Download Morality for Humans Or Is Mark Johnson A Closeted Care Ethicist

Morality for Humans
Or Is Mark Johnson A Closeted Care Ethicist?
In Morality for Humans: Ethical Understandings from the Perspective of Cognitive
Science (2014), Mark Johnson continues his research trajectory in moral theory that bridges the
gap between philosophy and cognitive science aided by the analysis of American pragmatists, in
particular, John Dewey. This book updates and extends Johnson’s 1993, Moral Imagination:
Implications of Cognitive Science for Ethics but also synthesizes his other works on the bodily
basis for reason and on aesthetics. Besides incorporating empirical research, a hallmark of
Johnson’s scholarships is that it is so clearly and logically argued by time one finishes reading
Morality for Humans the conclusions appear to be the product of common sense although the
claims are quite provocative by mainstream philosophical standards. Morality for Humans points
to a human skill of moral deliberation that is imaginative and based on experience rather than on
any objective normative standards for what is good or right. This paper recommends opening a
dialogue between Johnson’s work and contemporary care theorists. There are numerous
resonances between Johnson’s moral framework and care theory, and more importantly,
Johnson’s work has the potential to contribute to a robust theory of care that emphasizes the
embodied and performative dimensions of caring which contribute to knowledge creation and
identity formation as well as moral action. This dialogue is important because there remains a
surprising paucity of intellectual interchange between American pragmatists and care theorists
despite the potential for generative interplay being high. Some of the work done by
contemporary feminist pragmatists such as Cathryn Bailey and Heather Keith identify useful
conversation between care and pragmatism. Unfortunately, Johnson, like most other
contemporary American pragmatists, only engages care ethics in passing (2014, 59-61) if at all.
To be fair, many feminists do not richly address American philosophy either. The purpose of this
paper is to mine Johnson’s work for tools to enrich care theory. In particular, I will consider
Johnson’s approach to naturalism, and his use of Dewey’s notion of dramatic rehearsal. This
paper concludes with a brief example from the dance floor to how Johnson and care theorists can
rethink the very nature of ethical theory.
Not Your Mother’s Care Ethics
In the scope of the history of philosophy, care ethics is still in its intellectual infancy.
First named thirty years ago, care ethics was born out of a frustration with the
decontextualization of deontological and teleological ethics. Care ethics emerged out of women’s
experience and required feminist analysis to revalue that experience and theorize about it.
Accordingly, some of the early formulations (and many of the critics) conflated care ethics with
gender identity. Today, care theorists still find ethically significant insight from women’s
experience but are careful not to tie care ethics to essentialist or exclusive claims about women.
Furthermore, early models of care tended to valorize caring in parent-child dyads, which led to
marginalizing care as an individual morality appropriate primarily for the private sphere.
Contemporary care theorists such as Joan Tronto, Fiona Robinson, and Virginia Held have
extended care thinking into social and political philosophy seeking to explore how care might
inform institutional policies and practices. Despite the tendency of some to associate care ethics
with its founding mothers, it has come a long way in scope and complexity as witnessed by the
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increasing number of non-feminist identified scholars such as Daniel Engster and Michael Slote
who have begun to devote serious attention to developing care theory in new ways and applying
it to fresh arenas in order to challenge the presumptions of liberal ethics.
Although different versions exist, care ethics is an approach to ethics that favors context
and relationships rather than rubrics of moral adjudication. Because of its complexity and
entanglement with context, single sentence definitions are often inadequate to encapsulate care
theory. Diemut Bubeck defines caring as “meeting of the needs of one person by another person,
where face-to-face interaction between career and cared-for is a crucial element of the overall
activity and where the need is of such a nature that it cannot possibly be met by the person in
need herself” (129). Peta Bowden claims that care “expresses ethically significant ways in which
we matter to each other, transforming interpersonal relatedness into something beyond
ontological necessity or brute survival” (1). Each of these definitions offers important insight
into care but does not capture the depth of its complexity or the breadth of its domain. Care
ethics involves valuing empathy and emotion over rules and rights. Theorists of care do not
entirely eschew principles and moral systems but do not believe that these exhaust what
constitutes ethics. Because care is so contextually dependent, some have accused it of relativism,
however its contextual nature is indicative of care’s close ties to particularist epistemology.
