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Court Case Notes
Religious Freedoms
1st Amendment Rights
U.S. Supreme Court
ENGEL v. VITALE, 370 U.S. 421 (1962)
370 U.S. 421
ENGEL ET AL. v. VITALE ET AL.
CERTIORARI TO THE COURT OF APPEALS OF NEW
YORK.
No. 468.
Argued April 3, 1962.
Decided June 25, 1962.
ENGEL v. VITALE, 370 U.S. 421 (1962)
Facts of the Case

The respondent Board of Education of Union Free
School District No. 9, New Hyde Park, New York, acting
in its official capacity under state law, directed the
School District's principal to cause the following prayer
to be said aloud by each class in the presence of a
teacher at the beginning of each school day:
"Almighty God, we acknowledge our dependence upon
Thee, and we beg Thy blessings upon us, our
parents, our teachers and our Country."

“This daily procedure was adopted on the
recommendation of the State Board of Regents, a
governmental agency created by the State Constitution
to which the New York Legislature has granted broad
supervisory, executive, and legislative powers over the
State's public school system. These state officials
composed the prayer which they recommended and
published as a part of their "Statement on Moral and
Spiritual Training in the Schools," saying: "We believe
that this Statement will be subscribed to by all men and
women of good will, and we call upon all of them to aid
in giving life to our program.“’
ENGEL v. VITALE, 370 U.S. 421 (1962)
Outcome
Vote 6-1
 “Neither the prayer's nondenominational character nor its voluntary
application saves it from unconstitutionality. By providing the prayer, New
York officially approved or establishes religion.”
Majority Opinion (Justice Black)
 “There can be no doubt that New York's state prayer program officially
establishes the religious beliefs embodied in the Regents' prayer.
Dissent (Justice Stewart)
 “With all due respect, I feel the court has misapplied a great constitutional
principle. I cannot see how an ‘official religion’ is established by wanting those
who want to say a prayer say it.”
U.S. Supreme Court
WISCONSIN v. YODER, 406 U.S. 205 (1972)
WISCONSIN v. YODER ET AL.
CERTIORARI TO THE SUPREME COURT OF
WISCONSIN
No. 70-110.
Argued December 8, 1971
Decided May 15, 1972
WISCONSIN v. YODER, (1972)
Facts of the Case

Three Amish families sued the state of
Wisconsin over its requirement that children
be enrolled in school until the age of sixteen.
The parents refused to comply by removing
their children from school after they
completed the eighth grade and were
convicted of violating the law. The families
claimed that their rights to freely exercising
their religion were not being respected. The
Wisconsin Supreme Court found in favor of
the Amish parents.
Decision
Vote 6 and a half to one-half
 The Supreme Court agreed by a vote of with
the lower court that Wisconsin's law violated
the families' rights to free exercise of
religion. Justices Powell and Rehnquist did
not participate in the vote.
U.S. Supreme Court
MARSH v. CHAMBERS, 463 U.S. 783 (1983)
MARSH, NEBRASKA STATE TREASURER, ET AL. v.
CHAMBERS
CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF
APPEALS FOR THE EIGHTH CIRCUIT
No. 82-23.
Argued April 20, 1983
Decided July 5, 1983
MARSH v. CHAMBERS, 463 U.S. 783 (1983)
Facts of the Case
 Chambers was a member of the
Nebraska state legislature who
objected to its chaplaincy policy. The
clergyman who opened each session
with a prayer was paid by public funds.
The District Court objected to the use
of public money to pay the preacher’s
salary while the Appellate Court
objected to the prayer being offered.
Outcome
Vote 6-3
 Supreme Court permitted the practice
of beginning the legislative session
with a prayer given by the publicly
funded chaplain.
MARSH v. CHAMBERS, 463 U.S. 783 (1983)
Majority Opinion: (Chief Justice Burger)
 “The use of prayer is embedded in the nation’s history and tradition. That the practice of
the Nebraska legislature is consistent with the framers’ intent is proven by their use of
chaplains. Additionally, the Supreme Court and Congress have traditionally begun their
sessions with prayers. Individual states do not have to abide by more stringent First
Amendment limits than the federal government. The “Establishment Clause does not
always bar a state from regulating conduct simply because it harmonizes with religious
concerns.” Because of the principles upon which the nation has developed, religion has
become part of the fabric of society. The offering of the prayer is a “tolerable
acknowledgment of beliefs widely held among the people of this country.” The public
payment of the chaplain is historically allowable because it was done by the Continental
Congress years earlier. The pervasiveness of involving prayer with governmental
activity without adverse effect has shown that there is no real threat from continuing the
practice.”
Significance
 The Court placed a heavy reliance on looking to history and the intent of the framers in
reaching this decision. Because the practice had been done for many years, it had
become a communication of shared values rather than a decidedly religious practice.
Student Freedoms
1st Amendment Rights
Tinker v. Des Moines Ind. Comm.
School Dist.
393 U.S. 503 (1969)
Argued: November 12, 1968
Decided: February 24, 1969
Tinker v. Des Moines
Facts of the Case

