Download Ecological-Evolutionary Theory

Evolutionary Theory in Sociology
By Frank Elwell
Rogers State University
Macro-perspectives have largely fallen into disuse in sociology since the
19th century--trotted out in the opening chapter of our introductory texts perhaps,
but then largely ignored (except, perhaps, as an afterthought at the end of key
chapters). In an effort to attract students the field has concentrated more on
social-psychology; in an effort to attract research dollars, the field has focussed
on the "middle-range," simple relationships between social phenomenon and
human behavior rather than the all-encompassing systems of the founders.
Sociological theory in general has become the arcane specialty of a few, with its
own vocabulary, limited readership, and even more limited applications.
Against this trend in sociology Gerhard Lenski and his co-authors (Jean
Lenski an Patrick Nolan) have stood almost alone. Since the mid-sixties Lenski
has been developing an ecological-evolutionary theory that is both broad in
scope and capable of synthesizing many of the insights and findings of the
discipline into a coherent framework; capable of furthering our understanding of
sociocultural systems as a whole. Through his work Lenski presents an
ecological-evolutionary theory as an integrating device, synthesizing both the
classical works of sociologists and anthropologists and contemporary social
theory and substantive findings.
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The foundation of Lenski's ecological-evolutionary theory is the
observation that human societies are part of the world of nature. Human
societies are subject to natural law. Sociocultural systems can only be fully
understood as being responsive to the interactions of populations to their
environments (1987: 55). At the base of the perspective lies the relationship
between population and production. Like all life forms humans have a
reproductive capacity that substantially exceeds the necessary subsistence
resources in the environment. Thus, Lenski concludes, human populations tend
to grow until they come up against the limits of food production, and then they
are checked (1987: 32). The checks, of course, consist of both the positive and
preventive checks that Malthus first explored in 1798. The capacity for
population growth, Lenski asserts, has been a “profoundly destabilizing force
throughout human history and may well be the ultimate source of most social and
cultural change” (1987: 32). Lenski posits that the relationships among
population, production, and environment drive the evolution of sociocultural
systems.
The influence of Malthus is also clearly apparent when Lenski discusses
the nature of social inequality. Like Malthus, he asserts that we are social
animals obliged to cooperate with one another in producing a living (1966: 24).
Also like Malthus, he claims that human beings are strongly motivated by selfinterests. Lenski states: “when men are confronted with important decisions
where they are obliged to choose between their own, or their group’s, interests
and the interests of others, they nearly always choose the former—though often
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seeking to hide this fact from themselves and others” (emphasis in the original,
1966: 30).
Since most necessary resources are in short supply, he continues, a
struggle for rewards will be present in every human society. Individuals are born
with a range of innate abilities and circumstances. Thus the root of social
inequality is in our nature. Some minimal distribution of wealth is necessary to
ensure the survival of “others whose actions are necessary” to themselves, but
any surplus (goods and services over and above the minimum required to keep
necessary workers alive and productive) will be distributed unequally (1966: 4445).
In the earlier stages of sociocultural evolution the distribution of resources
is allocated on the basis of personal characteristics—hunting skills or plant
gathering productivity. With the development of a more complex division of labor
these inequalities become institutionalized in class, caste, race, sex, and ethnic
systems. Thus, like Malthus before him, Lenski concludes that inequality is
inevitable in any complex sociocultural system (complex as measured by a
division of labor)--though the degree of inequality is variable across societies and
through time (1966: 442).
While it begins with Malthus, Lenski’s perspective is an integrating device
as well. By his own report, his major theoretical influences have been Herbert
Spencer, Charles Darwin, Karl Marx, Max Weber and Thorstein Veblen. More
contemporary influences include C. Wright Mills, Leslie White, and Marvin Harris
(1991, p. xviii). One can see the influence of Weber in Lenski’s discussion of
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power and the multidimensional nature of stratification. One can see the
influence of Veblen as Lenski writes on the importance of status and status
striving, the influence of Mills as Lenski discusses power, authority and
manipulation. And certainly one can see the influence of White and Harris in
Lenski’s growing focus in later editions of Human Societies on technological
change and its subsequent impact on social structures, cultural ideas and
ideologies. Like evolutionary theory in biology, Lenski puts forward ecologicalevolutionary social theory as an all-encompassing paradigm for sociology that
can serve as a viable framework to bring order and research focus to the
discipline.
