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 Peloponnesian War: Athens Model United Nations at Chapel Hill (MUNCH) 2014 Carolina International Relations Association Carolina International Relations Association 2 MUNCH 2014: Peloponnesian War: Athens 3 Table of Contents Welcome Letter: 4 Historical Background: 5 Primary Map: 14 Athens Background: 15 Military Tactics & Strategy: 21 Committee Members: 24 Works Cited: 29 MUNCH 2014: Peloponnesian War: Athens 4 Welcome from the Committee Director Dear Delegates, It is my pleasure to welcome you to the Athenian side of MUNCH 2014's Peloponnesian War JCC. During the 5th century BCE, Athens was at the height of its Golden Age. Having defeated the Persians decisively half a century earlier, the Athenian-­‐dominated Delian League dominated the Greek political landscape. During this time, Greek culture flourished, the Western world's greatest philosophers wrote their first treatises, and Athenian merchants dominated the seas, bringing back untold wealth and riches from abroad. However, the peace may be illusory. To the south, Sparta gains power and allies by the day. To the East, the Persians still loom. Within the Delian League itself, whispers of rebellion continue to be a thorn in Athens' side. All of you will be representing some of Classical Athens' most powerful figures at the height of its Golden Age. Your goal is to entrench Athens' position atop the hierarchy of Greek city-­‐states. The primary threat to your supremacy is Sparta, a militaristic state that is known for its fierce warriors. At your disposal are the various members of the Delian League and the powerful Athenian navy; use them to counteract the Spartans' prowess on land. How you choose to proceed is entirely up to you; feel free to use any combination of statesmanship, military prowess, and political intrigue to accomplish your objectives. Sincerely, Chang Sun Chair, Athens MUNCH 2014: Peloponnesian War: Athens 5 Background Guide Historical Background The Greek Civilization The people who would eventually become the Greeks began migrating from the Balkans into the Achaean peninsula (“mainland” Greece) around 2,000 BC1 They came in three different ethnic groups, each speaking a unique dialect of Greek: first the Ionians, who would later found Athens, then the Achaeans, and finally the Dorians, who would later found Sparta. As the first arrivals settled into towns around the peninsula, they developed what is known as the Mycenaean civilization, best remembered for their destruction of Troy in Homer’s epic Illiad. Yet they also weakened themselves through constant warfare, allowing the Dorians, the latest ethnic group to enter Greece, to sweep in and overrun the Mycenaean cities around the twelfth century BC. The next three hundred years would be labeled by historians as the Dark Age of Greece: cities were abandoned, trade networks collapsed, and art and literacy vanished.2 Yet also during this time, many Greeks migrated from mainland Greece to the west coast of Asia Minor in modern-­‐day Turkey, thus beginning Greek colonization. The pace of colonization advanced when Greek civilization began to recover around 800 BC. The period of 800-­‐500 BC, known as the Archaic Age of Greece, saw the establishment of colonies throughout the Mediterranean and Black Seas by the cities in mainland Greece.3 Colonization was especially prolific on the west coast of Asia Minor and in southern Italy and Sicily, but included colonies as far afield as Saguntum on the east coast of modern Spain, Trapezus in eastern Asia Minor, and Tanais at the mouth of the Don River in modern Ukraine. 1
John Chadwick, The Mycenean World (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1976). Pg. 2. Robin Waterfield, Athens: A History (New York: Perseus Books Group, 2004). Pp. 37-­‐39. 3
Ibid, 40-­‐41. 2
MUNCH 2014: Peloponnesian War: Athens 6 Greek Colonies, 600 BC4 coursesa.matrix.msu.edu
During the Archaic Age, a fundamental social, political, and military revolution also transformed Greece and its colonies. Whereas the cities of Mycenaean Greece had effectively been little kingdoms, ruled by a king and his nobility, in the resurgence of Greek civilization the larger citizenry increasingly came to dominate political affairs. The result was the development of the polis, or city-­‐state, ruled to some degree by an assembly of all citizens (typically defined as property-­‐owning males).5 Implicit in the polis was the development of the phalanx military formation. The military specifics of the phalanx will be discussed later, but as the formation requires a large core of citizen-­‐soldiers rather than a small aristocratic elite, the citizens’ importance in war translated into greater political power in the assembly. The citizen assembly dominated politics to different extents in different cities—typically more so in 4
The territories labeled as Phoenician colonies are, at the time of this committee, the Carthaginian Empire. Kurt Raaflaub, “Archaic and Classical Greece,” in War and Society in the Ancient and Medieval Worlds, ed. Kurt Raaflaub and Nathan Rosenstein (Washington: Center for Hellenic Studies, Trustees for Harvard University, 1999): 129-­‐148. 5
MUNCH 2014: Peloponnesian War: Athens 7 Athens, and less so in Sparta—and aristocratic or monarchical elites remained in some city-­‐states, such as Sparta, but in almost all Greek cities, the citizenry became regarded as the core of political authority. As a result, magistrates and bodies entrusted with the actual execution of government—including these war councils—cannot perpetually ignore the will of the people. The Persian Wars and the Development of the Alliances As the poleis continued to develop and Greek civilization entered its Classical Age in the mid-­‐