John Tinker, 15 years old, his sister Mary Beth
Tinker, 13 years old, and Christopher Echardt,
16 years old, decided along with their parents
to protest the Vietnam War by wearing black
armbands to their Des Moines schools during
the Christmas holiday season. Upon learning of
their intentions, and fearing that the armbands
would provoke disturbances, the principals of
Des Moines school districts resolved that all
students wearing armbands would be asked to
remove them or face suspension. When the
Tinker siblings and Christopher wore their
armbands to school, they were asked to
remove them. When they refused, they were
suspended until after New Year's Day.
Constitutional Question

Does a prohibition against the wearing of
armbands in public school, as a form of
symbolic protest, violate the First Amendment's
freedom of speech protections?
Tinker v. Des Moines
Conclusion
 The Court ruled that wearing armbands is protected speech as a form of political expression.
This right is extended to students as a form of non-disruptive speech.
Vote 7-2
Majority Opinion: Justice Fortas, joined by White, Stewart, Brennan, Douglas, Warren,
Marshall
 “The wearing of armbands was "closely akin to 'pure speech'" and protected by the First
Amendment. School environments imply limitations on free expression, but here the principals
lacked justification for imposing any such limits.The principals had failed to show that the
forbidden conduct would substantially interfere with appropriate school discipline.”
 “First Amendment rights, applied in light of the special characteristics of the school environment,
are available to teachers and students. It can hardly be argued that either students or
teachers shed their constitutional rights to freedom of speech or expression at the
schoolhouse gate.”
Goss v. Lopez
419 U.S. 565 (1975)
Oral Argument: Wednesday, October 16, 1974
Decision:
Wednesday, January 22, 1975
Goss v. Lopez
Facts of the Case

Nine students at two high schools and one junior high
school in Columbus, Ohio, were given 10-day suspensions
from school. The suspensions arose out of a period of
widespread student unrest during February and March
1971.

One of these, Tyrone Washington, was among a group
of students demonstrating in the school auditorium
while a class was being conducted there. He was
ordered by the school principal to leave, refused to do so,
and was suspended.

Rudolph Sutton, in the presence of the principal,
physically attacked a police officer who was attempting
to remove Tyrone Washington from the auditorium. He
was immediately suspended. The other four Marion-Franklin
students were suspended for similar conduct.

Dwight Lopez was a student at the Central High School.
He was suspended in connection with a disturbance in
the lunchroom which involved some physical damage
to school property. Lopez testified that at least 75 other
students were suspended from his school on the same
day. He also testified below that he was not a party to the
destructive conduct but was instead an innocent bystander.
Because no one from the school testified with regard to this
incident, there is no evidence in the record indicating the
official basis for concluding otherwise. Lopez never had a
hearing.

None was given a hearing to determine the operative
facts underlying the suspension, but each, together with
his or her parents, was offered the opportunity to attend a
conference, subsequent to the effective date of the
suspension, to discuss the student's future., and Ohio law
did not require them to do so.
Goss v. Lopez
Constitutional Question:

Could the Ohio public schools suspend students without preliminary hearings or is this a violation of students' Due Process
rights guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment?
Conclusion

In a 5-to-4 decision, the Court held that the state of Ohio could not withdraw the right to a public education once it had
extended that right to its citizens "on grounds of misconduct absent fundamentally fair procedures to determine whether
the misconduct ha[d] occurred." The Court held that Ohio must recognize that students' entitlements to education are
protected by the Due Process Clause and that right could not be taken away without minimum procedures required by the
Clause. The Court found that students facing suspension should at a minimum be given notice and some form of hearing.
Hazelwood School District et al.
v. Kuhlmeier et al.
484 U.S. 260
Argued October 13, 1987
Decided January 13, 1988
Hazelwood School District v. Kuhlmeier
Facts of the Case:




