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Planning for War
Ever since Germany had inflicted defeat upon France in the Franco-Prussian War of 1870-71, the
major nations of Europe had busied themselves with plans for the next war, seen by many as
inevitable given the conflicting ambitions of the major powers; which, in the case of France,
included the repossession of Alsace and Lorraine, both lost to Germany as a consequence of the
Franco-Prussian War.
Much is made of the German Schlieffen Plan and, to a lesser extent, the French Plan XVII. But
what of Austria-Hungary's Plan B and Russia's Plan 19? This article details the primary aims of
each of these plans, and discusses the rationale behind them.
France: Plan XVII
The chief aim of Plan XVII, devised by Ferdinand Foch in the wake of the humiliation of
the Franco-Prussian War, and taken up by French Commander-in-Chief Joseph Joffre in 1913,
was the recapture of the territory of Alsace and Lorraine.
Entirely offensive in nature, Plan XVII made extensive use of the belief in the
mystical élan vital assumed to be instilled within every Frenchman - a fighting spirit capable of
turning back any enemy by its sheer power. It assumed the average French soldier to be more
than a match for its German counterpart. Indeed, numerous French officers were dismissed from
the army during the early stage of the war for a want of fighting spirit, including General
Lanrezac following the French army's failure at Charleroi.
More technically, Plan XVII called for an advance by four French Armies into AlsaceLorraine on either side of the Metz-Thionville fortresses, occupied by the Germans since 1871.
The southern wing of the invasion forces would first capture Alsace and Lorraine (in that order),
whilst the northern wing would - depending upon German movements - advance into Germany
via the southern Ardennes forests, or else move north-east into Luxembourg and Belgium.
The architects of Plan XVII, which included Joseph Joffre, took little account of a possible
German invasion of France through Belgium until just before war was declared; and in
modifying the plan to deploy troops to meet such an eventuality, actual French activity to meet
an invasion via Belgium was lackluster at best in August 1914.
Before war broke out Joffre and his advisers were convinced that the threat of British
involvement would keep Germany from invading through Belgium (with whom Britain had
a treaty guaranteeing its neutrality; Germany regarded this as a mere "scrap of paper").
Whilst the French had accurately estimated the strength of the German army at the opening of
the war, they did not place much emphasis on Germany's extensive use of reserve troops, having
little faith in their own. This proved a serious miscalculation which, in conjunction with an
underestimation of the Schlieffen Plan, almost led to France's undoing within a month of the
outbreak of war.
Within weeks of the war's start, the French attack into Alsace and Lorraine had proved a
debacle, effectively repelled by the German defenses. With the inevitable advance of the
Schlieffen Plan meanwhile, the French were thrown very much on the defensive.
Germany: Schlieffen Plan
Germany's Schlieffen Plan, named after its chief architect, Count Alfred von Schlieffen,
was both offensive and defensive in nature.
Schlieffen - and the men who subsequently enhanced and modified his strategy,
including Helmuth von Moltke, German Chief of Staff in 1914 - took as his starting assumption
a war on two fronts, against France in the west and Russia in the east. The nature of the alliance
system ensured that Russia was allied with France (and latterly Britain), set against Germany's
alliance with Austria-Hungary and Italy.
Notwithstanding the potentially enormous size of the Russian army, with its never-ending
supply of men, Schlieffen assumed - largely correctly, as it turned out - that it would take six
weeks or longer for the Russians to effectively mobilize their forces, poorly led and equipped as
they were.
Banking on this assumption, Schlieffen devised a strategy for knocking France out of the
war within those six weeks. In order to do so he would commit the vast majority of German
forces in the west to form an overwhelming assault with Paris as its aim, leaving just sufficient
forces in East Prussia to hold off the Russians during the latter's mobilization process. Once
France had been dealt with the armies in the west would be redeployed to the east to face the
Russian menace.
In striking against France von Schlieffen determined to invade through Belgium; for
tactical as well as political reasons, an invasion via Holland was discounted (Germany desired
Dutch neutrality for as long as possible); and Switzerland in the south was geographically
invasion-proof. Passage through the flat Flanders plains would offer the fastest route to France
and victory.
Working to a tight deadline, five German armies would advance through Belgium and
France in a grand wheel motion, turning through the Flanders plains north-east of France. The
German forces would move from Alsace-Lorraine west through France en route for Paris.
Schlieffen's often-quoted remark, "when you march into France, let the last man on the right
brush the Channel with his sleeve" was based upon this turning wheel-like advance.
By outflanking the French armies von Schlieffen aimed to attack from the rear, where the
French were likely to be most vulnerable. A small German force would guard the FrancoGerman border, enticing the French to move forward, upon which they would be attacked from
the rear by the main bulk of the German army, assuring encirclement and destruction.
A side benefit of the Schlieffen Plan saw the bulk of the French resistance situated within
France rather than in Germany. Even while retreating - which was by no means part of the plan the Germans could (and did) entrench themselves deep inside French territory.
Whilst the French aimed to evict the invader from their country - and consequently
constructed their own trenches lightly, never intending that they should be in use for any great
length of time - the Germans dug deep, sophisticated trenches, content to remain where they
were pending a further advance at some later stage.
The weakness of the Schlieffen Plan lay less in the rigidity of the timescale - for the
German army very nearly succeeded in capturing Paris within the time allotted - but in its
underestimation of the difficulties of supply and communication in forces so far advanced from
command and supply lines.