sixth century BC, the greatest empire the world had yet seen emerged far to the East. Under the leadership of Cyrus the Great, the Persian Empire conquered lands from the Himalayas to Europe, including the Greek colonies on the shores of Asia Minor. 6 Cyrus’ grandson Darius also forced Macedon, a kingdom directly north of the Greek mainland, to submit as a vassal state. The Persians divided their empire into 26 Satrapies, each ruled by a Satrap who usually exercised a wide degree of autonomy. Satrapies of the Persian Empire, 500 BC 6
Waterfield, 63. MUNCH 2014: Peloponnesian War: Athens 8 The Persian conquest of the Greek colonies of Asia Minor, which were mainly incorporated into the Satrapy of Ionia, brought the new empire into conflict with the Greek mainland cities. In 499, Athens send a small fleet and army to assist a revolt of Greek cities against the Persian Empire, which was defeated but aroused the wrath of the Emperor Darius.7 Darius assembled a large invasion force to burn Athens to the ground, but it was defeated by the heavily outnumbered Athenian army at the Battle of Marathon, when the heavy Greek phalanx proved superior to the lightly-­‐armed Persians in close quarters.8 After Darius’ death, his son Xerxes carried on his father’s quest for revenge, and in 481, he led an army of 300,000 men overland from north into Greece, supplied by a fleet of 1,000 ships.9 While many Greek cities defected to the Persians or maintained their neutrality, thirty-­‐one states formed an alliance to resist the invaders, nominating the Spartans to lead the alliance. Although the Persian army reached Athens and razed it to the ground, the Athenian populace was withdrawn to the island of Salamis, where Athens’ outnumbered fleet defeated the Persian fleet, forcing the Persian army to withdraw for lack of supplies. Yet after the defeat of the Persians, the Greek coalition broke into two factions: one led by Athens, and one led by Sparta. 10 After the Persians were expelled and their supply base at Byzantium was captured, the Spartans and their allies—almost all from mainland Greece—desired to return home to their cities. 11 The remaining states, including many of the newly liberated colonies, then nominated the Athenians to lead the alliance and continued to prosecute the war, leading a new revolt of the Greek cities within the Persian Empire. In 477, meeting at the island of Delos, the Athenians and their new partners formed a new alliance—the Delian League—with the purpose of freeing the remaining Greeks 7
Waterfield, 64. Waterfield, 66. 9
Waterfield, 68. 10
Thucydides, The History of the Peloponnesian War, ed. Richard Livingstone (London: Oxford University Press, 1981). 1.18. 11
Thucydidies, 1.89. 8
MUNCH 2014: Peloponnesian War: Athens 9 under Persian rule. 12 The members of the League were required to contribute either money or warships to the League to fund the continuing expeditions against Persia. As most chose to contribute money, Athens was left with almost a monopoly on naval power within the League, and began using this dominance to coerce other cities join the League, and to prevent current members from leaving. When a city “rebelled” by attempting to leave the League or refusing to make payments, Athens used its superior force to besiege the rebels, often razing the city and selling the inhabitants into slavery upon victory, and at the very least forcing the city to tear down its walls to obviate future resistance. Yet usually, the threat of a trade embargo, enforced by the Athenian Navy, was enough to bend minor cities towards Athens’ will. Meanwhile, the ostensibly “League” treasury was transferred to Athens itself, and used partly to rebuild the city and its walls. The Delian League had evolved from an alliance of equal partners into an Athenian Empire. On the other hand, while Sparta’s alliance—known as the Peloponnesian League—had existed before the Persian Wars, it did not consist of a single, formal body like the Delian League, but rather a loose coalition of states held together by individual alliances with Sparta. 13 Neither were the Spartans’ allies required to make payments to Sparta; rather, the Peloponnesian League was a more strictly military and foreign policy alliance. Decisions on the making of war, peace, treaties and foreign policy belonged to the alliance’s assembly, which was only convened when called by the Spartans. Sparta thus used this authority, and its vastly superior army, to maintain its leadership of the alliance. The “First” Peloponnesian War and the Thirty Years Peace Conflict first broke out between the Delian and Peloponnesian Leagues in 460 BC, in what became known as the First Peloponnesian War but was really a series of minor wars.14 It began when 12
Waterfield, 76-­‐77. Donald Kagan, The Peloponnesian War (New York: Penguin, 2003). Pg. 4. 14
Kagan, 16. 13
MUNCH 2014: Peloponnesian War: Athens 10 two allies of Sparta, Corinth and Megara, went to war over their boundary, and Megara, facing defeat, abandoned the Peloponnesian League and joined the Delian League. Sparta was not directly involved at first, until Megara defected from Athens and returned to the Peloponnesian League, and a Spartan army led by King Pleistoanax marched into Attica, the region of Athens. When the Spartan army returned home without engaging the Athenians in battle, the Spartans believed Pleistoanax had been bribed by the Athenians and subsequently exiled him. Nonetheless, Sparta and Athens concluded a treaty, the Thirty Years’ Peace, within a few months, in 445. The Thirty Years’ Peace formally established a balance of power between the Delian and Peloponnesian Leagues. Both Athens and Sparta—on behalf of their allies—recognized the legitimacy of the other’s alliance, and members of both alliances were forbidden to switch sides, as Megara had done.15 Yet neutral cities could still join either alliance, and thus Athens and Sparta continued to compete in recruiting new members. Breakdown of the Peace The chain of events that would launch the Peloponnesian War began at the Greek colony of Epidamnus, far from the Greek mainland in the Adriatic Sea. A civil conflict between rival democratic and oligarchic factions had broken out in Epidamnus in 436, and the democrats had requested support from both the island city of Corcyra, a neutral city, and Corinth, still a member of the Peloponnesian League.16 The Corcyraeans refused the offer, but when the Corinthians offered their support, the Corcyraeans in turn offered to support the oligarchic faction, and sent a fleet to assist in the defeat of the democrats and the expulsion of the Corinthian advisors. They furthermore defeated the Corinthian fleet and army sent to relieve Epidamnus. Corinth responded by taking two years to rebuild its own 15
