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CHAPTER
8: The Origills
of Wo,
103
8
The Origins of World War I
On June 28, 1914, a Serbian nationalist
assassinated
the Austrian archduke
and heir to the throne, Franz Ferdinand, in Sarajevo, Bosnia. While Ferdinand
was sitting in the open back seat of a car-it
was a beautiful sunny day-a
nineteen-year-old
youth stepped out into the street and fired several shots. Before the archduke himself expired-after
several times dismissing
his wound
as "nothing"-his
wife Sophie had already died from a bullet in the stomach.
The assassin was Gavrilo Princip, a Bosnian of Serbian nationality. Himself
stricken with tuberculosis,
he was fond of quoting Nietzsche's lines from Eeee
Homo: "Insatiable as the flame, I glow and consume myself." Princip wished to
see Bosnia break away from the Austro-Hungarian
Empire and become part of
a Greater Serbia. Austria-Hungary
soon declared war on Serbia, and by August 4 most of the major European powers were involved in World War l. To
understand
how a major war could follow from the shooting of an Austrian
archduke, it is necessary to investigate the combustible atmosphere
that transformed the spark of an assassination
into an all-consuming
fire that would
bring about the deaths
of millions.
NATIONALISM
Nationalism
was the first element at work. This passion was especially strong in
the Balkans. Serbia had gained complete independence
from the Ottoman Empire in 1878. In that year, major European powers at the. Congre~s of Berlin allowed Austria-Hungary
to occupy Bosma and Herzegovma
despite the fact that
these provinces were still legally part of the Ottol1:an Empire and that most of
the population
in both provinces consisted of Serbians. After Kmg Peter I ca~e
to the throne in 1903, Serbia stepped up its efforts to incorporate ethnic Serbian
areas still outside its national borders; it was outraged when Austria completely
annexed Bosnia and Herzegovina
in 1908. Serbia made threats and appealed to
Russia for help. Germany promised Austria its backing and sent the Russians a
102
Sarajevo, 1914: Austrian Archduke Franz Ferdinand and his wife in the rear of the
automobile in which they would soon be assassinated.
(UPI/BclIIIlOIlII
NCll'spilolo,)
note demanding
that the tsarist government
recognize the annexation and not
support Serbin in the matter. Russia yielded, and without Russian support Serbia had to acknowledge
the annexation. As a result of strong Austrian pressure,
Serbia also promised to cease activities that were hostile to its northern neighbor.
Despite its promise, however, Serbia failed to curtail such actions. In fact,
within a short period, several new nationalistic
societies appeared.
One of
these was the conspiratorial
group "Unity or Death," commonly referred to as
the "Black Himel," which specialized in encouraging
ethnic Serbs in areas such
as Bosnia to work for unification with Serbia. It helped to smuggle men, guns,
and propaganda
to sympathetic
individuals
still outside Serbian borders. Led
by the chief of intelligence
of the Serbian army, the Black Hand organized
Princip's bloody deed.
Although
this act of Serbian nationalism
had precipitated
the crisis, the
nationalism displayed by other powers widened it. Kaiser Wilhelm II and segments of the German public, including many intellectuals
and politicians, believed in the superiority
of the German nation and culture. Some Germans
dreamed of uniting all Germans in a Pan-German
state that would include
large areas of Austria-Hungary.
Pan-Cerrnanists
were countered by Russian Pan-Slavists. who dreamed of
politically uniting with Russia the many Orthodox Slavs who populated
the
Balkans. As the control of the Ottoman Empire in the Balkans weakened during the century preceding World War I, the Russians planned to exercise increasing influence in the area but instead suffered a number of disappointments. Russia lost the influence it once had in Bulgaria, and, along with
Serbia, suffered a diplomatic
defeat when Austria-Hungary
annexed Bosnia
and Herzegovina
in 1908.
••
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PART ONE: Tile
Em of
CHAPTER 8: Tire Origills
Imperialism
A quickening of French nationalism was also apparent. An anti-German
disturbance in late 1913 in a French town in the German provinces of AlsaceLorraine symbolized the painful loss of these provinces to Germany in the
Franco-Prussian War. Ten-year-old Raymond Poincare had watched the Germans march through his hometown in Lorraine in 1870. Elected premier of
France in 1912 and president in 1913, he played an active role in leading
France into war with Germany in 1914.
Nor were the Serbians, Germans, Russians, and French alone in their nationalism. As Winston Churchill later wrote about this period, "National passions, unduly exalted in the decline of religion, burned beneath the surface of
every land with fierce, if shrouded fires." Not even the rival faith of socialism
could compete with nationalism. For twenty-five years, the Second International Workingman's Association had preached the international brotherhood
of the working class. It had also often criticized war, attributing it to capitalist
forces. Yet the vast majority of its members supported their homelands in the
crucial days of early August 1914.
