Download Mind Lectures 1

MIND LECTURES 1
Philosophy of Mind

The philosophy of mind is that area of philosophy that deals
with topics that in one way or another relate to mental life. The
most commonly identified core question in the philosophy of
mind is:

What is the relation between human mental life and the human
body?
Or

What is the relation between mental life and the physical world?
The 20th century shift


The 20th century began with the dominance of philosophy focused on
language, logic, mathematics and epistemology. The philosophy of mind
was largely seen as posterior to discussions of language and epistemology.
Two shifts occurred in the philosophy of mind as the 20th century developed.
 First, philosophy of mind became an interdisciplinary subject. Currently, it
is impossible to study the philosophy of mind without knowing a great
deal about: computer science, phenomenology, neuroscience, linguistics,
cognitive science, traditional philosophy, and non-western philosophy,
such as ancient Asian techniques of meditation.
 Second, language and epistemology are now seen to be less basic than
philosophy of mind. Questions about how language works and how we
know things are taken to be dependent in part on how the mind works.
We now think of inquiring into the mind as a way of learning about
language and knowledge.
Problems in the Philosophy of Mind
The Problem of Other Minds
The mind ≠ body.
2.A person can only perceive another person’s body.
3.So, a person cannot perceive another person’s mind.
1.
Non-Solipsism Question: How do I know there are other minds out there at all?
Non-Uniqueness Question: How do I know that my mind is not completely
unique, even if there are other minds out there?
Animal Question: Do non-human animals have minds like humans?
Problems in the Philosophy of Mind
The Problem of Free Will
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
The mind = body.
The body is governed by laws of nature.
Either laws of nature are deterministic or indeterministic.
If laws are deterministic, then there is no free will.
If laws are indeterministic, then my actions are random.
Illusion Question: Is freewill an illusion?
Morality Question: How can there be moral responsibility without free will?
Punishment Question: If our bodies are governed by deterministic laws, why are we
punished? We could not have done otherwise.
Problems in the Philosophy of Mind
The Problem of the Self and Personal Identity
If the Self = my body, then what happens to my body also happens to me.
2.My body undergoes physical change constantly.
3.My Self does not undergo change constantly.
4.So, the self ≠ the body.
1.
Continuity Question: If there is something I fundamentally am, what is that thing
underlying me throughout all the changes my body and mind undergo?
Responsibility Question: If there is no continual self, how is that I can be held
responsible for something I did at an earlier time when that person is not around
any longer?
Problems in the Philosophy of Mind
The problem of Intentionality
1.
2.
3.
Intentionality or aboutness is a pervasive component of human life and
essential to understanding the human condition.
Intentionality allows us to think at one location or refer from one location to
something that is spatially distant or temporally distant from us.
Some think that intentionality is the mark of mental phenomena.
How is it that thoughts inside my head can reach out beyond my head and refer to
something very distant in space and time?
More generally, how is the phenomena of aboutness possible in a physical world?
Problems in the Philosophy of Mind
Questions concerning emotion and rationality
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
What is an emotion?
What is it to be rational?
Are our actions guided by reason or by emotion, or by both?
What is the specific analysis of an emotions, such as anger?
Are there different kinds of rationality, such as practical vs. theoretical?
Can reason influence emotion?
Can emotion override reason?
Problems in the Philosophy of Mind
Question concerning mind-reading?
How do I know what another person is doing or trying to do?
2.How does autism help us understand human mind-reading?
3.What role do mirror-neurons play in explaining our understanding of another
person’s behavior?
4.What evidence can we use to decide between competing theories of mindreading?
1.
Problems in the Philosophy of Mind
Questions concerning AI?
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
Can computers think?
What criterion is appropriate for answering the question of whether
computers can think?
What can we learn about human cognition by studying ways in which we
can program computers to learn?
What are the moral boundaries of AI?
Does mathematics provide a counterexample to the idea that computers
can perform mental tasks equivalent to humans.
Is the singularity coming? What does the singularity suggest about the
nature of mindedness?
Problems in the Philosophy of Mind
Questions on specific mental states:
What is a belief?
What is a desire?
What is an intention?
What is attention?
What is perception?
What is memory?
Main Outline

The Cartesian Backdrop of 20th Century Philosophy of Mind

Behaviorism

Identity theory

Functionalism

Physical Reduction
The Cartesian Backdrop of 20th century
Philosophy of Mind

Cartesian Dualism

The Divisibility Argument

The Conceivability Argument

Arnauld’s Criticism

Princess Elizabeth’s Criticism
Cartesian Dualism

Cartesian dualism is the inherited picture of the relation
between mind and body that 20th century philosophers use as
a backdrop for developing new ideas about the mind and the
body. Here is the core view of Cartesian Dualism:
Mind
Body
Essence
Thinking (conscious)
Extension (having
spatial dimensions)
Properties
Known directly
Free
Indivisible
Indestructible
Known indirectly
Determined
Infinitely divisible
Destructible
The Divisibility Argument
1.
2.
3.
4.
(Leibniz Law): x = y if and only if every property of x is a
property of y.
(Mind Essence): Mind is essentially indivisible.
(Material Essence): Matter is essentially divisible.
So, mind ≠ matter.
Questions:
Is consciousness essentially indivisible?
Is there a sense in which we can divide the mind?
The Conceivability Argument
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
If I can conceive of my mind existing without my body, then it
is possible for my mind to exist without my body.
I can conceive of my mind existing without my body.
So, it is possible for my mind to exist without my body.
If it is possible for my mind to exist without my body, then my
mind is not identical to my body.
So, my mind is not identical to my body.
Arnauld’s Criticism


Descartes’ assumes that if I can conceive x without y, then it is
possible for x to exist without y.
Arnauld challenges him with the following example:
1.
2.
3.
A man ignorant of geometrical knowledge can conceive of a right
triangle existing without having the Pythagorean property P. The
reason why is because he may grasp that the triangle T has a 90
degree angle, but fail to see that it has the Pythagorean property P.
However, it is impossible for T to exist without P.
So, it is not true that if S can conceive x without y, it is possible for x to
exist without y.
Princess Elizabeth’s Criticism


Descartes maintains that mind and matter are fundamentally
distinct.
Princess Elizabeth raises the following worry about causation
by showing that the following claims are inconsistent.




Upward causation: sometimes my body causes my mind to think
something. I place my hand in a hot fire, and I think OUCH! that hurts.
Downward causation: sometimes I decide to do something, and then my
body moves.
Causal Closure: All and only entities of the same type can bear causal
relations to one another.
Dualism: Mind and Matter are fundamentally distinct types.
Behaviorism in the 20th Century

Wittgenstein’s Beetle in a Box Thought Experiment

Ryle’s University Objection

Logical vs. Methodological Behaviorism

Mental States as Behavioral Dispositions

Problems with Behavioral Dispositions
Wittgenstein’s Beetle in a Box I
If I say of myself that it is only from my own case that I know what the word “pain”
means – must I not say the same of other people too? And how can I generalize the
one case so irresponsibly? Suppose everyone had a box with something in it: we call
it a “beetle”. No one can look into anyone else’s box, and everyone says he knows
what a beetle is only by looking at his beetle. – Here it would be quite possible for
everyone to have something different in his box. One might even imagine such a
thing constantly changing. – But suppose the word “beetle” had a use in these
people’s language? – If so it would not be used as the name of a thing. The thing in
the box has no place in the language-game at all; not even as a something: for the
box might even be empty. –No, one can ‘divide through’ by the thing in the box; it
cancels out, whatever it is. That it is to say: if we construe the grammar of the
expression of sensation on the model of ‘object and designation’ the object drops
out of consideration as irrelevant. – Philosophical Investigations 293
Wittgenstein’s Beetle in a Box II
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
Either mental state terms name something internal which is private and inaccessible
to others, or they pick out something external which is public and accessible to
others.
If mental state terms pick out something internal which is private and inaccessible
to others, then it is possible that the internal experience each of us associates with
a mental state term, such as pain, picks out in our own case something different
from that of others. As a consequence, it is in principle possible that we do not
mean the same thing by the use of mental state terms.
If mental state terms pick out something external which is public and accessible to
others, then it is possible for mental state terms to have some stable component of
meaning in virtue of which others can communicate with one another.
So, mental state terms cannot only have a private component of meaning, in virtue
of which their meaning is exhausted.
Moreover, mental state terms also have a public meaning component.
Ryle’s University I
A foreigner visiting Oxford or Cambridge for the first time is shown a number of colleges,
libraries, playing fields, museums, scientific departments and administrative offices. He then
asks ‘But where is the University? I have seen where the members of the Colleges live, where
the Registrar works, where the scientists experiment and rest. But I have not yet seen the
University in which reside and work the members of your University.’
It has then to be explained to him that the University is not another collateral institution, some
ulterior counterpart to the colleges, laboratories, and offices which he has seen. The University
is just the way in which all that he has already seen is organized. When they are seen and
when their coordination is understood, the University has been seen. His mistake lay in his
innocent assumption that it was correct to speak of Christ Church, The Bodleian Library, the
Ashmolean Museum and the University, to speak, that is, as if ‘the University’ stood for an
extra member of the class of which these other units are members. He was mistakenly
allocating the University to the same category as that to which the other institutions belong.
Ryle’s University II

A Category Mistake occurs when a predicate is applied to a domain for
which it is not defined.

1.
Example: 2 has parents from Detroit. ‘2’ refers to a type of thing, a number, for
which the predicate ‘is a parent’ is not defined. The property of having a parent
does not apply to 2.
The quest for the nature of the Mind as something independent of and over
and above the behaviors we engage is like looking for the nature of the
University as something independent and over and above the various parts
and their organization.
2.
The quest in the University case rests on a category mistake.
3.
So, the quest in the Mind case rests on a category mistake.
Behaviorism I


Dualism: When one listens attentively there is an internal
focusing of one’s attention and a listening. The attention is a
function of mind, and the listening is a function of bodily
behavior.
Behaviorism: ‘Listening Attentively’ is a unified act not
composed of two distinct components involving conscious
attentive focus, and bodily listening. All that is involved is
listening attentively to whatever one is listening to.
Behaviorism II

Behaviorism is the view that mental life is nothing over and
above behavior. There are two different kinds of behaviorism:

Logical behaviorism maintains that mental states under logical
analysis just are behavioral states.

Methodological behaviorism maintains that from a psychological
standpoint behavior is all that matters for the study of the mind.
Internal states are not objectively observable, and so, it is incorrect
to try to deploy them in psychology.
Logical Behaviorism


Mental states such, as Jones believes that it will rain, Jones
hopes that it will rain, Jones desires that it rain, etc are
ultimately logical shorthand for descriptions of behavior.
‘Jones believes that it will rain’ fundamentally means


In situation C, Jones will do P1 or P2 or P3…. or Pn.
Mental states are analyzed as dispositions to behave in certain
ways.
Problems for Behaviorism



Circularity as a problem for behavioral dispositions
Putnam’s Super-Spartans as a problem for behavioral
dispositions
Causation as a problem for behaviorism
Circularity as a problem for behavioral
dispositions

An analysis of mental states in terms of dispositions is successful
only if the analysis is non-circular.



Jones believes that it will rain if and only if were it to rain and he
intended not to get wet, he would bring an umbrella.
In the analysis of belief the notion of intention has shown up, so we
don’t have a complete analysis of mental states in terms of pure
behavior.
Questions:


Is it possible to give a non-circular analysis?
Does the circularity matter?
Putnam’s Super-Spartans I
Imagine a community of ‘Super-Spartans’ – a community in which the
adults have the ability to successfully suppress all involuntary pain behavior.
They may, on occasion, admit that they feel pain, but always in pleasant
well-modulated voices –even if they are undergoing the agonies of the
damned. They do not wince, scream, flinch, sob, grit their teeth, clench their
fists, exhibit beads of sweat, or otherwise act like people in pain or people
suppressing the unconditioned responses associated with pain. However,
they do feel the pain, and dislike it (just as we do). They even admit that it
takes a great effort of will to behave as they do. It is only that they have
what they regard as important ideological reasons for behaving as they do,
and they have, through years of training, learned to live up to their own
exacting standards.
--Brains and Behavior 1968
Putnam’s super-Spartans II
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
D is the correct behavioral disposition associated with mental state M only
if it is inconceivable that a person is in M, but fails to display any of the
behavior associated with D.
Suppose Pain = D, then Necessarily Pain = D.
Super-Spartans, creatures which can be in Pain and not exhibit D, are
conceivable.
If it is conceivable that super-Spartans exist, then it is possible that superSpartans exist.
If it is possible that super-Spartans exist, then it is not necessary that Pain
= D.
So, pain ≠ D.
Causation as a problem for behaviorism


Behavior seems to be the effect of the will.
As a consequence if our behavior is all that our mental life
amounts to it would be hard to make sense of claims such as
the following.

Jones’s ran into the store because he believed it was going to rain
and he didn’t want to get wet.

In the claim above Jones’s beliefs and desire seem to play a causal
role, so his beliefs and desires cannot just be behaviors.
Identity Theory

Identity Theory: Type vs. Token

Jackson’s Mary Thought Experiment

Kripke’s argument against type identity theory

Putnam’s argument against type identity theory
Identity Theory I


Identity Theory is the view that mental states are nothing over
and above brain processes.
Pain = C-fiber stimulation

No one takes seriously the idea that we have discovered exactly
which brain states correlate with which mental states. So the
example above is just an equation of sorts that is used to think about
the view propounded by identity theory.

The ‘is’ involved is one of strict numerical identity.
Identity Theory II


Two Kinds of Identity Theory
Type / Token distinction

How many numbers are in the following sequence: 33345512?


Type = 5
Token = 8

Type identity theory maintains that each mental state type is
identical to some brain state type.

Token identity theory maintains that each mental state token is
identical to some token physical state.
Jackson’s Mary Thought Experiment I
Mary is a brilliant scientist who is, for whatever reason, forced to investigate the
world from a black and white room via a black and white television monitor. She
specializes in neurophysiology of vision and acquires, let us suppose, all the physical
information there is to obtain about what goes on when we see ripe tomatoes, or
the sky, and use terms like ‘red’, ‘blue’, and so on. She discovers, for example, just
which wavelength combinations from the sky stimulate the retina, and exactly how
this produces via the ventral nervous system the contraction of the vocal chords and
expulsion of air from the lungs that results in the uttering of the sentence ‘The sky is
blue’… What will happen when Mary is released from her black and white room
or is given a color television monitor? Will she learn anything or not? It seems just
obvious that she will learn something about the world and our visual experience of
it. But then is it inescapable that her previous knowledge was incomplete. She had
all the physical information. Ergo there is more to have than that, and physicalism is
false.
Frank Jackson Epiphenomenal Qualia
Jackson’s Mary Thought Experiment II
Basic Version
1.
Mary knows all the physical facts.
2.
Mary does not know all the facts.
3.
So, the physical facts do not exhaust all the facts.
General Deduction Version
1.
2.
3.
There are truths about consciousness that are not deducible from physical truths.
If there are truths about consciousness that are not deducible from physical
truths, then physicalism is false.
So, physicalism is false.
Kripke’s argument against type-identity theory
1.
2.
If it is conceivable for P to exist without Q, and there is no way in which
the conception of P without Q can be confused with something else, then it
is possible for P to exist without Q.
It is conceivable that someone is in pain, and that C-fiber stimulation is not
occurring, and there is no way in which the conception of the
phenomenology of pain can be confused with some other state.
3.
So, it is possible for pain to exist without C-fiber stimulation.
4.
Pain = C-fiber firing only if it is necessary that Pain = C-fiber firing.
5.
So, Pain ≠ C-fiber firing.
Putnam’s argument against type-identity theory
1.
2.
3.
Mental States are multiply realizable. They can occur in both human and nonhuman animals, and they are also theoretically possible in beings that are not
fundamentally carbon-based.
If Pain = C-fiber firing, then any creature that fails to have C-fibers cannot be
in pain.
So, since mental states, such as pain, are multiply realizable, capable of being
had by both humans, dogs, and creatures whose existence we do not yet know
of in terms of the matter that constitutes them, mental states are not type
identical with any specific human brain structure.
Functionalism

