers will be allowed to organize
in unions and other associationsrepresentingtheir interests.The rules of a
"contract for services"are quite different. They commit the worker to produce an item by the time agreedupon and they commit the employerto do
no more than pay a price upon delivery. Self-employedworkers may, in
most democraticsocieties,have the right to join various groups, but their
right to organize in unions may be severelycircumscribed.For example,
when SEWA tried to register as a union, its requestwas denied because,
accordingto the registrar, self-employedworkers could not organize into
unions. Only after two years of argument and after the intercessionof
powerful union leaderscould SEWA registerlegally as a union.
The ILO conventionon homeworksignals a changeof theserules by setting, as a standardfor home-basedworkers,the rules of the employmentcontract. The challengesfor homeworker advocateswill be to turn the
directive-rulesimplied in the conventionand in laws that may result from the
convention into employer commitments,and to create among home-based
workers a senseof entitlementto employmentrights and protections.Unions
and homeworkeradvocacygroupsplayacrucial role in effecting suchcommitment-rulesby acting as watchdogsover the implementationof laws. Someare
doing so already.In Australia,the garmentunion hasincludedhomeworkersin
collective bargainingagreements;in India, SEWA watchesover violations of
the Bidi and Cigar Workers' Act and has taken employersto court to gain
workers their rights; in England,homework campaignsadvise homeworkers
about their rights underexisting law and publicize violations. For most homeworkers the problem is still that the laws are lacking, but the homeworkconvention provides a significant step toward writing better laws nationally and
toward realizingbasicworker rights for home-basedproducers.
FEMINIST STRUGGLE AS SOCIAL CONSTRUCTION
143
Conclusion
The purpose of this chapter is to illustrate the value of a constructivist
approachfor studying gender in global politics: that which is meant by
"womanhood" or "manhood," that which is demandedfrom women and
men, and the different roles women and men play in contractuallydefined
situations. It uses the caseof home-basedworkers to trace definitions of
gender through the mutually supportive rules of households,states,and
labor markets,and it showshow feminist activism unfolds as a challengeto
instruction-, directive-, and commitment-rules.In attackingrules, feminist
activists changeinstitutions. Householdsin which men no longer are the
undisputedbreadwinnerscan no longer uphold men'sauthority on the presumption that they ensurehouseholdsurvival. Statesin which supposedly
feminine preoccupationssuchas child care and the distribution of power in
householdsmove into the public realm can no longer legitimize thenotion
that men are better at ruling and administeringthe affairs of states.And in
labor markets where supposedlyfeminine skills and notions of women's
pay as supplementalare denaturalized,discriminatorytreatmentis no longer
justified. Activism changesrules, and rules changeinstitutions.
Yet structuresand institutions also circumscribethe activism of advocates.
Employeestatusand union organizing surfaceas the logical methodsof improving the wagesand working conditions of home-basedworkers, because
employeestatusand unions exist as well-establishedinstitutions with supporting rules codified in national and internationallabor laws and laws of association. Lobbying govemments(and by extensionthe ILO) for changesin laws
presentsitself as an effectiveapproach,becausethe rulesof democraticgovernment prescribe this venue. In contrast, advocatesabstain from demanding
ehangesto rules of supply and demandthat have assumedthe status of a
systemicimperativeundera capitalistmodeof flexible accumulation,andhave
beendefinedasoutsidehistory, no longeramenableto change.
Genderstatusesappearas bundlesof social rules anchoredin institutions
that reachfrom the local to the global. Gendercrucially definestheseinstitutions by "engendering"distributions of power within them (rules create
rule), and complementaryrules in different institutions effect a global subordinationof women. Feminist strugglehas targetedall types of rules in all
types of institutions, from the local to the global, and has destabilizeda
form of subordinationbasedon the fiction that women are housewives.For
home-basedworkers as well, instruction-rules that define them as true
workers are becominginstitutionalized;achievingpervasivedirectives and
commitmentsfrom governmentsand employers to gain equal rights for
home-workersremainsa taskto be accomplished.
144 ELISABETH PRUGL
Note
I would like to thank Nick Onuf for his thorough readingsof this paper and for his
constructivesuggestions.
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Martin's Press.
7
Internet GovernanceGoesGlobal
Craig Simon
Architectureis politics.
-Mitch Kapor
In the architectureofcontent,information becomesthe interface.
-EdwardTufte
The story that new ideasand technologiescan transform a societyand undermine establishedauthority is a familiar one. What will makethis telling different, I believe, is my use of the vocabulary of constructivism,following the
works of Nicholas Onuf (1989). The framework presentedby Onuf and other
constructivistsoffers far more power than traditional International Relations
(IR) frameworksto explain the rising significanceof the Internet and its governing institutions. Though kindred structurationistslike sociologist Anthony
Giddenshave beencited in various studiesofInternetpolicy (Zurawski 1997;
Uncapher 1994; Helmers, Hoffman, and Hoffman 1996), it is new territory
evenfor constructivistsengagedin IR.
I argue in this essaythat the standards-making
processfor global telecommunicationsis moving out of the handsof traditional state authorities into
the hands of people whose goals and loyalties are less national than commercial. Statesare not preparingto recapturethis power. Since the natureof
the newly constituted authority is inherently global, the effect, if trends
continue,will be to fortify the expansionof global rule, a processwhich is
alreadyunderway. Onufs framework is particularly well equippedto eval147
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uate whether Internet expansion representsa shift in effective authority,
whereasother IR frameworks overlook its counterhegemonicsignificance.
By explaining how rules make rule-how standardsmakers becomestandard bearers--{;onstructivismdraws attention to the most potent agentsof
global rule making.
We begin, therefore,by consideringthe generalplan of the new system's
vanguards,known to popularculture as the "digerati." This will be followed by
a discussionof the different ways constructivismand competingIR perspectives approachthe topic of rule making in telecommunications.The last section
appliesa constructivistanalysisto the ongoing efforts of the Internet'screators
to build new institutions and proceduresfor operatingthe Internet'saddressing
service,known as the domainnamesystem(DNS). If successful,thesechanges
would enlist the InternationalTelecommunicationsUnion (ITU) and other Geneva-basedorganizationsas agentsin support of global, rather than intergovernmental,goals.
The Digerati Agenda
The term digerati, a play on "digital literati," was coined by Nicholas
Negroponte, whoseBeing Digital (1995) exalted the impact of computerson
society. The word can refer loosely to anyonewho has facility with computers,
but is often appliedto industry pioneersand opinion leaders,severalof whom
are glamorizedin John Brockman'sDigerati: Encounterswith the Cyber Elite
(1996). Given their generally high level of media savvy and skill at selfmarketing,it is tempting to attribute their stardomto our society'sWarholian
obsessionwith wealth and fame. Thesemastersof microelectronicart are ready
made for celebrity, but their conspicuousstation in societyraisesan analytical
problem. Giving the digerati seriousconsiderationas an organizedmovement
might exaggeratetheir significance,imparting a substantivecoherenceto their
views that otherwisewould not exist, and therebycrediting them with an undeservedhistorical status.
Suchconcernsare outweighedby the unmistakableevidencethat the digital
telecommunicationsinfrastructurereachesnearly everywhereon the globe and
that, whereverit reaches,it transformssociety. Moreover, many people who
play key roles in designingthat structuredeclarethey are building a new order
which threatensthe primacy of sovereignstates.Healthy skepticismdemands
asking whether those assertionsare overblown, but we should not ignore the
fact that embellishedclaims to power play a role in any system of social
organization.
The digerati agendais bestsummedup in Metcalfe'sLaw, a term coinedby
economistGeorgeGilder in honor of Bob Metcalfe, owner of 3COM Corporation and inventor of Ethernet,the electronicprotocol usedby most networked
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personalcomputers.Metcalfe's Law states,"The value of a network can be
measuredby the squareof its numberof users."In short, "Connectedcomputers are better" (Metcalfe 1996). This suggeststhat connectingeveryone(and
perhapseverything)in the world througha global network of computerswould
be a beneficial and desirableproject. Adding membersto the system would
enable the network to achieve its fullest potential, and promises individual
empowermentas a consequence.
Metcalfe'sLaw is all-inclusiveand imperious.
It explicitly assertsthat global networking is a universal social good, and implicitly challengesthe exclusive norms of a world order basedon statesand
social divisions. The explicit part of the formulation is especiallyinteresting
becauseof a congruencewith formal theories of public goods and network
externalities.Economistsdefine public goodsas things whoseutility cannotbe
divided in a way that one person'smaximum use would diminish another's
benefit. Externalitiesrefer to the ways that investors recover costs from free
riders. The conceptof network externalitiesholds that the wider use of a thing
increaseseveryone'spotential benefit from it, as if a lighthouse could shine
more brightly when more ships find its beam, or as if the utility of a phone
systemimprovesby addingphonesto it, evensubsidizedones.
The implicit, counterhegemonicaspectof Metcalfe'sLaw follows from the
indivisible notion of public goods. Digerati trailblazerssharea tenaciousand
outspokendesireto overcomelimits on humancommunication.It is considered
heroic to build systemsthat enable escapefrom the binds of physical and
political space.Metcalfe's 1973 invention of Ethernet, for example,was inspired by an earlier engineeringfeat called AlohaNet, a wireless digital data
systemspanningthe Hawaiian islands. Tim Berners-Lee,creatorof the protocols that underlie the World Wide Web, summarizedhis work as creating a
"global information system" operatingacrossa "seamlesshypertext information space" (1992). His present activities involve developing systems of
"metadata"to providea universalcontentlabeling standardfor commercialand
social applications. Jaron Lanier, who pioneeredvirtual reality, describes
TransmissionControl ProtocollInternetProtocol (TCPIIP), the underlyingsoftware of the Internet,as a political "masterpiece"which will endureas a collaborativeachievementgreaterthanthe AmericanConstitution.
Embeddedin this rathersimple pieceof codeis a whole philosophyof life. A
whole philosophy of equality among people, of equal accessof people to
other people.A philosophythat anythingthat everyonehas to say is equally
worthwhile. A philosophythat peopleshould never be separatedfrom each
other, that there shouldn'tbe any standardhierarchythat tells them how to
relateto eachother. (Lanier 1997)
Consideralso the Teledesicventure,a digital communicationssystemconnectedthrougha backboneof 288 satellitesin low earthorbit, allowing usersto
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bypass the national seamsnow crimping land-basedphone and data lines.
Competingsystemswill also be deployed,but Teledesicis distinguishedby its
ambitious size and its high-profile founding investors---<:ell phone industry
pioneerCraig McCaw and Microsoft's Bill Gates.McCaw describedTeledesic
to a WashingtonPost reporteras "the ultimate egalitarianproduct" which will
"changedramatically the cultural patternsthe world was built on." "We are
granting peoplethe right to interactwith eachother," he said. "This will have
an impact on central authorities"(Mills 1997). Ironically, those sameauthorities are eagerto competefor contractsto launch such satellites from within
their presumablythreatenedborders.
To mix a famous phraseby Newt Gingrich with a lesserknown but equally
acuteone by a leadingconstructivist,AlexanderWendt, the Information Revolution is what we make of it. Many digerati considerthemselvesto be revolutionarieswho are particularly adeptat enlisting followers to their cause.A few
are becoming quite skilled at exploiting confusion and divisions among the
political leadersof the world's nation-states.Telecommunication,like sovereignty or religion, can serve as a tool for anyone who seeksto manageor
reorganizea society. Such tools offer a set of behaviors,institutions, and conceptsof social goodsthat amountto a kind of grammarthrough which leaders
and followers interact. Just as religious evangelismproducesconverts,just as
political ideas often acquire an imprimatur of substanceas they circulate, the
digerati ideologyadvancesits own self-fulfilling prophecies.
And considerhow many futurologistsand social soothsayershavebegunto
argue, quite persuasively, that acquiringand learning to use computerswill
advancea person'seconomicviability. As Gatestold readersof his column in
the New York Timessyndicate,"a Web lifestyle will take hold" as peoplelearn
it is the best way of adapting to life's bothers."You'll take the network for
granted," he wrote, "turning to it instinctively without a second thought"
(1997b). Within ten years,he foretells (perhapsoveroptimistically),all adults
will live a form of that lifestyle, and eventually everyonewill rely on it to
managefinancial transactions.In expressingchallengesto "central authority,"
Gates tends to be far less confrontational than his partner McCaw, but his
prediction neverthelesscontainsa demandingadmonition. The Web lifestyle
will presumablyoffer such a reliable, trustworthy, and universally available
facility for the conduct of commercial activity that it will be considereda
necessity.Any individual who shunsit will be foolhardy. Any collectivity that
tries to do so will be handicappingitself at greatperil.
Few technologieshave spurredsuch quick and dramatic social changesas
telecommunications,but neverbefore have the championsof an industry been
so bold aboutseekingto build an infrastructurethat can be both self-governing
and not only independentof the regulatorypowersof establishedstateauthorities but immuneto them. This ideologicalposition, promotingtelecommunica-
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tions as a meansto a wider social end, is what distinguishesthe digerati agenda
from numerousother tradeandprofessionalassociationsthat decry government
regulation. No other social movementhas dared to take such great practical
stridestowardtransformingstatesinto vestigial organsof the global body.
Judgingthis movementto be good or bad is anotherquestion.It is clear that
many digerati expressa desire to changethe world for the better, but it is far
too early to speculateabout whetherthey can effectively remedy the kinds of
injustice associatedwith the presentsystemof internationalrelations.The time
is ripe, however, to formulate a critique of their normative preceptsand their
philosophyof action. Since inequalitiesare inherentin every rule-basedpower
system,and since it is now becomingpossibleto sketch out the grandestfeatures of a digerati-styledsystem,one can try to anticipatewhat types of inequalities may result if the digerati agendareachesfruition. In other words, how
will it impact the circumstancesin which peoplefind themselves?
Cyber Shockwaves
Though information technologyis widely acceptedto be the hallmark of our
age, it is not necessarilya boon for humankind.The impact of electronicmedia
on culture is much discussedthese days, as is the rise of "internetworked"
computing in businessand education,and not always in glowing terms. Advancedindustrial economieshave experiencedhigh investmentin computers,
making the machinesnearly ubiquitous. Yet growth in workplaceproductivity
has not kept pace (Sichel 1997; Thurm 1997). As cognitive psychologist
ThomasLandauerdemonstratedquite clearly in The Trouble with Computers
(1995), computersare too complexfor most peopleto useany more effectively
than typewriters and regular mail. Still, we who depend onthesedevicesfeel
that we could not get by without them. Despite the trials they force us to
endure,and despitethe degradationof our skills and investmentswrought by
eachnew generationof software and hardware,we generally feel these tools
have enabledus to do new things, more quickly, and in greaterquantities.We
are convincedthey are an essentialtool for the future. Unfortunately,we have
good causeto doubt whetherthe next versionof a programwill fix more than it
breaks, or whether the next model of a machine will perform any more
smoothly than the last. We have learnednot only that we must abide by new
standardsas they emergebut also that the standardsto which we submit may all
too soon be declaredobsolete.Inability to completea task becausea computer
"won't take it," either becauseof inflexibility or flaw in design, is an increasingly familiar refrain.
Technology'sbenefits may be inconsistent,but its broad social impact is
undeniable,especiallywith regardto telecommunications.Landauer'sfindings
show that computerizationof the public telephonenetwork has brought about
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significant boosts in worker productivity while adding carrying capacity and
switchingspeedat a fast pace(Landauer1995, 169-70;also Noll 1997; 64-71).
Now financial and media sectorshave joined the market to createeven more
advancedtopologies.The nerve centerof the telecommunicationsindustry has
becomethe showcaseperformerof the information age. Its improvementscorrelate with other transformationsin society, including vast changesin investment patternsand workplace organization,a steady seriesof giant corporate
mergers,historic changesin law, and heateddebatesin public policy regarding
censorship,monopoly, and tariff regulation. Much of the boom in telecommunications focuses on the Internet, which not only is a catch-all term for a
burgeoningcollection of infrastructuresand applicationsbut also may prove to
be the platform throughwhich personalcommunicationsand massmedia technologiesconverge(Akimaru, Finely, andZhieseng1997).
As digital telecommunicationsbecomemore pervasivearoundthe globe, its
applicationsare likely to intrude more and more deeply into people'slives. The
currenttrajectoryof investmentinvites informedspeculationthat, within two or
three decades,innovations in the delivery of television, radio, and traditional
voice phone servicesmay transform digital data servicesinto a qualitatively
new form of technology.The scientistswho are developingthe prototypeplatform for future media convergencerefer to it as Nexus (Low 1997). Prognosticating further, by the middle of the next century, basic facility with that
integratedtechnologywill likely be as essentialto humansocializationas mastering skills like telling time, using money, reading maps, or recalling one's
addressand phone number. New generationsof surveillanceequipmentand
personalinformation collection softwarewill increasinglyassaultour concepts
of privacy and autonomy,enforcing an omnipresentdiscipline of social monitoring that many theorists call panoptic (Gandy 1993; Boyle 1977; Ashley
1983). The implicationsof the Web lifestyle far surpassthe novelty of ordering
pizza through the Internet: As did the making of clocks and maps in antiquity,
creation of the Web lifestyle involves the constructionand applicationof devices that extendhumanknowledgeand activity past local boundsof time and
space.These devices free us to coordinateourselvesacrossthose bounds in
dramatically new ways, but they limit us as well. Imbued with the belief that
those devicesshow the way to prosperity,we are forced to keep step with the
world beator elsebe trampledin the march. In a similar vein, Anthony Giddens
usesthe metaphor"Riding the Juggernaut."Modernity, unharnessed,
threatens
to run amok, crushingeverythingin its path (1990).
This raisesinterestin how to assessthesephenomenain theoreticalterms. It
is one thing to identify these global drummers--thepeople who make "the
rules." It is anotherto ask what they think they are doing and how they define
their interests.Digerati culture hasspawnedits own forms of political ideology,
theoriesof economics,and canonsof literature,as well as a few martyrs. There
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is considerableevidenceshowing that the membersof that culture are becoming consciousof their collective identity on the basisof their sharedinterestin
expandingand securingthe Internet. It is also possibleto reveal their strategic
assaulton the ability of statesto regulateInternetand othertelecommunications
activity within national borders.Therefore,my inquiry concernsthe intentions
of the central agents of modem technological change, recognizing that the
sociopoliticalimplicationsof their work may be profound.
Let us briefly review how other observersof global affairs approachthese
questions.
