Download Lessons from Thucydides on Vietnam and Iraq

Lessons from Thucydides on Vietnam and Iraq
Annalisa Triola
Thucydides is often considered the father of all historians by many Western
scholars for his scientific approach to recoding history as seen in his seminal work,
A History of the Peloponnesian War, which is frequently required reading for
students of politics and anyone interested in democracy or war.1 In reading the
History of the Peloponnesian War, many parallels can be drawn between Athens and
the United States in their military ventures that many important foreign policy
lessons can be derived from. Because of this, Thucydides holds an integral place in
today’s political science curriculums, especially due to the revived interest in
Thucydides during the Cold War, in particular the Vietnam War years.2
Thucydides’ History was illuminating work for scholars of the Cold War in
that the Peloponnesian War was incredibly similar to both the struggles of the Cold
War and the Vietnam War.3 Both the Peloponnesian war and the Cold War were
conflicts characterized by a bipolar structure, many Cold War scholars are eager to
draw parallels between the United States and Athens, and the Soviet Union and
Sparta.4 Athens and Sparta were powerful city states with impressive military
capabilities (albeit with different strengths) that balanced against the others’ power
by amassing alliances with the surrounding city states, while less powerful city
1
Connor, W Robert. "Book 1." In Thucydides, 20-51. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1985.
Connor, W Robert. "Introduction." In Thucydides, 3-19. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1985.
3 “17. The Peloponnesian War, Part I.” Youtube video, 0:01-5:5-45. Posted by “YaleCourses,”
November 20, 2008. http://youtu.be/nMlkvfFJYPo.
4 Gilbert, Alan. "Democratic Imperialism and Internal Corruption." In Must Global Politics Constrain
Democracy? Great-power Realism, Democratic Peace, and Democratic Internationalism, 148-176.
Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1999.
2
states bandwagoned with either of the two powers.5 6 The United States and the
Soviet Union behaved in similar ways during the Cold War, balancing against the
others’ power through military might and strategic alliances. Additionally much like
the Cold War, the Peloponnesian War was a world war for the Athenians.7 While the
Mediterranean seems like a very small portion of the world today, it was most of the
known world for the Athenians, and the Peloponnesian war deeply affected the
Athenian’s relationship and interaction with those on all sides of the sea.8
The Vietnam was not unlike the Peloponnesian War as well. Both of these
conflicts were bloody, long, and arduous wars that spanned more than twenty years
of fighting. They were both unprecedented in their brutality and the massive
amounts casualties incurred by the Athenians and by those that they were engaged
with. Both in Athens and in the United States, these conflicts internally divided the
nation, often exacerbating class conflicts.9
While many scholars note the similarities of the Cold War era to the
Peloponnesian war, the United States and Athens have shared similar fates in
regards to wasteful imperialist military ventures that had dire consequences at
home and abroad, highlighted the Vietnam War and the Syracuse expedition. The ill-
5
This is in part referring to the feud between Megara and Corinth in Thucydides, 1.2 In History of the
Peloponnesian War
6 All references to Thucydides’ History of the Peloponnesian War are reffering to the Crawley
translation of the work.
7 While the Cold War was not a “World War” in title like WWI and WWII, it did encompass most parts
of our global.
8 “17. The Peloponnesian War, Part I.” Youtube video, 0:01-5:5-45. Posted by “YaleCourses,”
November 20, 2008. http://youtu.be/nMlkvfFJYPo.
9 Gilbert, Alan. "Democratic Imperialism and Internal Corruption." In Must Global Politics Constrain
Democracy? Great-power Realism, Democratic Peace, and Democratic Internationalism, 148-176.
Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1999.
fated endeavors of American and Athenian foreign policy may prompt one to invoke
the old cliché; those who do learn from history are doomed to repeat it.
As discussed earlier, there are many obvious comparisons between the
Vietnam War and the Peloponnesian War, the similarities continue with an
exanimation of the work of Thucydides. In his History, Thucydides’ accounts often
expose the follies of Athens and his dismay with their foreign policies. In this vein,
Thucydides does not shy away from presenting the Athenian defeat in their conflict
with the city-state of Syracuse on Sicily, along with ignorance and hubris of the
Athenians in this venture. The beginning of Book VI of History elucidates an
Athenian desire to subjugate Sicily and a plan to bring Syracuse under the rule of
Athens. However this venture would end in failure as the Athenians were unmindful
of the size and capacity of the Sicilian forces and failed to see that this so-called
“expedition” had the potential to balloon into a conflict of similar scale to the
ongoing Peloponnesian war.10 Ultimately the Syracuse expedition would become the
single greatest disaster of the Peloponnesian War.11
The Sicilian expedition was a massive undertaking that was incredibly poorly
planned. The once great Athenian forces, who were more than a decade into the
Peloponnesian War at this time, was severely weakened from their ongoing military
campaigns. Even if the Athenians took the Sicilian forces seriously, Athens would
probably be unlikely to assemble an expedition capable of matching the Sicilians.
