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Comments on Capital Flows and Excess Saving Session Iwan J Azis ([email protected]) [email protected]) ADBI, Tokyo, February 8, 2012 Flow-of-Fund 1 2 GDP, Financial Development, and Employment Elasticity— Emerging Asia1 (model based) $ billion (others) 9,000 Elasticity 0.35 Pre-AFC (1990-1997) 0.31 8,000 0.30 Employment Elasticity2 7,000 0.25 6,000 4,000 3,000 0.20 Post-AFC (1999-2009) 5,000 0.15 Financial market asset/capitalization3 0.15 0.10 2,000 0.05 GDP 1,000 0 1990 1993 1996 1999 2002 2005 0.00 2009 2008 AFC = Asian Financial Crisis, GDP = gross national product. 1Includes People's Republic of China (PRC); Hong Kong, China (HKG); India (IND); Indonesia (INO); Republic of Korea (KOR); Malaysia (MAL); Philippines (PHI); Singapore (SIN); Taipei,China (TAP); and Thailand (THA). Excludes Brunei Darussalam, Cambodia, Lao PDR, Myanmar, and Viet Nam due to inavailability of long time series. GDP and financial market capitalization are in real terms. 2Computed by running a regression model of formal employment against real GDP, inflation and lending rate for each country. Aggregated by using nominal GDP in US dollars as weights. 3Includes deposit money bank assets, and stock market and bond market capitalization. Source: Thortsen Beck and Asli Demirgüç-Kunt, "Financial Institutions and Markets Across Countries and over Time: Data and Analysis", World Bank Policy Research Working Paper No. 4943, May 2009; World Economic Outlook Database, International Monetary Fund; and World Development Indicators, World Bank. GDP, Financial Development, and Income Inequality— Emerging Asia $ billion (others) GINI Index 9,000 45 8,000 40 GINI Index1 7,000 35 6,000 30 5,000 25 Financial market asset/capitalization2 4,000 20 3,000 15 2,000 10 GDP 1,000 5 0 1990 1993 1996 1999 2002 2005 2008 0 2009 Note: Emerging Asia includes People's Republic of China (PRC); Hong Kong, China (HKG); India (IND); Indonesia (INO); Republic of Korea (KOR); Malaysia (MAL); Philippines (PHI); Singapore (SIN); Taipei,China (TAP); and Thailand (THA). Excluded Brunei Darussalam, Cambodia, Lao PDR, Myanmar, and Viet Nam due to inavailability of long time series. GDP and financial market capitalization are in real terms. 1Weighted using nominal GDP in US dollars. Data for PRC and THA until 2004; IND, MAL, TAP (2005); HKG, PHI (2006); and KOR (2008). Previous period's figure was used to complete the series until 2009. 2Includes deposit money bank assets, and stock market and bond market capitalization. Source: Thortsen Beck and Asli Demirgüç-Kunt, "Financial Institutions and Markets Across Countries and over Time: Data and Analysis", World Bank Policy Research Working Paper No. 4943, May 2009; World Economic Outlook Database, International Monetary Fund; and World Development Indicators, World Bank. 3 4 Foreign Holdings in LCY Government Bonds % 35 31.35 30 25 Indonesia 22.03 20 15 Malaysia Korea 10 Japan 5 Thailand 0 Jan-96 Jan-97 Dec-97 Dec-98 Nov-99 Oct-00 Oct-01 Sep-02 Aug-03 Aug-04 Jul-05 Jun-06 Jun-07 May-08 Apr-09 10.14 8.38 5.03 Apr-10 Mar-11 Note: Data as of March 2011. Source: AsianBondsOnline. Liquidity & Bonds • Pawnbrokers make loans to liquidity-searching customers (SME, SMH) using their personal property as collateral: Perum Pegadian (PP) Indonesia’s chain of state-owned pawn shops 900 shops across the country, lending at lower Most people return to redeem the pawned items • PP plans to price its 1.5 trillion rupiah bond issue in June 2012 with yields ranging from 10-14 percent (5, 8, 10 years) 5 Capital Inflows and Currencies Appreciation Figure XX: Change in Exchange Rate vis-à-vis US dollar1 (%) Change in Exchange Rate vis-à-vis US dollar1 (%) Thai baht 12.3 2009 2010 YTD Malaysian ringgit 10.0 Singapore dollar 8.5 Philippine peso 5.7 Indonesian rupiah 5.1 Taipei,China NT dollar 5.1 Korean won 3.5 2 PRC renminbi 2.9 Hong Kong dollar Vietnamese dong 0.1 -5.2 -6 -2 2 6 1 10 Year-to-date (YTD) figures based on 10 Nov 2010 closing. Negative values indicate depreciation. Year-to-date (YTD) figures based on 10 Nov 2010 closing. Negative values indicate 2 PRC = People's Republic of China. 2 PRC = People's Republic of China. Source: OREI staff calculations based on Reuters data. 1 14 18 depreciation. 11 Source: OREI staff calculations based on Reuters data. Capital flows Fluctuation and Currencies Depreciation Figure XX: Exchange Rates against US dollar1 (1 Sep 2011 to 12 Dec 2011, % change) Korean won -7.4 Singapore dollar -7.4 Indonesian rupiah -5.7 -5.5 Malaysian ringgit Taipei,China NT dollar -4.1 Thai baht -3.9 -2.8 Philippine peso -1.3 Japanese yen -0.8 Vietnamese dong Hong Kong dollar -0.01 PRC renminbi 0.3 -8 -6 -4 -2 0 2 PRC = People's Republic of China. Note: Positive values indicate appreciation; negative values indicate depreciation. 1Latest closing as of 12 Dec 2011, based on local currency value of the $. Source: ADB calculations using data from Reuters. 6 PRC Korea & Japan ROW PRC ASEAN ROW 7 Intraregional Exchange Rate Stability and Trade Rationale: Post Great Recession (push factor) combined with stable and strong growth & return Capital flows; Policy response is less effective, create distortion & Spill-over effects, Intraregional trade Preventing Factors: Modality & non-economic sensitivity Stages: Institution-lite, ownership, basket with different composition & weights then standardized PLUS regulatory harmonization & shared governance practice Exchange Rate and Capital Flows Coordination/Cooperation? • Cooperation essential due to interdependencies; spillover and contagion effects • Exchange rate stability needed for intra-regional trade, production network efficiency, reducing trade surplus and helping to stimulate investment (all of which will support the region’s “rebalancing” efforts) • Bandid: “Collaboration of policy responses to capital flows at a regional level between countries can be effective” • Start with informal arrangements with no new institutions – Policy dialogue and discussion – Loose agreements 16 8