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Copyright 1990 New York Law Publishing Company
New York Law Journal
October 26, 1990, Friday
SECTION: OUTSIDE COUNSEL; Pg. 1
LENGTH: 4235 words
HEADLINE: Youth Parts: Constructive Response To the Challenge of Youth Crime
BYLINE: By Michael A. Corriero; Michael A. Corriero is a State Supreme Court Justice in the Court of Claims.
IN 1978, as a result of public furor fueled by the media's coverage of the perceived "failures of the Family Court,"
New York enacted the nation's "toughest" Juvenile Offender Law. n1 With the rising tide of public opinion demanding a
stricter accounting in punishment for teenage miscreants, rather than in traditionally rehabilitative treatment, came the
gradual demise of separate "youth" parts maintained since 1943 by the courts of criminal jurisdiction.
BODY:
n1 See generally, Whisenand & McLoughlin, Completing the Cycle: Realty and the Juvenile Justice System
in New York State, 47 Albany Law Review 1 (1982), in particular p. 18.
By 1983 the only remaining youth parts within the City of New York were located in Queens Criminal Court. By
1986, with the advent of the individual assignment system (IAS) and the increasing emphasis on all purpose parts, the
last of the youth parts in the Criminal Court had been replaced by "all purpose" parts.
At present there are no separately maintained parts for juvenile or youthful offenders in the Criminal or Supreme
Courts of New York City. Youths under 19 years of age and as young as 13 are now processed in the same parts as
adult offenders. There no longer is a "Part Three," as the Criminal Court youth parts were designated.
The purpose of this article is to illustrate the important role separate youth parts can play in meeting the challenge
of youth crime; to recommend, in addition to the reestablishment of youth parts in each county, a new version of the
Youth Counsel Bureau and the designation of a Youth Officer in each precinct to act as a liaison between the court,
community and individual youth who comes into contact with the system.
In the past, New York's Courts of Criminal Jurisdiction provided for the separate and special treatment of youths
under 19 years of age. The segregation of adolescents was premised upon assumptions concerning the nature of
adolescent behavior and the ability of the courts to affect that behavior. The conventional wisdom was that the court,
with the aid of investigative resources, could identify and segregate a corrigible youth from an incorrigible one. It was
further believed that the court could develop a sentencing program that would serve to rehabilitate the youth, as well as
to punish him. This special treatment was based on the assumption that adolescents are mallable, i.e. they possess the
capacity to change, to be influenced, to grow. n2
n2 See generally, Whisenand & McLoughlin, supra note 1; Silberman, Criminal Violence -- Criminal
Justice, (1978) Chapter 9.
These beliefs led to the enactment of New York's first "youthful offender" law and the establishment of the first
youth parts. n3
n3 See generally, Ludwig, Youth and the Law (1955) Chapter II.
In 1943 Governor Thomas E. Dewey signed into law comprehensive legislation providing for the separate and
distinct treatment of "youthful offenders." n4 The novel legislation was designed to protect youths from the stigma of a
criminal conviction and it authorized sentencing alternatives not available to adult offenders. n5
n4 L.1943, CC549-551, eff. Sept. 1, 1943 became § 31a to 31h N.Y. City Crim. Ct. Act, and § 252a to
252h, Code Crim. Proc. Under L.1944 C632, § 2, eff. April 7, 1944 the section numbers in the code became
913e to 913m; see Ludwig, supra note 3. p. 78, ftn. 7 for source of citation.
n5 Waxner, New York Criminal Practice, Vol. 2, Chapter 16, par. 16.1.
A youth was defined as a minor between 16 and 19 years of age. n6 A youthful offender was defined as a "youth"
who committed a crime not punishable by death or life imprisonment, who had not previously been convicted of a
felony and who was adjudicated a youthful offender pursuant to the provisions of the law. n7 It was anticipated,
however, that not all eligible youths would be suitable for this special treatment. And the determination of whether an
eligible youth would be adjudged a Y.O. was left to the sound discretion of the court. n8
n6 N.Y. Code Crim. Proc. § 913e.
n7 Id.
n8 See Ludwig, supra note 3, Chapt. VIII.