Former high school students who were staff
members of the school's newspaper, filed suit in
Federal District Court against the school district and
school officials, alleging that their First Amendment
rights were violated. The schools principal deleted
two pages of the school paper that included an
article (1) describing school students' experiences
with pregnancy and another article (2) discussing
the impact of divorce on students at the school.
The newspaper was written and edited by a
journalism class, as part of the school's curriculum.
Pursuant to the school's practice, the teacher in
charge of the paper submitted page proofs to the
school's principal, who objected to the pregnancy
story because the pregnant students, although not
named, might be identified from the text, and
because he believed that the article's references to
sexual activity and birth control were inappropriate
for some of the younger students.
The principal objected to the divorce article because
the page proofs he was furnished identified by
name (deleted by the teacher from the final version)
a student who complained of her father's conduct,
and the principal believed that the student's parents
should have been given an opportunity to respond
to the remarks or to consent to their publication.
The District Court held that no First Amendment
violation had occurred. The Court of Appeals
reversed.
Hazelwood School District v. Kuhlmeier
Conclusion:

In a 6-3 vote, the principals right to edit the paper was upheld by the Court. The majority opinion noted that the
school newspaper was not a public forum and thus the 1 Amendment challenge was not valid. Moreover, the court
affirmed prior rulings (see T.L.O., Bethel, etc) that student right are not “coextensive” with the rights of adults
outside of the school setting. The school may still meet its educational mission while censoring the student
newspaper and so the principals editorial control is upheld.
Lee v Weisman
Decision:Wednesday, June 24, 1992
Issues:First Amendment, Establishment of
Religion
 Facts of the Case
 In keeping with the practice of several
other public middle and high school
principals in Providence, Rhode Island,
Robert E. Lee, a middle school
principal, invited a rabbi to speak at his
school's graduation ceremony. Daniel
Weisman's daughter, Deborah, was
among the graduates. Hoping to stop
the rabbi from speaking at his
daughter's graduation, Weisman
sought a temporary restaining order in
District Court - but was denied. After
the ceremony, where prayers were
recited, Weisman filed for a permanent
injunction barring Lee and other
Providence public school officials from
inviting clergy to deliver invocations
and benedictions at their schools'
ceremonies. When the Court of
Appeals affirmed a District Court ruling
against the schools, Lee appealed to
the Supreme Court and was granted
certiorari.
 Question
 Does the inclusion of clergy who offer
prayers at official public school
ceremonies violate the Establishment
Clause of the First Amendment?
Lee v Weisman
Lee v Weisman
 Conclusion
 Yes. In a 5-to-4 decision, the Court held that government
involvement in this case creates "a state-sponsored and
state-directed religious exercise in a public school." Such
conduct conflicts with settled rules proscribing prayer for
students. The school's rule creates subtle and indirect
coercion (students must stand respectfully and silently),
forcing students to act in ways which establish a state
religion. The cornerstone principle of the Establishment
Clause is that government may not compose official
prayers to recite as part of a religious program carried on
by government.
Brown v. Board
 Decision:Monday,
May 17, 1954
 Issues:Civil Rights,
Desegregation,
Schools
Brown v. Board
 Facts of the Case
 Black children were denied admission to public schools
attended by white children under laws requiring or
permitting segregation according to the races. The white
and black schools approached equality in terms of
buildings, curricula, qualifications, and teacher salaries.
This case was decided together with Briggs v. Elliott and
Davis v. County School Board of Prince Edward County.
 Question
 Does the segregation of children in public schools solely
on the basis of race deprive the minority children of the
equal protection of the laws guaranteed by the 14th
Amendment?
Brown v. Board
 Conclusion
 Yes. Despite the equalization of the schools by
"objective" factors, intangible issues foster and maintain
inequality. Racial segregation in public education has a
detrimental effect on minority children because it is
interpreted as a sign of inferiority. The long-held doctrine
that separate facilities were permissible provided they
were equal was rejected. Separate but equal is
inherently unequal in the context of public education.
The unanimous opinion sounded the death-knell for all
forms of state-maintained racial separation.
CA v. Greenwood
Decision:Monday, May 16, 1988
Issues:Criminal Procedure, Search and
Seizure
 Facts of the Case
 Local police suspected Billy