Making Senseof the Information Revolution
Much of the currentgrowth in the scaleand scopeof digital telecommunications
is
due to technical innovation, but the far-reaching economic initiatives of the
Reagan-Thatcher
era earn specialcredit. An apt metaphorregardingthe deregulatory, pro-competitive legacy of those years was invented by New York Times
columnistThomasFriedman.The "goldenrecognizably
strai~acket,"
he wrote, "is all the rules
set down by global markets for how a country has to behaveeconomicallyif it
wants to thrive in today'sworld" (1997). The "golden straitjacket"is the tendency
of political leadersto tie their handsand pledgenoninterventionin their national
economies,in exchangefor the promisesof growth andprosperity.The breakupor
privatizationof national telephoneand telegraphmonopolieshasplayedout differently aroundthe world, however.The contrastis especiallystarkbetweenindustrialized nationsand underdevelopedones.Ben Petrazzini,for example,reflects the
conventionalwisdom in the field of comparativepolitics, concludingthat the "demise" of public phone monopolies in less developedcountries was motivated
primarily by fiscal decline,promptingpolitical leadersto sell off nationalindustries
in exchangefor infusionsof foreign capital (1995). Legal scholarsfind themselves
in rich but unchartedterritory. The Information Age has spawnedwhole new sorts
of crimes,augmentedby real confusionaboutwhere suchcrimes occurand about
who hasjurisdiction in cyberspace(Kahin andNesson1997).
IR specialistshave also begun to take notice. JosephNye and William
Owens(1996) have written aboutthe strategicopportunitiesand vulnerabilities
thesetechnologiescreatefor the United Statesin the global balanceof power.
Jill Hills (1994), following SusanStrange,showsthat advancedWesternindustrial stateshave foisted a liberal economicorthodoxy (basedon open markets
and monetarypolicy) upon the world, granting wide autonomyto large multinational corporations,while essentiallyprivatizing internationalorganizations.
This allows such states to translate the structural power they once enjoyed
(when outright coercionwas more easily applied) into a relationalpower better
suitedto currentcircumstances.Shefinds thesechangeslamentablein that they
subjectweakerstatesto new forms of dependency.
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Other studiesoffer practical guidanceto policy makerswho favor interstate
cooperation.Peter Cowhey (1990) upholds the fashionableIR theories of regimes and epistemic communities.His widely read study of the norms and
principles at work in intergovernmentalorganizationsfocused on the ITU's
predecessor,the InternationalTelephoneand TelegraphConsultativeCommittee (CCITT). Cowhey rejects the functionalist notion that the telecommunications regime is a supranationaltechnocraticexercise,describingit insteadas a
negotiating venue between separateentities committed to efficient national
operations. Large transnationalcorporate consumersof telecommunications
services,primarily banksseekingto reducethe cost of operations,were the first
to press their governmentsfor systemic reform in an organized way. This
promptedthe leading industrial statesto reassessthe costsof maintainingtheir
national telecommunicationsmonopolies,allowing them to accept privatization, competition, and the end of protectionismas a bargain that promised
betterpayoffs.
Despite contrastsin perspectivesand conclusions,all these authors work
within frameworksthat representstatesas rationally motivated,seeminglypersonified, territorial-basedactors. Their intent is to discussthe forces that constrain and propel thosestates,and how other statescan perhapsbe outfinessed
in light of those forces. An alternative,nonterritorial perspectiveis presented
by Craig Murphy's neo-Gramsciangeneralstudy of global governance(1994).
What Murphy shareswith the other authors,however, is the assumptionthat
somemasterscript is in play, guiding if not determiningthe behaviorof actors
on the world stage.The distinction for Murphy is that the leadingprotagonistin
this historic dramais global capitalism.
Each of thesescholarsseeksto understandan actor'sessenceby way of the
actor's environment.To postulatethat systemic forces like the drive for efficiency or strategicadvantagecan motivate transformations
of the telecommunications infrastructureis to posit that suchforces can rule internationalbehavior.
Following this logic, exogenous(external) structural forces would rule human
behavioras well, cagingpeople within fixed bars of the social world. An antithetical perspectivecomesfrom the post-modemmovement.Denying that substantivematerial factors of the environmentcan exert such rule, Andrew Barry
seestelecommunicationstechnologysimply as an instrumentthat mediatescommunication in society, enabling self-governancerather than constraining it
(1996). By suchlogic, self-governanceis an endogenous(internal) voluntary act
which may foster liberation or punishment,but the deviceswhich transmit the
gazeof socialdiscipline receiveno credit or blamefor the outcome.
Consideringtheseissuesas a constructivistrequiresformulating a position
that subsumesthe exogenous-endogenous dichotomy,
a split that echoesin
debatesbetweenpositivists and the various post-positivists,post-modernists,
and post-structuralistswho constitutethe post-modemmovement.Reconciling
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thesepoleswill give a clearersenseof how technologystandardsconstrainand
enable human activity, and how standardscan provide the mechanismsthat
simultaneouslyregulateand constitutehumansociety.
Constructing Standards
Unlike the authors just mentioned, constructIvistsrely on an interpretive
schemethat explains social rule by categorizingthe origins and outcomesof
social rules. The axioms that "rules make rule" and "rules put resourcesinto
play" distinguishconstructivismfrom positivist and Marxist philosophiessuch
as realism, neo-liberalism,and historical materialism,which look first at the
ways resourcesdeterminestructureand then at specific social outcomes."Post"
movementauthorsoften focus on the materialoppressionand feelingsof meaninglessnessthat result from a world ruled by positivist philosophies.Critical
authorsof the "post" movementexpressa desireto developpracticalstrategies
for emancipationfrom thosedilemmas.We canclarify the distinctionsbetween
the philosophiesof positivism and the "post" movementby recognizingthat
they are often taken to be equivalentto thosethat divide modernismand postmodernism.The former may be understoodas faith in efficiency, rationality,
perfectibility, the accumulationof knowledge, and collective progress. The
latter insists on existentialidentity and self-expression,often in the context of
free-floating relativism. Post-modernistsregardpeople'simaginationsas situational and unlimited, unboundedby the possibility of resolving down to a
common interpretationof the world. One might say that the positivists try to
seea single world by standingoutsideit, while the "post" movementgrantsthe
existenceof infinite perspectives,placing individuals inside our own myriad
worlds, looking out in endlessdirections.
Constructivismplays both sidesagainstthe middle, but not as a facile compromise. The challenge is to retain the positivists' scientific commitment to
inquiry, probing for the fundamentalstructureof things while understandingthat
interpretationis a humanact, limited by the necessityof symbol, the gravity of
memory,and the imperfectibility of language.When studyingsociety,positivists
look for measurablestructuralvariablesthat can be said to causehumanbehaviors. Their traditional researchinterestis the extent to which material structure
makessocial behaviorpredictableand involuntary. Constructivists,on the other
hand, see human behavior and social structure as inseparable,simultaneous,
co-constitutedoccurrences,but rooted in deeds of human urgency. Whereas
adherentsof the "post" movementare keen to celebratethat urgency, their
observationsoften scatter into solipsistic relativism, denying that any claims
aboutcausecan be trusted.In distinction, constructivistslook for the institutionalized routines of social practicethat stem from humanperformance.One can
and should seek to identify constantsacrosssocial structures,with the caveat
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that doing so is itself an act of social constructionwhich inventsand reproduces
contingentbelief in that constancy.To establishhabitsthat comportwith "Reality," wrote logician CharlesS. Peirce in 1877, "we seekfor a belief that which
we shall think to be true" (1955, 11). Constructivisminevitably reflectsthe limits
of language.Like all myths and scientific theories, IR's "isms" offer grand
statementsabout the world, instructing people how to make senseof reality so
that they can comprehendit and thereforeact within it. We humansare not as
unfettered as the "post" movement imagines us to be, or as limited in our
freedomsas the positivistsexpect.The point is to rememberGiambattistaVico's
principle ofverumJactum:what we recognizeas true is what we havemade.
The constructivistoutlook attemptsto recognizethat all humandeedsstandas
moral choices,with constitutiveeffectsthat extendbeyondimmediatesituations.
And regardlessof the mind-setreflectedin an instruction, a person'sacceptance
of that instructionwill fortify the hegemony-theauthoritativeinfluence----ofits
originators and its vocal proponents.For Onuf, social instructionsplay out in
two sorts of ways. In fonnal organizationswhere the instruction might be "the
boss is in charge," they situate people in offices requiring compliancewith
directionstransmittedthrougha hierarchicalchain of command.Alternatively, in
more opensocial environmentswhere the instructionmight be "buy low and sell
high," people will tend to behave like membersof a heteronomyin which
behavioralroles are regulatedand constrainedby commitmentsnegotiatedwith
otherswho adhereto the sameinstruction.
Applying constructivismmeansanalyzing socialbehaviorsand rules embedded in the speechacts of peoplewho occupy somestatus,office, or role, within
variousnetworks,organizations,and associations.
Understandingthe instructive,
directive, or commissivenature of those rules gives an insight into who is "in
charge,"and what kind of rule--hegemonic,hierarchical,or heteronomous--is
being exercised.It is beyond the scope of this work to explain the source of
constructivism'svarious trichotomies,exceptto note that it revealsthe influence
of three-partcategoricalschemesdevelopedby Peirce,Giddens,and others.As a
constructivist,to ask an individual who or what is "in charge"is not only to ask
what meaningthat ruler or rule has for them, but to appreciatethat a person's
interactionwith a rule ascribesmeaningto it. Rules arise from intersubjectivity,
and cannotexist without humanauthorship.This fonnulationallows constructivism to cleave the positivist-"post" divide. We can acknowledgethat the rules
that define a person'sidentity and interestmay seemfixed and persistentfor that
individual at a certainpoint in time, but suchrules are transfonnable.An observation madeby Peirce'scolleague,psychologistWilliam James,providesa useful illustration.
The antimilitarist Jamesis still rememberedfor asking whether a "moral
equivalentof war" could be fosteredin peacetime.Intrigued by the "supremest
and extremist" fonns of sacrifice and effort displayed by men in battle, he
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wonderedhow to summonthe passionate "spiritualenergy" of soldiers for a
common good, rather than internecineconflict (l972b, 295). After inquiring
into the sourceof "martial virtues," which he admired, Jamesconcludedthat
the "oughts" that motivate a person stem from the individual's pride in the
body (tribal, national, etc.) by which he or she is "owned" (l972b, 298). Anyone who can inculcatein othersa senseof oughtand, consequently,obligation
in social situationsis simply telling peoplewhat rules to follow (l972a, 220).
More to the point, anyonewho can inculcatea senseof belongingand identity
in addition to this or that "ought" has madea biggermove, facilitating a system
of rule. Let us saythat someone'ssenseof being ownedis equivalentto feeling
part of somethingbiggerthan oneself:a faith, a nation,an institution, a club, or a
meeting. To pledgeallegianceto that group, to obey that group'srules, to perform someother social interactionwith referenceto that group, or evento say it
exists is to instantiatethat momentof ownershipin which the institution transforms identity. Jamesrecognizedthat interactionas a pragmaticopening.Social
constructioncan involve the simplest tasks of coordination or the grandest
schemesof ethical unification. Society makes "man" just as "man" makes
society,simultaneously,all the time.
In the caseof the digerati agenda,then, it is important to investigateany
canonicalinstruction or principle usedto enlist participantsa group that shares
common goals. Who would adopt Metcalfe's Law as a creed worth fighting
for? Self-professedNetizens (Internet citizens) are potential candidates,but
their presenceis small, focusedaroundthe monthly magazineWired as well as
a few libertarianand Left-leaning Web sites. Their currentbehaviorresembles
an unruly debatingsociety more than a political movement.Still, even if the
rights and dutiesassociatedwith Netizenshipare informal, vague,and unknown
beyonda small circle of adherents,the notion of using the global telecommunications infrastructureto createalternativeforms of political associationbears
watching.
The "Web lifestyle" anticipatedby Gatesis a considerablymore potentand
immediatelyrelevantdeclaration.When askedhow he makessuchpredictions,
he answered,"I'm trying to draw a map thatconnectsthe presentto the future"
(l997b). For him to say the Web lifestyle will soon exist is to suggestit exists
now, since"getting ahead"requiresthat we preparefor it. The predictionstands
as an instruction that future humanbehaviorwill increasinglyrequire interaction acrossthe Internet, or a relatedmedium. Announcingan instructive claim
of such import standsas a hegemonicassertionpertinentto anyonewho feels
he or she belongsto modemsociety. Beyond his confirmed businessacumen,
Gates'spreeminentstatuswithin global industry gives his opinionsthe aura of
objective knowledge. For those seeking initiation into the world of wealth
creation,Gates'srank as the world's richest self-mademan gives him a priori
authority, akin to the traditional authority commonthroughoutpretechnological
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cultures."[MJaternal unclesdo not transmit [aJ particularstock of knowledge
becausethey know it, but they know it (that is, are defined as knowers), becausethey are maternaluncles" (Bergerand Luckmann1966, 70-71).
In this sense,by pronouncingan is, Gatesurges an ought. That samepronouncementcorrespondsto a set of directives given to Microsoft employees
and subcontractors,marshalingthe organization'sresourcestoward the goalof
completing specific projects. And it also servesas a commitmentwithin the
marketplace,declaringthat Microsoft's resourceshave beenput at risk in the
expectationthat consumersand other enterpriseswill commit their own resourcesto the sameproject. By predicting a Web lifestyle, Gatesconstructsit.
Those who may eventually adopt that lifestyle will also play a role in its
construction,so that the institution and the person'sidentification with it are
simultaneouslyco-constituted.We can think of a phenomenonand its practitioners separately,but they are not separable.One cannot exist without the
other. A path cannotbe called a path without the peoplewho walk it. This is no
subtle point; the notion of co-constitutionis at the heart of constructivism's
critique of both positivismandthe post-modernmovement.
Arguably, the only reality social beings can know is socially constructed,
since even the most rigorously scientific disciplines of knowing are mediated
by a languagethat explainsthings in terms of persistent,humanly manageable
tools like logic or the study of causeand effect. To break from positivism and
"postism" is to acknowledgeone's consciousparticipation in the act of construction, while simultaneouslyrecognizing that, without attention to social
structure, there can be no meaningful way to ground identity. The issue is
whetherwe believe we are collectively subjectto a universalfate, individually
mastersof a uniquely private reality, or pragmaticallyadaptive to the world
aroundus. It is not unusualfor many peopleto jumble these attitudestogether
as it suitsthem on different issues,with little concernfor their own discipline of
thinking. The samedistinctionsplay out in attitudestoward the social significanceof the growth of telecommunications.The digerati agendaexploits this
confusion,promotingthe modernistimpulse to heraldthe adventof the "New
World Information Order," while celebratingpost-moderndesiresto fabricate
multi-userdungeonsin virtual reality.
I intend to show that a particularvirtue of the constructivistapproachis its
ability to explain how the claims of universalismand equality inherent in an
instruction-rulelike Metcalfe'sLaw disguisethe conditions of inequality that
emergefrom successivewaves of technologicalinnovation. Such inequalities
can privilege certain innovatorsor stakeholders,therebycreatingor perpetuating monopoly power. Another virtue of the theory is its strengthin explaining
how the design and implementationof seeminglyarcaneelectronic standards
are facilitating the worldwide triumph of an institutionalizedethos in which
market-stylebehaviorsreign supreme.In other words, summoningan earlier
INTERNET GOVERNANCE GOES GLOBAL
159
metaphor,the freshestknots in the golden straitjacketsworn by nation states
havebeentied by computerexperts.
Of course, it is not unusual for contemporaryanalysts to discuss the
challengesthat modemforms of electronicallymediatedcommercepresentto
nation-states.Legal scholarMichael Froornkin usesthe term regulatory arbitrage to describe the ease in with which Internet-savvytraders can exploit
differencesin national laws to their own advantage.Yet he is optimistic about
this, predicting the effect will "probably be to promote liberal democraticvalues of opennessand freedomand not to detractfrom modemstates'legitimate
regulatorypowers" (1997, 155). On the other hand, economistStephenKobrin
worries that new technologieswhich enablethe use of digital money (e-cash)
are a "sovereignty killer." "[T]he advent of e-cash raises serious questions
aboutthe very idea of 'domestic'and 'international'as meaningfuland distinct
topics" (1997, 71). Constructivismallows us to take such analysisa step further, however, beyond discussionsof a weakenedsovereignty,toward an understandingof its co-constitutedsuccessororder. Consequently,we need to
understandwhat sort of rules arebecomingmore importantin people'slives.
It is appropriatehere to considerthe definition of the word standard.In the
English languageit derives from "stand hard," the rallying point in a battle at
which a heraldic bannerwas raised so that field commanderscould locate the
sourceof their orders. The word now has multiple meanings,including "flag"
and "a rule set up by an establishedauthority." Every standardworks literally
and figuratively as a social arrangement.Cultural symbolsare easyto recognize
as such when people are physically assembledaround a common focal point.
Sharedbehaviorsmanifest such assembliesas well, the more so when people
acknowledge theircommonpractices,reflect upon them, and makethemformal.
When peoplelook to a standardfor instruction, they are simultaneouslyconstituting an arrangementof peoplewho are "pointing" to that standard.New arrivals at the scenemay learn what a standardis just by pointing in the same
direction as others. In that sense,the standardhas regulatorypower as well as
constitutive effect. We organize ourselvesaccording to the standardswe acknowledge.We make standardsby following them. They re-presentwhat we do
and sayaboutthem.
To shuna pervasivestandardis to fall out of stepwith one'speers,proving
one'sdisloyalty to a group'snorms(Fletcher1993).This investsstandardswith
an ethical power. By stipulatingwhat is, standardsoperationalize"oughts." We
may refer to standardsas self-enforcingor self-surveilling,but, as adherentsto
the various "post" movementsrecognize,our willing participation in a social
arrangementis essentialto it. Thus we may say that a rule is drawn from the
consentof the people who practiceit, and that every rule, to qualifY as such,
must incorporateone or more standards.An intriguing and practical line of
questioning,then, is how peopleenlist supportfor new standards.Let us now
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CRAIG SIMON
tum to an aspectof standardsmaking by a group of digerati that combines
practicalandsymbolic importance,and the effectsof which will be felt within a
few years,ratherthan in many decades.
Internet Ownership and the Public Trust
The Internethas a root, technically called a root zone (often written as "." and
pronounced"dot"), which servesas the authoritativedirectory to all locations
properly registered withinthe system(for an exhaustiveexplanation,seeKahin
and Keller 1997,Rony and Rony 1998). At the time of this writing in 1997,the
primary root of the Internet sits on serverA, a machinein Herndon,Virginia,
which containsa databaselisting many of the namesand addressesof the tips
of the Internet'sbranches,properly referredto as hosts,of which thereare now
well over 20 million (nw.com). Hosts constitutethe end points on which data
reside, and the devicesthrough which peopleaccessthe system.Though host
computersmust be uniquely numbered,peopleprefer using memorablewords
and acronyms.Consequently,an important function of the root is linking domain namesto host numberswhile ensuringthat no two hostsare assignedthe
samename.
