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Works Cited
Takaki, Ronald. Hiroshima: Why America Dropped the Atomic Bomb. Boston: Little,
1995. 46-47
Donovan, Robert. Conflict and Crisis: The Presidency of Harry S. Truman. New York:
Norton, 1977. 94
Wyden, Peter. Day One: Before Hiroshima and After. New York: Simon, 1984.
Allen, Thomas, and Norman Polmar. Code Name Down Fall: The Secret Plan to invade
Japan—and Why Truman Dropped the Bomb. New York: Simon, 1995
Uchii, Soshichi “Nuclear Research in the Soviet Union.”8 Jan. 2004. July 2004
<http://www.bun.kyoto-u.ac.jp/~suchii/Sci.Ethics/soviet.bomb.html>
U.S. National Archives, Record Group 77, Records of the Office of the Chief of
Engineers, Manhattan Engineer District, TS Manhattan Project File '42-'46, folder
5D Selection of Targets, 2 Notes on Target Committee Meetings.
http://www.dannen.com/decision/targets.html
Szilard, Leo. Interview. President Truman Did Not Understand. Aug. 1960. July 2004
<http://www.peak.org/~danneng/decision/usnews.html>
1
Marshall Strother
Woods
10th
July, 22, 2004
2
Before a decision could be reached about a nuclear attack in Japan, the United
States had to answer three questions. First, what, if any, were the alternatives to a nuclear
attack on Japan? Second, how would such an attack affect the United States’ standing
amongst the post-war powers, and especially its relationship with the Soviet Union?
Finally, if use of the atomic bomb was deemed acceptable and necessary to victory, how
could it be used to effectively secure a Japanese surrender? The United States’ failed to
answer any one of these questions adequately, and as a result, it launched an unnecessary
nuclear assault which resulted in the deaths of over 240,000 Japanese civilians.i
Prospects for any diplomatic solution to the War in the Pacific were doomed,
from the United States’ point of view, in 1944 by Franklin Roosevelt when he said the
following at a press conference in Washington: “We [Churchill and Roosevelt] formally
reemphasized what we had been talking about before, and that is we don’t think there
should be any kind of negotiated armistice, for obvious reasons. There ought to be
unconditional surrender.”ii Initially, this statement was not intended to be taken as
doctrine; it was propaganda meant to rally the troops and public to War in the East.iii
However, as time passed, the movement for unconditional surrender picked up popularity
within the Allied countries.iv Fueled by stories of human rights violations in Japan,
lingering rage over the destruction of Pearl Harbor, and frustration over the increasing
casualties in Japan, the American public began to believe “unconditional surrender” to be
the only acceptable victory scenario in the Pacific.v When Roosevelt died, Truman was
uncertain of his position, and relied heavily on Roosevelt’s legacy to guide him.vi As a
part of this reliance, Truman accepted Roosevelt’s propaganda as a realistic War aim, a
mistake that would ruin all further negotiations with Japan.vii
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By the time the U.S. was considering using the Atomic bomb, the Japanese had
already been negotiating with the Soviet Union and Chiang Kai-Shek of the Chinese for
some time.viii The negotiations were fruitless for the most part.ix The Soviet Union had
no desire for peace with the Japanese and were merely stalling until they could make
their move on Japanese territory in Manchurian Chinax, but they were an earnest peace
attempt on the part of the Japanese. On May 29, 1945, the Japanese envoy to the Soviet
Union Naotake Sato said to a Russian official, “Japan follows Russia’s example in her
desire to end hostilities as quickly as possible. The Pacific War, however… as a result of
result of America’s attitude, we have no choice to continue the fight,”xi Truman knew of
the negotiations, but disregarded them as a Japanese attempt to spread dissention
throughout the Allies.xii Instead, Truman and the rest of the allied powers (except Russia)
stubbornly refused to negotiate with Japan and, on July 2nd, 1945, approved of an
ultimatum demanding Japan’s total surrender of lands and military forces to Allied
control.xiii The ultimatum included a clause that threatened Japan with “prompt and utter
destruction” if it did not comply; so, when Japan publicly denounced the ultimatum on
July 30th, the States felt justified in ending all further communication until Japan had
been thoroughly defeated.xiv
Aside from use of the nuclear bomb, a conventional invasion of the Japanese
homeland was the only method the United States had to secure an unconditional
surrender from the Japanese. As the War progressed, and Japan retreated farther west, it
began localizing its resources in Japan and Manchuria in preparation for such an
invasion. The peace negotiations with the Chinese and Soviets mentioned above were an
attempt to secure Japan’s Western front so that troops could be removed from China to