IMPERIALISM
Imperialism was the second combustible element in the prewar atmosphere.
The influential German historian Fritz Fischer has written of German imperialistic aims in Europe, Africa, and the Near East and identified them as a chief
cause of the war. Although some historians have disputed his charges, what is
undeniable is that imperialistic rivalries stimulated hostile feelings between
some of the major European powers.
The first Moroccan crisis of 1905 serves as an excellent illustration. In 1904
Great Britain and France had concluded the Entente Cordia le, an understanding concerning their overseas spheres of influence. As part of the agreement,
Great Britain recognized France's desire to control Morocco. Germany disliked
the Entente and thought that a stiff challenge to the French position in Morocco might split it apart. In 1905 Kaiser Wilhelm II landed at Tangier and recognized the sultan of Morocco as a ruler independent of French control. Wilhelm
also demanded an international conference, which assembled in 1906, to discuss the situation. Meanwhile, the British had become so alarmed at German
belligerence over Morocco, as well as at the continuing German naval buildup, that they moved much closer to France. While not going as far as the
French would have liked-a promise of British support in case of war with
Germany-Great
Britain's foreign minister, Sir Edward Grey, did authorize informal military conversations with the French. These conversations continued
from time to time over the years and strengthened the impression among
some French statesmen that Great Britain would back France in case of a war
with Germany.
In addition to bringing Great Britain closer to France, the Moroccan crisis
also helped to bring about the Anglo-Russian Entente in 1907. It was not an alliance but primarily a settlement over spheres of influence in Persia,
of
World
War I
105
Afghanistan, and Tibet. Nevertheless, it brought Great Britain closer to Russia,
France's ally. The entente increased the Germans' fear of encirclement and to
some extent induced them to vigorously back the Dual Monarchy in the annexation crisis of 190B-itself a manifestation of Austro-Hungarian imperialism. Again in 1914, Germany's uncompromising support of Austria-Hungary
reflected its fear of losing its only real ally.
MILITARISM
Militarism also contributed to the outbreak of World War I. European nations
feverishly expanded their military forces and armaments in the years immediately before 1914. German and Austrian military spending doubled between
1910 and 1914, and other European nations increased their expenditures
markedly. By 1914 both Germany and France had each assembled standing
armies of 800,000 men, with a million more in the reserves. About 1.2 million
Russians were under arms, although the Russian army was inferior in equipment, training, and leadership. By 1905 the British had begun construction on
a new battleship, the Dreadnought, designed to be the most powerful ship ever
built. Germany responded with increased naval expenditures of its own. From
1900 to 1911, German naval spending nearly tripled. Such contests did little to
increase the security of either side; instead they heightened the hostility and
mistrust already existing among nations.
Another manifestation of the militarism of the era was the failure of the
peace conferences of 1899 and 1907. Most government and military leaders
were more concerned with keeping up in the arms race and maintaining absolute national sovereignty than with achieving disarmament and arbitrating
disputes. At the 1907 conference, the delegates quickly postponed the issue of
disarmament and passed a resolution calling for further study of the question.
The delegates then spent weeks thrashing out the guidelines for the proper
conduct of warfare. It was as if they were saying to the world, "Disarmament
is a fool's dream, but war will surely come. So let us agree on the rules."
In this militaristic era, the plans and advice of military leaders played an
increasingly influential role in government decisions. Germany chose war in
1914 partly because it feared that if it waited, Russia's rearmament program
would make Russia a stronger foe. Germany's Schlieffen Plan, which the
French and Russian generals knew in broad outline, was a key factor in the
peace options and war plans of several nations. In the plan, the German general staff had assumed that in a two-front war with France and Russia, Germany
could not defeat both opponents simultaneously. Germany had therefore decided to knock out France first by an invasion through Belgium, while holding
off the slowly mobilizing Russians. After defeating France, Germany would
then concentrate its forces in the east and crush the Russians. For this plan to
work, the German military could not give the Russians a significant head start
in mobilizing their forces. Russia, on the other hand, reacting in part to strong
French pressure, had to do just what the Germans hoped they could not do-
CHAPrER
106
PARTe,,,.: Tire
8: The Origins of Wor,
107
Era of Imperialism
divert German troops to the Russian front before France could be defeated,
Other nations had their own military plans that demanded lead time for mobilization and deployment of troops.
