Download Infinitarian Ethics AC

Infinitarian Ethics AC
[I affirm.]
Economist Thomas Pugel1 defines economic sanctions as “
Discriminatory
restrictions or
complete
bans on
economics exchange, designed to punish the target country or countries.” [Thus, economic
sanctions are distinct from other punitive measures in that they aim to punish nations at large
rather than single persons and do so specifically by restricting trade.]
From Merriam-Webster’s2, “ought” expresses obligation.
[This definition is most contextually appropriate, since we use “ought” to express
advisability or desirability only with respect to self-regarding actions, e.g. in Merriam-Webster’s
the case given for that use is “ought to take care of yourself”. In the topical context of
potentially thousands of lives saved or lost, it’s absurd to talk about acts as merely “desirable”.]
[“Not” just negates “ought”, meaning first, that the neg has a textual burden to prove
the converse of the topic, namely that sanctions ought be used; second, that moral neutrality is
aff ground, in that I have to show that sanctions are not obligatory but not that they’re morally
proscribed, meaning you presume aff in absence of clear neg offense; and third, that arguments
about the emptiness of normative language are grounds to affirm, in that they render all positive
moral assertions false and thus their negations true.]
The qualifier “to achieve foreign policy objectives” limits the range of justifications for
sanctions we’re debating. Showing that sanctions are justified by deontic moral rules or by their
protective effect on domestic industries in the sanctioning country, for instance, wouldn’t negate
1
Thomas Pugel (Ph.D. in Economics from Harvard University in 1978; Professor of Economics and International
Business at the Stern School of Business, New York University), International Economics (Hill-McGraw textbook),
12th edition, 2004, http://highered.mcgraw-hill.com/sites/0072487488/student_view0/glossary.html
2
http://m-w.com/dictionary/ought [“used to express obligation <ought to pay our debts>, advisability <ought to take
care of yourself>, natural expectation <ought to be here by now>, or logical consequence <the result ought to be
infinity>”]
1
since it shows that sanctions ought be used for those reasons, but not to achieve foreign policy
objectives. [Letting the neg claim any desirable outcome or feature of a foreign policy as a
“foreign policy objective” clearly violates the textual meaning of the topic in that it makes the
qualifier vacuous, so that the topic might as well just have said “ought not be used”.]
[The aff has the right to frame the debate to facilitate AC argumentation and compensate
for time skew, so you prefer my reading of the topic so long as my arguments are reasonably
topical and open to substantive answers.]
As implied by the word “ought” in the resolution, I value morality. A basic adequacy
condition for any moral theory is that it provide positive ethical prescriptions at least where there
are strong intuitions in play, i.e. that it tells us how to act in important cases. In choosing
between two goods of similar magnitude where a clear quantitative comparison of values is
impossible, or when faced with a conflict between essential rights, it’s plausible to say that
morality gives no definitive prescription and leaves both options permissible. But any ethical
theory that can’t at least tell us that clear moral bads like the Holocaust should be avoided
defeats the purpose of such theories to both guide action and explain our strongly held ethical
intuitions. Since ethical truths can’t be observed in the empirical world or arrived at through
formal deduction, intuitions are the only basis for ethical theorizing and theories that don’t come
close to explaining them should be rejected. Thus, the meta-standard is preserving prescriptive
strength of normative theories. This standard acts as a tool by which to compare the normative
frameworks put forward by each debater—thus, the neg has a burden to show that his/her
impacts function within a framework that preserves ethical prescription.
All moral theories are based on theories of value, since for some actions or states of
affairs to be better than others they must share some common property that makes them better;
2
otherwise ethics could consist only of arbitrary assertions. But theories of value by themselves
don’t determine an ethics since we also have to decide how to treat values, i.e. whether they
should be maximized, respected as side constraints, et cetera. Ends-based theories like
utilitarianism seek to maximize the total aggregate of values like pleasure or preferencesatisfaction. But, under plausible empirical conditions, all such theories fail to meet the metastandard of preserving normative prescription. Nick Bostrom3 writes: “Recent cosmological
evidence suggests that the world is probably infinite.
