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Beyond Therapy: A Set of Essays
On Miscellaneous Topics in Psychology and Psychiatry (2001-2003)
V. Deception and Self-Deception:
Part II - An Egological Philosophy: Doing the Impossible Whether Deceptively or Non-Deceptively
How Do We Encounter that which Cannot Be Encountered?
0.
Introduction
In the midst of writing a series of papers on miscellaneous topics in psychology I have
had to deal with various problems concerning the self and its multi-faceted nature.1 What is
the self? - can we (metaphorically) meet it face to face, or, is the self only an appearance, a
simulation of an ego with our encountering of 'itself' itself also only a simulation? In a bewildering array of senses of self from the physiological, emotional, perceptual, conceptual,
judgmental, etc., to the personal, social, political, cultural, etc., along with the impact of
mental illnesses such as psychosis, multiple personalities, hysteria, etc., the overall vision of
the self seems to be taking on the complexion of a jigsaw puzzle, a series of overlying masks,
a presence marked by an absolute absence - a mere polarity that can be approached but never
absolutely encountered?! Hence my sub-title of "Doing the Impossible - …Can we (absolutely2, i.e., actually) encounter that which cannot be (absolutely) encountered?" (1)
1
A fact highlighted by a recent symposium held in the Blue Mountains on the topic of personal identity
where there were papers on the problematicity of the self, the philosophical problem of death with respect to
personal identity, cultural contributions to self identity, ideological contradictions in political identity, problems
in defining an acceptable sense of humanity and the pressing need for the same in this era of technological advancement, how do we meet with the ethical, etc.
2
An absolute-relative distinction is being invoked here. Although there may be the appearance of an
interaction, say between two people, how could that interaction take place we must ask if, from an absolute
point of view, those two individuals have no absolute existence; there absolute non-existence following from the
'fact' that the self being a mere polarity can only be an unobtainable polar fiction? The same qualification applies
to the polar fictions of object-states and fields which with the polar fiction of the ego(s) collectively constitute in
intentionality ‘mere’ (re-)simulations of identities-in-relationship(s) from a relative point of view.
A phenomenological philosophy argues that the intentional object-state is always presented/re-presented in a field appropriate to the nature of that object-state, i.e., is entertained from a certain perspective; hence a relative point of view. I define an absolute point of view as ‘non-relative’. A relative point of view
is aspectival in nature. As an absolute point of view would be non-aspectival we may ask how that point of view
could still be ‘a point of view’? To answer that objection I have two replies. First, for a relative point of view to
have significance as ‘a relative point of view’ implies that we must be able to informatively demarcate it from
that which gives this concept its significance through contrast hence the mutual relevance of the ‘absolute point
of view’. Second, I have previously argued that the formula “x of x is no(t)-x” allows us to determine the transcendental pre-conditions for the essential nature of x to manifest itself as x (refer to the theological essay in the
series Finding a Place for the Idea of God – Part II, Section 4, paragraph 55, and footnote no. 19). In this situation the “perspective(-ness) of perspective(-ness) is no(t)-perspective(-ness)” defines the absolute transcendental
pre-conditions for the significance of perspective(-ness) as meta-perspective(-ness) which is no(t) perspective(-ness) [because ‘meta-perspective(-ness) has/(is) no(t) perspective(-ness)’]. As the aspectival perspectiveness defines the essential nature of the relative point of view hence the absolute point of view can be viewed as
the transcendental preconditions of the relative point of view which must be meta-aspectival, which has no aspectival nature/which is not aspectival in nature. Hence the absolute point of view cannot be ‘a point of view’
from the relative point of view but being meta-aspectival in nature it is a meta-point of view. So, continuing in
this vein of thought, we might like to define the Absolute point of view as the transcendental preconditional
‘grounds’ for the possibility of all absolute points of view. This discussion is continued in section 11., from
paragraph 44.
2
This problem, "what is the nature of the self?", is brought home to us in an interesting
fashion in the allied problem (or problems) of deception and self-deception. How can the self
in its 'monolithic' unity of function deceive others since to do so implies various senses of self
that must be cooperating with each other in order to manufacture that dissimulation, namely,
a sense of self that simulates a certain appearance in conjunction with another sense of self
that knows that this former sense of self is being dishonest, discordant with a general understanding of reality, etc., along with the invocation of a series of senses or aspects of self (as
part of an overall sense of self?) that individually admire the possible efficacy of this intended deception, fear the possible consequences of its discovery, ponder the ethicality of being
dishonest in that situation… in general, review the overall practicalities of such a course of
behaviour, etc? Or, assuming the self is a hierarchically organized plurality of personal perspectives, i.e., is not monolithic, how, we might ask, is the self able to deceive its own overall
sense of self or some other sense of self that functions like an ego? How can the same 'self' be
fooled by its own intentional processes having created to some extent the preconditions and
conditions for this act of deception to manifest itself/have itself manifested? In the problem of
self-deception the overall sense of self somehow, in reviewing this self-manufactured state of
dissimulation, is itself fooled into believing this state of affairs to be in a state of coincidence
with their general understanding of reality, whilst, at the same time, it is reasonable to believe
that another sense of self should be postulated as being aware of this fact but unable to transmit this 'insight' to that other overall sense of self currently being 'literally' deceived by this
state of deception being manufactured by a different aspect of itself, etc… and all this is further complicated by the fact that in the course of our daily lives we are not consistent, have an
imperfect memory, hold a miscellany of contradictory ideas and beliefs, and, can never claim
to be in complete intentional control of our own lives. Indeed, the greater philosophical
problem must be in how we are to come to understand this very fact of 'our being in the
world' that, somehow or other, we do appear to function, on the whole, without utter psychic
confusion, its consequent paralysis, our ultimate disintegration and self-dissolution? (2)
In this paper let me examine a number of points in the light of this problem of an
overall sense of self - "how is it that the self can function with an overall sense of self when
this sense of self (is without an absolute basis and) is fabricated from a bewildering array of
self-perspectives?" (3)
1.
That this Self is a Hierarchy of Various Senses of Self
Somehow or other the person is 'a' person, someone who functions with an overall
sense of self! Then, in order for some sense of self to appreciate some other sense of self that
sense of self under review must be appreciated by a higher sense of self, i.e., given a certain
sense of self, a self-conscious reflection upon the same demands a greater degree of psychic
unity, or gestalt unity, in order to be able to review that sense of self (now made the intentional object-state of that reflexive act). This doctrine of appreciation implies that an object
level is always appreciated from a meta-level whose status is effectively raised by one degree
(in epistemological organization). Hence, e.g., a pain is not appreciated as a pain qua pain
from the perspective of a pain. Pain is experienced as pain from the point of view of that pain
but is appreciated as pain qua pain from a higher perspective which cannot be impressional in
nature (at the psychological-epistemological location and level of its originating consciousness). Hence pain might be appreciated from the affective perspective of mood or the cognitive level of the perceptual or the conceptual as a linguistic category of thought or as a judgment as to its identity, location, character, intensity, cause, possible amelioration, the poten-
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tial successfulness of such a program, etc. Indeed, the pain is experienced as pain qua pain on
the impressional level and then its affective impact is experienced on the affective level of
mood, the pain is then perceived in the perceptual field and named in the conceptual and
judged in the judgmental level of reflection (and that judgment recorded in linguistic terms of
reference in the cognitive-conceptual aspect of this epistemological hierarchy of intentional
consciousness).3 Hence pain is felt, impinges on mood, is perceived, conceptually treated and
judged as such. (4)
Although appreciation operates on a meta-level whose status is raised by one degree,
etc., we do not need to invoked an infinite spectrum of meta-levels in order to appreciate our
appreciation, etc. (although the epistemological hierarchy of intentional being might well appear to be so subdivided and extended?). Through processes of transformational treatment/retreatment (and our critical distinction of distinctive products and pathways of transformation) our mental processes can essential straddle two (or a few more) meta-levels of
analysis and/or synthesis, finally bringing the (retreated) productivity of our investigations
back on par with the initial object-level of examination.4 So, in the final analysis, the pain
through re-treatment can be experienced and 'appreciated' as pain qua pain. (5)
These two meta-levels of the object level and the meta-level (with a status raised by
one meta-degree) in the gestalt field of intentional inspection essentially represent respectively the object-polarity of focus and the polar-background-field of appropriate and significance-producing contrast. A third polarity of the ego-pole is invoked when we negatively define it as not the relationship between the two poles of the object-state and the background
field of contrast when the same, i.e., that ‘relationship’, in turn is intentionally reviewed (with
the simultaneous productivity of that relationship between the current intentional object-state
under focus and its corresponding field of informative contrast). As argued elsewhere these
three poles mirror the three moments of the hermeneutic circle, namely, the phenomenological text, hermeneutic meta-text and the existential non-text (along with the three archetypal
intentional moments of Object, World and Ego respectively, etc.).(6)
Now, returning to this problem (one among many of which a small number will be
listed and discussed in the course of this paper) - if there is a sense of self that is the overall
sense of self how could this sense of self be appreciated without the necessary implication of
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I have argued elsewhere that, e.g., for a pain to be appreciated it needs to be treated through transformation onto an affective level of appreciation, etc. That this is accomplished through a suspension of that initial
product on that object level, etc. Hence a pain experience is appreciated through (a series of its) suspension(s),
otherwise we would be lost in the mere pain of that painful experience without being able to realize it as a painful experience. Just as the hermeneutic circle is propelled through suspensions so too the epistemological hierarchy is organized in its functioning - in the intentional fluctuations of its overall centre of psychic gravity (defined through the location of its greatest activity whether defined physiologically and/or psychically – defined in
my Re-Analysis on the Nature of Things, Epistemology, Vol. I. as its internal intension as opposed to its external extension which is, in effect, a reflection of the epistemological hierarchy minus this current intensional
emphasis of current intensional interest(s) which, to that extent, could be theoretically determined differentially), etc.
4
This insight was first worked out in my Re-Analysis on the Nature of Things, Vol.II, Ontology. Transformational treatment-retreatment philosophy is noted in my very early essay On Essences and which can be
found on my homepagesite. A more technical explication of the same can be found in my recent paper Transformational-Treatment-Retreatment Philosophy: A Critical tool for Disentangling Philosophical Disputes Involving Processes of Transformation (which can be found on my homepagesite in Most Recent Papers in Philosophy, Page 2).
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a meta-overall sense of self?5 Just as every other sense of self can be appreciated from a more
epistemologically organized perspective is there an end of the line where the last station cannot be travelled past so to speak? Let me look into this dilemma, namely, that for a sense of
self to operate it needs to appreciate its distinctive intentional field of object-states and be itself appreciated from a more organized epistemological perspective. In this light is the 'overall sense of self' truly 'the overall sense of self' or is it a sense of a sense of self beholden,
knowingly or unknowingly, to an even 'higher' sense of self that might be/might not be appreciated by a more epistemologically organized sense of self? Or is this type of self quite
different in 'type' from that sense of self that essentially appreciates the relationship between
a distinctive type of gestalt field and its distinctive object-states, an appreciation of the relative transcendental unity of a certain field that establishes that corresponding sense of self
through appreciation from that higher epistemological perspective. Is this sense of self, then,
quite different - being a semblance of self produced/re-produced from a relatively integrated
interactive resolution of the collected miscellany of senses of self that appear to inhabit this
egological zoo placed under such an overall intentional umbrella - in effect a meta-sense of
self that neither can be reduced to a particular sense of self nor their mere collection or summation?! But, then, perhaps we should argue that as 'resolution' is normally realized through
the existential moment of the non-textual it follows that this overall sense of self must itself
be born in a field subject to the same gestalt rules as any other sense of self, albeit dealing
with an intentional field of discrimination whose intentional object-states are senses or other
fields of self-awareness (which in turn are probably subject to the same type of harmonized
accommodation just as the visual field can be hypothetically entertained as a collection of
sub-fields dealing with colour and focus, motion and background observation, line recognition, shape recognition, gestalt essentialization of form, facial recognition, etc.). Hence, in
this intentional schematization of consciousness 'self' can only be treated as a pole - a polar
objective that, by definition, can never be realized, cannot be completely obtained and, therein, can never be absolutely encountered! (7)
Looking into this dilemma let us first look more closely as to how a visual-perceptual
sense of self might arise from a hypothetical, archetypal point of view. (8)
In a visual-perceptual field visual objects are discriminatively 'viewed' intentionally as
visual objects. On one hand, they are seen as different from the background of that visual
field otherwise they could not be seen. On the other hand, they cannot be absolutely different
from that background field otherwise how could they be seen as 'visual objects in that visual
field'. So there is this intentional relationship between those objects and that field, indeed, it
is though this interactive relationship that visual objects are discerned within that visual field.
However, visual objects qua visual objects cannot be discerned without reference to their appropriate field of introduction, namely, the visual field. Moreover, this visual field qua visual
field could not be discerned without that visual field itself being appreciated from or within
an appropriate meta-field that allows us to view that visual field as if it were an intentional
object in its own right to that extent that it is necessary for one to be able to review it in that
light. A visual field gains its phenomenological sense as one distinctive aspect of a perceptual
field (in the discrimination of an empirical object-state). Moreover, it gains its distinct distinctiveness for that (overall sense of) self from this distinctive interaction between those in5
One way out of this dilemma is to invoke an overall sense of self that is the product of an object level
of selfhood in a relationship with its corresponding meta-level equivalent with this internal interactivity preserved in this overall semblance of self. Still, many of the same problematic considerations continue to apply,
such as, questioning the apparent termination of hierarchical epistemological organiazation in that overall sense
of self, etc?
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tentional objects in that intentional field of the visual (in the 'light' of its temporal-spatial
perspective(s)). The hermeneutic meaning of this hierarchy of intentional interaction between
'objects(-states)' and 'fields' or 'worlds' is determined culturally; through meta-textual genre
expectations conducted through processes of protention and processes of memory recognition
conducted through productive/re-productive processes of 'textual' retention. The existential
meaningfulness of these interactions arising form the third moment of the non-textual, namely, that existentially enriched and non-reducible interaction between the meta-textual and the
textual (that has been previously depicted metaphorically on a number of occasions as like
the right 'key' being fitted in its lock on a locked door allowing the relatively novel 'phenomenon of opening' to emerge and therein giving us passage through the resolution of their harmonized interaction). The dynamic transcendental balance of all three moments establishing,
in this instance, a not-textual sense of an overall visual self (as part of an empirical sense of
self). (9)
All of this theoretical description-prescription of intentionality is obviously hypothetical. Certain phenomenological 'observations', however, might be considered less theoretical
or less hypothetical, namely, for instance, that intentionality is complex; is hierarchically organized; each aspect of the self is determined by and determines both a corresponding field of
(intentionally structured) consciousness and its corresponding object-states able to be discriminatively focused upon in that field of consciousness; that these polar constructions are
ideal, polarized and can never be absolutely obtained or entertained apart from those co-polar
aspects that, from their own points of view, mutually co-determine other products and processes that are thematized in that same field and, in turn, are appreciated from their appropriate meta-perspective or meta-sense of self, etc. (10)
2.
Acter, Actor or a Mere (Series of) Mask(s)?
It is argued that there is a test to help us to 'decisively' reach the conclusion as to
whether we are dealing with another human being or a cleverly programmed computer instructed to answer us as if it were intelligent, human and possessed of self-consciousness, etc.
This is the Turing Test - essentially our asking complex questions via a keyboard and a computer screen in order to find ourselves in a position of being able to differentiate whether our
conversational partner is another human being or a well programmed computer that lacks a
true self-consciousness and which lacks as a consequence a sense of self-conscious reflection.
However, what if humans (as a sort of quazi standard) were machines, albeit very complex
ones, ones that possessed self-consciousness, surely, it would follow logically, if machines
became more sophisticated and apparently self-consciousness that, as a consequence, no process of discrimination (other than a close scrutiny of 'personal' history) would be able to
differentiate them if we were to merely apply this Turing Test. The implication being that, if
the human person is only a very sophisticated machine, then, the Turing Test is only going to
be able to help us to differentiate the complexity of one machine vis-à-vis some other, etc.,
and whether there is the appearance of self-consciousness or its relative absence. (11)
Furthermore, having argued for 'self' as a polar construction (constructed from a hierarchy of gestalt fields each with their own associated polarities of self) it would follow that
we are no longer dealing with an actual acter in the sense of an intentional agent whose intentional being is to be as an actual agent in the world nor with an actor acting behind a mask or
series of masks (or personae) as a hidden intentional agent. A polar vision of self argues for
the absolute fact that there is no absolute sense self acting in and of itself. However, from an
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empirical point of view, as engaged in our dealings with others in the course of our passages
through this world(-of-life), there is this appearance that this life-world is populated by actors, indeed, in effect acters operating as actors through the appearance of 'masks'. By masks
is metaphorically meant the adoption of a particular persona or set of personae appropriate or
not appropriate to the course of action that 'person' appears to adopt/have adopted in their
passage through this world(-of-life). Such personae as male, female, child, old person, good
samaritan, friend, scientist, mother, cook, lover, colleague, rogue, philosopher, deceiver, etc.,
etc. Indeed, in the emptiness of this nihilistic type of philosophy, although from an absolute
point of view we can argue for the absolute non-existence of the person, from an empirical
point of view, or any other relative, non-absolute perspective, we can argue from experience
for the presentation of the phenomenal appearance of a real ‘person’, real 'people' in this
life-world as a ‘fact’ would help to truly establish the world as a world-of-life. Moreover,
through the phenomenological fact that this life-world is 'one' world-of-life-there-for-all-of-us
it follows that we must be in direct contact with the same and all other phenomena that
metaphorically cross our path or whose path we cross (and not 'indirect contact' as proposed
in representationalist, dualist and Cartesian styles of philosophy or similar 'foundered' on discrete multiple worlds, etc.). However, this granted, we are now presented by one more problem, namely, if we are in direct contact with all others when we encounter them and are engaged with them we must now ask ourselves how it is possible for us to both deceive others
and be deceived by others? If our phenomenal contact with others is direct how would deception be possible in such a world? Or, even, in the midst of this relational emptiness how could
‘contact’ be conceived when there is nothing there that could be contacted or, for that matter,
make contact? (12)
3.
But if There is Direct Contact How Could We Deceive Each Other?
If we meet others 'directly' how could we dissimulate before others and they before
us?! Surely, in our direct contact with them and they with us, all intent to deceive would be
immediately experienced as such (and not realized 'mediately' through processes of mediation, indirectly recognizing that a process of deception was at some stage intended and put
into effect)!? (13)
But, as good post-modernists we should argue for the fact that no person is in absolute
intentional control of the formation of their own sense of self-being as 'a person-in-this-world-of-life! That being the case, it follows that no person can claim to be in full
control of their own intentional life nor be fully aware of the intentionality of some other
person even if they were in direct contact with them. So, if the other person cannot be in full
control of their own life then how much more so should we not be able to divine the intentional life of that person or any other person or all others for that matter!? Yet, at the same
time, still be in direct contact with them as demanded by the one-worldness of the life-world.
(14)
Let me resolve this puzzle by noting that it is because we can be in direct contact with
others that we can, at least theoretically, re-cognize an act of deception as an act of deception
at some hypothetical point in time. Being in direct contact does not mean we could have an
absolute understanding of the intentional life of some other person nor an adequate understanding of that other person through 'our' current directness of contact. Although we might
be in a position to have an adequate essential knowledge of that person to that extent we can
appreciate the ‘holistic unity of their being’ stamped upon the intentional deposition of their
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life as it traces out its course upon the fabric of this shared world as they make their textualized passage through this lived-world of intentionality(?). E.g., when we meet a ‘good’ person we know them as ‘good’, when we meet a ‘not so good’ person we have come to know
them as ‘not so good’, etc. Of course the problem hypothetically remains, if a person went
out of their way to pass themselves off as ‘good’ would they truly be a ‘good’ person when
their stance in this light is only a position adopted with some other end in sight? But what if a
person spent their whole life adopting this ‘good persona’ would we need to change our mind
in this regard? If a fake picture in the style of x is treated as a picture by x, and that picture
would have been an excellent example of x’s oeuvre if it had been painted by the same, does
it make any difference (until that time it is exposed as a forgery, albeit a brilliant forgery?)?