Care’s normativity is thus emergent from context rather than a priori generated. Specific
knowledge of concrete others as opposed to abstract knowledge of generalized others is crucial
to the connection and empathy that is at the foundation of care. Given its short history, the
definition of care ethics is not fixed or agreed upon yet it describes something that has become
attractive to many ethical theorists who are dissatisfied with traditional configurations of ethical
theory.
Analogous to the issue of how to define care is the challenge of how to categorize care in
terms of theory is also the subject of some disagreement. Although some view care as an
alternative method for normative analysis, which simply replaces one set of values and processes
with caring ones, others contend that care entails a more fundamental shift in how to think about
ethics. Philosopher Susan Hekman, for example, claims that care, “does not merely represent an
alternative to the moral theory of the dominant tradition, but, rather, calls into question the very
conception of what the west has identified as moral theory” (35). Specifically, Hekman contends
that care integrates considerations of the moral self with moral decisions and action in a manner
that defies the autonomous ontology of traditional Western theory as well as the discrete
analytical categories of philosophy (i.e. ethics, metaphysics, epistemology). It is my contention
that Hekman and others, such as Vrinda Dalmiya who argues that care is essential to moral
inquiry, are on to something in recognizing the richness of a paradigm shift in care theory. For
example, Fiona Robinson captures the extra-normative aspect of care when she states, that her
understanding of care “parts company with the literature on care in which care is posited as
normatively ‘good’ and based on an unproblematic assumption of ‘need’” (5). This is not to say
that care does not have a significant normative component (as mentioned above) but many care
theorists suggest that care is more than a normative theory of ethics.
In my opinion, the challenge of defining and categorizing care is indicative of the liminal
and fluid potential of care, and which makes it ripe for dialogue with American pragmatism. As
Johnson describes pragmatism, context, process, and ends are in dynamic relationship:
“Pragmatism is about discerning the full meaning of experience and transforming experience for
the better” (2007, 282). Similarly, care describes both means and ends, which transforms
morality from an isolated experience of ethical action (i.e. dilemmas) to one that is tied up in
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who we are and what we know. Specifically, I contend that care is a theory of being that must
take into consideration our physical existence and our chosen actions in the world.
Naturalistic Ethics
A baseline connection between Johnson’s morality for humans and care ethics is its
naturalism. Johnson describes human values as emerging from “ongoing interactions with their
physical, interpersonal, and cultural environments. Those values arise naturally and are not
handed down with some transcendent source” (192). There are a number of reasons why making
the explicit turn to ethical naturalism is important. For one thing, a naturalized approach provides
the intellectual opening to integrate scientific observations about how the body works as
evidence in moral theorizing. This is particularly fruitful for care theory, as significant capacities
of care have been demonstrated to have a biological basis. This is not the same as claiming that
caring is biological or innate but rather the capacity is present and with proper stimulation can be
developed and honed. For example, Johnson discusses recent research on mirror neurons that
appear to be the biological basis for empathy, a crucial component of caring (Slote). Given the
available research on the processes of mirror neurons, Johnson concludes that an “empathetic
experience is not a theoretical hypothesis about another’s behavior, nor merely an analogical
projection from my experience to yours; rather, it is an activation of sensory, motor and affective
processes in direct relation to the behavior I perceive in you” (62). Although seldom referring to
neuroscience, care theorists have also framed care as a part of naturally occurring phenomena
that heretofore has not been fully attended to in the Western philosophical tradition. Caring has
been receiving recent attention as basic to the survival of human civilization (Rifkin; de Waal).
Furthermore, as Johnson points out, naturalism not only stands opposed to the
supernaturalism of religion, it rejects the moral authority of that which is outside the “causal
processes and constraints of our natural world” (20). Accordingly, care reframes moral authority
around relationships rather than an external moral authority. As Noddings bluntly states, “In care
ethics, there is no need for God as intermediary, model, or enforcer” (2010, 146). The
centerpiece of care is the relationship between the caregiver and the one cared for. Crucial for the
caring relationship is the idea that the caregiver is responsive to one another in a genuine and
deep way. This kind of responsiveness requires attentiveness and listening to the other. Noddings
goes so far as to refer to the required responsiveness as engrossment with the one cared for
(1984, 19). Superficial or incomplete attentiveness to the other can result in care by stereotype
such that caring is not only poor it can be experienced as detrimental. Ideologies of moral
authority can serve as a constraint to robust caring responsiveness because it limits possible
actions. For example, if an individual adheres to an unequivocal belief that abortion is always
wrong, can they be truly responsive to the needs of the other whose situation might dictate that
terminating a pregnancy is the most caring response?