Moreover,
[I]f
the totality of physical existence
[it] is
indeed infinite, in the kind of way that modern cosmology
, then it contains an infinite number of galaxies, stars, and planets. If there are an infinite
suggests it is
number of planets then there is, with probability one, an infinite number of people. Infinitely
many of these people are happy, infinitely many are unhappy. Likewise for other local properties
that are plausible candidates for having value
many democratic states, infinitely many
and
that are
—there are infinitely
, pertaining to person‐states, lives, or entire societies, ecosystems, or civilizations
ruled by despots, etc.” Bostrom 2 continues:
“Suppose the world [does] contain an infinite number of people
s
and a corresponding infinity of joys and sorrows, preference satisfactions and frustrations, instances
of virtue and depravation, and other such local phenomena at least some of which have positive or negative value. More precisely, suppose that there is some finite value ε such that there exists an infinite number of local phenomena (this could be a subset of e.g. persons, experiences,
characters, virtuous acts, lives, relationships, civilizations, or ecosystems) each of which has a value ≥ ε and also an infinite number of local phenomena each of which has a value ≤ (‒ ε). Call such a world canonically infinite.
hold that value is aggregative imply that
of [both] positive
value
and
an infinite quantity of
amount of good or bad. Yet
a canonically
[such an] infinite world contains an infinite quantity
negative value.
in cardinal arithmetic,
{Ethical theories that
This gives rise to a peculiar predicament. We
[But we] can do only a finite
adding or subtracting a finite quantity does not change an
infinite quantity. Every possible act of ours therefore has the same net effect on the total amount
of good and bad
in a canonically infinite world:
[namely] none whatsoever. Aggregative consequentialist theories are
[thus] threatened by infinitarian paralysis: they seem to imply that
if the world is canonically infinite then
it is always
Nick Bostrom (Professor at University of Oxford, director of Oxford’s Future of Humanity Institute, PhD from
London School of Economics), “The Infinitarian Challenge to Aggregative Ethics,” 2008,
http://www.nickbostrom.com/ethics/infinite.pdf
3
3
ethically indifferent what we do
holocaust
or prevent one from occurring.
}4
. In particular, they would imply that it is ethically indifferent
If any non‐contradictory normative implication is a reductio ad absurdum, this one is.
[e.g.] whether we cause [or prevent] another
”
Thus, aggregative theories fail in an infinite universe. Bostrom 3 explains why we
probably live in one: “In the standard Big Bang model
, assuming the simplest topology (i.e., that space is singly connected),
there are three
basic possibilities: the universe can be open, flat, or closed. Current data suggests a flat or open
universe, although the final verdict is pending. If the universe is either open or flat, then it is
spatially infinite at every point in time and the model entails that it contains an infinite number of
galaxies, stars, and planets. There exists a common misconception which confuses the universe
with the (finite) ‘observable universe’. But the observable part
infinitesimal fraction of the whole.
—the part that could causally affect us—
would be just an
Statements about the “mass of the universe” or the “number of protons in the universe” generally refer to the content of this observable part; see e.g. [1].
cosmologists [also] believe that our universe is just one in an infinite
adds to the probability that the world is canonically infinite
ensemble of universes (a
; for a popular review, see [2].
Many
multiverse , and this
)
”
Even if the world might be finite, we should prefer ethical theories that don’t depend on
contingent facts of nature. Bostrom 4: “We do not know for sure that we live in a[n]
canonically
infinite
world. Contemporary cosmology is in considerable flux, so its conclusions should be regarded as
tentative. But it is definitely not reasonable, in light of the evidence we currently possess, to
assume that we do not live in a[n]
canonically
infinite world. And that is sufficient for the predicament to
arise. Any ethical theory that fails to cope with this likely empirical contingency must be
rejected. We should not accept an ethical theory which, conditional on our current best scientific
guess about the
es
size and
nature of the cosmos, implies that it is ethically indifferent whether we cause
or prevent another holocaust.”
