Download Superpower Relations Since World War II

SUPERPOWER RELATIONS SINCE WORLD WAR TWO
by
Ken Enderby
In the 74 years following the Bolshevik revolution in Russia, the Superpowers – the United
States and the Soviet Union – vacillated between two conflicting visions of each other. On the one
hand, Superpower motivations were seen as ideological and uncompromising; on the other, they
were seen as political and pragmatic. These two visions were dubbed the Riga Axioms and the
Yalta Axioms by historian Daniel Yergin in his book Shattered Peace.1 When the Riga Axioms
dominated, Superpower relations were characterised by conflict and confrontation. When the
Yalta Axioms came to the fore, relations were far less dangerous and intense.
The Riga Axioms
The Riga Axioms – first formulated by members of the American mission in Riga in the 1930s,
while monitoring developments in the USSR – asserted that Superpower foreign policy was
motivated primarily by ideological considerations.
According to the American version of the Riga view, the Soviet Union’s main aim was to foster
socialist revolution around the world. In other words, the USSR was believed to have subscribed
to Trotsky’s theory of permanent revolution, which asserted that socialism could only survive in
Russia if it was accompanied by revolutions elsewhere. Americans who subscribed to this view –
such as members of the State Department, Defence Department and CIA – pointed to Russian
support for Marxist parties in various parts of the world as evidence of the Soviet Union’s
ideological ambitions.
The Soviet Union had its own version of the Riga Axioms. According to this view, the United
States’ main aim was to expand the influence of its corporations, and to destroy the power and
appeal of socialist movements worldwide. Russians who subscribed to this view – such members
of the armed forces and the KGB – pointed to American support for right wing parties and
movements around the world as evidence of the United States’ reactionary intentions.
In summary then, the Riga Axioms asserted that the Soviet Union was a state in service of an
ideology – that ideology being international communism. The Soviet equivalent of the Riga view
saw the United States as also being motivated by ideology – that is, by a desire to see capitalism
conquer the world. Proponents of the Riga view regarded the other side as an implacable foe that
could never be trusted; anything it did was, by definition, malign. As such, cooperation was
impossible; perpetual vigilance and an unending arms race were the only paths to peace.
The Yalta Axioms
The Yalta Axioms – formulated by American president Franklin D. Roosevelt during the period
of wartime cooperation in the early 1940s – asserted that Soviet foreign policy was motivated
primarily by pragmatic factors.
According to this view, the Soviet Union’s main aims were to defend the revolution and to
secure its borders against aggression. The Yalta Axioms suggested that the USSR rejected
Trotsky’s notion of permanent revolution in favour of “peaceful coexistence” with the nonsocialist world. Americans who subscribed to this view included Roosevelt’s closest advisers and
a number of business leaders, who saw Russia as a potential market for American goods.
As with the Riga Axioms, the Yalta Axioms had their own Soviet counterpart. According to that
view, the United States’ main aims were to defend its allies and its strategic interests, which
included access to markets and resources around the world. Of course, elite opinion mattered a lot
less in Russia than the United States in the period up to 1953, since the only opinion that mattered
weight was that of the dictator – Stalin.
Advocates of the Yalta view in both America and Russia pointed to each side’s compliance with
various international agreements as evidence that Superpower relations could be cooperative.
In summary then, the Yalta Axioms asserted that in the two Superpowers, ideology was
secondary to the interests of the state. The United States and the Soviet Union were therefore like
any other nations – pursuing their economic, political and strategic interests, often at the expense
of their immediate neighbours.
The Axioms and Superpower relations
The implications of these two views are crucial in understanding the changes that occurred in
Superpower relations in the period since World War Two.
When the Riga view predominated – as it did in the years 1917-41, 1946-63, and 1979-87 –
there was virtually no chance of cooperation with the other side, since anything that side did was
seen as malign. The only option was to increase defence spending and hold the line against the
enemy’s advances. Hence, it was during these periods that the Superpowers became involved in
conflicts in Asia, Africa and Latin America.
When the Yalta view predominated – as it did in the years 1941-46, 1963-79, and 1987-91 –
Superpower relations improved dramatically. Hence, it was during these periods that agreements
were reached in areas such as scientific and cultural cooperation, and nuclear arms control.
Indeed, Superpower relations since the Russian Revolution were really determined by the power
struggle within each nation between those who supported the Riga view and those who supported
the Yalta view. The history of this period fell into five distinct periods: wartime cooperation, the
Cold War, Detente, the New Cold War and the New Detente.
WARTIME COOPERATION (1941-46)
The Soviet Union and the United States were thrust together as reluctant wartime allies in 1941,
when the former was attacked by Germany and the latter by Japan. Up until that time, both nations
had been isolationist – America by choice, Russia by circumstance – so it is hardly surprising that
the cooperation should have ended less than a year after the war came to an end.
The reason for the deterioration of American-Soviet relations in 1945-46 related to the differing
war aims of the two nations.
Russian ambitions for the post-war period
For Stalin, the priorities were to rebuild Russia and prevent Germany from starting another war
(after all, this was the second time Russia had been attacked by Germany this century). During the
war, the Soviet Union had lost 20 million people, 7 million horses, 20 million pigs, 4.7 million
houses, 1,710 towns, 70,000 villages, 65,000 kilometres of railway track, 15,800 locomotives and
428,000 freight cars. In addition, 25 million of its citizens were homeless.
Stalin was also intent on regaining territories lost to Russia during the previous decades (the
Baltic states [Latvia, Lithuania and Estonia], Bessarabia [now Moldavia], parts of Poland and
South Sakhalin) and on expanding Russian influence in Eastern Europe.
