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Mutually assured ambiguity
Jun 3rd 2013, 15:58 by Economist.com
How to play nuclear-armed poker
AMERICA, which has more deployed nuclear weapons than any other country, is open about
precisely how many warheads it has in what state of readiness. Russia is a little less so,
though it does share information with America. States with fewer nukes prefer not to give
many details of what they are holding. China, which is the only one of the five legally
recognised nuclear-armed states to be expanding its arsenal, according to the latest report
from the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, prefers this strategy. Iran, which is
not yet a nuclear state, seems to follow a different strategy. Analysts think that it may have so
many centrifuges spinning that it could enrich enough uranium for a bomb quite quickly—
within a couple of months. But it may not go as far as to build a bomb, for risk of provoking
both further sanctions and arms race in the region. Iran may thus invent a third category:
states with all the kit to build a nuclear bomb that are not technically nuclear-armed states.
Why Barack Obama may now be able to
start cutting nuclear weapons
Feb 23rd 2013 | From the print edition
FIRST there was the “open mic” incident last March when Barack Obama assured his Russian
opposite number, Dmitry Medvedev, that after his election he would have “flexibility” on the
subject of missile defence. Then came the briefest of sentences, in his state-of-the-union
address on February 12th, on the need to engage Russia in further reductions to nuclear
arsenals. But together they give a clue to what could become a lasting legacy of Mr Obama’s
two terms in office: a serious attempt to realise the commitment he made in Prague four years
ago when he promised to take “concrete steps towards a world without nuclear weapons”.
Those for whom the Prague speech was a rallying call have found Mr Obama, so far, a bit of
disappointment. True enough, he succeeded in getting the Senate to ratify the important but
relatively unambitious “New START” strategic arms-reduction treaty with Russia in 2010.
The treaty restored on-site inspections while limiting the number of deployed strategic nuclear
warheads on each side to 1,550 by 2018—a figure that Russia is already slightly below and
which America, with 1,720, is close to achieving ahead of time. It deals neither with nondeployed strategic warheads (America is reckoned to have 2,800 and Russia 1,000) nor
tactical warheads (America has around 500 and Russia more than 2,000) stockpiled by both
sides.
And not much has happened since. After the quadrennial “Nuclear Posture Review” in 2010,
which narrowed the declared role of nuclear weapons in American strategy, the administration
has dragged its feet over explaining how it would put it into practice. In 2011 it launched what
was meant to be a 90-day implementation study (NPRIS) that would determine how many
weapons and of which types America would need to deter attacks on itself and its allies in the
light of the changed relationship with Russia since the end of the cold war. But when the
NPRIS subsequently leaked, it was temporarily shelved to prevent it becoming a stick for
Republicans to beat Mr Obama with during his re-election campaign.
According to Daryl Kimball of the Washington-based Arms Control Association, the NPRIS
will be discussed at Mr Obama’s first post-election security cabinet meeting next month. The
president is wary of trying to get another treaty through the Senate, so he is contemplating
both accelerating the New START reductions and, if agreement can be secured with Russia,
moving below the ceiling, perhaps to 1,000 warheads—a figure that the joint chiefs of staff
have recently agreed would not put deterrence at any risk.
Tom Donilon, the White House national security adviser, is due to go to Moscow later this
month to discuss the proposal. To smooth the rough patches in the present relationship, Mr
Donilon may offer to delay the development of new high-speed interceptors in the fourth
phase of the European ballistic-missile defence system due for deployment in 2021. Mr
Obama is also believed to be keen to “de-alert” his nuclear forces from the hair-trigger,
launch-on-warning doctrine that still endures—something he could do with a stroke of the
pen.