4
Slow down and emphasize bracketed section.
4
Thus, ethical theories can’t be based on seeking to maximize aggregate quantities of
value[, and at best under any such theory you’d affirm on face since we can’t be obligated either
way with respect to sanctions]. Instead, ethics must place constraints on the distributional profile
of values between ethical subjects, i.e. the distribution of benefits and burdens between persons
and whether this distribution is intrinsically fair or is brought about fairly. While there’s of
course infinite fairness and unfairness in an infinite world, such distributional theories imply that
acts are right or wrong independent of how they impact any total quantity in the universe. There
are many distributional theories, e.g. deontic ones that think distributions should be based on
respect for the rational will of subjects or Rawlsian ones that think they should be based on the
abstract desirability of various distributional profiles. But all such theories seek to lay down rules
for treating people fairly which seek to provide a non-arbitrary basis for action. Thus, the
necessary standard under any non-aggregative theory is avoiding arbitrary harm to persons. This
standard is necessarily agent-centered since if I were responsible for preventing all inflictions of
arbitrary harm by others, the best I could seek to do would be to minimize them, which would
collapse into aggregationalism. Thus, the standard just implies a moral duty for agents not to
inflict arbitrary harm themselves.
I contend that coercive interference with private exchange, conducted through the
enforcement of sanctions policies, inflicts massive arbitrary harms on persons.
First, sanctions inflict arbitrary harm on civilians in the target state. Charles Rarick5
writes: “The theory
operating
behind sanctions is to cause as much pain as possible to the people of a
receiving country in order for pressure to be brought on the government. The citizens of the
5
Charles Rarick (Professor of Management, Barry University), and Martine Duchatelet. 2008. Economic A airs. An
Ethical Assessment of the Use of Economic Sanctions as a Tool of Foreign Policy." Pgs. 48 -52.)
5
sanctioned country are [thus] used as a means to achieve the
sanctioning country.” Justin Stalls6 furthers: “The
instrumental
foreign
policy objectives of the
effects of
economic
sanctions on the target State
up
are in part economic but also include human costs of suffering and death. ‘Severe
the
are bound to impoverish the
industrial,
result
economic
sanctions
population, cause hyperinflation, retard the agricultural,
and health systems while spreading crime and corruption.’ Sending States
educational
believe that
majority of the
economic
, ‘denying a nation the benefits of trade will cause it to suffer, and that
of this belief, sending States
ultimately
suffering will induce a willingness to bargain [and as] a
.’ As
aim to make the consequences suffered by the target State as dire as possible.
In fact,
[S]anctions ‘may have contributed to more deaths during the post- Cold War era than all
weapons of mass destruction throughout history.’ For [instance,]
estimated that
massive
human
they [economic
example, ‘various agencies of the United Nations . . . have
[the UN has]
sanctions against Iraq contributed to hundreds of thousands of deaths.’ This
cost is a direct result of
] have
economic
sanctions.” Since those hurt by sanctions include
dispossessed groups and children who can’t possibly be held responsible for regime behavior,
harms inflicted on them are arbitrary by any ethical standard.
Second, the distribution of harms from sanctions is arbitrary on a global scale, since the
targeting of countries for sanctions doesn’t follow any clear ethical guidelines. Roger Normand7
writes: “
As with Iraq,
[S]anctions are almost always imposed by strong countries against weaker
countries without reference to objective legal criteria or standards. This has resulted in the
selective use of sanctions: occupation by Iraq triggers sanctions but not by Israel; human rights
violations
in the Sudan
trigger sanctions [in Sudan] but not in Nigeria.” Further, this unfairness is inherent
Justin Stalls, “Economic Sanctions”, University of Miami International and Comparative Law Review, Vol. 11,
2003.