This expedition was an abandonment of the public good on the part of Athens, and
10
11
Thucydides, 6.18 In History of the Peloponnesian War
Thucydides, 6.21 In History of the Peloponnesian War
instead was a demonstration of how wasteful hubris fueled imperial ventures could
be.
Thucydides does not gloss over the failures of his home city-state of Athens
and in them he reveals his disappointment in the leadership of Athens and his many
concerns about Athenian foreign policy.12 Thucydides presents the ill-fated Sicilian
expedition as unreasonable, as the Athenians should be aware that Sicily can unite
successfully when threatened by outside forces. Alcibiades, an Athenian general and
strategist, justifies the doomed mission to Sicily on claims that Athens could not
simply be uninvolved as they had never been uninvolved in the past, and that the
calls for help from their allies on Sicily could not be ignored. In his speech to the
Athenians, after Nicias speaks out against the Sicily expedition, Alcibiades defends
the choice to sail for Sicily:
"In this state of things what reason can we give to ourselves for
holding back, or what excuse can we offer to our allies in Sicily for not
helping them? They are our confederates, and we are bound to assist
them, without objecting that they have not assisted us … It is thus that
empire has been won, both by us and by all others that have held it, by
a constant readiness to support all”13
He insists that “do-nothing policies” were not how Athens achieved its
glories and now is not the time to start. Alcibiades also argues that the Sicilians are
below the Athenians, their society had not developed to the level of Athens and
cannot live up to the military prowess of Athens.14 15
12
Connor, W Robert. "Introduction." In Thucydides, 3-19. Princeton: Princeton University Press,
1985.
13 Thucydides, 6.18 In History of the Peloponnesian War
14 Connor, W Robert. "Book 6." In Thucydides, 158-184. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1985.
15 Thucydides, 6.18 In History of the Peloponnesian War
Alcibiades insists that this mission is not for imperial conquest, but rather
that there is no other choice than to carry out the expedition. According to him
Athens has to be involved, as they cannot turn their backs on their allies residing on
Sicily. However, Thucydides asserts that Alcibiades was seduced by the prospect of
wealth and personal glory, claiming that “he hoped to reduce Sicily and Carthage,
and personally to gain in wealth and reputation by means of his successes”, with
little thought given to the wastefulness of such an expedition and the consequences
if Athens failed to subjugate Sicily. As such, the expedition is carried out with the
possibilities of private gains and personal honors in mind rather than the good of
the Athenian people and the long-term preservation of the city-state. It is important
to note that Alcibiades and his speech were very popular with the Athenians, and
there was widespread public support within Athens for the Syracuse expedition.16
Athenian pride allowed the mission to go on, and the reluctance of Athens to
practice self-discipline and not be tempted by the greatness of war led to their
ultimate defeat at Syracuse.17
Alcibiades’ speech to the Athenians that justifies the expedition to Sicily as a
cause greater than imperial conquest, is echoed millenniums later by US president,
Lyndon B Johnson, during the escalation of the Vietnam War at a Freedom House
dinner in New York City in 1966:
"Our purpose in Viet-Nam is to prevent the success of aggression. It is
not conquest; it is not empire; it is not foreign bases; it is not
16
Thucydides, 6.18 In History of the Peloponnesian War
Gilbert, Alan. "Democratic Imperialism and Internal Corruption." In Must Global Politics Constrain
Democracy? Great-power Realism, Democratic Peace, and Democratic Internationalism, 148-176.
Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1999.
