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University of Richmond UR Scholarship Repository Rhetoric and Communication Studies Faculty Publications Rhetoric and Communication Studies 2001 Wedge and Bridge: A Note on the Rhetoric of Distinction and Identification Mari Lee Mifsud University of Richmond, [email protected] Henry W. Johnstone Follow this and additional works at: http://scholarship.richmond.edu/rhetoric-faculty-publications Part of the Rhetoric Commons Recommended Citation Johnstone, Henry W., and Mari Lee Mifsud. "Wedge and Bridge: A Note on the Rhetoric of Distinction and Identification." Rhetoric Society Quarterly 29, no. 2 (1999): 75-78. This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Rhetoric and Communication Studies at UR Scholarship Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in Rhetoric and Communication Studies Faculty Publications by an authorized administrator of UR Scholarship Repository. For more information, please contact [email protected]. Henry W. Johnstone, Jr. and Mari Lee Mifsud WEDGE AND BRIDGE:A NOTE ON RHETORICAS DISTINCTION AND AS IDENTIFICATION Henry Johnstone(1970 p. 124, 1990) has advancedthe slogan "Rhetoricis a wedge" to suggest the ways in which rhetoric calls attentionto hitherto unnoticedconsequencesor assumptions,or even to featuresof the physical world thathave escaped an audience'sattention.Here, however, we intend to supplementthe notion of rhetoricas "wedge"by suggestingthe ways in which it is, and also must be, a "bridge."' Technically,we could say thatthe two functionsof rhetorichere underconsiderationare distinctionand identification.We distinguishideas thatwe may have tendedto confuse, anddistinguishfromthe backgroundthe stimuliwe shouldbe attending to. We identify diverse elements of the social landscape, including ourselves, with a cause or projectrequiring,or at least inviting, solidarity.Some examples shortly.But first it is importantto declare that we authorsmake no attemptto define "rhetoric."We only appealto an intuitionof what it is thatcan be the instrumentof eitherdistinctionor identification.It would not be strangeif persuasionhad somethingto do with it. Let us returnto the rhetoricof identification.Since this was not discussed in (1990), we ought to try to say enough about it now. But we mean to provide only the barestsketch. It is by no means a full study we are attemptinghere. Among the performancesof the rhetoricof identification,the most pervasive is clearly thatwhich is susceptibleto being dismissedas "mererhetoric."Speech of this kindrangesfrompoliticalutterancesperceivedas radicallybiased through pep rallies and other partisangatheringsthat might be aptly characterizedas "bacchanalian."Throughits revelry and indulgence, this rhetoricfixes both the speakerand audience on the particularworth of an action, idea, event, person, etc. in such a way thatthe possibility of alternativeperspectivesis never brought to consciousness. Mere rhetoricis thereforenot a wedge. But it is not quite a bridge either.The judgmentrequiredto discern and associate ideals of virtueis bypassed in mere rhetoric.That which moves the psyche along is more akin to compulsion thanjudgment. Furthermore,such rhetoricbypasses different perspectives, ratherthan overcomes them. "To overcome" suggests direct experience with opposition, while "to bypass" connotes indirection,or avoidance of opposition, throughsuch tactics as silence or raising misdirectedissues against opposition, what some might call trickery. Anotherperformanceof identificationis the rhetoricclassed as "epideictic." While epideictic has certainly been held in suspicion because of its tendency (throughouthistory) to display oratoricalexcellence, ratherthan public excellence, we are not forced to be suspicious. We can for instance envision a less 75 RSQ:Rhetoric Society Quarterly Volume 29, Number 2 Summer 1999 This content downloaded from 141.166.177.91 on Fri, 14 Mar 2014 10:57:51 AM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions 76 RHETORICSOCIETYQUARTERLY suspect functionof epideictic which would entail seeing the ways in which culturalexcellence comes to be identified.GerardHauser(1998) has most recently put voice to such a vision by exploring epideictic as didactic, as a teacher of public excellence through the display of public models of virtue. Didactic epideictic provides a common groundof public virtuefrom which deliberative and forensic argumentationcan proceed. To say thatepideictic is didacticsuggests it is both a wedge and a bridge.As a wedge, epideictic opens audiencesto the ideal of virtuousbehavior.As a bridge it connects an audience's consciousness of virtuosity with a model of public virtue. It bridges the self with the virtuousother. We can look to the commonrhetoricaltechniques(koina), in additionto rhetoricalgenres, for anotheroperationof identification.Takefor example, the rhetoricaltechniquewhichAristotlecalls amplification(auxesis),which he describes as generally applicableto all three types of speech but particularlywell suited for epideictic (1368a).3Amplificationtakesas its subjectthe undisputed.It draws from a common pool of readily available and agreedupon beliefs, values, and understandings.As Aristotledescribes,when a particularconsciousness is in an audience already,all