7
Roger Normand, Sanctions as economic violence, The Progressive Response (a publication of Foreign Policy In
Focus, a joint project of the Interhemispheric Resource Center and the Institute for Policy Studies), Vol. 2, no. 32(a),
17 October 1998
6
6
to sanctions since their harms can only fall on poor or undeveloped states. Emre et al8 write:
“Sanctions are a foreign-policy tool of the powerful. This is true both in regard to the ability to
threaten or impose sanction
(that is, in our selection models)
and in regard to the decision to [do so]
most clearly not the case that sanctions are a tool
of the weak,
utilize sanctions (that is, in our count models).
It is
to be used by [weak] states instead of
those
military force. The threat and the imposition of sanctions are used with greatest frequency by
powerful states, increasing in capability, and with the ability to project force.”
Third, sanctions inflict arbitrary harm on private persons within the sender state, by
killing jobs and hurting businesses. Elliott9 writes: “While the benefits of
economic
sanctions are
elusive, the costs often are not. Trade sanctions deprive the U S of the gains from trade and
nited
tates
frequently penalize exporting firms that are among the most sophisticated and productive in the
US economy. As
American
sanctions have expanded and proliferated over the past 20 years, they have
also led to increasing tensions between the U S and its allies and trading partners around the
nited
world.
In a recent extension of the IIE research, my colleagues and
forgone
merchandise
exports
I estimate that
to 26 target countries
d
in 95.
19
economic
tates
sanctions cost the U S
The analysis tentatively suggests that
nited
tates $15 billion to $
[15 to] 19 billion in
[E]ven limited sanctions, such as restrictions on
foreign aid or narrowly defined export sanctions, can have surprisingly large effects on bilateral
trade flows
(see table 2). Lower exports of $15 billion to $19 billion
[These costs] would mean a reduction [loss] of more than 200,000
jobs in the relatively higher-wage export sector and a consequent loss of nearly 1 billion in
$
wage[s]
export sector
.”
premiums
8
Hatipoglu, M. Emre., Morgan, T. Clifton. and Palmer, Glenn. "Economic Sanctions and Foreign Policy
Substitutability: An Application of the Two Good Theory" Paper presented at the annual meeting of the
International Studies Association 48th Annual Convention, Hilton Chicago, CHICAGO, IL, USA, Feb 28, 2007
<Not Available>. 2009-05-24 http://www.allacademic.com/meta/p180760_index.html p24
9
Kimberly Ann Elliott (Peterson Institute for International Economics), “Evidence on the Costs and Benefits of
Economic Sanctions,” speech given before the Subcommittee on Trade Committee on Ways and Means, 23 October
1997, http://www.www.piie.com/publications/papers/paper.cfm?ResearchID=294
7
The distribution of costs to domestic actors is especially arbitrary since it’s not spread
evenly over the whole state or economy but placed fully on specific export firms. Hufbauer et
al10 write: “
Economics
Sanctions can amount to a discriminatory, sector-specific, and therefore unfair
tax to finance foreign policy. In many [cases]
, sanctions restrict the sale of goods that are
instances
available from competitors in foreign countries, or require the cancellation of existing contracts,
or both. The impact
of sanctions
may fall most heavily on those few firms that suffer lost sales and
damaged reputations. This
sort of
lopsided burden-sharing can quickly arouse political opposition to
the goals of the sender government.”
Thus, sanctions create and distribute harms arbitrarily, thereby failing to respect any nonaggregative moral theory, so I affirm.
10
Hufbauer, Shott, and Elliott 1990 Economic Sanctions Reconsidered: History and Current Policy. Gary Clyde
Hufbauer and Jeffrey J. Schott. Washington Institute for International
8
Frontlines
AT There can be infinite impacts
(1) Even the chance of doing infinite good or bad doesn’t solve the for Bostrom since
adding one infinite quantity to another doesn’t make either of them bigger; infinity plus infinity
is still infinity, e.g. there are just as many even numbers as natural numbers. That’s just a
mathematical fact.
