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A Matter of Perspective: The Allies and the Jews of Europe
Jennifer Pagliaro
Mr. Cotey
IDP–4U1
December 18, 2006
This world contains millenniums of history. The power of human recollection and
the ability to store and record thoughts, memories and moments is awe-inspiring.
Through the centuries, a weave of fantastic and mysterious tales that define humans as a
species has been created. Not all things past, however, are easy to remember. Pain,
suffering, war: all these things one wishes to forget. The past is riddled with conflict.
However, in a post WWI world, people really believed that it had been “The War to End
All Wars”. They were sorely mistaken. Between the end of the WWI in 1918 and Hitler’s
invasion of Poland in 1939, catapulting the world into WW2, there were twenty-one
years of documented peace. Under the direction of Führer Adolf Hitler, Germany,
annexing Austria and invading Czechoslovakia, was treading deep water. Once Hitler
stepped over his boundaries, quite literally, Britain and France found no other option but
to declare war, a circumstance no one ever dreamed they would occur again.
A ‘world war’, at this day and age, was old news. It followed similar criteria and
models that the Allied Powers had begun to expect. Britain, France and Russia, leaders in
the Allied defense never imagined what was looming on the horizon. Concealing his real
intentions during the early years of the war, Hitler charmed the Allied leaders with his
poise and articulate nature. But with the deranged belief that the Aryan race was superior
above all others, Hitler began his systematic execution of the Jews in secret. Frightening
words became common vocabulary in the latter years of the war: Nazis, death camps,
genocide.
Historians and intellectuals studying the events of the Holocaust rationalize that,
“This type of history, although grounded in facts, permits us to imagine alternative
2
versions of the past in which we exercise a certain control over those facts.”1 The United
States Holocaust Memorial Museum’s records indicate that an estimated six million Jews
perished in the Holocaust; however, historians have long been at arms about where the
blame for the death of these people lies. Although very few disagree that Hitler and his
compatriots assume full responsibility for the execution of the genocide, many argue that
international aid was lacking. In terms of the Allied Powers, many would argue that they
simply did not do enough. Where were the bombs hailing Auschwitz? Where was the
unconditional refuge in Allied countries? Where was the will, the discipline and the
motivation to do anything about rescuing the Jews? These critics of the actions of the
Allied Powers, victorious, during World War II, speculate that the Allies were selfish,
lazy and inhumane. This idea of rescue itself can be debated. How much is enough? Did
the Allies do anything to rescue the Jews? Essentially, what historians will accept or
condemn is decided by whether or not the Allies could have done more to rescue the
Jews.
David S. Wyman, who wrote the controversial book The Abandonment of the
Jews, records the outcry that represents the Jews of Europe during WW2: “And you, our
brothers in all free countries; and you, governments of all free land, where are you? What
are you doing to hinder the carnage that is now going on?”2 Although this plea is heartwrenching, it simply doesn’t present one with the facts needed to come to an educated
conclusion on the subject of rescue. William D. Rubenstein, author of The Myth of
Rescue, disputes Wyman, stating that “Because the Jews of Nazi-occupied Europe were
1
Paul B. Miller "David S. Wyman and the Controversy over the Bombing of Auschwitz." Journal of
Ecumenical Studies. 371
2
David S. Wyman. The Abandonment of the Jews. (New York: Pantheon Books) 290
3
prisoners rather than refugees, they were quite literally unreachable by the Allies.”3
Through careful examination of the truth it can be concluded that The Allied Forces,
because of constricting immigration policies, their lack of knowledge regarding the
genocide and their commitment to end the war, could not feasibly have saved a more
substantial number of Jews during the Holocaust.
According to critics of the Allies performance during WW2, the Allied nations’
sense of apathy seemed indestructible. Each country, although sympathetic to Jewish
people’s suffering, did not in any way open their doors to Jewish migration when they
needed it most. From scenarios such as the SS St. Louis and the 1938 Evian Conference,
it appears evident that the major Allied Powers, consisting of: Britain, France, Russia,
the United States and Canada, all turned their backs on the Jews in their most dire time of
need.