Bruce Blair, co-founder of the Global Zero movement which campaigns for reducing and
eventually eliminating nuclear weapons, believes that Mr Obama could set in train a process
which would in time also lead to big cuts in the stockpiles of non-strategic and non-deployed
nukes. Neither has any military usefulness, but nobody pretends getting there would be easy,
particularly as tactical weapons remain more important to Russia—with its comparatively
weak conventional forces—than to America. But the prize for reducing stockpiles would be
the chance to draw other nuclear states with much smaller arsenals, such as China, into a
multilateral negotiation. That “holy grail”, as Mr Blair calls it, will not be reached, if ever,
until well after Mr Obama has gone. But if he could claim to have started the quest, it might
be just the legacy he yearns for.
From the print edition: United States
Nuclear weapons
Testing times
Feb 12th 2013, 14:59 by M.S.
NORTH KOREA’S third nuclear test on February 12th (and its first for nearly four years)
comes just two months after it launched a “weather observation” satellite into orbit. Both were
in defiance of UN sanctions against the pariah state’s nuclear programme. The significance of
this most recent underground test is that it is claimed to involve a powerful miniaturised
device that could be small enough to attach to a missile.
North Korea is now virtually alone in conducting nuclear-weapons tests, as the chart below
shows. Pakistan and India last carried out tests in 1998, while France and China conducted
their last underground tests in 1996 just before signing the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty
(CTBT). Although the CTBT has yet to come into effect because several states
(America, China, Egypt, Iran and Israel) have signed but not ratified it, while India, North
Korea and Pakistan have not yet signed it, the treaty has exerted a degree of moral force.
Experts disagree over the usefulness of testing. Technologically sophisticated nuclear states
that have collected data from tests in the past appear able to rely on computerised simulations
to ensure the continued effectiveness of their nuclear arsenals. But some American critics of
the treaty contend that at some point it may be necessary to carry out tests again to ensure the
safety of ageing weapons, most of which are now well over 20 years old. However, for North
Korea, as it has been for other emerging nuclear weapons states, testing is above all a political
act, a declaration of technical proficiency and military power. The world seems to have
decided on a policy of uneasy containment and isolation as far as a nuclear-armed North
Korea is concerned. That is unlikely to be the response if Iran, which has shared missile and
nuclear technology with North Korea for years, becomes the next country to test a device. In
Iran’s case, a test alone would be regarded as an act of war by Israel and, probably, America
too.
Missile diplomacy
Dec 12th 2012, 16:45 by Economist.com
North Korea's rockets
ON DECEMBER 12th Kim Jong Un, leader of North Korea's tin-pot regime, caught his own
people and the rest of the world off-guard by launching an Unha-3 rocket into space and
possibly putting a rudimentary satellite into orbit. The timing, just before the first anniversary
of the death of his rocket-loving father, Kim Jong Il, appeared to be aimed primarily at
solidifying the young Mr Kim’s leadership, as well as bolstering his popularity among his
oppressed subjects. Beforehand, news of the proposed launch was censored in North Korea,
possibly because of the embarrassment that ensued in April, when a previous Unha-3 rocket
flopped in front of the world’s media. Today’s success was broadcast with great fanfare.
Experts said the same technology it takes to put a 100kg satellite into orbit could be the first
step towards firing an intercontinental ballistic missile with an equivalent payload at America,
provided that North Korea could also master re-entry and accuracy.
See full article.
North Korea’s rocket launch
Space cadet
Dec 12th 2012, 10:35 by H.T. and D.T. | SEOUL
KIM JONG UN, the boyish leader of North Korea, is showing a flair for publicity stunts,
albeit defiant and dangerous ones. On December 12th his tin-pot regime caught his own
people and the rest of the world off-guard by firing a rocket into space and possibly putting a
rudimentary satellite into orbit.
The timing, less than a week before the first anniversary of the death of his rocket-loving
father, Kim Jong Il, appeared to be aimed primarily at solidifying the young Mr Kim’s
leadership clique as well as bolstering his popularity among his oppressed subjects, South
Korean officials said. But there were also important international ramifications.