(2) On top of that, Bostrom’s reasoning about frequencies still applies: If there’s a nonzero chance of some infinite good or bad then there are infinitely many of each in the universe
already, so adding one more won’t change anything. It’s just the same as summing lots of finite
impacts.
(3) Even if s/he’s right about infinite impacts mattering under aggregative theories, it’s
still totally non-responsive since any theory that only cares about infinite impacts can’t meet the
meta-standard in that it still wouldn’t care about really big finite impacts like the Holocaust
which we have strong intuitions about that ethical theories need to respect as per my argument
right above the meta-standard that says intuitions are our only ethical data.
(4) Finally, s/he’d need to be winning an infinite impact for any of that to matter since the
best ethical theory s/he can get is one that only cares about infinities. [S/he’s not claiming any
impacts as infinite in the NC, which means that if you buy his/her argument you can extend the
definition of “ought” as obligation and affirm on face since there’s no ethical reason grounding
a duty to use sanctions.] —or— [The only impact s/he’s claiming as infinite is [identify impact],
so at best that’s the only ends-based impact that matters at all.]
9
AT Extinction is an infinite impact
(1) Extinction’s not an infinite impact: If it has a non-zero likelihood to begin with, it’ll
happen eventually in finitely much time, meaning that only finitely many humans will ever live
even if that finite number is huge.
(2) If Bostrom’s right then there has to be lots of other intelligent life out there too, so
even if we could exist forever our existence would trade off with theirs, so the impact of human
extinction is just the differential between the value we’ll create with the space and resources we
use and the value some other species would create instead, which is unknowable and could easily
be negative.
AT Sanctions are omissions, don’t involve direct infliction of harm
This response totally misunderstands my argument. At the very top of the AC contention
I say that it’s not the withdrawal of trade between states that inflicts arbitrary harm but the
coercive interference with exchange between private persons, i.e. the state punishing me for
buying goods from someone in the target state. That coercion is clearly proactive, and I’m
showing you that it inflicts major harm. Don’t let him/her make new answers in the next speech
AT Turns saying sanctions solve some arbitrary harm/unfairness
Group [identify turns to be grouped] and extend the analysis right under the standard that
says that it has to be agent-centered since if we’re responsible for arbitrary harms inflicted by
others, the best we could ever do is try to minimize those harms, which would require
aggregation and link into all the Bostrom arguments. That means none of the turns have any
offensive link to the standard; don’t let him/her creates new ones in the next speech.
10
AT Universe is finite
Here’s a physicist giving a bunch of scenarios for an infinite universe that are supported
by current physics.
(1) Max Tegmark11 writes: “
The parallel universes of your alter egos constitute
the Level I multiverse is the least
. It
controversial type. We all accept the existence of things that we cannot see but could see if we
moved to a different vantage point or merely waited, like people watching for ships to come over
the horizon. Objects beyond the cosmic horizon have a similar status. The observable universe
grows by a light-year every year as light from farther away has time to reach us. An infinity lies
out there, waiting to be seen.
[If anything,
the Level I
You will probably die long before your alter egos come into view, but in principle, and if cosmic expansion cooperates, your descendants could observe them through a sufficiently powerful telescope.
[such a] multiverse sounds trivially obvious. How could space not be infinite? Is
there a sign somewhere saying ‘Space Ends Here
—Mind the Gap’
?
If so, what lies beyond it?
In fact,
Einstein's theory of gravity
[general
relativity] calls this intuition into question.] Space could be finite if it has a convex curvature or
an unusual topology
(that is, interconnectedness). A spherical, doughnut-shaped or pretzel-shaped universe would have a limited volume and no edges. The
background radiation allows sensitive tests of such scenarios
American, April 1999].
