Download Why Did Not The Black Sea Evolve Into A Zone Of Cooperation

Why Did Not The Black Sea Evolve Into A Zone Of
Cooperation?
By Selcuk Colakoglu
Journal of Turkish Weekly - 24/6/2014
Leaders from 11 countries came together on June 5, 1992, publishing the
Istanbul Declaration, the founding document for the Organization of the
Black Sea Economic Cooperation (BSEC). BSEC's primary goal was to declare
to the world that the Black Sea Basin was no longer a zone of polarization
and rivalry, but one of cooperation and integration.
Uncertainties surrounding the region in the aftermath of the Cold War, due
to the dissolution of the Soviet Union and the Eastern Bloc at large, were
to be eliminated in order to establish a solid ground for cooperation.
Turkey and Russia were historically opposed to each other based on long
lasting tensions, such as the rivalry between the Ottoman Empire and
Tsarist Russia, and the Cold War rivalry between NATO and the Warsaw Pact.
A new initiative aimed at enhancing cooperation and paving the way for
peaceful coexistence in the Black Sea Basin was jointly pioneered in 1992
by Turkey and Russia. Moreover, countries of the Balkans and South Caucasus
were also included under the umbrella of BSEC, meaning that the
organization covered a key region broader than Black Sea littoral. Turkey
even offered Greece, with which it was experiencing continued tensions over
Cyprus and in the Aegean Sea, to become a founding member of BSEC, a risky
move that clearly indicated a prevailing mood of optimism conducive to
enhanced cooperation.
Likewise, Azerbaijan and Armenia also took the plunge and joined the
initiative at the same time, despite the conflict over Nagorno-Karabakh.
Indeed, another goal of BSEC was to allow for countries which had
territorial disputes and cross-border minority issues to gradually sink
their differences through peaceful means via regular contact. The shared
hope of all parties was to witness the gradual resolution of the NagornoKarabakh conflict between Azerbaijan and Armenia, Georgia's problems with
the federal states of Abkhazia and South Ossetia, the Chechnian conflict
confronting Russia, and the dispute over Transnistria in Moldova, through
efficient diplomacy and joint efforts in which enhanced cooperation in the
Black Sea Basin would result. Likewise, problems which emerged after the
dissolution of Yugoslavia and the consequent civil war in Bosnia could have
been resolved through the BSEC mechanism. In fact, it was even thought that
such a spirit of cooperation and peaceful dialogue around the Black Sea
Basin could result in a new engagement process between Athens and Ankara.
Moreover, the U.S. and the EU also gave indirect support to the foundation
of BSEC, thus demonstrating their willingness to assist countries in the
region to join forces. Therefore, it is accurate to say that Turkey and
Russia were clearly on the right side of history when BSEC was founded, as
the organization was supported by all prominent actors in regional and
global politics.
Russia's return to its 'near abroad'
After a while, the initial mood of optimism that prevailed over the Black
Sea Basin during the first half of the 1990s was replaced by a context
marked by divergent interests and policies. That is, BSEC and other
regional bodies were unable to gain momentum despite all efforts. Even
though BSEC evolved into a regional organization with a permanent
secretariat in Istanbul by 1999, cooperation could not be deepened.
A major reason why enhanced cooperation could not be achieved was due to
the fact that Russia, which overcame the shock caused by the collapse of
the Soviet Union within only in a couple of years, began to exert its
Soviet-era influence once again. In this respect, Russia did not wish to
see Turkey and other Western countries playing an active role in a region
which it considered its hinterland. Moscow was also afraid of former Soviet
republics pursuing an independent foreign policy and possibly attaining
total economic independence from Russia.
Based on such a perspective, as Moscow recurred its power, Russia gradually
expanded its clout over these newly independent states thanks to its
political, military, and economic capacities, and managed to balance
developed Western countries' rising influence in the region. In its close
neighborhood, Russia froze the conflicts in Transnistria, Nagorno-Karabakh,
Abkhazia, and South Ossetia, in order to keep a tight rein on Moldova,
Azerbaijan, Armenia, and Georgia.
Furthermore, when the pro-Western government in Georgia led by Mikheil
Saakashvili "crossed the line" and tried to reassert its control over South
Ossetia in 2008, Russia entered into a war with Georgia as an act of
punishment. Seeing that Georgia could not resist Russia on its own, it was
disappointed that NATO and the EU were unable to provide necessary support.
After all, Russia managed to "punish" Georgia once again by recognizing the
independence of Abkhazia and South Ossetia.
>From such a perspective, what is currently going on in Ukraine is a clear
indication of a Russian strategy that is aimed at penalizing countries in
its near abroad which refuse to abide by the rules of the game set by
Moscow.
Independent policies of NATO and the EU
Countries in the region which feel insecure due to Russia's resurgence,
prefer to engage with NATO rather than counting on regional organizations
like BSEC. This is because they consider NATO a powerful actor which can
shield them from security threats, whereas regional organizations such as
BSEC are rather ineffective. NATO became the sole organization upon which
countries in the region of the Black Sea Basin relied for maintaining
security; for NATO's capabilities were affirmed on several key occasions,
such as the Civil War in Bosnia and the crisis in Kosovo, where it
intervened successfully. Romania, Bulgaria, and Albania, which are all BSEC
members, became NATO members in due course in order to guarantee their
territorial integrity. Similarly, the prospects of NATO membership became
all the more attractive in the eyes of Azerbaijan, Moldova, and Georgia on
the grounds that these countries could not maintain amiable relations with
Russia after 1990. Correspondingly, the subject of NATO membership acquired
currency in Ukraine when pro-Western governments came to power there.
Under such circumstances, EU membership also became a priority for
countries located in the Black Sea Basin because of the prospects it
offered in terms of economic development and prosperity. The EU became
littoral to the Black Sea after the accession of Romania and Bulgaria to
the Union. Later on, the EU expanded its membership perspective to cover
all Balkan countries. For Turkey, which received candidate status in 1999,
the EU took priority over any other international organization, including
BSEC.
Western countries began to ignore BSEC only one or two years after its
establishment in 1992, despite the fact that they were initially
supportive. Neither BSEC nor any other regional initiatives were mentioned
in the expansion and partnership programs promoted by the EU and NATO in
the greater Black Sea Region. Therefore, BSEC was unable to develop common
strategies with NATO or the EU. Additionally, unilateral policies
formulated and implemented by NATO and the EU with the aim of eastward
enlargement caused Russia to feel threatened, and as a result Moscow
distanced itself from cooperation-oriented policies. On the other hand,
although NATO and the EU enfranchised some Black Sea countries, they were
unable to put forth any tangible vision with regard to policies to be
pursued if Georgia, Ukraine, Moldova, or Azerbaijan were threatened,
consequently exposing these countries to increased Russian interference.
As a result, Russia's relentless efforts to expand its influence once
again, in addition to coordinated unilateral enlargement initiatives put
into action by NATO and the EU, inevitably undermined BSEC's promise and
potential to establish a solid ground for regional cooperation. Today, it
is polarization and war, instead of cooperation and peace, that
characterize the current context around the Black Sea region. In this
respect, the course of the Ukrainian crisis will act as a serious litmus
test that will reveal the true prospects of the "greater European idea".
http://www.turkishweekly.net/columnist/3891/why-did-not-the-black-seaevolve-into-a-zone-of-cooperation.html