Still, our vision of authenticity in this regard demands the ‘hand of the artist’ to have been
involved in its creation although I, for one, would be happy to own a ‘van Gogh’ that was
treated as a ‘genuine van Gogh’ even if it wasn’t as long as I and all others were not privy to
this ‘information’. (15)
Direct contact does not imply intentional transparency! The person themselves cannot
stand transparently before themselves, how much less so can we stand in front of others in
this same regard. On the other hand there can be no absolute intentional opaqueness! Metaphorically, there can only be degrees of intentional translucence! In direct contact with the
other or something other there can be only degrees of intentional comprehension. Being in a
relationship demands that we be in a relationship with that sense of the other directly, otherwise there could be no relationship (except indirectly through the ‘directness’ of an indirect
relationship6). The intentional nature of our being-in-the-world demands this directness, albeit by degree. As our being consciously aware of ourselves being in a relationship is determined intentionally we must already be in possession of some form of an intentional determination of that sense of the other or other thing in which we are currently focused upon.
That being the case this implies that we have already begun a process that is sets out to phenomenologically determine its sense, to examine its hermeneutical meaning and to
(re)-discover its existential meaningfulness. Our interaction with this other person or other
thing through directness of the relationship implies we already have an essential understanding of that intentional object-state to some degree or other, hence the relative intentional
translucency of that intentional object-state! Let me explain this in greater detail and examine
there the intentional consequences of this doctrine of relative intentional translucence. (16)
A relationship is a two-way process. Of course if I see an object x this does not mean
that that object x sees me, it does mean though that that object was seen, what ever that object
is. Intentionality is an intentional attitude towards an intentional object-state. Because there is
only one life-world there-for-us-all then all intentional interaction is direct. If I see a perceptual object then that 'perceptual object', whether it exists or not, is seen. If I remember a certain state of affairs that happened in my past then in entertaining that memory I currently
stand in a direct relationship with those intentional memories. Are all relationships direct in
this sense? Consider the following indirect relationship. I know Paul who knows John who
knows me only indirectly. He directly knows me indirectly. In other words he stands in a direct relationship with his indirect knowledge of me. Are all relationships two-way in the derivation of their relational processes? John knows of me indirectly since Paul has told him
about myself. Now, I don't know John so how can we stand in a two-way relationship with
each other? Well, we miss the point if we were to cash out the nature of this indirect relationship in that manner! John directly stands in a relationship with me indirectly. I directly
6
Refer to the next section for an amplification of this point.
8
stand in a relationship with what I know and/or don't know about John. Directness is between
the intender and the intentional object-state, and, between the intentional object-state and the
object, if any, that that intentional object-state is related to, and, because there can only be
one life-world it follows all intentional relationships with their intentional-object states must
be directly entertained and those intentional object-states to some degree must directly participate in the essential nature and being of their re-presentations. So a relationship with 'the'
Santa Claus is just that, a relationship with a mythical individual (who might have had a residual basis in historical reality). On the other hand a relationship with my friend Paul is a
relationship that engages many more phenomenal/phenomenological modalities of being than
a relationship with Santa Claus. When Paul tells me about his friend John I then stand in a
direct relationship to John to that extent that I have engaged him, namely, as a person whom I
have not met and know of only second hand with only the possibility that I might meet him if
that historical possibility is currently open to both of us. So, at this point, I must conclude that
all relationships are direct in their relational contact and simultaneously reciprocal in process,
gives one direct access to the essential nature of that intentional object-state, and, that intentional object-states co-respond directly with their object-states so intended (i.e., currently my
understanding of and relationship with Paul is as a friend met in the flesh, whereas, my understanding of and relationship with John is as a person I have merely been told about). All
that granted what implications and consequences does this approach have for our interaction
with deceivers and our potential ability to act as a deceiver of others? Being in a state of direct contact could the process of deception be enacted successfully? Should it not be immediately perceived as such, as an act of deception? (17)
First, we have another problem to work our way through, namely, if a polar approach
to intentional objects and subjects is granted how can contact be direct when there is neither a
real object nor real subject in place to be contacted, and, neither a real object or real subject
making contact with ourselves? If there are no absolutely real objects and subjects then contact could only be an illusion, a mere simulation? But even simulated relationships are experienced! Therefore as a simulation, as a simulation of a simulation, as re-simulations our interaction with other subjects and objects, and with ourselves, is allowed to come into phenomenal-phenomenological existence. By 'phenomenal' is meant that particular phenomena-experienced through its simulation, and, by 'phenomenological' is meant that type of phenomenally distinctive simulation of the simulated-reality-there-for-us that we find is waiting
for us to engage it or re-engage it, be engaged by it or re-engaged by it, etc. (18)
4.
How Could Contact Be Maintained if the Ego is Merely a Polar Fiction?
Does this polar position, therefore, destroy this concept of direct contact through the
simultaneous absence of a contacter and contactee? No! There may be no absolute contact,
there still remains a relative, provisional form of contact between simulations by virtue of
their common intentional formation and the phenomenological 'fact' that there is a direct relationship between the simulations themselves through re-simulation and between the simulations in that relational process, or those relational processes, under review through the
re-simulation(s) of the same. Because contact is between simulations as re-simulations and
never between or with non-simulated states of affairs that are impossibly and unobtainably
‘understood’ as prior to those intentional acts of simulation/re-simulation. Indeed, all phenomenal presentations are experienced as phenomenological re-presentations and not
pre-simulated representations! Contact is between simulations, as re-presentations, by virtue of their intentional constitution as phenomena-there-for-us through re-constitution, and,
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this 'fact' that they stand in a direct relationship to-us through what they re-present (rather
than what they might be incorrectly seen to ‘represent’)! Our complex modal engagement
directly reflecting, wittingly or unwittingly, the true modal complexion of the constitution of
those intentional-states-of-affairs-there-for-us as phenomena! Now, let us return to the problem of how deception is possible despite the simulation of a directness of contact between an
absolute non-existent deceiver and that absolute non-existent person apparently being deceived by the former (and v.v). (19)
5.
That ‘Direct Contact’ is Necessary for the Practice of Deception?
As I noted earlier it is because of the fact that there is a direct relationship between the
phenomenal parties in an act of deception that deception can be realized to be deception qua
deception! Moreover, to ensure the success of the deception as an enacted process it is because the deceiver is standing in a direct relationship with their intended victim that they can
fine-tune this process, adjust the course of their narrative to this effect. Furthermore, it is only
through their relationship to each other that the act of deception can be enacted. Then, as one
is neither in a position of absolute intentional self-control nor in possession of a full intentional self-understanding as to the nature of their own motivation we cannot ask others to
immediately have as full an understanding as the other party might have of their own motivation. Communication as a process takes place in time, takes time! But it is because, normally, we can have an adequate knowledge of the intentional motivation of ourselves and
others that we can in time construct a deceptive process and/or unmask that intent that
proves to have been deceptive! Only through direct contact, as outlined, could a deceptive
narrative be engineered and put into practice. This fact alone implicating the necessity of directness as a necessary feature for the both the practice of deception and the practice of its
unmasking. Lastly, this expression 'unmasking' indicates, I believe, the need for the adoption,
by the deceiver, of an externally projected persona of an appropriate nature in order to perpetrate their deceptive process. The assumed persona facilitating this process of deception until
such a time phenomenal 'facts' declare the deception to have been a deception and/or critical
hermeneutical investigations deconstructively expose contradictory narrative variants implicating a process of deception and/or our existential intuition alerts us to seek signs of good
faith when the lack of a good faith is felt to be present in the course of our interaction with
the suspected deceiver's presence and/or texts (through the same being subjected to a thorough intuitive transcendental suspension). So, in essence, deception is both possible and recognizable because of the 'fact' of this directness of intentional interaction in a process of deception; this directness, in turn, being a 'fact' of our existence in this world because transcendentally there can only be one life-world-there-for-us in our interaction within this
one-world-of-life! (20)
Now, deception in and of itself is not necessarily inauthentic in its essential nature or
practice. Indeed, many social situations authentically call for practices of deception in a variety of forms as discussed in the first part of this essay. On the other hand, deception committed in bad faith, inauthentically, through the greater complexity of personae involved in its
commission, whether revealed through their projection or not revealed through their
non-projection, collectively establishes through the interaction of these personae an overall
holistically reflected imprint whose integrity, or lack of the same, is revealed through the
textual deposition of this imprint when subjected to an adequate, in depth phenomenological,
hermeneutical and/or existential investigation. As these various personae are differently motivated intentionally it follows that our overall motivation must reflect that fact of their col-
10
lective constitutional synthesis, the manner of the relative resolution or non-resolution of
these competing forces revealing themselves in all textual deposition even if there is an overall intent to perpetrate an act of deception. That this lack of intrinsic harmony can be made
evident through an appropriate, in-depth phenomenological, hermeneutical and/or existential
investigation. Hence, in the light of this argument, dissimulation can never be regarded as an
absolutely intrinsic affair private to the person committed to its perpetration (as implied by
the concept of relative intentional translucence). (21)
6.
Is the Distinction Between ‘Persons’ and ‘Machines’ Fatally Flawed?
Previously, I noted a flaw in the application of a program that attempts the use of any
type of a Turing Test, through question and reply, in order to hermeneutically evaluate the
presence or absence of self-consciousness and therein the presence or absence of a person
with self consciousness and/or a machine without self-consciousness on the understanding
that machines must lack self-consciousness, be unable to reflect on the fact of their own existence. Now the flaw is this - if a person is only a very sophisticated machine it follows, if
only hypothetically, that a machine could be constructed to equal or surpass the simulation of
self-consciousness already possessed by that other machine already in existence, namely, the
human person. That that being the case the Turing Text must ultimately fail to that extent that
it cannot differentiate between machines and non-machines, only machines more or less sophisticated than the 'human machine'. But this conclusion is itself flawed, or at least needs to
be re-configured along the following lines, namely, that neither the human person can be reduced to a body qua body nor can a machine be reduced to a machine qua machine. A machine functions because there is an existential excess over and above the machine qua machine. In a similar fashion the human person cannot be reduced to a mere body since a mere
body is only a dead one and is certainly in no psycho-physical condition to then function as a
human-body-there-for-us as it could when it was alive, when ‘we’ were alive. This difference
then needs to be noted! This flaw, therefore, being fatal if it is read and exercised in an absolute mode! (22)
7.
An Embodied Person Cannot be Reduced to Mere Body!
Humans cannot be reduced to the status of a mere machine, a mere body, a mere
mind, etc., for they are defined by that existential excess (experienced through the 3rd moment of the hermeneutic circle, and the global suspension of the same 7 , and reinforced
through the ‘fourth moment’, i.e., the hermeneutic circle subjected to a global suspension.
But, likewise, a machine cannot be reduced to a mere machine for the 'machinery of the machine' emerges from the structural-functions of that device, or set of devices, in its engagement in this world-of-life and in our engagement and encounter with it? (23)
Both the person and the machine can be provisionally defined through reference to a
hypothetical history of that 'person' and that 'machine'. Both cannot be absolutely reduced!
On the other hand, a relative loss of meaning is at the ‘expense’ of any (lesser) gains realized
through that reduction. Moreover, an absolute reduction realizes only an absolute loss of
meaning! Whereas a partial reduction of a machine or a person might release information of a
7
Through the global moment of the not-textual (in distinction to the existential moment of the
non-textual).
11
supplementary form or format. to the extent that that type of process is able to deliver this
supplementary information. (24)
Hence, self, e.g., is provisionally defined through sense, meaning and/or meaningfulness, i.e., phenomenologically, hermeneutically and/or existentially (which correspond respectively to the object-state, the background field and/or the (relevant) sense(s) of self) involved in that particular intentional act (albeit with a relatively unique 'personal' spatio-temporal history). (25)
8.
That the Polarity of Ego is Only an Intentional Fiction!?
Self is only an intentional polarity, a fiction, that even through reification and projection can never be obtained, reached, realized, etc., and that all other intentional polarites, indeed all distinctions, are equally fictitious or rather ‘fictional’8 (from a non-relative/absolute
point of view)! Therefore, there can be no pure sense of an overall self nor purity in a distinctive sense of self in the expression of some aspect of self. Only in and through our relationships is the self defined through those relationships, i.e., with others, different aspects of ourselves, through institutions, the everyday-world, cultures, object-states, activities, etc. Consequently, the ‘self’ can never be absolutely distinctive nor absolutely isolated nor absolutely
independent. Hence the establishment of a ‘direct contact’ in all our relationships entered into
in this one-world-of-life! (26)
As previously argued, deception is able to be enacted because there is a direct contact
with the other - that is how it is fine-tuned in the process of its delivery, and, in time, is recognized as deceptive. Moreover, how could we know we were being deceived if not through
a deeper awareness of this direct contact with our deceiver in and through a state of deeper
insight into this state of affairs; in a comprehension of their deeper intent to deceive us.
Even a psychotic person is in contact with the world to some degree or other - their hallucinations are never absolutely of a science fiction-like character! As communication is always a
process, deception therefore takes place within that period of time that full comprehension is
not realized, is not able or allowed to be realized! Indeed, deception moreover necessitates
enough intentional understanding of the other person and of our own motivation in order to
establish the relative successfulness of this mission to deceive that other person. Then, for the
deceived person to realize that they have been duped a similar comprehension of intentional
motivation needs to be realized and that again as a possibility is pre-established through the
directness of interactive interaction already in play (through a deeper awareness of that immediate re-simulation and/or mediated retrospective re-simulation, prospective predictive
protention, etc). (27)
Are we in a direct contact with our own overall sense of self/senses of self? Or is this
semblance of 'directness' only an illusion, a simulation 'fixed' through retentional
re-simulation? A mechanism of intentional simulation that can favour neither the intentional
object-state nor its intentional context nor any intentional sense of self whether overall or aspectivally oriented, whether as an individual agent or as a collective assembly of agents
(whether institutionally re-organized or not). In this regard should this lack of preference be
reflected in our philosophical investigations? What ramifications should follow from the
adoption of this type of position? (28)
I.e., they are not absolutely fictitious having a fictional existence that ‘exists’ in the context of their
subjective-intersubjective narrative, intentionally formed/informed gestational matrix, etc.
8
12
9.
The Dialectical Art of Preferences and Their Suspension
To have preferences or not to have preferences - that is the question?! (29)
The sincere transcendental phenomenologist should, initially, face a dilemma here if
they were to adopt this type of non-transcendental position of seeking and maintaining preferences?! On one hand, in accordance with my understanding, prejudices, as pre-judgments,
should head us in the appropriate direction we wish to advance our investigations, and, help
us to set up our pre-recognition/re-cognition of the same, namely, the seeking the practical
realization of the transcendental goal(s) of our investigations! To this extent preferences are
transcendentally necessary (indeed, they phenomenologically establish phenomenal sense
through the essential discrimination of psychic ‘location(s)’ in the culturally pre-determined
linguistic mapping of our life-world)! On the other hand, through a thorough suspension,
through a thorough de-preferentialization of all our prejudices, the transcendental flavour of
our investigation is powerfully re-inaugurated through the ideal retrospective (re-)enactment
of the genesis of its intentional constitution (relationally generated between the archetypal
polarities of Object, World and Ego). This re-realization can be written neither in terms of
real nor ideal absolute preferences, adopted preferentially, because intentional consciousness
and the constitution of all forms of intentional identity, in their formation as intentional processes, are ‘entered’ and ‘left’ through the auspices of transcendental suspensions. This ‘fact’
is witnessed when forms of ongoing existential ‘presence’ reveal that all forms of intentional
simulation possess at least a central, residual existential authenticity 9 [thence their
non-textual/not-textual (re-)simulation of this phenomenon of ‘presence’ and the
(re-)simulation of our ‘encountering’ the same])! Then, to restate this again, it should be noted that as a dialectical counter-balance, we must have preferences as prejudices enacted, and
in place, in order to be in a position to start to recognize that object-state of our intent, yet,
transcendentally suspend the same in order to critically realize their essential-intentional nature ‘face to face’, so to speak, in and through their simulation of a ‘direct contact’ entered
into by-us to some degree or other through the (re-)simulation of that relationship. In this regard certain comments on the need for a co-authorial preference, made in the previous essay,
need to be critically re-appraised in a wider context. (30)
In the previous essay in noting the general non-observation, or widespread
‘over-looking’, of a co-authored dimension in the course of our daily lives it was suggested
that we should make this dimension of the co-authored a priority in order to re-review the
world (of psychology and psychiatry, indeed, of medicine in general) through that same lens.
This rectification, in turn, however, should itself be rectified through a non-preferentialization
of all phenomenological aspects and distinctions. Our transcendental research demands no
less even though the initial rectification of this system is demanded in order to give us the
material needed to fully rectify this omission of the co-authorial dimension, and, then, to
transcendentilize its contribution once it has been recognized as a necessary ingredient in our
therapeutic and philosophical research. But let me examine this process of rectification, and
its meta-rectification, more closely in the next essay titled Beyond Therapy. (31)
This dialectical art of exercising and suspending our preferences, essentially our
‘prejudices’, for good or bad, rightly or wrongly, is what allows us to successfully proceed
9
Implying that there can be no forms nor instances of absolute evil!
13
through this world-of-life. As an observation we might say that we manage to muddle on
through life with a successfulness in overall method that can only defy a coherent explanation. Once one knows how to ride a bike or drive a car, e.g., one thinks little on the technique
of this achievement and concentrates instead on the current intentional course of our riding or
driving or other affairs that fill our day. In a similar manner all manner of judgments that
embrace the course of that day are entered into with an ability that near defies all forms of
linguistic explication. So, let me do the impossible, an apparent motif of this essay, and
sketch out how this balancing act between exercising prejudice and suspending the same
might operate from a theoretical point of view. (32)
Prejudice as prejudgment10 is a necessary precondition for the act of judgment to take
place. This is the ‘material’ to be judgmentally evaluated, that which the judgmental act must
embrace as its topic for evaluation and critical appreciation. Its sense located us in this
world-of-life, its meaning is to be re-interpreted and the meaningfulness of this act is discovered non-reductively in the relationship between sense and meaning, between the analytic
[dealing with relative ‘parts’] and the synthetic [dealing with the relative unity of a ‘totality’],
the reductive and the reconstituted, the retrospectivity of textual retention and prospectivity
of protentional anticipation. These are the first two moments of the hermeneutic circle as analysed elsewhere. The third moment arises through the non-reductive interaction of the first
and second moments of the hermeneutic circle (which can also be described as a relationship
between textualization through intentional deposition and meta-textualization arrived at
through genre expectations, etc. The harmonic resolution of this relationship between the
dissonance of text and the consonance of meta-text is existentially arrived at in and through
the spontaneity ‘unlocked’ by the first two moments. In this moment it is as if the ‘presence’
of the text in all its dialectical richness is allowed to speak to us through its relative transparency and immediacy - when translucence becomes relatively transparent. It is
(re-)discovered in that ‘moment’ when we meet with a sudden loss of textual resistance,
when the text ‘appears’ to be understood in our understanding of it through its understanding
of us in its ability to virtually ‘speak to us’.11 (33)
Now these three moments (which constitute the hermeneutic circle) are essentially
different types of transcendental suspensions that collectively constitute the global suspension of consciousness12 as demanded by the transcendental phenomenologist!13 It is my intuIn this topic of ‘prejudice’ I am alluding to the work of the philosopher Georg Gadamer. As the transcendental phenomenologist (in the mould of Edmund Husserl) insists our access to the ‘transcendental dimension’ is through a thorough suspension of our prejudices this insistence on giving ‘prejudice’ its rightful place in
a transcendental phenomenology could be compared to ‘the waving a red rag in front of a bull’. However, when
properly understood it will be seen that what I am more correctly doing is setting the transcendental phenomenologist up to re-cognise the fruits of their research. This is done by ‘locating them in a distinctive place in the
life-world’ and ‘placing them in an appropriate attitudinal position’ so that the fruits of their research can be
recognised/re-cognised! Otherwise the transcendental phenomenologist is a bit like Ferdinand the Bull who just
chews the grass waiting for something to happen when nothing will happen because they have their eyes shut as
they just go on chewing their cud. Hence the need for this dialectical balance between prejudice and suspension.