Kagan, 18. Kagan, 25. 16
MUNCH 2014: Peloponnesian War: Athens 11 fleet to be superior to Corcyra’s, which prompted Corcyra to seek an alliance with Athens against Corinth. In September 433, ambassadors from Corcyra spoke to the Athenian assembly to encourage them to accept their offer of alliance, while ambassadors from Corinth spoke to dissuade the Athenians from the Corcyraeans’ proposal.17 The Corcyraeans’ arguments prevailed, not because Athens had extensive benefits to gain from the alliance, but because they feared the possibility of Corinthian victory leading to the capture of the Corcyraean fleet, which could have threatened Athenian naval hegemony. Thus, Athens agreed to send a small force of ten ships to assist Corcyra, hoping merely to deter further Corinthian involvement. The Corinthians nonetheless defeated the Corcyraean fleet, and their new Athenian allies, at the Battle of Sybota that same month. The Corinthian fleet prepared to finish off the enemy fleet and invade Corcyra, but returned to Corinth when thirty additional Athenian ships arrived, fearing fighting alone against Athens and Corcyra. That winter, in response to the threat posed by Corinth, Athens moved to secure its hold over the Corinthian colony of Potidaea, a member of the Delian League, on the north coast of the Aegean near Macedon.18 The Athenians ordered the Potidaeans to tear down their walls, dismiss the Corinthian magistrates in the city, and send hostages to Athens to guarantee their good behavior. The Potidaeans objected and attempted to delay Athenian action through negotiation, while using their Corinthian advisors to secretly petition the Spartans for aid. Before long, however, the Athenians grew impatient and ordered a force they had deployed near Macedon to besiege Potidaea to enforce their demands. The Corinthians did not respond with open force, but rather organized an army of volunteers from the Peloponnesian cities, under the command of a Corinthian general.19 17
Kagan, 30. Kagan, 37. 19
Kagan, 41. 18
MUNCH 2014: Peloponnesian War: Athens 12 That same winter, a final provocation towards war occurred when the Athens issued a decree placing a trade embargo on Megara, the city that had caused the First Peloponnesian War (the Megarian Decree).20 The Athenians claimed the decree was in retaliation to the Megarians’ illegal cultivation of Athenian lands, but the true intention was more likely either defiance of the Peloponnesian League or diplomatic pressure to punish Megara for its support of Corinth in the Corcyra War. Decisions Facing the Committees In July 432, the Spartan assembly was called to deliberate on the question of whether the Athenians’ actions merited war.21 The Corinthians, Megarians, and their supporters warned the Spartans that while the Athenians were actively expanding their power and had become “adventurous beyond their power,” the Spartans only sought to keep what they have.22 If the Spartans did not act, they would be unable to maintain the balance of power with the Athenians’ alliance. The implication of this argument was that if the Spartans did not actively defend the interests of their allies, Corinth and other states would take matters into their own hands, defecting from the Peloponnesian League or potentially usurping Sparta’s leadership of the League.23 The Athenian spokesperson admitted to the growth of Athens’ power, but insisted that this was inspired not by a need for dominance, but by quite rational “fear, honor, and interest,” and that moreover Athens would not use its power to interfere with the affairs of the Peloponnesians.24 They suggested that the Spartans submit their complaints to arbitration by the oracle at Delphi, as is provided for by the Thirty Years Peace. Nonetheless, the Athenians warned that if Sparta did not contain the aggressions of its allies such as Corinth, Athens would take its own action against these cities. 20
Kagan, 39. Kagan, 41-­‐42. 22
Thucydides, 1.70 23
Thucydides, 1.71.4 24
Thucydides, 1.76 21
MUNCH 2014: Peloponnesian War: Athens 13 The Spartans, if they are to maintain the leadership of the Peloponnesian League, must either lead their allies in war against Athens, or find a way to broker an agreement between Corinth, Megara, and its other aggrieved allies with the Athenians. The Athenians must likewise maintain control over the Delian League, by deterring further rebellions such as those at Potidaea, and adopting some form of response against the aggressions of Corinth. If the Spartans do not agree to arbitration, the Athenians have the options of launching a war against Corinth alone, or against the entire Peloponnesian League if they believe war is inevitable. Additionally, both Athens and Sparta have the option of looking to allies beyond their respective Leagues. The Persian Empire remains the superpower of the classical world, and while its present relationship with Athens is extremely sour, they may be willing to help either power if they believe it will enhance their influence in the Greek world or help defeat a potential competitor. The kingdoms of Macedon and Thrace, north of the Greek mainland, also present potential allies, and at the present Macedon has agreed to let Athenian troops pass through its territory to suppress the revolt at Potidaea. Greek colonies outside of either Spartan or Athenian control also dot the Mediterranean world, especially in Sicily and southern Italy, and many of these cities have