However, Stalin faced a serious dilemma. As the historian John Lewis Gaddis has put it:
“Disproportionate losses during the war may well have entitled the Soviet Union to
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disproportionate postwar gains, but they had also robbed that country of the power required to
secure those benefits unilaterally. The USSR needed peace, economic assistance and the
diplomatic acquiescence of its former allies. There was no choice for the moment, then, but to
continue to seek the cooperation of the Americans and the British: just as they had depended on
Stalin to defeat Hitler, so Stalin now depended on continued Anglo-American goodwill if he was
to obtain his postwar objectives at a reasonable cost”.2
In essence, what Stalin wanted was the right to extract reparations from a disarmed and
neutralised Germany, as well as reconstruction loans from the United States. Were these to be
denied to him, he would be forced to divide Germany permanently, then extract reparations from
the sector under his control.
Which of the two options Stalin would choose would depend largely on the attitude of the
United States.
American ambitions for the post-war period
For Roosevelt (the US president from 1933 to 1945), the priority was to prevent a repeat of the
events which had dragged the world into war. In the American view, the conflict had been a
consequence of the Great Depression and the three great ‘evils’ which had exacerbated that
prolonged slump: rising protectionism, fluctuating currencies and unstable capital flows. What
had happened was that nations tried to avoid the consequences of the Depression by exporting
their unemployment – raising tariffs and devaluing their currencies. This might have worked had it
been pursued by one nation only. But when all nations tried it, the result was a general decline in
world trade (by a third), a reduction in output and a rise in unemployment. Policies intended to
mitigate the effects of the Depression actually made them worse. This gave extremist groups the
opportunity to seize power in Germany and Japan. The world witnessed the rise of fascism in the
former and militarism in the latter.
If trade problems had been the cause of World War Two, then America’s answer was to
establish a set of rules to govern global trade, and a set of institutions to enforce them. These rules
were to become the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) and the Bretton Woods
monetary system; the institutions were to become the International Trade Organisation (ITO), the
International Monetary Fund (IMF), and the World Bank (originally known as the International
Bank for Reconstruction and Development [IBRD]). The GATT would prevent nations from
raising tariffs; the IMF would prevent them from devaluing their currencies; the IBRD would
provide long-term capital flows to finance economic development. (Interestingly enough, the ITO
was abandoned before it began, due to opposition from within the United States itself.)
A fine plan, but how was America to persuade other nations to agree?
France and Britain presented no difficulties. They were bankrupt and needed American money to
finance reconstruction. This was only provided when they agreed to America’s terms.
Russia was another matter. Roosevelt’s knew that, short of war, he could not force Stalin to
accept the new economic order. Nor could he prevent Stalin from establishing a buffer zone in
Eastern Europe. The loss of these countries to communism would be a blow, in that the world
would be divided into two rival economic systems. However, Roosevelt was hopeful he could
entice the USSR to join the new order by offering it cheap loans for reconstruction. That is, the
Russians would be persuaded to accept the system by being offered a stake in it.
Political differences (such as those over borders in Central Europe and control over the former
Axis powers) would be dealt with by ignoring them. The victorious powers would be given the
right to determine the post-war status of the nations under their occupation. Hence, the United
States and Britain would decide the fate of Western Europe, while the Soviet Union would decide
that of the East. Roosevelt expected that Stalin would seek control of Bulgaria and Romania (both
of which had been allies of Nazi Germany) and probably Poland (since it was the invasion
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corridor into Russia, and had once been a part of the Russian Empire). All three of these nations
he was prepared to abandon, in the hope of maintaining a working relationship with the USSR in
the post-war period. However, Roosevelt hoped that Central Europe could be neutralised, allowing
Finland, Czechoslovakia, Hungary and Yugoslavia to choose their own political systems. This
would provide a buffer zone between the American and Russian “spheres of influence”. Of course,
Germany and Austria would be occupied by the Allies for an indefinite period, but eventually they
could be granted independence, probably under conditions of unarmed neutrality.
The Yalta Conference
Clearly, Roosevelt’s plan was influenced by the Yalta Axioms. It reached its zenith at the Yalta
Conference in February 1945, when the ‘Big Three’ world leaders (Roosevelt, Stalin and
Churchill) got together in southern Russia to discuss the post-war division of Europe. Clearly too,
Stalin’s thinking was also influenced by the Yalta Axioms. What Roosevelt was offering was a
great power consortium, with the USSR finally accepted as one of the great powers. Roosevelt
agreed to German reparations of $20 billion over a 20 year period (half of which would go to
Russia), and offered the possibility of a multi-billion dollar reconstruction loan. It was an offer
difficult to refuse.
Of course, not everything went smoothly at the Yalta Conference. Many issues could not be
resolved to the satisfaction of both Superpowers. For example, Stalin gave a verbal promise that
he would allow free elections in the nations under Soviet occupation, but no one took this
commitment very seriously, least of all Stalin himself. Both sides knew that the alternative to
compromise was confrontation – and neither side wanted this. To quote Yergin, “Thus, on each of
the outstanding issues, the Great Powers had found that the best way to cooperate was to give each
a freer hand in its own sphere. Because they could not agree on how to govern Europe, they would
begin to divide it; this was how the Yalta system worked.”3
THE ORIGINS OF THE COLD WAR (1945-47)
Roosevelt’s plans for the post-war world were brilliant in their conception. But they were not to
be. Instead of great power co-operation, the world was cast into the shadows of the Cold War.
Three main factors explain this development: the Roosevelt’s death; Truman’s ignorance; and
Stalin’s intransigence.
The death of Roosevelt
The most important factor explaining the demise of the Roosevelt plan was the death of its
architect. Franklin Roosevelt died in April 1945, well before his plans for the post-war world
could be put into effect.