Otherwise we cannot begin our transcendental research nor face the transcendental dimension! If we wish, e.g.,
to understand the ethical dimension from a transcendental perspective, and v.v., then we must first be ethically
challenged, i.e., prejudiced. If we wish, e.g., to understand the egological dimension from a transcendental perspective, and v.v., then we need to be egologically challenged, etc., etc!!
11
The first two moments are metaphorically like a ‘lock’ and ‘key’, the third is like ‘the unlocking of the
door’ and ‘discovering a room full of treasure’. The third moment can also be compared to that type of understanding that upon the reading of a novel one can immediately answer the questions ‘did you enjoy reading that
novel?’ and ‘what was it all about?’.
12
The global suspension has been referred to elsewhere as the fourth moment of the not-textual.
10
14
itive understanding that these suspensions can dialectically move us around this hermeneutic
circle (in both ‘directions’).14 (34)
Re-stated simply – the productive phenomenologist needs to balance the use of
both prejudice and suspension in the exercise of their critical transcendental investigations! By such means, e.g., they can approach the ethical and extract the ethical from their
investigations, or, they can approach the egological and extract the egological from their investigations, etc., etc! (35)
These three moments of the hermeneutic circle (of textual comprehension), in accordance with my phenomenological understanding, give rise, respectively, to sense (as a
psychic location in the life-world), meaning (as hermeneutically interpreted and meta-textually demanded by the genre-rules of that text), and, meaningfulness (realized through
its ability to harmonically realize a distinctive existential surplus of meaning that cannot be
reductively reduced to the mere ‘moments’ of textual sense and meta-textual meaning, etc.).
(36)
10. That Deception is Grounded in ‘Truth’ Along with Self-Deception!
As a rule of thumb we might say:
99% of the intentional process of deception cannot be deceptive!
1% of self-deception, at the very least, can not be self-deceptive!
Let me explain. (37)
99% of the deceptive process is dependent upon non-deceptive material. Only the
overlay of that last '1%' is in the form of deceptive material and through which that deception
can then be planned, engineered and finely tuned! This ratio 1:100 is only meant to be taken
metaphorically, as an approximation. Can we theoretically demonstrate this type of constitutional ratio and through whose interactive relationship we get the instantiated practice of the
deception (just as a small quantity of yeast is instrumental in the making of leavened bread).
E.g., let us say for the sake of a proto-typical argument that “I (i) wanted you to believe that
person (x) stole (S) from you (u) your book (b) when it was, in truth, one of my friends (f),
namely (y) who currently has this tome (b).” I am, for the moment, protecting my friend Fy15
13
These three suspensions are respectively a conjunctive suspension (centrally located in metaphor when
‘like’ (or ‘as’, etc.) is to be cashed out as “‘both like’ and ‘not like’”), a dis-conjunctive suspension (centrally
located in the rhetoric of questioning along the lines of “it is either ‘x’ or ‘~x’”), and, a joint conjunctive(/dis-conjunctive) suspension of the first two suspensions.
14
Also ‘up and down’ in the epistemological hierarchy on the simplified understanding that the Affective
Aspect parallels the second moment of consonance (phenomenologically paralleled by the moment of World,
etc.), the Cognitive Aspect parallels the first moment of dissonance (phenomenologically paralleled by the moment of Object, etc.), and the Judgmental Aspect parallels the third moment of resolution (phenomenologically
paralleled by the moment of Ego, etc.) (and also the dialectical dynamics of our ordered philosophy in its circular format. Refer to the two Open Letters on the nature of Truth which can be found on my homepagesite in
the section dealing with New Papers in Philosophy).
15
Treat the capitalized expression ‘R’, etc., as ‘standing in a certain relationship’ as specified by the nature of its participants and the context of their specification. So F = friend of… so xFy = x is a friend of y. The
point of the notation is to demonstrate as simply as possible that the facts that are relatively atomic and
non-atomic utilized in an act of deception are on the whole relatively truthfully expressed and that deception is
planned, engineered and finely tuned only through the mis-representation of a few items needed to execute that
15
in this instance and will very soon ask him (y) if he indeed stole (S) this book (b) or had
merely intended to temporarily borrow it (L) [and, unbeknownst to myself, seek permission
for its being lent to him when he next saw (u) as he urgently needed this text for an unexpected university exam…] till he read the same (R), since for (x) to steal (S) did seem to me
to be out of character (c) for (x), but, I do know that currently he is in possession (p) of this
volume (b)? What facts do we have? For a start I have a plethora of facts that are relatively
atomic in nature such as x, u, b, y, r, c, p… Not one of those facts just listed is incorrect
and/or deceptively portrayed! Moreover, these facts form various relatively non-atomic facts
such as xFy (x is a friend of y), yPb (y currently possesses b), uOb (u is the legal owner of b),
etc., and none of those additional complex facts just mentioned are in themselves incorrect.
Deception only comes into existence when it is the intention (I) of some person to
mis-represent (M) their vision of reality (R) by not telling their vision of reality as they think
they truly see it; this distortion of reality being accomplished through sins of commission
and/or sins of omission, or, any other strategies that incline (u) to view what is viewed as true
(T) by (x) as not true (~T), or that incline (u) to view what is viewed as not true (~T) by (x) as
(T). Hence an enormous amount of the deceptive process is truthful and has to be truthfully in
play for the deception to 'properly' work (and be fine tuned by the deceiver in the midst of its
execution, and, be received by the victim of that deception as ‘apparently’ true and to be acted upon in accordance with that incorrectly interpreted ‘perception’).16 (38)
So, in the light of the above scenario, if I was to say to (u) that I don’t think yPb (that
y possesses b) I would be acting deceptively even if this deception is committed from a good
motive or a set of good motives. On the other hand if I was to say I believe (x) did not steal
(~S) that book (b), i.e, that y~Sx, I would not be acting deceptively since I truly believe this,
i.e., x~Sb is T. Hence to be deceptive we only need to alter a few propositions, the much
greater bulk of the deceptive process is, indeed, truthfully reflected (and herein lies the path
for the rectification of a deceptive process - that only a few propositions need to be
(re-)suspended and treated with due suspicion and therein rectified in accordance with what is
necessary to de-distort that deceptive mis-interpretation of what is more or less a collectively
entertained empirically oriented reality). (39)
On the other hand, metaphorically, at least 1% of the self-deceptive process cannot be
absolutely involved in a process of self-deception since, to some extent, the self-deception is
intended mis-interpretation of reality. However, it is true to say that these minimal manipulations of the truth in
their deceptive execution and/or the discovery of that deception can have consequences and ramifications greatly in excess of that initial minimal re-arrangement of what was considered to have been a more truthful reflection of reality than its deceptive re-arrangement. Alas, that is the reality of our daily existence in this world of
imperfection that people too often seek a path of least resistance with the objective of maximum gain without
regard to the existential spontaneity, richness and bounty that could be found-to-hand in our relationships already there-for-us when our ‘life’ in this ‘life-world’ is conducted from ‘their’ more authentic ‘point of view’.
Lying takes such little effort, telling the truth often entails only a little bit more of an effort; not that any one
moral act is intrinsically good or evil, and, as mentioned in the first part of this essay, there is a correct and
proper place in this world for all forms of deception, all forms of non-deception and the insightful transformations of ourselves that, in essence, constitute our true humanity, yet, life is still for most of us a small set of
themes in variation - but what variety can be found in the smallest of things, in the minutest transformations of
the soul, those little indications of a deep concern for others that signal a true magnanimity of the spirit…?
16
Similarly, no delusion nor any self-delusion could be one hundred percent out of touch with reality. In
a similar manner science fiction, the dramatic dialogue between animals as found in cartoons, e.g., all other
works of fiction, etc., cannot be created without some form of a reference to a commonly understood vision of
this world, this life-world as shared… an observation noted in my Unified Theory of Drama (written as an Appendix to my Aesthetics, Vol. III in my Re-Analysis on the Nature of Things (as yet not posted on my homepagesite).
16
manufactured by that individual themself with or without co-authorially influence. Therefore,
we must conclude that such a process of self-deception could never be practiced in an absolutely self-deceptive manner even though, for all practical purposes, it might well have been.
Let me elabourate on the theoretical logic behind this phenomenological ‘fact’. (40)
Let us say for the sake of argument that there exists a certain person (j) who believes
they are incredibly good-looking and aesthetically pleasing upon the eye (a). However, by no
shared canon of good taste would most people (w) regard (j) as (a), moreover, (j) is aware of
this fact that the world generally regards him as quite ugly (~a). But (j) suffers from a delusion that he and the world (w) in their heart of hearts both should regard him as (a). Let us
assume that (j) is mildly psychotic (p) which allows him to gloss over this discrepancy between the reality that he is (~a) and his mistaken belief that both the world (w) and him (j)
really believe he is incredibly good looking and aesthetically pleasing upon the eye (a). As
stated, part of him knows that he is (~a) but this is overlooked in his delusion to the extent
that he can override this disconcerting fact through this misplaced belief that he is truly (a).
(41)
All senses of the self must be interconnected, but, interconnected neither absolutely nor non-absolutely! No person can have complete mastery over the intentional processes that constitute there existence in this world-with-others. Hence this collective continuity can never be absolutely realized, either passively or actively, although, it is usually realized most of the time in an adequate and indubitable-like manner. At the same time, no person, whilst alive, can have a complete disconnection of the various senses of self that collectively constitute a holographic re-presentation of their overall sense of self. We may acquire
some new skills and we may loose some old skills, yet, this process of acquisition and
de-acquisition is never an absolute one. Through the intentional continuity of our existences,
despite and in spite of sleep, memory loss, cerebral-vascular accidents, etc., there is never the
complete loss of this overall sense of self and this egological ‘fact’ of our existence can be
appreciated when one finds oneself able to reflect upon this state of affairs re-presented
through this overall state of intentional continuity that accompanies all intentional formation
and expression. This is not to say that through hypothetical defence-mechanisms, cerebral-vascular accidents, all types of memory loss, etc, that we must always find an adequate
access to the simulated re-constitution of previous characteristic representations of
self-identity, memories and repertoires of behaviour from the past. Still, holographically
speaking, they are still there – even if laid down in a textualized form that cannot currently be
adequately retrieved, etc! In this regard we might say that no intentional trace is ever lost –
merely ceases to be available for us to read.17 Moreover, as the epistemological hierarchy is
grounded on the epistemological ‘fact’ that all ‘levels’, ‘aspect’, ‘layers’, ‘senses’, ‘perspectives’, etc., of consciousness are collectively dependent upon all of their completely stratified
interconnections (which follows as a consequence from the transcendental ‘fact’ that there is
a life-world, and, the epistemological-ontological ‘fact’ that there is this thorough transcendental unity of an unobtainable subjectivity, intersubjectivity and objectivity which collectively constitute that life-world as one-world-of-life-there-for-us). Moreover, even our residual powers of transcendental reflection (read judgment) guarantee the integrity of our psycho-physical organism and vice versa. Furthermore, the world as a shared phenomenon im17
Note that all textual deposition is also poly-textual, or, mutli-textual, in that every apparent intentional
act has its textual deposition mirrored in an infinitude of textual formats. So, in walking along the beach we
leave some footprints, we re-arranged the sand, have a memory of it, told someone about our day at the beach,
wrote a poem, took a photograph, squashed some seaweed here and there, was seen by a fellow beach goer, etc.,
etc. See The Presuppositions of a Contemporary Psychology - Introduction, p. 1.
17
plies a mutual interdependence that extends both into the community and the world (because
the life-world is a shared phenomenon constituted in that polar space intentionally constituted
between those unobtainable archetypal poles of Object, World and Ego [both subjectively and
intersubjectively]). Hence the reification and projection of intentionally constituted object-states, worlds and egos (etc.,) are, correctly, transcendental illusions, and, our
treating them as otherwise causes us to commit, therein, a transcendental mistake! Hence
the ‘self’, correctly, should be treated both as a transcendental illusion and as an empirical reality - as a mere series of masks reflecting these levels, aspects, layers, senses, perspectives, etc., yet, from the empirical point of view it is also both an acter (through the
‘self-presence’ of an historical, spatial-temporal continuity, etc.) and an actor with a series of
masks (in order to be able to commit acts of deception, etc.). Furthermore, as even the most
psychotically self-deceived person is rooted, to some variable extent (like all other people), in
the ongoing reality of the life-world, therefore, it follows that they cannot be absolutely
self-deceived without invoking their consequent absolute loss of self-integrity and the complete individual and collective dis-integration of all senses of self-consciousness in the wake
of such a loss. Because, essentially, deception and self-deception are aspects of the same type
of phenomenon (as previously argued in Part I of this essay), namely, as a mistreatment, either wittingly or unwittingly, of the hermeneutic circle and its intentional constitution of
sense, meaning and meaningfulness through a literalization of the metaphorical, etc., a
dis-placed substitution of the hermeneutical, etc., and/or inauthentic treatment of the existential, etc.18 (42)
11. The Existential Transformation of Deception, Deceiving and Being Deceived
As previously shown, only a few propositional re-arrangements characterize the intentional re-constitution of a deceptive intentional act as exercised in its planning, its expression, its fine tuning, and, in our recovery from being deceived by a deceptive state-of-affairs.
In this section let me explore the implications and ramifications of an existential transformation of deception. (43)
First, I would like to make some distinctions, namely, those as noted below:
1. Deception from the relative point of view
2. Deception from the absolute point of view.
3. The relationship between 1. and 2.
4. The Existential transformation of deception. (44)
(1.) The intention to deceive always takes place within a certain intentional perspective or set of intentional perspectives. If I tell a child about Santa Claus it is usually in the
context of Xmas (and related mythology). Because deception is perspective-oriented there
can be no form of deception from an absolute point of view. As noted previously in the formula “the x of the x is no(t)-x”19 “the deception of deception is no(t)-deception” implying
that deceptive-ness is not itself deception per se (by virtue of the different meta-status exhib-
Refer to the theological essay in the series Finding a Place for the Idea of God – Part VI, paragraphs
7-25, 37-56, and, this essay x-y (?)
19
Refer to footnote no. 2.
18
18
ited by these two linguistic items20). The expression-fragment “…is no(t)-deception” means
that from an appreciation of the situation of the deception, from an appreciation of the intentional act of deceiving, and, from an appreciation of the intentional act of being deceived, an
appreciation of the same is not a situation of deception, is not an intentional act of deceiving
and is not, in turn, being deceived. Although neutral, in effect, it is the opposite, namely, by
default, a non-act of deception, a non-act of deceiving, a non-act of being deceived, etc. If
this appreciation of a relative frame of reference is truly being conducted from a critical point
of view it follows that the relativity of the relative, in establishing the absolute
(‘non-perspective’) realizes, in effect, a state of affairs that is not delusive in nature even
though dealing ‘directly’ with what is delusive in nature. Coupled with our insight that deception only involves a minimal re-arrangement of propositional attitudes it follows that to
non-deceptively re-re-arrange that distorting propositional material is to de-distorted the deceptiveness of the deception. Let me invoke the following analogy. (45)
Deception involves the act of deceiving and being deceiving and/or the belief that
there is/was an act of deception and one is/was being deceived. In a rectification of deception
there is a need to take into account the fact that an act of deception may not have taken place
but that the belief that one is/was being deceived might be present in its place – it being my
opinion that the rectification of deception, whether actual or virtual in nature, is essentially
the same in theory and in practice. Let me also demonstrate this fact in this analogy. (46)
Shoplifting is a form of deception – the intention to directly acquire merchandise
without payment in such a manner as to try to not come to the attention of the owner of the
merchandise or those acting of their behalf. Now, the owner of a bookshop (o) needs to go to
the bank for a few minutes and leaves their shop unattended. As they leave they see a potential customer (c) enter with no bag and nothing in their hands. When the owner returns to
their shop just before going in they observe in the distance this customer (c) having left with
one book (b) in their hand. The owner believes (B) that this customer (c) has shoplifted (S) a
book (b) and knowing that this person is a friend (F) of (x) when (x) enters the shop shortly
after mentions this occurrence to them. This person (x) believes (B) that (c) has a good character and would not have stolen a book. That person later sees (c) that day and speaks to (c)
about this set of events and in reply (c) tells them (T) that they paid (P) the stated price on the
book of $5 and left 5 one dollar coins on the ledge under the counter. Soon after (x) mentions
this to (o) who remembers finding (F) $5 dollars in the stated place later that same day….
(47)
In this example we have a whole series of true, relatively atomic facts and true, relatively non-atomic facts. The shop owner entertained what transpired to have been only a belief that there was an act of shoplifting and that certain evidence seems to have adequately
disproved this person’s belief. On the other hand if this person’s belief was true (T) then an
act of shop-lifting would have occurred, i.e., the deceptive intention to directly acquire merchandise without payment in such a manner as to try to not come to the attention of the owner
of the merchandise. We have this complex propositional attitude which is the owner’s interpretation of the facts to hand, namely, oB{cSb} but this belief that {cSb} is ~T as cP$5 and
oF5$ after being told that cTx(cP$5), etc. Of all the propositions present in this situation only
oB{cSb} is ~T. In this situation to rectify this belief that an act of deception had taken place
the evidence of $5 found in a certain place as relayed to the owner was all that was needed in
Or if we substitute ‘deceptive-ness’ for ‘x’ the same type of conclusion is obtained, namely, that the
deceptiveness of deceptiveness is no(t) deceptiveness being in the form of a meta-deceptiveness (i.e., being the
transcendental preconditions for the significance of the expression deceptiveness).
20
19
this instance to rectify their false belief. Would that the falsity of our false beliefs in this
so-called ‘real world’ could be so easily recognized and de-distorted accordingly! (48)
Various points are being made by this analogy. First, deception from the relative point
of view needs to take into account actual deception, i.e., the true belief that an act of deception had taken place, and, virtual deception, i.e., the false belief that an act of deception had
taken place. Second, a relative point of view entails the adoption of a certain phenomenal
point of view or a set of phenomenal points of view. Third, most of the ‘facts’ to hand are
treated as true and unproblematic in the determination of their value. Fourth, in theory and in
practice, only one or a few of all those facts need be treated as problematic or possibly problematic; need be regarded as the locus of a possible deceptive practice. Fifth, when treated as
problematic, called into question, that ‘apparent fact’ is subjected to a suspension (in this case
dis-conjunctive in nature if the proposition and its truth value is subjected to a process of
questioning). Sixth, all facts are essentially interpretations whose truth determinations are either true, false, non-applicable and/or not currently able to be determined. Seventh, adequate
evidence is able to turn around a false belief, although, eighth, what counts for adequate evidence might itself be a false (meta-)belief. Ninth, a phenomenal perspective demands a phenomenal point of view or phenomenal points of view. Tenth, the ‘perception’ of an act of deception demands an ‘interpretation’ to this effect, an appreciation of the truth value of a ‘fact’
being primarily meta-factual, meta-interpretational in nature even though in accordance with
transformation treatment/re-treatment philosophy the situation portrayed by a fact, a fact considered as a fact, and its appreciation as a meta-fact, etc., can all be viewed on the same par,
i.e., treated with the same meta-status through treatment/re-treatment.21 (49)
(2.) A relative point of view is a phenomenal point of view. The transcendental constitution of a phenomenal point of view in its transcendental ideality is an absolute point of
view. We are no longer concerned with phenomena qua phenomena, but with the phenomenon of that phenomena, i.e., its phenomenality (which is not a phenomenon/has no phenomenal nature being meta-phenomenal). Deception from an absolute point of view does not exist,
as deception per se is a type of phenomenon (or a proto-typical set of phenomena). But deceptiveness does have an ideal transcendental ideality, or set of ideals, to that extent it has a
distinct(ive) essential-phenomenology. I am going to argue from an absolute point of view
that deceptiveness as a phenomenon has three overlapping degrees of distortion in their instantiation of this type of general type of phenomenal condition, namely:
1. Focalized, non-psychotic deception
2. Individualized, psychotic deception
3. Globalized, psychotic deception (50)
The first category is deception on a focalized level, e.g., for the first time seeing a
stick look bent in the water without realizing that it is the water that is making it look bent
and being told that it was bent. Similarly, lying and being lied to, shoplifting, etc., etc. The
second category is the entertaining of deceptive-like beliefs, true or false, because the person's overall thinking is distorted by that person's psychosis, such as delusions and their delusional systems whether systematized or not systematized in nature. The last category applies
to everyone of us by virtue of the fact that through the natural reification and projection of
intentional object-states and/or intentional fields and/or intentional subjects, i.e., as intentional polar-facets as presented/re-presented in and through the natural attitude, because this
21
Refer to footnote no. 4.