The SS St Louis was a luxury liner on the Hamburg-America Line which left
Germany for Cuba in May 1939 with 937 passengers on board. Of those 937 passengers,
930 of them were Jewish refugees. As a last resort, after being denied access by the
Cuban Government, the United States Government and even the Canadian Government,
the liner returned to Western Europe in June 1939, where most of the Jewish passengers
fell to Nazi hands.4 The SS St. Louis was viewed as one of the most outrageous situations
of inaction on the part of the Allies during the Holocaust. Citizens all over the world
implored their governments to allow the passengers to land at their docks, but the
decisions of the countries’ leaders were final.
3
4
William D. Rubenstein. The Myth of Rescue. (New York: Routledge) 84
William D. Rubenstein. The Myth of Rescue. (New York: Routledge) 41
4
In 1938, Franklin D. Roosevelt called together 32 nations to meet in Evian on
Lake Geneva, for what is now referred to as the Evian Conference of 1938. At the
conference, which was attempting to solve the situation in Nazi-occupied Europe, antiSemitic feelings were clearly evident. Out of all the 32 nations, only the Dominican
Republic was willing to increase immigration quotas.5 Critics rave that, although the
Allies were aware of the needs of the Jews oppressed in Germany, only 1 out of 32
countries was willing to do anything at all to help or rescue the Jews. Most Allied
countries, in fact, are accused of causing more harm than good. Case in point, Britain’s
imposition of the 1939 White Paper, stating that at the most 75,000 Jews would be
allowed into Palestine (then controlled by Britain) in the subsequent 5-year period and
after that there would be no further Jewish immigration to Palestine.6 Instead of
recognizing the pressing need to open doors to Jews trying to escape Nazi-occupied
Europe, more and more countries began to close their doors, sealing the Jews in the fate
of genocide.
The Allies tried to make it known that they were attempting to save the Jews. By
promoting events like the Evian Conference, they tried to convince the world that they
really did care. But did anything really get done? Why didn’t the Allies make more of an
effort to really save the Jews from Hitler’s overshadowing power? Ultimately, the Allies
had no say which Jews lived and which Jews died. The truth in this statement lies in the
often unacknowledged fact that constricting immigration policies of the time did not
allow for mass Jewish migration.
5
6
United States Holocaust Memorial Museum. http://www.ushmm.org (September 20, 2006)
Verne W. Newton. FDR and the Holocaust. (New York: St. Martin’s Press)
5
What could the Allies have done? Was their apathy a result of anti-Semitism, or
were there more pressing political matters to be dealt with? Although the inaction on the
Allies part suggests foul play, one must look at the situation through the perspective of
the Allies, to realize that their options were few. Constricting immigration policies within
their own countries and in Nazi-occupied Europe restricted the Allies from doing much at
all.
Most passengers of the SS St. Louis had obtained US Visas and had planned to
enter the United States through Cuba. Once the liner set sail, however, there was
evidence to suggest that landing in Cuba would be impossible, due to internal political
disputes between Cuban government officials of the country. It was also learned that
many of the passengers landing documents were fraudulent and invalid in Cuba or North
America for that matter. So, these refugees set sail with simply the hope that someone
would let them on to North American soil.
Besides the invalid documents that would have made the passengers of the SS. St.
Louis illegal refugees, Allied Countries were already economically depressed and did not
even have the capability to harbour any more refugees at that time.7 Under Roosevelt’s
administration, “The American government set annual quotas, country by country. By the
summer of 1939 the annual quotas for the rest of 1939, and for the whole of 1940 and
1941, were full.”8 The Allied countries involved in the SS St. Louis ‘tragedy’ had no
choice but to turn away the passengers. Their immigration policies and quotas simply did
not allow for 930 Jews to land in their countries as refugees. As shown, the passengers on
board the liner set sail knowing that their visas were not valid in the United States, and
7
8
United States Holocaust Memorial Museum. http://www.ushmm.org (September 20, 2006)
Martin Gilbert. Never Again: A History of the Holocaust. (Great Britain: HarperCollinsIllustrated) 46
6
yet they set sail regardless. North American governments were not cold hearted. Had
immigration quotas not already been full, and valid visas had been obtained, this incident
would have played out quite differently.