that remains to be done by the rhetor is to attributeto it greaterbeauty and importance,in other words to celebrate this consciousness (1368a). While this celebrationis not a wedge, since it calls attentionto nothing the audiencedid not alreadybelieve, it is a bridge.It is an appealto the identification of "like"consciousness. Only when this identificationdescends into an ecstasy beyond reasondoes it degeneratefrombridgeto bypass, fromrhetoricto mere rhetoric. If amplificationoperatesas a generaltechniquewithinall threegenresof rhetoric, andif it is a way of bridging,then the bridgeas a metaphorfor identification is applicableto all three genres,not just epideicticbut deliberativeand forensic address.Rhetoricworks as a wedge in deliberativeand forensic speech primarily to open an audience'sawarenessto the existence of a particularproblemthat needs attending.But the evocation of this awarenessis only the beginning of what might be describedas a tripartiterhetoricaltransaction.Beginning with a problem, deliberativeand forensic rhetoricproceeds throughdeliberationto a decision. It is the thirdterm which requires"rhetoricas a wedge" to be supplemented with "rhetoricas a bridge."The wedge alone cannotbring the rhetorical process to its necessary end of judgment. This is the case whetherwe are speakingof the more traditionalAristotelian referentof publicaddress,orwhetherwe arespeakingof a performanceof identification beyond this, such as the reflexive rhetoricwhich both of us have explored (Johnstone1970, 1990; Mifsud 1998). Reflexive rhetoric,whererhetorical transactionsparticularlyof a deliberativekind are internalizedwithin one individual, finds an individualtorn asunderby the recognition of a particular problemandthe alternativeways of solving the problem.If rhetoriconly wedges, the sunderedself will collapse into schizophrenia.The end of reflexive delibera- This content downloaded from 141.166.177.91 on Fri, 14 Mar 2014 10:57:51 AM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions 77 JOHNSTONE/MIFSUD/WEDGE ANDBRIDGE tive rhetoric is to bridge the poles of the divided mind, re-creatinga unity of mind manifest in a personaldecision. While we could continuedelineatingexamples of "rhetoricas a bridge,"this is not the task of this note. Ratherwe hope these exampleshelp to show the need for supplementingthe slogan 'rhetoricas a wedge.' A properlyrhetoricaltransaction must both wedge and bridge. What begins as an opening of consciousness must end in judgmentin orderfor a rhetoricaltransactionto reachits telos. While one might say thatthe coming of awarenessof a particularproblem(as in the case of most deliberativeand forensic rhetoric)or a particularideal of virtue (as in epideictic rhetoric)is a rhetoricalmoment,it is not the telos but the arche' of the rhetoricaltransaction.For the transactionto be completed it must move from awarenessto judgment.The metaphorof the rhetoricalwedge governs the former event while the rhetoricalbridge governs the latter.If rhetoricwedges without bridging,no judgmentcan be realized and the rhetoricaltransactionis incomplete.And if rhetoricbridgeswithoutwedging it becomes bacchanalianin nature.Rhetoricpresupposesboth the wedge andthe bridge-the two cannotbe separatedrightly. The PennsylvaniaState University The Universityof Richmond Notes 'In his first advancementof the idea 'rhetoricas a wedge', Johnstone also made use of the word 'bridge.'Ourpresentuse of 'bridge'is not precisely the use to which the bridge metaphorwas put in the relevantpassage of TheProblemof the Self. But it is too much to ask that metaphorsbe precise. That is the office of technical terms, the relevant ones of which are now aboutto be introduced. 2Fora noteworthypredecessorto the subject of this note see, Kenneth Burke, A Rhetoric of Motives (Berkeley:University of CaliforniaPress, 1969), 38-39. 'Amplification is best understoodas a koinon, something that is common to all species of rhetoric.It is a techniqueof persuasionlike example andenthymeme.All three techniques are koina, but each has its place where it is most at home: amplificationin epideictic speeches, example in deliberative speeches, and enthymemes in judicial speeches. See Aristotle's qualificationof amplificationas koinon at 1403a. For further explanation,see Kennedy (1991), n. 181, 267. Works Cited Aristotle. Ars Rhetorica. Ed. W.D. Ross. ScriptorumClassicorumBibliotheca Oxoniensis. n.p.: E. TypographeoClarendoniano,1959. Burke,Kenneth.A Rhetoricof Motives.Berkeley:Universityof CaliforniaPress, 1969. Hauser, Gerard."Aristotleon Epideictic: The Formationof Public Morality." Rhetoric Society Quarterly. Forthcoming. This content downloaded from 141.166.177.91 on Fri, 14 Mar 2014 10:57:51 AM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions RHETORICSOCIETYQUARTERLY 78 Johnstone,HenryW. TheProblem of the Self. University Park:The Pennsylvania State University Press, 1970. . "Rhetoricas a Wedge:A Reformulation."RhetoricSociety Quarterly.20.4 (1990), 333-338. Kennedy,George.Aristotle. On Rhetoric.New York:Oxford University Press, 1991. Mifsud, Mari Lee. "On the Idea of Reflexive Rhetoricin Homer."Philosophy and Rhetoric.31.1 (1998), 41-54 This content downloaded from 141.166.177.91 on Fri, 14 Mar 2014 10:57:51 AM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions