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4.4 Finance – useful resources Some useful resources A useful booklet explaining the Global Financial Crisis: http://www.bankofengland.co.uk/education/Pages/resources/financialsystem/fs.aspx The Open University ‘Open learn’ programme has an excellent range of podcasts/videos linked to the Global Financial Crisis: http://www.open.edu/openlearn/money-management/management/the-bankingcrisis-cause-and-effect The Bank of England has a selection of animated videos called ‘The role of the Bank of England, parts 1-7’. These can be found on the Bank of England’s video You Tube link. Other useful videos listed on the Bank of England website include titles such as ‘Why do financial markets matter’ and ‘What is stress testing’. Useful to look at topical articles from newspapers or journals such as The Economist on the internet, e.g. The Economist featured an article on 4 August 2014 called ‘What macro prudential regulation is, and why it matters’ and The Guardian has an article titled ‘This is no recovery, this is a bubble-and it will burst’ by Ha-Joon Chang on 24 February 2014. Tutor2u is likely to include a range of resources on this topic area. Knowledge, Application, Analysis and Evaluation Knowledge In terms of the Global Financial Crisis, there are some key points which will aid students’ understanding of topic 4.4 in general: these are summarised in this section. At any point in time, only a small fraction of depositors at a bank would wish to withdraw their money in cash. Banks must ensure that they have enough liquid assets (those easily convertible into cash) to ensure they can meet cash requirements from customers. Assets are money value items which a bank owns. Loans to customers, such as a small bank loan to a business or a mortgage for a household, will be an asset for the bank. These loans generate an income for the bank over time, in terms of interest. However, some of these assets will be illiquid – the bank will not be able to quickly get the cash value in the short run. Customers hold deposits at banks. These are liabilities for the bank, since the monetary value belongs to the customer and not the bank. Shareholder capital or equity is also a liability since it will generate a payment to shareholders over time in the form of dividends. Banks create money by lending; they have an incentive to lend as much as possible, since the interest they gain on these loans will make a profit for the bank. However, they must ensure that they have enough liquid assets to support these extra deposits for individuals. One of the key roles of a central bank is to act as a lender of last resort. On a particular day, the bank may have an unexpected number of customers who want to withdraw cash. If the bank has insufficient liquidity that day, they can borrow from other banks; or the central bank may be needed to step in and provide liquidity. This prevents a bank run; this is when customers, partly linked to herd behaviour, start to panic that the bank has run into difficulty – so everyone starts to want their money in cash. If withdrawals by a bank’s depositors are greater than its cash and liquid assets, then the bank will fail. This can cause contagion, if not dealt with promptly, when all banks are affected by a fall in confidence. 4.4 Finance – useful resources A fundamental problem kick started the Financial Crisis in 2007/08. Many bank assets became ‘bad debts’ (never to be repaid), so the value of their assets fell. From 2007 banks began to experience liquidity problems as interbank lending froze; they were unwilling to lend to each other since there was uncertainty about which banks were exposed to these bad debts. Northern Rock was frozen out of the interbank lending market, its liquidity dried up, so the Bank of England had to intervene quickly to halt a bank run which had started. Liquidity support was provided to Northern Rock in September 2007, but ultimately the government nationalised Northern Rock to protect taxpayer interests. However, it soon became clear that the scale of the bad debt exposure was significant within the financial market as a whole, requiring the Bank of England to step in to provide large scale liquidity support: acting as lender of last resort. The bad debt exposure also created an insolvency crisis. Shareholder’s capital can absorb the loss from any bad debt exposure (it acts as a shock absorber if risky loans make unexpected losses), but if this is not sufficient, the bank becomes insolvent. It owes more money – its liabilities (such as the value of its customer deposits) than it owns – its assets (such as loans to others). One insolvent bank will spark insolvency shocks for other banks, since any previous loans to the insolvent bank, part of the assets of the bank, will have to be written off – they will not get repaid. In 2007/08 the government/taxpayer stepped in to provide capital to some banks – recapitalisation package for the Royal Bank of Scotland and Lloyds (the taxpayer then became a part owner) and made loans to some insolvent banks. The government worked with the Bank of England to support the role as lender of last resort since the scale of the crisis was so significant. The cost of the Financial Crisis was to plunge economies into recessions. In the UK the scarcity of liquidity pushed up the cost of borrowing and reduced the availability of loans for businesses and individuals. Confidence was also shattered. This meant the Financial Crisis (both a liquidity and insolvency crisis) made a direct hit on the real economy, causing aggregate demand to fall and unemployment to rise. The risk of the whole financial system collapsing from a liquidity crisis and/or insolvency crisis is called systemic risk. The central bank will want to reduce this risk by regulating the financial sector and acting as lender of last resort. Regulation of financial markets (both within the UK, EU and globally) was significantly tightened after the Financial Crisis A key role of regulation is to ensure that a bank holds sufficient capital to protect customer deposits at its bank and holds enough liquid assets. Even the risk of insolvency or a liquidity crisis can cause a bank run, as depositors lose confidence. Microprudential and macroprudential regulation aims to create financial stability. 4.4 Finance – useful resources Application The market failures need to be applied to the financial sector. Some examples of application include: Asymmetric information Collateral Debt Obligations (CDOs) were complex financial products, created by financial institutions, and then traded within the financial sector. They contained a pool of sub-prime mortgages and other loans. The buyers often had difficulty assessing the ‘true’ level of risk associated with these assets, due to their complex nature. The PPI scandal of the 1990s and 2000s. Consumers were sold unnecessary insurance policies, at exploitatively high prices, when they took out loans such as mortgages and credit cards. Consumers did not understand whether they needed the insurance, whether it was necessary to buy from the lender or they could shop around, and what precisely they were being covered for. They were oversold insurance which many of them didn’t need. Regulators often possess inadequate information to regulate banking activity effectively, due to the complexity of the products or systems created by financial institutions. The problem is compounded by regulatory capture Speculation and market bubbles These bubbles are often fueled by speculative behaviour in the financial markets that the value of an asset will rise. In the housing market, irresponsible mortgage lending can also fuel a housing price rise which is way beyond its objective value. Panic selling then sets in, creating a fall in the asset value and a fall in confidence. The Swiss bank, UBS, reported in 2014 that London property was the most overvalued in the world with high risk that the bubble will burst. Since 2013 real London house prices have increased by 40%; key causes are foreign investors and ‘right to buy’ schemes fueling demand. Moral hazard Banks will be willing to take more risks in their banking activities, to potentially benefit the bank and the banker, because any negative costs or consequences which result will be felt by someone else, such as the government/ taxpayer or shareholder. The central bank is a lender of last resort: they will usually step in with extra funding to prevent a bank collapsing. This role of the central bank, combined with bankers’ bonuses being tied to making high short run profits with a minimum secure salary, gives bankers a real incentive to take on unacceptable risk in their lending behavior. This excessive risk taking was the prime cause of the 2007/08 Financial Crisis. Although the government is always likely to act as lender of last resort, new global rules proposed in 2014 (and to take effect by 2019) by the Financial Stability board (an international body – the current chairman is Mark Carney), requires ‘’globally systemically important banks’’ to hold more reserves to cover any losses they make (the banks will have to increase their capital: assets ratio) This would mean shareholders will bear an increasing burden of any future banking crisis, rather than the taxpayer. This helps to remove some of the moral hazard problem, since the costs of unacceptable risk taking are now felt by the bank via its shareholders. In April 2013 the European parliament approved capping bankers’ bonuses to double bankers pay, or triple with shareholders’ approval, to remove the incentive of unacceptable risk taking. In June 2015 the Bank of England and FCA have proposed that any bank involved in an investigation for misconduct will put the bonuses of their most senior managers at risk of being clawed back for 10 years. This is to link pay rewards with 4.4 Finance – useful resources responsible banking activity – ‘to discourage irresponsible risk taking and shorttermism’. Market rigging The LIBOR rate fixing scandal and the rigging of foreign exchange markets have been highlighted in the press in recent years. In June 2015 it is also reported that ‘The fair and Effective Markets Review’ proposes new laws to make it illegal to manipulate markets, such as the foreign exchange market. This would make individuals more personally accountable; rather than just fines for the institutions involved. Externalities Market failure in the financial sector in 2007/08 imposed high external costs on the real economy, beyond the costs to the financial markets themselves. These external costs fall on the taxpayer and government, and firms and individuals in general as GDP falls and unemployment rises. According to the National Audit Office, at its peak, UK taxpayers’ direct subsidies to banks was just over £1 trillion. Role of the Bank of England and government The Bank of England provided liquidity support and loosened monetary policy in response to the crisis. Quantitative easing was introduced. The Government bailed out specific banks with state investment and relaxed fiscal policy. Regulation of the banking industry was also tightened up. In the UK, in 2012, 3 bodies were set up to improve financial regulation; The Financial Policy Committee, The Prudential Regulation Authority and The Financial Conduct Authority. Analysis Students will need to be able to analyze why some types of market failure are a feature of financial markets. Detailed knowledge of new regulations will not be required; but recognition of why they are necessary (how in principle they target the market failure) is important. The impact of the market failure, in terms of the effect on individuals and the economy as a whole, is also important. Some examples: Asymmetric information The asymmetric information, between the original lenders of subprime mortgages, the financial institutions who then packaged up the CDO’s and the subsequent buyers, combined with the US housing bubble bursting, meant that interbank lending froze. Banks were unwilling to lend to each other, since no one knew to what extent another bank was exposed to what could be worthless assets (bad debts). This caused a liquidity crisis 2007/08, where credit in general became scarce and also sparked an insolvency crisis. The consequences were a collapse in aggregate demand and confidence. Asymmetric information in general, such as in the PPI scandal, means that consumers are exploited and there is over supply of certain types of financial products. Resources will be inefficiently allocated. Externalities Bankers only take into account the private costs and benefits of a ‘risky’ trading activity. Private costs might include the cost to the bank of a default, the cost to the banker of losing his job. Private benefits might include the high return if the activity is successful – both for the bank and the individual banker. The external cost of managing risk is not considered: the real cost to the economy if the whole system 4.4 Finance – useful resources starts to collapse e.g. chance of crisis triggering a fall in confidence, fall in aggregate demand, rise in unemployment, opportunity cost of taxpayer’s bail out etc. These external costs need to be internalized, for example, a bank levy and/or regulation needs to be more effective to ensure banking activity is at the ‘optimum level’ Moral hazard The central bank’s role as lender of last resort is likely to always create some moral hazard. However, regulation requiring banks to hold more reserves/capital so that they and their shareholders can survive big losses without resorting to the taxpayer, will reduce this market failure. Individual bankers may also be less willing to take risks if their asymmetric compensation structures are reformed through regulation. In good times, bankers stood to gain large bonuses if their risky behaviour proved successful, but if it failed, they still earnt a high salary. The bonus cap should reduce the personal incentive for bankers to take unacceptable high risk. Speculation and market bubbles The causes of speculative bubbles can be linked to herding behaviour by consumers, unsustainable lending by financial markets which fuel the boom and exaggerated expectations of growth in the price of the asset. However, something happens to burst the bubble. The impact on aggregate demand can be discussed with reference to the wealth effect on consumption and the impact of confidence on consumption. Market rigging The link to collusive behaviour can be made. Market rigging will distort the fair working of the market; the market is being manipulated to send out wrong signals about the market e.g. Barclays, in the Libor scandal, wanted to look like it had more liquid assets than it actually had. Manipulating the key lending rate between banks then affects the ‘price of money’ for millions of home loans and mortgages. Consequences of market failure in the financial sector Students need to be aware that the impact on the real economy in terms of real GDP, unemployment, inflation will be significant if there is a financial crisis caused by market failure; this is because banks underpin the functioning of the modern economy and the availability and cost of loans will affect most households and firms; hence the strong link with spending in an economy. This means effective regulation is particularly important. Evaluation The 2007/08 Financial Crisis had a massively negative impact on economies globally. The size of the market failure was large, but this must be balanced with the contribution of the financial sector to an economy i.e. link to the role of financial markets and the contribution of the financial sector to the UK’s GDP. The issue of government failure. Any regulation may never be wholly effective; perhaps particularly for financial markets. Due to the complexity of products created, there may always be asymmetric information, making it hard for regulators to have perfect information. It is, perhaps, also a market where there is greater scope for ‘regulatory capture’ since the financial sector has high rewards for any regulator, in the future, choosing to work in the sector. It is also fast moving, so any regulation may be ‘out of date’ very quickly and financial institutions may quickly find a way round the regulations e.g. growth of shadow banking. Regulation to reduce market failure may cause some negative consequences, which are minimized if they are adopted globally, rather than just within a single country or group of countries, such as the EU. For example, in 2014 the UK bank levy cost 4.4 Finance – useful resources HSBC £720m: this prompted them to threaten to move out of the UK where it is cheaper. A fall in foreign direct investment would have a significant negative impact on the UK’s GDP. In theory a tax on banks, such as a bank levy, if set correctly, could internalize the external costs and reduce ‘risky’ trading to its optimum level. However, regulators will have difficulty putting a monetary measure on the external cost of banking activities. Much of the unacceptable risky banking activity, which contributed heavily to the 2007/08 Financial Crisis, was linked to moral hazard. For this to change, it may be important to let more banks fail; although the short run external costs would be extremely high. That way the culture of banking may change, so the size of market failure in this sector falls over time. The UK is particularly prone to housing bubbles, because a high proportion of householders own houses and because there is scarcity of new housing with a growing population.