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ADAPTABILITY AND MORALITY:
ON TRUTH AND BELIEF
IN A BUDDHIST SETTING
Paul Williams is Reader in Indo-Tibetan Studies
at the University of Bristol and a member
of the Shap Working Party on World Religions in
Education
DOES THE BUDDHA SPEAK THAT WHICH IS
HURTFUL?
Odium theologicum is not unique to the Western world,
or to theistic religions. There is a Buddhist scripture
which purports to tell how the great Jaina saint
Nataputta tried to trap the Buddha into looking foolish
by getting a local prince to place Nataputta’s supposedly
enlightened rival in an impossible dilemma. To be
honest the dilemma seems poorly constructed and
scarcely impossible, but we must remember that it is the
Buddhists who are telling this story. Anyway, our prince
was urged to ask the Buddha with greatest politeness if
he, the Buddha, is capable of saying things which are
disagreeable and disliked by others? The Buddha,
Nataputta fondly hopes, will only be able to reply with a
yes or no. If he says yes, then he is no different from
anyone else. If he says no, then - and if you have ever
seen Tibetan monks debating then you must imagine
that this is where the two hands are clapped together
triumphantly, a ‘clash of cymbals’ - why did the Buddha
once say to his erring cousin Devadatta that poor old
Devadatta has had it, he is incurable, and is heading for
a very nasty hell for a very long time?
According to Jaina tradition Nataputta (=Mahavira) was
omniscient. He should have known that the Buddha
rarely if ever answers anything with a straightforward
yes or no. The Buddha returns Prince Abhaya to the
immediate practical situation, the everyday world where
things are never so clear cut as dreamt of in our
dilemmas. While questioning the Buddha Abhaya had
been playing with a baby on his lap. What, suggests the
Lord, if the baby suddenly started choking on a stone
lodged in his throat. Would Abhaya not wrench the
stone out, even if the baby started crying and the prince
drew blood? To cause another pain, to cause another
suffering can be appropriate if it is within an immediate,
urgent and overriding context of salvation. Causing pain
can be an act of great compassion.
Having made his point the Buddha, the hero of our
piece, dances his favourite dance, the Dance of
Dialectical Distinctions, a metaphorical dance which has
become the delight of monks forbidden actual dancing.
It is possible to speak words which are not true,
pointless, and thoroughly unpleasant. But the Buddha
does not do that. Nor does a Buddha speak words which
are true, but pointless and unpleasant. He might
however speak words sometimes which are true, have a
point, but are nevertheless thoroughly unpleasant although he would be mindful of the appropriate time to
state compassionately home truths which he knows will
at least in the short term cause distress. Of course a
Buddha does not speak that which is not true and
pointless yet nevertheless sounds nice. Indeed he does
not even speak things which are true and sound nice if
they are pointless. The ‘point’ he is thinking of here
incidentally - the attha, the intended object or goal - is in
the last analysis the final goal, nirvana. In the last
analysis words are pointless unless they intend one way
or another liberation. But, the Buddha adds, he is
delighted to speak words which are true, have a point,
and are also pleasant to hear into the bargain. Even so,
he waits for an appropriate occasion.¹
DOES THE BUDDHA TELL LIES OUT OF
COMPASSION?
Thus the Buddha speaks what is true at an appropriate
time, but he does not baulk at saying things if the time is
right which may be hurtful. The overriding concern of
the Buddha is with the path to liberation, and his speech
is seen by Buddhists as uttered out of compassion with
that goal in mind. This means that in general the
Buddhist tradition taken as a whole has tended to stress
the pragmatic intention of the Buddha’s teachings. The
common image found in all Buddhist traditions is that of
the Doctrine, the Teaching, as being like a raft to carry
one across the ocean of transmigration to the far shore
of enlightenment. The pragmatic attitude to the doctrine,
practicality with a particular goal in mind, is clarified in
a very direct way in the early Mahayana traditions with
the device of ‘skill-in-means’ or ‘skilful means’
(upaya). Logically there are two alternatives apparently
ignored by the Buddha in his chat above with Prince
Abhaya. Could the Buddha perhaps speak that which is
false and is pleasant or even thoroughly unpleasant if it
has a point, is spoken out of compassion and is
appropriate to the context? In other words, could the
Buddha for genuinely altruistic and truly beneficial
reasons infringe one of the precepts to which it is hoped
all Buddhists will aspire, the avoidance of false speech?