20
transcendental illusion is not seen as a transcendental illusion a transcendental mistake is
therein committed! Hence the implication of a global psychosis because the way
things-are-in-the-(life)-world is misapprehended on a global scale. I am going to argue that
the reification and projection of polar intentional-facets therein treated as independent and
self-existent states of affairs is indeed a form of psychosis and that an amelioration of this
psychosis would be beneficial in our lives and of assistance for the de-distortion of all other
forms of non-psychotic and psychotic deception. Of course, in our empirical employment of
phenomenal presentations/re-presentations we ostensively do not commit a transcendental
mistake if we operate within the limits of those boundaries that encompass and constitute the
empirical deployment of our conscious faculties. But, as there is no absolute limit between
the relative-phenomenal dimension and the absolute-transcendental-dimension 22 it follows
that even within the limits set by empirical employment we are still committing a transcendental mistake by virtue of our absolute inability to isolate ourselves from the transcendental-dimension (and by extension of the same argument, an inability to isolate ourselves from
the Absolute dimension, and, each other). This should be brought home to us when we realize
that all acts of judgment demand an overall transcendental suspension in order for judgment
to proceed and realize if, within the potential powers of that act of judgment, it can successfully arrive at a definitive resolution and conclusion of that judgmental process. All questions
are conducted under the auspices of a dis-conjunctive suspension, etc. For the hermeneutic
circle to function, as it must in intentional consciousness, all three moments and their respective transcendental suspensions must be collectively operative hence the implication of an
overall transcendental suspension. As an overall transcendental suspension is transcendental
and by implication the metaphorical doorway to the transcendental dimension it follow that
no phenomenal state of affairs can avoid being implicated in the parallel, concurrent transcendental dimension. Hence the relationship between the relative dimension of the phenomenal and the absolute dimension of the transcendental is one that is mutually dependent because it is through mutual dependency that the intentional significance of that relationship is
bourn/born. Hence the presence of an overall transcendental suspension implicates the direct,
simultaneous presence of the transcendental dimension. Hence the permanent presence of a
global psychosis to that extent we treat our phenomenal presentations as phenomenal representations (i.e., as not ‘mere’ phenomenal presentations but through reification and projection, etc., when we in the natural attitude just accept them at face-value 'in the apparent manner of their presentation/re-presentation'). This occurs through the ‘literal reading’ of those
presentations/re-presentations and accepting them merely at ‘face-value’ (but not ‘merely’
treating them at face-value; as mere appearances as discussed by transcendental phenomenologists and as happens in fact through the natural, everyday imposition of an overall transcendental suspension preparatory to an act of judgment be it existentially oriented or not existentially oriented23). Yet, in order to enact the ongoing course of judgment we equally must
suspend all phenomenal appearances in order to await a relatively non-distorted appreciation
of our phenomenal presentations/re-presentations. To that extent we don't appropriate these
presentations and appropriately and adequately enter into the 'spirit' of the transcendental
suspension to that extent we are left with a global psychosis and all other forms of distortions
built upon that basis. Indeed, a psychosis is nothing other than a loss of our powers of
transcendental discrimination, and, the intensity of that psychosis is reflected in this
22
A comparison can be made here to the famous saying of the Buddhist philosopher, Nagarjuna, paraphrased to the effect “that the limits of nirvana (approximately, ‘of the world from the point of view of salvation’)are the limits of samsara (worldly existence)”.
23
In regard to this distinction of the existential versus the non-existential refer to paragraphs x-y. These
presentations/re-presentations occurring as collective systems of differential signs in a transcendental economy
that is multi-modal in its textually deposited translations, etc.
21
degree of loss! Hence even our conventionally appropriate empirical employment of sense
perception, etc., is the subject of this global psychosis even if we don’t go beyond that level
of deployment. (51)
(3.) The relationship of the relative-phenomenal dimension to the absolute-transcendental dimension (and thence to the Absolute dimension) is therefore a mutual
one to that extent both dimensions co-define each other! Without the transcendental there
could be no relative, and v.v. Being like 'the two sides of the same coin' how could this mutuality of interdependence be enlarged upon or diminished, i.e., how could there be an augmentation in or a loss of our transcendental powers? (52)
In answering this question we effectively come to an understanding how there can be
an existential transformation and rectification of deception through a recovery of our transcendental powers of discrimination. In this hope let us proceed! (53)
(4.) The relative and absolute dimensions24 are there to the same extent because the
transcendental preconditions for the former are expressed in the latter which, being mutually
co-dependent, are, in turn, the transcendental preconditions for the latter. On the other hand
our powers of transcendental discrimination represent, and mirror, the degree to which we
have been able to integrate our psyche through the an increase in the gestalt integration of the
epistemological hierarchy. With increasing integration comes an increasing sense of
self-integrity which is reflected in a sense of positive body-tone (the extent to which we feel a
'whole person' in relative terms of reference and which can be evaluated by the person by
their giving an approximate percentage as to how they are feeling at that moment, in reflection, and before and after in retrospection in consultation or in consultation with others,
etc.25). (54)
How is this the case - that increasing gestalt integration is reflected in an increase in
our transcendental powers of discrimination and through the increased powers of their appreciation a consequent and subsequent rectification of deceptive distortion naturally follows?
Because a deeper appreciation of the intentional life allows us to see 'deception as deception'
and 'the rectification of distortion as the rectification of distortion.' Furthermore, in theory and
in practice, our ability to determine the truth of our propositional attitudes, to that extent this
avenue is available to us, is a direct reflection of our deeper appreciation of ‘our’ intentional
life as ‘lived together’; not only of ourselves but also of others by virtue of the fact that we
share the same lived life-world! Our own intentional life is not a closed book to us nor to
others, and, the intentional life of others is not a closed book to them nor to us! The intentional life of the person leaves a continual poly-textualized trail of intentional deposition in
the form, e.g., of memory traces, traces upon the fabric of the visible world, verbal communications, written communications, emotional indicators, signs of intentional discrimination,
etc., etc.26 Our access and ability to read that 'woven trail of trails', our ability to determine a
re-simulated re-constitution of sense (of psychic location in the life-world), our ability to the
24
Here we are talking about both the relative and absolute dimensions in general terms of reference
which means we are correctly discussing the Relative dimension and the Absolute dimension.
25
From experience I have observed that patients recovering from a recent psychotic episode often express
an increasingly positive sense of 'body-tone' as long as an affective component does not complicate this intuitive
calculation (since with a depressed affect there is a more pronounced loss whereas in hypomania there is exaggeration of this positive factor). Often for the psychotic person the return of an absent sense of humour is also a
good indicator of a return of this positive sense of body-tone, this more healthy sense of a self-apperceived sense
of integrity. There is also often a marked improvement of a balanced affective component to this sense of tone.
26
Refer to footnote no. 17.
22
hermeneutic ascertain the coherence of textual trails internally and intertextually, and, our
ability to intuitively determine non-textual textual authenticity helping us to realize this appreciation of our intentional life as it is shared in this one world-of-life. Through a simultaneous transcendental balancing of transcendent height and immanent depth, through an integrated joint balancing of analytical mental acuity and (synthetical-)physiological-relaxation,
through an artful dialectical balancing of prejudices and suspensions we arrive at this promised land which is none other than our ability to appreciate the phenomenal world as it is, as it
presents itself which, in all truth, is little more than our natural ability to determine truth as it
evidently appears to ‘reveal’ itself in the natural course of our daily lives. (55)
As noted before, in ideal theoretical terms of reference the rectification of deceptive
distortion needs to turn around only a few propositions at the most in each deceptive context.
Adequate and appropriate evidence is one way to do this. Another methodological aspect
would be to endeepen our suspensions and our reflective receptivity to their productive and
discriminative transcendental productivity. Then a further technique would lie in a deeper and
more systematic hermeneutic treatment of what is already to hand. Or, a cultivation of our
intuitive ability to appreciate the existential authenticity of being in conjunction with other
additional methods that would complement that type of practice…. (56)
Hence a discussion of deception from 'perspective' of the relative and absolute dimensions, the mutual cooperative interrelationship between the same and those practices that assist in the existential recognition, rectification and transformation of deceptive distortion. (57)
Now let me consider how an amelioration of our global psychosis might be of assistance to us in this endeavour for an existential recognition, rectification and transformation of
deceptive distortion. (58)
12.
How Should a Global Psychosis Be Treated If At All?!
A psychosis by definition is a relatively fundamental distortion of (what should be) a
common vision of 'reality'. In a global psychosis there is a relatively deeper fundamental distortion of reality as it is there for us to find and define, have ourselves found by and, therein,
re-defined, or, in effect, ‘spiritually’ refined (through an ‘atunement/atone-ment/at-onement’
with the way things are! In an endeepening of those methods that lessen this sense of a global
psychosis there should be a lessening of all other forms of psychotic and non-psychotic distortion(?). Let me look more closely into this equation.27 (59)
All acts of judgment necessitate transcendental suspensions. A non-distorted ‘act of
judgment’ necessitates the appropriate utilization of the transcendental mechanics operative
in the dynamics of judgmental activity. As intimated earlier this is a dialectical balancing act
between the exercise of our prejudices, as pre-judgments, and the full suspension of all sus27
In the performance of an overall transcendental suspension we do see things to some extent as they are,
namely, mere phenomena. I am reasoning here that, that being so, in the performance of an overall transcendental suspension, etc., we should see the rectification of all forms of mis-interpretation, both globalized and
non-globalized, deceptive and non-deceptive in nature, through the de-reification, de-projection and dissipation
of egotistically oriented processes of attachment/rejection.
23
pensions that establish the hermeneutic circle and its ability to function in both an active discriminative mode and a passive interpretative mode, i.e., to intentionally deal with both
judgments once delivered in acts of judgment being made and those specific acts of judgment
themselves (as ongoing transcendental processes of discrimination). 28 In other words,
properly exercised transcendental suspensions establish a non-distorted transcendental
productivity; in effect, a non global psychotic sphere of influence and extension. Unfortunately, prejudices not properly suspended distort this productivity commencing with the
re-imposition of a global psychosis, etc. 29 It stands to reason, therefore, that with the
re-imposition of a properly executed transcendental program all forms of psychosis are rendered non-psychotic over the duration of time that that program is able to be successfully implemented appropriately! What ramifications, implications and complications must qualify
this transcendental program from theoretical and practical points of view? (60)
If it is correct that from an appropriately conducted transcendental program all psychosis is neutralized in the execution of that state of affair through properly conducted transcendental suspensions, etc., why is it that no profound insight is necessarily demonstrated
and maintained in that critically conducted process of judgment, how is it that inauthentic
prejudices are not eliminated, and, all forms of psychosis and deception can be found to continue as if nothing has happened? (61)
For a start the natural attitude asserts itself on 'leaving' the overall transcendental suspension (implying that a globalized psychosis can only be dealt with through an ongoing
overall transcendental suspension. Second, the current causes of any non-globalized psychosis will continue to contaminate the implementation of all forms of suspension (unless,
somehow, a transcendental program can rectify this additional form of process-distortion).
Third, despite the presence of any form of psychosis, judgment is still realized with some degree of authenticity implying that to some extent transcendental suspensions must be in play;
giving us hope that such a program is realistic and demands only therapeutic forms of supplementation and complementation? The fact that even the majority of the propositional attitudes that constitute a delusional system are an accurate reflection of that cultural reality as
socially perceived reinforces this hopeful speculation that de-distortion of deceptive interpretations is a relatively superficial procedure if we exempt the overwhelming inputs from the
natural attitude. So in this regard we must remain hopeful even though the ramifications of
mis-interpretations greatly exceed the mere weight or quanta of mis-interpreted throughput.
Moreover, even though we cannot argue with a psychosis (a psychotic person who will irrationally dispute your arguments through a literalization of the metaphor, etc.) the fact that
suspensions are being conducted and the greater mass of their world view is in cultural accord with 'their socially perceived reality' must give us some hope in this regard? But can the
natural attitude ever be transcendentalized in an existentially authentic manner? (62)
In my reply to this last question I need to introduce the correlative concepts of an existential authenticity versus a non-existential inauthenticity. Let me elabourate. First we must
question what authenticity is? As an initial definition we could say that it is 'the spirit of appropriateness' being demonstrated 'in tune' with 'the spirit of the relationship' involved in that
currently 'approached and entered' relational situation or set of closely related relational situa28
Which could be analogued by proposing a horizontal hermeneutic circle and a vertical hermeneutic
circle respectively (along with a third axis, like the z-axis in geometry, dealing with accompanying senses of
self. Refer to Finding a Place for the Idea of God – Part VIII [not yet written but briefly outlined in a Finding a
Place for the Idea of God – A Brief Overview of Parts IV-VII And an Introduction to Part VIII).
29
The three types of deceptive distortion noted in paragraph 50.
24
tions. E.g. if a father is relating to his son he does so as a father even though in this instance
he could also be the son of his father who may or may not be still alive, a husband, a citizen,
a friend of (x), a person being befriended by (y), the teacher of (z), a pupil of (w), etc., etc.
The point being made here is that the dominant relationship or relationships that currently
appear to offer the greatest value for that individual, all other potentially pressing relationships being taken into account, should take an appropriate precedence on how we are to currently react and behave in this world-of-life (from the point of view of that relationship currently embracing us). So, we must appropriately select, or, find selected for us, what relationships we potentially have with the life-world that we should now be about to actively
'enter'. 'Enter' is meant in a metaphorical sense and in its use here does seem to be an apt
metaphor(?). So how, phenomenologically, is a relationship faced, approached and entered?
A relationship is greater than the sum of its parts and this existential excess is encountered on
the re-simulation of that relationship. On determining the particular textual sense of a relationship (and essential texts of its dominant parties and which help constitute the essential
nature of that relationsnhip), its particular meaning derived from its meta-textual genre invocations, and, its particular meaningfulness existentially realized through its textual-metatextual interactions we have, in effect, a simulation of the hermeneutic circle as it applies in this particular relational situation and as it is interpreted by that person entering into
this simulated interaction. Because this relational excess is greater than the mere summation
of its inputs, in simulating the relationship we are, in effect, entering into its relational excess
to that extent that we are entertaining an appropriate simulation/re-simulation of that relationship. Now, we need to address the next issue before us, namely, "how can we be 'in tune'
with 'the spirit' of that relationship we have metaphorically entered through experiencing the
simulation/re-simulation of its relational being through the being of that relational excess?
In simulating the experience of that relationship through re-simulation we are essentially
re-experiencing that same relationship through a re-simulation of that experience. In the
course of that re-simulated experience we experience the continuity of that relationship by
re-experiencing a relative transformational invariance running through that process of
re-simulation. Hence when our re-simulated understanding of a relationship is in tune with its
essential constitution we can then say we are essentially experiencing its relatively invariant
nature as 'spirit' by virtue of that excess and stability of significance re-created through its
re-simulation. Lastly, how is the appropriateness of our relationship realized when entering
into the spirit of that relationship under current examination? In approaching and meeting the
relationship on its own terms we are essentially rewarded by increasingly encountering that
existential surplus experienced in the being of that relationship which therein fine tunes
for-us this rewarded sense of a closer re-alignment (guaranteed by virtue of the transcendental unity of the life-world as a lived-dimension-of-being ‘there-before-for-us’). Lastly, we
must ask how a relationship could be encountered if all object-states, all fields of experience
and all egological entities as polar fictions cannot be approached and encountered being only
unobtainable reifications and projections of transcendental illusions deceptively created under
the all pervasive influence of the natural attitude mistakenly perpetrated in a global psychosis
and overlaid by prejudices and misinterpretations of a psychotic and/or non-psychotic nature?
Quite simply these 'simulations of reality' are met through the 'reality of simulations' through simulations as simulations, through re-simulations as re-simulations. Processes of
re-iteration taking a variety of forms as noted and discussed in previous papers.30 (63)
So having unpacked this complex metaphor of 'spirit of appropriateness', 'in tune'
with 'the spirit of the relationship', currently 'approached and entered', etc., let me now sketch
30
E.g., retention, protention, re-simulation; the simulation of appearances; mere phenomena; processes of
mere, sheer and bare repetition, etc., etc.
25
out how we are to define authenticity in this complex metaphorical frame of reference. For a
start authenticity is an experience experienced through 'the simulation of the relationship'
through 'the relationship of that simulation'. In this, in effect, the relationship qua relationship
is simulated/re-simulated and experienced as that relationship qua that relationship (in all its
simulated uniqueness). To do this the relationship is experienced in its transcendental ideality
(in its intentional configuration qua intentional constitution) as simulated in intentional consciousness subjected to an overall transcendental suspension as 'located' in this 'one'
life-world through the pre-conditional necessity of the appropriate prejudices/pre-judgments
as argued previously. Transcendental ideality is experienced through the auspices of the
overall transcendental suspension. Transcendental ideality is the essential configuration of
that relationship which, through being in a relationship with-us, allows us to experience some
degree of essential coincidence between itself and ourself/ourselves albeit in the simulated
space of that simulated relationship-with-us. Once an essential understanding is essentially
realized in our phenomenal/phenomenological appreciation of that relationship in the transcendental reflection of judgment we have a direct and true understanding of that relationship
(unless mis-interpretations in the assessment of that understand distort that overall appreciation necessitating, when discovered, the transcendental review, in turn, of those suspect defective propositional attitudes). Now existentialization is the existential transformation of the
relatively non-existential and never the existential transformation of the existential!31 Moreover, once an adequate level of essential understanding is reached all additional input into
such appreciation of that relationship is merely a confirmation of our direct awareness of its
already realized essential nature. Through (re-)alignment we essentially move, through simulational/re-simulational refinement, the psychic centre of our own existential richness of being within that shared relational space, i.e., with the psychically experienced nature of the
other party or parties experiencing therein the uniqueness of that relational 'space' as it automatically embraces this particular relationship. Hence, it must be fair to say that authenticity
is realized when an adequate and appropriate essential understanding is put in place
through the degree of psychic alignment that has been put into play. It is for this reason
that the existential cannot itself be existentialized because being at the psychic centre of
that shared relationship it cannot become more central in this regard! On the other hand, the
relatively non-existential can be centred, i.e., existentialized, in and through that relationship
treated in that manner. Hence authenticity is a measure of how well we know the other,
whether it be object-states, fields, egos, institutions, etc. A complex relationship demanding
the respect of a complex pattern of simulated/re-simulated authentic interactions. Moreover,
there is hope for us, again by virtue of the fact that once an adequate and appropriate essential
understanding has been reached we need not endeavour further other than to merely confirm
the directly ascertained truth delivered in this psychic re-alignment. Hence the ability of
transcendentally conducted research to deliver an apropriate, essential, adequate, direct and
true appreciation of that under investigative transcendental reflection! Now let me examine
how an existentialization of the relatively non-existential is be realized? (64)
Because of the transcendental unity of the life-world all relationships are in relationship with each other by virtue of this transcendental unity (and what does not exist for-us
might as well not exist!32). Since this 'space' is realized between the intentional polarities of
Object, World and Ego it follows that there can be no absolutely independent, self-existent
object-states; no fields nor worlds nor any other frames of reference; no egos nor institutions,
Refer to the theological essay in the series Finding a Place for the Idea of God – Part VI, Section 8,
paragraph 50.
32
Refer to the theological essay in the series Finding a Place for the Idea of God – Part I, paragraph 53,
e.g.