There is also no clear evidence that the governments and the people of the Allied
forces were predominantly anti-Semitist. There was however, the looming memory of the
Great Depression still hanging heavily over the heads of North America and Britain.
American Restrictionism became apparent from 1938 to 1941. Restrictionists opposed
refugee immigration because of the high unemployment rates as a result of the Great
Depression. They argued that mass immigration would only muddle the situation in the
United States by usurping jobs that would normally have gone to citizens of the United
States. Restrictionist viewpoints were very widely accepted. Any sort of counterargument
preaching that new immigrants would create new jobs was easily disproved and ignored.
At the 1938 Evian Conference, the United States, under the direction of Franklin
D. Roosevelt, made an active attempt to do something about the situation in Nazioccupied Europe, despite the inability to accept any more Jewish refugees. The
conference attendees created the Intergovernmental Committee on Refugees (ICR),
charged with approaching "the governments of the countries of refuge with a view to
developing opportunities for permanent settlement" and seeking to persuade Germany to
cooperate in establishing "conditions of orderly emigration."9 From this it can be seen
that the Allied countries did make an attempt to help the Jewish refugees, despite the fact
that their countries did not facilitate the expanding of immigration quotas. The Allies still
made active attempts to diffuse the situation in Europe. There is only so much a council
9
United States Holocaust Memorial Museum. http://www.ushmm.org (September 20, 2006)
7
of men can do miles away from the actual problem. Without authority over Hitler’s rule,
these men had very few options in solutions to extracting the Jews from Europe.
Countless documents have recorded that “…there were millions of Jews, shortly
to perish in the Holocaust, who had no choice in the matter of emigration.” 3,020,000
Jews in the Soviet Union were forbidden to leave, as well, other emigration bans were
passed such as the Regulation For the Ban On Jewish Emigration From the GovernmentGeneral in Germany, November 1940, which restricted Jews from leaving any territory
occupied by the Nazis: “I fully accept the point of view of the Reich Security Main
Office and request that you will not pass on the office here for decision any more
applications by Jews to emigrate”10 Even if the Allies had been willing to extend their
immigration policies, Hitler would not have allowed them to leave. Essentially, the Jews
were not refugees waiting to be rescued; they were prisoners with no way to escape.
Under such circumstances, there was little that could actually be done for the Jews.
This is not to say that no effort was made to rescue whoever was reachable by the
Allied Powers. A prime example is Britain’s outreach to Jewish children.
Known as the Kinder (children) of Kindertransport (children’s transport),
more than nine thousand German and Austrian children –between ages of
three months and seventeen years were brought to Britain after the
Kristallnacht. The British government gave them permission to come, as
an emergency measure to get them out of danger.11
The Allies did make an attempt to do the humane thing and rescue those Jews
who were immediately in danger, to the best of their ability. Directly after the
Kristallnacht (‘The Night of Broken Glass’) which took place in 1938, Britain, who later
became one of the Allies, began a trend of rescuing the Jewish people even before the
10
11
William D. Rubenstein. The Myth of Rescue. (New York: Routledge) 41
Martin Gilbert. Never Again: A History of the Holocaust. (Great Britain: HarperCollinsIllustrated) 44
8
war had begun. This type of action adds to the evidence that proves that the Allied
powers did what they could in the time given to them and with the resources they had.
As well as immigration quotas and emigration bans, there were many factors that
the Allies had to consider in terms of national security within their countries. At the time,
suspicion of spies was a real and prominent concern. “After Pearl Harbor, visa
procedures were even more stringently tightened for a large category of refugees, those
who had been born in enemy countries or had been longtime residents there.”12
Obviously for a large population, looking to emigrate from enemy Germany, the Allies
had no choice but to be suspicious. Any number of spies could have crossed onto
American, Canadian or British soil and compromised the war effort. Therefore, one can
see that the Allied Powers tight rein on immigration was in fact, necessary to protect the
homelands of each of their countries from enemy terror. There was no way for them to
control who was sneaking in or out for unjust purposes, so the restrictions on immigration
were justifiably necessary.