Experts said that the same technology it takes to put a 100kg satellite into orbit could be the
first step towards firing an intercontinental ballistic missile with an equivalent payload at
America, provided the re-entry expertise and accuracy were good enough. American and
Canadian defence officials, working together, cautiously confirmed that “the missile deployed
an object that appeared to achieve orbit.” Jonathan McDowell of the Harvard-Smithsonian
Centre for Astrophysics points to an object now orbiting the earth, dubbed “39026, 2012072A”, which would appear to correspond with a new North Korean satellite.
The launch success seems to represent a significant ratcheting up of the country’s “hard
power”. But it also raises the stakes in the outside world’s dealings with the rogue regime, at a
time of new administrations in America and China. It comes just before elections in South
Korea on December 19th. In those elections, both presidential candidates have spoken of
increased engagement with the North, after a prolonged and tense standoff under South
Korea’s outgoing president, Lee Myung-bak.
South Korea and Japan, which is also in the midst of an election campaign in which regional
security is a serious issue, swiftly condemned the launch. America called it “a highly
provocative act” that violated United Nations sanctions barring the nuclear-armed regime
from carrying out ballistic-missile activities. The three countries had pressured North Korea
beforehand to abandon its intentions. Even China, the regime’s strongest backer, had
expressed concern about the violation of UN sanctions. It maintains that the North has the
right to a space programme. But afterwards it expressed its “regret” over the rocket launch.
It is unclear how strongly the UN will react to the news. In April, when the new Kim regime
conducted a failed rocket launch in defiance of international opposition, the UN Security
Council issued a “presidential statement” condemning the action, strengthening sanctions on
the regime, and warning of further measures if another launch were conducted. However,
Beijing, which sits on the security council, is reportedly concerned that too much pressure on
Pyongyang may force it to stage a third nuclear test. China-watchers say the country’s priority
is ensuring stability on the Korean peninsula, and sees the denuclearisation of North Korea as
only a secondary and perhaps unrealisable goal.
Some analysts believe the timing of the launch, in the run up to end-of-year holidays, may
cushion some of its impact. While there is little doubt that the UN will address the matter
seriously, it is also possible that a new South Korean government next year may seek to put it
to one side and lead the way in trying to re-engage North Korea to pursue reforms. “This is
good timing for North Korea. There are two weeks to make a fuss, and then the new year
provides everyone with a chance to move on, both psychologically and politically,” said
Narushige Michishita of the Tokyo-based Graduate Institute for Policy Studies.
Beforehand, news of the proposed launch was censored to North Korean citizens, possibly
because of the embarrassment that ensued in April, when the previous rocket flopped in front
of the world’s media. Today’s success was broadcast with startling fanfare. In contrast to the
tear-choked delivery by a black-clad television announcer on December 17th 2011 that the
elder Kim had died, a presenter dressed in pink robes triumphantly barked out the news of the
rocket’s success.
In Pyongyang, Kyodo, a Japanese news agency, said people’s elation was tinged with
surprise. Certainly it was ecstatic: "I just don't know how to express my joy about the news," a
waitress gushed. "I cannot imagine how happy [the late] General Secretary Kim Jong Il will
be after hearing this wonderful news."
Though North Korea had announced its space plans to the outside world, the actual news of
the launch was unexpected, when it came. Only days before, North Korea had extended the
timeframe for the rocket’s takeoff, due to unexplained glitches.
On December 11th, what now look like erroneous reports from South Korea had said that the
Unha-3 rocket was being dismantled at the Sohae space station northwest of Pyongyang.
There may have been some wishful thinking involved. Tacitly, the two siblings have been
engaged in a space race ever since the North unsuccessfully sought to launch its first rocket in
1998. Then only last month the tech-savvy South failed in its third attempt to put a satellite
into orbit, partly because of faulty Russian technology.
But North Korea’s crowing should be put into perspective. Even if it has put a satellite into
space, experts say it is only likely to be able to send the grainiest of video images back to
Pyongyang. Those pictures may simply confirm what much of the outside world already
knows: that the country is so deprived of electricity it is pitch black at night, compared with
the brilliant glow across South Korea, Japan and much of China.
(Picture credit: AFP, NASA)