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help defend Japan.xv After peace negotiations failed, Japan stepped up industrial
production in China in order to support the troops that remained there without diverting
sending from the island.xvi Generals also suggested that if the army was driven off Japan
itself, it could retreat to its Manchurian holdings and continue the fight there.xvii Baron
Kantaro Suzuki expressed the Japanese determination in April 1945 when he
recommended that the army “fight to the very end” even if “one-hundred million”
Japanese had to perish.xviii
One June 15th Truman received from the Joint War Plans Committee an outline of
the United States’ strategy for a full scale invasion of Japan.xix The following describes
the three different scenarios addressed in the “Olympic-Coronet Plan”:
If the Olympic-Cornet plan went according to schedule, there would be tow landings, which were
expected to result in a total of 193,500 battle casualties. If… the Kyushu invasion ended the war,
then the battle casualty count would be 132,500. The worst-case scenario envisioned three major
amphibious assaults, and the estimated consequence of this triple invasion was 220,000 battle
casualties…total casualties, in the triple invasion scenario, would exceed 250,00 and were
climbing toward 500,000xx
Clearly, an invasion of Japan was out of the question. The American casualties,
to say nothing of Japanese casualties, predicted in Olympic-Coronet were more than
enough to justify use of the Atomic Bomb to Truman from a purely military standpoint.
He later stated, “It occurred to me, that a quarter of a million of the flower of our young
manhood were worth a couple of Japanese cities, and I still think they were and are.”xxi
In this and only this respect did Truman make the right assessment about Japan. The
Japanese were simply too determined to allow themselves to be defeated at home by a
conventional invasion.
Having determined that use of the atomic bomb was justified from a military
standpoint, Truman had one last issue to consider: the Soviet Union’s reaction to a
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nuclear assault. Since the Yalta Conference in February of 1945, the United States and
the Soviet Union had been in a heated debate over what to do with their European
territory after Germany was defeated.xxii After the land had been divided up between the
Allies and Russia, the chief concern was how to repair the damage that had been done in
Europe.xxiii It was concluded at Yalta that each conquering country should be responsible
for the reconstruction of its own territory, provided Germany paid $20 billion in
reparations for its aggression, $10 billion of which would go to the Soviet Union.xxiv
Neither the US nor the Soviet Union complied with this plan for long. During the
negotiations between the US and Soviet Union that continued after Yalta, it became
evident that the Soviets were completely disregarding their responsibility for East
Germany. Instead of repairing its infrastructure, the Soviet Union was pillaging the
German cities and industry and exporting their goods to Moscow en masse.xxv Truman
reacted on May 18 by replaced his standing reparations negotiator with a conservative
hardliner who was given specific orders to reduce the $20 billion figure, which he
thought would devastate the German economy.xxvi
This conflict with Russia made an atomic strike on Japan even more appealing.
Not only would such an attack serve to end the War in Japan, but many officials believed
that it could be used to intimidate the Soviets into complacency in the West. Secretary of
State James Byrnes and Director of the Manhattan Project General Leslie Groves,
arguably the two most influential people to the President regarding the atomic bomb,
were key advocates of this “atomic diplomacy.”xxvii Sadly, these two labored under a
similar misconception: that the Soviets would take 7 to 20 years before they could
develop a bomb of their own.xxviii Two scientists who had worked at Los Alamos warned
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them that the Soviets would most likely have a bomb in 3 to 4 years, but neither Groves
nor Byrnes would listen;xxix Groves was too eager to show a return on the 2 billion dollars
that the United States had spent on his Manhattan Project, and Byrnes was too frustrated
with the Soviets to miss such a vital opportunity to make the United States a dominating
force. Both Byrnes and Groves advised the President to use the bomb, but the Soviets,
who would be a nuclear power by 1949, were ultimately unthreatened.xxx
Satisfied with the bomb’s expected impact on Russia and Japan, the White House
had only to resolve the question of where and when the bomb would be dropped. This
decision fell on two Committees which met on May 10-11 and May 31 respectively.xxxi
The first of the two Committees, the Target Committee, was responsible for making
preliminary recommendations for the target of the atomic bomb.