The problem for Roosevelt had been that he could not admit to the American public that he was
abandoning Poland, Romania and Bulgaria to the Russians. After all, this would be a violation of
the principles of freedom and democracy for which America supposedly stood. There was also the
added problem that millions of Poles lived in the United States. Roosevelt depended on their votes
to win the 1944 election, so he had to be seen to be supporting Polish rights – at least verbally.
Roosevelt was also a prisoner of the American public’s rejection of great power consortia, in
favour of a Wilsonian (i.e. collectivist) approach to international relations. The symbol of this
desire was the United Nations Organisation, which was to replace the moribund League of
Nations. To satisfy public opinion, Roosevelt created the General Assembly, with its democratic
voting system (one vote per state and decision by simple majority). To satisfy himself and Stalin,
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he created the Security Council, with its undemocratic voting system (one permanent vote per
great power, and decision by unanimity).
Hence, Roosevelt was saying one thing and doing another. As Yergin put it, “The genuine
tensions between these two approaches remained concealed for most of the Second World War.
After the war, the conflict became explicit, and a major source of the Cold War.”4
The rise of Harry Truman
Roosevelt was succeeded by Harry Truman, a man with little understanding of, or interest in,
international affairs. One of Roosevelt’s greatest errors was his failure to confide in his vice
president. (In fact, Roosevelt had only selected Truman because he did not wish to choose
between his two favourites, James Byrnes and Henry Wallace.) Truman was only consulted by
Roosevelt twice during his vice-presidency, and neither of these discussions concerned foreign
policy. Indeed, so ignorant was Truman of America’s wartime initiatives that he did not learn
about the Manhattan Project (to build the atomic bomb) until the night he was sworn in as
president.
Harry Truman – like most Americans – took Roosevelt at his word. He knew nothing of his
predecessor’s secret agreements with Stalin, and believed that Roosevelt seriously wanted to
defend Eastern Europe against Soviet interference. He therefore interpreted Stalin’s efforts to take
control of these nations as evidence of Russia’s expansionist ambitions. Truman also rejected the
idea of “spheres of influence”. When he saw Stalin carving out such a sphere in Eastern Europe,
he concluded that the Riga Axioms offered a better explanation of the Soviet Union’s intentions.
As Yergin put it, “Truman, himself part of the great public consensus, had no idea that Roosevelt
had been speaking two languages, nor did he know that aspects of Russian behaviour in Eastern
Europe were in response to Roosevelt’s Great Power diplomacy. Truman could not believe that
Russia’s quest for security had a rationale; he had to ask himself who could threaten the Soviet
Union. Certainly he could not entertain doubts about American intentions. When he was finally
confronted with foreign policy questions, all he had as background was his storybook view of
history and a rousing Fourth of July patriotism. He tended to see clearly defined contests between
right and wrong, black and white. Neither his personality nor his experience gave him the patience
for subtleties and uncertainties.”5
Truman’s political weakness persuaded him to seek advice from people other than those close to
Roosevelt – men like Averell Harriman, Winston Churchill and Chief of Staff Admiral William
Leahy. All four men were strong anti-communists, with an abiding hatred of the Soviet Union.
One of the most misguided pieces of advice he received was that the United States would enjoy a
long-term monopoly on the atomic bomb. Truman’s military advisers persuaded him that it would
take the Soviet Union 20 years to develop nuclear weapons. They also insisted that the USSR
possessed no uranium of its own, and that the United States had purchased 95 percent of the
world’s available supply.
The Potsdam Conference
The Potsdam Conference, held in July 1945, was held to settle the post-war borders of Europe.
Many of Stalin’s territorial demands were approved at this meeting, as were the occupation
arrangements for Germany and Austria. It was agreed that both countries should be jointly
administered by the four victorious powers (Britain, France, the USA and the USSR), via zones of
control, with Berlin given special status.
During the conference, Truman learned of the successful testing of the atomic bomb, but decided
not to share this news with Stalin. As it turned out, the Soviet dictator did not need to be told; he
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had spies in the Manhattan Project, and had known about the bomb for several years (earlier than
Truman, in fact).
The successful testing then use of the bomb had a profound effect on Truman. Although he had
no intention whatever of using it against the USSR, he believed that the threat of it might force
Stalin to honour his pledge at Yalta to allow free elections in Eastern Europe. The first step in the
process of pressuring Stalin had been to cancel Lend Lease aid to Russia (May, 1945). Next
Truman withdrew the offer of a loan. Then, at the London Council of Foreign Ministers
(September, 1945), he allowed Secretary of State James Byrnes to imply that the US might use
nuclear weapons against the Soviet Union. Finally, he refused to allow the Western sectors of
Germany to pay war reparations to the USSR (May, 1946). By September 1946, the Riga Axioms
were firmly in place in the United States.
Increasing Soviet control over Eastern Europe
Throughout 1945, Stalin stuck to the deal hammered out at Yalta. He gave America a free hand
in Western Europe and denied aid to the communist forces in the Greek Civil War. However, as
Truman persisted in demanding concessions in Eastern Europe, Stalin’s attitude hardened and he
turned his sphere of influence into a sphere of control. Communist governments were installed in
one Eastern European nation after another – Romania and Bulgaria in 1945, the Soviet sector of
Germany in 1946, Poland and Hungary in 1947, and Czechoslovakia in 1948. One of Stalin’s aims
was to create governments which were entirely dependent upon Soviet military support for their
survival. In this way, they would be entirely compliant to Soviet demands – including the payment
of reparations.
Stalin now began demanding reparations from the nations under his control. If he could not get
the money from the sectors of Germany under American, British and French occupation, he would
certainly get it from the areas under his own control.