[and s]o far
, however
[But] cosmic microwave
[see "Is Space Finite?" by Jean-Pierre Luminet, Glenn D. Starkman and Jeffrey R. Weeks; Scientific
, the evidence is against them. Infinite models fit the data, and strong
limits have been placed on the alternatives.”
11
Max Tegmark (professor of physics and astronomy at the University of Pennsylvania; studies cosmic microwave
background and galaxy clustering; much of his work bears on the concept of parallel universes: evaluating evidence
for infinite space and cosmological inflation; developing insights into quantum decoherence; and studying the
possibility that the amplitude of microwave background fluctuations, the dimensionality of spacetime and the
fundamental laws of physics can vary from place to place), “Parallel Universes,” Scientific American, 14 April
2003, http://www.krabach.info/astro/parallel_universe/parallel_universe.html
11
(2) Max Tegmark12 writes: “
If the level I multiverse was hard to stomach, try imagining
[The Level II multiverse is] an infinite
set of distinct Level I multiverses, some perhaps with different spacetime dimensionality and
different physical constants. Those other multiverses
popular theory of chaotic
many of [its] loose ends
the
eternal
—which constitute a Level II multiverse—
are predicted by the currently
inflation. Inflation is an extension of the big bang theory and ties up
, such as why the universe is so big, uniform and flat. A rapid
of that theory
so
so
stretching of space long ago can explain all these and other attributes in one fell swoop
Universe," by Alan H. Guth and Paul J. Steinhard; Scientific American, May 1984; and "The Self-Reproducing Inflationary Universe," by Andrei Linde, November 1994].
Such stretching is predicted by a wide
class of theories of elementary particles, and all available evidence bears it out.
[O]n the very largest scales
. Space
[see "The Inflationary
The phrase ‘chaotic eternal’ refers to what happens
[space] as a whole is stretching and will continue doing so forever,
but some regions of space stop stretching and form distinct bubbles, like gas pockets in a loaf of
rising bread. Infinitely many such bubbles emerge. Each is an embryonic Level I multiverse:
infinite in size and filled with matter deposited by the energy field that drove inflation.”
12
Ibid.
12
(3) Max Tegmark13 writes: “
The Level I and Level II multiverses involve parallel worlds that are far away, beyond the domain even of astronomers. But
multiverse is right around you. It arises from the
famous, and
[T]he next level of
famously controversial many-worlds
,
interpretation of quantum mechanics—the idea that random quantum processes cause the
universe to branch into multiple copies, one for each possible outcome.
In the early 20th century the theory of quantum mechanics revolutionized
physics by explaining the atomic realm, which does not abide by the classical rules of Newtonian mechanics. Despite the obvious successes of the theory, a heated debate rages about what it really means. The theory specifies the state of the universe not in classical terms, such as the positions
and velocities of all particles, but in terms of a mathematical object called a wave function. According to the Schrödinger equation, this state evolves over time in a fashion that mathematicians term ‘unitary,’ meaning that the wave function rotates in an abstract infinite-dimensional space
called Hilbert space.
Although quantum mechanics is often described as inherently random and uncertain, the
wave function evolves in a deterministic way.
this wave function with what we observe.
There is nothing random or uncertain about it.
The sticky part is how to connect
Many legitimate wave functions correspond to counterintuitive situations, such as a cat being dead and alive at the same time in a so-called superposition.
In
the 20s physicists explained away this weirdness by postulating that the wave function
19
‘collapsed’ into some definite classical outcome whenever someone made an observation. This
add-on
had the virtue of explaining observations, but it turned an elegant, unitary theory into a kludgy,
nonunitary one.
The intrinsic randomness commonly ascribed to quantum mechanics is the result of this postulate.
this view in favor of one developed
postulate is unnecessary.
in 1957
by
Over the years many physicists have abandoned
Princeton graduate student
Unadulterated quantum theory does not, in fact, pose any contradictions.
