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Lessons from Thucydides on Vietnam and Iraq Annalisa Triola Thucydides is often considered the father of all historians by many Western scholars for his scientific approach to recoding history as seen in his seminal work, A History of the Peloponnesian War, which is frequently required reading for students of politics and anyone interested in democracy or war.1 In reading the History of the Peloponnesian War, many parallels can be drawn between Athens and the United States in their military ventures that many important foreign policy lessons can be derived from. Because of this, Thucydides holds an integral place in today’s political science curriculums, especially due to the revived interest in Thucydides during the Cold War, in particular the Vietnam War years.2 Thucydides’ History was illuminating work for scholars of the Cold War in that the Peloponnesian War was incredibly similar to both the struggles of the Cold War and the Vietnam War.3 Both the Peloponnesian war and the Cold War were conflicts characterized by a bipolar structure, many Cold War scholars are eager to draw parallels between the United States and Athens, and the Soviet Union and Sparta.4 Athens and Sparta were powerful city states with impressive military capabilities (albeit with different strengths) that balanced against the others’ power by amassing alliances with the surrounding city states, while less powerful city 1 Connor, W Robert. "Book 1." In Thucydides, 20-51. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1985. Connor, W Robert. "Introduction." In Thucydides, 3-19. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1985. 3 “17. The Peloponnesian War, Part I.” Youtube video, 0:01-5:5-45. Posted by “YaleCourses,” November 20, 2008. http://youtu.be/nMlkvfFJYPo. 4 Gilbert, Alan. "Democratic Imperialism and Internal Corruption." In Must Global Politics Constrain Democracy? Great-power Realism, Democratic Peace, and Democratic Internationalism, 148-176. Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1999. 2 states bandwagoned with either of the two powers.5 6 The United States and the Soviet Union behaved in similar ways during the Cold War, balancing against the others’ power through military might and strategic alliances. Additionally much like the Cold War, the Peloponnesian War was a world war for the Athenians.7 While the Mediterranean seems like a very small portion of the world today, it was most of the known world for the Athenians, and the Peloponnesian war deeply affected the Athenian’s relationship and interaction with those on all sides of the sea.8 The Vietnam was not unlike the Peloponnesian War as well. Both of these conflicts were bloody, long, and arduous wars that spanned more than twenty years of fighting. They were both unprecedented in their brutality and the massive amounts casualties incurred by the Athenians and by those that they were engaged with. Both in Athens and in the United States, these conflicts internally divided the nation, often exacerbating class conflicts.9 While many scholars note the similarities of the Cold War era to the Peloponnesian war, the United States and Athens have shared similar fates in regards to wasteful imperialist military ventures that had dire consequences at home and abroad, highlighted the Vietnam War and the Syracuse expedition. The ill- 5 This is in part referring to the feud between Megara and Corinth in Thucydides, 1.2 In History of the Peloponnesian War 6 All references to Thucydides’ History of the Peloponnesian War are reffering to the Crawley translation of the work. 7 While the Cold War was not a “World War” in title like WWI and WWII, it did encompass most parts of our global. 8 “17. The Peloponnesian War, Part I.” Youtube video, 0:01-5:5-45. Posted by “YaleCourses,” November 20, 2008. http://youtu.be/nMlkvfFJYPo. 9 Gilbert, Alan. "Democratic Imperialism and Internal Corruption." In Must Global Politics Constrain Democracy? Great-power Realism, Democratic Peace, and Democratic Internationalism, 148-176. Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1999. fated endeavors of American and Athenian foreign policy may prompt one to invoke the old cliché; those who do learn from history are doomed to repeat it. As discussed earlier, there are many obvious comparisons between the Vietnam War and the Peloponnesian War, the similarities continue with an exanimation of the work of Thucydides. In his History, Thucydides’ accounts often expose the follies of Athens and his dismay with their foreign policies. In this vein, Thucydides does not shy away from presenting the Athenian defeat in their conflict with the city-state of Syracuse on Sicily, along with ignorance and hubris of the Athenians in this venture. The beginning of Book VI of History elucidates an Athenian desire to subjugate Sicily and a plan to bring Syracuse under the rule of Athens. However this venture would end in failure as the Athenians were unmindful of the size and capacity of the Sicilian forces and failed to see that this