Greenwood was dealing drugs
from his residence. Because
the police did not have enough
evidence for a warrant to
search his home, they
searched the garbage bags
Greenwood had left at the curb
for pickup. The police
uncovered evidence of drug
use, which was then used to
obtain a warrant to search the
house. That search turned up
illegal substances, and
Greenwood was arrested on
felony charges.
 Question
 Did the warrantless search and
seizure of Greenwood's
garbage violate the Fourth
Amendment's search and
seizure guarantee?
CA v. Greenwood
CA v. Greenwood
 Conclusion
 Voting 6 to 2, the Court held that garbage placed
at the curbside is unprotected by the Fourth
Amendment. The Court argued that there was
no reasonable expectation of privacy for trash
on public streets "readily accessible to animals,
children, scavengers, snoops, and other
members of the public." The Court also noted
that the police cannot be expected to ignore
criminal activity that can be observed by "any
member of the public."
Employment Division v. Smith
Decision:Tuesday, April 17, 1990
Issues:First Amendment, Free Exercise of
Religion
Employment
Division
v.
Smith
 Facts of the Case
 Two Native Americans who worked as
counselors for a private drug rehabilitation
organization, ingested peyote -- a powerful
hallucinogen -- as part of their religious
ceremonies as members of the Native
American Church. As a result of this conduct,
the rehabilitation organization fired the
counselors. The counselors filed a claim for
unemployment compensation. The government
denied them benefits because the reason for
their dismissal was considered work-related
"misconduct." The counselors lost their battle in
state court. But the U.S. Supreme Court
vacated the Oregon Supreme Court's judgment
against the disgruntled employees, and
returned the case to the Oregon courts to
determine whether or not sacramental use of
illegal drugs violated Oregon's state drug laws
(485 U.S. 660 (1988)). On remand, the Oregon
Supreme Court concluded that while Oregon
drug law prohibited the consumption of illegal
drugs for sacramental religious uses, this
prohibition violated the free exercise clause.
The case returned to the U.S. Supreme Court
in this new posture.
 Question
 Does the state law violate the Free Exercise
Clause of the First Amendment?
Employment Division v. Smith
 Conclusion
 No. Justice Scalia, writing for the majority, observed that
the Court has never held that an individual's religious
beliefs excuse him from compliance with an otherwise
valid law prohibiting conduct that government is free to
regulate. Allowing exceptions to every state law or
regulation affecting religion "would open the prospect of
constitutionally required exemptions from civic
obligations of almost every conceivable kind." Scalia
cited as examples compulsory military service, payment
of taxes, vaccination requirements, and child-neglect
laws.
Furman v. Georgia
Decision:Thursday, June 29, 1972
Issues:Criminal Procedure, Cruel and
Unusual Punishment, Death Penalty
Furman v. Georgia
 Facts of the Case
 Furman was burglarizing a private home
when a family member discovered him.
He attempted to flee, and in doing so
tripped and fell. The gun that he was
carrying went off and killed a resident of
the home. He was convicted of murder
and sentenced to death (Two other death
penalty cases were decided along with
Furman: Jackson v. Georgia and Branch
v. Texas. These cases concern the
constitutionality of the death sentence for
rape and murder convictions,
respectively).
 Question
 Does the imposition and carrying out of
the death penalty in these cases
constitute cruel and unusual punishment
in violation of the Eighth and Fourteenth
Amendments?
Furman v. Georgia
 Conclusion
 Yes. The Court's one-page per curiam opinion held that the
imposition of the death penalty in these cases constituted cruel and
unusual punishment and violated the Constitution. In over two
hundred pages of concurrence and dissents, the justices articulated
their views on this controversial subject. Only Justices Brennan and
Marshall believed the death penalty to be unconstitutional in all
instances. Other concurrences focused on the arbitrary nature with
which death sentences have been imposed, often indicating a racial
bias against black defendants. The Court's decision forced states
and the national legislature to rethink their statutes for capital
offenses to assure that the death penalty would not be administered
in a capricious or discriminatory manner.
Westside v. Mergens
Decision:Monday, June 4, 1990
Issues:First Amendment, Parochiaid
Westside v. Mergens
 Facts of the Case
 The school administration at Westside
High School denied permission to a group
of students to form a Christian club with
the same privileges and meeting terms as
other Westside after-school student clubs.
In addition to citing the Establishment
Clause, Westside refused the club's
formation because it lacked a faculty
sponsor. When the school board upheld
the administration's denial, Mergens and