31
26
etc. That no form of phenomenal identity could be constituted in intentional consciousness
other than those simulations/re-simulations of identity thematized in this polarized ‘space’ of
the life-world! By a transcendental process of rectification, through de-reification,
de-distortion, de-projection and dissipation of all forms of attachment and rejection, all transcendental illusions ‘found’ to populate this world-of-life, in theory at least, are then seen for
what they are, namely, mere phenomena! Through the re-imposition of an adequate and appropriate overall transcendental suspension all forms of psychosis and deception are ultimately cut through, defused and re-stored as phenomena qua phenomena; as phenomena-there-for-us in this shared world-of-life. Hence, in effect, through the re-imposition of an
overall transcendental suspension authenticity already present, whether recognized or unrecognized, is returned to us and enlarged and therein self-confirmed through this transcendental
existentialization of the relatively non-existential. That relational being, being experienced in
the ongoing 'spiritual fullness' of the relationship, comes into ‘our’ experience through the
existential excess of value that holistically permeates that relationships, reflecting its degree
of distinctive integrity. This degree of relational integrity being experienced as 'the authenticity of its own passage through this world-of-life', re-investing itself in the re-enriched integrity of its own being whose integrity is ‘shared’ with the transcendental illusion of our own
being! Our being in this world being uplifted through the natural beauty of the world, the
beauty of a great work of art, the harmony brought to bear through our being there for others
and finding others there for us…! (65)
Hence, I must conclude that, through the existential enrichment of our relationships,
through an existentiallization of our interactions enacted through auto-critical processes of
transcendental suspensions, etc., all forms of deception whether globalized or non-globalized
should meet with some appropriate degree of rectification through the ongoing dissipation of
all forms of distortion and mis-representation! That this optimism explains why most of the
life-world is met in a truthfulness of re-presentation, how we find that most of the world is
not problematic for us even for those poor people who suffer individualized forms of psychosis. Hence my belief that, to some extent, even a global psychosis is, in effect, ameliorated in
practice through the fact of this all pervasive ‘aura of truth’, this overwhelming ‘spirit of
truthfulness’ that inhabits all of what we think, do, encounter and reflect upon even in the
midst of error, illusion, deception and delusion that superficially colour our passage through
this world. That, indeed, this ‘ground’ can be built upon through an increasing existentialization of that residual inauthenticity in our relationships through this dance with all senses of
the other met ‘face to face’!! (66)
But one more problem still needs to be effectively addressed - how is it possible to
encounter that which, correctly, is absolutely unobtainable and therefore could not be encountered (regardless of whether our approach was deceptively or non-deceptively motivated)?! (67)
13.
How Do We Encounter that which Cannot Be Encountered?
To begin to resolve this problem let me look into how we meet our own sense of an
overall sense of self because as all senses of self are polar fictions we must wonder how any
sense of self could be met let alone the semblance of an overall sense of self? And in dealing
successfully with this aspect of our problem we should be in a better position to confront the
semblance of an other, namely, how is it possible to encounter other intentional object-states,
other frames of reference, other egological entities, etc., let alone the epistemologi-
27
cal-ontological fact that both the other and the non-other (in all their diverse possibilities)
(e.g., our own senses of self and an overall sense of self) have no absolute epistemological-ontological existence? (68)
Imagine we have a tooth ache. We experience pain. How do we know we are experiencing pain? We are experiencing pain full stop! We tell the dentist we have a toothache and
point to a possible tooth that we think might be the miscreant. Something as fundamental an
experience as pain involves the whole psyche of the person, the entire epistemological hierarchy. Pain qua pain is experienced. It upsets, has us feeling out of sorts, we recognize its origins as dental, we are motivated to see a dentist,. we tell the dentist we have a toothache and
point out which tooth we think it is… and this fact more than likely will be confirmed for us.
Physiologically, emotionally, affectively, perceptually, conceptually, judgmentally, motivationally, factually… many aspects of the psyche passively and actively have had to deal with
this experience of pain, an 'experience' that has involved many different senses of self. Obviously these senses of self can cooperate when they need to! (69)
We have this philosophical problem - how can the pain that is being experienced be
thought about since 'the pain being experienced' is, by category, not identical with 'the pain
being thought about'? To 'think something' and 'to think about that thing' are obviously not
the same thing! Just as a title may be part of the text (being put there by the author) it is also
the case that as the title is 'about' that book and is not the 'book itself', etc., it hence misrepresent that text.33 In previous research on this type of problem I have proposed a transformational treatment/re-treatment type of solution, namely, that through a process of transformation (a part of) that process's essential symmetry remains invariant under those transformations (between, e.g., 'experience qua experience' and that 'experience under some form of
reflection', etc.). How is this achieved? In an account that is much simplified I would argue
that the relationship on one meta-level is reflected on some other in such a way that those relational components and factors that are invariant, i.e, isomorphic, maintain this virtual stability of relational identity despite differences in frames of reference; meta-status; introduction, alteration, and/or subtraction of non-essential components; re-treatment of that transformation's production back on to the same meta-level where that process of transformational
treatment was initiated, etc. (70)
Stability of transformational identity is maintained, therefore, through the preservation of symmetries across those transformational states where this invariance of relational
identity is maintained. But, surely, the consequences of this preservation of symmetry is an
illusion? As all sense, meaning and meaningfulness are intentionally constituted in a polarized ‘space’ between the archetypal poles of Object, World and Ego it surely implies that in
intentional consciousness we can meet with no absolute object-states, no frames of reference,
and no egotistical entities, etc! What is met with is only an illusion, a simulation which
through retention is a re-presentation and not a representation of the apparent ‘reality-realized-to-hand’!34 Hence the semblance of reality is re-presented and not represented! Hence, through a global psychosis, phenomenal simulations/re-simulations are misrepresentations when reified, distorted, projected and prejudicially desired and/or rejected! (71)
33
But we could also say that when we understand how a title mis-represents that text that, for us, it no
longer mis-represents that text in that same manner.
34
Therefore the simulated is never a simulation of a ‘pre-simulated reality’, only the simulation of a simulation! Thence its status as the 'simulated' is, correctly, that of the 're-simulated' and not of the so-called
'pre-simulated'!
28
Thence, as a set of isomorphic simulations re-simulated we meet with our own
various senses of self and an overall sense of self, and, as sets of isomorphic simulations
re-simulated we meet with all senses of an other open to such an encounter…. (72)
As all intentional object-states, frames of reference, egotistical entities, etc., have no
absolute existence in intentional consciousness obviously we should ask "how is it possible to
actually encounter that which does not exist… cannot be absolutely encountered! However,
what can be encountered can be encountered, and, what that is are those fictitional polarizations produced and re-produced in the intentional 'space' simulated, and re-simulated, between our three archetypal poles of Object, World and Ego. Moreover, we, ourselves, encounter these simulations/re-simulations as simulations/re-simulations being ourselves only
simulations/re-simulations - through simulations/re-simulations of various senses of self and
an overall sense of self! So, in the light of this explanation we need to ask ourselves these two
questions. First, in this simulated vision of reality just what might be real and what might not
be real if everything in truth is only simulated? Second, what meaning can this type of proposition possess if we were to state "everything is a simulation of a simulation, i.e., merely a
re-simulation" when significance of a proposition demands an informative contrast implying
that everything cannot be just a simulation of a simulation, merely a process of re-simulation?
(73)
This first awesome problem is quickly tamed by the transcendental phenomenologist
through a recognition that all experience is intentionally constituted and that the nature
of that constitution is multi-modal in complexion (which, as a ‘fact’, is guaranteed by its
formative passage through the multi-modal complexities of the epistemological hierarchy in
its structuralization of the psyche). The phenomenal experience of ‘reality’ is an experience
whose existential ‘weight’ is a reflection of the number of appropriate modes normally engaged in the invocation of that type of phenomenon. In an apparent instance of that type of
phenomenon the corresponding modalities associated with that type of phenomenon need to
be actively entered and engaged. This critical density and intensity of modes actively engaged
helping to establish the ‘apparent reality’ of that to hand (through this active invocation of the
‘quantity and quality’ of modalities necessary for the true establishment of that type of phenomenon). So, e.g., a dream apple might appear real in a dream it does not truly satisfy bodily
hunger, etc., and this experiential mode is, therefore, (eventually) experienced as absent or
deficient in our overall experience of that particular ‘apple phenomenon’. In such a climate
we can no longer say that that ‘apple’ is truly an apple as meant in the full multi-modal expression of that phenomenon. The experience of ‘reality’ in general, therefore, is this recognition/re-cognition that the phenomenal reality of our experience of all intentional object-states, frames of reference, egotistical entities, etc., is determined through the appropriate
‘mix and might’ of modalities being adequately exercised and satisfied in a similar manner to
that normally found to constitute that type of experience. In essence – nothing more and
nothing less! No unobserved occult entities need apply!35 Of course a variety of other factors
and influences might help (correctly or incorrectly, validly or invalidly) to disestablish the
apparent ‘reality’ of that experience, e.g., disease, mental illness, absent sense modalities, invalid logical methods dealing with supposition and presupposition, contradictory beliefs,
misinterpretations, inadequate consequential analysis, faulty memories, etc., etc. But those
factors when relatively negative in character do not contribute to the presentaSuch as a ‘vision’ of the thing-in-itself, transcendent realites, the so-called ‘external world’, the mind
of god, etc., etc. I.e, all such unnecessary philosophical entities that cannot be empirically and non-speculatively
experienced, etc.
35
29
tion/re-presentation of a phenomenal simulation, only its dis-establishment. In a relatively
positive frame of reference they merely clarify the fact and its confirmation of what actively
is modally present and what is modally absent, what has been retained and what is anticipated
or should be expected. (74)
The second problem is also very successfully dealt with by the transcendental phenomenologist when they examine the nature of the ‘intentional’ qua the ‘nature’ of the intentional by asking what significance this expression has internally and externally. Internally, I
have noted in this paper that intentionality is generated between those poles of the Object,
World and Ego which correlatively define themselves in terms that are not 'intentional'.
Moreover, this tripolar disposition is further examined or described through various tri-modal
sets of expressions such as sense, meaning and meaningfulness; reduction, reconstitution and
suspension; textual, meta-textual and non-textual, respectively, etc. Externally, the intentional
is noted as 'simulated/re-simulated' but not as a 'simulation of that which is not simulated prior to this act of simulation', etc. Moreover, the expression 'non-intentional' has a number of
contrasting meanings, such, e.g., as 'intent' when viewed as motivation without recourse to an
intentional object-state; those philosophies that invoke naive metaphor to describe the world
and end up literalizing their metaphorical vision of that world as occurs in empiricism, realism, rationalism, idealism, objectivism, etc. This expression is also co-defined in a matrix of
terms like pre-intentional, post-intentional, trans-intentional, (extra-intentional when referring to the so-called 'external world' as an impossible philosophical entity, e.g.), etc., that
supply a complex informative contrast to this expression of the 'intentional'. So, externally,
this expression does not reduced the entire world of significance to a 'mere intentional' playing field although treating 'phenomena' as 'mere phenomena' does give us transcendental access to the constitutional domain of the intentional through the implicit transcendental suspension, etc., embedded within this type of expression (that correctly utilizes this expression
'mere' when this practical technique is carefully inserted into this critical phenomenological
frame of reference). The non-intentional point of view is also referred to through the use of
the expressions not-textual/not-textual when we have a direct recourse to the reality of
life-world through the de-construction of the intentional 'space' between intender and intentional object and object as intended, etc., through the unity and one-worldness of the
life-world.36 37 38(75)
As transcendental fictions entities like 'self', etc., can only be treated as fictions that
may be fruitful in one context and fruitless or poisonous in some other. From the general
everyday point of view intentional objects and states can be lent a provisional existence even
though, correctly, in their empirical employment they still constitute and perpetrate a global
psychosis as previously argued. As the distortion of 'reality' has its roots in the global psychosis it follows, I believe, that deception of deceiving and being deceived would be considerably ameliorated in the neutralization and diminution of the same. Why do I have this
hope? For a start despite the all-pervading influence of the natural attitude the world is correctly viewed, in the main, from an empirical point of view. Hence the ‘empirical’ nature of
this point of view, this point of view that does seem to successfully simulate the everyday
36
By intentional 'object' is meant intentional 'object-state'. Not all intentional objects can be described as
'objects', e.g., a piece of music is not so much an object as a state of affairs which can be treated as an intentional object when, e.g., we listen to this piece of music as a 'piece' of music.
37
Refer to paragraphs 63, 65 in the second part of this fifth essay.
38
The non-textual moment establishing the sense of a spontaneous present/presence within the hermeneutic circle which itself is deconstructed through the suspension of the same in the sense of the not-textual – i.e.,
our direct experience of this ‘one’ world-of-life through the intentional object-state being experienced as the
intentional object-state-as-intended; albeit simulated, and therein seen, from our own point of view.
30
world. Only on the metaphorical edges of our universe, it would seem, does ‘our world’ become problematic for us factually, ethically, religiously, scientifically, etc. Through the imposition of transcendental suspensions, etc., in the exercise of our judgments, the discrimination of the life-world is validly ascertained within the general limits of our cultural understanding. Although channelled by our empirical attitudes, and despite the limitations of our
cultural and scientific models of reality, these transcendental suspensions, etc., appear to keep
us in contact with the reality of what there is to hand in this world-of-life! Hence, in this light,
we should review our critical passage through this world more as the de-distortion of the distortions of mis-re-presentations rather than as the de-distortion of the distortions of misrepresentations, in effect coming to an understanding of how we deal, must deal with deception in
the life-world experienced through those processes of deceiving and being deceived, and, insightfully realized through processes of rectification and validation. Thus, in this critical
endeavour, dealing with deception in its three forms or levels of being we have, in effect,
through default, formulated an egological philosophy! Let me make some general observations on this topic “how the self is phenomenally constituted” in outlining some of the
themes that establish a relatively more speculative side to this type of enterprise before going
on to finally conclude this essay. (76)
14. Facing/De-facing Speculation in a Critical Egological Philosophy?
How does the critical transcendental phenomenologist, from a critical transcendental-phenomenological perspective, deal with egological speculation? Can they confront egological speculation and find themselves actually facing such concepts as ‘self’, ‘mind’, ‘soul’,
‘spirit’, ‘divinity’, etc? Or, does the critical transcendental philosopher merely end up
scratching out/defacing such expressions by discovering and declaring them to be expressions
lacking, or completely devoid of, phenomenological sense, hermeneutical meaning and/or
(experientially-oriented) existential meaningfulness? (77)
That in the course of their work the metaphysician knows they can invoke Ockham’s
razor and go for a relatively more simple economy should they be presented with sensible
alternatives whose only difference is a matter of theoretical complexity. On the other hand,
the phenomenologist has to take a more balanced approach. Phenomenologically the experience of existence, when thoroughly investigated, is found to be is incredibly complex, modally many-layered and multi-aspected, and, existentially rich (to a degree beyond our imagination). Moreover, they must carefully walk a balance between ‘prejudice’, on one hand,
and, on the other, a suspension of the same with out positing or denying the fruits of their labours until that final moment their work is presented in a form that is adequate to the intent of
their investigations; albeit forever provisional even if such research is (mis-)treated as definitive in form and format! The critical philosopher, therefore, needs to adopt this more balanced methodological approach or rule, namely, taking the prejudice of the pre-judgments to
hand and through a thorough process of suspension, (reduction and reconstitution,) etc., find
the right balance necessary to conduct their research into that particular topic. In this respect
the critical phenomenologist at no point in the midst of their transcendental research can either affirm or deny either the existence or the possible speculative ramifications of their topic.
Whatever meaning there is should be examined critically despite the nature of one’s own
epistemological-ontological commitments! They are there only to examine the possible
meaning that is to hand in such speculative items, and, subject the same to a critical process
of phenomenological analysis which demands this openness to an appreciation of the phenomenon itself (to the extent that it maintains it own distinctive sense of identity, albeit as a
31
simulated re-simulation). If the linguistic expression of such a term appears to have sense,
etc., then it falls within the province of a transcendental phenomenological investigation in
order to recover that appearance of sense, etc. So in what way, they must ask, do linguistic
expressions like ‘self’, ‘mind’, ‘soul’, etc., appear to function in a manner that actually seems
to generate some degree of significance?39 They must first re-produce what significance is
discovered to hand. Then they must ascertain just what that significance is and how it is generated. Penultimately, they must closely attend to those factors that seem to help establish the
linguistic sense, etc., of that item in the here and now which is already the phenomenal province of the multi-skilled transcendental philosopher. Lastly, questions of value are dealt with,
i.e., logical questions, factual questions, ethical questions, hermeneutical questions, etc. 40
This web of interconnections helping to establish the ‘final’ overall sense, meaning and
meaningfulness of that expression under examination. Being an investigation into locative
sense, essential meaning and experiential meaningfulness subject to a thematically systematic, overall, process of transcendental suspension in the hope that the canvas of our exploration
has a value greater than that psychic energy invested in the theoretical-practical thematization
and realization of that topic! However, all processes of language do indeed mirror the nature
of ‘the world’, in some manner or other to some extent, from their relative point of view
hence the potentially productive fruitfulness of this type of research. Then, we also have the
concept that the potential can never be treated in a mode of pure potentiality neither epistemologically (because we cannot think it) nor ontologically (because it could not exist for us
as we could not re-cognize it) nor epistemologically-ontologically (for the reasons as already
briefly alluded to).41 How then should we confront egological concepts of a relatively speculative nature? (78)
To answer that last question I would like to propose some general rules from the following list to that extent that they, tentatively, can be made to apply:
1. Attempt to determine the concept’s primary motivation for being proposed by
seeking to ascertain what philosophical problem is being resolved?
2. Attempt to determine the concept’s secondary reasons for being proposed, by
seeking to ascertain what other philosophical problems are implicated?
3. Attempt to re-write those mechanisms from the point of view of the here and now
(hic et nunc)?
4. Attempt to determine whether there are possible methods for the experiential determination of those re-written mechanisms in (an existential sense of) the living
present?
5. Evaluate the values and degrees of possible success attained/might be possible to
attain (in the current ‘directions’ being travelled)? (79)
If we were to examine the expressions ‘soul’ and ‘spirit’ and comparatively attempt to
relate them to each other and an everyday understanding of ‘self’ how might we go about this
type of research in the light of these five rules or guidelines just noted? How do we ‘save’
39
In the same manner the theological series of essays Finding a Place for the Idea of God is essentially
structured on an examination of how the concept of God (along with allied concepts of the numinous, the divine,
the Divine, divinity, etc.) can be found to have sense, meaning and meaningfulness, and, where possible, how
this clarification can be rectified, reconstructed, theoretically systematized, have its limitations of deployment
spelt out, find those practical means that allow it to acquire a greater degree of existential significance, etc., etc.
40
Elsewhere I have examined six types of value, namely, logical (as pre-essentially essential), aesthetical
(as essentially essential), ethical, pragmatical, hermeneutical and factual. Refer to the two Open Letters on the
nature of truth (on my homepagesite in New Papers in Philosophy, Page 2)
41
Refer to the theological series of essays Finding a Place for the Idea of God – Part IV, paragraph 23,
etc.
32
these terms from merely a speculative domain and attempt to re-introduce them back into an
arena of experiential appreciation and potential phenomenological reflection (on the grounds
that all expressions have an original basis in an experiential arena?42)? For an expression to
have significance it must possess sense, meaning and meaningfulness, i.e., be located in the
psychic world of phenomenal experience, be subject to hermeneutic interpretation in accordance with meta-textual expectations and genre conventions, and, have a distinctive sense of
non-textual presence that allows us to meaningfully refer to it directly despite its overlaid
‘misrepresentative’ linguistic sense of ‘definition’43 (as an expression with a distinctive sense
of phenomenal being in some form or other44).45 (80)
Whole books are being written about ‘self’, ‘soul’ and ‘spirit’, etc., and it would be
churlish to sweep then all under the carpets as merely the transcendental mistakes that they
correctly are!46 We may only be a series of over lapping masks, the mere illusion of a very
complex personae, still in the life-world the phenomenon of ‘being a person’ cannot be dismissed from a relative point of view whether empirically oriented or non-empirically oriented
in the deployment of their ideological utilization.47 (81)
42
Of course, e.g., pegasus, the mythical winged horse in Greek mythology, cannot currently and historically be found in human experience, but, ‘being a horse’ and ‘having wings’ are things found in the phenomenal
reality of the everyday world. Essentially all concepts, even a concept like God, can be found ‘rooted in the
world’. By intellectual processes of fragmentation and/or combination/re-combination, extrapolation and/or
metaphorical extension, etc., our concepts are then allowed to wander away from their phenomenal/phenomenological ‘rooted in this world-of-life’. So, to make sense/re-make sense of the significance of a
concept this process needs to be retraced in conjunction with a contextualization of the use of that ‘concept’ in
order to re-discover its implicit meta-textual rules of operation, i.e., its genre conventions. Putting these two
cooperating lines of research together then, hopefully, allows us to experience the non-textual sense(s) of this
expression, and, therein to recover, a taste of the overall not-textual significance, range of significance,
evoked/re-evoked through the appropriate re-invocation of this expression.
43
The word ‘definition’ is being used in the senses of being ‘a linguistic definition’ and ‘having a sense
of definition’, i.e., phenomenal distinctness (the essential hallmark of being a phenomenon to that extent that it
can appear ‘essentially’ distinctive. But, as already noted, never absolutely - as the essence of essence is essentially no-essence, is not and essence (from the meta-essential/phenomenal point of view).
44
In wandering about the phenomenal centre of an expression’s ‘phenomenon of having significance’, to
that degree that it has or appears to have had significance, we essentially mis-represent that significance until
such a time that that mis-representation is understood, appreciated, as being a mis-representation (just as, in the
same way, titles essentially mis-represent their texts, etc.).
45
What I am attempting to do here, or rather merely sketch out, is a similar program being put into effect
in my series of theological essays Finding a Place for the Idea of God where the expression God is understood
as a concept whose phenomenon of significance is being examined to order to determine in what way or ways, if
at all, this concept can be found to have significance, i.e., sense, meaning and meaningfulness, i.e., the possibility of have ‘a place’ in this world-of-life. It is my belief that such a philosophical program is both viable and
fruitful, and, when correctly conducted in a critical transcendental format presents us with a powerful style of
critical research to assist us in ‘neutrally‘ dealing with these speculative, controversial, ideologically beholden
types of concepts. Letting us, in effect, to take a middle path between their uncritical assertion and their skeptical denial and, thereby, take a path that essentially attempts to retrace the significance of the significance that
that expression had/has as ‘lived in its world(s) of deployment’ (through the existential surplus of value released
through the joint cooperation of its sense, meaning and meaningfulness in those world(s) of its deployment and
possible re-deployment).
46
E.g., I am about to read The Soul’s Code: In Search of Character and Calling; James Hillman, Random
House, New York, 1996.
47
As there is no absolute ontological-epistemological pursuit or preference of the whole over its parts
(except in the production of an existential surplus re-invested in the body of that relationship) it follows, therefore, that the self is built upwards as well as downwards, i.e., immanently and transcendently without a preference for one over the other!?
33
In the highly charged atmospheres of the religious and/or political spheres where
many of these ideological expressions have their deployment (which, correctly, extend well
outside and beyond the religious and political domains) how is the critical transcendental
philosopher to venture neutrally into their midst when most of the proponents of such linguistic expressions so obviously fail to demonstrate even a modicum of the necessary degree of
transcendental detachment needed in the course of their own related endeavours? (82)
The resolution of this dilemma, e.g., should a certain ideological discipline be promulgated or merely transcendentally reflected from by its proponents, has already been dealt
with, by default, in my earlier argument that the critical transcendental philosopher
pre-conditionally needs to operate from a position of ‘prejudice’ but, that, in the course of
their critical research, those investigations need to be exercised through appropriate ongoing
transcendental suspensions, reductions and reconstitutions, etc. as critically, and naturally,
establish the course of the hermeneutic circle in its productive re-production of sense, meaning and meaningfulness (through re-simulation).48 All this is quite simple! Until we try to put
into words how we actually seem to go about this business of making critically purified forms
of judgment! But, then, that is the case with all skilfully conducted operations performed in
this world-of-life. Could we discuss how we walk along the street, ride a bicycle, play the
piano, the organ or harpsichord… Even then the same piece of music played on those last
three instruments would be played differently and need to be dealt with in a different commentary… the sort of text perhaps only a novelist or phenomenologist might be able to start
to emulate… and then we must ask, in this self-reflected narrative where does the realm of
the factual end and the world of fiction begin? Might not the phenomenologist being doing
little more than the novelist. As previously noted, it is only the addition, or subtraction, of a
few propositions to shift an honest rendition of this world-of-life to a vision of the world
meant to deceive!? And in our obsession to minutely analyse the world with the necessary
blinkers on to what degree is this only a project of self-deception? (83)
As previously argued for I have noted that what ever is said about the world must to
some extent mirror the same. We cannot completely mis-represent the world in our
mis-re-presentation of the same! Even in our global commission of transcendental mistakes
we cannot escape the fact of our being in this world-of-life by being-in-this-world-of-life
through the transcendental powers of re-simulation, and therein re-presentation, unleased
through suspensions, etc! The hermeneutic circle, through a re-simulation of
the-world-there-for-us, acts both as lens and that very same world being simulated therein. It
is as if the simulation of the simulation is no simulation, has no simulated simulation
there-for-us… allows us to directly access the world of simulation as the simulation of the
world, and, that together, they constitute this world that is there-for-us! It is as if the world is
a video recording of a video recording that is never anything other than a video recording
(say an animated world created in the cyber space of computer animation). Of course, when
‘pushed’, all metaphor ultimately break down as they cannot operate through the literalization
of the metaphor, but, in simulating the world they also re-simulate it for us! So, to this extent,
to the extent the metaphor is ‘set up’ to simulate a certain aspect or set of aspects about the
world, they should be allowed to operated through their powers of simulation! (84)
So, how do we go about this re-retrieval of significance assuming an expression had
meaning, has access for-us to that meaning? (85)
48
Refer to Section 9, paragraphs 29-36.
34
Our first guideline (in paragraph 79) states “…determine the concept’s primary motivation for being proposed by seeking to ascertain what philosophical problem is being resolved?” This is a question – what is the primary ‘metaphysical’ problem being dealt with by
that ideological expression? ‘Metaphysical’ by virtue of the fact that that expression will reflect the relevant primary presuppositional preconditions that constitute that ideological frame
of reference in which that term is being meaningfully ‘situated’ or ‘set-up’, and, the relevant
primary suppositional conditions that actually constitute the immediate application of that
ideological frame of reference. In other words, the concentration of our attention on the metaphor present (in their rhetorical contexts) will help us to focus our attention on the very
problematic that those artefacts are set-up to resolve in an ideologically acceptable fashion.
The metaphor are situated on the centre of this disconcerting semblance of tension that that
metaphor, and ultimately that metaphysical frame of reference, and its hierarchy of existential
tensions endeavour to resolve. Because the metaphorical is a conjunctive suspension between
‘the is and is not’ (and the rhetorical is a dis-conjunctive suspension between the either/or)
we find that the centre of the same is directly aligned with the psychic centre of our problem
(and its being searched for problematic). Therefore, by asking “why this metaphor” (and/or
“what is this question” when looking at its rhetorical context) we are given the very tools to
help us start this metaphysical ‘unpacking’ of the primary problematic and its associated
secondary problematics (by also looking more closely at allied metaphor utilized in that/those
rhetorical contexts, etc., in the light of this relatively primary problematic, etc.). (86)
How do terms like ‘self, ‘soul’ and ‘spirit’ function in our world(s)-of-culture in
which we find ourselves born into, embodied therein and/or possibly transplanted to (even if
only through the ‘processes of time’ in this multi-cultural world-of-ours with the accelerated
osmotic-like interaction that cultural worlds now seem to have with each other49)? (87)
In this endeavour I am going to try the following experiment. In the book The Soul’s
Code written by James Hillman50 let me see how he deals with this expression of ‘soul’ in
the first chapter of his book. (88)
After a number of paragraphs criticising various forces in our culture that seem to
have us cast as ‘victims’, and, the author suggests that, despite this, there is at work in the life
of every person some form of fate that seems to have us called to be who we are in a certain
distinctive way, which, in being allowed to come into existence, seems to better define who
we are. “In a nutshell” (in this literal pun) he defines this vocation as entailed in the being of
49
I am going to make three points in regard to this last comment or aside. First, eating in an ethnic restaurant I
suspect is a bit like learning the language of another culture, the first steps at least. Second, the proliferation of
images of the Buddha (a bit like the modern ongoing proliferation of cafés as our culture becomes more public
and multi-cultural?) and I wonder what the semiotic consequences will be in the spread of this image – will the
message remain Buddhist, become Buddhist or something more or less entirely new? Does this image tell us
that we can be a hero, a super-person, or, that we need a realm of the sacred to enter into the post-postmodern
secularism of our contemporary lives? Can this explain why they sit on our tv’s and meditate in our gardens – as
tokens of hope wishing for the irruption of the sacred into our relatively de-sacralized lives with or without spiritual effort on our part? Third, although cultures are heavily borrowing from each other they may well be just as
vigorously trying to re-constitute themselves? In my vision of the Contemporary era the international style (read
the internationalization of the American style) is going to be complemented by the vigorous re-institution of
local cultures from that of the Welsh to the Tibetan, from that of the Basque to the Tatar, etc., etc., along with
the re-appropriation of political power, in part or in whole, that will inevitably ensue (through a
de-centralization of imperial power) in conjunction with an opposite ongoing loss of ‘absolute’ sovereignty of
nations which, hopefully, will work for the overall good of world peace?
50
Refer to foot no. 46.
35
our life in much the same way that an acorn grows into an oak tree, that “the image of the
oak” is somehow entailed in the seed of the acorn.51 (89)
Then he discusses this in the following paragraph:
The soul of each of us is given a unique daimon before we are born, and it has selected an image or
pattern that we are to live on earth. This soul-companion, the daimon, guides us here; in the process of arrival,
however, we forget all that took place and believe we come empty into this world. The daimon remembers what
is in your image and belongs to your pattern, and therefore your daimon is the carrier of your destiny. 52 (90)
Such a concept is, of course, a re-telling of a myth used by Plato and taken up subsequently by Plotinus and the Neoplatonists, as dully noted by Hillman. But, is this story, as an
explanation of an experiential observation that people do seem to be called to various vocations in life to varying degrees, to be taken literally or metaphorically or a combination of
both? Hillman has preceded the above quote by the following qualification:
…that there is a reason I am alive.
Not the reason to live; not the meaning of life in general or a philosophy of religious faith-this book
does not pretend to provide such answers. But it does speak to the feelings that there is a reason my unique person is here and that there are things I must attend to beyond the daily round and that give the daily round its
reason, feelings that the world somehow wants me to be here, that I am answerable to an innate image, which I
am filling out in my biography.
That image is the subject of this book…53
(91)
But “image” could have two meanings here – figurative and literal? Like a
‘black-box’ – we cannot see into it but it does what that sort of ‘black-box’ is meant to do. As
he says the “image of the oak” is entailed in the acorn and that is meant metaphorically, but
also, in the goodness of time, literally to the extent that the acorn is allowed to become an
oak. In effect the daimon is like a black-box in this regard – he will not define what it is but
will allude to it through its effects it has upon us by means of various metaphorical ‘images’,
etc. He concludes this first chapter titled In a Nutshell on page 40 by saying:
We will be elaborating the acorn theory and discovering other effects of the daimon in other chapters of
this book. (92)
So the essential metaphor of his book is the (black-box of the) diamon and its primary
metaphor is the ‘image’ in the acorn as expounded in its rhetorical context of the acorn theory, i.e., that an acorn is destined to become an oak tree (from the moment it was produced)
and not otherwise! That granted, we are now in a position to understand the intentional motivation behind his use of this expression soul? (93)
It would seem that the psychological ‘self’54 as a ‘person’ in this world has a destiny
that is essentially pre-set. It is up to us to put that destiny into effect and through being in
harmony with our destiny we will be in harmony with the world (and therein through such
The Soul’s Code, p. 7.
Ibid., p. 8.
53
Ibid., p. 4.
54
An expression Hillman tells us he loathes: “ I have also tried to prevent the most pernicious term of all,
“self, ”from creeping into my paragraphs. This word has a big mouth.” Essentially he wants a word like soul
along with the connotations brought to it as entailed in the concept of the daimon. Ibid., p. 37.
51
52
36
harmony of being find our true happiness in the being of who we are). Hence this ‘self’ has
soul… is a ‘soul’ taking a middle path here without necessarily disappearing into a religious
frame of reference or a scientific direction (these “contesting dogmas” as Hillman refers to as
“barking at each other through the ages and which Western thought fondly keeps as pets” 55).
(94)
In the light of my first guideline it would appear that the primary motivation for the
word soul is to ensure that the self be seen as something with value that cannot be reduced to
a mere self as a practice that Western psychology seems so often to attempt (according to
Hillman). As he notes:
The core subject of psychology, psyche or soul, doesn’t get into the books supposedly dedicated to its study and
care.56 (95)
Other motivation hinted at in the end of this first chapter, it is promised, will be revealed in the course of reading this book. (96)
My third guideline notes the need for an “attempt to re-write those mechanisms from
the point of view of the here and now (hic et nunc)?” This Hillman has done for us by noting
both a need for re-writing the self, ego, etc., in terms of a soul accompanied by this daimon,
and, seeking the value of this exercise in the here and now of our life in the current course of
its living existence (rather than for the purposes of advancement in some other, etc.). (97)
The next guideline notes the need for an “attempt to determine whether there are possible methods for the experiential determination of those re-written mechanisms in (an existential sense of) the living present?” This Hillman attempts to do for us by supplying examples of various famous people who, very early on as children, knew what they were going to
do in life. Most of the first chapter is devoted to this task with a commentary to guide us in
interpreting these ‘observations’ with various possible objections and other theoretical explanations argued against and, thereby, disposed of. (98)
My last guideline notes the need to “evaluate the values and degrees of possible success attained/might be possible to attain (in the current ‘directions’ being travelled)?” In this
first chapter Hillman has set the stage for the rest of his book. The values he seems to focus
on are the need to recognise that we should divine our destiny and conform to its course (as,
essentially, a deontological expression of the ethical), the need to let beauty enter into the
course of our existence through this harmonization offered though setting out to actively realize the course of our fate57, a need to seek this inner truth of our soul, etc. That Hillman
both evaluates the values needed to be brought to the fore and offers us ways and means for
the mechanisms for determining the success we might feel if we were to adopt this attitude,
etc., towards the soul and its ‘accompanying’ daimon. (99)
Hence, in using this example from Hillman, I believe I have been able to successfully
sketch out how a critical transcendental-phenomenological-egological philosophy might deal
with egological concepts of a relatively speculative nature, in the process ‘returning’ them to
an experiential arena. (100)
55
56
57
Ibid., p. 11.
Ibid., p. 10.
This is discussed by Hillman in a subsection titled Beauty, p. 35-40.
37
I also mentioned that I would like to comparatively explore the use of the world ‘spirit’. In many ways the words ‘soul’ and ‘spirit’ appear to be different terms and that this fact
can be demonstrated by substituting them in contexts used by one or the other. E.g., if we say
“with soul” we might be saying something to the effect that “it is more profound and in some
ways sad too ‘ (as it might be used in the Blues or Gospel music?)? On the other hand if we
were to say “with spirit” we get a different meaning with a different aura of connotations, indeed, “something with life, speed, and is naturally happy”? I don’t wish to proceed further on
this point other than to note that different expression can bring their own unique baggage so
to speak and that we need to be sensitive to these nuances given to the ‘self’ or ‘ego’ in our
transposition of such ‘neutral’ terms into that particular context. (101)
Hence an approach to how we face/de-face egological concepts of a relatively speculative nature and retrieve from them a significance that, if properly conducted, can be ‘returned’ to an experiential arena in the ‘here and now’!? This ever present possibility giving
us an explanation how expression of marked speculative nature appear to possess a significance beyond their mere reduction, and, above and beyond any ‘black-box’ use and effect?
But not in all situations - that much speculation should be seen for what it – a wishful thinking often dissolving into near nonsense with a pernicious effect upon the life of the person in
so far as it stops us from living our own lives and being true to ourselves (or as Hillman
might put – being true to our daimon)! (102)
15.
A Succinct Method for Determining Ideological Perspectives
Before I conclude this essay I would like to tender the following philosophical observation and succinct philosophical technique, namely, that as philosophy often entertains itself
in prolix conversations, that, despite this observation, we can always find to hand a short-cut
through whose proper use we can quickly get to the essential message, or lack of one, of that
philosopher, ideologue, pseudo-philosopher or any one presenting a philosophical-like opinion. Merely ask them “how they would like to define, in as few words as possible, the nature
of the ‘self’ or the ‘ego’ or the ‘person’, etc., in their philosophical system or from their current philosophical point of view (if they are not feeling particularly systematic in their endeavours)?” With this simple stratagem they will, if they can be brief, accept this stricture of
being succinct, state everything there is needed to be known about what is being philosophically focused upon and what is over-looked in their philosophical thinking or opinion. And
this is regardless of whether that person is a philosopher or not! An economist, e.g., when
asked how they define their sense of ‘person’ in their thinking will, with one stroke, reveal
the essential nature of their thinking, warts and all! Insights and blind-spots should be equally
available for reflection. So if they define the person ‘merely as a consumer’, e.g, then we
know immediately where they are coming from and what they are missing out on, namely the
fact that person cannot be reduced to a ‘mere consumer’, etc! For those reasons, on reflection,
that should be obvious! As I have argued that the sense of self is phenomenologically simulated (in the coursing of the hermeneutic circle, etc.) through it relative distinction from a
sense of the not-an-object-state and the not-a-frame-of-reference it follows that along with
this vision of self their philosophy of the intentional object-state and its intentional field of
reference should be equally spelt out! Most philosophers seem to avoid a philosophy of self
38
and in their over attention to the object-states and fields-of-references become prolix (a fault I
must too confess from suffering from and, hopefully, seek my reader’s indulgence and/or
forgiveness, or, at least, their compassion and understanding in this regard). (103)
So this tip is basically this: that to get quickly to what a philosopher is really up to, or
anyone else with an overt or covert philosophical point of view we would like to understand
better, all we need to do is to simply ask them “how do they define the self, what have they to
say about the nature of self…?” This type of questioning providing us very rapidly with an
essential snap-shot of that questioned person’s philosophical points of view, being, in effect,
an essential snap-shot of their philosophy in its holistic entirety regardless of the length or
lack of length they go to in answering this question, or, even their honesty of reply (since any
rely is going to reflect upon their own nature and how they perceive themselves (in this particular situation of having to give an answer in this respect). The person's ‘vision of self’,
therefore, being an essential snapshot of the integrity or lack of integrity of their overall philosophical stance(s). (104)
The informative response elicited through such interrogation allows the questioner,
and others privy to this reply, to ascertain the essential philosophical characteristics of that
person’s stated philosophical point(s) of view – in effect what is under focus and what is left
out in their overall picture of the ‘world’, and, an outline of the possible motivation for this
distinctive positioning in the life-world from an understanding of the primary and secondary
motivation as to why this person’s appears to have adopted that type of position. Therefore,
through these sins of omission and commission we are in a position to determine possible
primary and secondary motivation for the utilization of relatively speculative egological concepts. So ‘soul’ might be proposed in order to see out ‘the survival of the ego after the death
of the body’. That’s would most likely be its primary motivation? But, then, you could also
re-write it as in the here and now? Surely, the mechanism in play for this survival of ‘psychic
identity’ must already be in place if it is going to do what motivates its ideation (maintaining
and giving continuity of the psyche despite the transformations it must undergo?). Then, we
can ask ourselves if it is possible in theory and practice to find a basis for that type of view
from a phenomenological point of view? E.g., that person’s reply directly or indirectly can
tell us how they view (or don’t view) the transition of ‘death’.58 From this aspect one can
then determine the ideological nature of their religious beliefs, if religious beliefs are indeed
In a speculative digression we could further ask: ”if a self needs a 'soul', does the soul need a 'meta-soul', ad infinitum? We could try to accept this possibility but it would be no absolute explanation, nor, for
that matter an adequate relative explanation. And with respect to death… how is this existential excess of selfhood, as a residue, invested/re-invested back into the world? Can self trace itself out upon the fabric of the
world? How could psychic continuity be maintained without embodiment (or is some form of embodiment a
necessary precondition here?)? Then we could extend our frame of reference and look at continuity from a cosmic point of view. In the death of the universe we might find a perfect example that mirrors our own appearance
of death? How, we might ask, could identity be saved? Is there in effect a loss of information or and inability to
merely retrieve it – although some might argue that “‘information’ is never lost!”. Indeed, our bodies are a living witness to very early stellar cataclysmic cycles that established the heavier elements like oxygen, silicon and
iron, etc. Perhaps there can only be a preservation of information from the perspective of a totality (and the relative preservation of identity would need to be conducted on that basis?). The list of questions in this speculative
type of field are, no doubt, more numerous than all the grains of sand upon a huge beach! The best approach
shifting them into a more experiential style of arena through the adoption of my five guidelines, e.g., as outlined
in paragraph 79 (and looked at more closely in paragraphs 95-99). Although these guidelines are more probably
a commentary on what, perhaps, is already being done in an attempt to make those relatively ‘esoteric’ concepts
significant or ‘appear’ more significant!
58
39
present. The use of other ‘selectively supplied contexts’ further refining this technique…. 59
(105)
In this regard we should also ask the psychiatrist or the psychologist, the doctor or
nurse, or any other medical practitioner we might have to deal with, how they might review
their understanding of the nature of the ‘self’? Our examining of their response(s) helping us
to quickly come to an understanding of the presuppositions central to their philosophical
point(s) of view, and, helping us to come to an understanding as to whether their therapeutic
methods might possibly have any merit or not – an aspect of our psychological research that
will be taken up in my next paper Beyond Therapy. (106)
16.
Provisional Conclusion
The title and subtitles of this paper suggest three interlinked themes, namely, an
in-depth examination of deception and self-deception (which, in this paper, have been treated
as part of the same phenomenon of deception), the phenomenological formulation of an egological philosophy, and, a confrontation with the philosophical problem - how can we actually encounter the self if the self from an absolute point of view has no existence? A fourth
topic was also looked at in passing - how do we face (or de-face) egological concepts of a
relatively speculative nature that, on the whole, seem to overpopulate various diverse egological philosophies whose consequential ramifications, whether therapeutic, neutral or
non-therapeutic in ambition and in truth, on the whole can not be ignored in the (cultural)
understanding(s) of our being in this world-of-life? (107)
Let me look at these four areas in reversed order. (108)
(4) In dealing with an experiential retrieval of the significance of egological entities of
a relatively speculative nature five guidelines were suggested (in paragraph 79) and briefly
demonstrated (in paragraphs 95-99)? (108)
(3) In answering the question: "how can we actually encounter the self if the self (or
any other self) from an absolute point of view has no existence?" A(nother) tentative solution/resolution could be proposed along the following lines - that as all intentional significance (defined through sense, meaning and meaningfulness) is simulated and that the same
through processes of retention is, in effect, virtually re-simulated, it would appear that identity qua identity is apparently 'fixed' in the flux of time and therein give the appearance of an
'appearance' through this ability to exhibit duration; to endure as a re-simulation through such
retention. Now, as the phenomenal world is experienced as a re-simulation it follows that it is
possible for one re-simulation to meet another re-simulation if this interaction is itself being
simulated/re-simulated! That from the point of view of this re-simulation of the 'reality of this
interaction' and the 'interaction of this reality', because there is no essential difference between the same they are, in effect, in a state of interaction through re-simulation. So, although
there may be no absolute sense of self it does not imply that from a relative and empirical
point of view that the various senses of self and an overall sense of self need not appear to
interact, or, that someone’s overall sense of self cannot appear to interact with some other’s
overall sense of self, etc! Moreover, using our formula "the x of x is no(t)-x" we could also
argue along these tentative lines: 'the appearance of an interaction' of the 'appearance of an
This ‘essential snap-shot short cut’ can also show us how a philosophy, through a simplification of its
issues, can lead to a misleading commodification of that ‘enterprise’ in the market place.
59
40
interaction' is 'the no(t)-appearance of an interaction', i,.e,. the reality of an interaction being a
re-simulation. Which stands to reason that any two items of the same ontological status in a
state of interaction must be able to interact as such, a state of affairs that gives their interaction the status of a 'direct state of interaction'! On the other hand, but in the same manner, the
overall sense of self remains just that - an overall sense of self, and, that the various senses of
self that interact with each other essentially recreate the non-semblance, i.e., the reality, of
that interaction between the same! In a transcendental phenomenological setting, therefore,
the interaction between the same type of intentional entities is apparently 'direct'! Thus although an overall sense of self might profitably be viewed as a semblance of reality, a collection of personae, as an empty fiction, etc., the simulation of the interaction between entities of
a similar status is effectively direct and real, albeit simulated, and, re-simulated through retention! Moreover, as there is no pre-simulated state, a state of affairs being simulated
through simulation, it follows that reality is there to that extent there is a matching of modalities. A reflection seen in a dream is not a reflection being a meta-reflection… a dream of a
dream is not a dream being a meta-dream… but, the handshake had between two hands of
similar ontological status is real by virtue of the fact that there is a direct alignment between
these two hands of the same/similar ontological status which simulates this directness of interaction! Despite the absolute (Absolute) emptiness of the self and its various collection of
personae, the relative sense of self is, effectively, as real as any other of its counterparts operating with the same modal status in this world-of-life. (109)
However I recognize that a number of issues would need to be correctly addressed
here to run this type of argument. For a start if a simulation of a simulation is no(t) (a) simulation being a ‘re-simulation’ how would re-simulations and simulations be able to (directly)
interact assuming that they have a different ontological status - being of a meta-level and of
an object–level respectively? This problem is easily overcome in a transformational philosophy where treated products can be re-treated on to the same meta-level that they initially
originated upon (say that initial object-level). And this type of re-treatment can apply to all
processes of transformation. Furthermore, between disparate product types whose interaction
is realized through transformational invariance on each of the meta-levels involved in that
overall process we have in effect a de facto directness of interaction when that can be put into
‘play’ through the demonstration of that transformational invariance. But rather than follow
up the complexities of this direction let me try a third path in a resolution of this problem
(involved in encountering that which absolutely does not exist). (110)
Let us say a relationship is exercised in a ‘relative’ frame of reference. This stands to
reason. There is a relationship by virtue of the fact that there is the appearance of an interaction between the involved parties. Now let us say that the relativity of this relativity is its absoluteness by virtue of the a fact that this type of transformational interaction is essentially
meta-relational or i.e., relatively absolute (in relation to the relativity of the relational level as
a relative object-level in meta-status). Then it follows, without processes of re-treatment back
on to the original meta-level, that the absolutivity of the absolute is essentially not ‘absolute’
in meta-status, i.e., as essentially ‘Absolute’ in meta-status (being raised by two degrees relative to the object-level of relational relativity). Now the interaction between two relational
entities of the same type is on an object level to commence with. The resulting interaction is
then raised by one meta-degree and the final product of that interactional transformation is
re-treated back on the same par as possessed by its initial parties involved in that interaction.
But relational simulations and relational re-simulations, treated/re-treated on the same meta-level in their interaction re-produced, initially, an essentially absolute type of product. It is
through the absolutivity of that product that we arrive at a new entity, namely, the relational
41
transformation of their interaction. So if a simulated state of affairs effectively interacts with
another simulated state of affairs we find ourselves entertaining an absolute state of affairs in
the re-simulated productivity of that interaction. Of course we can then through transformational re-treatment return to the initial meta-level of commencement. But before we do that
let us consider the interaction of all possible absolute states of affairs with any other absolute
state of affairs. What would we find through the resultant of such a(n open ended) process?
Surely, none other than a sense of the Absolute equal to the transcendental ambit of the
life-world itself. So the possibility of interaction in the life-world is accomplished for us by
virtue of the transformational-philosophical ‘fact’ that the ‘Absolute’ is ‘grounds’ of the ‘absolute’, i.e., the interaction between relational states of affairs, e.g., re-simulational simulations, and, the absolute is the ‘grounds’ for the relative, i.e., the realm of simulations/re-simulations. Thus through the transcendental grounds of possibility, that constitute
the ambit of the life-world, all forms of simulation and/or re-simulation can interact despite
the absolute absence of intentionally constituted object-states, intentionally constituted
frames-of-reference (or fields/worlds), and, intentionally constituted egological entities. So
the ‘simulation of interaction’ guarantees the ‘interaction of those simulations’ in terms of
that simulated-interactional frame-of-reference (as argued for previously in paragraph 109)!
Basically the argument is saying that if an interaction is simulated then, from the point of
view of that interactional space, an ‘interaction’ is effectively being simulated in the same
despite the fact that no intentional object-state needs to be absolutely constituted as an object-state, etc. So in cyber space, e.g., a process of interaction is an interactive-process in
those simulated terms of reference despite the absence of represented objects or states being
present (since the ‘intentional state intended’ is the ‘object-state as intended’ through the relative directness of their interactivity)! But, because there are no object-states representing any
intentionally constituted object-state it implies that, ultimately, from an Absolute point of
view, through the ‘relativity of relativity’ (as no(t) relativity) there can be no real relativity
hence its mere simulation/re-simulation. But, what appears to be in a state of interaction does
just that, appears to be in a state of interaction despite the ultimate isolation of all things from
an Absolute point of view which is none other than the Absolute unity of the life-world, the
oneness of the life-world as the Life-World, the virtual grounds of all possibility and its actualized expression through the simulation/re-simulation of appearance/appearances. Hence
appearances are relatively ‘substantial’ in their own right, not by virtue of their so-called underlying reality! The philosophical difference between an intellectually bankrupt absolutist
philosophy and the existential richness and potential creativity of a transcendental-phenomenological constituted Absolute philosophy. (111)
(2) I have also arrived at an egological philosophy by looking closely at certain problems that to varying extents seem to have belittled the sense of being a person (through deception and self-deception, psychosis, global psychosis, etc.). Moreover the significance of
such an encounter with specific senses of self, our overall sense of self, and, with the sense of
other egological entities and institutions, is described through the significance producing interaction between sense, meaning and meaningfulness (without absolute recourse to the intentional polar-fictions of object-states, frames-of-reference, egological entities). (112)
(1) Lastly, the subject of deception (and self-deception) was closely investigated and
three levels of deception were discerned, namely, a global level where through reification and
projection of intentional states a global psychosis was set in train by virtue of the epistemological ‘fact’ that the intentional nature of all constituted products (read simulations/re-simulations) to be only ‘polar fictions’, on an individualized psychotic level and on a
focalized non-psychotic level through acts of deception and/or being deceived. It was also
42
noted in that research that through the ongoing imposition of a transcendental suspension,
etc., that the distorted productivity of what ever is being simulated/re-simulated still essentially remains in touch with the reality that is generally shared through the auspices of the
life-world, as realized through a common general (con)census of reality; which is, in effect,
that-reality-there-for-‘us’! (113)
Now, let us turn our attention, very briefly, to the possible therapeutic ramifications
and consequences of this understanding of deception, etc. (114)
As noted, the process of deception basically involves being in general conformity
with our understanding of reality and the reality of that understanding! Deception, and its
deeper cousin, self-deception, is arrived at only through the minor re-arrangement of a large
set of true propositions, through a transformational processes of omission and/or commission
(or, those processes that virtually establish the same by default). It follows, therefore, that to
rectify the distortion of this situation all one needs to do is to turn around a small fraction of
those deceptively re-constituted propositions and a spirit of rectification will automatically
ensue(?).60 Hence the possible therapeutic consequences of this research in this regard - a fact
assisted through the installation of an appropriate transcendental suspension, etc.61 Moreover,
this realization of a conformity with reality should automatically lead to an increasing degree
of productive harmonization of the individual which, in turn, would be radiantly reflected in
their existential choice of (those ‘choice’) activities (creatively found available for them).
(115)
Hence, the possible therapeutic consequences of a de-distortion of deception and
self-deception, although, one should also note, the social harmony put in play and preserved
through acts of socially acceptable patterns of deception. This dialectical balancing act, between the de-distortion of distortion and the prejudicial installation of distortion helping us to
existentially walk that fine path between the extremes that as 'polar fictions' help to constitute
the reality of that-one-life-world-there-for-us but which in themselves, from an absolute point
of view (or the Absolute point of view), have absolutely no-existence, but, which as fruitful
fictions, help to create the relative illusion of the same and, therein, a relatively safe and sane
path, to some degree or other, through this world-of-life-for-all-of-us!!! (116)
What an irony it is that to perpetrate an act of deception a greater degree of truth
has to be proffered!62 (117)
Noël Tointon, Sydney, 9.1.03.
60
Essentially, alter a few of those wrongly held beliefs and the rest might well fall correctly into place.
That you cannot existentialize the existential, only the non-existential! Refer to footnote no. 18. and to
paragraph 64, also, Finding a Place for the Idea of God – Part VII, para. 47, 50, etc.
62
Refer to paragraphs 37-41, e.g.
61
43
Beyond Therapy: A Set of Essays
On Miscellaneous Topics in Psychology and Psychiatry (2001-2003)
V. Deception and Self-Deception:
Part III - An Overview: A Focusing on the Philosophical Issues
Concerning The Problematic Phenomenon of Deception and Self-Deception, etc.
0.
Introduction
A number of primary philosophical problems were looked into in this Fifth Essay. I
would like to name these as follows:
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
The problem of deception. (I1-7,II1-18)
The problem of self-deception. (I1-7,II1-18)
The problem of egological existence. (I19-21, I1. etc.)
The problem of a substantial world. (An implication that parallels Prob.3.)
(II111).
The problem of phenomenal directness. (II12-18, 75-76)
How does the critical transcendental phenomenologist deal with egological
speculation? (II77-102) (1)
A number of secondary problems were also looked into, e.g:
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
8.
9.
10.
The critical evaluation of the abduction experience. (I7-14)
The disparity between linguistic texts and visual texts. (I16-17)
The failure of the Turing Test? (II22-25)
What prejudice should the phenomenologist have or not have? (II29-36)
The problem of intersubjectivity. (II42, 65)
How is deception exposed? (II43-57)
How should we treat a global psychosis if at all? (II59-67, 76, 113, 116)
What is the nature of authenticity? (II63-66)
How are relationships entered into? (II63, 68-76)
How do we determine what is real? (II 74-75) (2)
In relatively simple language let me briefly describe what is problematic about those
primary problems as noted above. (3)
1.
The problem of deception is only a problem when one views the self as if it were
monolithic in its semblance of self-unity. The problem ceasing to be a problem when we
postulate one aspect of the self creating the deception and another dissimulating that intention. In essence, one aspect of the self looks at the deceptive practice at face value whilst
some other facet of that self sees it as a deception qua deception. As long as these two facets
are cooperating together, yet relatively separated, the self is able to deceive (without finding
itself being deceived). (4)
2.
On the other hand the problem of self-deception is a deeper puzzle since we must ask
how the self, in constituting that deceptive practice, is only able to read it at face value and
therein be self-deceived? Although the self appears to be self-deceived, by various stratagems
44
it can be shown hermeneutically that 'part' of the psyche 'knows' and 'acts' as if were not being deceived even though overall it generally, or more ostensively, behaves as if it were being
self-deceived. The implication that might be drawn is that 'in appearing as if deceived' this
metaphor is then read literally by that sense of self that misconstrues this as 'if one were deceived' and through this loss of transcendental distance comes to believe and act, to some
considerable degree, as if it were being self-deceived with this qualification, namely, that a
more integrated aspect of the overall sense of self does 'recognize' this self-deception as a
deception qua deception even if, overall, by the relatively impossible literalization of metaphor it cannot, as a result, be absolutely self-deceived. That to some extent the 'relatively
more insightful sense of self' is over-ruled by that sense of self that confronts that loss of
transcendental distance at face value. (5)
3.
The third problem of egological existence comes into play when the philosopher holds
the view that the overall sense of self and all subsidiary senses of self are only an illusion, an
impossible to obtainable polar fiction, a construction and reified projection of the mind. If the
self can have no absolute self-existence then how do we interact 'within' our own sense of self
and with so call 'others' 'without' our so-called sense of self? (6)
4.
Paralleling this problem is a loss of world, it too being treated as a polarized projection of the mind along with all object-states being treated in the same fashion, i.e., as absolutely non-existent? Hence the implicit fourth problem should note the problem of an absent
substantial world. (7)
5.
Following on from problems 3. And 4. We can then ask how can there be one
life-world, and, how could there be any directness of (relational) interaction given that phenomenal selves, others, world(s) and objects are all non-existent from an absolute point of
view? Since the self, world, etc., are all absolutely non-existent how can there be any form of
an interaction between 'things that don't exist'? (8)
6.
How does the critical transcendental phenomenologist deal with speculation? By noting both the use of metaphors being utilized and the normal limits of the usage associated
with the same, That through such a reading we should try to understand the existential import
of the same, and, adopt the richest reading that allows us to establish what degrees of relevance are had by that metaphorical construction in the light it throws on the 'here and now' of
'our' everyday existence. (9)
Let me re-address these problems in the reverse order. (10)
6.
The metaphorical is always conducted in a metaphorical context that is rhetorically
driven. An inspection of that rhetorical context and its existential relevance helping us to determine the existential worth of that metaphorical construct (be it actual or virtual in ontological range or extent?)? (11)
5.
One might say that it is because there is no absolutely substantial sense of self, world,
object-state, etc., that that the semblance of an interaction between the semblance of these
'fiction' is assured! Being simulations/re-simulations (in order to establish a sense of temporal
duration, etc.) the apparent relationship between the same can be equally simulated. The 'reality' of that interaction manifesting through the multi-modal richness apparently entailed.
Hence 'directness' can be re-established, albeit as simulated/re-simulated (and thence not met
in any impossible to comprehend self-existent, substantial type of mode). (12)
45
4.
The same type of argument as presented in 5. being adopted, namely, by virtue of
their simulated nature everything in the life-world acts and interacts through simulation/re-simulation, including the sense of an overall semblance of one's own sense of self or
some one other than one's else? (13)
3.
The same argument as presented in 5. being adopted, namely, by virtue of their simulated nature everything in the life-world acts and interacts through simulation/re-simulation,
including the sense of a world and its miscellaneous inventories of object-states and egologically-oriented entities. (14)
2.
The self-deception of the self is understandable if the self looses its sense of a transcendental distance in its reading of metaphor and in the reading of its own metaphorical
constructions63, etc. (15)
1.
Deception being understood as an artefact, like all the other problems noted here, of
our philosophical perspectives. Placing a monolithic sense of an overall self centre stage simulates the problematic nature of this and other problematic areas of concern. (16)
Let me now quote some sections of this essay that deal with these problems and then
later let me quote some of their solutions. (17)
1.
The Problem of Deception
In an act of deception the person creating the deception normally is not the person who is to be deceived. However, in my tentative understanding of
self-deception I am going to propose that the two processes are essentially the
same, albeit that self-deception involves a metaphorical 'endeepening' of the process and, perhaps, some form of a phase change wherein the literal semblance of
the deception is then mistakenly read as the 'reality-to-hand' in that particular situation. Self-deception is obviously problematic in the philosophical sense - how
is it possible for the very same self to deceive itself? To my mind deception is
problematic in this special sense for just the same type of reasons, namely, how is
it possible for the same self to simulate a deceptive version of reality when that
same self knows, or should know, that that version is not in conformity with reality as generally understood - the self having to wear two or more hats, at the same
time, so to speak. Essentially the first aspect of this problem is predicated on the
monolithic unity of the self. Obviously deception and self-deception exist and
therefore it would appear that we must give up this notion of the self as some
form of a uniform monolith possessed of absolute self-control and self understanding (and this has been, to date, an effective postmodern critique of a 'modernist vision of self'). Although we must postulate the implicitly projected semblance of an overall sense of self in order to explain the apparent intentional unity
63
The overall sense of self, or its apparent equivalent, reading an apparently deceptive-type of situation
as a situation that has one deceived literally? E.g., I feel very wealthy, as if I am wealthy, to… I feel I am
wealthy therefore I must be wealthy! This state of 'feeling wealthy' being discordant with reality implies, if I
assert and appear to believe in the same, that I am, in effect, suffering an act of self-deception. But, because this
feeling of being as if wealthy was originally self-presented it also implies that part of the self must be 'aware', if
only covertly, that it 'self-created' this feeling and that it was not derived from an actual state of affairs that
would allow me to directly and validly make that assumption (should that actually be the case, which, unfortunately, is not the case currently since not being wealthy it is true that 'I am not wealthy'!).