so-called “expedition” had the potential to balloon into a conflict of similar scale to the ongoing Peloponnesian war.10 Ultimately the Syracuse expedition would become the single greatest disaster of the Peloponnesian War.11 The Sicilian expedition was a massive undertaking that was incredibly poorly planned. The once great Athenian forces, who were more than a decade into the Peloponnesian War at this time, was severely weakened from their ongoing military campaigns. Even if the Athenians took the Sicilian forces seriously, Athens would probably be unlikely to assemble an expedition capable of matching the Sicilians. This expedition was an abandonment of the public good on the part of Athens, and 10 11 Thucydides, 6.18 In History of the Peloponnesian War Thucydides, 6.21 In History of the Peloponnesian War instead was a demonstration of how wasteful hubris fueled imperial ventures could be. Thucydides does not gloss over the failures of his home city-state of Athens and in them he reveals his disappointment in the leadership of Athens and his many concerns about Athenian foreign policy.12 Thucydides presents the ill-fated Sicilian expedition as unreasonable, as the Athenians should be aware that Sicily can unite successfully when threatened by outside forces. Alcibiades, an Athenian general and strategist, justifies the doomed mission to Sicily on claims that Athens could not simply be uninvolved as they had never been uninvolved in the past, and that the calls for help from their allies on Sicily could not be ignored. In his speech to the Athenians, after Nicias speaks out against the Sicily expedition, Alcibiades defends the choice to sail for Sicily: "In this state of things what reason can we give to ourselves for holding back, or what excuse can we offer to our allies in Sicily for not helping them? They are our confederates, and we are bound to assist them, without objecting that they have not assisted us … It is thus that empire has been won, both by us and by all others that have held it, by a constant readiness to support all”13 He insists that “do-nothing policies” were not how Athens achieved its glories and now is not the time to start. Alcibiades also argues that the Sicilians are below the Athenians, their society had not developed to the level of Athens and cannot live up to the military prowess of Athens.14 15 12 Connor, W Robert. "Introduction." In Thucydides, 3-19. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1985. 13 Thucydides, 6.18 In History of the Peloponnesian War 14 Connor, W Robert. "Book 6." In Thucydides, 158-184. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1985. 15 Thucydides, 6.18 In History of the Peloponnesian War Alcibiades insists that this mission is not for imperial conquest, but rather that there is no other choice than to carry out the expedition. According to him Athens has to be involved, as they cannot turn their backs on their allies residing on Sicily. However, Thucydides asserts that Alcibiades was seduced by the prospect of wealth and personal glory, claiming that “he hoped to reduce Sicily and Carthage, and personally to gain in wealth and reputation by means of his successes”, with little thought given to the wastefulness of such an expedition and the consequences if Athens failed to subjugate Sicily. As such, the expedition is carried out with the possibilities of private gains and personal honors in mind rather than the good of the Athenian people and the long-term preservation of the city-state. It is important to note that Alcibiades and his speech were very popular with the Athenians, and there was widespread public support within Athens for the Syracuse expedition.16 Athenian pride allowed the mission to go on, and the reluctance of Athens to practice self-discipline and not be tempted by the greatness of war led to their ultimate defeat at Syracuse.17 Alcibiades’ speech to the Athenians that justifies the expedition to Sicily as a cause greater than imperial conquest, is echoed millenniums later by US president, Lyndon B Johnson, during the escalation of the Vietnam War at a Freedom House dinner in New York City in 1966: "Our purpose in Viet-Nam is to prevent the success of aggression. It is not conquest; it is not empire; it is not foreign bases; it is not 16 Thucydides, 6.18 In History of the Peloponnesian War Gilbert, Alan. "Democratic Imperialism and Internal Corruption." In Must Global Politics Constrain Democracy? Great-power Realism, Democratic Peace, and Democratic Internationalism, 148-176. Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1999. 