powerful armies and navies and strong trade connections in their own right, and could be crucial allies. MUNCH 2014: Peloponnesian War: Athens 14 The Delian and Peloponnesian Leagues, 431 BC undevicesimus.deviantart.com MUNCH 2014: Peloponnesian War: Athens 15 Athens’ Background Domestic Politics and Society Athens' relevant history as a city-­‐state begins in the early 6th century BC, when reforms made by the Athenian statesman Solon introduced democratic principles that countered the tyrannical, localized oligarchies (rule of a small elite) that existed in the region.25 Solon divided the population into property classes to define a minimum property qualification for citizenship, instituted regular meetings of the Assembly of all citizens, and drew up a law code for the city. Cleisthenes, a nobleman, later created an official democratic constitution for Athens in 508 BC, establishing a Council of 500 to meet more frequently than the assembly and manage the day-­‐to-­‐day governance of the city.26 By this point Athens’ political system was highly democratic, even by the standards of the Classical Greek polis: it encouraged its citizens to participate in government, although its definition of "citizen" was narrow by modern standards. Only property owning males were considered citizens, and so only they could vote; however, the property threshold was set quite low by Solon, and thus even most poor farmers could count themselves as citizens. All magistrates and members of political bodies above the Assembly such as the Council were either elected by the Assembly or chosen by lot, and never appointed by a dictator or magistrate. Thus, members of this Committee may face removal or fail to be re-­‐appointed if they do not adequately fulfill the duties of their office. Normally, the Assembly had the power to discuss and make decisions on political issues, elect the magistrates, and approve or reject treaties and decisions for war; although at the present, this emergency War Council has assumed these powers, but only retains them at the discretion of the Assembly. The Council of 500 (an “extension of the Assembly”), divided into many specialized committees, continues to manage the details of governance and external affairs, at the 25
Waterfield, 51-­‐53. Waterfield, 60 26
MUNCH 2014: Peloponnesian War: Athens 16 service of this War Council. Magistrates include the Strategoi—who all sit on this Committee—and the Magistrates of Finance. The strategoi are powerful military generals/admirals who conduct war and can also manage foreign affairs. These institutions work together to ensure that all citizens have a say in domestic and foreign political affairs, although much of that say has presently been curtailed in the exigencies of war. There remains significant political competition between the democratic and oligarchic factions, as wealthy landowners amassed large estates and political power prior to Cleisthenes' introduction of democracy in 508. Of course, many of the wealthiest Athenian aristocrats are in fact supporters of the democratic faction, although the democrats tend to be “new” money who gained their wealth in commercial ventures rather than through holding ancestral lands. Oligarchic elements still exist in the strategoi, although the majority of these positions are controlled by the democratic factions, and democracy remains the dominant political force in the region. Major domestic political issues of the time included definitions of citizenship, methods of appointing political leaders, the practice of slavery, and the use of Athens’ finances on public works projects, which has been a major platform point of the democrats. Economics Athens is currently at the height of its economic power. Following the defeat of the Persians in 480, Athens became a bustling center of commerce for Greece and the Mediterranean world.27 It has the largest population of the city-­‐states, and while a majority of the population are modest craftsmen or farmers, Athens also has a large concentration of wealthy merchants and landowners. Athens obtains the largest portion of its state wealth from the tribute levied on members of the Delian League, who control the majority of trade in the Greek world. Significant wealth is also obtained from Athens’ 27
A. H. M. Jones, “The Economic Basis of the Athenian Democracy,” Past and Present 1 (Feb. 1952): 13-­‐31. MUNCH 2014: Peloponnesian War: Athens 17 extensive foreign trade, as well as natural resources such as obtained around the city and from its colonies (especially the silver mines in the north near Macedon). While the majority of this wealth is used to fund the mighty Athenian navy, enough wealth remains in Athens that the city managed to fund the construction of the Acropolis (a then-­‐unrivaled architectural project) using an income tax, as well as a small annual tribute from the excess treasury of the Delian League. While Athens is the head of the Delian League and the treasury has been moved to Athens, this does not mean that Athens has complete control of the League treasury. All League members, by Athenian decree and including Athens, must pay an annual tribute into the treasury.28 The tribute is taken in money, not in raw materials or any form of service (with the exception of the small number of cities that provide ships). Furthermore, there is still a decision-­‐making process that the League must go through in order to spend funds, even if Athens can usually impose its will. In summary, Athens, through trade has access to almost every available resource on the Mediterranean Sea via the Delian League and its formidable navy. At the same time, because it garners these resources through trade, if Athens’ economy begins to suffer from the war, its access to materials will decrease exponentially. The city is wealthy enough to generate large sums of money through an income tax, although as of now the treasury is slightly depleted following the reconstruction of the Acropolis. But in order to maintain this flow of income, Athens must maintain control over the cities of the Delian League and its extensive trade routes, requiring the continued dominance of its navy. Foreign Policy Athens’ foreign policy revolves primarily around the affairs of the Delian League, which was founded as an alliance network with Athens at the head, but has morphed into what is now effectively an Athenian Empire. Its precursor was the pan-­‐Greek alliance that fought in the Persian War. After the 28