several other students sued. The students
alleged that Westside's refusal violated
the Equal Access Act, which requires that
schools in receipt of federal funds provide
"equal access" to student groups seeking
to express "religious, political,
philosophical, or other content"
messages. On appeal from an adverse
District Court ruling, the Court of Appeals
found in favor of the students. The
Supreme Court granted Westside
certiorari.
 Question
 Was Westside's prohibition against the
formation of a Christian club consistent
with the Establishment Clause, thereby
rendering the Equal Access Act
unconstitutional?
Westside v. Mergens
 Conclusion
 No. In distinguishing between "curriculum" and "noncurriculum
student groups," the Court held that since Westside permitted other
noncurricular clubs, it was prohibited under the Equal Access Act
from denying equal access to any after-school club based on the
content of its speech. The proposed Christian club would be a
noncurriculum group since no other course required students to
become its members, its subject matter would not actually be taught
in classes, it did not concern the school's cumulative body of
courses, and its members would not receive academic credit for
their participation. The Court added that the Equal Access Act was
constitutional because it served an overriding secular purpose by
prohibiting discrimination on the basis of philosophical, political, or
other types of speech. As such, the Act protected the Christian
club's formation even if its members engaged in religious
discussions.
Marbury v. Madison
Decision:Wednesday, February 23, 1803
Marbury v. Madison
 Facts of the Case
 The case began on March 2, 1801,
when an obscure Federalist, William
Marbury, was designated as a
justice of the peace in the District of
Columbia. Marbury and several
others were appointed to
government posts created by
Congress in the last days of John
Adams's presidency, but these lastminute appointments were never
fully finalized. The disgruntled
appointees invoked an act of
Congress and sued for their jobs in
the Supreme Court.
 Question
 Is Marbury entitled to his
appointment? Is his lawsuit the
correct way to get it? And, is the
Supreme Court the place for
Marbury to get the relief he
requests?
Marbury v. Madison
 Conclusion
 Yes; yes; and it depends. The justices held,
through Marshall's forceful argument, that on the
last issue the Constitution was "the fundamental
and paramount law of the nation" and that "an
act of the legislature repugnant to the
constitution is void." In other words, when the
Constitution--the nation's highest law--conflicts
with an act of the legislature, that act is invalid.
This case establishes the Supreme Court's
power of judicial review.
Chicago v. Morales
Decision:Thursday, June 10, 1999
Issues:Due Process, Miscellaneous
Chicago v. Morales
 Facts of the Case
 Chicago's Gang Congregation Ordinance prohibits
"criminal street gang members" from loitering in
public places. If a police officer observes a person
whom he reasonably believes to be a gang
member loitering in a public place with one or
more persons, he shall order them to disperse. A
violation of the ordinance arises when anyone
does not promptly obey a dispersal order. An
officer's discretion was purportedly limited by
confining arrest authority to designated officers,
establishing detailed criteria for defining street
gangs and membership therein, and providing for
designated, but publicly undisclosed, enforcement
areas. In 1993, Jesus Morales was arrested and
found guilty under the ordinance for loitering in a
Chicago neighborhood after he ignored police
orders to disperse. Ultimately, after Morales
challenged his arrest, the Illinois Supreme Court
held that the ordinance violated due process of law
in that it is impermissibly vague on its face and an
arbitrary restriction on personal liberties.
 Question
 Does Chicago's Gang Congregation Ordinance,
which prohibits "criminal street gang members"
from loitering in public places, violate the Due
Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to
the U.S. Constitution?
Chicago v. Morales
 Conclusion
 Yes. In a plurality ruling, Justice John Paul Stevens delivered an
opinion for a marjority on several key points. The Court held that
Chicago's Gang Congregation Ordinance was unconstitutionally
vague and provided law enforcement officials too much discretion to
decide what activities constitute loitering. Justice Stevens wrote for
the majority that the ordinance's definition of loitering as "to remain
in any one place with no apparent purpose" does not give people
adequate notice of what is prohibited and what is permitted, even if
a person does not violate the law until he refuses to disperse. "'[A]
law fails to meet the requirements of the Due Process Clause if it is
so vague and standardless that it leaves the public uncertain as to
the conduct it prohibits,'" noted Justice Stevens, "[i]f the loitering is in
fact harmless and innocent, the dispersal order itself is an unjustified
impairment of liberty."