Adopting a naturalistic approach to ethics means placing moral behavior in the context of
natural processes. Johnson applies the term allostasis to describe the process of life maintenance
or well being that humans pursue (55). While homeostasis suggest a return to a stable position,
allostasis connotes a more dynamic integrity that is changed as it confronts environmental
challenges. Being cared for is an important part of human well being but it is not a passive
experience (although it has not received the attention it should). The allostatic dynamism can be
a framework for understanding the interplay of caring actions in the life of individuals. Caring
actions are responsive to individuals and the interchange contributes to our knowledge of others
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and knowledge of our selves as caring actors. The individual in this case is maintained but at the
same time they are no longer the same—there is stability and yet change from the experience.
Given the allostatic framework, the phenomenological account frequently given for the caring
relation between the cared for and the caregiver is enriched to account for the ongoing growth
associated from the experience. Each agent is changed from the responsiveness and action. This
account differs from modernist accounts of ethics by eliding the categories of ethics,
epistemology and ontology. Johnson’s naturalistic and allostatic approach can help push care
theory into unchartered territory.
Dewey’s Dramatic Rehearsal
Another related avenue for fruitful discussion between care theorists and Mark Johnson’s
work revolves around the notion of dramatic rehearsal. Supported by neuroscience that indicates
humans engage in fast intuitive process to make moral decisions and then slower justificatory
processes to support those actions, Johnson extends the notion of dramatic rehearsal offered by
Dewey in suggesting that imaginative moral deliberation is at the heart of a morality for humans.
For Dewey, moral decision making is a deliberative process. This deliberation “involves doubt,
hesitation, the need of making up one’s mind, of arriving at a decisive choice” (134). In Dewey’s
approach, moral principles are guides and should not be treated as rules requiring rote
application: “Deliberation is not then to be identified with calculation, or a quasi-mathematical
reckoning of profit and loss” (134). Dewey maintains an important role for emotion in the
deliberative process, particularly sympathy. He describes sympathy as, “the animating mold of
moral judgment not because its dictates take precedence in action over those of other impulses
(which they do not do), but because it furnishes the most efficacious intellectual standpoint”
(130). Similarly, Johnson claims, “moral deliberation is a process of cognitive-conative-affective
simulation” (110).
For Johnson, dramatic rehearsal is both an imaginative and embodied endeavor that
involves emotion. Johnson applies the work of Antonio Damasio and others to argue for the
central role of emotions in moral cognition (83). Perhaps here is where Johnson most appears to
be a care theorist. Noddings similarly claims, “Caring depends on a form of attention that
requires continuous interaction between the cognition that assesses needs and the emotion that
moves a carer to respond to them” (2011, 163).
However, what if the boundary between rehearsal and caring action were further broken
down? What I am suggesting is that every caring action could be a rehearsal for future caring
actions. Accordingly, caring is actually a chain of actions ultimately linked by the mind/bodies of
the individual caregivers. We can explore this idea through an example on the dance floor.
Conclusion: Dancing in Jaffa
The 2014 film, Dancing in Jaffa, presents an interesting case study for an embodied and
performative theory of care as well as for American pragmatism as Mark Johnson characterizes
in Morality for Humans. The movie reflects the culmination of the life work of Pierre Dulaine,
an internationally recognized ballroom dancer. Dulaine was born in Jaffa, Palestine but spent
most of his life in England and the United States. He co-founded the American Ballroom Theater
Company in 1984 and in 1994 helped found the educational arm of the organization, known as
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Dancing Classrooms. The organization frames its mission in terms of developing life skills
including respect for individuals through ballroom dancing programs in elementary and middle
schools. Dancing Classrooms claims over 500 schools internationally use their programs (2014).
A significant quantity of research supports the positive impact of Dancing Classrooms on the
lives of students. For example, Larry P. Nelson and Wendy Guess of the University of Texas at
Arlington report on a pilot of the Dancing Classrooms program: “Findings of the study reveal
significant improvement regarding students’ perceptions of social support, diversity interaction,
self efficacy, and school success as a result of the program” (2). Anecdotal evidence and
testimonials from students also support the potential benefits of the program. Dancing in Jaffa is
an extension of Dulaine’s vision for Dancing Classrooms. In the film, Dulaine returns to the
town of his birth, which is now torn by the political realities of warring Israelis and Palestinians
living there. He works with 10 year olds who have inherited their parents and society’s identity
stereotypes and mistrust. Over time and through hard work, the intimacy, physicality, and risk of
ballroom dancing bring down barriers as documented in the statements of students and teachers.