Day-to-dayresponsibility for managingserverA's databaseis currently in
the handsof Network Solutions,Inc. (NSI). Additions and revisionsto the host
addressdata on serverA immediatelypropagateto serversB through M, and
then on throughout the Internet, cached(stored) in name serversaround the
world. Those name servers, run by Internet service providers (ISPs), from
giantslike America On Line down to the humblestentrepreneur,all userouting
software,which serveroperatorsvoluntarily point backup the chainto serverA
for instructions on how to direct traffic around the system. Therefore,when
individuals sende-mail through the Internet or "surf' the Web, their transmissions are routed aroundthe systemon the basisof the contentsof the root and
reproducedin compliantnameservers.
Responsibilityfor operatingInternet'sroot is expectedto changehandsin
1998, either in April when NSI's five-year contractwith the National Science
Foundationexpires,or six months later if necessary,after an optional "rampdown" period, during which new operatorswill take over. But it is not yet clear
who thosenew operatorswill be. A battle has beenbrewing for severalyears
over how to expandthe top level of the domain namesystem(DNS), and who
will be in chargeof adding new top-level genericsuffixes, like firm, web, arts,
and info. The existing generic names,edu, org, net, and especiallycom, are
filling quickly, and are primarily an Americanpreserve.Many digerati seethe
upcomingtransition as an opportunity to acceleratethe Internet'sgrowth as a
platform for global telecommunications
convergence.Fulfillment of Metcalfe's
Law requiresbuilding a systembig enoughto encompassworld society,result-
INTERNET GOVERNANCE GOES GLOBAL
161
ing in somethingfar lessAmericanin characterthanat present.U.S. politicians,
not surprisingly, have pledged to maintain control. Upon learning that the
Internet's designerswere planning to move the root oversight functions to
Geneva,RepresentativeCharlesPickering (R-Mississippi), head of the House
Science Subcommitteeon Basic Research,declared, "This is something
uniquely American. That part of the [plan] is not going to sell very well--not
here,not on Main Street."
To investigatethis controversyis to plunge into an acronym soup of standards-makingbodies, intergovernmentalagencies,and other organizations
which built the Internetand which claim a stakein its future. To abbreviatethe
story, we may begin with two groupswhoseleaderstestified before Congressman Pickering's committee: The Internet Society (ISOC), headedby Don
Heath (previously employedby MCI and British Telecom), and the Internet
AssignedNumbersAuthority (lANA), headedby Jon Postel(a veteranhandof
Internet engineering,currently basedat the University of SouthernCalifornia's
Information ScienceInstitute [lSI]).
ISOC and lANA are key forces behind the effort to constitute a policy
oversightcommittee(POC), which would take over authority of DNS management whenNSI's contractexpires.NSI would still be allowed to provide domain name registration services, a lucrative business,but NSI's monopoly
would end, to be replacedby a globally competitive framework of registrars.
Thesewould, in tum, participatein a council of registrars(CORE), incorporated in Geneva.POC activities would be reviewedby a public advisory body
(PAB), representingthe interestsof Internet stakeholders.The details of this
plan were initially presentedon February2, 1997, by the InternationalAd Hoc
Committee(IAHC), a group directedby Heath. The IARC plan was formally
establishedthrough an instrumentknown as the Generic Top Level Domains
Memorandumof Understanding(gTLD-MoU, or simply MoU). Unfortunately
for MoU supporters,the signing ceremonyhostedby the International TelecommunicationsUnion (lTV) in Genevaon April 29, 1997 did not go as they
might havehoped.
Private industry'S responsewas lukewarm. The MoU neededa more resounding endorsementfrom telecommunicationscompanies,service providers, and other Internet businessesas an indication of legitimacy among
Internet stakeholders.PSINet, an important early supporterof the IAHC, denouncedthe MoU and called for a global Internetconventionwith Vice President Al Gore as moderator. The following week, in responseto mounting
criticism, substantialchangeswere announced,removing provisionsfor a lottery that would have limited the number of total registrarsto twenty-eight,
coveringsevenglobal regions.
The public sector'sinitial responsewas also cold. Days before the ceremony, the U.S. StateDepartmentleakeda memo from Madeline Albright ex-
162
CRAIG SIMON
pressing"concerns"about the ITU secretariat'sacting "without authorization
of membergovernments"to hold "a global meetinginvolving an unauthorized
expenditureof resourcesand concludingwith a quote internationalagreement
unquote" (Sernovitz 1997; Wylie 1997). The EuropeanCommissionalso expressedconcerns.In July the U.S. Departmentof Commerceinitiated a notice
of inquiry (Nor), soliciting public commenton the expirationofNSI's monopoly. The controversy continued to escalate,prompting hearings before the
Pickering'ssubcommitteein late September.
Americancritics of the MoU complainthat authority for resolvingdisputesover
contendeddomain names would move beyond the jurisdiction of U.S. courts.
Disputeswould insteadbe settledby administrativechallengepanels(ACPs) under
the administrationof the Arbitration and Mediation Centerof the World Intellectual PropertyOrganization(WIPO). MoU supportersarguethat clearer,more evenhanded proceduresare necessaryto reduce the likelihood of arbitrary and
inconsistentdecisions.UnderNSI's guardianship,registrationand hostingof existing brandnameslike mcdonalds.comby third partieswasallowedunlessthe brand
owner took stepsto demonstrateprior rights. NSI transferreda nameto the proven
owner only when the initial registrantagreed,or after litigation (InterNIC 1996),
and in confusing situations,would put contendednames"on hold." One notable
exampleinvolvedpeta.org, a nameclaimedby Peoplefor the Ethical Treatmentof
Animals (PETA) but initially registeredto the promoter of PeopleEating Tasty
Animals (Doughney1996). An evenmore vexing disputearoseoverprince.com, a
properly registeredtrademarkof distinct companiesin different countries,serving
as a lessonin the challengesof regulatinga global infrastructurethrougha patchwork of nationalcourts(OppedahlI997).MoU supportershopethat expandingthe
rangeof generictop-level nameswill reducethe cachetof namesending in com,
abating explosive demandsfor that suffix. But the MoU's successwill hinge in
large part on the ability of the POCIPAB/COREIACP institutional structure to
resolve disputesover contendedresources.Thus POC choseas its first president
David Maher,an attorneywhosespecialityis internationaltrademarksand intellectual property.
Let us now considerthe DNS transitionfrom the perspectiveof constructivist categories.
With regard to instruction-rule, further commercializationof the Internet
would both follow and reinforce the pro-businessnorms that permeatemodem
industrial states.Adam Smith'sguiding handwould becomean even freer one.
There are competingproposalsto establishroot serverconfederations(RSCs)
that take a far less centralized,even cowboyish, approachto the question of
DNS management.RSC supportersthus claim a more faithful allegianceto the
free market principle. Advocatesof the MoU, in tum, are likely to wave the
bannersof the Internet'sfounding mothersand fathers, assertingtheir legacy
and statusas reveredauthorities.
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163
With regard to commitment-rule,breakingNSI's monopoly and creating a
global marketfor domainregistrationwould augmentcompetitionon the Internet, where consumerscan already choose from many sourcesfor hardware,
software,and contentvendors,as well as, to a lesserdegree,Internet connection services.This casedemonstratesthe intentionality inherentin markets.To
eliminate a monopoly, somethingmust be createdin its space.Moreover, students of IR who are concernedwith the constructionof internationalrelations
should pay close attentionto the new forms of judicial associationestablished
through the MoD. Switching domain name dispute resolution venues from
nationalcourtsto Geneva-based
ACPs would constitutean expresslynew form
of commitment-rulewhich could eventuallyinfluenceglobal trademarklaw.
With regardto directive-rule,the ability to coordinatecompliantdeviceson the
Internetis of fundamentalimportancefor stabilizing the day-to-dayoperationsof a
"Web lifestyle." Ensuring that Internet service providers all point to a common
authority like CORE for domainnameinformation promotesthat goal. Replanting
the standardof the Internet'sroot may appearto be an obscuretechnicalexercise,
but it would havea pivotal impact,perhapssimilar to thoserarehistoricalmoments
when new calendarsor systemsfor calibrating time are instituted. Whetherthis
transitionwill be smoothor traumaticremainsto be seen.
Extending the Internet Domain
This disputeover ownershipof the DNS root raisesthe recurringquestion"Who
'owns' the Internet?" Resolving the immediatebattle will decide, for the time
being, not only who gets to collect the Internet'sequivalentof rent or tax on
domain names,but, more significantly, whetherthe Internet'sdesignerswill be
able to proliferate the use of generic nameswhile globalizing (or at least deAmericanizing)systemadministration,creatinga world marketout of a national
monopoly. The use of generictop-level nameshas not beenwidespreadbeyond
the United Statesand Canada.From elsewherein the world, NSI's distance,
inconvenientbusinesshours,and English-languageorientationare often prohibitive. For anyone outside North America seekingto establishan Internet presence, registration under a national suffix usually provided an acceptable
alternative.Openingnew CORE-certifiedregistriesin other countrieswill thus
make generic suffixes more appealing,especiallysince the new top-level domains will not be so heavily dominatedby Americans. Also, the decision to
incorporateCORE in Genevaaffords the symbolismof a neutral,"international"
city, and enhancesthe practical accessto the root's administrativeregime by
Europeans,Africans, Asians, and others. If theseplans succeed,worldwide investmentsin Internet serviceswill continueto accelerate,and its generic spaces
will take on a different, less"American" look.
Defending the MoU under pressurebefore Pickering'S committee, Heath
164
CRAIG SIMON
statedthat the DNS must be treatedas "an internationalresourcesubjectto the
public trust." Its management"must allow for true self-governancein order for
the Internet to reach its fullest potential." "If one nation tries to rule it," he predicted, "others will overrule it" (Heath 1997b). Such words provide insights into
the philosophyof digerati leaders.Commentsrelatedto Internet self-governance,
Global InternetGovernance(GIG), and global civil societyall "raise flags" that
indicatedirectionsin which their thinking is headed.Heathhassubmittedother
statementsto the U.S. governmentregardingISOC'sglobal agenda.
We believe that it is important that governmentsof the world should be
involved in the self-governanceprocessesthat will evolve; but, they should
do so in a mannerso as not to control or otherwisecreateeffective control
and, thus, thwart the processof true Internet self-governance.The Internet
communicationsmedium; it must not be used
must remainan unencumbered
as a tool for censorship,or of controlling the free flow of information. The
architectureof the Internet is basedon an end-to-endphilosophy.Any "controlling" activity should only be done at the end points: where content is
introduced,or where it is takenoff. It is with thesethoughtsin mind that we
say governmentshould be involved, but not in such a way to take control.
(1 997a)
The claim that the Internet'sarchitectureis basedon an "end-to-endphilosophy" is frequently repeatedamong the system'sdesigners.By declaring their
intent to draw and uphold a borderseparatingthe Internet'swires and switches
from the world without, the architectshave becomegatekeepers,pledging to
maintain systemsecurity while advancingthe interestsof the system'susers.
However, in distinction to the narrow gatesoperatedby the club of sovereign
statessincethe inception of the Westphaliansystemin the seventeenthcentury
(bsterud 1997), the Internet's gates are wide and beckoning to all comers.
While most seriouspublishersrequire novice authorsto overcomea seriesof
rigorous hurdles,the Internet allows anyoneto publish any inanities he or she
wishes, instantly, without review. While entry into a professionalelite is normally grantedafter a processthat reinforcesthe group'sstandardsand reputation, the Internet'sstructureis intentionally openand inclusive. Therefore,it is
noteworthywhen the digerati targeta group they wish to exclude,as they have
doneby seekingto deny governmentsa placeat the Internet'sheadtable.
Building trust in the securityof Internettransactionswill foster ever greater
activity over that medium, increasingdemandfor the wiring and switchesthat
carry its signals. The supplying industriesare extremelyvolatile in character,
though quite profitable when successful.This environmentservesto reinforce
the politically proactiveapproachesof leading playerslike MCI, whosecorporate personalitieswere forged in the deregulatoryheyday of the ReaganThatcher years and fortified by the explosive gigantism of the 1990s.
Tremendouseconomiesof scale and rapid developmentcycles have brought
INTERNET GOVERNANCE GOES GLOBAL
165
about remarkableimprovementsin the quality of goods, coupled with steady
reductionsin price. It is not unreasonableto forecastthat hundredsof millions
if not billions of peoplewill be able to afford accessto the systemwithin the
first decadesof the next century. Under thesecircumstances,private industry is
more likely to continuefunding digerati activities than to supportany effort that
might threatenInternetexpansion.
Many of the Internet's gatekeepersbelieve that new structuresof social
organizationwill form, respondingto new kinds of needs,which cannotbe met
by the nation-state.Glenn Kowack, prior to his appointmentas lANA's representativeto POC, wrote a piece in the normally staid engineeringjournal IEEE
Communicationswhich laudedthe Internet'sengineersfor deployingthe "costimplosive" economicmodel of the information technologyindustries.He echoes Peter Drucker in welcoming the rise of "societies of organizations,"
believing this heraldsa shift of global importance.This growth will lead, however, to a "vacuum" in the "administrativeenvironment"which cannoteffectively be filled by traditional governments:
The generaldirection of the Internet and the activities of its global community of users,consistentwith [Thomas]Paine'sconceptof "natural individual
propensityfor society," are both philosophicallylegitimate and arguablysuperior to jurisdictionalclaimsby nation-states.(Kowack 1997,55)
The MoU's promotersand their adversariesboth recognizethat the ability to
commandor deny the flow of information measurestheir power. For rapid
system growth to continue, sendersand receiversmust be assuredthat their
transmissionsare private and trustworthy.The digerati agendais thereforefuriously engagedin developingmechanismsto secureInternettransmissionsfrom
interference,especiallyin relation to issueslike cryptography,free speech,and
protectionof intellectual property. This coincidentally provokesconfrontation
with stateswhose traditional businessis also to provide security within their
domain. The MoU disputeis just one of the battlegroundsbut is symbolically
important,becauseof the communicativepowerof namesand addresses.
These
are constructedinstruments,part of an indispensable,imperfect tool we call
language. They are tags on reality which we use to mediate our contacts
through a similarly constructed,mappedspace.To control the domain name
systemin a world that rises each day greeting a Web lifestyle is to name the
streetsand boulevardsthat feed the "Information Superhighway."Thosewho
exercisethis control will acquirea tremendouspower to fashion our memories
of place,and to reblendour comingsand goingsin an entirely new way.
Today'sInternet has a significant design limitation that inhibits the fulfillment of Metcalfe's Law. The current addressingscheme(Internet Protocol
Version 4-IPv4) allows a theoretical maximum of 232, or 4,294,967,296
nodeson the system,well short of the populationprojectedfor the world in the
166 CRAIG SIMON
next century. The practical numberof addressesis far less becauseof inefficienciesin the allocation scheme,but an upgradepresentlyunder development (IPv6) will createroom for 2128, or over 3.4*1038 addresses,a truly
mind-stretchingquantity, presumablyenoughfor everyoneborn in the next
few centuries,plus vast numbersof interconnecteddevicesper person.The
project to expandthe addressspaceis called InternetProtocolNext Generation (IPNG), and hasbeenproceedingundera level of reasonablybusinesslike and effective technical cooperationunder the aegis of the Internet
EngineeringTask Force (IETF), the organizationthat spawnedlANA and
ISOC. Other IPNG priorities include adding security featuresthat support
commercial transactions, technicalimprovementsto facilitate smooth
streamingtransmissionsof sound and video, and managementfeatures to
regulatetraffic-congestion.Thesewill all be essentialelementsof the Web
lifestyle, regardlessof the MoU's fortunes.
Postscript
Though this work refers to a digerati agenda, there is no conspiratorial
Protocols of the Elders of Cyberspaceor philosophical Digerati Papers
which allows us to plumb their thinking. Yes, one can point to screedslike
"A Magna Carta for the Information Age" (Gidari 1995), "A Cyberspace
IndependenceDeclaration" (Barlow 1996), and "Crypto-Anarchist Manifesto" (May 1992), but thesestandas individual works. They presentinteresting insights into the culture, but they are self-consciouslygrandiose,and
are unrepresentativeof the leadersat the core. I invented the term digerati
agendato amplify my conclusionthat the creatorsof global telecommunications standardsare self-consciouslychallenging the rules and the rule of
sovereignstates,offering new mechanismsfor coordinatingeconomictransactionsand enlisting humanloyalties, and experimentingwith prototypesof
global government.I confessthat by positing its existenceI playapart in its
construction.As Lao Tzu wrote in the openingof the Tao te Ching, "Naming is the origin of all particular things." By bringing the conceptto a new
audience,or by presentingnew ways of thinking about it to those who are
already interestedin such ideas,I may augmentit and changeit. Ironically,
the open-mindedreaderparticipateswith me in that construction.Our effort to
understandthe digerati agendareproducesit, and impartssignificanceto something that may soonbe forgotten. Time will tell if it shouldhavebeen,but there
is enough intriguing evidenceto warrant a continuing look. My conjectures
may appearto be as grandioseas any screed,but dismissingthis phenomenon
out of hand risks overlooking a developmentof great potential consequence.
Peopleare subject to the standardsand structuresthat they themselveshave
made.Thus constructivisminvites its own methodof analysis.
INTERNET GOVERNANCE GOES GLOBAL
167
Note
Thanks go to Vendulka KubaIkovli, Nicholas Onuf, Michael Froomkin, Phil Agre, and
Ken Goodmanfor their helpful comments.
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Part IV
Construction in the Academy
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8
Remodeling International Relations:
New Tools from New Science?
Henry L. Hamman
The inclusion of a chapteron the applicationof scienceand mathematicsin
internationalrelations(IR) in this set of essaysmay appearcontradictory,in
no small part becausethe constructivistapproachto international relations
is often seenas a subsetof antipositivistor post-positivisttheory, as a genre
that rejects empiricism, as one of the pillars that upholds the edifice of
science,and as applicableto the study of social phenomena.That this view
is widely held is due to a misapprehension
of the natureof constructivism,
sinceconstructivistsdo not follow antipositivistsin rejectionof empiricism.
In fact, constructivist thinkers--at least those who work with Nicholas
Onufs approach-havederived their theoreticalconstructs preciselyfrom
the observationand analysisof the empirical.