But should the social sciences even be using the term evolution?
Stephen J. Gould was a professor of zoology and geology and one of the most
vigorous defenders and popular teachers of natural evolution in the last half of
the 20th century. For most of his professional life he struggled against the idea of
“progress” in natural evolution, both in the popular mind as well as among some
of his professional colleagues (see especially Full House, 1996). In several of
his essays Gould (1992 & 1996) decries the use of the term “cultural evolution”
because the process is so very different from natural selection in nature.
Gould (1992) identifies three major differences between natural evolution
and social evolution (what Gould prefers to call simply social change): First,
cultural evolution does not rely on inherited characteristics, rather its chief
mechanism of descent is learning. Successful innovations can be directly taught
to the next generation. Second, genetic change takes place over generations,
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sociocultural change can occur within a matter of months or even days.
Biological evolution is indirect, relying upon fortuitous genetic variation that will
enable the organism to adapt to a changing environment; sociocultural
adaptation to changing natural and social environments is far more direct and
potentially purposeful. Finally, and most distressing to Gould, biological evolution
is a system of divergence. Once a species becomes separate, it cannot
recombine, it is separate for ever. Yet in sociocultural evolution “transmission
across lineages” (cultural transmission) is probably the chief avenue of change
(1992, p. 65). In 1996 Gould adds “Natural evolution includes no principle of
predictable progress or movement to greater complexity. But cultural change is
potentially progressive or self-complexifying because Lamarckian inheritance
[learned adaptation] accumulates favorable innovations by direct transmission,
and amalgamation of traditions [cultural contact in various forms] allows any
culture to choose and join the most useful inventions of several separate
societies” (1996, p 222).
Because of the different mechanisms of change (learning, cultural
contact, and sheer speed of change) in sociocultural systems and the apparent
directionality to sociocultural change (increasing complexity), Gould expresses
the wish that social scientists would just use the more neutral term “cultural
change” and stop confusing people. Yet, as Gould knew full well, biology and the
social sciences have always had a symbiotic relationship in terms of evolution.
Both Darwin and Wallace (a cofounder of natural evolutionary theory) credited T.
Robert Malthus, economist and demographer of the early 19th century, as a
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critical influence on the development of the natural theory. The term “evolution”
itself was actually popularized by another social scientist and contemporary of
Darwin’s, Herbert Spencer. Darwin did not even use the term in the first edition
of Origin of Species, he preferred “descent with modifications” (Gould, 1996, p.
137).
Lenski writes of the same basic differences between natural and social
evolution as those noted by Gould (1991, pp. 66-68). And Gould is surely
correct, it is important to note the differences as well as the parallels, for
practitioners within biology as well as the social sciences. While drawing false
parallels between growing complexity (or sometimes “progress”) in sociocultural
systems has misled biologists and others, social observers have been misled by
faulty analogies between social and biological evolution as well. The
misapplication of biological evolution by the “Social Darwinists,” 19th century
social scientists who characterized nature’s struggle as bloody and brutish and
used this faulty biological model to justify the inequality around them, still haunts
social evolutionary theory today. But if used precisely, social evolutionary theory,
particularly social evolution grounded in ecology (there are other varieties), has
great potential. For unlike Gould’s neutral term “cultural change,” the term social
evolution does encompass a theory that is truly useful in understanding
sociocultural stability and change.
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References:
Gould, Stephen Jay. 1991. “The Panda’s Thumb of Technology,” in Bully for
Brontosaurus: Reflections in Natural History. New York: W.W. Norton &
Company, pp. 59-75.
Gould, Stephen Jay. 1996. Full House: The Spread of Excellence from Plato to
Darwin. New York: Three Rivers Press.
Lenski, Gerhard Emmanuel. 1966. Power and Privilege: A Theory of Social
Stratification. New York: McGraw-Hill Book Company.
Lenski, Gerhard and Jean Lenski. 1986. Human Societies: An Introduction to
Macrosociology. New York: McGraw-Hill Book Company.
Lenski, Gerhard and Jean Lenski and Patrick Nolan. 1991. Human Societies:
An Introduction to Macrosociology. New York: McGraw-Hill Book Company.
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