In furtherance of the protective nature of the Youthful Offender Act, the legislation insured the secrecy of the
process through "sealed records," n9 and the creation of a "youthful offender" classification in place of a criminal
conviction. n10 The legislation specifically provided:
All of the proceedings and segregation had under the provisions of this title may be private and shall be conducted
in such parts of the court or judges' chambers as shall be separate and apart from the other parts of the court which are
then being held for proceedings pertaining to adults charged with crimes." (Emphasis added.) n11
n9 N.Y. Code Crim. Proc. § 913o.
n10 N.Y. Crim. Proc. § 913J.
n11 N.Y. Code Crim. Proc. § 913K; N.Y. Crim. Ct. Act § 31g.
As a result of that mandate Youth Parts were established in the courts of Special and General Sessions in New York
City. n12 In the part, a preliminary investigation was conducted by the Probation Department on motion of the district
attorney or the court, with the consent of the defendant. The investigation was to ascertain whether the youth's prior
conduct and background merited the court's adjudication of the defendant as a youthful offender. If the court found the
accused teenager eligible and suitable for Y.O. treatment, the teenager would be processed as a youthful offender. He
would be permitted to plead guilty as a Y.O. or entitled to a summary trial by the court without a judge. Any conviction
would result in a youthful offender adjudication rather than a criminal conviction. n13
n12 Court of Special Sessions, Youth Part Rules, adopted 1943, amend. 1945 Rules 1-4, Benders Rules of
the Court (1st ed. 1947), see Ludwig, supra note 3, p. 76, ftn. 12 for source of citation.
n13 See 1943 Annual Report of Court of Special Sessions for outline of Youth Part procedure.
In 1950, seven years after the youth part procedure went into effect, Judge Irving Ben Cooper, then Chief Judge of
the Court of Special Sessions, commented on the role of the court in dealing with youth crime:
We must make an effort to identify the youthful offender with good moral potential who can safely be returned to
the community, from the hairtrigger psychopathic first offender who needs institutional treatment.
He went on to say:
The great asset of this group (corrigible youths) is that communication with adults is still possible. They have not
utterly repudiated and walled-off the mature world. n14
n14 See 1950 Annual Report of Court of Special Sessions.
Judges were asigned to the youth part on a rotating basis. When a judge had approximately 50 youths under his
supervision as adjudicated and sentenced youthful offenders he was "rotated" to another part. n15
n15 1945 Annual Report of the Court of Special Sessions, p. 8.
These parts allowed the court to concentrate the resources of the Probation Department, charitable programs and
other counseling agencies in a single entity. These agencies were then able to alert the court to those youths who in
their judgment possessed sufficient potential to make them amenable to counseling or special supervision.
Judge Cooper, assessing the capacity of the youth part to implement the mandate of the youthful offender
legislation, stated:
The potential of the youth court procedure rests on the degree of knowledge which the court can secure of the
youth's character and background and the help which it can give him in mastering his impulses, resisting the force
exerted by associates and environment which tend to pull him into temptation, and through positive action and right
living gain a stabilized personality and a sound attitude toward community standards. n16
n16 1951, State of Courts Message, Court of Special Sessions, p. 8.
Within a few years of the legislation's enactment, it was apparent that the court's success with young offenders
depended largely on the amount of resources available in determining which youths were most suitable for re-education.
n17
n17 Id. at p. 13.
Since 1943 the resources of the criminal courts have been taxed by the increasing number of teenage defendants,
decreasing availability of funds and dwindling confidence in the ability of the courts to "rehabilitate" adolescent
offenders.
The strain on the court was evident in 1971 when the original Y.O. legislation was repealed and replaced by the
provisions which form the basis of our present Youthful Offender Law. Originally, the Youthful Offender statute
contemplated the early identification of a youth eligible and suitable for Y.O. treatment, with a preliminary investigation
initiated on the youth's first appearance in the part. n18 The new legislation postponed the determination of youthful
offender status and the probation investigation until the time of sentencing eliminating the need and expense of a
preliminary report. n19 The governor's memorandum in support of the legislation stated:
As a consequence of the shift of the determination of youthful offender treatment to the time of sentencing, only
one probation report for sentencing purposes will be compiled, the delay and cost of unnecessary probationary reports
will be avoided and valuable probation resources will be conserved and more productively re-allocated. n20
n18 See N.Y. Code of Crim. Proc. § 913g.
n19 See N.Y. Crim. Proc. Law § 720.20.
n20 Governor Rockefeller's statement on approving L.1971, c.981.