Unlike the antipositivist or post-positivist position, which rejects the
whole notion of application of the tools of scienceto the study of human
behavior,constructivismendorsesthe scientific notion of formulating theory on the basisof empirical knowledgeas well as the scientific view that
knowledgeis tentative,subjectto revision, andincomplete.
A numberof reasonsfor the rejectionof scienceby "post" social scientists have beendiscussedin earlier chapters.However, anotherfactor adding to the difficulty of discussingthe possible contributions of natural
scienceand mathematicsto the understandingof the social world is the
social sciencecommunity'slack of awarenessof developmentsin twentieth-centuryscience.(To be fair, natural scientists,as a group, are hardly au
courant with the state of the art in sociology or anthropology,either.) My
173
174
HENRY L. HAMMAN
conjectureis that-for social scientistsat the centerof their fields (men and
women in their forties and fifties)--scienceeducationgenerally stopped
with high school chemistry, or perhaps asingle required natural science
coursein their undergraduate
years.One would further suspectthat most of
thesecourseswere taughtby individuals who had themselvesreceivedtheir
scientific training in the 1920sor 1930s,just as the implicationsof quantum
physicsand the specialand generaltheoriesof relativity were beginningto
be assimilatedinto the naturalsciencecanon.
Further, the researchtopics of international relations may well appear
incompatible with the methods and data analysis techniquesapplied in
many natural scienceresearchefforts. Natural scientistsoften conduct researchin which observedoutcomesfall not preciselyon targetbut within a
range, and they draw conclusionsbasedupon averagesof events.On the
other hand, international relations tends to be eoncernedwith specific
events,and the measureof efficacy is the ability to predict a specifie outcome.Given the small numberof entitiesavailablefor observation,the lack
of appropriateexperimentalvenues,and the inherentdesire of human beings not to be shown up as wrong, it is hardly surprising that in recent
decadesinternationalrelationsscholarshiphasturnedaway from the intractable problemsof dealing with the real world and toward linguistic gamesmanshipand wordplay.
The argumentadvancedhere is that internationalrelationsscholarsmay
find it useful to reconsidertheir attitudestoward the natural sciencesand
mathematics.First somebasicconsiderationsconcerningsystemsandmodels will be summarized,and then a numberof developmentsin the natural
sciencesand mathematicsthat appearto be of partieularsalieneefor international relationswill be discussed.Additionally, the outline of a possible
schemafor the integrationof constructivistontologyandmodernmathematics and naturalsciencewill be presented.
Systemsand Models
Scientific and mathematicalthought is largely systematic,and the goal of
much of this thought is the developmentof theoriesthat can be represented
as modelsof the subjectunderstudy. Unfortunately,becaueof the remembrance of attemptspast to apply general systemstheory to the study of
politieal behavior,any suggestionthat somesort of "systemstheory" could
advancethe study of internationalrelations is distastefulto many international relationstheorists.
As Mario Bunge (1979) points out, however,we really have no choice
but to study systemsand their componentsif we wish to comprehendthe
REMODELING fNTERNATIONAL RELATIONS
175
workings of our world. As Bunge observes,studyingcomponentsin isolation is akin to studying sawdustto understandtrees--boringand of limited
utility. Conversely,studying the externalsof the trees without referenceto
their compositionleavesthe observerwith only generalities.The difficulty
with a systems-oriented
approachis that it requiresboth breadthand depth;
scholarsmust be both generalistsand specialists.Nonetheless,whetherthe
subjectis treesor the socio-economico-politicalworld in which we live, we
cannotescapethe requirementfor systemicthought.
At its simplest,a systemis a group of elementsthat are linked togetherin
some fashion. This definition is implicit in such uses of the term as "a
systemof laws" and "a systemof philosophy."A taxonomy--thesimplest
form of systematization---isan exampleof this usage.As with any other
form of systematization,one of the major goals of taxonomicalsystemsis
to enableenhancedprediction(SeeCasti 1990,43).
Systemsmay be classified as either static or dynamic. Static systems
expressa relationship among componentparts that remains unchanged.
Dynamic systemschangeovertime.
A dynamic systemis a systemin which somesort of input is receivedby
componentsthat are in some form interconnectedand which, in turn produce some sort of output. (See Howard 1991 for a clear discussionof the
basic formal definition of a dynamic system.)If both input and output are
containedwithin the system,the systemis a closedsystem.To the extent
that the systemreceivesinput from outsideor deliversoutputto the outside,
the systemis an open system.An open systemmay have recursivecharacteristics.In sucha system,outputis releasedinto the largerenvironmentbut
may also feed back into the system as an input. A systemthat receives
recursive inputs and inputs from the larger environmentis a cybernetic
system.This type of system is what we are interestedin in international
relations,sinceit is a generaldescriptionof the internationalsystemand its
relationshipto the largerenvironmentin which it operates.
Another important distinction is betweendiscrete and continuoussystems. In a discretesystem,inputs arrive in packets,outputsare producedin
the sameform, and the systemchangesin finite increments.In continuous
systems,inputsand outputsare streams.
Two other divisions amongsystemsare important: the division between
systemsthat treat time as an explicit variableand thosethat do not, and the
division betweensystemsthat exhibit entropyand thosethat do not.
While time is a factor in all dynamic systems,not all systemsrequire that
the interval of time be specified.Systemsthat do not specify time are referred
to as systemsin which time is an implicit variable,while systemsin which time
is specifiedare referredto as systemsin which time is an explicit variable.
176
HENRY L. HAMMAN
The division of systemsinto entropic and nonentropicsystemsalso relates to the question of time. A general thermodynamicdefinition of the
term entropy is "a measureof the capacity of an isolated macroscopic
systemfor change"(Covenyand Highfield 1990,362).Left unchecked,an
entropicsystemwill eventuallymove to a stateof equilibrium. This may be
viewed as a form of decay,a temporalprocess.In the mathematicalsense,
entropy is consideredas a loss of information over time. As such, entropy
may be considereda measureof the disorganizationpresentin a system.
The presenceof entropy signifies that for the system,time is a one-way
street: the systemcannotbe made to run backward.Entropie systemsare
also known as dissipativesystems.Human beings are a good exampleof
dissipativesystems,sinceno matterhow hard we try to stemthe onslaught
of old age, no one has yet managednot to get old. Even Dorian Gray
eventuallydisintegrated.
For nonentropicsystems,to the contrary, time is viewed as reversible.
Newtonianphysicsand classicalastronomytreat the systemsthey study as
nonentropic. Becausethey do not decay, nonentropic systemsare also
known as conservativesystems.
Since in the real world entropy is a constant,all real-world systemsare
time-dependent.
Having declaredentropya constant,one is alsoaskedto consideranother
idea that seemsdiametrically opposed-evolution.Entropy arguesfor the
decay of systems.Evolution posits the developmentof increasinglycomplex systems.Canthesetwo conceptscoexist?
There is a body of theory and experimentthat seemsto supporta view
that in certain conditions,systemscan exhibit both evolution and entropy.
Ilya Prigogine(1984), who developedthe theory of dissipativestructures,
arguesthat dissipativestructuresdevelopin systemsthat are operatingfar
from equilibrium. It is within thesedissipativestructuresthat evolutionary
processesare thoughtto takeplace.
A final important division betweentypes of systemsis that between
linear and nonlinearsystems.In essenceit is the division betweensystems
in which there is a constantproportionalrelationshipbetweenthe variables
in the system(linear) and systemsin which changesin the valuesof variablesare not necessarilyproportional(nonlinear).Until recently,mathematics has lacked the tools to study nonlinearsystemssatisfactorily, so there
hasbeena markedtendencyto attemptto producelinearmodelsof systems,
evenwhen thesehavebeeninappropriate.
Having acceptedthe idea of the system,one immediatelyfacesa problem: to portray the system completely requires that the system itself be
studied. However, in all but the simplest systems,this is impossible: for
REMODELING INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS
177
example,the solar systemis not accessibleto direct observation.Additionally,
if the goal of studyingthe systemis to understandcertainaspectsof it, thereis
considerableeconomy of effort to be producedby limiting the study of the
systemto thoseaspectsthat areof particularimportanceby creatingmodels.
Bunge(1973) offers this taxonomyof models:
• The modelas objectmay be definedas a hypotheticallyreal but possibly fictitious sketchof something.The model as object may be pictorial or conceptual (e.g., a mathematicalformula), but it is always
partial; if it is not partial, the model is identical with the object of
study. Thus, the model as object is a meansof selectingthe essential
and ignoring the nonessential.
• The model as theory is a specific theory of a concreteor reportedly
concrete(that is, nonreified) object. The relation betweentheory and
model here is that a generaltheory that lacks the particulars supplied
by the model cannotbe tested;only when the theory is convertedto a
model is it available for empirical testing. The model as theory may
be consideredas a hypothetico-deductivesystemconcerninga model
object. The goal of this type of modeling is to insert the specific
theory derived from the model into a comprehensivetheoretical
scheme.
• The modelin the (Estheticsenseis a pictorial representation.
• The model in the heuristic senseis an analog of a familiar object, a
metaphor.
• The model in the model-theoreticsenseis a true interpretationof a
formal system.
The type of model of most immediateconcernto internationalrelations is
the model as object. The hope is that through the developmentof enough
specific model objects, it will be possibleto intuit or otherwise develop the
morecomprehensivetheoreticalschemeassociatedwith the modelastheory.
In trying to producemodelsto serveas a test bed for theory, the sciences
search for analogons. An analogon is something more than a simile or
metaphor,somethinglessthan equivalence.An analogonis a set of parallel
cases.Systemsof different designthat are functionally similar are consideredanalogous.
Formal modeling may be consideredthe construction of formal anThis view can be justified bealogons for natural-;-eal-world-systems.
cause the successfulformal model, while without meaningful content,
nonethelessproduces outcomes that show a subjective similarity to the
naturalreality.
178
HENRY L. HAMMAN
At this point, it may be worth a moment'sdigressionto note that not all
operationsinvolving quantitativemethodsare actuallymodeling.
A formal mathematicalmodel consists of a set of symbols, a set of
transformationrules statedas well-formed formulae, and a set of inference
rules that permit the constructionof otherwell-formed formulae; when a set
of axioms is allowed to operateon these elements,the result is a formal
system.If it is allegedthat this systemis an analogonof anotherphenomenon, the systemis said to be a formal model.
Statisticalanalysisis the analysisof numericaldata,either descriptiveor
inferential. Inferential statisticalanalysisis a form of analysisthat relies on
probability theory for determiningboth the reliability of data and the reliability of inferencesdrawn from that data.
Simulation is a form of modeling in that it is an explicit attempt to
producea simulacrumof somereal processin anotherform. The game of
Monopoly is a simulationof the capitalisteconomicsystem.While a simulation may be basedon a formal model, many simulationsare developed
heuristically.
Formal modelsare basedon threekey assumptions;
• That quantitationof datais possibleand that thesedataare not reified
but representsomesort of reality.
• That it is possibleto expressmathematicallythe relationshipbetween
variablesrepresentedby the datathat havebeengathered.
• That solving equationsthat expressthis relationshipbetweenvariables
shedslight upon reality.
Modeling in International Relations
A numberof criticisms of modelingin internationalrelationshaveemerged.
Without exhaustingthe subject, a summaryof thesecriticisms would include the following lines of attack:
• The genericcriticism of the assumptionsof Newtoniandeterminism.
Even probabilisticmodels-modelsthat introducerandomor stochastic effects-arereally only Newton plus an uncertaintyterm, sincethe
stochastic effect is introduced on heuristic rather than theoretical
grounds.
• The criticism that internationalrelationsmodelsare basedon concepts
that are anarchicallydefined(seeFergusonandMansbach1988).
• The criticism that internationalrelationsmodelshave often beenproduced for normative rather than scientific reasonsand may well exhibit their creators'normativebiases.
REMODELING INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS
179
• The criticism that many modelsin internationalrelationsare particularistic.
• The criticism that becauseof their heuristic nature, most models in
internationalrelationsremainunsubjectedto the rigor of phasespace
analysisfor validation, thus leaving openwhethertheir variable space
is coterminouswith that of their real world analogons.
• The criticism that methodsof scientific analysisdrawn from the physical sciencesare inappropriateto the studyof humanbehaviorbecause
consciousness
is not currently accessibleto scientific analysis (Penrose 1989, 1994).
Thc basicproblemwith internationalrelationsmodelsderived from classical
scicntific methodology is, however, one that is generally unstated:most
international relations models are basedon the intellectual assumptionsof
Newtonian physics: the clockwork, totally determineduniverse. Newton's
physicsare an attemptto explain the regular aspectsof life. In international
relations,though, what we are interestedin is not regularity but irregularity.
Thus, clockwork models are inappropriatebecausethey do not allow for
irregularities,andwhen irregularitiesappear,the modelsaredeemedfailures.
The inability of classicalscienceand mathematicsto provide tools for
the significant advancementof knowledgein international relationsappears
to many theoriststo have foreclosedadvancementsalong these lines. But
the core problem is somewhatmore tractable: it is not that sciencehas
failed, but that we have emulatedthe wrong science,the scienceof the
eighteenthand nineteenthcenturies,ratherthan the scienceof the end of the
twentiethcentury.
Emergent Scienceand Mathematics
While the term still has not beenuniversally adoptednor comprehensively
defined,one ofthe key aspectsof currentscientific thoughtis the notion of
emergentproperties.In shorthandterms,the notion of emergenceis tied up
with the questionof behavior.Scientistsare generallynot contentsimply to
observeand note the structureof the object of their study; they want to
know what the object will do under given conditions and, if possible,the
reasonfor that particularaction. In otherwords, they want to know not just
what "it" is, but why "it" doesthe things it does.
One of the ways scientistsdo this is by paring down the "its" they study.
They try to pick out the significant featureor featuresof the object of their
interestandto limit the variablesthey consider.This activity hasbeengiven
the vaguely pejorative name of reduction, pejorative becauseit has been
180
HENRY L. HAMMAN
arguedthat reductionmakesthe complexoverly simplistic and substitutesa
pencil sketchof a tree for the reality of the forest. That line of attack was
successfulin raising serious doubts about the entire scientific enterprise
amongmany who heard it, both inside and outside the scientific community. But research,discoveries,and observationsover the past century,
building to a crescendoin the 1960s, 1970s,and 1980s, have led to the
finding that astonishinglycomplexand unpredictedbehavioroften emerges
from simple----:reduced:----systems.
This new scienceis a scienceof emergence-theunfolding of the system to reveal levels of complexity and
structurethat are not apparenton the surface.Emergencemeansthat there
are some propertiesof matter and being that emerge(or appear)only as
matterand/orbeingdevelopscomplexity.
Marjorie Greneaddressesthe questionof whetherliving systemsare govemed by the laws of physics-areductionistproposition.She points out that
this syllogism seemsto suggestthat living systemsareexplainedby the laws of
physicsand that no other laws apply. She notesthat such a position doesnot
follow "unless we know ... that the laws of physics are the only laws we
know." This not being the case,sheproposesas a valid syllogism: "All living
systemsindeedobey the laws of physics,but without contraveningthe laws of
physicsthey may well obeyotherlaws aswell" (Grene1971,21).
Today, even the most diligent defendersof the reductionistcanon concedethat there are propertiesof complex structuresthat do not have counterpartsat lower levels. StevenWeinberg(1992) notesthat there is nothing
like intelligenceon the level of individual living cells and nothing like life
on the level of atoms and molecules.He arguesthat while emergenceis
most obvious in the biological and behavioralsciences,it also appearsin
physics.He cites as examplesthe emergentpropertiesof thermodynamics,
suchas entropyand temperature,propertiesthat are without meaningin the
discussionof individual particlesof matter.
Weinberg'sis essentiallya reductionistview of emergence.Others,like
Roger Penrose(1989, 1994), have made a much broaderclaim, that there
systemsthat are not
exists a set of rules goveming--especially--human
evenaccessiblethroughreduction.
Despitethe contestationover the scopeof the conceptof emergentproperties,even thosewho find the conceptoversoldagreethat someaspectsof
reality only becomevisible (apparent)at certainlevels of systemicdevelopment. A simple exampleof an emergentproperty might be that of color.
Considerthe level at which this propertyemergesin the elementcarbon:
• What color is a quark? We don't know, and evenif we did, it would
tell us nothing aboutthe color of carbon.
REMODELING INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS
181
• What color is an electron?The sameanswerapplies.
• What color is the nucleusof a carbon atom? Again, the questionis
irrelevantto the color of carbon.
• What color is coal?Black.
We may know the componentsof a carbonatom, but the propertyof color
emergesfrom the way thosecomponentsinteract and only abovea certain
level. Other examplesof emergentpropertiesin the natural world include
intelligence, photosynthesis,various forms of systemic self-organization,
and language.Theseand other emergentpropertieshave in common that
they appearonly in systemsthat haveattaineda certainlevel of complexity.
Emergenceis itself a featureof the emergentscience.
For intemationalrelations,what is important about the notion of emergenceis that those who are studying complex systembehaviorare beginning to generalizeaboutemergentproperties.
One exampleof the generalizationsthat are appearingcomesfrom the
field of artificial world modeling,a computationalfield that usesthe power
of the computerto test out algorithms for the creation of virtual environments. The underlying hypothesisthat legitimates the study of artificial
worlds is a strangecombinationof reduction (in that artificial worlds are
much simpler than their real counterpart)and holism (in that the entire
world is the universeof study, not just a small cornerof it).
Among those who have used the idea of the artificial world are economists and statisticiansseekingto understandeconomicbehaviorin the real
world by creating an artificial world and observing the developmentof
economicstructuresin it. It is out of this work that the processof emergent
hierarchical organization has appeared.For the current purpose,two observedcharacteristicsare important.The first is that this emergentorganization is hierarchical(seeLane 1992 for a good discussionof the implications
of hierarchy).
The secondimportant observationis that systemsexhibiting emergent
hierarchical organizationseemto produceorder from within themselves.
This propertyis noted in physical,chemical,biological, and social systems
andis often calledself-organization.
GregoireNicolis and nya Prigogine(1989) point out that self-organization,
though first observedin biological systems,is not a function of biology but
is much more deeplyrooted. They cite as examplesof self-organizationthe
order that emergesin thermal convection(a phenomenonstudiedin physics) and the chemical phenomenonknown as autocatalysis,in which the
presenceof a product of a chemicalreactionstimulatesfurther production
of that product.
182
HENRY L. HAMMAN
The ideathat propertieslike self-organizationemergeas systemsbecome
more complex is interestingin itself, but more interestingis the question:
What purposedo emergentproperties,suchas self~organization,
recognizably serve?The
answerto this question,offered by emergentscience,is that emergent
prop~
recognizably
ertiesare the meansby which complexsystemsadaptto their environment.
