Download Conflict, Bargaining, Deterrence, and Escalation

Conflict, Bargaining,
Deterrence, and
Escalation
• Bargaining is direct and indirect
communication of words or signals to
reach agreement.
• Negotiations is only one form of
bargaining
• War is a severe form of bargaining that
continues toward some sort of outcome,
as long as one side is not completely
annihilated.
• Agreement may not be reached,
resulting in war or other worst-case
outcomes.
• Carl von Clausewitz of 19th century
Germany once said: “War is politics
by other means.”
• To some, war is another means of
settling conflicts. Also, negotiations
may continue even while states are
fighting.
Rational Bargaining
requires:
1. Rationality – known goal and ordered
preferences, maximize interest.
2. Information about opponents
capabilities and resolve.
3. Opponent must be able to read/
understand signals and vice versa.
More on Bargaining
 Bargaining is interactive, often sequential
 The Prisoners’ Dilemma Game is a form of
game theory but is static unless iterated.
Game theory demonstrates situations more
dynamic than Prisoners’ Dilemma game.
 Game Theory allows us to see how
counter-intuitive behavior is rational:
Brinksmanship, MAD, etc.
Deterrence
 To deter means to prevent another state
from taking a certain action.
 Compellence means to reverse the
actions of other states if deterrence fails.
 First Gulf War: Iraq was not deterred from
attacking Kuwait and was compelled to
leave by the coalition.
 Brinksmanship: Pushing a state to the
brink of war – putting your country in a
dangerous situation from which war
might be difficult to stop. “Binding one’s
hands.”
 Essentially, power can be manipulated
by tricking the opponent that you are
crazy enough to commit to a drastic
decision – Mutual Assured Destruction
Context of bargaining
 Domestic political actors can strengthen or
undermine bargaining position.
 Two level games – convince domestic actors
of lack of room for negotiation, use domestic
constraints as limits on concessions.
Counterintuitive finding: more constrained
state may win more!
 Implications – democracies cannot easily
bluff, but this allows democracies to send
clear signals, which may lower risk of war.
Discussion: Who can be
deterred?




Iraq?
North Korea?
Cuba?
Al Qaeda?