17 domination. It is, simply put, just to prevent the forceful conquest of South Viet-Nam by North Viet-Nam."18 Much like Alcibiades, Johnson frames the US presence in Vietnam as answering a call for help from the South Vietnamese. The United States is not there for imperial conquest, but rather to assist an ally and to prevent the fall of the rest of Southeast Asia to communism. Johnson’s words continue to echo Alcibiades’ speech to the Athenians, where he insists it is Athenian duty to get involved in Sicily, as Athens has always been involved in these missions, and that involvement is what has led Athens to greatness.19 Later in 1966 in a State Department bulletin, Johnson made these remarks regarding the American involvement in Vietnam: “Yet our American purpose and policy are unchanged. Our men in VietNam are there. They are there, as Secretary Dillon [former Secretary of the Treasury Douglas Dillon] told you, to keep a promise that was made 12 years ago. The Southeast Asia Treaty promised, as Secretary John Foster Dulles said for the United States, that 'an attack upon the treaty area would occasion a reaction so united, so strong, and so well placed that the aggressor would lose more than it could hope to gain … But we keep more than a specific treaty promise in Viet-Nam tonight. We keep the faith for freedom.”20 Just as Alcibiades proclaims that the Athenian mission to Sicily is a required duty of maintaining the empire, Johnson not only declares that the United States is bound by the Southeast Asia treaty to assist South Vietnam, but American military involvement in Vietnam is essential for protecting the freedom and democratic world. However, the American over-expansion of power is what ultimately led the 18 The Pentagon Papers. Gravel ed. Vol. 4. Boston: Beacon Press, 1971. 644. Thucydides, 6.18 In History of the Peloponnesian War 20 The Pentagon Papers. Gravel ed. Vol. 4. Boston: Beacon Press, 1971. 644. 19 United States into Vietnam, rather than an earnest desire to protect the democratic freedoms of the South Vietnamese.21 Much like the Athenians grossly underestimating the Sicilian forces and capabilities, the United States too was incredibly ignorant of what would await them in Vietnam. During both the Kennedy and Johnson administrations’ escalations in Vietnam, no single individual in the Department of State knew the Vietnamese language. Additionally the United States failed to account for the fact that Ho Chi Minh had led a decades long resistance against the Japanese and French occupations prior to the arrival of US troops and as such the Vietnamese people were highly capable of defending themselves against external forces.22 In light of this it is important to note that the Athenians had launched an earlier expedition to Sicily in attempt to subjugate the island, which Thucydides describes in Book 4 of History. In this earlier expedition to Syracuse, the Athenians are defeated as the Sicilians are able to successfully unite when threatened by outside aggression. The Athenians suffer the same fate when they attempt the later expedition to subjugate Syracuse, as Alcibiades still believes the Sicilian forces to be less capable than the Athenians.23 Like Athens, the United States fails to recognize the military capabilities of Ho Chi Minh demonstrated during their struggle against 21 Gilbert, Alan. "Democratic Imperialism and Internal Corruption." In Must Global Politics Constrain Democracy? Great-power Realism, Democratic Peace, and Democratic Internationalism, 148-176. Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1999. 22 Gilbert, Alan. "Democratic Imperialism and Internal Corruption." In Must Global Politics Constrain Democracy? Great-power Realism, Democratic Peace, and Democratic Internationalism, 148-176. Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1999. 23 Connor, W Robert. "Book 6." In Thucydides, 158-184. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1985. the Japanese and French forces in the years prior to war, and pays dearly for this ignorance. The collective hubris and ignorance of the American and Athenian leadership not only led to wasteful and devastating military ventures, but these incidents also demonstrate the abandonment of democracy by both the United States and Athens in favor of imperial desires. Both the American and Athenian leadership violated democracy abroad though overseas military expansion and at home through silencing internal critics and going after imperial gains as opposed to pursuing the public good. Furthermore, as it has been shown that both the United States and Athens violated democracy abroad and at home, there is something very profound to be said about the validity of the democratic peace theory from these revelations. The democratic peace theory states that democratic nations do not go to war with other democratic nations. However the Peloponnesian war and the Syracuse expedition are both examples of interdemocratic conflict between Athens and the other democratic Greek city-states such as Sparta, and Syracuse. While the United States has not gone to war with stable, capitalist, democratic states such as France or Canada, the US has intervened in a variety of states with democratically elected regimes such as with Mosaddegh in Iran, replacing him with the more US-friendly Mohamed Reza Shah in 1953. This is only one example of dozens of instances of the Unites States intervening in democratically elected regimes across the so called “global south” from South America, Southeast Asia, the Caribbean, and