One response would be to argue that false speech, which
is by definition a moral evil, simply could not have a
point, could not be beneficial in leading anyone to
enlightenment.² The pragmatic orientation of Buddhism
is doubtless one reason why in general there is an
immense diversity of philosophical doctrines across the
Buddhist world. This philosophical diversity - in
Buddhist terms a diversity of viewpoint is not matched,
however, by diversity in the moral or monastic (vinaya)
perspectives. Differences there certainly are, but in
general there is relative uniformity in monastic code and
moral expectation. All Buddhists would agree that, other
things being equal, a Buddhist who tries to keep the
Five Precepts - refraining from killing, stealing, sexual
immorality, lying and alcohol or mind-disturbing drugs
- would count as a good Buddhist, while one who
deliberately and self-centeredly infringes the precepts
would not. Having said that, however, in general the
reason for uniformity of morality is again pragmatic. It
is held to be simply the case that avoidance of wrong
doing and promoting good - explained through the
precepts - has appropriate temporal and ultimate
benefits for oneself and the wider society of sentient
beings.
But we know that historically there was a certain tension
felt sometimes in at least some Buddhist circles and at
least theoretically between a strict adherence to the
precepts and a need for compassionate adaptation, a
tension between precepts and pragmatics. We can see
the direction in which one stream of Buddhist thought
was moving here if we look at another scriptural source,
this time a parable from an early Mahayana text. The
Buddha is said to be like a father who bribes his
children to escape from a building which, unbeknown to
the children, is going up in flames. The father offers as
bribes play-chariots drawn by animals (the Indian
equivalent of go-carts and skate-boards). He offers
whatever bribe is necessary in order to get them to leave
the burning house (of transmigration, of course - the
nicest parables are the obvious ones). But when the
children are out, running pell-mell into his loving arms,
he does not necessarily give them what he promised.
Some were easily bribed with low-grade toys, but out of
his love he actually gives them all the same , the very
best quality Mk. 3 superduper play-chariot - that is to
say, when decoded, the Mahayana, for this story also
has its intra-Buddhist polemical dimension. Now, the
scripture itself raises the issue as to whether the father,
the Buddha, lied to his children? We are told that he
certainly did not. He would not have lied even if he had
given them nothing, no play-chariots at all. He simply
used his skill-in-means to adapt his message to the level
of those he wanted to reach. It is not that lying is
justified; rather the father is said not to have lied
because he did it in order to help others. Thus truth itself
depends upon purpose and ultimately on a
compassionate motivation. ³
PRAGMATISM - BUT NOT TRUTH?
This common pragmatic attitude to truth in Buddhism
should not be thought to entail that a teaching could not
therefore also articulate some final truth - the way things
genuinely, truly, are. After all, enlightenment itself is
commonly referred to as ‘seeing things the way they
really are’. The possibility of expressing this in
language is however a matter of some dispute within
Buddhism, since while some traditions (particularly in
East Asia) maintain that the final truth, ‘the way things
are’ cannot be articulated others (in the Geluk tradition
of Tibetan Buddhism, for example) think that there is a
real sense in which words can genuinely state the final
truth. For the first position anything articulated is not in
itself finally true, but purely pragmatic, just stated for a
particular beneficial effect. According to the second it is
possible to say in a real sense that some teachings are
more true than others, and there is a finally true
teaching. Indeed at least some teachings arc beneficial
because they are true, rather than true because they are
beneficial. All the different teachings of the Buddha and
indeed of other religions are very good and appropriate
at a particular stage on a path to enlightenment.
Nevertheless some teachings are nearer to the final
teaching than others. Crucially, however, normally this
is not thought in Buddhism to entail that all should
adopt or be converted to that final teaching. The general
feeling is that it is much more important to practise a
teaching appropriate to one’s own level, without
feelings of dogmatic attachment. A Buddhist considers
that there are many more lifetimes; it is not necessarily
the case that everything has to be perfectly right in just
this short lifetime. It is sometimes said by Tibetans that
we can tell which teachings are appropriate to our level
precisely by which teachings make sense, seem
coherent, to us. Thus from this perspective it would be
inappropriate to try and follow teachings which we feel
make no sense, even if those teachings may seem
coherent to - and therefore be appropriate for - others.
Of course it goes without saying that those Buddhist
traditions which think the ultimate truth can be known
and expressed in speech do not confuse the expression
of ultimate truth with direct awareness in meditative
experience.