Hugh Everett He showed that the collapse
Although
III.
it predicts that one
classical reality gradually splits
into superpositions of many such realities, observers subjectively experience this splitting merely
as a slight randomness, with probabilities in exact agreement with those from the old collapse
postulate. This superposition of classical worlds is the Level III multiverse.”
13
Ibid.
13
Extension shells
Simple standards extension (long)
Now extend the standards. The value’s morality as implied by “ought.” Extend that any
moral theory has to tell us how to act since that’s the purpose of moral systems, and has to
explain explain strong intuitions like our belief that the Holocaust was wrong, since intuitions are
the only ethical data.
Then extend Bostrom 1 and 2 saying that if the world is infinite, aggregative theories like
utilitarianism don’t do that, since there’s always infinitely much good and bad in the world
whatever we do. Then extend Bostrom 3 saying that the most likely cosmological models make
the universe infinite, and Bostrom 4 saying that even if it’s not we should still reject ethical
theories that require us to assume that it’s not.
Next, extend the impact that we can’t aggregate goods but have to look at how they’re
distributed and whether benefits and burdens are assigned fairly based on some ethical theory
like deontic constraints or Rawlsian justice. I say that whatever that theory is, it has to be
prescriptive so it has to lay down non-arbitrary rules for distributing goods, so extend the
standard of avoiding arbitrary harm to persons. [Lastly, extend that the standard is agentcentered since if we were responsible for preventing everyone else from causing arbitrary harm,
the best we could do is try to minimize it, which would require aggregation. That’s very clearly
excluding all the turns saying that sanctions prevent other actors from inflicting harms, like
[identify turns].]”
14
Simple standards extension (short)
Extend the value of morality and the argument that moral theories have to guide action
and tell us not to do bad things like the Holocaust. Then extend Bostrom 1 and 2 saying that if
the world is infinite, aggregative theories like util don’t do that since we can’t change the total
amount of good or bad in the world. Extend Bostrom 3 saying that our best models say the world
is infinite, and Bostrom 4 saying even if it isn’t we should reject ethical theories that force us to
assume that it’s not. Then extend that since we can’t aggregate values we have to look at how
they’re distributed based on some rule like deontic constraints or Rawlsian justice, and that any
such theory has to give rules for distributing goods and burdens non-arbitrarily, so extend the
standard of avoiding arbitrary harm to persons. [Lastly, extend that the standard is agentcentered since if we were responsible for preventing everyone else from causing arbitrary harm,
the best we could do is try to minimize it, which would require aggregation. That’s very clearly
excluding all the turns saying that sanctions prevent other actors from inflicting harms, like
[identify turns].]”
15
Bostrom writes: “Infinitarian paralysis threatens a wide range of popular ethical theories.
Consider, to begin with, hedonistic utilitarianism, which in its classical formulation states that
you ought to do that which maximizes the total amount of pleasure and minimizes the total
amount of pain in the world. If pleasure and pain are already infinite, then all possible actions
you could take would be morally on a par according to this criterion, for none of them would
make any difference to the total amount of pleasure or pain. Endorsing this form of utilitarianism
commits one to the view that, conditional on the world being canonically infinite, ending world
hunger and causing a famine are ethically equivalent options. It is not the case that you ought to
do one rather than the other. The threat is not limited to hedonistic utilitarianism. Utilitarian
theories that have a broader conception of the good—happiness, preference‐satisfaction, virtue,
beauty‐appreciation, or some objective list of ingredients that make for a good life—face the
same problem. So, too, does average utilitarianism, mixed total/average utilitarianism, and
prioritarian views that place a premium on the well‐being of the worst off. In a canonically
infinite world, average utility and most weighted utility measures are just as imperturbable by
human agency as is the simple sum of utility.”