Thus, in those final hectic days, military considerations afforded diplomacy little time to reach a peaceful settlement. Because it included the military
necessity of invading neutral Belgium, the Schlieffen Plan was also likely to
bring Great Britain, which wanted nearby Belgium free from either French or
German control, into the war.
That troops, weapons, and plans had such influence was partly a result of
the continuing belief that war could be more beneficial than harmful. On the
eve of World War I, most European leaders still expected a brief and not terribly destructive war-a "short, cleansing thunderstorm" in Winston Churchill's
words.
THE ALLIANCE
SYSTEM AND
WAR PREPARATION
As the events of July and August 1914 clearly indicate, the two European alliance systems were the mechanisms that transformed a local conflict into
World War 1. After the shooting of Ferdinand, Austria was convinced that the
Serbian government was implicated. The government in Vienna believed that,
one way or another, it must crush the threat to its empire posed by advocates
of Greater Serbia. Before acting, however, Austria sought to keep Russia from
mobilizing to aid Serbia, or at least to ensure German backing against Russia
should intervention occur. Germany granted almost unconditional backing-a
"blank check" -to her ally in early July, and Austria sent an ultimatum to Serbia on July 23. Austria demanded an end to anti-Austrian organizations and
propaganda, the removal of officers and officials accused by Austria of being
hostile, Austrian participation in the investigation of the assassination plot,
and the suppression of subversive movements directed against AustriaHungary. The Serbian government was given forty-eight hours to reply.
Serbia was aware that Russia, its chief supporter, advised caution but
would nevertheless ultimately back Serbia in case of hostilities. Russia supported Serbia because after the diplomatic defeat of 1908 it did not wish to
lose further influence and power in the Balkans to Austria-Hungary. Serbia
was Russia's last bastion of influence in the area. If Austria were allowed to
crush Serbia, either diplomatically or militarily, Russia's hopes in the Balkans
would be finally smashed. After hearing of Austria's ultimatum, the Russian
foreign minister, Sergei Sazanov, declared: "It means a European war!" He accused Austria of "setting fire to Europe," and on July 25 his government approved preliminary military preparations. This was done in the hope that it
would frighten Austria into arriving at some sort of compromise. Russia also
wished to be prepared in case it was necessary to come to the aid of Serbia.
In addition to its concern about Austria, the tsarist government had also
become increasingly troubled about growing German influence in the Ottoman Empire. It is not difficult, therefore, to understand why some Russian
Inflamed with Patriotism
Tome those hours seemed like a release
from the painful feelings of my youth.
. . . Overpowered by stormy enthusiasm, I fell down on my knees and
thanked Heaven from an overflowing
heart for granting me the good fortune
of being permitted to live at this time.
A fight for freedom had begun,
mightier than the earth had ever seen;
for once Destiny had begun its course,
the conviction dawned on even the
broad masses that this time not the fate
of Serbia or Austria was involved, but
whether the German nation was to be
or not to be....
As a boy and young man I had so
often felt the desire to prove at least
once by deeds that for me national enthusiasm was no empty whim....
Thus my heart, like that of a million
others, overflowed with proud joy that
at last I would be able to redeem myself
from this paralyzing feeling. I had so
often sung "Deutschland IIber Alles" and
shouted "HeW' at the top of my lungs,
that it seemed to me almost a belated
act of grace to be allowed to stand as a
witness in the divine court of the eternal judge and proclaim the sincerity of
this conviction. . . . [l] was ready at
any time to die for my people and for
the Reich which embodied it. ...
[Dlays later I was wearing the tunic
which I was not to doff until nearly six
years later"
~.e•••
Adolf Hitler, describing his feelings at
the start of World War 1, wlten Ite was
twellty-five alld living all impoverished life
ill Munich.
On August 3, 1914, he volunteered to enlist in the German army. See
Chapters 13 alld 18 for more on Hitler's
youth and his dictatorship it! Germany.
'From Meill KilllI!,! by Adolf Hitler. translated by
Ralph Manheim. Copyright © 1943 by Houghton
Mifflin Company. Reprinted by permission.
officials perceived the demands placed on Serbia as part of a united effort by
Austria and Germany to strengthen the "Germanic" influence in areas long
considered of special interest to the Russians.
Partly because of Russian support, Serbia did not accept all the Austrian
demands. Nevertheless, its carefully worded reply reflected a conciliatory
spirit. Austria, however, despite some belated German qualms, would recognize nothing less than unconditional acceptance. On July 28 Austria declared
war on Serbia and bombarded Belgrade, the Serbian capital.