Proponentsof the view of emergenceas an adaptivemechanismseethis
as a crucial dividing point betweentheir view of scienceand the more
traditional position. Drawing on ideasand computermodels developedby
JohnHolland, Murray Gell-Mannstatedthe institutionalpositionthis way:
• Thereare basicrules that all systemsof a given type follow.
• Historical accidentis the sourceof othersystemicparameters.
• Those featuresof systemsthat are not determinedby basic rules or
historical accidentare the result of emergentadaptationof the system
to its environment.
The trick, of course,is sorting out what is a basic rule, what is the result of
historical accident,and what is the productof emergentadaptation.
Emergence's
Antecedent-Uncertainty
Emergentsciencehas beena long time in blossoming:the bud was formed
in the fecund thirty-year period that startedwith Max Planck'sproposalof
the quantumtheory in 1900, advancedwith Albert Einstein'sspecial and
general theories of relativity (1905 and 1915), and culminated with the
unification of thesetwo theoriesby P.A.M. Dirac in 1929.
The notion of the quantumis perplexing:while it resolvescontradictions
betweenprediction and observationin the behaviorof particles, it defies
intuition and our everydayperceptionof reality. And yet, it is sucha simple
idea: the quantumis the smallestamountof energyby which a systemcan
change.Inherentin the definition is the notion that the quantumis discrete,
not continuous.The idea of the quantumis importantin physicsbecauseit
redefineswhat atomic structureis.
In classicalphysics,the atom resemblesthe solar system,withneutrons.
the elec~
trons orbiting aroundthe central atomic core of protonsand neutrons.The
electronscanhaveany orbit diameterand can, in theory,be trackedwith the
sameprecisionas astronomerscan track Mars. This comfortablepicture is
disturbedby the quantumtheory, which holds that there are only certain
energylevels at which the electrons(or any other particles)can exist. This
feature means that when the energy level of a particle changes,it shifts
immediatelyfrom one orbit to anotherand that unlessone knowsprecisely
REMODELING INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS
183
what the energylevel of the particle is at a given time (somethingthat is
impossibleto determine),one can only give probabilitiesfor the position of
a particle. As if this were not complicatedcnough,researchersin quantum
mechanicshave shown both theoretically and experimentally that the
particles appearas wavesand waves as particles,dependingon the conditions under which they are observed.Odd as it may seem, the results of
studyof the physicaluniverseover the pastninety yearshaveremovedfrom
physical sciencethe matter-of-factand the pragmatic and have elevated
uncertaintyto the statusof a first principle.
Mathematicshas added its own confirmation of ultimate unknowableness. GOdel's 1931 publication of his incompletenesstheorem has made
clear that no matter how hard we try, we can never produceunity of truth
and proof. GOdel showedthat for any given logical framework, there is at
leastonepropositionthat canbe provedonly by referenceto a meta(logical)
framework,and so on to infinity. As informally statedby JohnCasti (1990),
GOdel's Theoremis that arithmetic is not completely formalizable. Stated
even more informally, it is impossible to write down all the rules to a
mathematicalsystem.GOdcl's Theoremmeans,for those who work with
formal systems,that no matterhow hard they try, someaspectof the system
will escapethem.
The importanceof GOdel's discovery is predicatedon the assumption
that what is true for formal systemsis also true for real, that is, nonmathematical, analogons.In Godel's Theorem, the question is not whether the
formal system mirrors the real system, but whether the formal system
(which has an independentexistence)provides us with information about
.the structureof real systems.
On a trivial level, we seethe notion of incompletenessin ancientexplanations of how the Earth fitted into the cosmos.In one variant, the Earth
(which was thoughtof as a flat disk, like a tray) was said to be balancedon
the backsof two turtles. The turtles, in tum, were said to standon the backs
of two birds. This systemofferedno explanationof wherethe birds perched
when they becametired of flying. If GodeJ'sTheoremis correct (and we
have no reasonto assumethe contrary), then we are always obliged to
accepton faith someelementof any systemof thought.
It is, of course,one thing to acknowledgethe limits of knowledgeand
quite anotherto build a scientific structureupon thoselimits. The former is
nothing more than a negationof determinism.The latter would be a considerably greater achievement,since it would provide a means of moving
forward, a meansof surmountingthe obstacleposed by the removal of
determinismfrom the calculusof existence.
No doubt, few practicingscientistsor mathematicianslie awakeat night
184
HENRY L. HAMMAN
worrying about suchissues.They haveresearchproblemsto solve, articles
to write, and careersto advance,just as we all do. Fortunately,though, the
researchthey have undertakenhas generated
a structurethat adaptsto both
deterministicand indeterminatephenomena.In addition, this structureaccommodatesnotions of change,choice, and nonrationality,for which classical Newtoniandeterminismhad beenunableto accountin an acceptable
way.
In the popularliterature dealingwith aspectsof this new appreciationof
natural sciencesand mathematics,this structureis often given the appellation "the scienceof complexity." This may be a misnomer, since a new
understandingof complex systemsis an aspect(but not the whole substance)of the new structure.It is for that reasonthat I have chosenthe
phrase"emergentscience"to describethis thought structure.In the following sections,I shall touch briefly on someof the other conceptsthat help to
delineateemergentsciencefrom the classicalmodel.
Nonlinearity
We find it easyto incorporateinto our thoughtssuch ideas as, "For every
action, there is an equal and opposite reaction." This sort of statement
appealsto us as it tracesa direct path from A to B, a relationshipthat can be
expressedas A --+ B.
This statementsaysthat A (whateverA may be) mapsinto B. But we can
say much more aboutthe relationshipof A and B, drawing on our intuition.
We can say that, for the statementabove,it is also true that A =kB.
While the valuesassignedto A, B, and k (some constant)may change,
the relationship among these three values is straightforwardand directly
proportional.
Relationshipsthat do not respondproportionally (and systemsthat exhibit this property) are called nonlinear. For nonlinearsystems,it is possible for two variables to be in a relationship that varies under different
conditions.
Nonlinearity is an aspectof emergentsciencethat mathematiciansand
scientistshaveonly begunto explore.Therearetwo relatedreasonsfor this.
The first is the relative difficulty of solving nonlinearproblems.Because
they do not exhibit the regularity of responseof linear problems,nonlinear
problemsare not susceptibleto simple mathematicalmanipulation.Nonlinear equationsare so difficult to solve that, until recently, the approachof
scientistsand mathematicianswhen confrontedby nonlinearterms was to
toss them out, to linearize the equation. Sometimesthe equationswere
deliberately written to avoid nonlinear terms. For instance,the classical
REMODELING INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS
185
equation for heat flow is linear, but heat flow is nonlinear. The result of
approachingnonlinearproblemsas if they were linear is the Hobson'schoice
that results: problemsthat are seento be nonlineareither are left unattacked
or areconvertedto linear problemsand solvedwith the wrong answers.
The secondreasonfor the recentemergenceof nonlinearityin mathematics and sciencehas to do with the relatively recentarrival on the sceneof
the computer, more particularly the proliferation of small but powerful
individual computerworkstations.As noted above, the beauty of a linear
problemis that once two solutionsfor it are found, the path of all solutions
is known. This meansthat, for the most part, linear problemscan be solved
without referenceto equationsbecauseformulae are sufficient. To get the
answerto a nonlinearproblem, however,one must find the stateof all the
variablesand parametersfor eachpoint at which a solution is sought.When
this had to be done by hand,or evenwith a mechanicalcalculator,nonlinearity resembledthe south face of the Eiger-fascinatingbut apparently
unchallengeable.
Indeterminacy
Another block in the structureof emergentscienceis the notion of indeterminacy, or, more accurately,the notion of "apparentindeterminacy."The
starting point for understandingthe importance of indeterminacyis, as
usual, the Newtonian worldview and, more particularly, what Gerald
Holton refers to as "the delayedtriumph of the purely mechanisticview in
the completionof Newton's work by Laplace"(1988,3).
Laplaceis best known for his notion that a universalintelligence,aware
of the position and velocity of all matter at a given moment, could accurately predictoutcomesto the infinite future.
Sucha notion appearsamusing,naive, or arroganttoday, but much of the
substanceof our daily lives we live as if Laplaceandeterminismwere fact,
even while bridling at the figurative straitjacketsinto which our free wills
have beenencased.It is no wonderthat humanistswith only limited exposureto the notionsof physicsrail againstdeterminism.
Of course, as David Ruelle observes,Laplace's cosmic view is less
restrictive than we are generally taught to believe. Ruelle points out that
there is nothing inherently contradictorybetweendeterminismand chance,
for if the stateof a systemat its start time is not preciselyfixed but random,
then the systemwill remainrandom(1991).
Despitethis small comfort, the clockwork world of Laplacecontinuedto
trouble philosophers.It was only with the developmentof quantummechanicsin the early part of this centurythat relief of a sort appeared.
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HENRY L. HAMMAN
Two points are speciallyimportantfor emergentscience.The first is the
introduction of the notion of probability into a field that had previously
beencharacterizedby the questfor precision.The secondis the introduction
of the notion of the subjectiverole ofthe observerinto a field that had been
characterizedby an objectiviststance.
This profoundly unsettlingview of the natureof the fundamentalstructure of the physical world has beencited as one of the intellectual roots of
the relativistic philosophical movementsthat have assumedsuch importance in the intellectual tenor of contemporaryWesternthought. If the nature of fundamentalphysical reality is dependentupon the observer,then
what can be determined?From another perspective,since we observers
make the choiceof what to look for, are we not ourselvesproducingdeterministic results?Ifwe cannotassertlocation as more than a statementof the
odds,what, then, can be certain?Ifwe can determineaccuratelywhat those
odds are, is this not a form of true certainty?Paradoxessuch as thesehave
becomea stapleof the philosophyof science.
Conditionality,Complexity,and Chaos
As the spreadof computingpowerfocusedattentionon nonlinear problems,
conditionality appearedas an answerto the puzzling fact that eventsthat
seemedalike often producedvastly different outcomes.Quantummechanics gave impetus to the notion of indeterminacy.These ideas, which all
share the property of "fuzziness," found unity in the rubric of chaos and
complexity.
Conditionality is really nothing more than a willingness to say, "It all
depends."In other words, emergentsciencemakesexplicit the well-known
but too-often-ignoredreality that ceterisparibus seldomapplies. The best
examplesof the importanceof conditionsto outcomesare drawn from the
subfield of emergentscienceknown as chaostheory, but the idea is one that
goesbackcenturies.The verseaboutthe causalchain in which for want of a
nail, the horse'sshoewas lost, which causeda knight to be withdrawn from
battle, which causedthe tide of the battle to turn, which led to the fall of a
kingdom is a clear illustration of the idea behind conditionality. Had a
blacksmithtappedjust a bit harderon the nail, perhapsthe horsemight not
have lost its shoe,and so forth. Or maybe,there was a flaw in the nail or a
weaknessin the structureof the hoof. Suchspeculationcan go on ad infinitum (not to mentionad nauseam).
The problem that chaos theory is most closely associatedwith in the
physical sciencesis an ancient one: turbulence. Turbulence is a specific
caseof a problem--tbebreakdownof order in deterministicsystems.What
REMODELING INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS
187
makesturbulenceso difficult to deal with is the unpredictabilityof its onset.
Not only has physical sciencefailed to devise rules for predicting the appearanceof turbulence,it alsohasfailed to developan adequateexplanation
for its appearancewithin otherwiseorderedsystems.Lacking requisitetheoretical tools, engineersand scientistsgenerallydeal with turbulenceeither
by ignoring it when possibleor by treatingit as a problemto be approached
heuristically.
Turbulent phenomenahave been encounterednot only in engineering,
but also in a rangeof systemsin which, despitetheir manifestlydeterministic nature,the randomand the inexplicablecould appearsuddenlyandwithout warning. Since the problem of turbulence appearedincapable of
solution within the scopeof existing knowledge,the responsewas, for the
mostpart, to ignore the issuesraised,concentratinginsteadon the regularities, with the view that theseanomalieseventuallywould be resolved.There
is nothing shamefulin this; it is the meansby which the physical sciences
have progresseddespite the continued existenceof problems that they
lacked the ability to solve. The danger,of course,is that what is ignored
may be treated as if it did not exist. The problem of indeterminacyin
determinatesystems,however,proveddifficult to ignore, particularly after
the arrival of the computer,when even the most deterministic scienceof
all--mathematics--was
increasinglytroubled by stochasticintrusions.The
intrusion of the random-seeminginto the determinatewas the cause of
intellectual disquiet, as it appearedto be in contradictionto the Newtonian
vision of a universe in which, when initial values were known, outcomes
wereassumedto be predictable.
Complexity, like chaosand like the quantum,is one of those concepts
that both defies intuition and appealsto intuition. Essentially,the idea be~
hind complexityis that the location of interestingbehavioris in a region far
from stability, where order is just on the verge of breaking down, at the
edge of chaos. Scholarswho write about complexity often refer to what
they call criticality. When they do so, they often cite a sandpile as an
exampleof what they aretalking about.
The sandpileis a system:it consistsof componentgrains of sand.The
systemreceivesinput as more sanddribbling from above.New grains of
sandorganizethemselves(without volition) on the top of the pile, so that
the structuregrows higher and higher until it can no longer remain stable. At that point, the sand slides unpredictably(chaotically) down the
sides of the pile, and the system attains a new, self-organizedstate of
criticality.
The behavior of the sandpile system is an example of how systems
operateon the edgeof chaos,the areaof the system'sphasespace thatis of
188
HENRY L. HAMMAN
particular interest to researchersin complex systemsbehavior. There are
severalreasonsto suspectthat this region is of particularinterest.
First, the system is seekingto maintain itself in an organizedfashion,
without any outsideintervention.This conceptof self-organizationis a core
conceptof theoriesthat embracecomplexity. Self-organizationis the mechanism by which insect colonies arrange themselves,the mechanismby
which convectioncurrentsappearin liquids and gasesthat have previously
exhibited only Brownian motion, and (very possibly) the mechanismthat
underliesthe creationof humansocieties,including states.
Second,the systemat the edgeof chaosis interestingbecauseit exhibits
the dynamic tension betweenorder (self-organization)and stochasticbehavior (chaos). Since the system has not slipped over the dividing line
betweenstability and chaos,its behavioris perfectly predictable.When the
boundaryis crossed,it becomesimpossibleto say with any certainty what
will happento the structure.One cannoteven say just when the boundary
will be crossed,since there is exquisitesensitivity to changesin conditions
at this boundary. Who can know which grain of sand, falling at which
precisespot, will be the trigger for a slide?Even if the grain of sandand the
precisespotwereto be detennined(one could figure out which grain caused
the slide by simply dropping sanda grain at a time), that knowledgewould
not enablethe observerto predict the condition of either that grain or the
systemwhen it emergesfrom the chaoticregion.
Third, the systemis interestingbecausethe excursionsinto chaotic behavior vary. At sometimes, the slides that the falling sandtriggers will be
small, and only minor changesin the systemwill result. At other times, the
excursionsinto chaotic realmswill producemajor restructuringof the system. A mathematicalfunction called apowerlaw enablesan observerof the
system to speakprobabilistically about the chancefor a major or minor
restructuringto take place,althoughnot to predict with any precisioneither
when a given excursioninto chaoswill occur or how severethe excursion
will be.
The Problem of Learning
Researchershave long beenpuzzledby questionsabout how complex systems seemto learn--to changetheir structures,their behaviors,and even
their appearances--without
the presenceof a central directing sentient
power. Of particular interestis the genetic algorithm, a set of instructions
that modifies itself and in so doing may bring improvementsto the system
in which it operates.
Algorithms are nothingmore than a setof rules for achievinga particular
REMODELING INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS
189
task. The benefit of an algorithm is that, once it has beendeveloped,those
who use it do not have to think about its derivation. In fact, they have no
knowledgeof the algorithm'spresenceor operation.Humanbeingsare not
awareof the embeddedalgorithmsthat govern much of their behavior.For
instance,there is the algorithm that determineswhat happenswhen food
reachesthe stomachand the algorithm that controls what happenswhen a
speckof dust approachesthe eye. Thesealgorithms are hardwiredinto our
individual systems. One would imagine that algorithms, once installed,
would remain the same,rote formulas, producing the sameresults repeatedly, ad infinitum. Yet we know that systemsevolve, that new behavioral
responsesappear.If algorithms are rules and rules are deterministic,how
cantherebe any change?
John Von Neumannaddressedthis problem. He first discussedsystems,
which he called automata,that follow algorithmsto produceoutputsunlike
themselves,such as computers,which follow instructionsbut do not reproducethemselvesby thoseinstructions,and McCulloch-Pittsneurons,which
produce pulses that are different from the automaton.Then he turned to
automata,"which can have outputssomethinglike themselves."Von Neumannthen definedwhat he was interestedin.
Von Neumannarguedthat this passageis "an axiomatically shortened
and simplified description of what an organism does." He notes that the
resultsreachedby such an operationwould be heavily dependentupon the
way the elementaryparts had beendefined, their number,and so on. However, having acknowledgedtheselimitations, he arguedthat it is legitimate
to consider a system of self-reproducingautomata"which will stand up
undercommonsensecriteria" (1966, 77).
Von Neumannmadea telling point when he observedthat, in considering
self-reproducingorganisms,one would expect to find that the organism
could not produce any new organism more complicated than itself. One
would expect to see a reproductionfalling short of the original, so that the
processwould be a degenerativeone. However, this is not necessarilythe
case, Von Neumann noted. The key to this nonintuitive result he called
"complication," and the level of complicationwas the determinantfactor for
whetherthe processof reproductiveactivity would be degenerativeor otherwise. The level of complicationwas, in tum, determinedby the number of
parts. Von Neumannsaid he did not know precisely where the break point
was, but he proposedthe level at betweenone dozenand two dozen.Then he
madethe following observation,which is the crucial one for this discussion:
There is thus this completely decisive property of complexity, that there
existsa critical size below which the processof synthesisis degenerative,but
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HENRY L. HAMMAN
abovewhich the phenomenonof synthesis,if properly arranged,can become
explosive,in otherwords,wheresynthesesof automatacan proceedin sucha
manner that each automatonwill produce other automatawhich are more
complexand of higherpotentialitiesthan itself. (1966, 80)
The meansfor this productionof more complexautomataproposedby Von
Neumann is the introduction into the system of random changesin the
descriptive code that the automatause for reproduction. Some of these
randomchangeswill causethe reproductivecycle to break,and thesemutations will be lethal. Others will lead to the production of more complex
machinesthat can reproducethemselvesat the new level of complexity.
This is, at a basic level, preciselyhow genetic algorithms behave.This is
also a much simplified presentationof the way in which DNA operatesin
the reproductivecodingofliving organisms.