In addition to delaying the early identification, the new legislation entirely eliminated any direction to conduct
youth proceedings in separate parts. Nevertheless, despite this omission, the courts of criminal jurisdiction pursuant to
local court rules continued to maintain separate youth parts. n21
n21 Rule 1 of the Rules of the Criminal Court, eff. as of Sept. 1, 1962 established a part in each county of
the city, designated as Part Three for the: "Arraignment, pleadings, examination, trials and sentences of persons
who have reached the age of 16 years but have not reached the age of 19 years . . ." McKinney's 1980 New York
Rules of Court § 2950.1 (22 NYCRR § 2950.1).
The rules of the Supreme Court for each county in the City also provided for the separate treatment of
youths between the ages of 16 and 19: New York and the Bronx, McKinney's 1980 edition, Rules of the Court, §
666.3(c); Kings § 751, Queens § 796.8, and Richmond § 755.27.
Note that the aforesaid Rules of the Criminal and Supreme Court were rescinded eff. Jan. 6, 1986 upon the
promulgation of the Uniform Rules of the Courts of Criminal Jurisdiction. McKinney's New York Rules of the
Court 1987 edition, p. 500.
Public Confidence
Historically it must be noted that the enactment of the original Y.O. legislation was reflective of the popular belief
of the post World War II era that the various branches of government could effectively solve society's problems and that
the rehabilitation of those adolescents who engaged in antisocial or criminal behavior could be accomplished.
In recent years, however, government in general and the courts in particular have lost a great deal of the public's
confidence in treating our social ills. This pessimism is reflected in the public's hardening attitude toward young
offenders and an increased demand for more severe treatment of all criminal offenders regardless of age.
The pendulum has swung from the dominant rehabilitative goal of the 1940s, 50s and 60s to a demand for "just
desserts" for all criminal offenders. Many now believe that the ameliorative treatment of adolescent offenders has
outlived its usefulness; that the reason we have this explosion in youth crime is the "leniency" of the juvenile and
criminal courts. Some commentators have even questioned the continuing validity of the rehabilitation goal itself. n22
n22 See generally, Davis, Rights of Juveniles (1980), in particular § 1.3.
In 1978 the legislature, sensitive to the public outcry against juvenile crime as portrayed in the popular media,
enacted an omnibus crime control bill which created a new classification of "juvenile offender." n23 The Juvenile
Offender Law lowered the age of criminal responsibility to 13-, 14- and 15-year-olds charged with certain violent
crimes n24 and proscribed periods of mandatory imprisonment upon conviction. n25
n23 N.Y. Crim. Prox. Law § 1.20 (42).
n24 N.Y. Pen. Law § 30.00 (2).
n25 N.Y. Pen. Law § 60.10 (1), 70.05 (1). But note 14 and 15 year old juvenile offenders are eligible for
Y.O. treatment, N.Y. Crim. Proc. Law 720.10 (1).
The 1978 "get tough" legislation represented a retreat from the traditionally dominant rehabilitative philosophy in
favor of a more punitive policy as the sustaining rationale of our treatment of adolescent offenders.
As a result of this legislation, 13-, 14- and 15-year-olds accused of certain designated felony offenses were
subjected to the jurisdiction of the Criminal and Supreme Courts. The Juvenile Offender Law, like the 1971 Y.O.
legislation, did not include any provision directing that proceedings involving juvenile offenders be conducted in
separate parts. Consequently, they were processed along with other defendants regardless of age or charge.
By 1986, with the advent of court reorganization, the Court Rules providing for separate youth parts were
rescinded. The existence of special youth parts thereafter became a matter of discretion. n26
n26 See note 21, supra. Upon the promulgation of the Uniform Rules of the Court, eff. Jan. 6, 1986, the
rules providing for separate parts were rescinded. Research does not reveal any comparable rules in the Uniform
Rules. Section 200.2(b) of the Uniform Rules for courts exercising criminal jurisdiction 22 NYCRR § 200.2 (b)
provides, however, ". . . there shall be such parts as may be authorized to be established from time to time by the
chief administrator of the courts."
Operation of Youth Part
In 1982 and 1983, as a judge of the Criminal Court, I had the opportunity to preside over Part Three, one of two
youth parts maintained in Queens County Criminal Court. At that time Queens was the only county which continued to
process youths between the ages of 13 and 19 separately. My experience in that part reenforces my belief in its value.