The range of tribute paid by each city is noted in the map in the appendix. MUNCH 2014: Peloponnesian War: Athens 18 liberation of Byzantium, the Spartans withdrew from the alliance, feeling that the war’s aims had been accomplished. Athens, however, rejected this, seeking to reclaim Ionian colonies that had not yet been liberated from the Persian forces.29 A new alliance was proposed during a meeting on Delos, which bound each member state to an agreement that they would either provide military forces or pay a tax to the League’s joint treasury.30 The original goal was to finish defeating the Persians as well as divide the spoils or war. However, as time went on, Athenian power greatly eclipsed that of any other member city-­‐state. Following Athens’ brutal putdown of the rebellion on the island of Thasos, the League saw a clear shift from alliance to hegemony. The following passage from the great Athenian historian Thucydides describes the transition in detail: “Of all the causes of defection, that connected with arrears of tribute and vessels, and with failure of service, was the chief; for the Athenians were very severe and exacting, and made themselves offensive by applying the screw of necessity to men who were not used to and in fact not disposed for any continuous labor. In some other respects the Athenians were not the old popular rulers they had been at first; and if they had more than their fair share of service, it was correspondingly easy for them to reduce any that tried to leave the confederacy. The Athenians also arranged for the other members of the league to pay its share of the expense in money instead of in ships and men, and for this the subject city-­‐
states had themselves to blame, their wish to get out of giving service making most leave their homes. Thus while Athens was increasing her navy with the funds they contributed, a revolt always found itself without enough resources or experienced leaders for war.”31 After the fall of the Athenian statesman Cimon from power, democrats such as Pericles and Ephialtes gained control of policymaking. Breaking off relations with Sparta’s Peloponnesian League, they allied instead with Argos and Thessaly, both Spartan enemies. The acquisition of Megara allowed 29
Holland, p. 362 Thucydides I, 96 31
Thucydides I, 99 30
MUNCH 2014: Peloponnesian War: Athens 19 the construction of a defensive line of walls along the Isthmus of Corinth, which connects the Peloponnesian Peninsula with the rest of Greece. The democrats’ predominance has also been characterized by increasingly dominant relationships with the members of the Delian League, as described previously. Some of the oligarchic faction support this aggression and imperialism, but most are more keen to remain at peace with Sparta, which they see as a source of stability in the Greek world. Military Athens’ army, like all classical Greek armies, was composed primarily of hoplites who fought as phalanxes. With its large population, it could deploy an army of over 10,000 hoplites at one time, in addition to the troops supplied by allied cities. Athens also deployed a cavalry corps, known as the hippeis, recruited from the wealthiest citizens who could afford horses, that numbered around 1,200 men. Poorer citizens or non-­‐citizens who lacked property served as light missile troops such as archers, slingers, and javelin-­‐men. Yet Athens’ main strength lay in its navy, which was widely regarded as classical Greece’s preeminent navy. After saving the population of Athens and devastating the Persian navy at the Battle of Salamis, it served as the guarantor of the city’s prosperity during its Golden Age. Athens’ economic livelihood depended on the trade brought in by its numerous seafaring vessels, and the ability of its navy to protect them from rival states and pirates enabled this trade to flow uninterrupted. Furthermore, most rebellions from the various Delian League vassal cities were put down quickly thanks to the Athenian navy, and its ability to blockade these cities and quickly deploy troops. Like other Greek navies, the combat vessels within the Athenian navy consisted mainly of triremes. Their crews typically consisted entirely of freemen, even the rowers. All crewmembers trained during peacetime, further ensuring Athenian naval supremacy in the Aegean Sea (and contributing to the expense of maintaining the fleet). Typically, Athenian fleets relied on their ships’ advantages in speed and maneuverability, MUNCH 2014: Peloponnesian War: Athens 20 honed by their crews’ superior training, to ram and sink enemy vessels, whereas other fleets relied more on boarding actions. Athens’ navy also has the potential to continue to supply the city of Athens in the event of defeat on land. The city was circumvented with walls when it was rebuilt after the Persian Wars, and it was eventually connected to its harbor, five miles away at the port of Piraeus, by the “Long Walls.” As long as Athens’ navy maintains control of the sea, and its colonies can continue to supply grain and other necessities, the city can be supplied from the sea even if the surrounding countryside is taken and the city laid under siege. Athens, Piraeus, and the Long Walls archive.worldhistoria.com MUNCH 2014: Peloponnesian War: Athens 21 Military Strategy and Tactics Ground Warfare The centerpiece of Classical Greek armies were the hoplites, who formed a formation known as the phalanx. Hoplites were heavy infantry fitted with shields and armor (the term “hoplite” translates roughly