Africa to remake these nations in our own interests.24 Both Athens and the United States set aside their alleged reverence for democracy in favor of imperial conquests and tyranny for their own glory and benefit. While the context of Peloponnesian war has helped us understand the United States’ foreign policy disasters during the Vietnam War and how our overexpansion of power has led to violation of democratic dreams across the globe there are other lessons we can learn from Thucydides’ History. We have already explored the colossal loss the Athenians suffered at Syracuse, but early in History, Thucydides tells the tale a mission with a hauntingly similar outcome to the Syracuse expedition. In Book 1 of the History the reader is informed of a six-year expedition to Egypt prior to the commencement of the Peloponnesian War. The Athenians took a fleet of over 200 ships to Egypt to assist an allied Libyan King, with the alluring desire for the treasures of Nile in their minds rather than the potential for disaster that the mission holds. This mission, much like the Syracuse expedition more than a decade later, ends in disaster and massive losses.25 However the massive losses weigh little on the Athenian mind in the years to come as they have become emboldened by other victories and successes that they have forgotten the folly of the Nile. More the two millennia after the Athenian defeats in Egypt and Syracuse, the United States is on the verge of launching the 2003 invasion of Iraq. It is unlikely that Bush administration is thinking of Thucydides and the Egyptian disaster, but 24 Gilbert, Alan. "Democratic Imperialism and Internal Corruption." In Must Global Politics Constrain Democracy? Great-power Realism, Democratic Peace, and Democratic Internationalism, 148-176. Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1999. 25 Thucydides, 1.4 In History of the Peloponnesian War they may be trying to drown out the critics of the invasion who are invoking the memory of the Vietnam war and the decades long “quagmire” that cost hundreds of millions of dollars and thousands of American lives, not to mention the lasting suffering for generations in Vietnam. Like the Athenians emboldened by the glory of their imperial expansions rather than the memory of Egypt, the Bush administration is riding high off of the soaring approval ratings following the 9/11 terror attacks, and the invasion of Iraq is the next step in the so-called “global war on terror”.26 At the time the reasons for the invasion were murky and backed by little to no evidence. Over the years many reasons have been given by the Bush administration for the invasion and subsequent war in Iraq, but none of these were revealed to be the truth. What has become clear is that the real reasons behind the Iraq War, to build a neoliberal US friendly Iraq, the good of the American people and the defense of democracy was not one of them.27 The Athenians were enticed by overseas treasures, personal glory and imperial expansion, so much so they forget the folly of Egypt, only to have history repeat itself in Sicily. The leadership of the Vietnam war era sought imperial expansion and to rebuild Southeast Asia to our liking, but as the war escalated both Kennedy and Johnson feared being the handed the title of the only US president to lose a war, so we stayed for more than a decade in a foolish effort to preserve our 26 Eichenberg, Richard C., and Richard J. Stoll. 2006. War president: THE APPROVAL RATINGS OF GEORGE W. BUSH. The Journal of Conflict Resolution 50, (6) (12): 783-808, http://0search.proquest.com.bianca.penlib.du.edu/docview/224559028?accountid=14608 (accessed November 14, 2014). 27 Klein, Naomi. 2004. BAGHDAD YEAR ZERO. Harper's Magazine. 09, http://0search.proquest.com.bianca.penlib.du.edu/docview/233490694?accountid=14608 (accessed November 13, 2014). American military prestige. In Iraq, the Bush administration sought to rebuild Iraq to better suit our interests and desired the glory of “liberating” the Iraqi people, but failed to see the chaos and suffering their interests would unleash. Today, thanks in part to the Bush administrations’ meddling in Iraq the United States is now reentering the Middle East in attempt to deal with threat of ISIS/ISIL, and it is very possible the US may continue to have an extended military presence in the Levant for many years to come. All of these cases highlight how often democracy is abandoned in favor of tyranny and how easily power can lead to hubris, and how hubris can lead once great nations to a path of self destruction and overall suffering for all involved. History is a cautionary tale; Thucydides had no qualms with exposing the poor leadership of Athens and their folly in not heeding the memory of their own failures. The United States too may face a similar downfall if they continue to seek unwarranted power expansion and imperial desires to reshape the nations of the world in their own interests. Once again, the age-old cliché bears repeating, those who do not learn from history are doomed to repeat it.