By the end of 1947, Stalin had decided that the Riga view provided a better explanation of
America’s intentions.
THE COLD WAR (1947-63)
The emergence of rival blocs
With suspicion running rife on both sides, all talk of nuclear disarmament was abandoned. The
problem of the atomic bomb was settled by both sides acquiring the new weapon. Peace would be
maintained by mutual deterrence. The question of Germany was settled by dividing it two –
permanently. From 1948 onwards, the two Germanys became symbols of the new world order – a
division of almost all nations into two political, economic and military blocs. As Yergin put it,
“Two great unknowns confronted the United States and the USSR, and the resolution of either
could have decisively shifted the balance of power between them. One was Germany; the other,
nuclear weapons. Neither the Soviet Union nor the United States could willingly run the risk that
the other would carry the day in either area. The most stable solution? That each would have its
own Germany, and each its own atomic arsenal. In that way, a kind of stability would be
introduced into their relationship.”6
The Western Bloc (the US sphere of influence) was based on the American vision of free trade
and private enterprise (although not always freedom and democracy, as evidenced by the inclusion
of numerous right-wing dictatorships), and was defended by a series of alliances negotiated by the
United States in the 1940s and ‘50s: NATO (1949), ANZUS (1952), SEATO (1954), CENTO
(1955) and the US-Japan Security Treaty. Its economic underpinning was provided by the
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Marshall Plan in 1948, which channelled $22.4 billion of economic aid to the nations of Western
Europe, to help them rebuild.
The Eastern Bloc (the Russian sphere of influence) was based on the Soviet vision of command
socialism and democratic centralism (ie. a monopoly on power by the Communist Party), and was
defended by the Warsaw Treaty Organisation (1955), known usually as the Warsaw Pact.
Superpower intervention
By the end of the 1940s, the Superpowers had become obsessed with maintaining control of
their respective spheres, and with expanding their influence among the nations of the Third World.
This was particularly the case after Yugoslavia left the Eastern Bloc (following an attempt by
Stalin to replace Tito with a more pliant ruler in 1948) and China left the Western Bloc (following
the communist revolution in 1949).
American interventions
In America, the Truman Doctrine (announced in March 1947) committed the United States to
limiting Soviet influence to those areas already under Russian control – a policy known as
“containment”.
The United States intervened to defend its allies against internal and external aggression. In
1947, it took control of the war against leftist rebels in Greece, leading the Greek army to victory
in a bitter two year conflict. The following year, when the Russians blockaded Berlin in the hope
of forcing American to back down over the creation of a West German state, the US launched a
massive 11 month airlift. The most successful military intervention occurred during the Korean
War (1950-53), when the United States and its allies prevented a takeover of South Korea by the
communist North. Less successful was the US involvement in Vietnam, although a communist
takeover was postponed for more than 20 years.
The US also attempted to overthrow any governments which threatened to leave its sphere of
influence. This policy was carried out successfully in many nations, including Iran in 1953,
Guatemala in 1954, Ecuador in 1963, Indonesia and the Dominican Republic in 1965. It was
attempted unsuccessfully in Cuba in 1961. It didn’t matter whether these regimes really were
turning to the Soviet Union for assistance. Any sign of independence on their part was seen as a
threat, and therefore a justification for American action.
Soviet interventions
Similarly, the USSR moved to defend its sphere of influence by crushing opposition groups
threatening to bring down, or change the nature of, the governments of its satellite states.
Examples included the suppression of riots in East Germany in 1953 and the overthrow of
reformist communist governments in Hungary in 1956 and Czechoslovakia in1968). It didn’t
matter whether these opposition groups really were trying to restore capitalism. Any attempt to
disengage themselves from Soviet control was regarded as a threat, and therefore a justification
for Soviet intervention. The notion that socialism could never retreat became known as the
Brezhnev Doctrine.
During this period, the Soviet Union began actively supporting revolutionary groups around the
world, in the hope that they might weaken American influence. Such groups were mainly active in
Asia and Latin America.
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The nuclear arms race
Both Superpowers now participated in a desperate race for nuclear supremacy. In 1949, the
Soviets detonated an atomic bomb. The following year, Truman ordered development of the
hydrogen bomb. In April 1950, he approved NSC-68, the blueprint for rearming America. Within
10 years, the United States had 5,000 strategic nuclear weapons aimed at the Soviet Union. Within
20 years, the Soviets had a similar number aimed at the United States.
More dangerously, Truman’s successors began using nuclear threats as a means of resolving
international disputes. President Eisenhower ended the Korean War by threatening to use nuclear
weapons in North Korea and China. He also issued a nuclear threat during the Taiwan Straits
Crisis of 1955. President Kennedy resolved the Berlin Crisis (1961) and the Cuban Missile Crisis
(1962) by issuing nuclear threats to the Russians. And President Nixon tried to end the Vietnam
War by threatening a nuclear attack on North Vietnam in 1969. That same year, the Russians
issued a nuclear threat of their own against the Chinese during their border dispute.
These threats only heightened Cold War tensions, reinforcing the Riga view of the other side.
The logic of the Cold War
The tragedy of the Cold War was that it appeared to be self-perpetuating. The Riga view ensured
that one side’s loss was automatically interpreted as the other side’s gain. Hence there was no
room for neutrality or non-alignment; nations were required to take sides, or suffer the
consequences. Indeed, the Superpowers began to behave precisely as the Riga Axioms predicted:
in America’s case, boycotting the USSR in an attempt to bring down the socialist system; in the
Soviet Union’s case, exporting revolution in an attempt to destroy the Western alliance from
within. It was during this period that anti-communist groups were required to follow the
“American line” if they wished to receive help from the United States. Similarly, revolutionary
socialist groups were obliged to follow the “Moscow line” if they wished to receive aid and advice
from the USSR.