to mean “armored man”), typically free citizens who could afford their own armor and weapons.32 Hoplites were armed with a “dory,” or a spear about 7-­‐9 feet long. This spear would also have a spike attached to the end that could be used as a secondary weapon in case the main shaft snapped, and the hoplites also often carried short swords to use in closer quarters. The evolution of hoplite armor also reflected the need to balance mobility with protection. As the Classical age progressed, the need for more mobility saw more hoplites turning towards corselets in place of heavy bronze breastplates. For shielding, a hoplite carried a hoplon, a large, heavy circular shield a little over 3 feet in diameter. This equipment was uniquely designed to function within the phalanx formation. A single phalanx was a rectangular mass of hoplites, typically over twenty men wide and eight men deep. The hoplites formed an interlocking shield wall, with the spears of several lines protruding in front. This formation yielded great success for the Greeks during the Persian Wars, allowing relatively smaller Spartan armies to inflict crushing defeats on their numerically superior but lightly armed Persian counterparts. Despite their many strengths, however, hoplite phalanxes had their weaknesses. In battles between the phalanxes of the various Greek city-­‐states, combat tended to get bogged down as two opposing phalanxes clashed head-­‐to-­‐head until one managed to break through the other, not necessarily a quick process. Furthermore, phalanxes could be vulnerable to attacks from the flank and rear, and light, flexible supporting units such as cavalry and skirmishers could severely hamper phalanxes operating without similar supporting units. If a phalanx formation broke in battle and its men 32
Azar Gat, War in Human Civilization (New York: Oxford University Press, 2006). pp. 295–298. MUNCH 2014: Peloponnesian War: Athens 22 fled, the individual hoplites were vulnerable to these supporting units, and it was during this period flight after the battle had been decided when most casualties occurred. Non-­‐hoplite supporting troops comprised a relatively small part of classical Greek armies. Cavalry were armed either with spears for charging the enemy, or javelins to throw against the enemy while they avoided contact. In either case, they were primarily used for making flanking attacks or pursuing defeated enemies; they did not possess the heavy armor to charge headlong into heavy infantry formations. Light troops typically consisted of the poorer members of society, who could not afford the full hoplite “panoply.” They might include light infantry with spears and shields, javelinmen, slingers, or archers. Cavalry and light troops were rarely decisive in Greek battles, the exception being if the enemy’s phalanx formation was broken by battle or difficult terrain. The tactics of Greek armies in battle, therefore, were usually focused on the central clash of the phalanxes. Individual phalanxes were typically drawn up as a single line in the center of the army, while cavalry and light troops were placed on the flanks or in the rear to skirmish, or hunt down the hoplites if they broke and ran.33 Meanwhile, the opposing phalanxes would advance and meet in the middle of the battlefield. Commanders could use the depth of their phalanxes to try to defeat the enemy’s phalanxes head to head, punching holes into the enemy’s line, or attempt to use the length of their line to flank the enemy and attack his phalanxes from the side. Terrain also played an important role in tactics, as a phalanx formation that held the high ground, or was less encumbered by obstacles such as hills or rivers and therefore had more room to maneuver, held the advantage. If all else was equal, battles were decided by which army’s hoplites had more experience and motivation, and were able to hold the phalanx formation for longer. Naval Warfare 33
Raaflaub. MUNCH 2014: Peloponnesian War: Athens 23 The combat vessels within a Greek navy consisted mainly of trireme: long, slim galleys rowed by three banks of oarsmen (hence “trireme”) and fitted with a metal ram protruding from the bow. A true technological feat for the time, Greek triremes were constructed to fit a balance between superb speed, durability, and flexibility. Most tactics of ancient naval warfare revolved around boarding and ramming enemy ships.34 Due to the maneuverability and speed of triremes, Greek navies became experts at ramming. However, triremes did have their drawbacks. They could actually become waterlogged if kept out at sea for too long, and thus had to be beached when not in use. Constant upkeep was required to keep the vessel operational; ropes, sails, and oars would sometimes have to be replaced mid-­‐
campaign.35 Maintaining a navy was thus a highly expensive undertaking for a Greek city, requiring continuous maintenance and professional expertise. They also consumed a considerable amount of manpower; a fully staffed vessel used for combat would typically consist of around 200 crewmembers, in addition to 10-­‐20 “marines” that were used for boarding actions. These marines were typically hoplites, with some arches mixed in.36 Committee Members Pericles 34
John Coates, "The Naval Architecture and Oar Systems of Ancient Galleys" in The Age of the Galley, Hanson (2006) p. 260; Fields (2007), p. 10 36
Plutarch, Parallel Lives Themistocles XIV 35