Holland's creationof genetic algorithms is the outcomeof nearly forty
years of efforts to simulate evolution in a computer.His insight was that
while mutations play a role in evolution, the primary engine of genetic
evolution is mating, with the resultantrecombinationof genetic material.
Holland'smodel for this processrelies on what he calls a classifiersystem,
consistingof a set of rules, eachof which performsparticularactionsevery
time its conditions are satisfied by some piece of information (Holland
1992, 66). If certain parts of the output of a classifier systemare tied to
behaviors,thenthe operationof the systemcan trigger actions.
While the geneticalgorithm clearly appliesto biological systems,it can
also be applied to other systems.For instance,corporatemanagementsystems evolve as managersdevelopnew classifiersystemsthat rate fitness in
termsof corporateprofit.
A Do-It-Yourself Kit for Constructivists
The picture of scientific or mathematicalthought outlined above is (1 suspect) considerablydifferent from the picture held in the minds of many
internationalrelationstheorists.However,this picture is remarkablyconsistent with constructivistontology, enoughso that it is possible,without too
much imagination,to suggesta possibleisomorphismbetweenconstructivism and emergentscience'selaborationof complexdynamic systems.This
observationmay be demonstratedby the act of constructingwhat computer
programmerscall a look-up table, or a table of correspondences,
suchas the
one presentedin Table 8.1. This exerciseis presentednot as definitive or
complete, but simply as an example of just how easily one can locate
correspondences
betweenconstructivismand current scientific or mathe-
REMODEUNG INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS
191
Table 8.1
Potential Isomorphisms Between Emergent Science and Constructivism
Social arrangement/structure
Agent
Rule
Institution/regime
Social arrangement/structure
Social construction
Unintended consequence
Social arrangement/structure
automaton
Complex automaton
Genetic algorithm
Classifier system
Interconnection matrix
Emergent hierarchical organization
Emergent property
matical thinking. While the table as it now standsis no more than a hypothesis,the relationshipssuggestedby it are subjectto experimentalconfirmation or rejection.
Onufs definition of agentsis at least consistentwith the propertiesof
complexautomata,especiallyif thoseautomataare seenas both constructing andbeing constructedby rules (which changeover time), alsoknown as
"genetic algorithms." And just as agent-constructedand agent-governing
rules generateand are generatedby institutions, so too can autornataevolved setsof geneticalgorithmsbe seenas classifiersystemsthat generate the further evolution of the automataand the systemof which they are
components.A systemthat evolvesitself (as doesthe internationalsystem)
is by definition an emergentorganization.As Onuf points out, that system,
despiteclaims of sovereignty,doesexhibit hierarchicalcharacteristics,thus
suggestingthat this social constructionis isomorphicwith emergenthierarchical organization.Clearly, there is an isomorphismbetweenOnufs "unintendedconsequences"
and emergentproperties,both by definition being
productsof the complex interplay among the elementsof the systembut
generatedfrom the systemitself.
Of course,pointing out potentialisomorphismsis considerablylessdifficult than building a formal theoreticalmodel, but the apparentgoodnessof
fit betweenemergentscienceand constructivismis surely enoughto suggest that it may be too soon for internationalrelationstheory to give up on
the methods(andepistemology)of the sciencesandmathematics.
If the isomorphismssuggestedhold up under appropriatetests, the advancefor international relationstheory would be significant, since intemational relationswould finally have in hand the tools neededto commence
the constructionof a model-theoreticapproachto the discipline. And that
would be no small achievement.
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HENRY L. HAMMAN
Note
Someof the material in this chapteroriginally appearedin a different form in my "The
EmergentScientific Epistemologya."1d International Relations" (unpublisheddoctoral
dissertation,Coral Gables,Fla.: University of Miami, 1993), while additional material
flows from researchundertakenat Sociocybernetics,Inc. I am grateful to my colleagues
at Sociocybernetics,Inc., especiallyBernardE. Howard, for their patienceand lucidity
in discussingand explainingmany of the mathematicalconstructsusedherein. I should
also like to thank Vendulka Kubalkova and Nicholas Onuf for many constructivesuggestions.Obviously, misunderstandingsor misrepresentations
that remain are my responsibilityalone.
Bibliography
Bunge,Mario. 1973. Method,Model. andMatter. Dordrecht:D. Reidel.
- - - . 1979. CausalityandModern Science,3d rev. ed. New York: Dover.
Casti John. 1990. Searching/orCertainty: What ScientistsCan KnowAboutthe Future.
New York: William Morrow.
Coveny, Peter, and Roger Highfield. 1990. The Arrow 0/ Time: A Voyage Through
Scienceto SolveTime'sGreatestMystery.New York: FawcettColumbine.
Ferguson,Yale H., and Richard W. Mansbach.1988. The Elusive Quest: Theory and
InternationalPolitics. Columbia:University of SouthCarolinaPress.
Gell-Mann, Murray. 1990. "The SantaFe Institute." SantaFe: The SantaFe Institute.
Photocopy.
Grene, Marjorie. 1971. "Reducibility: Another Side Issue?"In Interpretations0/ Life
andMind: EssaysAroundthe Problem0/Reduction,ed. MaIjorie Grene.New York:
Humanities.
Holland, JohnH. 1992. "GeneticAlgorithms." ScientificAmerican267 (1): 66-72.
Holton, Gerald. 1988. The ThematicOrigins 0/ Scientific Thought: Kepler to Einstein,
rev. ed. Cambridge:HarvardUniversity Press.
Howard, Bernard E. 1991. "Dynamic Systems." Coral Gables, Fla: University of
Miami. Photocopy.
Lane, David A. 1992. "Artificial Worlds and Economics." Santa Fe: The Santa Fe
Institute.Photocopy.
Nicolis, Gregorie, and Ilya Prigogine. 1989. Exploring Complexity: An Introduction.
New York: W.H. Freeman.
Penrose,Roger. 1989. The Emperor'sNew Mind: ConcerningComputers,Minds, and
the Laws0/Physics.Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- - - . 1994. Shadowso/the Mind: A Search/orthe Missing Scienceo/Consciousness.Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Prigogine,Ilya. 1984. Order out 0/Chaos: Man's NewDialogue with Nature. Toronto:
BantamBooks.
Ruelle, David. 1991. Changeand Chaos.Princeton:PrincetonUniversity Press.
Von Neumann,John. 1966. Theory of Self-ReproducingAutomata, edited and completedby Arthur W. Burks. Urbana:University of Illinois Press.
Weinberg,Steven.1992. Dreams0/Final Theory. New York: Pantheon.
9
Reconstructing the Discipline:
Scholars as Agents
Vendulka Kubtilkovti
SinceNicholasOnuf introducedthe approachin 1989,"constructivism"has
spreadlike a forest fire. Unfortunately most scholarstook only the label.
They attachedit to many things and rarely definedit. Worse still, it became
a vacuouscliche: as the post-Cold War order is being reconfigured,the
term constructivismhasan air of being appropriatefor the occasion.
This book was not written to reclaim rights to a particularword. If in the
world of academeit were possibleto registera trademarkfor any "original"
term or concept,the legal professionwould have to move to campusesand
the flood of academicpublicationswould be reducedto a trickle. We want
to reattachthe term to the meaning its author originally intended for an
entirely different reason.
Constructivismas Onuf conceivedit was designedto convey a distinct
message.If someonecries that there is a fire when there is no fire, then
eventually the word will no longer convey alarm when it would be warranted. When people falsely cry "fire," the word loses its meaning and
association.As this book shows,constructivismdoesnot refer to instances
of statessigning internationalagreements,
joining an internationalorganization, or observingrules of a particularinternationalregime. Constructivism,
in this book, refers to a universal human experienceof living in both
smallerand larger social contexts.Expandedontological guidelinesto how
the world is put togetherdo not necessarilyexcludeor diminish the centrality, in the presentworld, of statesand interstaterelations.Yet the redescription of the world leadsto a very different understandingof statesand states'
193
194
VENDULKA KUBALKOV A
relations.Reclaimingthe word constructivismsavesit from being drowned
in so manyparallel meaningsthat the original messageis not heard.
Addressingthe issue raisedby the title of this chapterwith constructivism in mind provides ample justification for moving beyond endlessesoteric debatesinto something more constructive. How do scholars in IR
function as agents?How does the discipline as an institution constitute
agency?How, in short, can constructivismbe turned to an analysisof this
discipline itself? Answering thesequestionsfrom a constructivistperspective revealsthe multiple agenciesand their often conflicting rules that the
academicdiscipline, and individual scholars,mustreconcile.
Agents are participantsin the social process,individuals whoseactsmaterially affect the world. Not all individuals can intervenein every kind of
world-making,social arrangement-constituting
process.Rulesconstitutinga
societydefine the conditionsunderwhich individuals, institutions, or associationscan intervenein the affairs of society.
Each of us, in our professionas scholars,is an agent. Indeed,we can be
in
manysortsof agentsat once,andwe arepart of multiple socialarrangements
which, by defmition, we could or should be intervening in the world. In this
chapter,I count five suchsocial arrangementsin which we can, as a profession
and/or as individuals, make a difference: in the culture of society broadly
construed,in the culture of internationalpolitics, in the foreign policy of the
United Statesin particular,in the discipline ofIR, and in the classroom.To put
it differently, how IR as an institution in the United Statesfunctionsas an agent
dependson the intersectionof a numberof social processes,all of which affect
or are affected by academicIR: society, its foreign policy, the international
societyand its agents,the IR discipline itself, andthe teachingthat trains future
agents.The requirementsof theseagenciesare intertwined, sometimesmutually reinforcing, often conflicting. In the following discussionsI will try to
addressthemas if they were isolatedfrom eachother.
1. Guardians of Western Culture in Academic Disciplines
Societydeterminesthe guardiansof its culture. For that purpose,the educational systemis establishedand chargedwith the analysisand codification
of rules and norms, and with their legitimization,justification, elucidation,
and explication. Educationprovidesknowledgeboth of theserules and of
overt and covert sanctionsfor noncompliance.Universitieseducatethe future public elites, educators,journalists and other media specialists,and
future policy makers.
According to establishedpracticein the Westernuniversities,rules keep
the guardiansof educationaway from agentsin "real life." Until recently,
RECONSTRUCTING THE DISCIPLINE
195
the questionof whetherIR could become"an agent"in internationalpolitics
would have been beyond the bounds of reasonabledebate,and one who
raisedthe questionwould be dismissedas a disciple of Noam Chomsky,Joe
McCarthy, or of Soviet Marxist-Leninist propaganda.In the liberal tradition, academicsand practitionershavebeenregardedas two distinct ethnic
groups with only limited intermingling, as with the exception of few
Kissingersdefectingto diplomacy and lapseddiplomatsseekingcareersin
academe.The prevailing view, as Stanley Hoffmann put it, was that you
cannotexpect"a cherry tree to grow applesany more than an appletree can
grow cherries."Academicsas guardiansof knowledgewere to be protected
from political interferencein their relentlesssearchfor the truth. This positivist separationof scholarand subjectmatter was reinforced by the more
sophisticatedpositivism of behavioralism:in their pursuit of objectivetruth
and value-free knowledge, the academicdiscoverersof knowledge were
isolated(Alker 1982) to preservetheir questfrom the contaminatinginfluenceof "outside" interests.The separationhasdevelopedinto a big "gap" in
needof bridging. AlexanderGeorge(1994) reportsthat policy makersconcedethe usefulnessof putting things in a larger context.Georgeconcluded,
however, that the academicversion of knowledge is perceived as very
different from "policy relevant knowledge" (the more heuristic wisdom
soughtby policy makers).Can the distinction betweenacademicsand poliey makersbe defendedin the information age, in an era of unprecedented
democratizationof accessto datarequiring interpretation?If the universities
do not help to makesenseof the world, whereelsedo policy makerstum?
Other custodiansof Westernculture, of which the discipline of IR is a
part, are scattered:they are in the media, the publishing world, different
governmentagencies,and think tanks. The circumstancesunderwhich they
are eligible to become"agents"dependalso on the internal normsandrules
establishedin the intellectualcommunityof a country.
In principle, university professors,as both scholarsand teachers,have
been called upon to rationalize and legitimize the assumptionsof their
culture. As such they can serveas prime agentsof social construction.But
often it is the unintendedeffects of their primary activities that become
more important.
For example,the IR discipline hasbeenconstructedas a discipline with
the mandateto study war and conflict in international relationsso that
future wars may be avoided.Nobody would dismantlea discipline for failing to fulfill that mission, which is no doubt harderthan finding a cure for
cancer. If IR has failed in its main mission, then inadvertentlyit has performed to perfection a much easierrole, namely the reaffirmation of the
mainstreamrealistunderstandingof internationalrelations.
196 VENDULKA KUBALKOV A
Statesas social arrangementsrequireand receiveconstantremindersand
confirmations,constantdisplaysof symbolsand rituals reinforcing the social processcalled stateor nation. The understandingof the world as taught
in international relations coursesassistedthese processes.A state-centric
view and an understandingof "anarchy" on the "outside" contrastedwith
the safetyof the "inside" reinforce personalallegiancesto the state.As has
frequently beenpointedout, the internationalor global awarenessof young
studentsand citizens generally is low, and the blind acceptanceof norms
and rules for national behavioron the world stageis incredibly high. Citizens question internal policies in minute detail but accept the image of
internationalrelationsas received.Thus they acceptpassivelythe existence
of and needfor immigration regulations,carry passports,and subjectthemselvesto visa controls. The state'sflags fly proudly, and soldiersare celebrated and honored for dying or killing for their country, the most
incredibly powerful of social constructions.
2. Guardiansof tbe Cultureof tbe International
Societyof States
The public elites of other countriesare similarly engagedin shapingthe
rules and normsof their societies.IR scholarshaveactedon the assumption
that becausethe theory and practice of IR are supposedto be universally
valid, the practice of IR and the codifications of norms and rules of IR
publishedby Americanpresseswill be universallyaccepted.The worldwide
use of the English languagehas reinforcedthis myth. This approachdenies
a role to local circumstancesin different countries and to local "agents"
who areinevitably engagedin the processof co-construction.
Reactingto this flawed assumptionof universality, many perceivecultural imperialism,hegemony,and parochialismin the practiceof American
intellectuals. American scholarsof IR reassurethemselvesthat they are
doing a good job in teaching a realist view of the world, in an effort to
representthe "truth," since the statessystem is so well institutionalized
acrossthe planet.Thereis no meaningfulway to live outsidestates(except
in ratherinhospitableareason the oceanand underwateror in the air). How
was this arrangementconstructed?Who setthe rules andnorms?
Anglo-AmericantextbooksportrayacademicIR and its understandingof
this processas part of a universal humanexperience.This contrastssharply
with perceptionsof the processelsewhere.IR does not exist as a separate
academicareaof study in most partsof the world. Yet in the Anglo-American context, it has beenportrayedas being on a par with natural sciences
suchas biology or physics,of universalrelevance.
RECONSTRUCTING THE DISCIPLINE
197
Onuf's analytical schememakesit easierto recognize-indeed,it leads
us to expect--thatthe rules and norms of IR are not uniform acrossthe
world. The practiceof diplomacy originating in the West appearsto have
gained universal currency. Yet not all rules and norms related to IR are
sharedor universalized.Statesaccept international law and international
organizations,and in their international intercourse behave in a similar
manner(Hedley Bull thought this constitutedwhat he called international
society). Onuf's constructivism acknowledgesthat there are multiple
sourcesof rules and norms constructingthe world's social structure.Both
local identity and culture are crucial influenceson the interpretationand
creationof rules by agents.The analysisof norms and rules in world politics revealsthat they reflect national,ethnic, religious, and other identities,
broughtto bearon socialprocessesby particularcultures.
The conductof internationalrelationsmakessenseonly within a cultural
context. Unfortunately,becauseof the assumptionof universality, the cultural contexthas beena blind spot (or indeeda consciouslyexcludedsubject) in the discipline of IR. And yet, membersof Western societiesdo
assumethat ideascount,that rules guide conduct,that peoplecanmakereal
choices,and that differencescan be reconciled.By contrast,in the former
Soviet bloc (in which culture retainsa stronglegacyof the communistway
of thinking and understandingthe world), new rules have not always replacedthe old. The culture of the former Soviet bloc still assignsa primary
positionto materialfactorsandtreatsrules in a strictly instrumentalfashion.
It may appearto offer meaningful choices,but the rule has not yet been
establishedthat choicescan be made. It is indeedpossiblethat rules will
continueunchangedon one level and will changeon another,as happened
whenthe SovietUnion fell apart.
IR scholarsseldom appreciatethat the majority of the world does not
speakor think in the languageof modernity. IR expertsthereforeconfront
an insurmountableproblem with the currentdebateabout "de-Westernization," "desecularization,"or "Islamization" of the world; "religious wars";
or revanchedu Dieu. The missingcommondenominatoris a needto recognize that frighteningly complex world affairs require an understandingof
many systemsof thought, whetherreligious or secular.Each of thesesystems carries its own attitudes and values about good and bad, right and
wrong, the world and God, individual, family, society,state,nation, wealth,
authority,equality,justice,conflict, violence,andwar.
The causeof the problem can be found in Westernculture. Most postEnlightenmentWesternthinkers,in the spirit espousedby many academics
to this day, assumethat religions are superstitionsto be phasedout in the
age of "modernity" and "progress"by a "secular humanism"and by sci-
198
VENDULKA KUBA.LKOVA.
ence.Exposedby a diminishedpreoccupationwith the Cold War, the error
of this assumptionis being revealed.Stimulatedby migration, social mobility, trade, and the electronicand print media, religion has expandedexplosively within many societiesand has reemergedas an internationalforce.
Religions are increasinglyrecognizedas one of the most significant forms
of social organizationand ideology, the codifications of norms and rules.
Religiously inspired people are agents too. The world is disrupted with
increasingfrequencyin the nameof religion, at both the domesticand the
internationallevel. Indeed,somereligions do not include amongtheir values a territorial principle that respectsstateboundariesand nonintervention
acrossthem.. Religions define valuesand strugglesover values,in addition
to strugglesfor securityand wealth, and will very likely playa central role
in the next century. Many observersnow view religion as an important
predictorof peaceand war, just as ideology was during the Cold War. Yet
the study of religions is totally absentfrom IR studies.In the most recent
book heraldingthe return of the identity and culture to internationalrelations, there is no index entry referring to religion per se and there are only
severalpagesdealingwith Islam (Lapid and Kratochwil 1996).