THE DECLINE OF THE COLD WAR (1963-70)
The Cold War eventually thawed in the 1960s, as the Yalta Axioms gradually displaced the Riga
view in both the White House and the Kremlin. Three reasons were paramount: declining political
influence on the part of the Superpowers; the failure of Cold War policies to solve international
disputes; and the rise of nationalism in the Third World.
Declining Superpower influence
By the mid-1960s, the Superpowers had began to lose influence within their respective blocs.
This made it difficult for them to continue imposing their hard-line views on their allies.
In America’s case, this loss of influence was mainly a consequence of the increasing economic
power of Japan and the nations of Western Europe. None of these countries regarded the Soviet
Union with anything like the malice and suspicion that the United States did (which is not
surprising, given that they had been Russia’s neighbours for several centuries). Instead, they
accepted a Yalta view of the USSR – a view which suggested that there was no reason not to trade
with the place.
The country most concerned with maintaining good relation with the Soviet Union was West
Germany, since most of its citizens still hoped for reunification with the East some day. The
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policy of building bridges with the Eastern Bloc – begun in the late 1960s by the West German
Social Democratic Party – was known as “Ostpolitik”. In August 1970, West Germany and the
Soviet Union signed the Treaty of Moscow, formally recognising the post-war borders in Europe.
That December, West Germany and Poland signed a similar treaty. Then, in September 1971,
Britain, France, the US and the USSR signed the Four Power Agreement on Berlin, guaranteeing
access to the western sectors of the city. Finally, in December 1971, the two Germanys signed a
treaty of mutual recognition and renounced all territorial claims on each other. The division of
Germany, which had played such a key role in the origins of the Cold War, was formalised. Both
sides hoped it would end all confrontation in this part of the world.
The decline of US power was most strongly evidenced by the inability of the United States to
honour its promise to back its own currency with gold. This resulted in the collapse of the Bretton
Woods monetary system in 1971. With it went America’s ability to solve its balance of payments
problems by printing money.
In Russia’s case, the decline in its influence was mainly a consequence of the Sino-Soviet split.
This began in the late 1950s, when Mao Zedong refused to follow the Soviet line on domestic and
international issues. Mao’s attempts to promote himself as leader of the communist world
prompted the Soviets to cut off economic and military aid to China. The Chinese responded by
developing their own nuclear weapons. By the late 1960s, the two communist giants regarded each
other as enemies.
The Sino-Soviet split had repercussions across the world, with communist parties being forced
to choose between two competing approaches to international relations: the Soviet belief in the
possibility of “peaceful coexistence” with the West, and the Maoist view of “permanent armed
conflict”. The split also began to break the grip of the Riga Axioms on those in power in the
United States. It was harder to portray the world as divided into two rival camps when the
communist world itself was divided that way.
The Soviets were also plagued by the difficulty of justifying their suppression of human rights
within the Eastern Bloc. Many communist parties in the West cut off relations with Moscow
following the invasion of Czechoslovakia in 1968. Fidel Castro began by condemning the
invasion, then changed his mind when the Soviets threatened to cut off economic aid.
The failure of Cold War policies to solve international disputes
Alongside the decline in political and economic influence of the Superpowers, there was a
change in their political and military thinking, following the Cuban Missile Crisis in 1962. During
that incident, the United States and the Soviet Union came alarmingly close to nuclear war –
partly because of Soviet interference in America’s sphere of influence, and partly because of a
lack of communication between the two nations. President Kennedy and Premier Khrushchev
concluded that the Cold War had become too dangerous to be allowed to continue in its present
form. In future, the rivalry between the Superpowers would have to be managed more carefully;
the two nations would need to reach agreement on matters of mutual concern (such as on
controlling the nuclear arms race). Unfortunately, the process was postponed for a decade as a
result of Kennedy’s death in 1963 and Khrushchev’s overthrow the following year.
The change of heart on nuclear matters was accompanied in the United States by a growing
disenchantment with militarism as a means of dealing with international crises. The involvement
in Vietnam was costing the US billions of dollars a year, with few positive results to show. The
war was also costing America dearly in the propaganda stakes. It did the nation’s reputation as a
champion of freedom enormous harm to be seen waging unconstrained warfare in the defence of a
corrupt dictatorship. An increasing number of businesspeople, politicians and ordinary citizens
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decided that it was best if America cut its losses and pulled out. At least that would smooth the
way for an improvement in relations with the USSR.
The rise of nationalism in the Third World
Finally, the East-West conflict was blurred by the growing demands of developing countries for
a new international economic order (NIEO). Those countries were tired of playing by the rules
America had established at the end of World War Two. To them, these rules existed to benefit the
wealthy nations only. Now, they wanted a new set of regulations – ones which would bias trade in
their own favour.
In America, this was interpreted by some as posing a far greater threat than the USSR. After all,
the United States hardly traded with the Soviet Union. On the other hand, the poorer nations were
the world’s principal sources of oil – a resource vital to the survival of the West. This fear reached
its height in 1973, following the 300 percent oil price increase imposed by the Organisation of
Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC).
In the USSR, the rise of Third World nationalism was initially regarded as beneficial, since it
was expected that these nations would regard the Soviet Union as an ally in the struggle against
“Western imperialism”. However, most of the developing nations viewed the Soviets as just
another imperialist influence, particularly since they traded under the same profit-maximising
conditions as the Western countries.
