Download ELECTRONIC VOTING SYSTEMS SECURITY

Electronic Voting
System Security
CREATED BY
HETAL PATEL
PATRICIA PASQUEL
CMPT 495 Computer & Data Security
Project Outline
 Definition
 History
 Purpose of the system
 How the system works
 Vulnerabilities
 Kinds of attacks and attackers
 Goals of defense
 Conclusion
What is electronic voting system?
An electronic voting system is a voting system in which
election data is recorded, stored and processed as digital
information.
History
 Results of Florida 2000 presidential elections were
difficult to recount.
Florida 2000,
difficult to recount
Electronic voting,
impossible to recount
Major Events since Jan 2003
 Jan, 2003. “Resolution on Electronic Voting” finalized and
signed by 3 people.
 Jan 2003. Santa Clara County (CA) Recommends Buying
DREs. Computer Scientists Speak Out.
 Feb 2003. CA Ad Hoc Task Force on Touch-Screen Voting
Convened.
 ? Feb/Mar 2003. Rush Holt Introduces HR 2239 -- “Voter
Confidence and Increased Accessibility Act” Requiring a
Voter Verifiable Paper Trail.
 May 2003. Task Force Recommends “Voter Verifiable
Audit Trail” by 2010.
Major Events since Jan 2003
 June, 2003. CA Secretary of State Kevin Shelley receives
6,000 letters -- 4,000 in favor of a voter verifiable paper
trail.
 July, 2003: Johns Hopkins/Rice Report finds serious
security problems with Diebold software
 Nov 2003: CA SoS Shelley announces paper trail
requirement for California (2005/2006)
 Jan 2004: SERVE program cancelled.
 Mar 2004: Various machine failures in primaries
Purpose of the System

a.
b.
c.
Develop an easy to use client side program
That will help all voters cast their vote
Maintain a high level of security to avoid voter fraud.
Allow of checking affirming the votes that are being
made.
 Develop a server
a. That allows for quick reports/updates pre and post
elections utilizing database.
b. Handles large scale voting requests using queuing
methods.
c. Maintain high level of security to avoid voter fraud.
 Develop a dynamic voter registration system to allow for
the enfranchisement of more individuals.
How the system works

The voter must have a smart card or memory
card.
 Smart card
a. Voting terminals are offline during elections.
b. Voter get “voter card” after authentication
c. Insert card
d. Vote
e. Machine cancels smart card and poll workers
reprogram it for the next user.
Smart Card Protocol
Terminal
My password is (8 byte)
“Okay”
Are You Valid?
“Yea”
Cancel Yourself Please
“Okay”
Card
Voting Systems design criteria*
 Authentication: Only authorized voters should be able to
vote.
 Uniqueness: No voter should be able to vote more than
once.
 Accuracy: Voting systems should record the votes
correctly.
 Integrity: Votes should not be able to be modified without
detection.
 Verifiability: Should be possible to verify that votes are
correctly counted for in the final tally.
Voting Systems design criteria*
 Audibility: There should be reliable and demonstrably
authentic election records.
 Reliability: Systems should work robustly, even in the face
of numerous failures.
 Secrecy: No one should be able to determine how any
individual voted.
 Non-coercibility: Voters should not be able to prove how
they voted.
 Flexibility: Equipment should allow for a variety of ballot
question formats.
 Convenience: Voters should be able to cast votes with
minimal equipment and skills.
Voting Systems design criteria*
 Certifiability: Systems should be testable against essential
criteria.
 Transparency: Voters should be able to possess a general
understanding of the whole process.
 Cost-effectiveness: Systems should be affordable and
efficient.
 * Internet Policy Institute, Report of the National
Workshop on Internet Voting: Issues and Research Agenda,
USA, March 2001.
Vulnerabilities
 Is divided into two categories.
a. Technical
b. Social
Technical Vulnerabilities

a.
b.

a.
Computer Code
Cryptography use of the system
The way the code is designed
Connection to the other computers
Most well known attack targets are computers with
direct internet connections that hackers can exploit.
 Auditing Transparency
a. Voter cannot know if the machine recorded his vote
correctly.
b. Observer cannot check to see if all ballots casts are
Voting Systems design criteria counted correctly.
Social Vulnerabilities
 Policy
a. Goals and requirements for a system and how it
is implemented.
 Procedures
a. How access controls are developed
 Personnel
a. Inadequately skilled and trained
b. Insider attacks
Vulnerable Stages
Stage
Vulnerability
Malice
Development of hardware/software
X
Storage of machines between polls
X
Backup copy
Error
X
X
Transport of modules
X
Loading of votes from modules
X
X
Separation of ballot papers for counting (where multiple
X
X
X
X
ballots are cast on the same day)
Counting results
Who are potential attackers?
Hackers
Candidates
Foreign governments
Criminal organizations
A Generic Attack
 Programmer,system administrator, or janitor
adds hidden vote-changing code.
 Code can be concealed from inspections in
hundreds of ways.
 Code can be triggered only during real election.
a. Using “cues”- date, voter behavior
b. Explicitly by voter, poll worker, or wireless
network.
 Change small % of votes in plausible ways.
Kinds of attacks
Vote tampering ( changes the votes by adding,
dropping or switching votes )
Disrupt voting (Malware can be used to cause
voting machine to malfunction frequently)
Electronic interception
Theft
Modification of information during transportation
or transmission.
Misuse of authority to tamper with or collect
information on software or election data.
Goals of Defense
Three goals of defense
 Protection
 Detection
 Reaction
Protection
 Makes a target difficult or unattractive to attack.
a. Physical security
b. Use of encryption and authentication
technologies ( prevents attackers from viewing,
altering or substituting election data when it is
transferred).
c. Procedural mechanisms ( include access
controls, certification procedures, pre-election
equipment testing).
Detection
 Identifying that an attack is being or was
attempted.
a. Auditing the “black box” system
b. Cryptographic protocols ( detects attempts at
tampering).
Reaction
a.
Responding to a detected attack in a timely and
decisive manner so as to prevent it’s success or
mitigate it’s effects.
If something suspicious occurs during voting or
tallying , process can be stopped and situation
investigated.
Secure Electronic voting : instead
of conclusions
 Election equipment should be proved reliable and secure
before it is deployed.
 Security experts and skillful judges needed
 Need for further experimentation
 Transparency in the voting process fosters voter
confidence.
 Software used should be open to public inspections.
 Measures of procedural security that are in a place but are
inadequate to cover all aspects of the electoral process.
 Solution to authentication lies within technologies of
public key cryptography.
End of the Show
Thank You All !