The result is not a glorious moral triumph in meeting an imminent need as much as it is a
glimpse of what could be, if people are given the opportunity to empathetically and
imaginatively make meaningful inroads into one another’s lives.
What Dulaine accomplishes is establishing new habits using the affectations associated
with a shared aesthetic endeavor. In describing the reality of human morality, Johnson claims,
“We are simply intersubjectively co-active with others in creating a shared communicative and
performative situation” (58). The dance, in this case is a physical dramatic rehearsal or
performance, not with the intention of turning these ten year olds into champion dancers but with
the aim of improving relationships through exercising natural capacities. A positive outcome is
not just lessons about the common humanity of Palestinians and Israelis but also the
imaginative/cognitive habits of opening the door to understanding people who are “othered.”
Dancing becomes a means of learning ethics in a method other than acquiring propositional
knowledge of rules or calculating utility. Ballroom dancing is the vehicle for meaningful
interaction that is further elevated through attentiveness.
An interchange between Johnsonian American pragmatism and an embodied and
performative care theory has the potential to fully flesh out the moral implication of Dancing in
Jaffa. Johnson spends a great deal of time addressing ethics as problem solving and his treatment
is expansive including explicit concern for the unseen problems of the privileged (105-106).
However, a supra normative approach to care would seem to suggest that ethics is more than
problem solving. Ballroom dancing does not solve an immediate problem as much as it equips
individuals with experiences that if attended to, can enhance empathetic imagination. Care
theorists have emphasized care as triggered by need. No doubt, most care is indeed a response to
need. But, can care be proactive? Ballroom dancing stimulates the capacities of young people to
confront unfamiliar others that can promote caring.
Is Mark Johnson a closeted care ethicist? Well, no. Yet there is so much overlap that
cross conversation is truly warranted. The depth and range of intellectual fields today makes
many such inter and intra-disciplinary discussions challenging. At the rate of current scholarship
production, mastering what is going on in a variety of philosophical fields is virtually impossible.
However, care theorist and American pragmatists appear to be intellectual cousins that should
get to know one another better.
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Works Cited
Bubeck, Diemut. Care, Gender, and Justice (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1995).
Bowden, Peta. Caring: Gender Sensitive Ethics (London, Routledge, 1997).
Dalmiya, Vrinda. “Why Should a Knower Care?” Hypatia, 17:1 (Winter 2002), 34-52.
Dancing Classrooms. http://www.dancingclassrooms.com/NationalNetwork/ [accessed 8/24/14].
Dewey, John. Theory of the Moral Life (New York: Irvington, 1960).
Hekman, Susan. Moral Voices, Moral Selves: Carol Gilligan and Feminist Moral Theory
(Pennsylvania State University Press, 1995).
Johnson, Mark. Morality for Humans: Ethical Understandings from the Perspective of Cognitive
Science (Chicago University Press, 2014).
-----. The Meaning of the Body: Aesthetics of Human Understanding (Chicago University Press,
2007).
-----. Moral Imagination: Implications of Cognitive Science for Ethics (Chicago University
Press, 1993).
Nelson, Larry P. and Wendy Guess, “An Evaluation of Dancing Classrooms North Texas
Expansion Pilot Program” [undated]
http://www.dancingclassrooms.com/rw/collections/files/press/mediakit/dr_larry_nelson_f
ort_worth_research.pdf [accessed 8/24/14].
Noddings, Nel. Caring: A Feminine Approach to Ethics and Moral Education (Berkeley:
University of California Press, 1984).
-----. The Maternal Factor: Two Paths to Morality (Berkeley, University of California Press,
2011).
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Rifkin, Jeremy. The Empathetic Civilization: The Race to Global Consciousness in A World in
Crisis (New York: Penguin 2009).
Robinson, Fiona. The Ethics of Care: A Feminist Approach to Human Security (Philadelphia:
Temple University Press, 2011).
Slote, Michael. The Ethics of Care and Empathy (New York: Routledge, 2007).
de Waal, Frans. “Bodies in Sync: Contagious Laughter, Yawns, And Moods Offer Insight Into
Empathy’s Origins.” Natural History (September 2009).
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