Part Three served as a focal point for the myriad counseling programs available to young people. Many programs had
court workers who attended sessions of the court each day. The mandate of the part, required the court to assume
functions not customarily considered the traditional realm of judicial responsibility. n27
n27 Supra note 16, at p. 9.
For example, the monitoring of the progress of youths referred to counseling programs during the pendency of their
cases. Monitoring alerted the court to any non-compliance and to remind the youth of the court's interest in his
behavior. Essential to the Part's success was the willingness of the presiding judge to educate himself concerning the
nature of the counseling programs and their services, and to assume the responsibility of supervising a youth's progress.
When we deal with teenage offenders the criminal law is largely about neither criminals nor law but rather social
services and education.
Second Chance
The proper functioning of the part depended upon the cooperation and support of the District Attorney. The
Queens District Attorney's office, through the "Second Chance" program, initiated by District Attorney John J. Santucci,
diverted many teenage defendants from the normal process of the courts. Defendants considered eligible for Second
Chance had their cases adjourned for a lengthy period with the consent of the court. After satisfactorily completing
counseling and/or community service their cases were adjourned in contemplation of dismissal or dismissed. The
Second Chance program continues to function in Queens, despite the discontinuance of the youth parts.
In many respects, the Second Chance program is reminiscent of the Youth Counsel Bureau established in 1941 by
then District Attorney Thomas E. Dewey and expanded by his successor Frank S. Hogan. n28
n28 See Ludwig, supra note 3, Introduction of Adrian P. Burke, Judge, Court of Appeals, ps. V-VI for
description of program and its goals.
The Youth Counsel Bureau was a counseling program for arrested youths between 16 and 21 years of age who had
no substantial prior involvement with the law. At the conclusion of counseling the case would be dismissed on motion
of the District Attorney with the consent of the court. The Bureau functioned as an independent and unofficial agency
acting out of the District Attorney's office. It furnished, through referral to various private agencies, vocational
guidance, psychiatric service, medical attention and overall supervision. Its guiding principle was that proper guidance
and assistance in social and moral adjustment at a critical period in a youth's life might save him from a life of crime.
It is interesting to note that the efforts of the Youth Counsel Bureau came into play well before any adjudication or
disposition of the case. Immediately after an arrest, and during the pendency of the proceedings, an eligible youth could
receive assistance. In addition, the Bureau was designed to help a youth by providing counseling even after the
conclusion of his case and even if the court's jurisdiction ended through an acquittal or other dismissal of charges. The
Bureau's demise reflects a change of attitude and policy toward youth crime.
The Youth Officer
Many adolescents, after their experience with the criminal justice system or pending a disposition of their charges,
return to the same moral, material and social environment which contributed to their delinquency. It is at this juncture
that the need for meaningful contact with such a youth is vital. To that end a Youth Officer should be designated in
each precinct. He should be notified of those youngsters in his precinct that are involved with the judicial system.
Ideally, he should be available to contact the youth and provide mature, friendly and firm guidance to those youngsters
who are out on bail, involved with programs, on probation, or in some alternative sentencing program. He should be
familiar with the youth "hang outs," the trouble makers, those who have just returned from a prison sentence. He should
know the neighborhood, its people, and he should be familiar with the youth parts and the presiding judges.
It may not be practical or possible to process all cases of teenagers under age 19 in youth parts. The numbers may
be unmanageable. Discretion must be exercised as to which youths will be referred to a youth part or, if all youth cases
are referred to a youth part, which cases will remain in the part. Determining or identifying youths who should receive
special attention is a difficult matter and no exact science. In the final analysis, the precise manner of assigning cases
should be left to the enlightened discretion of the administrators and the judge presiding over the part. What is
important, however, is that the court provide a part, an apparatus where youths can be isolated and on the basis of
available knowledge those most likely to benefit from counseling identified.
There are several advantages that may be realized in establishing such a part: a more uniformed treatment of
teenage defendants, the concentration of court and private agencies dealing with youths, a greater diversion of teenage
offenders to private agencies for supervision and counseling thereby supplementing an already overworked and
overburdened Probation Department.