MUNCH 2014: Peloponnesian War: Athens 24 Pericles is the most prominent statesman in all of Athens – he is so admired in Athens at this time that he’s nicknamed “the first citizen of Athens.” Pericles holds a strong anti-­‐aristocratic view, befitting of the head of the democratic party of Athens. An adept politician, Pericles holds complete sway over the voting populace through his legendary oratory skills and cunning machinations. Pericles is a competent general, and has held the post of strategos several times. Pericles, is, however, not known for great victories and more for well-­‐thought-­‐out strategies – most of his military forays have been naval, and rarely does he engage in battle unless he has a sure chance of victory. Pericles is well known as a patron of the arts, having started the largest building project known to man in refurbishing the Parthenon. Finally, Pericles is a determined supporter of Athenian imperialism. Pericles sees Athens as the jewel of Greece, and therefore wants it to have complete control over the peninsula. Demosthenes A powerful orator and a demagogue, Demosthenes was delivering his first judicial orations at the age of 20 where he successfully sued his guardians for what was left of his familial inheritance. Demosthenes is well known for his inflammatory and inspiring speech-­‐style, as well as his strong knowledge of Athenian laws and politics. While his speech style was often considered crude by higher society because it was self-­‐taught, most agree that Demosthenes more than makes up for this disadvantage with his incredible passion for politics. Due to his humble upbringing, Demosthenes is a democrat, though he does not hate the aristocracy. Alcibiades Alcibiades is a prominent statesman, orator, and general for Athens. Alcibiades is a member of the aristocracy, the most recent member of his mother’s family the Alcmaeonidae. He is an aggressive supporter of imperialism and war with Sparta, yet he does not have clear allegiences towards either the democratic or oligarchic factions. He is nonetheless known for his political ambition, and is willing to do anything to gain the prestige and glory necessary to advance himself. Known at the time as the invincible general of Athens, Alcibiades is an extremely competent commander, though many doubt his strategic abilities. Though he speaks with a lisp Alcibiades is known as a great orator, and due to this and his compelling victories has immense popular support, although he is also a very polarizing figure amongst the elite. Cleon The general and statesman Cleon of Athens is of the commercial class and a democrat, but, due to his opposition and political rivalry with Pericles, often finds himself an ally to the aristocracy. Cleon was highly divisive – to his friends he was a seasoned orator and dedicated statesman, to his enemies a warmonger and demagogue. Cleon has been known to resort to underhanded tactics in the past like smear campaigns in order to defeat his opponents, fabricated false evidence for charges, and possibly MUNCH 2014: Peloponnesian War: Athens 25 even resorting to the use of spies in the city to defeat his political opponents. Cleon highly supports an expansionist and imperialistic course for Athens. Nicias Nicias is a general of Athens and a high-­‐ranking aristocrat in the political scene. Nicias is rich, having inherited a large fortune from his father, and became the owner of his father’s silver mines around Attica’s Mt. Larium. Staunchly opposed to the democrat’s imperialistic goals, Nicias is a moderate who believes in peace and negotiations instead of the use of force in order to maintain the status quo. While a competent general, Nicias does not have any glorious victories to his name, and is more known for his treaty negotiation abilities. Even with this record, the people of Athens trust Nicias more than any other general, and should he desire the post of strategos at any time, he should not have a difficult time receiving popular support. Thucydides Thucydides is a general for Athens and a prominent historian, known for his strict standards of information gathering analysis. Though not a member of the aristocracy, Thucydides is often at odds with the democrats. Thucydides is a competent and trusted general of Athens, but he draws criticism for his refusal to admit to divine intervention in daily life or on the battlefield. Thrasybulus Thrasybulus is an Athenian general and powerful orator, who is a higher-­‐up in the democratic party of Athens. While he is not primarily known for his military abilities, his strategies are generally crafty and well thought out. He is extremely patriotic and a staunch defender of Athens, which in his mind, means hating the aristocracy. Thrasybulus, like his democratic cohorts, believes Athens should pursue an imperialist policy in order to further expand its dominance. Theramenes The leader of the moderate oligarchs, who favor extending real power to a council of 5000 rather than 400, yet hardly a supporter of democracy. Theramenes has grown suspicious of the system he helped to institute, and has much loyalty amongst fellow oligarchs disgruntled with the present system. He also has significant support from many of the common citizens. Theramenes is a highly effective politician who is determined to use his base of support to maintain the middle ground between the democrats and the radical oligarchs, who he believes would rather surrender Athens to invaders than lose power. Lamachus MUNCH 2014: Peloponnesian War: Athens 26 An elderly and warmongering general at the time of the war. Some say he is less competent than his peers in the military, but that might just be class bias: he is so poor that he charges the people of Athens for his clothes. Regardless, Lamachus is still regularly selected to lead Athenian armies as a strategos. In contrast to the diplomatically-­‐focused Alcibiades, who usually recommends gathering allies before launching attacks, Lamachus favors immediate, unilateral, overwhelming force against enemies he sees as unprepared. He has the potential to be one of Athens’ boldest generals, and one of its most aggressive advocates of a hawkish foreign policy. Eurymedon An Athenian general and admiral, who currently commands the fleet at Corcyra (Corfu), and has commanded this squadron in the recent battles with the Corinthians. He is also a strong supporter of the democratic faction, and has contacts with democrats beyond Athens and has advocated for backing the democrats at Corcyra in their domestic struggles. Eurymedon is not entirely