Fundamentals of Functionalism

The problem of mental holism

The problem of the inverted spectra

The Chinese Nation Argument

The Chinese Room Argument
Fundamentals of Functionalism I



Functionalism maintains that the essence of mental states, such as
being in pain, having a desire, or holding a belief, is the functional
role they play in the cognitive system.
The focus is on function, and not on the matter or substance that
realizes the function.
Functionalist try to define mental states in terms of the causal
relations they bear to inputs, outputs, and other mental states.
Fundamentals of Functionalism II



Example: Pain is the state that tends to be caused by bodily injury, to produce
the belief that something is wrong with the body and the desire to be out of
that state, to produce anxiety, and in the absence of any stronger, conflicting
desires, to cause wincing or moaning.
Functionalism is not the same as behaviorism because while behaviorism makes
no reference to internal mental states, functionalism explicitly does.
Functionalism is not open to the circularity problem that behaviorism faced
because functionalist can use Ramsey-sentences to avoid circularity. Consider
the definition of pain above. The Ramsey sentence of it is:
xyzw [x tends to be caused by bodily injury & x tends to produce states
y, z, and w & x tends to produce wincing and moaning].
The Problem of Mental Holism
The objection from mental holism holds that functionalism makes it very hard
for two distinct individuals of the same species and two individuals of different
species to share the same mental state.
Between Persons Version: John and Jim both believe the A’s will win the
pennant, but that and a few other beliefs are the only ones they have in
common. So given that so little of their psychology is in common, it cannot be
that their beliefs have the same functional role, so they don’t have the same
belief.
Cross Species Version: John and Bunny Rabbit Sam both can feel pain, but
since John has a richer psychology than Sam, they are not both in pain.
Mental holism cuts against the idea that functionalism can really capture the
multiple realizability of mental states in the right way.
The Problem of Inverted Spectra
1.
2.
Functionalism about the qualitative aspects of seeing a color is true only if it is
impossible for there to be two individuals with identical functional roles, but
distinct qualitative characters.
It is conceivable that two individuals exist with inverted spectra, where one
sees blue the other sees yellow, where one sees red the other sees green.
3.
If it is conceivable that P, then it is possible that P.
4.
So, it is possible that inverted spectra exists.
5.
So, functionalism about the qualitative aspect of seeing a color is false.
Functionalism cannot capture the qualitative aspect of experience.
The Chinese Nation Argument I
Suppose we convert the government of China to functionalism, and we
convince its officials that it would enormously enhance their international
prestige to realize a human mind for an hour. We provide each of the
billion people in China with a specially designed two-way radio that
connects them in the appropriate way to other persons and to the artificial
body mentioned in the previous example. We replace the little men with a
radio transmitter and receiver connected to the input and output neurons.
Instead of a bulletin board, we arrange to have letters displayed on a
series of satellites placed so that they can be seen from anywhere in China.
Ned Block Troubles with Functionalism
Question: Would such a system instantiate a mind?
The Chinese Nation Argument II
1.
2.
3.
4.
Functionalism maintains that mental states are defined by their functional
role and not by the material that realizes the role. And is true only if any
material that does realize the role actually instantiates the state.
It is possible for the Chinese nation to instantiate the role of a particular
mental state, or set of mental states, for about an hour.
However, it is implausible that the Chinese nation actually instantiates the
particular mental state, or set of mental states, for the hour envisioned.
So, functionalism is false.
The Chinese Room Argument I

Imagine that a bunch of computer programmers have written a program
that will enable a computer to simulate the understanding of Chinese. So,
for example, if the computer is given a question in Chinese, it will match the
question against its memory, or data base, and produce appropriate
answers to the questions in Chinese. Suppose for the sake of argument that
the computer’s answers are as good as those of a native Chinese speaker.
Now then, does the computer, on the basis of this, understand Chinese, does
it literally understand Chinese, in the way that Chinese speakers understand
Chinese?
The Chinese Room Argument II