3. Advisors to ForeignPolicy Makers
IR neednot be irrelevantto foreign policy making. The lack of relevanceis
expressedin the deepeningdisdain with which policy makers approach
researchand advice proffered by academics.For policy makers,the readymade substitute for scholarly advice is at hand in the Information Age:
accessthroughinformationsuperhighwaysto "knowledge"without the benefit of formal training in IR. If academicIR does not perform this role, if
the debatesbecometoo esotericor impossibleto understand,then sanctions
(often too subtle to be regardedas such) will come into play: funding for
professorsandjob opportunitiesfor graduateswill flow elsewhere,and the
statusand the profile of the professionwill be lowered. The franchisewill
be taken over by whoeverelse is capableof performing the relevanttasks:
print media,televisioncommentators,andjournalists.
Academicsmay consolethemselvesthat theseare peoplewhom we prepared to be agents and whose role we constructed.But did we? If we
examinethe rendition of the world as we find it in the media, the conclusions are disturbing: awarenessof the "outside" has not beenenhancedand
internationalaffairs take a distant secondplaceto national and particularly
local events. Reporting and editorials in public affairs journals reflect a
strong degreeof statecentrismbut none of the increasinglyarcaneconceptual apparatusthat IR scholarsuse to make senseof the world. We do hear
RECONSTRUCTINGTHE DISCIPLINE
199
voices that speakin the languageof constructivism,without knowing what
it is, like Moliere's M. Jourdain,who neverknew that he spokein prose.
4. Membersof AcademicDisciplines
Certain rules and norms govern the American academiccommunity as it
engagesin the social processesdiscussedso far. Crucial in this regardis the
hierarchy of the American IR community, the internal rules it abides by,
and its ability to regenerate,evaluateitself, and adjust. Also important are
the rules and norms that establishqualificationsand seniority in the field,
define scholarship,and identify the "mainstream,"marking the rest as outsidethe mainstream.
The distinction betweenmainstreamand nonmainstreamdoes not have
an obvious parallel in the British Commonwealthcountries or Europe.
There, terminal degreesare awardedwith the participation of a diverse
academiccommunity.Doctoral examinersare selected(and their identity is
kept secretfrom the candidate)from any other university in the same(or
evenanother)country. Thus a standardis maintainedthat doesnot necessitate the tremendouslystrict pecking order in the American academy,
whereby degreesare judged and awardedinternally by each institution.
Academein the United Statesis thereforevery hierarchical,with very limited "upward mobility." Perhapsthe reasonis the tremendoussize of the
U.S. educationalsystem.IR is taughtin most of the 3,200degree-awarding
institutions, which would make it difficult to follow the British and Continental model. The consequence
of the U.s. systemis that only the elite in
the IR field, a handful of "experts" located in the most respectedU.S.
universities,are "agents."What is publishedin the main scholarlyjournals
(with editorial boards"manned"by the samegroup) and by the main publishing housesis controlled by these experts. The rest of the field is left
simply to instructstudentsin mainstreamwisdom.
5. Teachersof Studentsin a Relationas Individuals
Most scholarsare teachers.Teachingremainsthe most pedestrianform of
agencyfor most of us, but the main or the only one in which we are not
anonymous.We devisesyllabi that reflect our professionalopinions about
knowledge,and we standin front of classesto conveyit.
It is from thesepedagogicalconcernsand ambitionsthat this volume has
grown. On one hand, IR is one of the most importantsubjectstaught in the
social sciences.On the otherhand,we worry aboutwhetherour pronouncements qualify as knowledgeto impart to students.We have two choices.
200
VENDULKA KusALKOV A
One is to presentthe studentwith a smorgasbordof approachesand debates
encouragedby the notion that IR is multi paradigmatic.Thus graduatestudentsare left with the problemof decidingto what paradigmtheir research
should be attached,and undergraduatestudentsare left with xenophobic
ideas about the increasinginhospitability of the world "outside." Professional students,combining IR with preparationfor work in businessor
otherprofessionswith a "global" component,will be left without muchhelp
andwith little ideaaboutwhat to expectwhen confrontingthe globe.
The secondchoice is to pick and teach an approachthat each of us
regardsas the most sensibleone, playing down or ignoring all the others.
This is easyfor scholarswho teachthe resultsof their own research.Yet the
sharp distinction between mainstreamand nonmainstreammakes it irresponsiblefor nonmainstreamscholarsto pursuethis path since their students would be seriouslydisadvantagedby ignoranceof mainstreamtexts
shouldthey proceedto otherinstitutionsfor otherdegrees.Neitheroption is
attractive to the teacher who is disenchantedwith current debates.Not
everyonefinds it easyto teach tenfold classificationsand increasinglyincestuousdelusionary"debates"over "schoolsof thought" (of often one or
two people)explaining an imaginary world populatedby abstractand nonhmnanbut often reified creaturessuch as states,anarchies,structures,levels, units, and balances.The creaturesare accordedtheir own logic that
peoplecannothopeto influence.
A reorientationis obviously overdue.A glanceat a handbookfor teachers (LaBarr and Singer 1977) publishedtwenty years ago reveals thatwe
are adding without cmnulatingand repeatingwithout deepening.Most of
the texts this handbooklists still appearin footnotes.The list could now be
augmentedby including youngerscholars,but newer books are more and
more polemical and assmnea broader and broader range of shallower
knowledgediffused within a larger and larger body of literature. Nothing
ever seemsto be pruned out. Amazingly not even the "hurricane" of the
Cold War's endmanagedto do the pruningjob.
However, it is the accumulationof irrelevancies,in all five social processesdiscussedabove,that gives hope that changeis possible.Pressures
for changecome also from outside the discipline. Many academicfields,
social sciencesas well as natural sciences,are now adding global concerns
to their agenda.Interest in the global context is obvious not only among
economists(who populatea subfield of IR) but also in sociology,historical
sociology, sociology of religion, anthropology,demography,and geography. It seemsto follow logically that as the world becomesincreasingly
global, the subject matter of thesedisciplines will spill acrosstraditional
boundaries.The natural sciencesalso work with the global perspectivein
RECONSTRUCTING THE DISCIPLINE
201
mind, particularly thosesciencesthat addressenvironmentaldegradationor
the Information Age-by definition global in scope.It is too late to stop
them from encroachingon our turf What then doesthe future of IR hold?
What will happennext?
Reconstructing IR?
Nothing. Certainly not soon.Thereare only two processes,both social, that
might interveneto bring abouta changein due course.First, the discipline
of IR might ceaseto be an agent in any of the sensesdiscussedabove.
Before that happens,however,a secondprocessmight intervene:IR might
well take on ideasand conceptsfrom other fields. This processof absorption would be at the sametime a processof dissolution.IR would not cease
to exist but would assumea new role--a role pioneeredin the study of the
environment.IR would coordinatean influx of social and natural sciences
into global studieswithout insisting on its own distinct turf. Justas ecology
has becomean organizerand integratorof many disciplines(indeed,ecology is derived from the Greek oikos, for "house"), so too IR might house
the "social ecologyof global society."
Unlike realism,constructivismis not threatenedby such potentialdevelopments.On the contrary,it can provide valuableassistancein reconstructing the discipline. Thosewho are awareof theseprocessesare more likely
to take stepsforward aheadof the mainstream.
Note
Paul Kowert has very kindly helpedme to rewrite this chapter.My thanksgo to him for
this assistance,as well as to both Paul Kowert and Nicholas Onuffor their comments.I
take responsibilityfor the chapter'sconclusions.
Bibliography
Alker, Hayward R. 1982. "Logic, Dialectics, Politics: Some RecentControversies."In
Dialectical Logic for (he Political Sciences,ed. H.R. Alker, PoznanStudies in the
Philosophyof the Sciencesof Humanities,vol. 7,65-93. Amsterdam:Rodopi.
George,AlexanderL. 1994. Bridging the Gap: Theoryand Practice in Foreign Policy.
Washington,DC: United StatesInstituteof Peace.
LaBarr, Dorothy F., and 1. David Singer. J977. The Studyof International Politics: A
Guide to the Sourcesfor the Student, Teacher, and Researcher.SantaBarbara,CA:
Clio Books.
Lapid, Y osef, and Friedrich KratochwiI, eds. 1996. The Return of Culture and Identity
in InternationalRelationsTheory. Boulder,co: Lynne Rienner.
Pettrnan,Ralph. 1994. "What We Think About World Politics, What We Don't Think,
and Why?" Paperpresentedat the U.S. InternationalStudiesAssociationConference,
March.
This page intentionally left blank
Index
Adorno, Max, 45
Adler, Emmanuel,8
academicdisciplines.Seedisciplines
academicsand practitioners,195
act, acting.Seedeed
action-structure.SeeCarlsnaes;
morphogenesis
actions, classof. Seerules
administrativechallengepanels
(ACPs), 162, 163
agency,59-61,64-77
co-constitutionof, 128
theory of, 128
agent(s),5, 6, 7
as institutions,72-73
as observers,61-62, 64, 71, 73
autonomy,independence
of, 65, 77
control over, 63, 74-5
defined,80-81
individual as, 83
InternationalRelationsas, 195
imputing structure,83
scholarsas, 194-201
singular,collective, 64, 66
stateas, 83
Seealso rule
agent-structureproblem/debate,62,
79-99,62,79,82,83,89
and levels of analysis,88-89
ontologicaland methodological
natureof, 83
Albright, Madelaine,161
algorithm, genetic,188-90
Alker, Hayward,31,195
Seealso Alker, H. and Biersteker,T.
Alker, H. and Biersteker,T., 30, 31,
36,48
Allen, Roger, 111
Allport, Gordon, 107
Alperovitz, Gar, 44
Althusser,Luis, 6, 45
Seealso Marxism, structural
analytic dualism,91-92
anarchy,196
in structuralrealism,90
interactionswithin, 90
condition of. Seerule
Anderson,Perry,41, 44
anthropology,9
anti-epistemology.SeeFoucault,Michel
anti-positivist, 173
approachiparadigm,48
discourse,39
archaeologyof knowledge.See
Foucault,Michel
Archer, Margaret,91-92
Aristotle, 30
arrangements.
See structure
artificial world, 181
Ashley, Richard, 35, 36, 37,41,48,49
associations,as institutions,72-76
Aswan High Dam, 113, 114, 116,118
attribution error, 107, 110, 114,116
Austin, lL., 45
authority. Seecontrol legitimate;
hegemony
autonomy.Seeagents,autonomyof
BaghdadPact, 110, III
balanceof power, 20
as institution, 70-71
global,153
Seealso consequences,
unintended
Banks,Michael, 36
203
204
INDEX
Baran,Paul, 44
Barry, Andrew, 154
behavior,regularities.Seebehavioralism
behavioralism,84
benefits,74
Benjamin,Walter, 45
Berners-Lee,Tim, 149
Bhaskar,Roy, 86, 88, 89
Seealso realism,scientific
Biersteker,Thomas.SeeAlker H. and
BierstekerT.
binary thesis-antithesis.
Seedialectics,
dialecticalrules
biological determinism,125
Booth, Kenneth,27
Bourdieu,Pierre,44, 48
Britain, 110-20
Brown, Chris, 29
Brucan,Sylviu, 46
Bull, Hedley, 26, 41, 197
Bunge,~ario, Bunge,~ario, 174-5, 177
Buraimi, 112
Byroade,Henry, 111
Campbell,John, 104, 105
capitalism,global, 154
Carisnaes,Walter, 90, 91-92
Carr, E. H., 25-57, 28, 29, 36, 53-54
Carter,Jimmy, 104
castes,75
Casti,John,175, 183
categorization,106
Chan,Stephen,90
change,30
18~
chaos,7,53-54
as absenceof rule, 62
choices,60-63,65,67,70, 74, 77
Seealso rules
Churchill, Winston, 110, 115
citizens,manufactureof, 126
citizenship,104
civil society,38, 48
classstruggle,29
clockworld model, 185
co-constitution,80
patternof, 82, 155
Seealso structures,phenomenal
propertiesof
coercion,37
cognitivepsychology.Seepsychology
Cold War, 198
collective action, 101
collective identities,93
Seealso identity
command,chain of, 71, 76
Seealso organizations
commissive-rule,158, 162-3
commitment-rules,68, 72
Seealso rules
commongood, 39
computers,148, 149, 150, 151, 159
communications,digital, 152
communicativeaction,theory of, 129
and constructivism,129
complexinstitutions.Seeinternational
relations
complexity,186-188
Comte,Auguste,8
conditionality,186-188
conflict. Seedialectics,dialectial rules
conjecture,historical, 45, 52n.2
consensus,37-38
consequences,
intended,unintended,
20,59-64,68-69,71,73-74,
76-77,83,97
conservative,7
construction,of knowledge,of reality,
purposeof, 38
social, 37, 38
distortionsof, 37
constructivism,4-5,8, 14, 19,20,
147, 199
an overview of, 103-6, 12&-30,
155-7
and critical theory, 19
andDNS, 162-3
andemergentscience,190-1
and empirical research,20
and epistemology,19
and feminism, 125-46
and historical materialism,20
and InformationAge, 156-66
and liberal theory, 19
and post-positivism,129
andpost-structuralism,19
12&-9
INDEX
constructivism(continued)
andscience,and mathematics,
173-92
and theory of communicativeaction,
129
and third debate,19, 128
as manipulationof states,126
intellectualsourcesof, 19-20,25
"proto", 25
versionsof, 193
ofCarlsnaes,Walter
91-92
ofDessler,David, 8t'Hl8
offeminist, 126-46
ofWitworth, Sandra(Coxean),
126-7,ofSylvester,
Christine(post-structural)
127-8
of Jabri, Vivienne and Chan,
Stephen,93
ofOnuf, Nicholas,58-78
overviewsof, 80-84, 79-82
Seealso Onuf, Nicholas.See
constructivism
of post-movement,5, 52
of Wendt, Alexander,84-86,
88-89,90-91,102
Seealso Wendt, Alexander
consumersof knowledge.See
knowledge
contradiction,dialectical.See
dialectics,dialecticalrule
control, legitimate,as authority, 76
conventionon homework, 141-3
conventions,66-67
convergence,152, 160
Council of Registrars(CORE), 161, 163
counterhegemony,
38
countriesas constructions.See
societies
Cowhey,Peter,154
Cox, R.W., 27, 33, 36, 37, 41, 48, 49,
54n.l and2, 126, 127
critical, 7, 20, 28, 48
approach,theory, 19,26,37,48,49,
52, 53, 54n.l
sociology,37, 45
criticality, 187
205
culture,Western,195
of internationalsociety, 196-7
local, 197
cyberspace,153, 166
debatein IR, 200
on levels of analysis.Seelevels of
analysis
on agent-structure.Seeagent
structureproblem
Seealso debates,"great"
deconstruction,4,8, 17,40, 125
deed,81, 155, 156
dependencytheory, 11,38
Der Derian, James,49
Derrida, Jacques,40, 125
Deschamps,Jean-Claude,107
Dessler,David, 8t'Hl8, 89
determinism
economic,44
in agent-structure,80
Newtonian,178
development;unilinear,dynamic,
multi causal,and multidirectional.
Seedialectics,dialecticalrules
dialectics,27, 29, 30-32, 37
as ontology, 31
Seealso ontology
as epistemology,31
Seealso epistemology
as method31
Seealso methodology
dialectical
interplay, 92
logic, 27
materialism,31
relation,29
rules, 30-32
synthesis,of agentand structure.See
structurationtheory
dialectical,radical, approach.See
Alker H. and Biersteker,T.
dialects,disciplinary 6
difference,93
digerati, 148, 150, 151, 165
Dirac, P.A.M., 182
directive-rules,67, 71, 158, 163.See
rules
206
INDEX
disciplines,disciplinaryboundaries,5,
200-1
discourse,7
distorted
communication,theory of, 39
ideologies,39
social construction,38
DomainNameSystem(DNS) 102-3,
148
andconstructivism,162-3
domination,37
Doty, Roxanne,94
DNS. SeeDomainNameSystem
Drucker, Peter,165
Dulles, JohnFostergood;
112, 114
Durkheim, Emile, 46
dynamic,30
economicdeterminist.See
determinism
Eden,Anthony, 110, 111, 112,1l3,
117
Egypt, 109-20
Eisenhowever,Dwight, 112
Elster, Jon, 89
emancipation,19,38,39,52
politics of, 128
emergentproperties,91
hierarchicalorganization,181
empirical,4
research,andconstructivism,20,
21
empiricism,84, 173
endogeneous.