hawkish, however, and also has talents as an effective negotiator. Nicostratus An Athenian general and admiral, who has been mentioned as a possible replacement for Eurymedon in the Corcyra command. He currently commands a squadron at Naupactus in the Gulf of Corinth. Nicostratus has so far focused on his military service and has not displayed major interest in Athenian politics or clear allegiance to a faction, but his support will likely be courted by both factions. Cleophon A prominent democratic politician and old rival of Critias. He is from a modest background, and has great connections and influence with the common citizens, capable of rallying them to his causes. He is also a vigorous opponent of Sparta and supporter of aggressive action to maintain Athens’ empire. Cleophon is of joint Greek-­‐Thracian descent, and maintains some contacts in the kingdom of Thrace that could be useful in forging a Thracian alliance. Critias MUNCH 2014: Peloponnesian War: Athens 27 An ironfisted oligarch, friend of the late Socrates, and noted writer who has yet to become one of the most prominent politicians but has strong connections with his fellow aristocrats. He tends to be one of the more extreme of the oligarchs, and is highly hostile to many of the democrats in the government. His highly aristocratic background and friendship with the controversial Socrates do not lend him to support by the masses, but he is more concerned with reestablishing a highly centralized oligarchic government over Athens than gaining popular support. Aristocrates An Athenian politician who is an ally of Theramenes and fellow leader of the moderate oligarchs. After ruptures develop within the Four Hundred, he is commits to extending power to the Five Thousand and refusing any settlement that would deprive Athens of its regional hegemony, even if he has to instigate a crisis to do so. Like Theramenes, he is willing to take decisive action to maintain his position against both the democrats and the radical oligarchs, and is capable of raising considerable popular support to do so. He also has military experience and has been mentioned as a possible contender for a military command post as a strategos. Phrynicus Phrynicus was an Athenian general in the Peloponnesian War and a staunch supporter of oligarchy. He has hostile relations with many of the democrats and is particularly antagonistic to the statesman and orator Alcibiades. Phrynicus is very publicly influential amongst his fellow military commanders, but is also willing to use covert rumors and deceit to spread opinions amongst his fellow Athenians. Aspasia Aspasia was a female companion of Pericles (who lived with him after he divorced his wife) who was originally from Mediolanum (modern Milan) in Italy. Her foreigner status exempted her from the traditional Greek constraints on female activity outside the home, and many argue that she ran a brothel. Aspasia was also recognized as an intellectual and philosopher whose views impacted Socrates' teachings. Aspasia's relationship with Pericles aroused much controversy around the time of the Peloponnesian War, and some argue that Pericles used Aspasia to manipulate the women of Athens (even going so far as to say that his manipulation of women via Aspasia influenced the alliances he helped forge before and during the war). Phormio MUNCH 2014: Peloponnesian War: Athens 28 Phormio was an Athenian general and admiral during the Peloponnesian War. He was regarded as the best naval commander in Athens and one of the greatest naval tacticians of all time, and is eager to lead the Athenian navy into battle against its enemies. Naturally, he is an advocate of taking an aggressive, naval-­‐focused strategy in the war. Phormio is highly regarded around Athens as a main reason for the city-­‐state's naval dominance, and has immense influence on matters of sea power. Laches Laches was an Athenian General during the Peloponnesian War. Like Phrynicus, he supported oligarchy rather than democracy. He also held moderate views on the issue of conflict with Sparta, and tends to support peaceful resolutions to their conflicts with Athens. He has strong influence with both the Athenian aristocracy and the Spartan elite that could enable him to broker negotiations between the two powers. Hagnon Hagnon was a statesman and general during the Peloponnesian War. Like Phrynicus and Laches, he too supported oligarchy and like Laches, he supported peace agreements with Sparta. He is known for founding a colony called Amphipolis on the river Strymon near Spartan territory. Hagnon is particularly fervent amongst the supporters of oligarchy, and is often named as a central figure of resistance to the power of the democrats. Isthmonicus Isthmonicus was an Athenian statesman and politician during the Peloponnesian War. He, along with Laches and Hagnon, supports maintaining peaceful relations with Sparta, and is a moderate supporter of the oligarchs. He himself is a wealthy commercial aristocrat, who made his fortune in the trading of agricultural products. He owns a vast country estate in addition to property within the walls of Athens. Works Cited MUNCH 2014: Peloponnesian War: Athens 29 Chadwick, John. The Mycenaean World. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1976. Gat, Azar. War in Human Civilization. New York: Oxford University Press, 2006. Jones, A. H. M. “The Economic Basis of the Athenian Democracy.” Past and Present 1 (Feb. 1952): 13-­‐31. Kagan, Donald. The Peloponnesian War. New York: Penguin, 2003. Raaflaub, Kurt. “Archaic and Classical Greece,” in War and Society in the Ancient and Medieval Worlds. Edited by Kurt Raaflaub and Nathan Rosenstein. Washington: Center for Hellenic Studies, Trustees for Harvard University, 1999. pp. 129-­‐148. Thucydides. The History of the Peloponnesian War. Edited by Richard Livingstone. London: Oxford University Press, 1981. Waterfield, Robin. Athens: A History. New York: Perseus Books Group, 2004. MUNCH 2014: Peloponnesian War: Athens