17
domination. It is, simply put, just to prevent the forceful conquest of
South Viet-Nam by North Viet-Nam."18
Much like Alcibiades, Johnson frames the US presence in Vietnam as
answering a call for help from the South Vietnamese. The United States is not there
for imperial conquest, but rather to assist an ally and to prevent the fall of the rest of
Southeast Asia to communism. Johnson’s words continue to echo Alcibiades’ speech
to the Athenians, where he insists it is Athenian duty to get involved in Sicily, as
Athens has always been involved in these missions, and that involvement is what
has led Athens to greatness.19 Later in 1966 in a State Department bulletin, Johnson
made these remarks regarding the American involvement in Vietnam:
“Yet our American purpose and policy are unchanged. Our men in
VietNam are there. They are there, as Secretary Dillon [former
Secretary of the Treasury Douglas Dillon] told you, to keep a promise
that was made 12 years ago. The Southeast Asia Treaty promised, as
Secretary John Foster Dulles said for the United States, that 'an attack
upon the treaty area would occasion a reaction so united, so strong,
and so well placed that the aggressor would lose more than it could
hope to gain … But we keep more than a specific treaty promise in
Viet-Nam tonight. We keep the faith for freedom.”20
Just as Alcibiades proclaims that the Athenian mission to Sicily is a required
duty of maintaining the empire, Johnson not only declares that the United States is
bound by the Southeast Asia treaty to assist South Vietnam, but American military
involvement in Vietnam is essential for protecting the freedom and democratic
world. However, the American over-expansion of power is what ultimately led the
18
The Pentagon Papers. Gravel ed. Vol. 4. Boston: Beacon Press, 1971. 644.
Thucydides, 6.18 In History of the Peloponnesian War
20 The Pentagon Papers. Gravel ed. Vol. 4. Boston: Beacon Press, 1971. 644.
19
United States into Vietnam, rather than an earnest desire to protect the democratic
freedoms of the South Vietnamese.21
Much like the Athenians grossly underestimating the Sicilian forces and
capabilities, the United States too was incredibly ignorant of what would await them
in Vietnam. During both the Kennedy and Johnson administrations’ escalations in
Vietnam, no single individual in the Department of State knew the Vietnamese
language. Additionally the United States failed to account for the fact that Ho Chi
Minh had led a decades long resistance against the Japanese and French occupations
prior to the arrival of US troops and as such the Vietnamese people were highly
capable of defending themselves against external forces.22
In light of this it is important to note that the Athenians had launched an
earlier expedition to Sicily in attempt to subjugate the island, which Thucydides
describes in Book 4 of History. In this earlier expedition to Syracuse, the Athenians
are defeated as the Sicilians are able to successfully unite when threatened by
outside aggression. The Athenians suffer the same fate when they attempt the later
expedition to subjugate Syracuse, as Alcibiades still believes the Sicilian forces to be
less capable than the Athenians.23 Like Athens, the United States fails to recognize
the military capabilities of Ho Chi Minh demonstrated during their struggle against
21
Gilbert, Alan. "Democratic Imperialism and Internal Corruption." In Must Global Politics Constrain
Democracy? Great-power Realism, Democratic Peace, and Democratic Internationalism, 148-176.
Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1999.
22 Gilbert, Alan. "Democratic Imperialism and Internal Corruption." In Must Global Politics Constrain
Democracy? Great-power Realism, Democratic Peace, and Democratic Internationalism, 148-176.
Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1999.
23 Connor, W Robert. "Book 6." In Thucydides, 158-184. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1985.
the Japanese and French forces in the years prior to war, and pays dearly for this
ignorance.
The collective hubris and ignorance of the American and Athenian leadership
not only led to wasteful and devastating military ventures, but these incidents also
demonstrate the abandonment of democracy by both the United States and Athens
in favor of imperial desires. Both the American and Athenian leadership violated
democracy abroad though overseas military expansion and at home through
silencing internal critics and going after imperial gains as opposed to pursuing the
public good.
Furthermore, as it has been shown that both the United States and Athens
violated democracy abroad and at home, there is something very profound to be
said about the validity of the democratic peace theory from these revelations. The
democratic peace theory states that democratic nations do not go to war with other
democratic nations. However the Peloponnesian war and the Syracuse expedition
are both examples of interdemocratic conflict between Athens and the other
democratic Greek city-states such as Sparta, and Syracuse.
While the United States has not gone to war with stable, capitalist,
democratic states such as France or Canada, the US has intervened in a variety of
states with democratically elected regimes such as with Mosaddegh in Iran,
replacing him with the more US-friendly Mohamed Reza Shah in 1953. This is only
one example of dozens of instances of the Unites States intervening in
democratically elected regimes across the so called “global south” from South
America, Southeast Asia, the Caribbean, and Africa to remake these nations in our
own interests.24 Both Athens and the United States set aside their alleged reverence
for democracy in favor of imperial conquests and tyranny for their own glory and
benefit.