DETENTE (1970-79)
All in all then, the Cold War thawed in the mid 1960s and was replaced by the era known as
Detente (meaning ‘relaxation of tensions’). During this period, several important treaties were
signed between the United States and the Soviet Union to limit the nuclear arms race.
International agreements
The main concern of the Superpowers was the alarming growth in nuclear missiles, particularly
land-based ICBMs. The first Strategic Arms Limitation Treaty (SALT I), signed in 1972, limited
the number of missiles each side could deploy. To circumvent this limitation, both Superpowers
began equiping their missiles with multiple warheads, known as MIRVs (multiple independently
targetted reentry vehicles). Each missile could then hit between three and twelve targets
(depending on how many MIRVs it carried). This was very destabilising, since missiles were now
outnumbered by warheads. The problem was compounded by the improvement in missile
accuracy which occurred during the 1970s. Theoretically, the nation which attacked first could
destroy most of the enemy’s ICBM’s before they could be used. This Russians found this
particularly worrying, since the majority of their missiles were based on land. They danger was
that, during a crisis, the Soviet Union might be compelled to launch its missiles before they could
be destroyed, thereby precipitating a nuclear war. Salt II, signed in 1979, sought to address this
problem. This treaty limited the growth of nuclear warheads, particularly the ones deemed to be
the most accurate. Another military agreement signed at this time was the Threshold Test Ban
Treaty of 1974, which restricting nuclear tests to 150 kilotons.
In July 1975, 35 nations attended the Helsinki Conference on European Security, to sign a treaty
recognising the borders of Europe. Progress was also made on such issues as scientific and
cultural exchange, and Jewish emigration from the USSR.
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Domestic considerations
In the United States, Detente saw the advent to power of the Trilateral Commission – an
organisation representing the liberal wing of international business. Its American luminaries
included Henry Kissinger (National Security Adviser and Secretary of State, 1969-77), Jimmy
Carter (President, 1977-81), Cyrus Vance (Secretary of State, 1977-81), Zbigniew Brzezinski
(National Security Adviser, 1977-81) and Harold Brown (Defence Secretary, 1977-81). Their rise
represented the epitome of the Yalta view of the USSR These men hoped to deal with America’s
problems by returning to the policies of Franklin Roosevelt – buying Russia’s cooperation by
offering it a stake in the American world order. In this way, the US could get on with the job of
dealing with the real problems it faced – Third World nationalism, declining economic power visa-vis Japan and Western Europe, domestic stagflation, and so on.
In the Soviet Union, Detente saw the consolidation of power by the Brezhnev faction – men who
sought American recognition of Russia’s status as a Superpower. In their view, the route to such
recognition lay it the attainment of nuclear parity (equality).
It should be noted, however, that Detente did not mean a cessation of ideological competition
between the Superpowers. Both nations were still concerned to maintain control over their
respective blocs. To this end, the United States did not hesitate to overthrow the democratically
elected government in Chile when it threatened to nationalise American assets in 1973. Similarly,
the Soviet Union did not hesitate to invade Afghanistan when that nation’s communist
government was under threat from Islamic rebels in 1979.
What Detente did mean was a compartmentalisation of the rivalry between the Superpowers.
From 1970 to 1979, strategic nuclear issues were dealt with separately from all others, since both
nations had a common interest in avoiding war.
THE END OF DETENTE (1979-80)
Detente came to a rather ignominious end at the close of the 1970s. In some ways it was a victim
of its own contradictions; in other ways it was a victim of circumstances. Three factors were
paramount: differing interpretations of Detente; the return of America’s Cold War warriors; and
perceived military weakness on the part of the United States.
Differing interpretations of Detente
From the outset, the Superpowers had different conceptions of what Detente actually was.
For the USSR, Detente was a means of controlling Superpower rivalry, to ensure that it did not
erupt into nuclear war. The Soviets never demanded, nor expected, that the United States would
change its ideological stance. Hence, they continued to stir up revolution in various parts of the
world, and fully expected the US to counter these moves wherever possible. It never occurred to
them that many Americans would not share this interpretation of Detente.
By contrast, for those in the United States who still adhered to the Riga Axioms, Detente was
supposed to involve a cessation of revolutionary activity on the part of the USSR in exchange for
nuclear arms concessions on the part of the US. Hence, when the Soviet Union continued to
pursue its international political interests (expanding its influence in Asia, Africa and Latin
America), these people – who still dominated the State and Defence Departments, the Pentagon
and the CIA – protested that America had been deceived by the Soviet Union. Russian advances in
Angola, Mozambique, Ethiopia, South Yemen and Kampuchea were presented as tipping the
balance of global power in favour of USSR. Moreover, these ‘successes’ were contrasted with the
United States’ failures in Vietnam, Iran and Nicaragua. The final straw was the Soviet invasion of
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Afghanistan, which was alleged to be the first stage of a plan to conquer the Persian Gulf – the
source of much of the Western world’s oil.
Return of America’s Cold War warriors
The apparent advances made by the USSR in the international arena coincided with a growing
feeling within the United States that the Trilateralists’ approach to dealing with global crises was
inadequate. Proponents of the Riga Axioms suggested that the only language the Soviets
understood was force. America therefore had to make it clear that it would resist Soviet advances
with whatever force was necessary – even nuclear weapons. This, in their view, was the best way
to ensure that nuclear weapons would never be used.
The Cold War warriors also objected to America’s insistence on respecting human rights in
friendly Third World nations. By distancing itself from the Shah’s repressive government in Iran
and General Somoza’s brutal regime in Nicaragua, the United States had allowed revolutionary
groups to come to power in both countries. This was threatening America’s vital interests, since
Iran was a major source of America’s oil, while Nicaragua was becoming a source of inspiration
and weapons for leftists across Latin America. The Riga view suggested that a friendly dictator
was preferable to an unfriendly one (or even to an unfriendly democrat, for that matter).