The Allies, although they attempted rescue in practical forms, essentially had no
say in the matter. Hitler was determined to exterminate the Jews. Most situations of
murder were unpreventable by the Allies.
Within twelve months, more than one million Jews had been murdered
east of the September 1939 border of Greater Germany. Most were driven
from their homes, forced at gunpoint to pits and ravines a few miles away,
ordered to undress and then shot. No mercy was shown.13
What chance did anyone have to save the millions of Jews who were murdered
point blank? For many Jews there was no wait period, no time spent in concentration
camps waiting to be liberated. For many, the terror was over as quickly as it began. The
12
13
David S. Wyman. The Abandonment of the Jews. (New York: Pantheon Books) 125
Martin Gilbert. Never Again: A History of the Holocaust. (Great Britain: HarperCollinsIllustrated) 62
9
Allies had no control over the actions which Adolf Hitler carried out in his own streets.
And when he was not murdering Jews in the street, he was restricting millions of Jews
from leaving Europe by placing emigration policies as early on in the war as 1940. This
would have given the Allies only a year to accommodate 11 million Jews as refugees
from Germany; a simply impossible feat.
The Allies knew well in advance that the genocide was to take place. Or so the
critics say. Under scrutiny, the Allies appeared to be lacking in the basics of humanity
needed to feel the obligation to save another human life. According to the evidence of the
critics, the Allied nations were well aware of the looming fates of most of European
Jewry.
Documentation of reports sent to Allies show that that they were warned of the
impending murders.
The U.S. State Department also delayed publicizing reports of genocide.
In August 1942, the State Department received a cable confirming Nazi
plans for the total destruction of Europe's Jews. The report, sent by
Gerhart Riegner (the representative in Geneva of the World Jewish
Congress), was not passed on to other government officials. The State
Department asked American Rabbi Stephen Wise, who also received the
report, to refrain from announcing it.14
According to this statement, the Allies were given information about the
‘destruction of Europe’s Jews’ early on in the war, allowing them to have time to take
action against Germany, this information, however, was not taken seriously or
acknowledged in full. Similarly, “Reports of Nazi atrocities often were not publicized in
full by the American press. In 1943, Polish courier Jan Karski informed President
Franklin D. Roosevelt of reports of mass murder received from Jewish leaders in the
14
United States Holocaust Memorial Museum. http://www.ushmm.org (September 20, 2006)
10
Warsaw ghetto. No immediate executive action was taken.”15 Even when more
substantial reports where given to the Allies, there was still inaction on their part.
According to the United States Holocaust Memorial Museum, “By the spring of 1944, the
Allies knew of the killing operations using poison gas at the Auschwitz-Birkenau
extermination camp.”16 Nearing the end of the war, when evidence of mass murder was
blatantly obvious, the Allied government remained inactive by refusing to bomb
Auschwitz-Birkenau or the major railways leading to it. Critics argued that the
destruction of such facilities would have stopped the genocide dead in its tracks. By
destroying the means of which to transport the Jewish people to concentration and
extermination camps, critics believe that the Allies could have effectively halted the
Holocaust.
The Allied governments had knowledge of the Nazi extermination of the Jews
early on in the war and did nothing to stop it. Or so it would seem. The critics of the
Allies fail to acknowledge that in most cases, reports of genocide were incomplete and
for the most part, merely rumours, which leads to the more correct understanding, that the
Allies really didn’t have an understanding at all for what was happening in Europe.
Although the Allied governments may have caught wind of rumours about the
planned genocide in Europe, the Allied Forces had limited knowledge on the extensive
organization Hitler had enlisted for the mass extermination of the Jews. “There were
some individual reports of executions which leaked into the press in various countries.
15
16
United States Holocaust Memorial Museum. http://www.ushmm.org (September 20, 2006)
Ibid
11
There was not enough information to discern any systematic pattern.” 17 The Allies could
not have acted upon the rumours received because they did not provide solid enough
evidence of any planned events that they perceived Hitler to be planning.