46
of that agent, at the same time, this sense of self must come about through a multitude of different senses somehow cooperating to some degree or other and integrated to some extent within this overall sense of self. In effect it is through this
cooperation that an act of deception can be entered into. So, e.g., the 'deceiving
self' can say (to another person or persons that) "x is a" when in fact a
'non-self-deceived sense of self knows that '~x is a' or x is ~a'. Once a
non-monolithic sense of self is accepted this problem of deception ceases to be
problematic! On the other hand, how can the self enter into a process of its own
self-deception and act, to some considerable extent, as if it were unaware of its
own deception (in the process reviewing what light or darkness might be thrown
on the intentional life of the subject?). A resolution in progress of this more difficult aspect of our problem will be taken up in last section of this paper. First, let
me look at this meta-critique of the general spectrum of critical evaluations of the
theory and evidence (or lack of evidence) for the abduction experience and from a
meta-meta-critique conducted by myself note a number of conclusions I would
like to make in this regard. As abduction reports are often vague, lack supporting
evidence and seem to be logistically untenable from an overall perspective we
should provisionally conclude that most if not all individuals making such a claim
are, to put it politely, mistaken. On these grounds, with this prejudicial
pre-judgment to hand, let me now adopt a transcendental phenomenological position, etc., in order to critically investigate the essential nature of this type of
'phenomenon' (of the 'abduction' experience 64 ) and set out to evaluate therein
whether my previous research in this regard, specifically with respect to
co-authored phenomena, is of value, can throw some informative light on this
type of problem, namely, 'how is it possible for the same self to effectively deceive its own overall sense of self?' (as most claims, if not all, of abduction appear, on probability, to be deceptively manufactured by the claimant65). (7)
Essentially, the pseudo-philosophical problem of deception is a problem if one's view
of the self is monolithic and unified. An experience of pain should disabuse us of that notion we feel pain, we feel pain here or there, we think about it, it motivates us to look for some
form of pain-relief or strategy to deal with it, we know we are in pain, etc. Hence the overall
sense of self is a sense of self that overviews all the other senses of self such as an impressional sense of self, a reflective sense of self, a motivated sense of self, a sense of self that
knows that they are truly in pain, a sense of self that knows what it is like not to be in pain,
etc., etc. (18)
2. The Problem of Self-Deception
I ask in I33: (19)
Why does a loss of transcendental distance more easily facilitate an 'act' of
self-deception? (33)
In a progressive loss of gestalt integrity there is the increasing autonomy of aspects and perspectives, etc., albeit with a progressively diminished degree of
64
Albeit through the media of textual reports produced by claimants; critical and non-critical comments
by non-claimants; positive, neutral and/or negative meta-critiques, positive; neutral and/or negative meta-meta-critiques, etc.
65
Or assisted in its manufacture by a hypnotist-investigator/therapist and/or peers through interpersonal
co-authored peer group pressure.
47
qualitative richness. In such an environment idealities desired might be mistakenly identified and recognized through a literalization of the(ir) metaphor(ical
simulation), etc… (34)
I argue that a self-delusion takes place in a loss or diminution of our powers of transcendental discrimination wherein there is an associated impoverishment of the overall hermeneutic circle: (20)
…So, e.g., a dream apple may taste like an apple, indeed, ideally like a very good
or perfect apple, yet, without a full complement of modalities that should accompany a 'real' apple tasting process our judgment could never arrive at the affirmation of such a judgment without the same! Without this degree of psychic depth
and richness of modalities, etc., no judgment would affirm the existence of an apple beyond the classification of this type of (imagined) experience as a mere apple-like experience. However, in the loss of our gestalt integrity we open ourselves up to a mis-placed affirmation of idealities envisaged without realizing,
through a process of re-cognition, to what degree those 'phenomenal presentations' are not modally rich enough to sustain that 'apparent' attribution (as might
be presented in a dream, a delusion, an hallucination, an illusion, etc.). On a
re-establishing adequate powers of transcendental discernment, we of course,
re-open ourselves to a better appreciation of just what (intuitively) establishes or
disestablishes, confirms or dis-confirms, that phenomenal presentation to be or
not to be as its appears. E.g., on waking an apple dreamt might have tasted very
nice we know damn well that it will not satisfy our current hunger, etc. (34)
To provisionally conclude at this point I have speculatively implicated the following, namely, that diminished insight allows the partial enactment of a process
of self-deception; loss of transcendental detachment allows us to focus on the
presentation of idealizations and to mis-represent them to ourselves; that increasing autonomy of distinctive levels and aspects, etc., assist us in this misplaced
project of idealizational-re-emphasis, the literalization of the metaphor, etc., loss
of overall transcendental distance and discernment, etc. Moreover, it appears to
follow that from a loss of transcendental distance through the loss of an overall
transcendental suspension necessary for the rhetorical dimension of an act of
judgment to take place (through the asking of a properly formed question) by virtue of a suspension of belief that an inverse suspension of dis-belief is substituted
for the former. Instead of asking “does x possess ‘a’?’, in its stead, we say to ourselves that “x must possess ‘a’!”, or, “why isn’t x in possession of ‘a’?” without
seriously asking this rhetorical question, perceiving (wrongly) the situation as
apparently self-evident. 66 Now, let us look into a hypnotic model of
self-deception and inquire what role the co-authored might be construed as being
present either actively or by default (paralleling this non-transcendental suspension of dis-belief at the expense of a transcendental suspension of belief)? (35)
The last point made in this quotation is an important one to note, namely, that in a
suspension of disbelief the overall sense of self opens itself up to being deceived by its
very own overall sense of self!. On the other hand, it is through a suspension of belief that
66
Where ‘a’ is a predicate, relation or logical identity or a set of the same.
48
we avail ourselves of the powers of transcendental discrimination that will help to shield
us from self-deceiving ourselves! (21)
Another point that is made is that reality should, phenomenologically, be defined as
the multi-modal richness of modes engaged in the construction of that phenomenal
re-presentation and the degree of richness of those modes exercised therein with respect to
the degree of richness that should be normally expected to be entertained from a multi-modal
perspective and from an individual modal perspective. I.e., how many modes are engaged,
and, how rich or poverty stricken is that specific modal experience experienced therein (all
evaluated from a general, comparative, expectational point of view)?? (22)
In the light of these comments one could ask oneself just what type of suspension is
taking place - a suspension of belief or a suspension of disbelief?! (23)
3.
The Problem of Egological Existence
A third problem arises from the realization that the self is only the overall sense of a
collection of various senses of self that are individually distinctive in themselves to some degree or other but not absolutely separate from an overall sense of self which itself has no absolute basis in fact as a self qua self, i.e., as an entity that has a substantial, self-reflexive substance (despite having the continuity of a distinctively personal life-history intersecting that
temporal-spatial point or locus of an apparent embodiment and personal identification).
How have I argued for this type of position? Why do I find the 'self' as problematic philosophically (and phenomenlogically?)? In what sense is the constitution of self problematic?
(24)
What phenomenological nature has the self? If we refer to the overall sense of
the self through an overall sense of self just what can this sense of self do and not
do, etc? If a particular sense of self is that gestalt polarity that can review the relationship between the intentional object-state and the intentional background
field (that collectively form the hermeneutic circle as a basic structure that organizes the epistemological hierarchy which, in turn, is set in its cultural-intercultural
frames of reference which collectively constitute the life-world as experienced by
the person and which delineates that pluralistic sense of self) can this overall
sense of self be referred to in the same manner as a 'self'? In this light, is this
overall sense of self then more a fiction, albeit a fruitful fiction? Being the resultant consequence of this relatively cooperative federation of selves it cannot
therefore be itself an active sense of self able to review itself if this overall sense
of self has no higher sense of self against which it could be appreciatively
're-viewed'. On the other hand, this sense of self cannot be dismissed as completely ineffective as our intentional activity and our desired intent through processes of intentional resolution can be put into practice to that degree that is practicable for it to appear to be able to do so and in this regard is, in effect, a reflection of this qualified self-referential ability to be itself, or, at least appear to be
like any other sense of self with an overall sense of acting as a self. But is the self
then, in this sense, an acter or an actor behind a mask, or, indeed, just a mere (set
of) mask(s) without any substantial sense of self other than as a logical subject
connecting an intentional flow of connected personal history in our collective
mapping of this one-world-of-life? (46)
49
In this space between an 'absolute sense of self' and a sense of self that is a
'mere illusion' we will find the 'real self' albeit with all the qualifications attendant
upon this 'in between state of affairs'. This in between ‘space’ permits the ‘self’ to
practice deception towards others and, in turn, to suffer varying degrees and types
of self-deception as noted in this paper. To that extent that it is a logical subject
with a sense of historical continuity it finds itself allowed to exist with a qualified
being-through-becoming-in-this world-of-life with the ability to purport itself in a
relatively authentically-oriented manner or a relatively inauthentically-oriented
manner...
(47)
Because the sense of self is a polar fiction it cannot be reached, i.e., obtained. Indeed,
it cannot be thought (or even met face to face)! In a like fashion the intentional object-state
cannot be met and be obtained, and, the intentional sense of a world or frame of reference
equally cannot be met and be obtained. On the other hand, I am not arguing that the empirical
sense of a self should be denied, only that there can be no absolute67 absolutist68 sense of
self. What are the implications of this egological positioning? (25)
That the self is an empirical reality but a transcendental illusion when the metaphor of a self is projected beyond the level of its empirical/metaphorical deployment!
(26)
4.
The Problem of a Substantial World
I won't look into this problem here other than to note that if the polarities of Ego, Object-State and World are all polar fictions then it implies that the transcendental reality of
world, etc., is too a transcendental illusion, i.e., being the reified projection of intentional expectations (beyond the limits of their metaphorical deployment [through a literalization of the
inherent metaphor of the world as a space or field, as a background or ground] and the instantiation, therein, of a global psychosis).69
(27)
5.
The Problem of Phenomenal Directness
Because, in accordance with this type of philosophy being articulated by myself, there
can only be one-world-of-life then all must be in direct contact when in a process of relationship, the sense of 'contact' being defined by the nature of that relationship. Hence two people shaking hands is a physically direct experience for those two parties, e.g., etc. The implication being drawn that in a re-presentational view of reality (contra an impossible to obtain
representationalistic point of view) we are indirect contact with the world and each other, al67
Defined as that perspective conducted under an overall transcendental suspension, but, when used as an
adjective, as used here, means the extreme treatment of the same, i.e., the absolutization of that perspective
which as a literalization of the involved metaphor is, correctly, unobtainable.
68
Defined as that pseudo-perspective that attempts to be conducted in a literalization of the associated
metaphor without the realization that such a perspective is correctly unobtainable.
69
In this essay this problem and the allied problem of the transcendental illusion of the intentional object-state being left implicit and running in parallel to this problem of what reality does an egological sense actually possess? Just what empirical reality has a sense of self and just what transcendental reality has this same
concept from that absolute point of view??
50
beit with the particular perspective adopted and all the limitations attendant upon each parties
point(s) of view). In this essay I noted this problem… (28)
In the midst of writing a series of papers on miscellaneous topics in psychology
I have had to deal with various problems concerning the self and its multi-faceted
nature.70 What is the self? - can we (metaphorically) meet it face to face, or, is
the self only an appearance, a simulation of an ego with our encountering of 'itself' itself also only a simulation? In a bewildering array of senses of self from the
physiological, emotional, perceptual, conceptual, judgmental, etc., to the personal, social, political, cultural, etc., along with the impact of mental illnesses such as
psychosis, multiple personalities, hysteria, etc., the overall vision of the self
seems to be taking on the complexion of a jigsaw puzzle, a series of overlying
masks, a presence marked by an absolute absence - a mere polarity that can be
approached but never absolutely encountered?! Hence my sub-title of "Doing the
Impossible - …Can we (absolutely71, i.e., actually) encounter that which cannot
be (absolutely) encountered?" (1)
It was noted that if our contact with each other was 'direct' then how could we deceive
each other? (29)
If we meet others 'directly' how could we dissimulate before others and they
before us?! Surely, in our direct contact with them and they with us, all intent to
deceive would be immediately experienced as such (and not realized 'mediately'
70
A fact highlighted by a recent symposium held in the Blue Mountains on the topic of personal identity
where there were papers on the problematicity of the self, the philosophical problem of death with respect to
personal identity, cultural contributions to self identity, ideological contradictions in political identity, problems
in defining an acceptable sense of humanity and the pressing need for the same in this era of technological advancement, how do we meet with the ethical, etc.
71
An absolute-relative distinction is being invoked here. Although there may be the appearance of an
interaction, say between two people, how could that interaction take place we must ask if, from an absolute
point of view, those two individuals have no absolute existence; there absolute non-existence following from the
'fact' that the self being a mere polarity can only be an unobtainable polar fiction? The same qualification applies
to the polar fictions of object-states and fields which with the polar fiction of the ego(s) collectively constitute in
intentionality ‘mere’ (re-)simulations of identities-in-relationship(s) from a relative point of view.
A phenomenological philosophy argues that the intentional object-state is always presented/re-presented in a field appropriate to the nature of that object-state, i.e., is entertained from a certain perspective; hence a relative point of view. I define an absolute point of view as ‘non-relative’. A relative point of view
is aspectival in nature. As an absolute point of view would be non-aspectival we may ask how that point of view
could still be ‘a point of view’? To answer that objection I have two replies. First, for a relative point of view to
have significance as ‘a relative point of view’ implies that we must be able to informatively demarcate it from
that which gives this concept its significance through contrast hence the mutual relevance of the ‘absolute point
of view’. Second, I have previously argued that the formula “x of x is no(t)-x” allows us to determine the transcendental pre-conditions for the essential nature of x to manifest itself as x (refer to the theological essay in the
series Finding a Place for the Idea of God – Part II, Section 4, paragraph 55, and footnote no. 19). In this situation the “perspective(-ness) of perspective(-ness) is no(t)-perspective(-ness)” defines the absolute transcendental
pre-conditions for the significance of perspective(-ness) as meta-perspective(-ness) which is no(t) perspective(-ness) [because ‘meta-perspective(-ness) has/(is) no(t) perspective(-ness)’]. As the aspectival perspectiveness defines the essential nature of the relative point of view hence the absolute point of view can be viewed as
the transcendental preconditions of the relative point of view which must be meta-aspectival, which has no aspectival nature/which is not aspectival in nature. Hence the absolute point of view cannot be ‘a point of view’
from the relative point of view but being meta-aspectival in nature it is a meta-point of view. So, continuing in
this vein of thought, we might like to define the Absolute point of view as the transcendental preconditional
‘grounds’ for the possibility of all absolute points of view. This discussion is continued in section 11., from
paragraph 44.
51
through processes of mediation, indirectly recognizing that a process of deception
was at some stage intended and put into effect)!?72 (13)
This is the problem of directness! But I note that intentional directness does not mean
intentional transparency! Nor do we have absolute intentional opaqueness. Rather we operate in the in-between with some degree of intentional translucence!73 This type of hermeneutical point being made by the philosopher Geog Gadamer when he suggests that we can never
confront a text with absolute certainty as to its intent nor can we approach it without some
form of an understanding as to it genre, that it's a text of some kind, etc. (30)
First, we have another problem to work our way through, namely, if a polar approach to intentional objects and subjects is granted how can contact be direct
when there is neither a real object nor real subject in place to be contacted, and,
neither a real object or real subject making contact with ourselves? If there are no
absolutely real objects and subjects then contact could only be an illusion, a mere
simulation? But even simulated relationships are experienced! Therefore as a
simulation, as a simulation of a simulation, as re-simulations our interaction with
other subjects and objects, and with ourselves, is allowed to come into phenomenal-phenomenological existence. By 'phenomenal' is meant that particular phenomena-experienced through its simulation, and, by 'phenomenological' is meant
that type of phenomenally distinctive simulation of the simulated-reality-there-for-us that we find is waiting for us to engage it or re-engage it,
be engaged by it or re-engaged by it, etc. (18)
I attempt to resolve this problem in the following fashion. (31)
Does this polar position, therefore, destroy this concept of direct contact through
the simultaneous absence of a contacter and contactee? No! There may be no absolute contact, there still remains a relative, provisional form of contact between
simulations by virtue of their common intentional formation and the phenomenological 'fact' that there is a direct relationship between the simulations themselves
through re-simulation and between the simulations in that relational process, or
those relational processes, under review through the re-simulation(s) of the same.
Because contact is between simulations as re-simulations and never between or
with non-simulated states of affairs that are impossibly and unobtainably ‘understood’ as prior to those intentional acts of simulation/re-simulation. Indeed, all
phenomenal presentations are experienced as phenomenological
re-presentations and not pre-simulated representations! Contact is between
simulations, as re-presentations, by virtue of their intentional constitution as phenomena-there-for-us through re-constitution, and, this 'fact' that they stand in a
direct relationship to-us through what they re-present (rather than what they
might be incorrectly seen to ‘represent’)! Our complex modal engagement directly reflecting, wittingly or unwittingly, the true modal complexion of the constitution of those intentional-states-of-affairs-there-for-us as phenomena! Now, let
us return to the problem of how deception is possible despite the simulation of a
72
I would argue that in an authenticity of experience and an adequate degree of reflection upon the same
any intent to deceive us or any intent on our own part to deceive ourselves would indeed be experienced as deceptive. Fortunately, few people seem to have that degree of insight into intentional processes be it their own or
that of others.
73
II16.
52
directness of contact between an absolute non-existent deceiver and that absolute
non-existent person apparently being deceived by the former (and v.v). (19)
Am I successful here? What are your thoughts - do we have a real problem and/or a
real solution? Or, is the problem an artefact of a philosopical way of "seeing things'…? (32)
6.
How does the Phenomenologist Deal with Egological Speculation?
How does the critical transcendental phenomenologist, from a critical transcendental-phenomenological perspective, deal with egological speculation? Can they
confront egological speculation and find themselves actually facing such concepts
as ‘self’, ‘mind’, ‘soul’, ‘spirit’, ‘divinity’, etc? Or, does the critical transcendental philosopher merely end up scratching out/defacing such expressions by discovering and declaring them to be expressions lacking, or completely devoid of,
phenomenological sense, hermeneutical meaning and/or (experientially-oriented)
existential meaningfulness? (77)
As a provisional answer to this question I will proffer the following list of options in
response. (33)
To answer that last question I would like to propose some general rules from the
following list to that extent that they, tentatively, can be made to apply:
1. Attempt to determine the concept’s primary motivation for being proposed
by seeking to ascertain what philosophical problem is being resolved?
2. Attempt to determine the concept’s secondary reasons for being proposed,
by seeking to ascertain what other philosophical problems are implicated?
3. Attempt to re-write those mechanisms from the point of view of the here
and now (hic et nunc)?
4. Attempt to determine whether there are possible methods for the experiential determination of those re-written mechanisms in (an existential sense of) the
living present?
5. Evaluate the values and degrees of possible success attained/might be possible to attain (in the current ‘directions’ being travelled)? (79)
In effect, accepting the transcendental illusion of our reified and projected intentional
entities/states, and, the empirical reality when that phenomenal presentation/re-presentation
conforms to the modal richness expected to accompany that type of state. (34)
7.
Conclusion
What I have presented here is but an essential snap-shot of these particular primary
problems and their resolutions, a number of other resolutions also being attempted in this essay not being noted here. How would you go about this type of process? And what implications does this type of position have for our dealing with the 'reality' of our being in this
world-of-life-together-with-others???74 (35)
74
A general theme taken up in my Postscript.
53
Noël Tointon, Sydney, 9.5.03.