By contrast, the Cold War warriors believed the Soviet Union should be forced to respect human
rights within its own sphere of influence. Only then should the United States agree to the
normalisation of relations between the two nations. This policy was known as “linkage”, since it
linked international cooperation with respect for human rights (although only in the Soviet Bloc).
Perceived military weakness on America’s part
The final factor bringing Detente to an end was a changing view in the United States about arms
control and the nuclear balance. As the 1970s progressed, an increasing number of people came to
believe that America had fallen behind in the nuclear arms race. This they blamed on President
Carter’s decision to limit the number of strategic nuclear warheads permitted by both
Superpowers. Advocates of the Riga Axioms argued that since the Russians could not be trusted
to abide by an arms control treaty, the US was walking into a trap by signing SALT II. As
Pentagon analyst Colin Gray put it, “nations don’t distrust each other because they are armed, they
are armed because they distrust each other.”
In the end, President Carter decided to abandon SALT II, despite having spent two years
negotiating it. He felt that there was no other way he could get re-elected, with public opinion
running so strongly against the treaty. Even so, Americans still rejected him in favour of Ronald
Reagan – the man who had tirelessly advocated the Riga view for almost forty years.
THE NEW COLD WAR (1980-87)
American foreign policy under Reagan
Ronald Reagan came to office with two complimentary aims: to restore America’s selfconfidence, and to restore its international prestige (tarnished by the ‘loss’ of Iran, and the
ignominy of the hostage crisis). In the area of foreign policy, the Reagan Administration attempted
to do this in four ways.
Firstly, it undertook a huge military build-up to reverse the alleged Soviet advantage in nuclear
and conventional weapons. This meant the shelving of arms control negotiations until America
was in a position of nuclear superiority (whatever that meant!). Only then did the Administration
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believe it could force the Soviets to accept a mutually beneficial arms control treaty. In the
meantime, arms control negotiations were regarded as useful only for propaganda purposes (to
demonstrate to the world that America was serious about disarmament, even when it wasn’t).
Secondly, American strategic nuclear doctrine was modified to enhance its deterrent capability.
During its first years in office, the Reagan Administration toyed with the idea that a nuclear war
could be won, but by the mid 1980s, it had settled on a modified version of war-fighting
deterrence (the policy which sought to deter an enemy attack by threatening to match that attack at
every different force level).
Thirdly, the Reagan Administration sought to aid non-socialist nations in the Third World
against “communist subversion”, irrespective of their human rights record. Hence, arms supplies
were resumed to El Salvador, Guatemala and other nations guilty of gross human rights violations.
Fourthly, the Administration decided to push back the Soviet sphere of influence by supplying
arms to anti-socialist insurgents in Asia, Africa and Latin America. Such groups included the
Mujahaddin in Afghanistan, the Contras in Nicaragua and UNITA in Angola. Reagan also ended
America’s self-imposed ban on the use of US forces in Third World hot spots. For example, he
sent the marines to Lebanon in 1983 to defend the Christian government against its Muslim
opponents; that same year he also used the marines to overthrow the socialist government of
Grenada.
Soviet reactions
The Soviet Union initially reacted to Reagan’s tough rhetoric by refusing to believe he really
meant it. However, by mid 1981, the Russians realised that Ronald Reagan was no Richard Nixon.
(President Nixon had espoused the Riga Axioms in his speeches, but implemented the Yalta
Axioms in his policies.) They therefore concluded that it would be impossible to do business with
the United States as long as Reagan was in office. Hence, they decided to stop negotiating and
wait for his political demise. Of course, Reagan won the 1984 election, which meant that the
Soviet strategy was a failure.
THE END OF THE COLD WAR (1987-1991)
It seemed to most observers in the mid 1980s that the world was returning to the political
climate of the 1950s. Yet within four years the Cold War was over, and with it the ideological
rivalry and mutual suspicion that had been the glue of international relations for four decades. Five
factors explain this radical transformation: economic collapse in the Soviet Union; changing
domestic and foreign policy within the USSR; failure of the Reagan Doctrine in the United States;
the rise of the peace movement in Europe; and growing rivalry within the Western alliance.
Economic collapse in the Soviet Union
The USSR suffered a severe economic crisis in the 1980s, brought on by two decades of bad
economic management under Leonid Brezhnev. This crisis made it difficult for the nation to
maintain its level of military spending (estimated to be as high as 12 percent of GDP – almost
double that of the United States). The problem was exacerbated by the threat of a new arms race in
space, using sophisticated technologies which were still on the drawing board. Soviet scientists
estimated that it would cost hundreds of billions of dollars to match President Reagan’s Strategic
Defence Initiative of March 1983 – money the Soviet government could only obtain by reducing
the living standards of its citizens. This would almost certainly lead to unrest and demands for
political change.
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Under Brezhnev, the problem of popular dissent was dealt with by greater repression. However,
an increasing number of government officials recognised this policy as a prescription for longterm disaster. If living standards fell, the USSR would become ripe for revolution (as happened in
Romania); and if the economy were not reformed, Russia would lose its status as a Superpower.
Something drastic had to be done. The new leader, Mikhail Gorbachev (who came to power in
March 1985), decided that the answer was to reduce Russia’s military spending. Hence, he
immediately moved to accept President Reagan’s offers of nuclear disarmament, even on terms
more beneficial to the United States than to the Soviet Union. In 1987, the Intermediate Nuclear
Forces (INF) agreement was signed, allowing the Superpowers to dismantle 2000 nuclear
warheads in Europe (572 American, the rest Russian). With the Soviet ‘threat’ apparently
diminished, the Reagan Administration found itself returning to the Yalta view of the USSR.