While the context of Peloponnesian war has helped us understand the United
States’ foreign policy disasters during the Vietnam War and how our overexpansion
of power has led to violation of democratic dreams across the globe there are other
lessons we can learn from Thucydides’ History. We have already explored the
colossal loss the Athenians suffered at Syracuse, but early in History, Thucydides
tells the tale a mission with a hauntingly similar outcome to the Syracuse expedition.
In Book 1 of the History the reader is informed of a six-year expedition to Egypt
prior to the commencement of the Peloponnesian War. The Athenians took a fleet of
over 200 ships to Egypt to assist an allied Libyan King, with the alluring desire for
the treasures of Nile in their minds rather than the potential for disaster that the
mission holds. This mission, much like the Syracuse expedition more than a decade
later, ends in disaster and massive losses.25 However the massive losses weigh little
on the Athenian mind in the years to come as they have become emboldened by
other victories and successes that they have forgotten the folly of the Nile.
More the two millennia after the Athenian defeats in Egypt and Syracuse, the
United States is on the verge of launching the 2003 invasion of Iraq. It is unlikely
that Bush administration is thinking of Thucydides and the Egyptian disaster, but
24 Gilbert, Alan. "Democratic Imperialism and Internal Corruption." In Must Global Politics
Constrain Democracy? Great-power Realism, Democratic Peace, and Democratic
Internationalism, 148-176. Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1999.
25
Thucydides, 1.4 In History of the Peloponnesian War
they may be trying to drown out the critics of the invasion who are invoking the
memory of the Vietnam war and the decades long “quagmire” that cost hundreds of
millions of dollars and thousands of American lives, not to mention the lasting
suffering for generations in Vietnam. Like the Athenians emboldened by the glory of
their imperial expansions rather than the memory of Egypt, the Bush administration
is riding high off of the soaring approval ratings following the 9/11 terror attacks,
and the invasion of Iraq is the next step in the so-called “global war on terror”.26
At the time the reasons for the invasion were murky and backed by little to
no evidence. Over the years many reasons have been given by the Bush
administration for the invasion and subsequent war in Iraq, but none of these were
revealed to be the truth. What has become clear is that the real reasons behind the
Iraq War, to build a neoliberal US friendly Iraq, the good of the American people and
the defense of democracy was not one of them.27
The Athenians were enticed by overseas treasures, personal glory and
imperial expansion, so much so they forget the folly of Egypt, only to have history
repeat itself in Sicily. The leadership of the Vietnam war era sought imperial
expansion and to rebuild Southeast Asia to our liking, but as the war escalated both
Kennedy and Johnson feared being the handed the title of the only US president to
lose a war, so we stayed for more than a decade in a foolish effort to preserve our
26
Eichenberg, Richard C., and Richard J. Stoll. 2006. War president: THE APPROVAL RATINGS OF
GEORGE W. BUSH. The Journal of Conflict Resolution 50, (6) (12): 783-808, http://0search.proquest.com.bianca.penlib.du.edu/docview/224559028?accountid=14608 (accessed
November 14, 2014).
27 Klein, Naomi. 2004. BAGHDAD YEAR ZERO. Harper's Magazine. 09, http://0search.proquest.com.bianca.penlib.du.edu/docview/233490694?accountid=14608 (accessed
November 13, 2014).
American military prestige. In Iraq, the Bush administration sought to rebuild Iraq
to better suit our interests and desired the glory of “liberating” the Iraqi people, but
failed to see the chaos and suffering their interests would unleash. Today, thanks in
part to the Bush administrations’ meddling in Iraq the United States is now reentering the Middle East in attempt to deal with threat of ISIS/ISIL, and it is very
possible the US may continue to have an extended military presence in the Levant
for many years to come.
All of these cases highlight how often democracy is abandoned in favor of
tyranny and how easily power can lead to hubris, and how hubris can lead once
great nations to a path of self destruction and overall suffering for all involved.
History is a cautionary tale; Thucydides had no qualms with exposing the poor
leadership of Athens and their folly in not heeding the memory of their own failures.
The United States too may face a similar downfall if they continue to seek
unwarranted power expansion and imperial desires to reshape the nations of the
world in their own interests. Once again, the age-old cliché bears repeating, those
who do not learn from history are doomed to repeat it.