The most important misunderstanding about the rescue of the Jews can be seen
here however:
The general consensus among scholars who have studied the Holocaust is
that the Allied governments did not really recognize what was taking place
until December of 1942, in other words, a year and a half after the German
invasion. And even then, some government officials in London, as well as
in Washington, continued to express skepticism about atrocity reports that
were coming in.18
The Allied governments were forced to take precaution regarding reports coming
into their countries because not all of the sources were necessarily reliable in terms of
accurate information. Allied knowledge of extermination camps such as Auschwitz was
also fragmented and unreliable.
The first knowledge in the West of Auschwitz and the other extermination camps
has been frequently debated and examined; the telegram sent to Britain and the
United States in early August 1942 by Dr Gerhart Reigner, the World Jewish
Congress’s representative in Geneva, announcing that a plan that ‘the total of the
Jews living in Germany and German-occupied Europe…should be exterminated’
had been ‘discussed’ by Hitler, is often seen as the first authoritative report of the
genocide. Riegner’s message, it will be clear, was extremely vague; specific news
of Auschwitz did not reach the West until April 1944, nearly two years later.19
From this statement, it is evident that any confirmed information from Europe
was received very late into the seven-year period of conflict. With all countries being
otherwise occupied, it was almost impossible to attempt any sort of rescue as the end of
the war approached. The beginning of the war was riddled with uncertainty pertaining to
“What the Allies Knew”. NewsHour. PBS. (November 20, 1996)
“What the Allies Knew”. NewsHour. PBS. (November 20, 1996
19
William D. Rubenstein. The Myth of Rescue. (New York: Routledge) 86
17
18
12
any information coming from Europe. Communication resources of the time were
limited, and consequently Allied governments were unable to verify the reports of
genocide and murder from Europe. The first publicized, confirmed report came much too
late in the war. The Seattle Times proclaimed – “JEWS SLAIN TOTAL, 200,000!” in a
1942 edition. At this point, the war was more than halfway over. The Allies were moving
towards a victory that had not yet been assured, and were completely and totally
committed to ending the war as a first priority. The United States War Department
justified this decision with an official statement, “We must constantly bear in mind,
however, that the most effective relief which can be given victims of enemy persecution
is to insure the speedy defeat of the Axis.”20
As well, the Allies were still dealing with the problem of enemy spies, and
therefore, had another reason to not trust whole-heartedly the information received. The
world, at the time, was riddled with lies, deceit and uncertainty from 1939 straight
through 1945. No one could be trusted with the utmost certainty, especially not in bulk,
as the Jews were attempting to immigrate.
In terms of what William D. Rubenstein calls ‘The Myth of Bombing Auschwitz’,
“Bombing rail tracks, the United States discovered by 1943, had little effect; tracks were
repaired in 24 hours.”21 Other sources report that “successful cutting of railways
necessitated close observation of the severed lines and frequent rebombing, since repairs
took only a few days. Even bridges, which were costly to hit, were often back in
operation in three or four days.”22 By bombing the railways, Allies could have stopped
traffic, but how effectively could this have been carried out, and for how long would it
20
David S. Wyman The Abandonment of the Jews. (New York: Pantheon Books) 292
Verne W. Newton. FDR and the Holocaust. (New York: St. Martin’s Press) 161
22
David S. Wyman. The Abandonment of the Jews. (New York: Pantheon Books) 300
21
13
really benefit the Jews? In this case, bombing strategic positions of German rail was
costly and time consuming. Railways stretched across all of Germany and into
neighbouring countries. Concentration camps were built with the precise dimensions that
they were easily accessible by rail, but the bombing of German rail would have
significantly diverted aircraft desperately needed as part of the war effort.