BUDDHISM ANI) BELIEF
Belief (or faith) in the Buddhist context is generally held
to involve accepting the broad framework of karma,
rebirth, the possibility of enlightenment and so on which
provide the very structure within which Buddhist
practice makes sense and can take place. There is a
famous scriptural saying much beloved of the Dalai
Lama in which the Buddha is said to have maintained
that people should not accept what he says simply out of
respect for the Master, but should rather test carefully ‘as
a goldsmith test gold’. The Dalai Lama often states that
if what he himself has taught makes sense it should be
put into practice. If not, then it can just be left.
Nevertheless, certain things are very difficult to test, not
all people are capable of testing, and there are some
things which provide the very framework within which
testing can take place. In actual fact all Buddhist
traditions consider belief to be a virtuous mental state,
to have beneficial mental and practical results, and
absence of belief or doubt to be a rather negative state of
mind. Likewise, as far as I know all Buddhist traditions
hold one way or another that eventually a goal will be
reached where all the significant points originally held
on trust will be known directly and incontrovertibly as
they are. There is nothing from a Buddhist perspective
which is and always will remain a matter of belief. Even
in the so-called ‘faith-traditions’, such as the Japanese
Jodo Shinshu, the element of faith as it is normally
understood is transcended in the direct experience of
Buddhahood.4
ON MEETING WITH BUDDHISTS
A Buddhist takes refuge in the Triple Gem - the
Buddha, Doctrine, and Community - and will usually
have a clear conception of a moral requirement even if
that is not always lived. Beyond this, what it means to
be a Buddhist will vary from Buddhist tradition to
tradition. The pragmatic orientation has made Buddhism
adaptable to its cultural environment, and from the point
of view of meeting Buddhists in a Western context one
of the first requirements is a sensitivity to diversity, a
sensitivity which should prevent the assumption of one
Buddhist tradition as the norm from which others have
somehow deviated. Each Buddhist tradition considers
that it represents the true authentic teaching of the
Buddha. If followers of Mahayana traditions sometimes
resent the claim by Theravada to represent pure and
unadulterated the original Buddhism, Theravadins
resent the use of the term ‘Hinayana’ to refer to their
teachings, a polemical term which was coined by the
early Mahayana as an expression of disparagement and
means ‘Inferior Vehicle’. In spite of these historical
tensions however the cultural adaptability of Buddhism
has meant that Buddhists in the Western context have as
such faced little fundamental difficulty in beginning to
adjust to a new cultural setting and the presence of a
multi-religious and multi-cultural environment.
BUDDHISM AND OTHER RELIGIONS
Broadly speaking there are in traditional terms two
approaches taken by Buddhists to other religions. One is
to see all other religions as concerned with something
lower than enlightenment, with nirvana in actual fact the
concern of Buddhism alone. Thus other religions are to
do with temporal welfare, either in this life or the next in a heavenly realm, perhaps, seen by Buddhists as an
impermanent stage in the cycle of unenlightenment
(samsara). As such, provided there is no confusion,
there is no intrinsic reason why a Buddhist cannot take
part in the practices of other religions and still remain a
perfectly good Buddhist. Monks, who are supposed to
be concerned with enlightenment and not temporal
benefits, in theory should not participate. But laity may
and do. The other approach, common in modern
Western Mahayana circles, but with perfectly good
Indian scriptural ancestry, is to see other religions as
teachings of the (or, in Mahayana, a) Buddha adapted
out of skill-in-means to the level and cultures of those
who hear and believe. Again, this makes Buddhists very
adaptable. Christian events can be enjoyed by Buddhists
as particular expressions of the teaching of the Buddha,
although Tibetan Buddhists, for example, are reminded
not to take refuge in Christ as one who could lead to
enlightenment. Christianity should not be confused with
Buddhism.
BUDDHIST SENSITIVITIES
This very adaptability of Buddhists in terms, for
example, of their ability to attend Christian celebrations
and appreciate the religious activities of different
religions can lead however to a forgetting of the
Buddhist differences and consequently of Buddhist
sensitivities on the part of those teachers and others who
meet with Buddhists. It is problematic and can be
annoying for a Buddhist to be told that all religions
believe in God, or the soul. Even ‘the Divine’ is
problematic. It is worse to say that all religions seek
God, the Divine, and so on, or for the Buddhist to be
dismissed as really believing in these things because of
the way he or she see the Buddha, or nirvana. It should
be left to the Buddhist whether he or she really believes
the same as another religion on these issues. True ‘it all
depends what you mean by .....’, and the issue is
complicated by the very variety of Buddhist doctrinal
teaching. Nevertheless the Buddhist tradition is in
general quite clear that it does not accept the existence
of God, an omniscient, omnipotent creator, a person
who is at the same time the ultimate reality. Discussions
of creation in the world’s religions often, of course,
simply leave the Buddhists out. In the RE context to be
left out is also, I would imagine, difficult for a child.