Perhaps, however, the most important advantage of a separate youth part is that it provides a unique opportunity to
utilize the court process and staff on behalf of the community. At the risk of sounding Quixotic, the youth part is the
place where we can reduce the crime rates of the future. If we can help a teenager unravel a drug program, a drinking
problem or find a rewarding job or return to school, then perhaps we can prevent him from doing further harm to the
community.
I envision a youth part under the leadership of motivated judge, with the help of a committed staff, cognizant of the
concerns of victim and society, reaching out through the impersonal facade of the court to a youth, his family, his
neighborhood and community. A youth part with modest goals, to avoid disenchantment, frustration and despair. Not a
panacea, but an apparatus through which imaginative and innovative ideas can be channeled. A part where the
atmosphere is such that the presiding judge would be able to recognize and respond to the salvageable youth.
The challenge of youth crime spans 40 years and affects several generations. The socialization of our youth is the
responsibility of the whole of our society and its institutions, not just the courts. Despite the convenient and politic
belief that the courts have the primary responsibility of controlling crime, the burden of the socialization of our youth
rests on all aspects of our society, family, school and community government. In reality the problems of youth crime
and the socialization of our youth can no longer be viewed as simply a matter of efficient law enforcement, if ever it
was. The problem is larger than that. The community brings its adolescent offenders to the courts to be dealt with and
the courts have the responsibility of dealing as effectively as they can with these offenders.
In my view, adopting these proposals would provide the court with the proper tools to meet that challenge. The
court must also lead the community by declaring that the "get tough" attitude is an oversimplified solution to a complex
problem. The problem is not that our laws are not tough enough. "Tough" laws do not build character, reduce poverty
or enhance employment skills, nor has all the rhetoric of "tough" talking politicians or judges. One need only open a
newspaper or turn on a television to know that our get tough approach has not resulted in a significant reduction in
youth crime.
In recommending the re-establishment of separate youth parts and its support apparatus, I'm not unmindful of
society's concern for protection from violent youths. These proposals are not intended to subvert the will of the
legislature or to replace the judicial process with executive justice. Neither are they an institutionalized form of letting
young people off. Moreover, I recognize that our treatment of youths in the past was based upon certain assumptions
and beliefs not entirely supported by empirical proof such as the ability of the courts to "rehabilitate" or to even
"identify" those capable of being influenced to modify their behavior.
Indeed many adolescent offenders have significant mental, emotional, educational and environmental problems that
prevent meaningful assistance, and society has no choice at present but to incarcerate them as a means of self protection.
However, I stand by the belief that no adolescent should be incarcerated unless every consideration has been given
to an alternative. The adolescent offender has always been a challenge to the court and it is fatally convenient to
incarcerate him simply because the pressures of time and a massive case load have prevented the opportunity of a
thorough investigation of his potential. Although reestablishment of youth parts may not be administratively
convenient, there are no acceptable alternatives.
As Chief Justice Sol Wachtler once had occasion to remark:
In this day of massive case loads and an overburdened criminal justice system, judicial economy is not a negligible
consideration . . . But the first order of business of the criminal courts is justice, not economy or convenience."
Conclusion
There is a battle waging outside the courts for the lives of our children and we may be losing it. It is being fought
in the streets. The enemy -- drugs, poverty, ignorance and greed. It is a war of attrition, and it will be a long and hard
fight to win back future generations of young people to a life of social fulfillment and usefulness. We must try to win
back one life at a time, one family at a time, one community at a time.
The proposals I have made are not new. Most of them would not involve vast expenditures of funds. They would
use to advantage, however, existing youth agencies. They would require a reassignment of personnel, a commitment of
cooperation between the Judiciary, District Attorneys and Police Department, a motivated judge, a conscientious court
staff. They represent a constructive response to the challenge of youth crime.
In deciding whether or not the effort would be worthwhile, I can think of no better way to end this article but to
quote a story concerning the great educator Horace Mann on the occasion of his dedication of a juvenile reformatory:
Mann's thesis was that all the money being spent for the reformatory will be justified if only one child were to be
saved. When he has finished a cynical listener asked Mann if he had not let his enthusiasm run away with him. 'Wasn't
Mann exaggerating,' the listener demanded, when he said the whole expenditure would be worthwhile if it saved a
single child. Horace Mann's reply was brief but eloquent:
'Not if it were my child.' n29
n29 Silberman, Criminal Violence -- Criminal Justice (1978) P. 370