Similarly, another common debate is that the Allies should have bombed
concentration camps, namely, Auschwitz-Birkenau. By bombing this major concentration
camp, some believed that Hitler’s plans to exterminate the Jews would be put at a
standstill. However, even if the bombing of Auschwitz was to be attempted it was
feasibly impossible and most arguably, created a risk of harming the Jews, who were at
the time, situated within the camp. “…complete accuracy was rarely possible from such
heights. Some of the bombs probably would have struck nearby Birkenau, itself a heavily
populated concentration camp.” 23 For this sole reason: accuracy of weapons, the Allied
aircrafts never dropped a single bomb on Auschwitz. Paul B. Miller who wrote the
journal “David S. Wyman and the Controversy over the Bombing of Auschwitz” outlines
very clearly that:
(1) Both Allied and Jewish leaders feared killing innocent people, and, in any
case, the Nazis would have easily have found other means to continue their
genocide; (2) the target was too complex and ill-defined from a military
standpoint; and (3) bombing Auschwitz would have constituted an unprecedented
diversion of military resources essential to winning the war.24
And above these excellent arguments, which are all valid and correct in their own
right, one fact remains that critics of Allies very blatantly leave out: The fact that “Even
if the Birkenau killing machinery had been destroyed, the Nazis would have energetically
23
David S. Wyman. The Abandonment of the Jews. (New York: Pantheon Books) 302
Paul B. Miller "David S. Wyman and the Controversy over the Bombing of Auschwitz." Journal of
Ecumenical Studies. 372
24
14
improvised their murderous task.”25 The fact of the matter is that Hitler was intent on
exterminating the Jews. No amount of persuasion or aggressive action on the Allies’ part
would have convinced him otherwise. His dedication is clearly evident. It can be seen in
the establishment of about 20,000 internment and extermination camps built from 1933 to
1945
26
imprisoning millions of people. Three million people were exterminated in
extermination camps alone.27
Fig. 1. Greater Germany Major Concentration Camps 1944
Source: United States Holocaust Memorial Museum. http://www.ushmm.org (September
20, 2006)
25
Paul B. Miller "David S. Wyman and the Controversy over the Bombing of Auschwitz." Journal of
Ecumenical Studies. 373
26
United States Holocaust Memorial Museum. http://www.ushmm.org (September 20, 2006)
27
Ibid
15
After careful examination it has been determined that the bombing of AuschwitzBirkenau or any other camp would have been illogical because it would have resulted in
more Jewish death, and the bombing of these camps was pointless because Hitler was
determined to complete his task of exterminating the Jews. He and had the resources to
quickly rebuild the tracks or continuing killing at another death camp, as there were
many.
The Allied Forces did not have enough definitive knowledge to justify an attack
on Nazi death camps or railways, and even if they had sufficient evidence of Hitler’s plan
for genocide, the destruction of these camps and railways would have proved
meaningless in the eyes of the Nazis as it would have killed more Jews. Additionally, the
Allies did not have the firepower or the accurate weapons to provide a sweeping cover of
all of the death camps or even the majority of them.
Why did the Allies not do everything humanly possible to save the Jews?
Preventing the biggest genocide in world history should have been the first priority of
every government of the time period. The critics’ main argument is that the Allies did not
do enough to save the Jews, and instead, selfishly kept to themselves during the war.
“The conference attendees created the Intergovernmental Committee on Refugees
(ICR), charged with approaching ‘the governments of the countries of refuge with a view
to developing opportunities for permanent settlement’" and seeking to persuade Germany
to cooperate in establishing “conditions of orderly emigration.” The ICR received little
authority and virtually no funds or other support from its member nations. Its
achievements were minimal until September 1939 when the beginning of World War II
16
largely ended all efforts.28 World War II completely stunted all attempts to rescue Jews.
Supposedly, if the Allied Powers had organized themselves better they could have
enlisted more help in the early years of war.
Critics also argue that anti-Semitism played a large role in the ‘abandonment’ of
Europe’s Jews. “…it was not so much that they [Jews] were hated but that they were not
important or powerful enough to be of concern.”29 Anti-Semitism, according to these
critical historians, stopped the Allies from trying to rescue the Jews, not the impending
war. Because of a supposed hatred of the Jews, it is correlated as the sole reason the Jews
were not allowed into North America. This concept is based on the assumption that the
Allied governments must have shared certain sentiments of contempt for the Jewish
people that Hitler undeniably had.