The most important question at the Target Committee was whether to use the
“gadget” (as it was referred to) on a smaller military target, or a larger, more populated
area. The goals of the Target Committee are stated in the following excerpt from Section
7 of its summary: “1) obtaining the greatest psychological effect against Japan and 2)
making the initial use sufficiently spectacular for the importance of the weapon to be
internationally recognized…” For this reason, the possibility of using the weapon on a
small military target was largely forsaken. Dr. J. Robert Oppenheimer, who attended the
meeting, insisted that the target be large enough in area that it would fully contain the
explosion, so as to demonstrate the full capabilities of the bomb.xxxii
The Interim Committee affirmed much of what the Target Committee had
concluded. It considered demonstrating the atomic bomb in front of the UN or Japanese
officials or warning the Japanese before the bomb was dropped so it could evacuate the
7
target city, but these ideas were quickly dismissed for fear that the Japanese would move
US POWs to the drop site or the bomb would not go off, living the U.S. with only one
remaining functional bomb.xxxiii As Dr. Leo Szilard testified later in an interview with
U.S. News and World Report, the prospect of a nuclear demonstration on neutral ground
was highly feasible. The U.S. could have easily manufactured more bombs in time to
launch an effective nuclear strike, even if the demonstration was a disaster.xxxiv Instead,
the Interim Committee concluded that the bomb should be used on a highly populated
city, but one with a military industrial center so as to justify the slaughter.xxxv
The meeting of the Interim Committee was rushed.xxxvi At the time, the Soviet
Union was preparing for an invasion of Japanese Manchuria and Byrnes, who lead the
meeting, wanted to end the War before the Union had the chance to gain any more
territory.xxxvii On top of that, General Douglas Macarthur, who was unaware that the
atomic bomb even existed until the day before it was dropped, was becoming frustrated
with the delay of Olympia-Coronet, and reported that the invasion would become
impossible after November of that year.xxxviii As a result, the Interim Committee hastily
disregarded the prospect of a peaceful demonstration in order to end the war as quickly as
possible.
Throughout these final phases of the decision-making process, President Truman
was left almost entirely in the dark. He was informed of the results of the Interim
Committee, but he did not seem to comprehend what he had condoned. He wrote in his
diary on July 25, 12 days before the first bomb was dropped on Hiroshima, “this weapon
is to be used against Japan between now and August 10. I have told the Sec. of War, Mr.
Stimson, to use it so that the military objectives and soldiers and sailors are the target and
8
not women and children.”xxxix On August 9th he announced “the first atomic bomb was
dropped on Hiroshima, a military base. That was because we wished in this first attack to
avoid, insofar as possible, the killing of civilians.”xl Over 66,757 civilians had perished
in the bombing.xli Truman had no real reason to lie, the U.S. had been firebombing
civilians in Tokyo for weeks; therefore, it must be concluded that he either did not know
or did not understand what had occurred. Although Truman supported the bombing in
later statements, his morality almost definitely would have caused him to reconsider had
he comprehended what he was doing.
The same day Truman wrote the above diary entry, his Chief of Staff issued and
order to General Carl Spaatz of the Pacific Air Force to drop the atomic bomb on
Hiroshima, Nagasaki, Kokura (“one of the largest arsenals in Japan and is surrounded by
urban industrial structures”xlii), or Niigata (“Machine tool industries are located there and
it is a potential center for industrial despersion[sic]. It has oil refineries and storage.”xliii)
according to Spaatz’s judgment. He followed through with this order on August 6th.
As soon as the Japanese realized what had happened at Hiroshima, they
immediately were prepared to surrender. Three key leaders keeping Japan in the War,
Emperor Hirohito, Baron Suzuki, and Foreign Minister Togo, all quickly reversed their
positions when faced with the new American weapon.xliv Hirohito ordered Togo to
immediately step up his peace effort saying, “Japan should not miss the chance for peace
by vain efforts to secure better terms.”xlv The War would have ended with Nagasaki
untouched had it not been for a series of events that prevented the Japanese peace
negotiations to begin in time.
9
First, the atomic bomb had wiped out all communications within Hiroshima,
preventing the Japanese leadership from understanding the extent of the devastation until
long afterwards.xlvi The American’s, not realizing the strength of their own bomb, had
ordered the second strike much too soon to allow Japan time to surrender.xlvii Second, on
August 7th, two relatively small time field commanders and a nuclear scientist decided to
move the date of the second atomic attack from August 11th to August 9th, further
decreasing Japan’s allowed response time. Third, one day before the Nagasaki bombing,
Stalin gave the order to invade Manchurian Japan (just as Byrnes had feared) with 1.5
million men, which distracted Japan just long enough to miss its last chance at surrender.
