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THE SCOTSMAN
Thursday 30 November 2006
Happiness is more than a state of mind
Individuals tend to say, when asked, that they are happy. But for true well-being you
need contentment, welfare and dignity, argues Sir Anthony Kenny
Most philosophers have assumed that everyone wants to be happy, and that it is the task
of philosophy to say what this supreme good is and how it is to be achieved. St
Augustine observed that if you ask two people whether they want to join the army, one
may say 'yes' and the other 'no'. But if you ask them whether they want to be happy, they
will both say 'yes' without hesitation. The only reason they differ about the army is that
one believes, while the other does not, that it will make him happy.
Pollsters have been posing questions about happiness to people around the world. But
instead of asking them whether they want to be happy, they have been asking whether
they are happy. "Taking your life as a whole" runs a typical questionnaire "would you
consider yourself very happy, somewhat happy, or not happy at all?". Interestingly, most
of those responding to such polls declare themselves more happy than not.
What are we to make of these findings? They have been taken very seriously by
economists, who base policies on them. The polls suggest, for instance, that above a
certain level, the money a person has bears very little relation to how happy she is. Since
'happiness studies' began, average incomes in the most developed countries have more
than doubled. Yet people's answers to pollsters suggest that they are very little, if at all,
happier. Some economists, and some politicians, have drawn the conclusion that
economic policy should be aimed not at increase in growth, but at increase in factors that
correlate more closely with self-reported happiness.
Philosophers, on the other hand, tend to be sceptical about the questionnaires, and raise a
number of issues about their methodology.
First, is each person in a position to pronounce accurately about his or her own
happiness? An expression of contentment is a judgement not about a momentary
sensation, but about a long-term state, and a person uttering it does not have overriding
authority.
It is possible for such a claim to be mistaken, and later to be revised. "In those days I
thought I was happy. Now I know better."
Again, if someone claims to be contented, but is regularly irritable, frequently quarrels
with family and friends, is constantly trying to change his job, and often exhibits
symptoms of psychosomatic illness, it may not be unreasonable to discount his evidence
even if given in good faith.
Moreover, not all evidence is given in good faith: people may not always answer
sincerely to an inquiry about their happiness. A person may be too proud to reveal
discontent, or too superstitious to boast of happiness. One may belong to a culture, or
occupy a status, which is hostile to whingeing or fearful of hubris. Or one may refuse to
give the answer that springs to mind, or any answer at all, because the query seems futile
or impertinent.
Yet philosophers themselves have difficulty with the idea of happiness. Hardly any two
thinkers give the same set of answers to the following questions. Is happiness subjective
or objective? Is it a detectable sensation, or is it a quality of an entire life? Is it a motive
for endeavour, or is it a state of satisfaction? Does everyone pursue happiness? Should
they? However it is brought about, is it something to be hoped for in this life or only in
some afterlife? Is happiness the key to the structure of morality? If so, is it individual or
general happiness that stands at the apex of morality?
I am a philosopher, and my son Charles is a World Bank economist . After many
discussions of these topics - happy discussions - we concluded that the key to reconciling
the different accounts of happiness given in philosophical tradition, was to recognize that
there are three distinct elements in human well-being: contentment, welfare, and dignity.
Contentment is what is expressed by self-ascriptions of happiness. It is not so much a
feeling as a state of mind; but of the elements of well-being it is the one closest to the
idea of happiness first made popular by the philosopher Jeremy Bentham, the founder of
utilitarianism. If it is to amount to a constituent of well-being, however, it must be an
enduring and stable state, and not a passing glow of euphoria or satisfaction.
In the most obvious sense of material welfare, it consists in the satisfaction of the needs
that conduce to bodily flourishing. Self-ascription does not have the same central role in
the measurement of welfare as in the case of contentment; we may be mistaken about our
bodily health and others are often better placed to judge this. But welfare is the least
controversial element in well-being. Almost all philosophers who have considered the
topic have considered it either a constituent or a necessary condition of happiness.
Psychological welfare is less easy to quantify. Clearly there are negative conditions
necessary for well-being: freedom from mental illness or defect, and from tragedies
occurring within one's family or immediate circle. But there are also positive
psychological abilities which may well be regarded as basic constituents of a good life.
Literacy is a good whose possessors prize in themselves and wish to confer on others.
But perhaps it is not so much an element in welfare as is dignity.
Dignity is a much more complicated notion to define. It involves the control of one's
destiny and the ability to live a life of one's choice. But it also seems necessary that one's
chosen way of life should have worth in itself, and be respected by others. Because
dignity concerns, in part, one's position in relationship to others, measurements of dignity
cannot be as absolute and objective as those of welfare. Dignity is the element of well-
being most emphasized in the concept of happiness in the philosophical tradition going
back to Aristotle.
These three elements of well-being are distinct. Each may exist without the others, and
more importantly, pairs of the triad may occur without the third. It is possible to have
welfare and contentment without dignity. A well-housed and well-fed slave who looks
for nothing better than his servile lot and has no complaints about the way he is treated
may be thought of quite happy in some sense: but he lacks the dignity that only liberty
could confer.
Contentment and dignity may be present without welfare. A devout and ascetic hermit,
revered by all who come in contact with him, may regard himself as blessed even though
he may be undernourished and unhealthy. Similarly, a hunger may suffer resolutely to
further a cause he believes is paramount. Both religious and secular martyrs have died
proclaiming their happiness.
It is all too easy for welfare and elements of dignity to be present without contentment, as
in the case of a bored and pampered member of a rich and dominant elite.
Many of the problems and paradoxes surrounding happiness are removed if we resolve it
into these separate elements and consider them in turn. Our aim in breaking down the
notion of well-being was not to show that no one can be happy who does not score highly
in each dimension. Throughout history, few have been fortunate enough to possess all
the desirable characteristics we have identified. The purpose of the analysis is to show
that when we pursue happiness for ourselves or for others, the goal is a complex one, and
if we are trying to measure well-being, a single metric will not suffice. Policies for the
maximisation of happiness may involve trade-offs between dignity and contentment,
between welfare and dignity, and between contentment and welfare.
The three items we have identified correspond to the unalienable human rights whose
existence the American Declaration of Independence regarded as self-evident: life,
liberty, and the pursuit of happiness. "Life", broadly interpreted, includes the necessities
that we have entitled "welfare". "Liberty" is the foundation of a career of dignity. And
the founding fathers conceived the "happiness" to be pursued as a state of contentment,
such as was soon to be given the name of "utility". For this reason, we have entitled our
study "Life, Liberty, and the Pursuit of Utility".
Sir Anthony Kenny was formerly Master of Balliol College, Warden of Rhodes House and
Pro-Vice-Chancellor of the University of Oxford. He is also a past President of the
British Academy and former Chairman of the British Library.