On June 6, 1944 (D-Day), as part of a massive military operation, over 150,000
Allied soldiers landed in France, which was liberated by the end of August. By
September 15, 1944, the first U.S. troops crossed into Germany, one month after Soviet
troops crossed the eastern border.30 Many would argue that the Allies did not make a
large contribution to the war effort until 1944, and therefore had plenty of time to attempt
large scale rescue attempt in Europe while Germany was distracted with other military
advancements. And yet, despite the critics’ judgment,
“Germany’s control over most of Europe meant that even a determined
Allied rescue campaign probably could not have saved as many as a third
of those who died. But a substantial commitment to rescue almost
certainly could have saved several hundred thousand of them, and done so
without compromising the war effort. The record clearly shows, though,
that such a campaign would have taken place if only the United States had
28
United States Holocaust Memorial Museum. http://www.ushmm.org (September 20, 2006)
Henry L. Feingold. Bearing Witness: How American and Its Jews Responded to the Holocaust. (New
York: Syracuse University Press) 186
30
United States Holocaust Memorial Museum. http://www.ushmm.org (September 20, 2006)
29
17
seized the initiative for it. But American did not act at all until late in the
war, and even then, though it had some success, the effort was a very
limited one.31
A more substantial number of Jews could have been saved, according to critics of
the Allies, if the Allies had taken a more definitive stance in a ‘rescue’ mission and given
up their feeling of anti-Semitism. But was this the real issue?
The Allies, although they were involved in the war, had plenty of time to devise
escape and rescue plans for many more Jews, but because of anti-Semitic feelings and
overall apathy to the Jewish situation, Allied Powers did nothing more to save the Jews
when it would have been possible. According to critics the Allies were lazy, but there
were many more obligations placed on the Allies than the critics care to admit, as well,
the Allies were faced with virtually impossible obstacles blocking the way to the rescue
of the Jews.
Is not the primary objective of a government to serve its people? Franklin D.
Roosevelt and other Allied leaders such as Winston Churchill were obligated during
World War II to do what they were elected to do, protect their own countries from hostile
forces and end the war as quickly as possible so their troops could come home with as
few casualties as they could. In this sense, the Allied allegiance did not lie with the Jews
and their rescue, but with protecting their own countries and their commitment to end the
war as quickly as possible. And in doing so, an Allied victory would directly have
benefited all of the Jews trapped in Europe.
31
David S. Wyman. The Abandonment of the Jews. (New York: Pantheon Books) Preface ix
18
The most important thing to consider when viewing the Allies with a critical eye,
however is,
The fact that most contemporaries of the Nazi Holocaust, as well as more
recent writers and observers, have thought of the Jews of 1939-45 Europe
as refugees rather than as prisoners has in itself been a powerful factor in
raising the assumption and expectation that it was possible for the
democracies to have done something more to rescue those Jews when in
reality they were powerless to do anything at all apart from defeating
Hitler.32
How else could the genocide have been ended unless the man, who truly believed
he was accomplishing the divine will of God, himself, was stopped? (“My conduct is in
accordance with the will of the Almighty creator… In standing guard against the Jew I
am defending the handiwork of the Lord.”33) It was not the Allies obligation to rescue the
Jews, which for the most part would have been impossible, but to end the war by going
straight to the source of the problem, Adolf Hitler. “In a human-made, willful catastrophe
on the scale of the Holocaust, it is difficult to imagine that enough could have ever been
done to save the lives of all who needed saving.”34 There was no way that the Allied
forces could have made a more substantial rescue attempt for the Jews that would have
rescued enough Jews to be satisfactory in comparison with ending the war and stopping
the genocide altogether. “It was not really until mid-1943, several months after the Battle
of Stalingrad, that one could predict with some certainty that victory would go to the
Allies.”35, “In fact, opportunities of rescue were extremely limited until the tide of war
began to turn toward the Allies…”36 The Allies were uncertain until later years of the war
32
William D. Rubenstein. The Myth of Rescue. (New York: Routledge) 80
Gilbert, Martin. Never Again: A History of the Holocaust. Great Britain: HarperCollinsIllustrated) 20
34
Henry L. Feingold. Bearing Witness: How American and Its Jews Responded to the Holocaust. (New
York: Syracuse University Press) 186
35
Verne W. Newton. FDR and the Holocaust. (New York: St. Martin’s Press) 148
36
Verne W. Newton. FDR and the Holocaust. (New York: St. Martin’s Press) 161
33
19
whether or not the victory would land in Allied hands. Until that fate could be sealed, the
Allies had an obligation to the war front, not to Jewish rescue, and once this certainty was
obtained, late in the war, it was already too late to make any sort of large scale rescue
attempt. This is not to say that rescue attempts were not made during the war. According
to Martin Gilbert, author of The History of the Holocaust, the Allied powers were the
leaders in Jewish refuge during the war holding overall more refugees than in any other.