Imagine that you are locked in a room, and in this room are several baskets full of
Chinese symbols. Imagine that you (like me) do not understand a word of Chinese, but
that you are given a rule book in English for manipulating these Chinese symbols. The
rules specify the manipulations of the symbols purely formally, in terms of their syntax,
not their semantics. So the rule might say: ‘Take a squiggle-squiggle sign out of basket
number one and put it next to a squoggle-squoggle sign from basket number two’.
Now suppose that some other Chinese symbols are passed into the room, and that you
are given further rules for passing back Chinese symbols out of the room. Suppose that
unknown to you the symbols passed into the room are called ‘questions’ by the people
outside the room, and the symbols you pass back out of the room are called ‘answers
to questions’. Suppose, furthermore, that the programmers are so good at designing
the programs and that you are so good at manipulating the symbols, that vey soon
your answers are indistinguishable from those of a native Chinese speaker. There you
are locked in your room shuffling your Chinese symbols with respect to incoming
Chinese symbols.
The Chinese Room Argument III

1.
2.
3.
Strong AI: A suitably programmed computer can understand a natural
language and actually have other mental capabilities similar to humans.
If Strong AI is true, then there is a program for Chinese such that if any
computing system runs that program, that system thereby comes to
understand Chinese.
A person could run a program for Chinese without thereby coming to
understand Chinese.
Therefore, Strong AI is false.
The Chinese Room Argument IV
4.
Computer programs are completely defined by their formal
syntactic structure.
Manipulating syntax is not sufficient for generating semantic
understanding.
Minds have semantic capacities.
So, computers cannot give rise to minds.

Simulating a Mind is not equivalent to Duplicating a Mind
1.
2.
3.
Physical Reduction

Fundamentals of physical reduction

Kim’s argument from causal exclusion

Davidson – Fodor argument against reduction
Fundamentals of physical reduction I



Reduction is the general attempt to reduce a phenomenon
described in one vocabulary to the language of another
vocabulary. Typically one claims that the reduced vocabulary is not
fundamental.
Physical Reduction in the philosophy of mind is the view that
mental life can be completely understood in terms of physical
entities and relations.
Physical Supervenience: No two possible worlds can be identical
in their physical properties and be different in their mental or
social properties. If A supervenes on B, then A can be reduced to B.
Fundamentals of physical reduction II

Supervenience: Lewis’s example
A dot-matrix picture has global properties – it is symmetrical, it is
cluttered, and whatnot – and yet all there is to the picture is dots and
non-dots at each point of the matrix. The global properties are nothing
but patterns in the dots. They supervene: no two pictures could differ in
their global properties without differing, somewhere, in whether there is
or there isn’t a dot.

Reduction: Lewis’s account
1.
Mental State M = occupant of functional role F.
2.
Occupant of F = brain state B.
3.
Therefore M = B.
Kim’s argument from causal exclusion
The following four claims appear to be inconsistent:
1.
2.
3.
4.
Mental properties have causal powers.
Mental properties supervene on physical properties.
Every physical effect has a sufficient physical cause.
If a property E has a sufficient cause C, then no other
property C* distinct from C can be the cause of E.
What causal work do mental properties do?
Fodor’s argument against reduction I
From the character of the laws
1.
Laws of psychology involve exceptions.
2.
Laws of physics do not involve exceptions.
3.
So, the laws of psychology cannot be reduced to the laws of physics.




Psychological Law: If agent A desires D, and M is a means to D,
then all else being equal A ought to do M.
Physical Law: E = MC2.
These laws don’t have the same characters.
So, reduction is impossible.
Fodor’s argument against reduction II
From the nature of laws
1.
2.
3.
It is a law that P brings about Q.
It is a law that R brings about S.
It is a law that P or R brings about Q or S.
Fodor argues that while 1 and 2 are laws, 3 is not a law.
Fundamental Laws do not contain disjunctions in their antecedents
and consequents.