Ultimately, it was these problems, particularly in communicating strategy from Berlin,
that doomed the Schlieffen Plan. The Allied forces could rush troops to the front by use of the
railway faster than the Germans could arrange fresh supplies of food and reserve troops.
Most critically, Moltke's isolation from the front line not far from Paris led to a series of poor
decisions and a crucial weakening of his forces in the north. A promptly timed French counterattack exploiting a gap in the German lines at the First Battle of the Marne set off the so-called
'race to the sea' and the onset of static trench warfare. The rapid war of movement was brought
to an end.
Austria-Hungary: Plans B and R
Austria-Hungary's plans for war are much less discussed than those of France and
Germany, and with good reason. In devising first Plan B and then Plan R, Austria-Hungary
assumed that the coming war would be limited to Serbia.
Plan B (for Balkans) detailed the requirement for six Austro-Hungarian armies in the
field, three to invade Serbia, with a further three guarding the Russian border to dissuade an
attack from that quarter.
Plan R (for Russia) essentially revised Plan B, allowing for a greater volume of troops to
guard against Russian assistance for the Serbs in the south, whilst assuming German activity in
the north. This led to four armies being deployed against Russia and two against Serbia. Whilst
the chosen plan in August 1914, in the event this strategy never came to fruition, since in
committing to the Schlieffen Plan Germany devoted the bulk of its manpower to the west before
intending to turn its attention to the east.
Russia: Plans G, A and 19
Russia, meanwhile, put together two very different plans for war. Plan G assumed that
Germany would launch the war with a full-scale attack against Russia; the opposite of what
actually transpired. Unusually, Plan G was content to permit German infringement of Russia's
borders, with the consequent loss of territory and large-scale casualties, pending completion of
Russian army mobilization.
In short, the Russian military assumed that the country could readily bear a string of
defeats at the start of the war; such was the reserve of manpower ultimately available to the
army. Once effectively mobilized, they believed that the Russian army would inevitably eject
Germany from within its borders. Napoleon had failed to conquer the vastness of Russia; it was
assumed that Germany would likewise fail.
Plan 19 - also known as Plan A - was less drastic in its initial sacrifice of Russian
manpower. Russia's French partners pressed the Russian military to devise a more offensive war
strategy.
Plan 19, devised in 1910 by General Danilov and substantially modified in 1912,
correctly assumed that Germany would open the war with an attack against France rather than
Russia.
This being the case, two Russian armies would advance into East Prussia and to Silesia
en route to central Germany. Russia would at the same time make use of a fortress defense
against invading forces.
In the event, the Russian advance into East Prussia was thrown back almost immediately
upon the start of the war, with the Russian army suffering a particularly crushing defeat
at Tannenberg, followed by lesser setbacks at the First and Second Battles of the Masurian
Lakes.
Britain
The British did not devise a general war strategy in the same sense as France, Germany, AustriaHungary and Russia. Unlike these powers, Britain had no particular desire for war to break out,
and had no plans for expansion, although she was keen to protect her interests, in particular her
trading links with her far-flung empire.
However once war broke out Britain, governed by Asquith's administration, and after some
initial confused dithering, determined to come to the aid of 'Brave Little Belgium' (as Belgium
was represented in the initial British propaganda recruitment campaign) and to France.
In the absence of a conscripted army, the British Expeditionary Force (or BEF) was to be
transported to the continent and onwards by rail to Belgium and the French left flank. It was
estimated that it would take three full weeks, 21 days, to mobilize the BEF; Germany and France
banked upon mobilizing within 15 days.
Belgium
Belgium, by its very neutrality, could not openly plan for war. Instead, upon the declaration of
war (or, in the case of Germany, invasion), the entirety of Belgium's armed forces, comprising
117,000 field troops, were concentrated west of the River Meuse in the (ultimately unsuccessful)
defense of Antwerp.
Some 67,000 additional fortress troops were responsible for the defence of the forts
at Liege, Namur and Antwerp.
Serbia
The Serbian plan for war was simple: upon declaration of war the army would be doubled from
five to ten divisions and placed in readiness to strike against Austria-Hungary once it became
apparent what the latter's tactical intentions were.
American Neutrality
The U.S. was determined to adopt a stance of rigid neutrality at the start of the war,
and President Wilson announced the American stance to this effect shortly after war broke out,
on 19 August 1914, reflecting U.S. popular opinion. Consequently the U.S. had no plans for war
and played no initial part in the conflict.
Despite official neutrality, a huge leap in export to the Allies led to a vested interest - at
least in the eastern states - in an Allied victory. Exports to Germany and its allies rapidly
diminished in parallel to a significant rise in shipping to Britain and France.
Popular opinion in favor of the Allies began to build as news spread of Germany's
allegedly aggressive tactics, which were said to include a terror campaign against 'little Belgium'.
Similarly, Germany's policy of unrestricted submarine warfare caused much ill-feeling in the
U.S. The sinking of the Lusitania in May 1915 and the Sussex in April 1916 nearly brought the
U.S. into the war, and it was Germany's continued submarine policy that ultimately brought
about Wilson's war address to Congress on 2 April 1917. Other factors, such as suspicions of
German involvement with Mexico (via the Zimmermann Telegram), solidified popular
antagonism against Germany.