Table 1. Countries taking in German Jewish refugees from 1933 to the end of 1938
United States
Argentina
Britain
Palestine
France
Holland
South Africa
Shanghai
Chile
Belgium
Portugal
Brazil
Switzerland
Bolivia
Yugoslavia
Canada
Italy
Australia
Sweden
Spain
Hungary
Uruguay
Norway
Denmark
Philippines
Venezuela
Japan
102,222
63,500
52,000
33,399
30,000
30,000
26,100
20,000
14,000
12,000
10,000
8,000
7,000
7,000
7,000
6,000
5,000
3,500
3,200
3,000
3,000
2,200
2,000
2,000
700
600
300
Source: Never Again: A History of the Holocaust (Great Britain: HarperCollins) 38
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Bolded countries are those in allegiance with the Allied powers at the time. So
although, it is true that perhaps, a large scale attempt of unknown proportions that the
critics would have liked to see was never attempted, the Allies did make an effort despite
their more pressing commitment to the war.
The Allies acknowledged the despair and needs of the Jews, but they should never
have felt obligated to save the Jews. As elected political leaders, the Allied governments
had a commitment to protect and serve their own citizens before another country’s.
Although completely ignoring the Jewish situation would have been inhumane, the Allies
did no such thing. They simply had to deal with the world as it was at the time and take
into consideration their primary objectives which at the time did not involve a large-scale
rescue of European Jews.
Many factors resulted in the outcome of World War II, but in no way can the fate
of the Jews be placed as a heavy burden upon the shoulders of the Allied Powers. The
Allies had constricting immigration policies which did not allow for the Jews to migrate
en masse to their countries and were aware of the bans of Jewish migration that were put
in place in Europe. In line with the Allies lack of knowledge about the Hitler’s plan for
genocide and the commitment to end the war, the Allies had no other options. For these
specific reasons, it would have been impossible for the Allies to do substantially more for
the Jews during the Holocaust.
One must look at where the blame for the Holocaust truly lies. It is not the Allies
who began the war, and it was not the Allies who had a plan for genocide. The Allies had
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their own job to do, of protecting their homelands, which did not directly obligate them to
save the Jewish population of Europe. In fact, when we look at the Allied
accomplishments during World War II, we should be praising them for all their
achievements and efforts. Allied countries in conjunction with neutral states did as much
for the Jews as humanly possible while still maintaining an upper hand in the war.
Skeptics will always scrutinize those directly involved with a tragedy for not doing
‘enough’. But in the case of the Holocaust, one must look objectively at the restrictions
and efforts of the Allies to understand that, no matter how insignificant it may seem to
the critical eye, any attempt that was made by the Allied Powers would never have been
‘enough’. The horror of the Holocaust can never be forgotten, but by overanalyzing the
historical political stances and pointing the finger, little respect is shown for those who
were lost. Of course, those who perished and their respective families would wish their
deaths to be avenged in some way, shape or form, but a heated discussion between
historians won’t change the fact that what was done, is done. Henry L. Feingold said,
“We can sometimes measure the importance of an event by its impact on subsequent
historical development. The more important the event the louder the echo in history.”
Clearly the Holocaust has effected more than just the one generation. It is a marker in
time for all to see: a symbol of humanity, and inhumanity. It can be seen in the erected
memorials, in the testimonies of Jewish victims, through the life and subsequent death of
all who suffered; more importantly than whom to blame, should be remembered as the
true spirit of the Holocaust – In memoriam of them.
22
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