Meanwhile, Russia's ally, France, had been giving strong support to the
tsarist government. The French remembered the 1870 war with Prussia (Germany, 1871) and did not wish to be isolated again in a struggle with Germany.
Accordingly, they were prepared to give full backing to their major ally, Russia. In addition, a war against Germany, if won, held out the hope of recovering the lost provinces of Alsace and Lorraine. From July 20 to 23 French President Poincare and Premier Viviani were in St. Petersburg encouraging the
Russians to stand firm.
After some indecisiveness about how to proceed, on July 30 Russia finally
decided on a general mobilization of its troops. The French encouraged such
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PART ONE:
CHAPTER
Tile Era of Imperialism
an action because France knew of the general thrust of the Schlieffen Plan. If
Russia mobilized substantially
ahead of Germany, there would be less likelihood that Germany could swiftly defeat France.
Because of Germany's
war plan, it was no surprise that after several warnings on previous days, Germany, on July 31, sent an ultimatum with a twelvehour limit demanding
that Russia end its war preparations
along the German
frontier. On the same day, Germany asked the French government
what its position would be in case of a Russian-German
war. On August 1, the French
replied that France would consult its own interests. On the same day, the government in Paris ordered mobilization.
Germany also mobilized on that day
and, having received no reply to its ultimatum,
declared war on Russia. Two
days later, certain that France was preparing
to aid Russia and unwilling to
lose any more time, Germany declared war on France and directed its attack
through neutral Belgium.
As a result of British-French
friendship and military conversations
that followed from their entente and the Moroccan crisis of 1905, Great Britain had already been moving toward support of France. A few days before, for example,
the British cabinet had voted to give assurance to the French that the British
navy would protect the French coast and shipping against any German attack.
However, the invasion of Belgium made it much easier to decide on a declaration of war. The neutrality of Belgium, just across the English Channel from
Great Britain, was considered essential to British interests. Great Britain, along
with France, Germany, Austria, and Russia, had been one of the guarantors
of
------_._----
8: The OrigillS of World War J
109
that neutrality since the Treaty of London in 1839. Thus, on August 4, Great
Britain declared war on Germany. "All for just a word-'neutraiity'-just
for a
scrap of paper," lamented
Germany's
Chancellor
Bethmann-Hollweg,
who
nevertheless
had earlier in the day stated: "Whatever our lot may be, August
4, 1914, will remain for all eternity one of Germany's greatest days."
With the British declaration,
almost all the major European
powers that
would enter the war were committed.
Great Britain, France, and Russia opposed Germany and Austria-Hungary.
The fear of being left without an ally
helped ensure such a widespread
war. Italy, the ally of Germany and AustriaHungary in the Triple Alliance, did not enter the war at this time on the
grounds that the alliance was a defensive one, and that Germany had taken
the offensive.
SUMMARY
The assassination
of Archduke Franz Ferdinand was the immediate
cause of
World War I, but four prominent background
factors helped to explain how
such an event could lead to a war as vast as World War I. As with the Boxer
Rebellion of 1900, nationalism,
imperialism,
and militarism again all played a
part. So too did a fourth factor: the alliance system.
Historians
have debated and will continue to debate which nation was
most at fault. In recent years, many historians have followed Fischer's lead in
placing the primary blame on Germany. Yet none of the nations that went to
war in the summer of 1914 had done all they might have done to prevent the
conflict from occurring. Despite some late and relatively weak diplomatic
efforts to slow the rapid escalation of events, each nation finally valued security,
prestige, influence, and allies more than peace. Only after years of death and
destruction
did many realize that in 1914 they had undervalued
the fruits of
peace and vastly underestimated
the human and material costs of modern
warfare.
SUGGESTED
Serbia, Austria, Russia, Germany, France, and Great Britain in a cartoon
suggesting how the alliance systems would work.
(BrooklYIl Eagle)
----
SOURCES
DEDIJER,
VLADIMIR,
Tile Road tv Sarajevo (]966). A detailed but fascinating account of the
events leading up to the assassination of Archduke Franz Ferdinand; sympathetic
with the idealism of the conspirators.
EVANS,R. J. w., and HAI(TMUTPOGGEVANSmANDMANN,Eds., The Comillg of the First
World Wnr (1989). A series of essays that delineates the position of each major
country that entered the war in July and August and also looks at the influence of
public opinion.'
FISCHER,
FRITZ,World Power or Decline (1975). A summation of the author's controversial
case for primarily blaming Germany's imperialist aims for causing World War 1.'
HERWIG,HOLGERH., Ed., Tilt' Outbreak of World War I: Causes and Responsibilities (1991).
A new edition and editor of a title first published in 1958 in the Heath "Problems"