Changing domestic and foreign policy in the USSR
The second factor influencing the transformation in Superpower relations was the change in
Soviet domestic and foreign policy.
Domestically, Gorbachev decided to solve the nation’s problems by introducing a series of
radical reforms. On the economic front, he introduced the policy of perestroika (restructuring) to
raise the efficiency of Soviet enterprises. To ensure the free flow of ideas, he also introduced
political reforms, the first of which was glasnost (openness). Under this policy, Soviet citizens
were given access to accurate information about events in their country. This had the effect of
reducing American suspicion of Soviet motivations. All of a sudden it became much easier for the
United States to monitor Soviet compliance of arms control treaties. The second political reform
was demokratizatsiya (democratisation), which had the effect of rendering the Soviet government
more responsible to its own population. Since it is much harder to distrust a democracy than a
dictatorship, American suspicions were further allayed.
Internationally, the USSR moved firmly back to the Yalta Axioms, undertaking a series of
initiatives to demonstrate its new approach to foreign relations. Firstly, it abandoned the Brezhnev
Doctrine (which stated that socialist advances were irreversible), withdrawing its troops from
Afghanistan and reducing aid to its allies in the Third World. This was a logical development,
given the fact that the USSR had abandoned its own belief in command socialism. It also began
withdrawing its troops from Eastern Europe, as a demonstration of its unwillingness to defend the
communist regimes in those nations. This policy became known as the “Sinatra Doctrine”, since
each nation was now free to find its own way.
With the threat of Soviet intervention gone, it now became possible for the people of Eastern
Europe to remove the Communist governments which had been imposed on them by Stalin in the
1940s. During 1989, there were dramatic political changes in Poland, Hungary, East Germany,
Czechoslovakia, Bulgaria and Romania. Then, in 1991, Communism collapsed in the Soviet
Union itself.
Failure of the Reagan Doctrine
The third factor causing the change in Superpower relations was the failure of President
Reagan’s domestic and foreign policies to deal with the nation’s problems.
Domestically, the United States found itself facing serious financial difficulties at the end of the
1980s. Having wasted its resources on military research and development, it discovered that many
of its firms could not compete with their Japanese and European counterparts, particularly in hightech industries. Japan and the European nations had never accepted the Riga view of Soviet
intentions, and had therefore never devoted much money to military expenditure. To make matters
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worse, President Reagan had been reluctant to raise taxes within the United States, and had
therefore been obliged to finance his military build-up by borrowing from abroad. This meant that
over an eight year period, America went from being the world’s largest creditor nation (in 1981) to
the world’s largest debtor (in 1989), owing as much as all the Third World countries combined.
Internationally, the Reagan Doctrine failed to resolve crises in the Third World. It became
increasingly obvious to Americans that their main Third World enemies (Iran, Libya, Syria and
Nicaragua) were not under Soviet control, and that threatening the USSR was not having an effect
on them. It also became clear that military methods were not effective in dealing with problems in
the Middle East and Central America (with the Gulf War of 1991 as a notable exception). Finally,
Americans realised that the Reagan Administration was subverting the democratic process in its
quest to overthrow certain Third World governments. This was starkly illustrated by the IranContra scandal.
The rise of the peace movement in Europe
A fourth factor contributing to the end of the Cold War was the rise of the peace movement in
the 1980s, particularly in Europe.
The European Nuclear Disarmament movement (END) was formed in 1979, following the
NATO decision to deploy cruise and Pershing missiles in Western Europe. END argued that the
Cold War had lost its purpose, and now existed primarily to justify the dominance of the two
Superpowers. END called for a nuclear free Europe, “from Poland to Portugal”, and an end to the
division of the continent. During 1981-83, peace groups organised demonstrations in every major
city of Europe, and almost succeeded in stopping the new missile deployments. The demand for
nuclear disarmament created political havoc in Germany, Holland, Belgium and Spain – all key
allies of the United States – and forced their governments to demand that the United States resume
negotiating with the Soviet Union.
Growing rivalry within the Western alliance
Finally, the 1980s saw the emergence of Japan and the European Union (EU) as economic rivals
of the United States and Russia. In Japan’s case, it overtook the United States as the centre of
international finance, and overtook Russia as the world’s second largest economy. In the EU’s
case, its decision to remove all trade barriers in 1992 effectively made it the world’s largest
economic power.
Since Japan and the nations of Western Europe (Britain excepted) had always accepted the Yalta
view of the USSR, it was not surprising that this view should return to favour as these nation’s
usurped an increasing proportion of the United States’ economic and political world role.
The Conference on Security and Cooperation (1990)
The Cold War officially ended on November 19, 1990, with the signing of the Charter of Paris
for a New Europe at the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe. The European
continent was declared to be reunited, and the opposing blocs dismantled.
When the Soviet Union collapsed the following year, the United States found itself without an
enemy. The new Russian Federation was in such economic difficulty that it was unable to
maintain its military commitments. The nation’s navy became port-bound and its nuclear arsenal
fell into disrepair. Under the second Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START II), signed in 1993,
each Superpower was to be permitted 3,500 strategic nuclear warheads by 2003 (down from more
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than 10,000 in the mid 1980s). However, the Russians planned to deploy only 2,500. Some
analysts believed the number could be closer to 1,500.
The Cold War was finally over.
1
Daniel Yergin, Shattered Peace (London, 1977).
John Lewis Gaddis, The Cold War: A New History (New York, 2005), pp. 11-12.
3
Yergin, p. 118.
4
Yergin, p. 48.
5
Yergin, p. 72.
6
Yergin, p. 240.
2
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