Seeendogeneous,
exogeneousdichotomy
Engels,F., 28, 31
English School,ofIR 4, 1
Enlightenment,8, 15
Enloe, Cynthia, 104, 125
entropy, 175, 176
epistemiccommunities,154
epistemology,12-21,89,93-94,
104
Ethernet,148-9
equilibrium, 10
Seealso Waltz
ethics,ethical issuesin IR, l3
Eurocommunism,38
exogeneous,endogeneous
dichotomy,
53, 154
facts, independentexistenceof, 38
falsificationism,46
feminism, 51, 125--46
main schoolsof, 125
humanist,127
post-structural,127---8
standpoint,127
foreign policy making, and IR
discipline, 198
formality. Seerule, legal
Foucault,Michel, 28, 36, 37,44,48,
125
France,110-20
Frankfurt School,28, 45, 54n.1
free will, in agent-structure,80
Freud,Sigmund,49
Friedman,Thomas,153
Froornkin,Michael, 159
functions. Seespeechacts
fundamentalattribution error, 107, 110
Seealso attribution error
Gadamer,Hans,39
Galtung,Johan,46, 104
Gates,Bill, 150, 157, 158
Gell-Mann, Murray, 182
gender
as a constellationof rules, 130
as social construct,125, 129
in IR, 125
in political economy,4
genderedrules, 124
of home-basedwork, l30-1
GenericTop Level Domains
Memorandumof Understanding
(gTLD-MoU), 161, 163
Seealso Memorandumof
Understanding(MoU)
George,Alexander,195
George,Jim, 105
Giddens,Anthony, 46,52,80,81,85,
88,89,93,104,147,152,156
Gilder, George,148
Gingrich, Newt, 150
INDEX
global, 6
capitalism,124
context,200
governance,neo-Gramscian
approach,154
telecommunications,147
globalism,globalist, 11,38,41,44
Global InternetGovernance(GIG), 164
Glubb, JohnBogot "Pasha,"112
goals,60, 64--65, 71, 73, 77
Goedel' stheorem,183
"goldenstraitjacket,"153
Gorbachev,M.S., 38
Gore, AI, 161
government,60, 76
Gramsci,Antonio, 11,28,36,37,38,
45,48,126
"great" debatesin IR, 4, 13, 79
first. Seerealismand idealism
second,(behaviouralistsvs
systemicists),84
third, 20
and agent-structure
debate,83
Grene,Marjorie, 180
Habermas,Jurgen,19,26,28,36,37,
39,48,52,54n.l, 129
Halliday, Fred, 49
Harding, Sandra,125
harmonyof interests,20
Seealso unintendedconsequences
Hart, H.A.L., 45
Heath,Don, 161, 163, 164
Hegel, G.W. F., 30
HegelianMarxism, 44
hegemony
different meaningsof, 10, 11
Gramscion, 37, 38
of Americanculture, 196
Seealso form of rule
hegemonic,156
assertion,157
consensus,49
hegemony,156
Hempel,c., 46
Heraclitus,30
hermeneuticconcepts,in structuration
theory. Seestructurationtheory
207
hermeneutics,18
heteronomy.Seeform of rule
heteronomous,156
hierarchy.Seerule, conditionof, form of
Hills, Jill, 153
historical
bloc, 48
materialism,49
history, 30
Hitler, Adolph, 113, 115
Hobbes'sstateof nature,10
Hobsbawm,Erick, 44
Hoffmann, Stanley,40,195
holistic, 84
holistic. Seedialectics
Holland, John, 182, 190
Hollis and Smith, 80, 86, 88,89-90,
91,92-93,96
Hollis, Martin. SeeHollis and Smith
Holsti, K. J., 12,36
Holton, Gerald, 185
home-basedwork, 123-4
HomeNetInternational,136--8, 140
homeworkermovement,124
homeworkers,l23
Horkheimer,Max, 45, 54n.l
household,rules of, 131-3
humanism,secular,197
Hume, David, 84
idealism,idealist, 26, 29,30, 31, 32
Seealso debates,"great," first;
realism
identity, 64, 152
and categorization,106
and cognitivepsychology,106
and exogeneous,endogeneous
influences,90
and interests,collective,national,
101, 109
and language,105
as belonging,104
changing,124
defined,75
feministson, 104
formation on, 125
in neoliberaland neorealisttheories,
101-3
208
INDEX
influenceon world politics, 197
national,4
of self and other, 105
of state,102, 108
political, 102
ideologies
manipulationby in social
construction,126
Seealso distorted
imperialism, 11
cultural, 196
incompleteness
theorem.SeeGoedel's
theorem
Seeagents,
independence.
independenceof
indeterminacy,185-6
individual, as agent,83
individualism
methodological83
ontological,80, 84, 89
and structuralism,85
information, 62, 66-fJ7
InformationaAge, 4, 153
Information Revolution, 153-5
Information Superhighway,165
"institutional tum," 97
institutionalizationof structure,62
institutions,61, 70-77, 82
defining features:status,office, types
of, networks,organizations,
associations,71-72
and rules 83
changesthroughchangesof rules,
143
instruction-rules,67, 71, 158, 162
integrationtheory, 102
intellectual
intentions.Seeconsequences
interconnected.Seedialectics,
dialecticalrules
interdependence,
interdependent,40
interests,64, 71, 77
andconstructivism,103-9
and psychology,103-9
exogeneousorendogeneous,102
formation of, 101
structuralconstraintsand incentives,
103
InternationalAd Roc Committee
(IARC),161
internationalinequality, 11
InternationalLabor Organization(lLO),
123, 133, 136, 137, 138, 141-3
internationallaw, sourcesof, 71
InternationalPolitical Economy,33
internationalrelations,
and constructivism,58-59, 62, 70, 77
InternationalRelations(lR), 156, 163
American, 196, 199
and mathematics,173-92
and science,173-92
Anglo-American,196
approachesto, 11
as a discipline, 3, 5, 36
as a social science,10
evolution of, 9
hierarchical,156
knowledgein, 34
state-centric,9, 196
teachingof, 21, 199
uniquenessof subject-matter,9
Seealso disciplines,academic
internationalsociety, 197. Seesociety,
international
InternationalStudiesAssociation,18
InternationalTelecommunication
Union (lTU), 148, 161
InternationalTelephoneandTelegraph
ConsultativeCommittee
(CCITT),154
InternetAssigned Authority (lANA),
161, 165, 166
InternetEngineeringTaskForce, 166
InternetProtocol, 149, 165, 166
InternetServiceProviders(lSPs), 160
InternetSociety(ISOC), 161, 164, 166
Internet, 147-fJ6
interparadigmatic,36
interpretative,interpretivist, 18
interpretivism,93, 94, 102
Islam, in InternationalRelations,
197-8
Israel, 109, III
Jabri, Vivienne, 90, 93
James,William, 156, 157
INDEX
Jones,Charles,27
Kant, Immanuel,7
Keohane,R.O., 18,40,41
andNye, J., 18,40
Kirkpatrick,Ivone, 115, 116
knowledge
academicandpolicy relevant,195
creationof, 34
cumulative,8
productionanddissemination,3, 6,
83
progressiveaccumulationof, 84
purposeof, 33, 34
uncertain,36
knowledgeconstitutiveinterests,37
Kolko, Gabriel, 44
Korbin, Stephen,159
Korsch, Karl, 28
Kowack, Glenn, 165
Kratochwil, Friedrich, 7, 18, 104
Kratochwil F. and Ruggie,J., 41
Krippendorf, E., 46
Kuhn Thomas,35, 36
Lakatos,Imre, 46
Landauer,Thomas,151, 152
language,4,8,17, 19,39,81
imperfectionsand inadequacies,46
manipulationof, 105
by peopleand nations, 105
of modernity, 197
scholarly,3-4
Seealso rules
Lanier, Jaron,149
Lapid, Y osef, 19
26,41, 105
Laplace,Pierre-Simon,85
Left, 11,35
and Right, 33
leftist, 7
Lenin, V.I., 28, 29,30, 48, 49
levels of analysis,9, 79, 84, 95-96
and agentstructureproblem,88-89
andMGP,109
as imputeddemarcations,95
attributesof, propertiesof, definition
by rules, 96
209
Levi-Strauss,Claude,6
liberal institutionalism,10
liberal, liberalism, 9, 20, 30
linear, 30
linguistic philosophy,45
linguistic tum, 17, 18, 19,6
emancipatorynatureof, 105
in IR, 105
Linklater, Andrew, 27, 28,33, 49
Lloyd, Selwyn, 112
logical empiricism,32, 46
logical positivism, 32, 46
logoentrism,127
Lucky Break, 112, 113
Lukacs,Georg,28
MacLellan, David, 44
Macmillan, Harold, 115
Maher,David, 162
manand nature,separationof, 33
Mandel, Ernst,44
manipulation,38
of minds,of states,126
Seealso ideologies;distorted
Marcuse,Herbert,45
market,62, 72, 76--77
Marx, Karl, 28, 29, 31, 37,41, 48,
52
Marxism, 7, 11,30
Continental28, 29, 38
European,11
Hegelian,44, 49
Western28
non-determinist,44
and feminism, 1-24, 125
Marxism-Leninism,Soviet,28, 29
materialcircumstances,60, 64,69
material resources,59, 64
mathematics,7
in InternationalRelations,173-92
McCaw, Craig, 150
McLean, John,48
mechanics,quantum,185
Memorandumof Understanding
(MoU), 161, 163, 165, 166
Mercer, Jonathan,108
Merlau-Ponty,Maurice,28
metaphysics,8, 13
210
INDEX
Metcalfe'sLaw, 148-9, 157, 158, 160,
165
meteorology,7
methodology,13,89,94
methods,of naturalsciences,84
Seealso debates,great,second
Microsoft, 150, 158
minimal group paradigm(MGP), 106,
108-9
models,174-78
clockwork, 179
probabilistic, 178
stochastic,178
typesof, 177
modeling
formal, 177
in InternationalRelations,
178-9
modernism,155
modernity,40
languageof, 197
logocentrismof, 127
monocausal,30
Morgenthau,Hans,26, 40, 48
morphogenesis
and structuration,
91-92
MoU. SeeMemorandumof
Understanding(MoU)
multi causal,30
Murphy, Craig, 154
Mussolini, Benito, 113
Nasser,GamalAbdel, 109, 110
nationalidentity. Seeidentity
National ScienceFoundation,160
nationalinterest,9
naturalism,8
natureand society,unity of, 20
Seealso global, governance,
neo-Gramscianapproach,
154
neoliberalism,101
neorealism,34, 48, 52, 101
Seealso structuralrealism
Netizens,157
network externalities,149
Network Solutions,Inc. (NSI), 152,
153,160
networksof rules,as institutions,71-72
Neufeld, Mark, 105
"new thinking," 38
New World InformationOrder', 158
Nexus, 152
Nicolis, Gregoire, 181
Nietzsche,Friedrich,44
non-deterministic Marxism,
44
Seealso Marxism
nonlinearity, 184
norm, normative.Seerules
normative,19
normsas context, 129
norms,study of, 129
notice of inquiry, (NOI), 162
Nutting, Anthony, 118
Nye, Josephand William Owens,153
objectivity, 34, 39, 46, 52
observer,subjectiverole of, in
physicalsciences,186
offices, 72-76
Oilman, Bertell, 30
ontological
individualism, 80
structuralism,80
ontology, 13-19,20,89,94,104
positional,87
transformational,87
Onuf, Nicholas,G., 4,19-21,42-43,
52-53,79,88,95-97,104-6,
147-49,156,173
Seealso constructivism,versionsof
Oppendahl,Carl, 162
oppression37, 38
organizations,as institutions,71-72
other,the, 7
others,127
outside- inside, 196, 198
paradigm,35, 36
the usein IR, 35
paradigmatic
discipline, 36
parochialism,48
Seealso Alker and Biersteker
parochialism,40
paradigmatic,48
INDEX
participants.Seeagents
partsand wholes.Seelevel of analysis
patterns,of rules, practices,
institutions,61-64, 67, 73-75, 81
Peirce,Charles,156
Penrose,Roger, 180
perception,III
Seealso cognitivepsychology
perestroika,105
perspectivism,19
Seealso Lapid, Y osef
Peterson,Spike, Y., 104, 125
Pettman,Jan,Jindy, 125
philosophy,separationfrom science,8
physics,7
Pickering,Charles,161, 163-64
Planck,Max, 182
pluralism,methodological,19
pluralist, 11,41
policy makers,195, 198
Policy OversightCommittee(POC),
161, 162, 165
policy relevance,33
policy relevantknowledge,195
political economy,separationinto
economicsand political science,8
political identity. Seeidentity
politics of emancipation,128
politics, emancipatory,critical, 4
Popper,Karl, 46
positive sumgame,International
Relationsas, 101
positivism, 4, 7, 8, 33, 34, 36, 37,45,
81,84,95,155, 195
science,4, 16, 17
Postel,Jon, 161
"post" movement,11, 17, 18, 19,20,
25,27,28,29,33,34,35,37,41,
52, 154, 159
and science,173
post-Marxist,45, 49
post-modem,4, 5,19,2039,49,155,
158
skepticism,127
post-positivism,173
post-positivistandpositivist, 19
Seealso third debate
post-Soviet,5
211
post-structural,19,44,45,48
feminist, 127-8
Poulantzas,Nicos, 45
powerover opinion, 33, 36, 37, 38, 39,
52
power, 125, 143
power-knowledge,39
power-relations,39
powers,67, 76
practice,7, 31
Seealso theory and practice.See
rules, institutions
pragmatism,93, 157
praxis, 7
Prigogine,Iiya, 176
principle, 67, 70, 73, 76
probability, 186
problem-solving,7
problematique,7,45,54n.2
productivity, 151
project, 7
promises,67-68
properties,emergent,179-80
Public Advisory Board(pAB), 161,
162
public good, 101
public goodstheory, 149
purpose,39
purposes.Seegoals
quannuntheory,182
radical dialecticalapproach.SeeAlker
andBiersteker
raisond'etat,9
rational choicetheory, 11
rational conduct,60-61, 65, 69, 74
rationalistepistemologicaltradition, 84
rationalist,20. Seereflective and
rationalist
realismin IR, 5, 7, 8, 9, 11,25,36,37,
29,30,31,32,36,41
and idealism,29, 30, 31, 53-54
in philosophy,7
pluralist, globalist,41
scientific, 7
structural,10
reality,34
212
INDEX
Realpolitk, 9
reason.SeeEnlightenment
Reagan-Thatcher
era, 153-54
reciprocalcausalities.Seedialectics
recursive,175
reductionism,in IR, 83
reflectiveandrationalistapproaches,18
regimes,70, 102, 154
regulatoryarbitrage,159
religions, ofthe world, 197-8
and IR studies,198
resources,64, 72-73,154,162,163
control over, 74-75
revolution, 29, 37
Bolshevik,37
rhetoric, 17
Richardson.L.F., 9
right-wing, 7
rights andduties,68-72
role, 72, 76
root serverconfederations(RSCs)
162
Rosenau,James,N., 36
Ruelle,David, 185
Ruggie,John, 18
rule, 20,
stablepatternof relations,62-63
condition of, anarchy,77
form of, 156
hegemony,hierarchy,heteronomy,
62-63, 75--77
rules, 19,20,80,83,129
andactivism, 130
and resources.SeeDessler,David
as heuristictool, 129
as materialproperty(Onu!), 81
as propertyof structure(Giddens),81
as support,72
at the nexusof biology, psychology
and sociology, 104
categoriesof, instruction,directive,
commitment,67-68, 70-73,129,
104-6
codifying, 124
commitment-rules
WOlX, 142
changingandhome-based
constitutiveand regulative,68-69,
81,87, 129
definition, 59-60,66-67
directive-rules,
changingand home-basedwork,
140-2
division of private and public
spheres,133
families of, 6~70
instruction-rules,
changingand home-basedwork,
13~0
legal, 69, 75--76
making,following, breaking,69, 74-75
of academicdisciplines,194
of household,131-3
oflabor market, 135-6
of state,133-5
of Westernculture, 194
ontologicalstatus,82
Seealso institutions
uniformity acrossthe world, 197
Runyan,Anne, S., 125
Russia,37, 38
science,16
credibility of, 10
emergent,179-84
in InternationalRelations,173-92
natural,physical,8, 33, 83-84
social, 4, 8, 20, 204
philosophyof, 21
separationfrom philosophy,8
scientific realism,81-82,83, 85, 87,94
Scott, Joan,125
Self-EmployedWomen'sAssociation
(SEWA), 123, 137, 138, 140, 142
self-organization,181-2
Seeidentity
self-consciousness.
Sherif, Muzafer, 106
Shuckburgh,Evelyn, 111, 112
simulation, 178
Singer,David, 12,79,84
Smith, Adam, 162
Smith, Steve.SeeHollis and Smith
social arrangements,58, 63, 73
Seealso structure
social beings,59
social constructions,
as manipulation,126
INDEX
213
social constructions,(continued)
structure(continued)
Seealso constructions
dissipative,176
social identity theory(SIT)
functionsof, 82
and stereotyping,108
in Waltz, 84
intersubjective,in identity formation,
social movement,124, 151
103
and changeof rules, 130
of society,82
social,relations,59
phenomenalpropertiesof, 82, 83
theory, 19,52
world,59
Seealso social arrangements;
societies,59, 73-76
institutions
subject-object,33
society
SuezCrisis, 109--18
international,59, 69, 74-75
surveillance,social, 152
distinctivecharacter.Seestructure
sociology,8, 30
Sweezy,Paul, 44
Sylvester,Christine, 104-5, 125,
historical,49
127-8
sovereignty,9, 62, 67, 69, 73, 159,
symbolic interactionism,93
164, 166
synthesis.Seedialectics,dialecticalrules
SovietUnion 28, 37, 109,
system,systems,174--8
110, 197
complex, 184
and 'new thinking', 105
conservative.Seenonentropic
speechacts, 81, 156
cybernetic,175
functions,68-69
discreteand continuous,175
typesof, assertive,directive,
dissipative,176
commissive,66
entropicand non entropic, 176
spheresof influence,as institutions,
70-71
linear and nonlinear,176
standards,154, 155, 159,166
openandclose, 175
static, dynamic, 175
standards-making
process,147
time dependence,175
stateidentity. Seeidentity
systemicists,84
state,62, 72-73,76, 150, 151, 153,154,
156, 165
as agent,83
Tajfel, Henri, 106
positionaldefinition, 86
taxonomy,175
statecraft,9
TCP/IP, 149, 151
technology,150, 153, 154
status,71
Stienstra,Deborah,126
telecommunications,147, 148, 151,
Strange,Susan,153
152, 154, 160, 165
structural
Teledesicventure,149--50
liberalism, 10
temporalprocess.SeeCarlsnaes,
Marxism, 6, 35
Walter
realism,5, 10,34,35,41,48,52,83,88 text, 17,39
structuralisttheoriesof linguistics,44
theories,purposeof, 39
structuration,46, 80
theoryandpractice,31, 33
theory of, 80, 83, 89
third debate,19
Seealso debates,great
structure,5
and constructivism,128
definition, 62--63, 82
Thompson,E.P., 35
determinismof, 80, 82, 88
Seealso Wendt,Alexander
Thucydides,36
214
INDEX
Tickner, A., 104-5
time and space,40
spatialand temporalstructures,86
Seealso structuration
transactioncosts,102
transfonnationalontology.See ontology
treaties,as institutions,70-71
Trevor-Roper,Hugh, 26
Trotsky, Leon, 28. SeeMarxism,
Western
trotskyist, tradition, 44
Tucker, Robert,41
turbulence,7, 186
Turner,John, 106
uncertainty,182-4
unilinear. Seelinear
United States,109, Ill, 117
unity of natureand society,20
university, university professors,195
unobservablephenomena,81, 85
Seealso scientific realism
utopianism.Seeidealism
value-freenatureof knowledge,52
Vico Giambattista,156
Vienna Circle, 45
Vietnam, 11
virtual reality, 149
voluntarism.Seedetenninism
Von Neumann,John, 189
Walker, R.B.J.,49
Wallerstein,Immanuel,44,84-85
Waltz, Kenneth,7,10,34,35,41,83,
84,85,87,90
war, studyof, 9
web lifestyle, 152, 157
Weber,Max, 44,45,46
Weinberg,Steven,180
Wendt, Alexander,79, 82, 84-86,
88-89,9~91, 90-91 101, 150
on agent-structure,82, 84, 85
on stateidentity, 102
WesternMarxism. SeeMarxism
Westphaliansystem,164
Whitworth, Sandra,126
wholesand parts.Seelevels of
analysis
Williams, W. A., 44
Winch, Peter,46
Wittgenstein,Ludwig, 44
World IntellectualProperty
Organization(WIPO), 161
world
social,physical,differencebetween,
16
making of, 59
material,64
social, cleavageinto selfand other,
106
World systemstheory, 11,83,84
World Wide Web, 149