THE WELFARE OF SENTIENT BEINGS
On the side of positive Buddhist involvement, Buddhist
children are often brought up to be particularly
concerned about the welfare of sentient beings. Indeed
this is one aspect of Buddhist teaching which, along
with the story of Shakyamuni Buddha, is easily
accessible to the younger child and repeated again and
again at Buddhist classes for children. A requirement to
take part in any school activity which will entail causing
harm to any sentient creature provides a serious moral
crisis’ for a Buddhist, requiring sensitivity on the part of
teachers. Many years ago I saw living worms boiled for
a dissection class. How should the Buddhist child
respond, particularly when he or she needs the good-will
of the teacher and exam success?
Meat-eating and vegetarianism is a particular interesting
issue. Historically, in Oriental countries, there has in
general been no requirement that monks and nuns, let
alone laity, should be vegetarian. The exception is East
Asia (mainly China, and excluding Japan), where
monks, nuns, and very pious lay adherents have tended
to be vegetarian. In India the renunciate, of which the
Buddhist monk provides an example, was expected to
be free of food taboos and, as someone who survived
through alms donations, eat whatever he was given.
Buddhism, however, teaches contentment, a lessening of
desires, and compassion. It is a feature of the
assimilation of Buddism into Western cultures that
Western Buddhists have tended to develop these
qualities in terms of a socio-political programme which
is avowedly ecological, broadly Green. Vegetarianism
has become an almost universal feature of Western
Buddhism, an article of faith, and many if not most
Western Buddhist children will be vegetarian. This by
no means follows, however, for children from
non-Western Buddhist cultures. The fact that
vegetariansim is so important to Western Buddhist
children, seen by them as part of the Buddhist emphasis
on compassion,5 can provide real problems in an
insensitive setting for children required to handle or
produce meat dishes as part of a food technology class,
for example. There are many ways in which the
insensitive teacher can make a vegetarian child feel
peculiar. For many Buddhist children - and many Hindu
children too, of course - to see meat, handle it, work
with meat by-products, or even eat vegetarian dishes
which have been in proximity with meat is simply
repulsive. To be urged by an insensitive teacher to have
anything to do with meat sets up a psychological tension
between the sense of compassion which the child seeks
to generate in him or herself, a sense of compassion the
child expects to find in teachers who are admired
role-models, and what he or she is being required to do.
The issue is moral and religious; in general for
Buddhists the two are never very far apart. It is also
social and political, and as more people become
vegetarian for ecological as well as moral reasons
perhaps a greater sensitivity to these aspects of the
perspective of the Buddhist child will emerge as a
natural response. Such is surely overdue.
NOTES:
1.
The Pali sutta from which this account comes is the
Abhayarajakumarasutta, contained in the Majjhima
Nikaya 1:392-6. I B Homer’s translation: The
Collection of Middle Length Sayings, vol. 2, Oxford:
Pali Text Society, 1989, pp.60-4.
2.
This approach is taken in an interesting if
controversial discussion
of
the
Abhayarajakumarasutta in K.N. Jayatilleke, Early
Buddhist Theory of Knowledge, London: George
Allen and Unwin, 1963, pp.358-9.
3.
This parable can be found in the Scripture of the
Lotus Blossom of the Fine Dharma, trans. Leon
Hurvitz, New York: Columbia University Press,
1976, pp.58ff. For a further discussion of this
scripture, and the theme of skill-in-means, see Paul
Williams, Mahayana Buddhism: The doctrinal
foundations, London: Routjedge, 1989, ch.7.
4.
It should be noted that ‘faith’ is however a rather
misleading translation of the Japanese shinjin, which
does not correspond with faith or belief as it is
normally understood in theistic discussions. For
more on faith in Buddhism, and Jodo Shinsu, see
Williams, 1989, ch.10.
5.
For an explanation of the traditional Buddhist view,
which in general does not see the person who eats
meat as responsible in a morally significant way for
killing, and therefore does not see meat-eating as
infringing the first precept and consequently
entailing vegetarianism, see my article on the
Buddhist perspective forthcoming in the new edition
of the Shap Handbook on World Religions in
Education, Heinemann, 1993.