Bostrom writes: “The situation for mixed ethical theories that include
non‐consequentialist side‐constraints in addition to an aggregative consequentialist component is
slightly more hopeful. For example, a theory constructed along these lines might say that
“permissible” acts are those that satisfy deontological side‐constraints (no unjustified killing,
lying, cheating, stealing, etc.), and that a right act is a permissible act that scores highest on the
aggregative consequentialist criterion among the available permissible acts. The side‐constraints
would serve as a buttress, reducing the theory’s dependence on empirical assumptions to avoid
the fanaticism problem and the distortion problem. The theory could thus make do with a weaker
empirical assumption, which means that it could potentially meet a higher methodological
acceptability standard.”
Babic et al14 write: “The rationality of sanctions
precisely
presupposes
this kind of
[an] initial inequality of
power—in the case of comparable power structure the war-like character of the conflict would
been
[be] fully visible from the outset. What country would voluntarily tolerate the blockade of its
borders and restrictions on its freedom and well-being
that ensues from it
? [C]learly in a case of power
Thus,
equilibrium sanctions could play no role what ever. The disproportionality of power is an
so
element of the logic of decision making in this context. Thus, insisting in any given case that
Babic, Jovan and Aleksandar Jokic. “Economic sanctions, morality and escalation of demands on Yugoslavia.”
International Peacekeeping, vol. 9, no. 4, Winter 2002, pp. 119-126.
14
16
have
sanctions are unfair carries no weight. For if the side imposing sanctions did not believe itself to
be in the right—the proof of which is only in the effectiveness of accomplishing [its] set goals
the
—they would not get involved in this activity in the first place.
nothing else
This only goes to show that
, and
[Thus] sanctions, as
a distribution of power, are a way of making a claim that one is entitled to construct on behalf of
others what their definition of value ought to be.”
Justin Stalls15 writes: “
It appears that
[T]he third-world's struggle within the U N for economic
nited
ations
development has not succeeded in creating protection from the economic powers of the western
world. The voice of the third world has been heard in the General Assembly and it cries out for
UN
,
protection from the economic powers of the western world. Unfortunately , this voice has not
though
been heard in the Security Council. In fact, the
UN
use of multilateral
sanctions, that makes
economic
sanctions. Therefore,
United Nations
Security Council is presently increasing its
the United Nations has provided a forum for the third-world to request freedom from the West's economic coercion and, at the same time, a means, i.e., economic
the third-world's request[s] [for freedom from economic coercion] appear meaningless.”
Justin Stalls16 writes: “
Security Council
[A]uthorization to use
economic
sanctions based on a human rights
violation will inevitably be premised on a definition of human rights that is not accepted by the
offending State. For [instance,]
international human
example,
the U S consistently denies that the death penalty violates
nited
tates
rights norms, while nearly the entire developed world disagrees. The U S does not
nited
believe that the Security Council has the right to authorize
economic
tates
sanctions against it based on
up
the use of
the
death penalty because the U S has determined that the death penalty does not violates human
nited
tates
use of
rights. However, the Security Council could claim that the U S has violated
nited
authorize the use of
economic
tates
human
rights
norms
and
sanctions against the U S ”
nited
tates.
Justin Stalls, “Economic Sanctions”, University of Miami International and Comparative Law Review, Vol. 11,
2003.
16
Justin Stalls, “Economic Sanctions”, University of Miami International and Comparative Law Review, Vol. 11,
2003.
15
17
“As a study commissioned by the UN concluded, ‘the amount of information available today on
the devastating economic, social, and humanitarian impact of sanctions no longer permits
policymakers to entertain the notion of ‘unintended effects.’ A member of the Security Council
has declared that ‘it is disingenuous to talk of ‘unintended side effects’ when everybody knows
that the sector most affected by sanctions, as presently applied, are precisely civilian populations.
There is nothing surprising or unintended about it.’”
Marks, Stephen P. “Economic sanctions as human rights violations: reconciling political and
public health imperatives.” American Journal of Public Health, October 1999, vol. 89, issue 10.
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