Finally, Nagasaki was not meant to be the second. Major Charles W. Sweeney, the pilot
responsible for delivering the bomb, was flying over Kokura, a significantly more
military target, preparing to drop the bomb when he found the cloud cover over the
Arsenal to be to heavy to allow a visual bombing. He then changed his flight path
towards the secondary target, Nagasaki, and completed his mission, killing thousands
more civilians than a similar attack in Kokura would have.xlviii
Eventually, of course, Japan surrendered. In a matter of days, the United States
had achieved absolute victory without experiencing a single casualty. However, the
convenience that the atomic bomb afforded the US in defeating Japan was easily
balanced by moral and political losses. The United States had demonstrated its
willingness to use its nuclear capabilities and thereby inspired the Soviet Union to begin
building arms to defend itself. The United States had decimated Japanese economic
centers and enraged the people of Japan, making post-war occupation much more
difficult to manage. Most importantly, by using the atomic bomb on civilians, the United
10
States sacrificed the moral high ground. It had lowered the expectations of a civilized
country by committing mass murder and getting away with it. In the coming Cold War,
the US could not in good conscience advocate nuclear disarmament because it had
already used nuclear weapons. Because of the major oversights committed during
Truman’s Presidency, the United States and its people are now forced to live with the
guilt of having committed one of the most overt and devastating acts of violence ever to
be witnessed by man.
i
Takaki, Ronald. Hiroshima: Why America Dropped the Atomic Bomb. Boston: Little, 1995. 46-
47
ii
iii
iv
v
vi
Takaki, 35
Takaki, 35
Takaki, 35
Takaki, 37
Donovan, Robert. Conflict and Crisis: The Presidency of Harry S. Truman. New York: Norton,
1977. 94
vii
Donovan, 95
Donovan, 92
ix
Wyden, Peter. Day One: Before Hiroshima and After. New York: Simon, 1984. 230
x
Wyden, 233; Takaki, 66
xi
Allen, Thomas, and Norman Polmar. Code Name Down Fall: The Secret Plan to invade Japan—
and Why Truman Dropped the Bomb. New York: Simon, 1995. 197
xii
Allen, 196
xiii
Donovan, 94-95
xiv
Wyden, 229
xv
Allen, 196
xvi
Allen, 195
xvii
Allen, 195
xviii
Allen, 195
xix
Allen, 203
xx
Allen, 208
xxi
Donovan, 97
xxii
Wyden, 127
xxiii
Donovan, 56
xxiv
Donovan, 76
xxv
Donovan, 78
xxvi
Donovan, 78
xxvii
Takaki, 62-63
xxviii
Wyden, 157
xxix
Takaki, 62
viii
11
Uchii, Soshichi “Nuclear Research in the Soviet Union.”8 Jan. 2004. July 2004
<http://www.bun.kyoto-u.ac.jp/~suchii/Sci.Ethics/soviet.bomb.html>
xxxi
U.S. National Archives, Record Group 77, Records of the Office of the Chief of Engineers,
Manhattan Engineer District, TS Manhattan Project File '42-'46, folder 5D Selection of Targets, 2 Notes on
Target Committee Meetings. http://www.dannen.com/decision/targets.html this is a memo sent to Groves
containing a summary of the Target Committee; Takaki, 42
xxxii
http://www.dannen.com/decision/targets.html
xxxiii
Wyden, 160-161
xxxiv
Szilard, Leo. Interview. President Truman Did Not Understand. Aug. 1960. July 2004
<http://www.peak.org/~danneng/decision/usnews.html>
xxxv
Wyden, 162
xxxvi
Wyden, 156
xxxvii
Takaki, 66
xxxviii
Allen, 210
xxxix
Takaki, 42
xl
http://www.dannen.com/decision/hst-ag09.html this is an excerpt from Truman’s radio broadcast
xli
Takaki, 46-47
xlii
http://www.dannen.com/decision/targets.html
xliii
http://www.dannen.com/decision/targets.html the misspelling of “dispersion” is included in the
original document
xliv
Wyden, 296
xlv
Wyden, 300
xlvi
Wyden, 296
xlvii
Takaki, 48
xlviii
Takaki, 47
xxx
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